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CTC Sentinel 6 FEBRUARY 2013 . VOL 6 . ISSUE 2 Contents Islamist Militant Groups in FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Islamist Militant Groups in Post-Qadhafi Libya Post-Qadhafi Libya By Alison Pargeter By Alison Pargeter REPORTS 5 Yemen’s Use of Militias to Maintain Stability in Abyan Province By Casey L. Coombs 7 Deciphering the Jihadist Presence in Syria: An Analysis of Martyrdom Notices By Aaron Y. Zelin 11 British Fighters Joining the War in Syria By Raffaello Pantucci 15 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s New Cease-Fire Offer By Imtiaz Ali 18 The Significance of Maulvi Nazir’s Death in Pakistan By Zia Ur Rehman 20 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Libyans celebrate the second anniversary of the Libyan uprising at Martyrs Square on February 17, 2013, in Tripoli. - AFP/Getty Images n july 2012, Libya held its first and currents have emerged in the post- national elections since the fall of Qadhafi era, including those at the Mu`ammar Qadhafi. The Libyan extreme end of the spectrum that have people, however, appeared to taken advantage of central authority Ibuck the trend of the Arab Spring by weakness by asserting power in their not electing an Islamist1 parliament. own local areas. This is particularly the Although Islamists are present in case in the east of the country, which the newly-elected General National has traditionally been associated with About the CTC Sentinel Congress, they are just one force among Islamist activism. The Combating Terrorism Center is an many competing in the political arena.2 independent educational and research While Islamists have not succeeded in Given the murky and chaotic nature of institution based in the Department of Social dominating Libya’s nascent political Libya’s transition, which has prompted Sciences at the United States Military Academy, scene, they have come to represent an the mushrooming of local power West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses ever growing and influential force on brokers, it is difficult to distinguish the Center’s global network of scholars and the ground. A number of Islamist groups between many of the Islamist militant practitioners to understand and confront groups and brigades. While some contemporary threats posed by terrorism and groups, such as the Rafallah al-Sahati other forms of political violence. 1 The term “Islamist” refers to those who engage in politi- Brigade or the February 17 Brigade, are cal activism articulated through an Islamic discourse. This operating, nominally at least, within does not necessarily mean those who espouse violence. the official structures of the state, The views expressed in this report are those of 2 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction 3 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, others, such as Ansar al-Shari`a, are Party, for example, secured a significant presence in the the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. congress and is now part of the recently appointed gov- ernment. 3 Ansar al-Shari`a (Partisans of Shari`a) has emerged as 1 FEBRUARY 2013 . VOL 6. ISSUE 2 functioning independently. Despite the time of the revolution.5 This There is a strong feeling in the east that the fact that the state attempted to includes figures such as the former the central authorities, as well as the dissolve these independent militant director of Benghazi security, Colonel Islamist-dominated local authorities, brigades following the public protests Faraj Mohammed al-Drissi, who was are engaged in a cover-up and are that erupted in response to the attack killed on November 21, 2012.6 Given pandering to militant elements.12 Such on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi the nature of the targets, it is widely suggestions may be exaggerated. The in September 2012, these groups assumed that the attacks are the work of central authorities remain weak and continue to operate and impose their Islamist militant forces seeking revenge unable to properly project authority. authority in their communities. This for the suppression they experienced at Despite the repeated efforts to bolster poses particular challenges for Libya the hands of the former regime. as it moves through the transition “Given the power vacuum process. Despite the ongoing violence, the official bodies of the state have been slow to react that accompanied the fall This article examines the nature of or to bring the guilty parties to justice. of the former regime, the some of the Islamist militant groups They did, however, arrest Majdi Zwai active in the east of Libya, including (also known as Majdi Dhub), a member central authorities have Ansar al-Shari`a, as well as their of the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, on had little choice but to relationship with the state. It argues charges of