State Elites and the Politics of Regional Inequality in Ghana
A Thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In the Faculty of Humanities
2012
Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai
School of Environment and Development
Table of Contents
List of Tables 5 List of Figures 5 List of Boxes 6 List of Appendices 6 List of Abbreviations 7 Abstract 9 Declaration 10 Copyright Statement 11 Acknowledgements and Dedication 12
Chapter 1. Background and Introduction 14
1.1 Introduction 14 1.2 Research aim and questions 17 1.3 Case selection: why Ghana? 19 1.4 Ghana: A brief ethno-regional profile 20 1.5 Poverty reduction and regional inequality in Ghana 22 1.6 Theoretical perspectives on persistent regional inequalities 25 1.6.1 Perspectives of economic theorists: states versus markets 26 1.6.2 Regional inequalities and the ‘bad’ geography arguments 28 1.6.3 Persistent inequalities and regime types 31 1.6.4 Political representation and power relations 34 1.6.5 The influence and limits of aid donors 36 1.6.6 Summary 38 1.7 Social exclusion and adverse incorporation: a framework for understanding persistent regional inequalities 39 1.8 Thesis structure 45
Chapter 2. Adverse incorporation, social exclusion and regional inequality in sub-Saharan Africa: towards a methodological framework 48
2.1 Introduction 48 2.2 Regional inequality in Africa: A colonial legacy 48 2.3 Regional inequality and postcolonial African states 51 2.3.1 The neo-patrimonial nature of African states: implications for inequality 51 2.3.2 Postcolonial African states: addressing socio-economic inequalities through political inclusion? 54 2.4 Summary 61 2.5 Research design and methodology 62 2.5.1 Research methods 62 2.5.2 Research design and data 64 2.6 Conclusion 75
Chapter 3. A historical account of power relations and regional inequality in Ghana 76
3.1 Introduction 76 3.2 Ghana and the colonial legacy of regional inequalities 77 3.2.1 Adverse incorporation and Northern underdevelopment 78 3.2.2 Colonial educational policies and the exclusion of Northern Ghana 80 3.2.3 Political exclusion and Northern underdevelopment 82 3.3 The politics of decolonization and rising ethno-regional agitations 84 3.4 The newly independent state and the suppression of ethno-regional agitations 88
2 3.5 Addressing regional inequalities? Socio-economic and political policy responses of post- colonial regimes, 1957-1992 90 3.5.1 Responses in the political system and their consequences 90 3.5.2 Economic policy responses to the North-South inequality 95 3.5.3 Social service provision: A focus on education 101 3.6 Conclusion 104
Chapter 4. The politics of ethno-regional inclusion in Ghana’s Fourth Republic (1993-2008): implications for regional inequalities 108
4.1 Introduction 108 4.2 Ghana’s Fourth Republic: a brief political context 109 4.3 The politics of ethno-regional inclusion 111 4.3.1 Legal and institutional framework for ethno-regional inclusion 111 4.3.2 Regional distribution of political power in Ghana: 1993-2008 112 4.3.3 The regional composition of the Rawlings-NDC governments, 1993-2000 112 4.3.4 The regional composition of the Kufuor-NPP governments, 2001-2008 114 4.4 The politics of representation and regional development in Ghana 119 4.5 The growing politics of patronage in Ghana 121 4.5.1 Electoral competition 122 4.5.2 Political patronage in Ghana: a socio-cultural norm? 125 4.5.3 Excessive executive power 126 4.6 Northern political leaders and Northern underdevelopment 127 4.7 Donor influence 129 4.8 Conclusions 130
Chapter 5. The politics of social service delivery and regional disparities in Ghana 133
5.1 Introduction 133 5.2 Public spending and educational inequalities in Ghana, 1994-2008 134 5.3 Public health spending and regional inequalities 138 5.4 Exploring the politics of public education and health spending in Ghana 142 5.4.1 Education 143 5.4.2 Health 145 5.5 Case Studies on the politics of social service delivery 149 5.5.1 Case Study I: The Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSFP) 149 5.5.2 Case Study II: The Model Secondary School Programme 162 5.6 Conclusions 164
Chapter 6. The PRSPs and the politics of excluding the poorest: the case of Ghana’s HIPC Fund 167
6.1 Introduction 167 6.2 Including the historically-excluded Northern regions? The GPRS rhetoric 168 6.3 The Reality of the HIPC Fund: A tool for widening regional inequalities? 170 6.3.1 The GPRS I and Regional HIPC Allocations, 2003-2005 171 6.3.2 The GPRS II and regional HIPC expenditures: a paradigm shift? 174 6.4 The HIPC Fund and Northern exclusion: questioning the official explanations 175 6.5 Understanding the rhetoric-reality gaps of the HIPC Fund: a political interpretation 178 6.5.1 The imperative of winning elections: between patronage and the politics of regional balance 179 6.5.2 Unequal power relations and the exclusion of the North 182 6.5.3 Northern Ghana and the GPRS rhetoric: the politics of securing donor aid? 184 6.6 Conclusion 187
3 Chapter 7. The politics of productive sector investments in Ghana: implications for regional economic disparities 189
7.1 Introduction 189 7.2 Ghana’s Millennium Challenge Account: a brief introduction 190 7.3 The MCA and the politics of beneficiary selection 191 7.3.1 Rural poverty incidence 191 7.3.2 Private sector-led investments 192 7.3.3 Excluding the Upper regions from the MCA: a product of bad geography? 193 7.4 Understanding the distribution of MCA projects: a political explanation 196 7.4.1 Exclusive elite coalitions and the exclusion of the poorest from the MCA 197 7.4.2 Electoral calculus, ideas and ideology? 202 7.5 Excluding the North from productive investments: beyond the MCA 204 7.6 Conclusions 209
Chapter 8. State elites and the politics of regional inequality: conclusions 212
8.1 Introduction 212 8.2 Understanding persistent regional inequalities: the primacy of politics and power relations213 8.3 The politics of resource allocation: why access to political power matters 220 8.4 Conceptual and theoretical implications 226 8.4.1 Understanding persistent regional inequalities from an AISE perspective 226 8.4.2 The African state and the politics of resource sharing 229 8.5 Lessons and policy implications 233 8.6 Concluding remarks and suggestions for future research 238
References 240
Appendices 265
Final word count: 86, 718 words
4 List of Tables
Table 1.1: Ghana’s Basic Poverty Indicators, 1992-2006 22 Table 1.2: North-South inequalities in access to basic services 25 Table 3.1: Official Statistics on Schools in the Gold Coast in 1919 81 Table 3.2: North-South Composition of governments (Ministers only), 1952-1988 92 Table 4.1: Regional voting patterns in Ghana, 1992-2008 110 Table 4.2: Distribution of political power relative to population shares (%), 1993-2000 114 Table 4.3: Distribution of political power relative to population shares, 2001-2008 116 Table 5.1: Expenditure/Enrolment Rates, 1997 134 Table 5.2: Public on SHS Education (in GH¢), 2006 and 2007 137 Table 5.3: Per capita GoG health funding by region in 2000 (amounts in ¢) 140 Table 5.4: Percentage deviations between budgetary allocations and actual expenditures (recurrent only) for primary education, 1995 143 Table 5.5: Deviations between budgetary allocations and actual education expenditures (%), 2004-2008 144 Table 5.6: Rate of change in public health facilities and personnel, 1998-2008 146 Table 5.7: Selected socio-economic indicators and GSFP allocations 151 Table 5.8: North-South GSFP expenditures (in thousands GH¢), 2005-2008 151 Table 5.9: List of first 30 beneficiary Secondary Schools for the model school programme 163 Table 6.1: GPRS weighting criteria for regional resource distribution 169 Table 6.2: HIPC Fund Allocations to District Assemblies, 2002 171 Table 6.3: Comparison of Expected and Actual HIPC Expenditures (in million ¢) by Region (2003-05) 172 Table 6.4: Regional HIPC Expenditures (million GH¢) under GPRS II (2006-2008) 175 Table 6.5: Regional HIPC expenditures and ruling party support 180 Table 7.1: Regional distribution of PSI projects 205
List of Figures
Figure 1.1: Regional poverty trends in Ghana, 1991-2006 23 Figure 1.2: District-level North-South income inequalities 24 Figure 4.1: The regional composition of the Rawlings-NDC government, 1993-2000 113 Figure 4.2: The regional composition of the Kufuor-NPP government, 2001-2008 115 Figure 4.3: Margins (%) between NDC and NPP presidential candidates, 1992-2008 122 Figure 5.1: Education subsidies 1997 (recurrent expenditures only) 135 Figure 5.2: Annual per child expenditure (in GH¢) for basic education, 2004-2008 136 Figure 5.3: Per capita Recurrent and Development Health 138 Figure 5.4: Regional Per Capita Health Expenditures, 1995-1997 139 Figure 6.1: Expected and Actual per capita HIPC allocations, 2003-2005 average 172 Figure 6.2: Deviations between expected and actual per capita HIPC allocations, 2003-05 average 173 Figure 6.3: Picture of a HIPC toilet facility in the Northern Regional capital, Tamale 181 Figure 7.1: District-level rural poverty incidence in Ghana, 2000 192 Figure 7.2: Cocoa production in Ghana, 1977/78-2007/08 206 Figure 7.3: Value of main non-traditional agricultural export crops, 2000-09 207
5 List of Boxes
Box 3.1: The adverse incorporation of Northern politicians and the Northern Railway project 96 Box 5.1: GSFP’s criteria for Beneficiary Selection 150
List of Appendices
Appendix 1: List of interviewees 265 Appendix 2: List of political office holders in Ghana, 1993-2008 267 Appendix 3: Regional representation in key bureaucratic positions 281 Appendix 4: Regional distribution of Political power, 1993-2000 282 Appendix 5:Absolute distribution of political power, 2001-2008 283 Appendix 6: Relative distribution of political power (%), 2001-2008 284 Appendix 7: Actual health expenditures, 1995-1997 (in ¢ Million) 285 Appendix 8: Population per doctor by region, 2002-08 286 Appendix 9: Population per nurse by region, 2008 286 Appendix 10: MCA beneficiary regions and districts 287 Appendix 11: Registered projects by sectors, Jan. 2001-Dec. 2007 287
6 List of Abbreviations
