ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: REJUVENATING THE
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ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: REJUVENATING THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN TAIWAN: THE IMPACTS OF THE EIA AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (2006-2011) Ying-Feng Chen, Doctor of Philosophy, 2011 Dissertation Directed by: Professor Scott Kastner Department of Government and Politics Asian Tigers were sometimes referred to “developmental states” for they were capable of designing successful development agendas and implementing these plans with the compliance of private capital instead of simply regulating the market. However, with the fast democratic transition during the 1990s, the developmental state encountered serious challenges from business sectors, opposition parties and civil groups. Some literature suggested that this infiltration of private sector jeopardized the state’s autonomy in formulating long-term plans. The chaotic policy process at the early stage of democratic transition revealed Taiwan state’s capability in controlling developmental agendas has been weakened. If the developmental state of Taiwan ceased to function, in what way did it evolve? This dissertation aimed to answer this question by examining the role of the Taiwan state in promoting three major investments, the Formosa Steel-making Plant, the Central Taiwan Science Park in Holi-Chixing and Erlin, and the Eighth Petrochemical Plant, from 2006 to 2010. While developmental states were often argued incompatible with democratic regimes, this dissertation demonstrated that the status of Taiwan’s developmental state remained firm after democratic transition given that the state was still autonomous in terms of defining and preserving national interests. Furthermore, it WAS the public participation and environmental institutional monitoring brought by democratic transition that reinforced the developmental state in Taiwan by correcting the state’s errors in promoting those inefficient projects. Through the interdependent governance in the review mechanisms, these industrial programs based on outdated development agendas were smoothly postponed. Some programs were even called off by the corporations themselves. The democratic transition did not lessen politicians’ pursuit of constant national economic development; moreover, it brought in correcting mechanisms and thus further reinforced the capacity of the developmental state in choosing developmental agendas. REJUVENATING THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN TAIWAN: THE IMPACTS OF THE EIA AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (2006-2011) by Ying-Feng Chen Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2011 Advisory Committee: Dr. Scott Kastner , Chair Dr. Miranda Schreurs Dr. Ken Conca Dr. Margaret Pearson Dr. James Gao @Copyright by Ying-Feng Chen 2011 Dedication The author would like to dedicate his dissertation to Chy-yun Liu, the lovely and supportive wife of the author at all times, to thank her for her whole-hearted company with the author. The author would also like to thank his parents ( Dong-chiang Chen, Tsai-ling Yang, Sheng-li Liu, and Huan-chu Wu) for their devotions, for the family has been the greatest motivation to push this dissertation forward. At last, as a father of two, the author would like to dedicate his heart to Megan and Marcus, for they completed this dissertation in a way that they had never imagined. ii Table of Contents List of Tables……………………………………………………..……..…...…..…...vi List of Abbreviations………………………………….………………..……..…….viii Chapter I Survival of the Developmental States …………….…………….…1 An Overview…………………………………………………………………1 Developmental State Theory and Taiwan’s Experience……………………..4 Developmental State in Taiwan: Authoritarian Past………………………....9 The Challenge: Democratic Transition and Environmental Activism……...12 The Developmental State on the Line: Dismantled by the Democratization.18 Weak Administrations or a Weak State?.......................................................23 The Puzzle: The Rejuvenation of the Developmental State?.........................27 Chapter II Literature Review on the Developmental State, Its Democratic Implications, Parameters, and Methods ..................................................................33 Developmental State and Democracy: Compatibility……………..………..33 Taiwan’s Implication: Democratic Contention as an Adjustment of the Developmental State……….……...…………………………………..……37 New Development, New Developmental State…………………….………40 From the Developmental State to Interdependent Governance?...................44 Developmental States in Democratic Regimes: Deliberation and Accountability……………………………………………………..………..49 The Model………………………………………………………..……..