having assassinated al- that while these militant groups are Drissi.7 In December 2012, the Shabab rely on Islamist brigades largely working within the confines of Libya channel reported that Zwai had and units to help keep the the state, this cooperation could quickly confessed not only to al-Drissi’s killing, turn to confrontation if the formation of but to the killings of other officials.8 He peace in certain regions, the constitution does not develop the also reportedly implicated a number particularly in the east way that they expect. of key Islamist militants operating in the region in the assassinations.9 On where the national army “By Night We Are Benghazistan” December 16, 2012, however, a group of has a limited presence.” The growing influence of Islamist armed gunmen, believed to be from the militant elements has prompted Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade, attacked the particular concern among local police station that held Majdi Zwai.10 residents in the east. On December Zwai was freed after a three hour gun the national army, the government and 28, 2012, Benghazi residents staged battle that left four policemen dead.11 the General National Congress remain another demonstration calling for the largely at the mercy of the militias. dissolution of the Islamist militias in This fact was highlighted following the the city, holding banners that declared, attack on the Ain Amenas gas plant in “By day we are Benghazi, by night we 5 In the week of January 10-17, 2013, for example, two Algeria in January 2013, when in its are Benghazistan.”4 policemen were killed in two separate bomb attacks in rush to secure its borders and energy Benghazi and there was also an attempted assassination facilities, the government had to enlist Authorities suspect that Islamist against the Italian consul-general in the city, Guido de the help of the secular-oriented Zintan militant groups are behind the Sanctis. See “Curfew Mulled for Benghazi,” Libya Herald, militia in the west of the country.13 deadly string of night attacks and January 17, 2013. assassinations that have rocked the 6 Kareem Fahim, “Security Chief in Benghazi Assassi- Yet although the ruling authorities may east in recent months. The near weekly nated, Libyan Says,” New York Times, November 21, 2012. be unable to stem the violence in the east, bombings and assassinations have been 7 The Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade is one of the largest there is also a reticence on their part aimed almost exclusively at members Islamist brigades in the east and is believed to number to challenge Islamist elements in any of the security forces, many of whom around 1,000 members. It is named after a young engi- substantive or sustained way. Unlike in defected from Qadhafi’s regime at neer, Rafallah al-Sahati, who was killed by the regime neighboring countries, such as Tunisia on March 19, 2011, during what is known as the battle of and Egypt, where the Arab Spring Quwarsha in the west of Benghazi. The brigade is based revolutions were largely peaceful, a significant force in eastern Libya since the toppling of in the Hawari neighborhood of Benghazi and is led by Islamist militant elements in Libya have the former regime. It is more of a group or current than a prominent Islamist Ismail al-Salabi. The brigade comes a legitimacy born out of the position that specific militia or brigade, and it has “branches” in both under the authority of the Libyan Defense Ministry. Its they played in the struggle. Islamist Benghazi and Derna. Like its counterparts in Tunisia headquarters was stormed by protestors after the attack militants comprising former members and Yemen, its adherents follow an extremist ideology. on the U.S. Consulate in September 2012. See Ibrahim of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Although the Libyan group insists it is not linked to al- Majbari and Dominique Soguel, “Islamists Flee as Angry (LIFG) and other radical movements, Qa`ida, its leader in Benghazi, Mohammed Ali al-Za- Libyans Storm Benghazi Compound,” Agence France- as well as jihadists who spent time in hawi, has expressed his approval of al-Qa`ida’s strategy Presse, September 22, 2012; “Rafallah Sahati, the Martyr Iraq and Afghanistan, played key roles as well as statements issued by Ayman al-Zawahiri. See Swore that Qadhafi’s Army Would Never Enter Beng- “Meeting Mohammad Ali al-Zahawi of Libyan Ansar al- hazi,” New Quryna, March 19, 2012. Sharia,” BBC, September 18, 2012. 8 “An Armed Attack on a Police Station to Free ‘Al- 12 On December 28, 2012, for example, protesters ac- 4 Libya Focus, January 2013. This demonstration was a Dhub,’” Libya al-Jadidah, December 17, 2012. cused the authorities and the local council of being en- follow-up to the “Save Benghazi Friday” protests held 9 Ibid. gaged in a cover-up. See Libya Focus, January 2013.
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