ADA Avoidance of Discrimination Act AISE Adverse Incorporation and Social Exclusion APRs Annual Progress Reports AR Ashanti Region BAR Brong Ahafo Region BECE Basic Education Certificate Examination CEPA Centre for Policy Analysis CPP Convention Peoples Party CR Central Region CWIQ Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire DAs District Assemblies DCE District Chief Executive DFID Department for International Development (UK) EEI Expenditure-Enrolment Index ER Eastern Region ERP Economic Recovery Programme GAR Greater Accra Region GCR Gold Coast Regiment GES Ghana Education Service GHS Ghana Health Service GLSS Ghana Living Standards Surveys GoG Government of Ghana GPRS I Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy GPRS II Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy GSFP Ghana School Feeding Programme GSS Ghana Statistical Service HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative IDA International Development Association IFIs International Financial Institutions IMF International Monetary Fund JHS Junior High School JSS Junior Secondary School MCA Millennium Challenge Account MDBS Multi Donor Budget Supports MoFA Ministry of Food and Agriculture MoFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning MoH Ministry of Health MoTI Ministry of Trade and Industry MPs Members of Parliament NDC National Democratic Congress NDPC National Development Planning Commission NLC National Liberation Council NLM National Liberation Movement NORPREP Northern Region Poverty Reduction Programme NPP New Patriotic Party NR Northern Region NRC National Redemption Council NRGP Northern Rural Growth Programme NTC Northern Territories Council NTs Northern Territories of the Gold Coast ODI Overseas Development Institute PAMSCAD Programs of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment PDA Preventive Detention Act PIP Public Investment Programmes 7 PNDC Provisional National Defence Council PNP Peoples National Party PP Progress Party PRSPs Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers PSIs President’s Special Initiatives REDP Rural Enterprise Development Project SADA Savannah Accelerated Development Authority SAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes SEND Social Enterprise Development Foundation SHS Senior High School SMC Supreme Military Council SSA sub-Saharan Africa SSS Senior Secondary School UER Upper East Region UGCC United Gold Coast Convention UNDP United Nations Development Program UWR Upper West Region VR Volta Region WDR World Development Report WFP World Food Programme WR Western Region
8 Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai, December 2012: The University of Manchester, Doctor of Philosophy State Elites and the Politics of Regional Inequality in Ghana
Abstract
Recent years have witnessed renewed global attention to persistent spatial inequalities and the potential role of politics and power relations in redressing and reinforcing them. This thesis offers a political analysis of the problem of regional inequality in Ghana, with particular attention to the role of inter-elite power relations in underpinning the country’s historical North-South divide. The analysis is based on three main sets of data: the regional distribution of political power during 1993-2008; the regional composition of public expenditure; and elite interviews. The thesis argues that a key factor that explains Ghana’s stark unbalanced regional development has been the continuous exclusion of the historically poorer Northern regions from a fair share of both productive and social sector spending. The socio-economic marginalisation of these regions has been underpinned principally by a weaker influence of Northern elites on resource allocation decisions within a political environment that is driven largely by patron-client relations. Consequently, even policies and programmes designed with the formal objective of targeting the ‘poor’ often end up discriminating against the poorer Northern regions at the level of implementation. However, Northern elites’ lack of ‘agenda-setting powers’ is not a function of their exclusion from government, but rather of their ‘adverse incorporation’ into the polity, whereby they have often been included on relatively unfavourable terms.
This explanation differs significantly from much of current mainstream thinking regarding the underlying drivers of persistent unbalanced regional development, including dominant accounts of Ghana’s North-South inequalities. Notably, there has been a tendency of both academics and policy makers to put the blame on certain innate characteristics of the North, such as the region’s fewer production potentials associated with its ‘bad geography’ and Northerners’ proclivity for violent conflicts. Such accounts therefore tend to blame the relative socio-economic backwardness of the Northern regions on the North itself rather than the nature of its incorporation into broader political formations.
9 Declaration
No portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.
Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai
December 2012
10 Copyright Statement
I. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes. II. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made. III. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions. IV. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=487), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses.
11 Acknowledgements and Dedication
I am indebted to the School of Environment and Development (SED) at the University of Manchester for fully funding this project. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to my PhD supervisors, Professor David Hulme and Dr. Sam Hickey. Your encouragement and intellectual guidance at all stages of this study have been integral to improving my research and writing skills. Without such a tremendous support, this research would not have been possible.
I also thank my previous co-supervisor, Professor Tony Bebbington for his support in the early stages of my studies. I remember it was his comments that enabled me to make a good choice between my two competing research proposals during the first few months of my ‘PhD journey’. Outside of Manchester, this research also benefited considerably from my discussions with other academics, especially Professor Gordon Crawford, Dr. Lindsay Whitfield, and Dr. Stefan Lindemann.
In Ghana, I am indebted to all my interview partners, especially the politicians and senior bureaucrats who were open enough to provide me with critical insights into the workings of the Ghanaian state. To my SED friends and PhD colleagues, my sincere thanks go to Dr. Huraera Jabeen, Justice Bawole, Dr. Badru Bukenya, Aarti Krishnan, Alma Kudebayeva, and Juan M. Villa for supporting me in this research in various ways. My research has also benefited from many friends and family members. During my field work in particular, I received substantial help from Adam Salifu, Mohammed Tajudeen, Dr. Alidu Seidu Mahama, Yahuzah Abubakari, and Zakaria Yushaw and wife.
And last, but certainly not least, I owe my largest amount of thanks to my wife, Faiza, who not only patiently endured my months-long absence during the first year of this research, but also provided invaluable emotional support throughout this project. Without her loving support, this research would have been more difficult to undertake.
Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my two kids, Abdul-Haqq and Fadl.
12
13 Chapter 1. Background and Introduction
“There has never been any illusion that inequality would be wholly and systematically eliminated, but the struggle to achieve even a measure of success has become increasingly difficult” (United Nation’s Inequality Predicament Report, 2005:9).
1.1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed renewed global attention to persistent spatial inequalities and the potential role of politics and power relations both in redressing and reinforcing them. With the turn of the Millennium, the international development community was primarily concerned with levels of absolute deprivation in the world, such as a reduction of the number of people living on less than US$1 per day. Addressing inequality was generally marginal on the global development agenda, such that apart from a commitment to eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education, there was no other explicit focus on inequalities in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by world leaders in 2001.
From the mid-2000s, however, international attention began to focus on the large and growing inequalities in opportunities within and across countries. The question of regional or spatial inequality has therefore since attracted significant interest among scholars and policy-makers. Clear evidence of this shift is manifested in the 2005 Human Development Report (HDR), which highlights the need to move “the MDG agenda beyond national averages to address the structural inequalities linked to wealth, gender, location and assets that are hampering progress in development” (UNDP, 2005:71). Around the same period, the problem of widening inequalities was highlighted by several other high profile reports, including the 2005 ‘World Social Situation’ report, titled The Inequality Predicament, and the 2006 World Development Report (WDR) on Equity and Development . Although from a radically different perspective, the 2009 WDR was also dedicated to a related theme.
Amidst growing international concerns about rising inequalities, spatial inequality, or “inequality in economic and social indicators of wellbeing across geographical units within a country” (Kanbur and Venables, 2005a:11), has been of particular concern for at least four reasons. First, beyond the adverse implications of inequality in general for poverty reduction (World Bank, 2005; UNDP, 2005), it is recognised that spatial inequalities can also undermine social and political stability due to the tensions and conflicts that they often engender (Stewart, 2002; Kanbur, 2010). Østby (2007:2) utilised survey data from 55 countries to calculate welfare inequalities between ethnic, religious, and regional groups
14 during 1986-2003, finding that “[a]ll the inequality measures, but particularly regional inequality, are positively associated with higher risks of conflict outbreak”. Second, evidence from many developing countries indicates that spatial inequality contributes significantly to overall inequality (World Bank, 2005). A recent study on Confronting Rising Inequality in Asia observes that “[s]patial inequalities account for a large part of Asia’s inequality” (Asian Development Bank, 2012:82). Third, spatial inequality is generally on the rise in developing countries. Summarising the findings of a major research project on the Spatial Dimensions of Human Development, Kanbur and Venables (2005b:22) state that “the overall conclusion ... is that spatial inequality is high and, in many countries, rising”. 1 Elsewhere, these same authors draw attention to “the presence of significant and often increasing spatial disparities in African economies” (Kanbur and Venables, 2003:473). Fourth, the trend towards growing regional inequalities occurs largely within the context of positive economic growth and poverty reduction, undermining the rapid achievement of the MDGs (UNDP, 2005). This has been especially so in previously poor performing regions such as sub-Saharan Africa (Aryeetey et al., 2009).
Although a global phenomenon, the trend towards increased spatial inequality is particularly interesting in the African context because it presents us with a puzzle. Historically, income inequality in Africa has been among the highest in the world (Thorbecke, 2012:234; Handley et al., 2009:5), and this is considered a paradox: “Africa should be a low-inequality continent because African countries are poor and agriculture- based…and also because land (the main asset) is widely shared” (Milanovic, 2003:1). Moreover, industrialization, the main cause of widening inequality in the US and Europe, has been limited in most African countries (Ibid). Surprisingly, however, apart from the persistently high levels of income inequalities in Africa, inequalities in access to social services such as education and health care also remain high in the region, especially between regions and along rural-urban lines (Okojie and Shimeles, 2006).
