A top airpower analyst looks back at the greatest air war that never was. How the West Would Have Won By Christopher J. Bowie riving through Germany scattered across Europe. What was their Exactly what would cause the So- these days, one frequently purpose? The answer is that, in the viet Union to attack Western Europe encounters abandoned run- 1980s, those massive shelters housed was never clear. What was only too Dways surrounded by huge, and protected thousands of sleek fight- clear, however, was that the Soviet-led camouflaged, and “hardened” aircraft ers that lay at the core of United States Warsaw Pact had deployed powerful shelters. Their concrete walls and heavy Air Force strategy in Europe. offensive forces along the inner Ger- sliding doors typically are painted a Nuclear forces formed the backbone man border, held a huge numerical dark green, matching the colors of the of US deterrent power, but the tensest advantage, and kept improving its surrounding countryside. Cold War flashpoint was Europe—in capabilities. Future generations may well wonder particular the Central European re- The airpower community spent a lot how and why these relics came to be gion. of time in the 1980s planning for a war 60 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2007 June 1, 1982: Inside a hardened the thrust close to the border (a German forces to conduct ground attack op- shelter in Europe, airmen prepare an priority) while keeping the conflict at erations aimed at blunting the Soviet F-15 fighter for an exercise. a conventional level. NATO reserved armored spearheads and reducing the the option to “go nuclear” to further flow of enemy forces to the front. In complicate Warsaw Pact decision-mak- addition, some elements of the airpower DOD photo ing and bolster deterrence. fleet could be held in reserve to execute The greatest concern was the inner nuclear strikes should NATO choose German border. to escalate. Defending the border region was a In contrast, the Soviet and Warsaw daunting prospect. Land forces usually Pact air armies’ primary objective was to prefer to fall back and trade territory deny NATO control of the air by striking for time, but West Germany could not airfields, radar sites, and missile sites accept any strategy that accepted a while also shooting down air defense Soviet thrust—however brief—into its fighters and AWACS aircraft. national territory. By denying NATO control of the Many of the contemporary computer air, Warsaw Pact ground forces could combat simulations were based on a utilize their larger mass of armor to metric that used as its primary objec- smash through the outnumbered NATO tive the amount of friendly area lost or ground forces and drive to the English friendly area regained. Strategists rated Channel. positively those strategies and forces Allied air forces in the Central Re- that minimized the area lost. gion fielded a force of approximately 115 fighter squadrons, for a total of Vulnerable to Sheer Mass about 2,000 operational aircraft in the NATO forces arrayed along the border 1980s. USAF added approximately possessed very little operational depth, 20 squadrons, comprising 700 combat particularly after France withdrew from aircraft. Most were based in the Central the Allied military command in 1966. Region and Britain. In comparison, US The distance from the inner German Air Forces in Europe today maintains border to Belgium, Holland, and the a fleet with fewer than 200 fighter and English Channel was, at its shortest attack aircraft. points, only about 350 miles. The Central Region air forces were NATO ground forces, though they divided into two Allied Tactical Air were rated as superior to pact units in Forces or ATAFs, established in 1952: quality and capability, nonetheless were 2 ATAF in the northern half of West vulnerable to the sheer mass of the land Germany and 4 ATAF in the southern armies the East could generate. Soviet half. doctrine held that, in a conflict, waves The RAF dominated 2 ATAF, which of armored echelons would advance was always commanded by a British air across Eastern Europe, enter the main marshal. It featured the Royal Nether- battle area, and exploit weak spots to lands Air Force, the Belgian Air Force, break through and shatter the NATO elements of the German Air Force, and defenses. those USAF aircraft based in the 2 ATAF To help redress this imbalance of area. Meanwhile, 4 ATAF featured land forces, the United States pre- USAF, Canadian, and German forces How the West positioned huge masses of equipment and was commanded by an American and war materiel on the continent. and, later, a German general. Commercial airlifters would fly in The division of the airspace into troops to link up with this equipment. two zones might have made sense for Commanders planned to bolster the slow-moving ground operations, but By Christopher J. Bowie forward forces with three divisions in for air operations, it was a serious Would Have Won the first week, followed by a division weakness. A