Proxy War: a Critical Examination of Superpower Indirect Conflict in Africa by Gregory D. Stone a Thesis Submitted to the Facult
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Proxy War: A Critical Examination of Superpower Indirect Conflict in Africa By Gregory D. Stone A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Studies, Faculty of Arts University of Manitoba Copyright © 2010 by Gregory D. 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Table of Contents Introduction 1 Chapter One: Wars by Proxy 6 Limited War and Proxy War 11 Proxy War 18 Conclusion 25 Chapter Two: Proxy Wars During the Cold War 29 The United Nations Operation in the Congo (Leopoldville) 31 The Angolan Civil War 46 Chapter Three: The Importance of Africa to the United States and China 59 The United States and Africa 61 China and Africa 72 China’s Competitive Advantage 83 Chapter Four : The Future Conflict in Africa 98 The Future Structure of the International System 99 Proxy Logic in a Great Power Rivalry 110 The African Dimension 114 Conclusion 122 Bibliography 126 List of Figures Figure 3.1: Africa’s Merchandise Exports to China 2004 59 Figure 3.2: Africa’s Merchandise Exports to the United States 2009 60 Figure 3.3: United States Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products from the Persian Gulf vs. Gulf of Guinea, Algeria, and Angola 67 Figure 3.4: Total US Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products 2009 69 Figure 3.5: World Proved Reserves of Oil 2007 69 Figure 3.6: China’s Oil Production and Consumption 79 Figure 3.7: Total Oil Consumption 2007 80 Figure 3.8: Total Oil Imports 2007 80 Figure 3.9: China’s Crude Oil Imports 2009 82 Figure 4.1: Measurement of State Power as a Percentage of Global Power 100 Figure 4.2: GDP per Country per Decade 100 Figure 4.3: Military Expenditure of China 105 Figure 4.4: China’s GDP per Decade 105 Introduction During the Cold War, war by proxy was a key strategy of indirect conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The purpose of these proxy wars was to either maintain or change the balance of power between the superpowers/great powers1 in conflict areas outside the central front in Europe. Within the condition of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to avoid direct confrontation between their conventional military forces in regional conflicts out of a fear that it would escalate to an all out nuclear war. The Cold War occurred with the structural conditions of bipolarity based upon strategic and ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. This condition, and the competition it entailed, largely determined the strategies of the United States and Soviet Union. In this condition, both powers engaged minor powers rather than each other directly. This entailed limited, indirect wars via proxy forces to minimize the threat of direct confrontation between the superpowers for fear of escalation. Close to two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall there has been very little discussion about proxy wars between major international powers that possess nuclear capabilities. The Soviet Union no longer exists and Russia is not the existential threat to the United States that the Soviet Union once was. Moreover, the United States currently stands unchallenged as the lone superpower. The international focus has shifted towards Western state intervention in small local conflicts and away from Cold War strategies under the umbrella concept of Peace Support Operations. 1 The term superpower was a label given to the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War. For the purposes of this paper a superpower and a great power are synonymous. 1 During the Cold War the United States concentrated on the containment of the Soviet Union, a United States grand strategy that began in the late 1940s and ended with the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a strategy to combat Soviet communist expansion in order to prevent Soviet influence penetrating countries that had traditionally been considered under the influence of Western interests. The Soviet Union and the United States effectively accepted the division of Europe. It was the Third World that was to mark the dynamics of the Cold War and become the focus of superpower competition and conflict. The nature of the Cold War saw the two superpowers pitted against one another in regional conflicts in Third World countries in an effort to diminish the others control and influence in order to promote their own national interests. Since the end of World War II, interstate war between major international powers has become highly unlikely as a tool of foreign policy. Instead, as experienced during the Cold War, major powers will come into conflict indirectly through third parties in what are local internal conflicts in order to accomplish their national interests. The United States and the Soviet Union used foreign governments and international organizations as proxies, such as during the United Nations operation in the Congo in 1960 and the Angolan Civil war in 1975, to influence and alter the outcome of a local conflict to suit its national interests and alter the regional balance of power. Today, there is a new potential great power on the horizon in China and there are strong indications, based on patterns of China’s growing economy and military capabilities and China’s regional and global strategic intentions that American and Chinese interests may clash in the future outside of Asia generating conditions for the return of the strategy of war by proxy. Moreover, there are strong indications that Africa 2 will become a main venue for United States – China strategic competition, as it was to some degree during the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. The debate on whether the future relationship between the United States and China will be one of competition or cooperation is at the forefront among academics and government officials in the West.2 Regardless of this debate, China has significantly altered the strategic context in Africa and Beijing’s motives have become more transparent. China’s growing industries and middle class demand new energy and raw material suppliers and Africa has become central to meeting these demands. Since China is becoming ever more intertwined in the global economy, China is acquiring vital interests in more and more regions around the globe.3 As vital interests increase China will attempt to shape the international order in ways favourable to its political interests even if they are counter to United States vital interests.4 For the first time in United States history the words national strategic interest and Africa have recently appeared together in government documents and statements. In 2 For further analysis on this debate see Peter Brookes & Ji Hye Shin. (2006). “China’s Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States.” In Backgrounder. Feb. 22. No 1916. pp. 1-9. David Gompert, Francois Godement, Evan Medeiros & James Mulvenon. (2005). “China on the Move: A Franco-American Analysis of Emerging Chinese Strategic Policies and Their Consequences for Transatlantic Relations.” RAND. National Defense Research Institute. Doc. #CF199. David Shambough. (2000). “Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors.” In Survivor. Vol. 42. No. 1 pp. 97-115. Drew Thompson. (2005). “China’s Emerging Interests in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa and the United States.” In African Renaissance Journal. July/August. pp. 20-29. 3 For an example of China’s strategic thinking see Chris Alden. (2007). China in Africa. New York: Zed Books. Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Premier, stated at the China Africa Cooperation Forum in Addis Ababa in 2003 that the broader global strategic purpose of forging closer ties with Africa was to counter Western dominance. Alden p. 16. 4 China does not share United States concerns for issues of governance, human rights, or economic policy, which are major concerns currently on the forefront of United States foreign policy.