Milanovic (2003:3) hypothesises that the surprisingly high levels of inequality in Africa “is principally a political phenomenon”. This hypothesis resonates with the growing consensus that politics and power relations act as fundamental drivers of development (Hickey, 2011:4). Specifically in relation to the problem under investigation in this study, Echeverri- Gent (2009:635) claims that problems posed by persistent inequalities “are especially hard to overcome because they are a consequence of an endogenous, self-reinforcing political process”. Thus, for Moncrieffe (2004:5), “[p]ower relations must figure significantly in
1 This project covered 58 developing and transition countries. 15 explanations of poverty and inequality”. These claims have gained substantial buy-in among mainstream international development agencies, who have increasingly recognised that the limited impact of their development programmes in developing countries has been, in part, due to their limited attention to domestic political processes and actors (Hyden, 2008; Brown, 2009; DFID, 2010a). However, there are still those who do not assign any significant role to politics and power relations in the development process. The 2009 WDR team argue, for example, that spatial patterns of development are shaped fundamentally by the intersection of Density, Distance and Division – the so-called notion of ‘Development in 3-Ds’ (World Bank, 2009a:46). The Report therefore treats the problem of unbalanced development “as a technical issue” (Scott, 2009:2), with little recognition that the challenge of overcoming poverty and inequality has as much to do with politics as with policy (Kabeer, 2009).
Nevertheless, despite the increasing rhetoric of the “primacy of politics” (Leftwich, 2008) in shaping pro-poor policy reforms, the political and political economy mechanisms that underpin poverty and inequality remain poorly understood (Mookherjee, 2006:231). However, there have been significant advances in recent years in moving beyond the generic notion of ‘politics matters’ to an emphasis on power relations as one of the most influential forms of politics that shapes processes of development and underdevelopment. This shift, evident in particular in the emerging literature on ‘political settlements’, emphasises the importance of inter-elite power relations vis-à-vis institutional arrangements, as well as the role of informal orgnisations (notably patron-client relations) in shaping broader development processes and outcomes. This literature suggests that because institutions often reflect the values and interests of powerful elites in society, their actual functioning can only be fully understood within the context of prevailing power structures and relations (see Khan, 2010; Parks and Cole, 2010; di John and Putzel, 2012). Thus, rather than the actual design of institutions per se , it is argued that it is the underlying political settlement – the “expression of a common understanding, usually forged between elites, about how power is organized and exercised” (DFID, 2010b: 22) – that determines developmental outcomes (di John and Putzel, 2009:6).
A similar line of thinking is evident in the influential work of Douglas North and colleagues who argue that developing countries are characterised by ‘limited access orders’, meaning that their polities are “ruled by a dominant coalition; people outside the coalition have only limited access to organizations, privileges and valuable resources and activities” (North et al., 2009a:56). In this context, access to political power in the form of
16 elite representation in the ‘dominant coalition’ becomes a critical tool in shaping the extent to which different groups are included or excluded in the distribution of valuable state resources. Although far from homogenous, a central theme of this emerging literature is the emphasis on how underlying power relations shape the emergence and performance of key state institutions in relation to developmental outcomes. From such a perspective, to the extent that some groups and regions become and stay poor, it is “precisely because they do not have the power to adjust institutions and policy in their favour” (Parks and Cole, 2010:7). Persistent inequality is therefore seen as a relational phenomenon, underpinned mainly by “relationships of unequal power” (Mosse, 2007:3).
It should be recognised, however, that much of this increasingly influential literature has been concerned primarily with accounting for how problems of violence are dealt with, and how political stability emerges and is maintained. Consequently, while there is now abundant literature on the link between power-sharing and violent conflict, “we know a lot less about the relationship between power-sharing and economic development” (Lindemann, 2010:258), especially as it relates to its spatial dimensions. Claims concerning the impact of politics and power relations on regional inequalities have remained largely conjectural, as with the recent assertion of the Asian Development Bank (2012:82) that while greater fiscal transfers to poorer regions play an important role in reducing regional inequality, “such transfers are likely to encounter political resistance from the richer regions” (my emphasis). To the extent that such claims have rarely been verified through rigorous empirical analysis, Gradus’ (1983:383) three-decade old concern that “the political aspects of regional development and power relations in space have been neglected in explaining regional inequalities” remains valid today. This is even the more so as recent Political Science literature has only utilised inequality “as an explanatory variable in studies of conflict or political instability but rarely as a variable to be explained” (van de Walle, 2009: 309).
1.2 Research aim and questions
This thesis seeks to contribute to a fuller understanding of the political underpinnings of regional inequality in sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on the Ghanaian experience. It does so by combining the two-related concepts of adverse incorporation and social exclusion (AISE) to offer a relational account of the problem of persistent regional inequalities; and by adopting a political settlements approach to explore the specific ways in which politics and power relations shapes regional inequalities. While the concepts of social exclusion
17 and adverse incorporation are both concerned with the role of inequalities in power in shaping development outcomes, they differ in their diagnoses of the roots of such inequalities. From the spatial perspective, the concept of exclusion sees relative deprivation as the product of some regions being ‘left out’ of broader socio-economic and political structures and processes. In contrast, adverse incorporation emphasises how such structures and processes can incorporate some regions in ways that are detrimental to their development (Wood, 2003; Hickey and du Toit, 2007; Moore et al., 2008; Bird, et al., 2010). These concepts represent two research traditions that have historically held conflicting claims (Jones, 2009), but recent research has shown that the two are not necessarily alternative, but can also operate in mutually reinforcing ways to underpin poverty and inequality (e.g. Hickey and du Toit, 2007; Mosse, 2010).
My main interest in this study is to investigate whether, how and why political forms of exclusion and/or adverse incorporation shape socio-economic forms of exclusion in terms of the distribution of state resources. Here, I follow the view that “[i]nequality dynamics depend primarily on the policies and institutions adopted by governments” (Piketty, 2006:71), including the spatial patterns of government expenditures that accompany the implementation of such policies. Thus, based on the assumption that persistent regional inequalities are a product of the regional patterns of public resource allocation, I ask two inter-related questions in this research:
• Does the spatial distribution of political power shape the spatial patterns of socio- economic resource allocation? • If so, how and why does this happen and what does this imply for (in)equitable regional development?
These questions are addressed through an analysis of the role of elite politics in shaping regional patterns of development in Ghana, with particular attention to the country’s North-South divide. Ghana’s North has historically lagged far behind in terms of development since colonial times. Given the multiplicity of actors that shape the development trajectories of poor developing countries (e.g. civil society and donors), it is useful to explain the reasons for focusing particularly here on the state and state elites. The main reason is that “[t]he state remains the only entity with the legitimacy and capacity to capture and redirect the wealth that society produces” (Sandbrook et al., 2007:253). In contrast, the influence of donors and civil society groups in stimulating pro-poor reforms in poor countries is often exaggerated (e.g. UNDP 2000:11-12; UNDP, 2005:71). In
18 particular, growing evidence suggests that the mobilization of civil society around pro-poor reforms often falls short of making the desired impact “when faced with heavy resistance by powerful elite actors” (Parks and Cole, 2010:1). By elites, I refer to the “[t]he people who make or shape the main political and economic decisions....” (Hossain and Moore 2002:1). Analytically, a distinction can be made between different types of elites – political, administrative/bureaucratic, economic, and societal (Therkildsen, 2008).
Following Therkildsen (2008), this research focuses mainly on ruling political elites or the political leaders atop the incumbent regime who make key decisions (Whitfield and Therkildsen, 2011). I focus mainly, though not exclusively, on ruling political elites because an important characteristic of elites in Africa since colonial times is that politics and economics are closely linked to the state (Orrnert and Hewitt 2006:7, cited in Therkildsen, 2008). Moreover, because of their considerable influence over resource allocation, ruling political elites tend to be especially powerful in developing countries (Therkildsen, 2008). Thus recent research evidence suggests that development outcomes in poor countries are shaped fundamentally by “the political incentives facing political elites and leaders” (Booth and Therkildsen, 2012:3).
Moreover, McAllister and Rose (1983:534) have long reminded us that “[p]olitics is about the articulation of competing demands and about the authoritative resolution of competing demands by government”. Nowhere is this observation more applicable than in the regional allocation of state resources in sub-Saharan Africa. The African state is a venue where political actors bargain over the allocation of resources in order to secure their consumption under conditions of economic scarcity (Hyden, 2006). Indeed, the prevailing economic scarcity in Africa implies that various regional elites “compete for favourable authoritative actions on the part of state institutions” (Rothchild, 1984: 151) in terms of the distribution of state power and public goods. Variations in access to political power can therefore have important implications on variations in the regional patterns of resource allocation, and by implication the spatial patterns of development.
1.3 Case selection: why Ghana?
Given that Ghana’s North-South inequalities mirror a broader pattern found along the entire West African coast, where the Savannah regions to the North have disproportionate shares of extreme and chronic poverty (Oduro and Aryee, 2003; Stewart and Langer, 2007), some justification is required for the choice of Ghana for this research. Three distinct reasons make Ghana particularly suitable for exploring the political underpinnings
19 of regional inequality in sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly, Ghana is typical of the countries in the region where sustained national economic growth and poverty reduction at the national level over the past two decades has been accompanied by increased regional inequalities, and might therefore reflect more general features of this problem.
Secondly, this trend appears surprising because Ghana has had a long-standing political culture that emphasises national unity and ethno-regional inclusivity via the equitable distribution of political power and state resources among different ethno-regional groups. Many observers believe that this political culture explains Ghana’s relative political stability in sub-Saharan Africa (see Nordås, 2008; Langer, 2009; Hammerstad, 2011). The failure of Ghana’s so-called inclusive-driven politics to ensure a more inclusive regional pattern of development therefore presents us with an intriguing set of questions. Thirdly, Ghana is one of the most democratic countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and has increasingly been hailed as “an example to the rest of Africa, and the world, on successful democratic practice” (World Bank, 2009b). Its experiences, therefore, have the potential of offering us useful insights concerning the theoretical expectations about democracy’s instrumental value in promoting equitable development.
Given the presence of many other forms of inequality in Ghana, including persistently high levels of gender and urban-rural inequalities (GSS, 2007:9), a rationale is also required for the particular attention paid to the North-South inequalities in this research. The first key reason is that the North-South divide represents one of the most “politically salient socio- economic divisions in Ghana” (Mancini, 2009:3) in part because of an overlap between ethno-cultural groups and administrative regions in the country (see below). Moreover, overall inequality in Ghana is driven significantly by increased spatial inequalities. Indeed, one study found that if income levels in the Northern part of the country had grown at the average rate for the rest of the country (around 5%) during the 1990s, this would have added some 5% to national average per capita income between 1992 and 1999 (ODI and CEPA, 2005:6; also Vanderpure-Orgle, 2004). Understanding and addressing the underlying drivers of the persistent North-South inequality in Ghana must therefore be considered central to the country’s national development strategies.