seam ran down the middle a week after that. between the two ATAFs, which one in Central Europe, because airpower Air forces, the most strategically senior commander characterized as would play the key role in the outcome agile forces, were to form the primary “a brick wall.” of an East-West conflict. In 1988-89, I tool for providing additional firepower Many commanders expressed the fear produced a classified study for RAND during these first critical weeks as the that the Warsaw Pact air armies would Corp. titled, “Basing Uncertainties in ground forces built up strength. The penetrate along this seam to sow confu- the NATO Theater.” It was recently first goal of the allied air forces was sion. Planners also believed the 2 ATAF declassified, and some of the material to gain control of the air, which would region would suffer the most violent presented here comes from it. enable military and civil airliners to thrusts by Warsaw Pact forces because NATO sought to deter an attack by bring reinforcements to the theater. of the nature of its terrain—flat plains maintaining powerful military forces Control of the air would also enable ideally suited for armor operations. that could, if deterrence failed, blunt airmen to re-role their flexible fighter But trying to vector 4 ATAF assets into AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2007 61 defense. Passive defense comprised measures to reduce airbase vulner- ability. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when the Israeli Air Force caught the Arab air forces on the ground in a well-coordinated attack, NATO air forces made the decision to “harden” their airfields. Concrete was deemed much cheaper than aircraft. The pace of this effort always lagged behind objectives, but, over time, NATO air forces devised a vast array of aircraft shelters at dozens of airfields across Europe. The Alliance added additional taxiways and runways, “toned down” buildings with camouflage paint, in- stalled air and ground crew shelters, and purchased rapid runway repair equipment. Planners feared Soviet use of tactical ballistic missiles to pin down air defense aircraft, followed by a wave of attack Soviet armor crews on parade in 1985 show off the 41-ton T-72 main battle tank, aircraft to wreak further havoc on the huge numbers of which faced NATO forces. airfields. Additional threats included chemical attacks and Soviet Special Forces. NATO believed the latter would the 2 ATAF region was rendered more The Air Force accordingly embraced be inserted before the Warsaw Pact difficult by the invisible line separating operations with integrated defense offensive to sow confusion and attack the two commands. suppression, and so 4 ATAF placed a key facilities on airfields. There were force imbalances as well. greater emphasis on centralization and Loss of Allied airpower was viewed USAF F-15s scheduled to reinforce coordination. as a recipe for disaster, and so, to reduce central Europe were dedicated to 2 The search for the right approach— the risk, NATO attempted to increase the ATAF, and, within 2 ATAF, they were low level, or medium altitude with number of sites that could be turned into concentrated in the Netherlands. defense suppression—sparked endless airfields in an emergency. Each nation The better solution would have been debates among Allied airmen around provided spaces for deploying USAF a single ATAF with a single area under the theater. aircraft at what were called co-located a single commander, but this ran afoul operating bases, or COBs. Over time, of interservice and Alliance politics. Passive and Active shelters and other passive defenses were American concern over the divided To stymie Warsaw Pact efforts to added to some of these fields. command of airpower led to creation cripple Allied airpower, NATO em- Every year, USAF conducted so- of a coordinating body, but the real braced a two-pronged strategy—use called “Rapid Reactor” exercises to power remained with the ATAFs. As a of passive defense and use of active familiarize US-based squadrons with result, the dangerous seam endured and would no doubt have been exploited by the adversary. Doctrinal differences were also pres- ent on both sides of the “brick wall.” DOD photos British airmen believed communica- tions channels would be disrupted very quickly in the opening phase of the war, and the individual air bases would have to operate independently. Aircraft would have to rely on low-level flying to evade defenses and reduce losses. As a result, 2 ATAF believed in a more decentralized approach and an operational style that required minimal coordination. The assumptions in 4 ATAF differed due to USAF experience in Vietnam. Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns had taken a terrible toll on fighters operating at low level, which led to an emphasis on medium-level penetration and unpleasant An F-15C (foreground) and F-15D prepare to take off in 1987 from Bitburg Air Base, encounters with surface-to-air missiles.