…..53 Methods and Case Selection……………………………………..…………59 Research Methods………………………………………………..…………64 Chapter III Formosa Steel-making Plant ………..……………………...…..68 Introduction………………………………………………………..………..68 State Autonomy in the FSP Decision-making Process………………..……70 The Land Struggles between the Formosa and the GP………………71 The Tight Politician-Corporation Relation in the FSP Case……..…..78 Losing Autonomy?...............................................................................83 State’s Penetrative Power……………………………………..……………86 Weak Penetration into the Yunlin County………………..………….87 State Left Aside?..................................................................................91 State’s Strike Back against Local Resistances…………..…….……..96 iii Economic Rationality……………………………………….…...……..…..98 The Necessity of the FSP Project in Steel Industry………...….……99 Limited Domestic Demands on Steel Products…………...……….102 Inefficiency from the Perspective of Total Utility………...….…….105 Inefficacy of the Private Capital……………….………...…………108 Deliberation………………..…………………………………..………….113 Public Checks on the Formosa Group Took Off…………..……….113 State’s Accountability and Transparency……………....…………………118 State’s Political Intervention into the EIA……..……….…………..118 Manipulation of the EIA Process…………..…….…………………122 Transparency: A Black Box………………..……………………….126 Conclusion………………………………………..…….……................…………..129 Chapter IV Central Taiwan Science Park: the Holi and the Erlin Plans.. 133 Introduction………………………………………………………..………133 The Nurturing Period: The AUO and the Holi-Chixing plan……………..136 Limiting the Capital Outflow: the Erlin plan………………..……….……141 State’s Autonomy……………………………………………..….………..145 State’s Penetrative Power……………………………...………....……….153 Weak Penetration to Local Politics and the Myth of Science Parks…………..………………………………………..…………...153 Land Speculation by the Investing Plans…...…………..………..…156 Myth beyond Local Factions and Elections………...…..…………..158 Economic Rationality……………..……..……………………..……….…161 A Key Sector to Taiwan? Some Risks……………………………...162 Fill Gap between Supply and Demand?.............................................165 Structural Adjustment and Strategy Selection instead of Expansion………..………………………………………..………...168 Political Concerns: Controlling Capital…………………..……..….170 Deliberation………………………………………………..………..……..172 CTSP’s Expansion: A Regional Plan or Expediency?.......................173 Arbitrary Site Selection…………………………..………..………..181 Degrading Deliberation: Reducing Public Participation……..……..185 Accountability and Transparency………………………...………....…….188 Politicians’ Intervention in the EIA Procedures………………....…188 Emerging Monitoring from the Judicial System and State’s Counter Back……………………………………………………...…..….….197 iv Increasing Regulative Capacity of EPA’s on Free Information…....202 Experts Meetings: Two-Faced Sword…………..……..……………207 Conclusion……………………………….…………………..……………211 Chapter V the Eighth Naphtha-Cracking Plant (ENP) …………………..214 Introduction……………………………………………………..…………214 Politics of the ENP Plan………………….………………………..………218 The 13+1 ASEAN System and the Threat of Capital Outflow in the Petrochemical Industry…………………….……………………..……… 220 Could the ECFA help? Maybe Not!.............................................................222 State’s Autonomy…………………...………………………………..……226 The Ban on the Petrochemical Industry’s Migration to China….….226 Penetrative Power……………...…………………..……………..……….230 Ineffective Penetration to the Investor…………,,,,,,,,………..…….230 State’s Weak Penetration to Local Politics…………………………235 Economic Rationality……….………………………………………..……240 The Balance of Power within the Petrochemical Business……....…241 The ECFA and the Competition with China……………….……….250 Economical or Political?....................................................................263 Deliberation…………………..………………………………………..…..264 Inconsistent Deliberation on Energy Efficiency and Emission….... 265 Lack of Equity and Deliberation on Water Supply………..………..270 First Time Administrative Hearing in the MOEA System….....…...273 Accountability and Transparency…………………….…………..……….276 State’s Attempts in Manipulating the Administrative Procedures.....277 More Transparency Created by the EIA……...………..…..……….284 Resisting Politicians’ Intervention in EIA Committee…..…...….…285 Adjust and Learn: Better Accountability and Autonomy of the Checking Mechanisms in the ENP Case…………..………………..289 Conclusion………………...……………..………………………………..294 Chapter VI Conclusion ……………………………………….……………..296 Developmental States and the Impacts of Democratic Transition…..….…296 Taiwan’s State Capacity: the Comparison on Three Cases………..….…..300 Rebuilding the Developmental States: Civil Involvement and National Planning………………………………………………………..………….306 Future Focus on Taiwan’s EIA System………………………….....……..310 v List of Tables