1.4 Ghana: A brief ethno-regional profile
A former British colony, Ghana is centrally located in West Africa, bordering Togo to the east, Cote d’Ivoire to the west, Burkina Faso to the north and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. It covers an area of about 239,000 km 2 and comprises three broad distinct ecological
20 zones: a small coastal zone, a forest zone and a large savannah zone in the North (McKay et al., 2005). The 2010 national census put the country’s population at about 24.7 million, distributed unevenly across 10 administrative regions (see map above) which are in turn sub-divided into several districts. Given significant regional development disparities, however, some scholars have suggested the need to think of Ghana as comprising just “two broad regions, the North and the South” (Boateng et al., 1990:29).
The area that has been administratively referred to as ‘the North’ is the same as that which was occupied by the British in 1897 and formally annexed to the Gold Coast (as colonial Ghana was called) in January 1902. During the colonial period, the British administered the area under the title of the ‘Northern Territories’, later re-named as the Northern Region at independence in March 1957. In 1960, a separate Upper Region was carved from the North, and in 1983 the Upper Region was itself divided into the Upper East and the Upper West regions (Kelly and Bening, 2007). Thus, as used in this research, Northern Ghana or simply the ‘North’ comprises the Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions, while the remaining seven regions— Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Central, Eastern, Greater Accra, Volta and Western — form the Southern part of Ghana. The North consists of 41% of the land area of Ghana, although it is home to only about 20% of its total population.
There is a rough overlap between ethnicity and administrative regions in Ghana, both along the broader North-South divide and within individual regions. The country’s estimated ninety-two ethnic groups are often classified into four large groups that together comprise around 86% of the population. These are the Akan, Mole-Dagbani, Ewe and Ga-Adagbe (Langer, 2009:535). The Akans constitute the largest ethnic group (about 49% of the total population), and dominate in all the Southern regions, except in Greater Accra and Volta. The second largest group are the Mole-Dagbanis who constitute around 17% of the population and are predominantly found in the North. The third largest are the Ewes (13%) who are concentrated largely in the Volta region, followed by the Ga-Adanbges (8%) whose traditional home is the Greater Accra area. This complex mix of ethnic groups and regions is crucial to understanding the politics of public expenditure in Ghana and its implications for regional inequalities because it “has allowed political and cultural entrepreneurs to exploit divisions and sub classifications to suit their purposes” (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004:15).
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1.5 Poverty reduction and regional inequality in Ghana
Over the past two decades, Ghana has achieved significant socio-economic development outcomes alongside an increasingly entrenched democratic practice. Politically, although many recent elections in Africa have been followed by a degree of political upheaval, Ghana continues to enjoy a stable political environment, holding five relatively peaceful and credible national elections between 1992 and 2008. Considerable achievements have also been made in the economic sphere, especially since the return to multiparty democracy in 1992. Economic growth averaged 4.5% from 1983 through to 2000 and accelerated to 5.6% in 2004 and 6.2% in 2006 (World Bank, 2007, cited in Higgins, 2009:1), while income poverty, measured as living on less than US$1 per day, has also reduced. Successive Ghana Living Standards Surveys (GLSS) suggest that the incidence and severity of poverty, as well as the number of poor all declined substantially between 1992 and 2006. In absolute terms, the number of poor went down from 7.9 million people in 1992 (or 52% of the population at the time) to 6.3 million people in 2006 (or 29% of the population at the time). During the same period, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty also declined from 36.5% to 18.2% of the population (Table 1.1). With such achievements, Ghana has been hailed as the first sub-Saharan African country to achieve the MDG of halving extreme poverty ahead of 2015 (Republic of Ghana and UNDP, 2006:4).
Table 1.1 : Ghana’s Basic Poverty Indicators, 1992-2006
However, as Ghana’s democracy consolidates and its economy develops, not all regions have benefited in equal ways. Evidence from the GLSS data shows that the absolute number of the poor declined by some 2.5 million people in the South between 1992 and 2006, but increased by 0.9 million people in the North during the same period (World Bank, 2011a). With the notable exception of the Central Region, both the incidence and depth of poverty reduced everywhere in the South between 1992 and 1999, but increased in the Northern and Upper East regions. The regional patterns of poverty during the 2000s did not change much, such that headcount poverty in the North remained exceptionally high, reaching a staggering 88% in the Upper West, where the rate actually increased
22 between 1999 and 2006 (Figure 1.1a). In contrast, significant reductions in poverty occurred in the South, especially in the Eastern, Central and Western regions (GSS, 2007:13).
A similar, but more dramatic pattern is reflected in the distribution of the extreme poor, defined in Ghana as “those whose standard of living is insufficient to meet their basic nutritional requirements even if they devoted their entire consumption budget to food” (GSS, 2000:10). The most recent GLSS data shows that the incidence of extreme poverty in each of the three Northern regions was more than twice the national average in 2005/06. Indeed, whereas less than 10% of the populations in the Greater Accra, Eastern, Central and Western regions were categorised as being extremely poor in the most recent GLSS for 2005/06, the corresponding figures for the Upper East and Upper West were 60% and 79% respectively (Figure 1.1b).
Figure 1.1 : Regional poverty trends in Ghana, 1991-2006
1.1a: Trends in headcount poverty 1.1b: Trends in extreme poverty 100 90 90 80 80 70 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 Percentofpopulation Percentofpopulation 10 10 0 0
1992 1999 2006 1992 1999 2006
Source : Author, based on Ghana Statistical Service (GSS, 2007:40-41, Appendix Table A1.5).
Unsurprisingly, the North has consistently accounted for a disproportionate share of the country’s poor. While it comprises about 20% of the national population, it harboured 45% of Ghana’s poor in 2006, up from 34% in 1992. Its contribution to the extreme poor was even higher, rising from 28.6% in 1992 to 57.2% in 2006 (GSS, 2007). Other indicators of monetary poverty also point to higher levels of deprivation in the North, such that mean annual per capita income in the two Upper regions was less than a third of the national average in 2006 (see GSS, 2008:107). Inter-district income inequalities along the North- South divide appears even more dramatic, such that in 2000, all the 20 districts with the highest poverty incidence were in the North. In contrast, the 20 districts with the least 23 poverty incidences were all concentrated in the South (Figure 1.2). Thus, although pockets of poverty can be found in all regions in Ghana (Aryeetey and McKay, 2004), the broader North-South income inequalities remain very significant. This analysis suggests that Ghana’s ‘success story’ in poverty reduction is at best “the success story of its South” (World Bank, 2011a: iv).
Figure 1.2 : District-level North-South income inequalities in Ghana
90
80
70
60
50
40
30 Headcountpoverty (%) 20
10
0
Source: Author, based on GoG (2005a:76-77, Appendix Table I. Note : The districts at the left hand side of the middle line are all in the North, while those at the other side of the line (i.e. those with the least poverty incidences) are all in the South.
However, the North has recorded significant improvements in relation to access to basic social services since the 1990s. Shepherd et al. (2004:41) attribute this improvement to the interventions of donors and international NGOs, whose “social development projects have helped to compensate for the benign neglect and government abdication of the north”. Even then, however, non-income dimensions of inequality along the North-South divide remain evident. Demographic and Health Survey data for 2003 showed that Southern women were over 3.5 times more likely than ethnic Northerners to have attended secondary or higher levels of education (Mancini, 2009:12). Moreover, school enrolment and literacy rates as well as infant mortality rates continue to show a clear North-South divide (Table 1.2). 24
Table 1.2 : North-South inequalities in access to basic services
As we will see, these socio-economic inequalities are not new, but have their initial origins in British colonial policies that subordinated the interest of the North to that of the South, both by excluding the former from public investments and through its adverse incorporation into the colonial economy as a pool of cheap labour (Chapter 3). The crucial question however is why such disparities have persisted after more than half a century of Ghana’s political independence. This is an important question because nearly all postcolonial governments have expressed commitment to bridging the North-South inequalities since 1957. Moreover, for the past couple of decades, the majority of foreign NGOs in Ghana have concentrated their ‘development’ interventions in the North (Mohan, 2002:140). That the North continuous to lag far behind despite all these perceived efforts is the puzzle that this research hopes to help unravel.
1.6 Theoretical perspectives on persistent regional inequalities
In order to provide a framework for investigating the key underlying drivers of the North- South inequalities in Ghana, this section reviews the theoretical literature on the phenomenon of persistent regional inequalities in developing countries. The review covers arguments concerning free markets versus state interventions, agro-climatic variations, regime-types, the spatial distribution of political power, and donor influence. With the notable exception of those that emphasise inter-elite power relations, most of these explanations fall short of providing a convincing account of why some regions become and stay poor. Against this background, I go on to outline a research framework that focuses on the implications of the spatial distribution of political power among regional elites for the spatial distribution of socio-economic public goods.
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1.6.1 Perspectives of economic theorists: states versus markets
The literature on the economic explanations of regional inequality can be categorised under three broad themes: the convergence, divergence and radical paradigms (Lipshitz, 1992). The convergence perspective, advanced by neoclassical economists, considers regional inequality as a natural, but a short-lived phenomenon that arises from temporal market failures. In the long-run, however, and provided there are no barriers to factor mobility such as labour and capital, “...the market mechanism will be equilibrating and any disparities in regional wages will tend to disappear over time” (McCombie, 1988:267). The underlying thinking is that in a free market economy, labour and capital tend to move in opposite directions: while labour moves in search of higher wage locations, capital tends to move in the opposite direction in search of lower cost locations. It is assumed that this process will continue until such a time when the income per worker in both flourishing and lagging regions is roughly equal, leading to convergence in regional incomes.
There are several weaknesses associated with such arguments. Notably, as the introductory section of this Chapter indicates, far from being a temporal phenomenon, regional income inequalities have remained a global reality, and have even tended to widen in many countries in recent years. This is in spite of, or perhaps even because of the vigorous pursuit of the neoliberal, pro-market ideology since the 1980s. Second, to the extent that such arguments implicitly assume the possibility of a perfect market situation, their application to developing countries can be particularly problematic given the high degree of market failures in the developing world. Third, by focusing on interregional convergence of incomes in assessing levels of regional development disparities, neoclassical economists fail to recognise that spatial inequality is not just about differences in monetary indicators, but one which has socio-political dimensions as well.
In contrast, the divergence/spatial disequilibrium perspective holds that there is no reason why market forces will necessarily result in the convergence of living standards among regions, and that markets, if left to operate on their own, would lead to the cumulative concentration of the factors of production in certain regions at the expense of others (Martin and Sunley, 1996:2). Myrdal (1957) invoked the concept of circular and cumulative causation to argue that once a region takes a lead in socio-economic development ahead of others, all new major economic activities tend to be concentrated in the already relatively developed areas. Leaving market forces to dictate developmental outcomes therefore implies that less developed regions would continue to lag behind, “stagnating or even becoming poorer...” (Myrdal, 1957:32). Recent studies generally tend
26 to support this thesis, showing that in a liberal, pro-market economy, where the role of the state is confined to creating a level playing field for private sector-led growth, inhabitants of underdeveloped regions are likely to be further marginalized, increasing their levels of poverty and exacerbating regional inequalities. This has been one of the key arguments of the ‘Operationalising Pro-Poor Growth’ research project undertaken in 14 developing countries (see Grimm and Klasen, 2007:15).
Yet, the third strand of these economic-oriented theories, the radical perspective, perceives the state more as a cause rather than a solution to the problem of regional inequality. Rooted largely in neo-Marxist theories, these analysts perceive uneven regional development as an inevitable outcome of capitalism. It is argued that the dynamics of capital accumulation inherently creates a centre-periphery structure in production in which the role of the periphery (lagging regions) is essentially to serve as: a) a labour reserve that can feed the expansion of production; and b) a market place for absorbing the increasing quantities of commodities produced (Harvey, 1975). In such relations, lagging regions are merely ‘dependent colonies’ (Clark, 1980:227), providing reserves of labour and markets for exploitation by the core economy. This makes it impossible for the former to catch up in developmental terms.
Inspired largely by these Marxist assumptions, dependency theorists also argued in the 1960s that the structure and development potential of every country was inextricably linked to its historical position in the world economy, and that the development challenges of Third World countries was a consequence of their peripheral incorporation into an exploitative, global capitalist economy (e.g. Rodney, 1972). Some analysts subsequently extended these arguments to explain intra-country regional inequalities, claiming that similar to the center-periphery relationship between metropole and colony, there developed in many colonies a similar relationship between more and less developed parts of the colony (e.g. Friedmann, 1963, cited in Aka Jr., 1995).
The above debates have some resonance with the more recent discussions concerning the impact of economic globalisation on spatial inequalities. Contrary to claims that globalisation “has actually promoted economic equality and reduced poverty” (Dollar and Kraay, 2002:120), a large volume of empirical case studies show that the recent trends towards widening spatial inequalities across the globe has partly been “a consequence of the uneven impact of trade openness and globalization” (Kanbur and Venables, 2005c:1). It is argued that the increased integration of national economies into the global economy has weakened state control over powerful global actors, with profound adverse consequences
27 on the ability of national governments to implement policies of their choice (Mkandawire, 2004; Abdulai, 2009a), including their scope to attend to more equitable forms of development. Another argument is that global integration leads to a sharper expression of comparative advantage, and that regions whose geographical locations and other initial conditions are better suited for export-oriented production tend to derive the most benefit and grow faster than interior regions (e.g. Kanbur and Venables, 2007; Kanbur, 2010). These latter arguments raise a further question of interest for this study: is the relationship between physical geography and the spatial patterns of development outcomes deterministic?
1.6.2 Regional inequalities and the ‘bad’ geography arguments
Both within and among countries, variations in geographical conditions have been invoked by scholars to explain persistent spatial inequalities. Bloom and Sachs (1998) have argued that tropical regions have lagged far behind temperate regions in economic development, due mainly to the former’s unfavourable climate, soils and topography. Africa’s relatively poor development records, in their view, are not therefore the result of ‘bad governance’, but rather due to the continent’s “extraordinarily disadvantageous geography” (p.4). Geographical factors have also been invoked to explain spatial disparities within several countries, including China (e.g. Shuming et al., 2002) and Mexico (e.g. Gallup et al., 2003). Similarly in Vietnam, agro-climatic variables were found to have explained about 75% of measured variation in district-level rural poverty (Minot et al., 2003, cited in Bryceson, 2006:20).
However, empirical evidence has demonstrated even more strongly that “geography is not destiny” (Rodrik, 2002:13; also Clark and Gray, 2012:1; Gallup et al., 2003). Economic geographers distinguish between first and second nature geography: while the former refers to some regions’ favourable natural characteristics (e.g. resource endowments, soil type, proximity to rivers etc.) in explaining their relative developmental fortunes, the latter emphasizes the role of policy-influenced variables such as the spatial distribution of public infrastructure. Although both tend to have some explanatory power, the wealth of evidence shows that it is ‘second nature geography’ that is more critical in explaining why some regions become and stay poor (Kanbur and Venables, 2005c: 8-9; Williams et al., 2005:12). In Peru, spatial inequality was superficially attributed to ‘first nature’ geographic variables such as altitude, soil type and temperature, but when infrastructure variables were introduced into the analysis, the explanatory power of geographical variables almost disappeared (Kanbur and Venables, 2005c). 28
The relatively strong explanatory power of ‘second nature geography’ has also been demonstrated by the experiences of two previously backward and landlocked regions – the Cerrado region of Brazil and the Northeast Region of Thailand. Both regions, which have very similar ecologies to that of West Africa’s Guinea Savannah, have been recently turned into highly competitive poles of commercial agriculture for cassava, soybeans, sugar, rice, maize, cotton and beef through improved agricultural technology, publicly financed infrastructure, and rural credit. That these initiatives have enabled both regions to conquer important world markets and developed at a rapid pace is in clear defiance of previous claims that their “challenging agroecological characteristics, remote locations, and high levels of poverty would prove impossible to overcome” (World Bank, 2009c: 23 and 41). All of these examples show that appropriate spatially-sensitive interventions and the regional composition of infrastructural investments can serve as a powerful stimulus in overcoming geographical constraints (World Bank, 2005:42-3).
Yet, the efficacy of spatially-targeted policies has recently been called into question by the WDR 2009 – Reshaping Economic Geographies . The Report categorised the geographical realities of development into a notion of 3Ds, depicting the intersection of density (of populations and economic activity), distance (flows of people, goods and capital), and division (of labour as well as religious and cultural divisions within populations). It argues that many countries have achieved inclusive forms of development by promoting transformations along these three dimensions of economic geography: higher densities due to urbanisation, shorter distances as people and businesses move to cities, and fewer divisions as economic borders are weakened and world markets entered. The Report’s ‘central message’ is that development involves an inevitable (and welcome) spatial unevenness in economic growth, and that to try to spread out economic activity to those currently excluded only amounts to discouraging further national economic development (World Bank, 2009a). To this extent, the task of state elites in addressing spatial inequalities is not to attempt to spread productive sector investments to economically excluded regions, but to concentrate such investments in leading regions while taking steps to move the poor from lagging regions to the areas where economic activities are booming. This is to be achieved through spatially connective infrastructure (e.g. transport and communication), the removal of barriers to factor mobility in order to enhance economic integration, and the provision of basic services “everywhere”. There are several weaknesses associated with these claims, four of which are highlighted below.
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The first relates to the implicit assumption that the facilitation of out-migration to leading regions will result in more inclusive forms of development. One recent extensive review of the literature concludes that the evidence on the impact of internal migration on interregional income disparities is “not yet conclusive” (Ozgen et al., 2009:2), but very much depends on a variety of factors, including the skill levels of migrants and the extent to which migration induces gross fixed capital formation. A related concern is the Report’s emphasis on out-migration to leading regions without an adequate consideration for the welfare of those who may be unable or unwilling to migrate for several reasons, including disability and illness, age, education and skills, lack of access to networks, and high up-front costs of relocation (Kothari, 2002; Willams et al., 2005; Klasen, 2009; Bird et al., 2010). Such perspectives suggest that even with the availability of good connective infrastructure, reliance on outmigration as an exit route out of poverty for lagging regions can exacerbate the poverty levels of those who may be unable or unwilling to migrate. Moreover, while many can hope for support from those who have departed through remittances, the development of vast slums in many developing countries, where migrant labourers often get trapped in a vicious cycle of exploitation and poor working conditions (UNDP, 2009), is a clear indication that migration does not necessarily improve the socioeconomic situation of labour migrants let alone their home regions. These observations are strongly supported by the specific Ghanaian experience explored in the present study (see Chapters 3 and 7).
Third, given the above, the Report’s suggestion that the concentration of productive economic investments be concentrated in advantaged regions is problematic. Empirical evidence has increasingly shown that:
“Access to jobs is essential for overcoming inequality and reducing poverty. People who cannot secure adequate employment are unable to generate an income sufficient to cover their health, education and other basic needs and those of their families, or to accumulate savings to protect their households from the vicissitudes of the economy” (United Nations, 2005:3; also UNRISD, 2010; Turok, 2011).
In contrast, while investments in basic services is often held out as a powerful strategy for overcoming income inequalities (UNDP, 2005:69), it would seem that the economic returns to education are often exaggerated (Corbacho and Schwartz, 2002:19). Vinson (2009:8) has gone as far as to depicting social service spending as potential ‘sticking plaster expenditures’ that tend to focus attention on the consequences rather than the root causes of socio-economic exclusion. Such perspectives do not dismiss the value of social service provisioning in the poverty reduction discourse, but rather emphasise that “human
30 development as the main development strategy to address inter-regional inequality has limitations” (Shepherd et al., 2004:4).
A fourth major weakness, as noted earlier, relates to the Report’s overall apolitical stance, notably by treating spatial inequality as a function of density, distance and division, while neglecting (or at least underplaying) the crucial issue of embedded power relations that are integral to the perpetuation of poverty and inequality (CPRC, 2004; Rigg et al., 2009).
1.6.3 Persistent inequalities and regime types
Although increasingly becoming outdated, some scholars assume a link between a country’s regime type and its ability to overcome the problem of regional inequality. The most common distinctions are often between democracies and non-democracies and federal/decentralised versus unitary/centralised systems of government, as discussed below.
Democracies versus non-democracies Some analysts claim that authoritarian regimes are more likely to pursue egalitarian policies and foster socio-economic inclusion (e.g. Beitz, 1982), not least because of their wide degree of institutional capacity and autonomy to promote developmental goals without being ‘captured’ by particularistic interests – what Evans (1995) called ‘embedded autonomy’. Although these claims are strongly supported by the well-known developmental success stories of the East Asian ‘Tigers’(see Birdsall et al., 1995), on a global scale, the poor developmental records of authoritarian regimes makes it even more difficult to escape the association between non-democratic rule and development failure (Lewis, 2008; Crawford and Abdulai, 2012). Yet, it is equally difficult to sustain Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2005: 359-60) claim that there is a “greater tendency for redistributive policies in democracies”. Recent evidence suggests that “income inequality in the majority of democracies has either remained constant or increased” (Network of Democracy Research Institute, 2009:2).
Indeed, much of the literature suggests that far from concerns about equitable development, the fundamental driver of public resource allocation in many democratic regimes is essentially a question of how to maximise the political returns on public investments in order to retain political power. Accordingly, observers have highlighted the tendency of elected politicians to target public resources disproportionately to their ‘core supporters’ (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Weinstein, 2010) or to regions with relatively large numbers of “swing” voters based on political calculations (e.g. Cox and McCubbin,
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1988; Cox, 2006). Thus, contrary to earlier expectations that democratisation would be the means to overcoming the prevalence of patron-client politics that impede broad-based development in poor countries (e.g. Lemarchand, 1988), the empirical evidence shows that in countries as diverse as Argentina (e.g. Remmer, 2007) and Uganda (e.g. Joughin and Kjær, 2010), increased electoral competition tend to contribute to increased patronage spending. Finan (2004:32) describes political patronage as “the principal impediment for equity enhancing reform in Brazil”, as resources are increasingly diverted away from needs-based allocation for electoral gains.
The above observations provide support for Khan’s (2005) argument that the persistence of clientelist politics in developing countries is not driven by the absence of democracy, but rather by the structural features of their economies (p.722). Khan contends that the generally low level of economic development in such countries means that “[t]he only viable redistributive strategy for developing country political entrepreneurs is to organize enough organizational muscle to be able to capture resources through a combination of fiscal, off-budget and even illegal means” (p.718). Consequently, the political settlements of many developing countries, according to Khan (2010: 4), remain generally clientelist despite democratization.
Lindberg (2003) offers a more politically-attuned explanation regarding why multiparty elections may indeed reinforce rather than counteract political patronage in developing countries. He argues that competitive elections may reinforce political clientelism because ruling elites will need to have an even tighter grip on material resources in order to prevent competitive patronage networks from emerging. Thus, competitive democratic elections have the tendency of generating ‘competitive clientelism’. In Khan’s notion of political settlements, competitive clientelist organisations, which “are typically associated with developing country democracies” (Khan, 2011: 48, original emphasis), are especially likely in contexts where ruling elites are faced with a strong excluded opposition and strong lower levels of ruling coalitions. Together, these factors render ruling elites vulnerable in power, which in turn drive them towards the clientelist distribution of public resources in order to maintain power. Recent research show that since political elites now increasingly need to win competitive elections, there has been a tendency for dominant elites to target resources to opposition strongholds (Kjær and Therkildsen, 2011; Morjaria, 2012).
Finally, it is worth noting that although the democracy-patronage debate has been predicated largely on the assumption that clientelist politics are inherently bad for ‘good
32 governance’ and development, recent scholarship has increasingly cautioned against such assumptions. Such observers argue that depending on the particular historical and political motivations of the ruling elite, “[p]atronage can be exercised in constructive as well as destructive ways” (Crook, 2010:490; also Kelsall and Booth, 2010; Hickey, 2012). I return to these debates with specific reference to the problem of inequality in sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 2).
Federal/decentralised versus unitary/centralised systems There is also a debate about the differing effectiveness of federal and unitary systems of government in overcoming regional inequalities. While some claim that a unitary system, with its centralised tendencies, is better placed to redistribute resources between regions, others maintain that the fear of secession can alone ensure an equitable distribution of public resources in federal systems (Shepherd et al., 2004). Yet, Shankar and Shah’s (2003) study of 24 countries show that both unitary and federal countries are becoming more unequal, while a few of both are becoming more equal. This suggests that the success or failure of regional development policies does not simply follow from the fact of a country’s political system.
Nonetheless, some still maintain that an effective decentralised system of governance has the potential to help achieve greater equity and balanced development. Notably, because regional elites are assumed to have better information about their regions, it is claimed that decentralising power to regional leaders would make public spending more reflective of diverse regional preferences and therefore contribute to balanced development (Bakke and Wibbles, 2006). Yet, for some observers, to the extent that devolution compromises the redistributive role of national governments, it “can play a part in allowing inequalities to develop” (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003:21). Empirically, even Crook’s (2003) analysis of the “‘best documented’ African cases” of decentralisation did not point to any evidence of decentralised governance contributing to a reduction in spatial inequalities. One reason was that central governments, in “most” of his selected cases, were using decentralised structures and resources “either to create ab initio a dependent local elite or to consolidate an alliance with local elites based on availability of patronage” (p.85). Such findings provide grounds for arguing that if Africa’s best documented decentralization projects have failed to address the material needs of historically excluded regions, then decentralised governance is unlikely to lead to decreased spatial inequality elsewhere in the continent.
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1.6.4 Political representation and power relations
In the introduction to this study, I drew attention to a growing recognition of the role of power relations as one of the most important forms of politics that shape broader development processes and outcomes. Such perspectives perceive the problem of persistent inequality as the consequence of people’s differential access to political power, how that power is exercised in shaping the design and actual functioning of state institutions, and how these in turn shape the distribution of valued state resources and development outcomes (see Bird, 2008; Green 2008; Parks and Cole, 2010).
Given the centrality of the concept of power in these claims, and the contested meanings associated with this concept (see Lukes, 2005), it is useful to first clarify what is meant by power her. Following Hyden (2008:13), I use the term power to refer to “the ability to achieve a desired outcome in competition with other actors who lay claim to the same resources needed to produce that outcome” (original italics). The idea of power, in this context, is understood not simply as an “an ability or capacity” (or ‘power to’), but one which emphasises relationships (Lukes, 2005:34). This definition corresponds with Steven Lukes’ idea of ‘visible power’, which applies to political decision-making where there is an actual, and thus observable, conflict of interests, at times expressed as differing policy preferences (Lukes, 2005:18). Lukes (2005) distinguishes this idea from his notion of ‘hidden power’, which extends the scope of power to control over the agenda of political decision-making. ‘Hidden power’ highlights the ways in which “political systems prevent demands [of the less powerful] from becoming political issues or even from being made” (Lukes, 2005:40). Here, power manifests itself in the capacity to determine which issues can be discussed, and which are excluded by virtue of being perceived as detrimental to the interests of the more powerful (Lukes, 2005:22).
Mosse (2007; 2010) extends these views into poverty analysis, drawing attention to the importance of the second-order ‘agenda-setting powers’ that set the terms in which poverty becomes (or fails to become) politicised. Power in this respect manifests itself in what he calls “ the non-issue ”, whereby the interests of politically-marginalised regions get excluded from the political agenda and from the mandates or institutions of public policy. From this perspective, regional inequalities persist because the development concerns of politically excluded regions tend to remain “invisible and their needs unpoliticised” (Mosse, 2010:1165).
Together, the above observations point to the different ways in which inequalities in political power can undermine public investments and result in the socio-economic 34 exclusion of regions with limited influence over decision-making structures and processes. One key assumption is that because the choice of policy decisions can have differential implications for the development prospects of different regions within a country, “[d]ifferences in political power between regions can result in intended or unintended biases in government policies” (United Nations, 2001:109). Writing on England, Amin and colleagues (2003) argue that the problem of regional inequalities have been “the product of a long history of imbalanced inter-regional relations and the profound spatial concentration of power” (pp. 24-25), especially as it relates to the concentration of political power in London and the South Eastern part of the country.
These arguments echo the claim that “[i]nequalities in income and human capabilities often reflect inequalities in political power” (UNDP, 2005:53), whereby “unequal power leads to the formation of institutions that perpetuate inequalities in power, status and wealth” (World Bank, 2005: 9). The WDR 2006 emphasises the point that institutions, and the policies they formulate and implement, are not benign entities that aim to enhance welfare across society, but rather political entities that reflect power relations within any given society (Ibid). There are strong echoes here with Khan’s argument that the durability of political settlements depend on the extent to which there is equilibrium between the interests of powerful actors and the institutions that govern the behaviour of individual actors:
“Institutions and the distribution of power have to be compatible , because if powerful groups are not getting an acceptable distribution of benefits from an institutional structure they will strive to change it” (Khan, 2010: 4, original emphasis).
The discussion here suggests that access to political power can serve as a crucial means to advancing the socio-economic development of a region in as much as the lack of it can reinforce its socio-economic exclusion. Importantly, country case studies frequently show that as far as the distribution of government resources is concerned, the strategy employed by regional representatives in national political institutions often involves pork-barrel politics, with each trying to acquire as much central spending for their constituencies as possible. With a region’s capacity to effectively lobby and attract government expenditures dependent on its possession of ‘bargaining chips’ and the degree of its representation in key national decision-making organs, it is not surprising that “unequal regional representation in national decision-making organs is often related to the unequal distribution of central [government’s] spending across regions” (Shaoguang, 2005:5). This claim is somewhat supported by Brockerhoff and Hewett’s (1998) analysis of the ethno- 35 regional pattern of child mortality in some 12 sub-Saharan African countries during the 1990s. With the notable exception of Zambia, their findings showed that levels of complete childhood immunization and early child survival chances were significantly higher among the ethnic groups with high-level of government representation, plausibly because such political influence gave the favoured ethnic groups better access to health clinics and well- paved roads. Interestingly, their results also pointed to “a consistent bias in road infrastructure and access to public health services in favour of ethnic groups that have held political power” (p.18).
Studies by Atlas et al. (1995), Kraemer (1997), Meyer & Naka (1999) and Kawaura (2003) have also confirmed that even in matured democracies like the United States and Japan, the geographical distribution of government expenditures tends to reflect the regional strength of legislative representation. Indeed, even in apparently non-democratic contexts where leaders have nothing to worry about so-called democratic accountability, recent research has established a “significant” relationship between the spatial patterns of resource allocation and the nature of elite coalitions. This has been illustrated by the experience of China, where “unequal provincial representation in central decision making [tend to] have visible effects on provinces’ shares of central transfers” (Shaoguang, 2005:3), not least as “Chinese politicians tend to use fiscal transfers to please their constituents... as do their counterparts in electoral democracies” (Ibid). Where more disaggregated expenditure data is available, as in the case of India (Khemani, 2004) and Thailand (Kawaura, 2011), the evidence often shows that between capital and current expenditures, it is the former, over which politicians have more discretion, that are frequently targeted to favoured constituents. The Ghanaian experience explored in the present research reflects this claim, evident in my comparison of regional recurrent and capital health sector expenditures during the 1990s (see Chapter 5).
1.6.5 The influence and limits of aid donors
“In country after country in the developing world, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been highly successful in ‘capturing’ the state” (Gutierrez, 2011:6).
“International action cannot compensate for poor governance and bad national policies” (UNDP, 2005:71).
The previous sections have highlighted a number of endogenous factors that potentially shape the spatial patterns of development, ranging from geographical variations to embedded political power relations among elites. However, such explanations cannot be sufficient within the context of the ‘governance states’ (Harrison, 2004) of sub-Saharan
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Africa where control over policy-making is substantially shared between governments and donors. There is broad agreement, for example, that the conditionality-driven market liberalization policies orchestrated by donors under the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s have had important spatial implications in many poor countries. Notably, the introduction of user fees for basic services under SAPs made access to education and health care more difficult for the poorest in ways that not only “exacerbated inequalities” (United Nations, 2005:109), but also contributed to “increased social polarisation” (Mohan, 2009: 7) in some cases. Moreover, to the extent that the SAPs were geared largely towards export agriculture at the expense of food crop production, it tended to accrue disproportionate benefits to regions whose geographical locations and other initial conditions were better suited for export-oriented production and thereby deepening spatial inequalities (Anyinam, 1994).
Towards the late 1990s, several factors, including concerns about aid effectiveness and the issue of policy sovereignty in developing countries led to an introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) by the IMF and the World Bank as their new framework for development assistance to poor countries. The production of a PRSP became a condition for receiving various concessional credits and grants, including debt relief via the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative. A country’s PRSP is required to outline its anti-poverty strategy and stipulates how donor funding, including HIPC resources, would be used to reduce poverty. Taking cognisance of some of the criticisms of SAPs, the PRSPs emphasise ‘country ownership’ and broad-based civil society participation, both of which were “intended to reduce the risk of slippages in implementation as the countries themselves take greater responsibility for the design and success of their economic plans” (IMF, 2000:114). Moreover, broad-based participation and national ownership were expected to enhance the accountability of decision-makers to domestic constituencies (Hickey and Mohan, 2008) and by extension “elicit greater commitment to equitable and efficient development policies” (Booth, 2005:1).
Critics have argued, however, that the PRSP experiment has not altered the fundamental power relations between poor countries and the IFIs in any significant way, not least as the so-called ‘nationally-owned’ poverty reduction strategies require the ‘endorsement’ of the IMF and the World Bank if donor resources are to be made available for their implementation (Stewart and Wang, 2003; Craig and Porter, 2003). Yet, for Bwalya et al (2004), even the attainment of ‘national ownership’ would not necessarily strengthen domestic accountability and contribute to equitable development outcomes. Drawing
37 evidence from Zambia and Malawi, they note of how the implementation of ‘impressive’ development strategies have often been undermined by powerful domestic elites in the pursuit of their interests, and go on to caution that the emphasis on ‘national ownership’ in the PRSPs can be “a double edged sword” (p.4):
“While greater national ownership may challenge the power of external agents, it does not follow that it would also alter the domestic, neo-patrimonial power relationships inherent in national institutions” (p.5).
This observation resonates with Booth’s (2005) argument that the theory of political change that underlies the PRSP experiment is a “mistaken” interpretation of the character of politics in most aid-dependent countries. He highlights the tendency of proponents of the PRSP idea to exaggerate the role that can be played by the introduction of formalised processes and spaces within contexts where politics is essentially driven “by networks of clientelism and patronage” (p.5). Similarly, Eberlie et al (2005:12) draw attention to the likelihood of the reforms manifested in the PRSPs to “be usurped by neopatrimonial interests” (see also Eberlie, 2005). Empirical evidence from Ethiopia suggests, for example, that “...even before the PRSP ink was barely dry, key policy decisions, for resettlement, education, water sector reforms, all differed from the PRSP commitments” (Craig and Porter, 2005:88). As we will see, such observations strongly reflect the Ghanaian experience, evidenced in the ways in which clientelist politics and power relations undermined formal institutional arrangements within the framework of the country’s PRSPs in ways that resulted in the marginalisation of the poorer Northern regions (Chapter 6).
1.6.6 Summary
The above review reveals that most of the theoretical explanations on spatial inequalities do not provide convincing accounts regarding the question of persistent regional disparities. While the explanations that focus on the value of free markets versus state intervention as well as the question of regime-type have now become increasingly obsolete, one approach which can rarely be dismissed altogether relates to the arguments concerning agro-climatic variations. The review also indicates, however, that it is ‘second- nature’ geography such as the spatial distribution of infrastructure that is more important in explaining why some regions become and remain poor. Moreover, it should be emphasised that geography by itself does not automatically confer any advantage for the development of a region unless the resources associated with such geographical advantages are exploited. Much therefore depends on what state elites choose to do or not to do.
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Moreover, although donor agencies have become key players in shaping the development processes of many aid-dependent countries, the review here shows that donors cannot easily overcome local elite resistance to reforms that do not sufficiently serve the interests of powerful domestic constituents. Consequently, policies aimed at promoting more equitable forms of development are unlikely to succeed without state elites’ support. Against this background, my theoretical approach to the study of Ghana’s North-South inequalities focuses on the inclusiveness of governmental coalitions. Based on an assumption that the spatial patterns of socio-economic development are significantly shaped by the spatial patterns of public resource allocation, the interest is to see whether and how embedded power relations in the domestic political environment have influenced the actual functioning of state institutions with regards to resource allocation processes and outcomes. I do so through the two related concepts of social exclusion and adverse incorporation, as explained in some detail below.
1.7 Social exclusion and adverse incorporation: a framework for understanding persistent regional inequalities
The term social exclusion was initially coined to describe various categories of people who were left out of state contributory benefits in Western Europe, but has since the 1990s been extended to encompass the multidimensional and relational aspects of deprivation and poverty (Moore et al., 2008). From this multidimensional perspective, the concept of exclusion has come to denote situations in which a broad range of factors – from physical and mental disability to gender, unequal power relations, the nature of regional and spatial integration – prevent individuals from participating fully in social, political and economic life (du Toit, 2008; Koti, 2010). The notion of exclusion, f rom the spatial perspective, sees persistent inequality as essentially a product of some peoples’ “limited/inequitable opportunities and capabilities to participate in decision making, gain access to meaningful livelihood opportunities and social services due to discriminatory institutional practices in the political economic, social spheres...” (UNDP, 2007:12).
Although a multidimensional concept, encompassing social, economic, cultural and political dimensions, many analysts have emphasised inequitable access to political decision-making structures as a particularly consequential dimension of exclusion, as “political inequalities … often lead to bias in the distribution of government resources” (UNRISD, 2010:85). The two key-related assumptions here are that, first, inequality in the distribution of political power leads to a disproportionate public spending; and, second, that a key characteristic of lagging regions which underpins their relative deprivation is 39 their weak influence over the decision making structures of the state (World Bank, 2005). From this perspective, the route to enhancing balanced regional development is to ensure the integration of poorer regions into key political decision-making institutions. One recent study claims that “without political inclusivity, there is little chance of implementing effective remedial policies for disadvantaged groups” (UNRISD, 2010: 82; also Stewart, 2009).
There are debates regarding the usefulness of the concept of exclusion in explaining relative deprivation in developing countries. Kabeer (2000) makes a strong case for the value addition of this concept, stressing that the idea of exclusion is particularly useful in poverty analysis where deprivation results from some people being ‘set apart’ or ‘locked out’ of participation in socio-economic and political development processes. Laderchi et al (2003) argue that a key strength of this concept, vis -à-vis the monetary, capability or participatory approaches, is that it “is the only one that focuses intrinsically, rather than as an add-on, on the processes and dynamics that allow deprivation to arise and persist” (p.23). Sen (2000) similarly points to the relational focus of the social exclusion discourse as one of its most significant contributions to poverty analysis.
Emphasising the Western roots of this concept, some have argued, however, that the idea of exclusion is ill-suited for unravelling the factors that underpin poverty and inequality in developing countries. Gore (1994) notes that whereas the concept was developed to describe ‘pockets’ of poverty faced by a small ‘underclass’ in industrialised countries, poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is a mass phenomenon. This means that if being ‘socially excluded’ is synonymous with being left out in the formal economy, then the notion of social exclusion will imply that nearly whole populations in Africa are ‘excluded’. Nonetheless, Gore (ibid) acknowledges that a complex politics of exclusion and inclusion has formed an important part of the histories of African societies. In particular, he identifies exclusion from political forms of organisation and representation as a key dimension of social exclusion in sub-Saharan Africa, and focuses on forms of incorporation in clientelist systems. Here, “exclusion from representation is seen in terms of lack of access to the economic advantages that pertain to government offices and a major axis of organisation involves the formation of clientalistic networks and factions” (Gore, 1994, not paginated).
Scholars have also criticised the overly-simplistic included/excluded dichotomy embedded in the concept of exclusion, arguing that persistent spatial inequality in much of sub- Saharan Africa stems not only from exclusion but also from people’s incorporation into
40 socio-economic and political life on disadvantageous terms. Associating the idea of social exclusion to the capability perspective of poverty, Sen (2000:28-9) cautions against trying to explain all cases of capability deprivation in terms of exclusion. He notes that “many problems of deprivation arise from unfavourable terms of inclusion and adverse participation, rather than what can be sensibly seen primarily as a case of exclusion as such”. It is thus “very important”, he argues, that we “distinguish between the nature of a problem where some people are being kept out (or at least left out ) and the characteristics of a different problem where some people are being included…in deeply unfavourable terms” (original emphasis). In fact, Gore (1994) argues that a conventional wisdom had emerged by the mid-1970s “that individuals and communities in Africa had been incorporated into the broader economy and society and that what was problematical was their terms of incorporation” (not paginated).
Arising mainly from the above critique, one concept that has increasingly become prevalent in current development thinking has been the notion of ‘adverse incorporation’ (AI) – “a situation in which people are included in social, political and economic spheres but on unfavourable terms” (Moore et al., 2008:13). This concept challenges the widely held view that poverty is caused primarily by people being ‘left out’ in broader socio- economic and political institutions and processes (Bernstein et al., 1992), while emphasising how unfavourable terms of incorporation into such institutions and processes can itself be the source of underdevelopment (CPRC, 2008a: 130).
Adverse incorporation sees development as a process by which some regions, and the people within those regions, may become and stay poorer precisely because of the way they are integrated economically, socially and politically into national, regional or global webs of interaction (Hickey and du Toit, 2007; Bird et al, 2010). There are some echoes here with the Marxist critique of capitalism discussed in an earlier section, in which persistent regional inequality was seen as a function not of the exclusion of poorer regions within the capitalist space economy, but rather, as an outcome of the subordinate incorporation of peripheral regions into exploitative and imperialist economic networks. The notion of adverse incorporation, according to Bernstein (2007:1), thus has its “roots in the definitive class relations and accumulation dynamics of capitalism more generally”.
The above observations have led some analysts to speak of the “greater accuracy” of adverse incorporation as a concept (Bracking, 2003:5), and that this concept “is perhaps more appropriate than the now conventionally predominant idea of ‘social exclusion’” when investigating chronic poverty (Murray, 2001:5). Such suggestions are not
41 unproblematic, however, not least as they do not consider the possibility of people and indeed whole geographical regions being both socially excluded and adversely incorporated. Moore et al. (2008:13) have argued, for example, that migrant labourers and their families in many parts of the world are not only often excluded from public services and the institutions of governance; they are in most cases also simultaneously adversely incorporated into exploitative labour markets. This echoes Silver’s (1994) argument that “the excluded are simultaneously excluded and dominated” (quoted in Hickey and du Toit, 2007:5).
It is also important to recognise the complex ways in which processes of exclusion and adverse forms of inclusion can work in mutually-reinforcing ways in underpinning the spatial dimensions of inequality. One potential scenario is the way in which inequalities in political power among regional elites can shape the inequitable distribution of state resources. Notably in sub-Saharan Africa where the highly personalised nature of political power has been well noted (Jackson & Rosberg 1982; Kelsall, 2008), the exclusion and /or adverse incorporation of a region into the polity can have important implications in the spatial distribution of patronage resources. Several analysts, among them Boone (1994) and Arriola (2009) have argued that an important feature of politics in Africa has been the broad-based incorporation of ethno-regional spokespersons into their ruling coalitions, both as a means to discouraging potential rivals from coordinating other elites against them, and to giving credibility to their promises to distribute patronage among political elites and the constituencies whom they represent. But as Mustapha (2006) and Stewart (2010a) have argued, the power of patronage varies significantly across different government positions, such that the formal political representation of all regions may not necessarily translate into their capacity to influence resource allocation decisions in the interest of their constituents. For example, it is unlikely that a deputy minister can have the same ‘agenda-setting-power’ as a minister with full cabinet status, in as much as it may be naive to expect a minister for Information to have the same power over the public purse as the Minister for Finance.
The key point here is that whereas ruling elites are unlikely to fully exclude any ethno- regional group from cabinet, they may still foster the adverse incorporation of elites from marginalised regions on terms that do not enhance their influence over policy agenda in the interest of their constituents. In such contexts, it is possible for inequitable forms of political inclusion to undermine resource flows to marginalised regions, resulting in the exclusion of the poorest from the distribution of public resources. Underdeveloped regions,
42 under such circumstances, may continue to lag behind through the interplay of processes of political adverse incorporation at the elite level and socio-economic forms of exclusion at the mass level (see also Chapter 2). I use the words ‘elite’ and ‘mass’ here to emphasise the point that it is ordinary citizens from adversely incorporated regions who are likely to be affected by the adverse incorporation of their representatives, so long as they do not benefit substantially from public policy choices. In contrast, the elites themselves may still be able to derive substantial personal benefits from their adverse incorporation such as through salaries and various patronage resources. I return to this point in Chapter 2.
The above discussion suggests the need to think of adverse incorporation and social exclusion as potential complementary frameworks when seeking to investigate the social and political relations that make people poor and keep them in poverty (Green, 2005; Green and Hulme, 2005). Thus, Hickey and Du Toit (2007:1) have called for a “closer interrogation of the linkages between the state of chronic poverty on the one hand and, on the other, the processes of adverse incorporation and/or social exclusion that trap people under poverty” (original emphasis). This suggestion is based on the fact that both concepts share a preoccupation with politics, the historical nature of development problems as well as the multidimensional nature of deprivation (Hickey and Bracking, 2005; Harriss, 2007). Moreover, both concepts emphasise the relational (rather than residual) nature of poverty, with persistent inequalities thus seen as a function of power relations in society rather than the internalized cultural characteristics of poor people.
This study responds to the above call by combining the concepts of adverse incorporation and social exclusion (AISE) to explore the politics of persistent regional disparities in Ghana. An AISE perspective can provide a particularly useful lens for exploring problems of regional inequality because it provides an opportunity to correlate the spatial distribution of political power among regional elites with the output of decision-making processes such as the allocation of socio-economic resources. Such an approach refocuses attention from the often power-blind accounts of persistent regional inequalities such as the ‘bad geography’ arguments noted above as well as those provided by economistic explanations. Moreover, the AISE framework draws attention to some of the weaknesses of the ideologically-driven diagnostics of underdevelopment. This relates in particular to arguments that simply emphasise defects in liberal democratic modes of governance without taking into account the ways in which power relations and informal institutions such as patron-client organisations can undermine the effective operation of formal democratic institutions.
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However, whereas an AISE perspective is useful in drawing us towards a more relational approach to poverty analysis, these concepts cannot in themselves help us understand the politics of spatial inequality in any great depth. For example, the concepts of exclusion and adverse incorporation do not seem to tell us much, if anything, about the key underlying drivers of clientelist forms of politics that seems to be at the centre of shaping the design and actual functioning of state institutions, and how these in turn shape development processes and outcomes in poor countries. It is in recognition of some of these gaps that I usefully combine an AISE framework in this study with a political settlements approach to undertake a more detailed political analysis of Ghana’s historical North-South inequalities. As noted in the introductory section of this chapter, this study is interested not only in establishing whether power relations matter in the development process, but also how and why they matter. The political settlements literature has greater potential for addressing the why and how aspects of my research questions by enabling an investigation of the ways in which the incentives of powerful elites derive them to shaping and adjusting institutions in ways that advance their interest.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that employing the political settlements framework in an analysis of persistent regional inequalities is not without weaknesses. A particularly important shortcoming relates to the ‘rational actor’ bias interpretation of elite behaviour embedded in this framework, whereby the actions of state elites are “driven primarily by pursuit of an inter-related set of economic and power interests” (Parks and Cole, 2010:8). There are at least two-related problems with this claim. First, such arguments seem to suggest that because dominant state elites will always act to advance their individual interests, the implementation of policies aimed at overcoming spatial inequality are contingent on the question of whether elites from lagging regions have a strong representation in government. Such an assumption echoes Gradus’ (1983) depiction of greater access to political power by poorer regions as a prerequisite to achieving balanced development, without which regional development policies are “doomed to failure” (p.399). This study’s findings reject such pessimistic claims, and argues that although Northern elites’ lack of ‘agenda-setting powers’ has played a crucial role in underpinning Ghana’s North-South inequality, the solution to this problem does not necessarily depend on enhancing Northern politicians’ access to political power.
Moreover, there is now growing recognition that state elites do sometimes support development programmes that benefit the poor on ideological grounds. Therkildsen (2011:34) has recently drawn attention to the role of an “ideological legacy of party driven
44 modernisation of agriculture” in informing the implementation of a massive irrigation project for rice production in Tanzania, one which was neither motivated by winning elections nor strengthening the ruling coalition more broadly (see also Birner and Resnic, 2010). Similarly, Hickey’s (2012) recent six-country comparative research found a number of pro-poor interventions to have been driven by an elite conviction that the predicaments of the intended recipients were caused by wider forces beyond their control (such as discriminatory colonial policies), with targeted policies towards the poor generally implemented as an integral part of a wider process of nation building. This suggests that rather than simply on the grounds of self-interest, the ideological orientation of a political regime may also be important in shaping the policy choices of state elites, and therefore their behaviour towards a reduction of poverty and spatial inequalities. Nonetheless, it is argued here that the political discourse around nation building in postcolonial Africa played a rather minimal role in targeting public resources to the regions that were most victimised by the colonial project. Rather, what was more evident was the adverse incorporation of political elites from such regions into ruling coalitions in ways that further contributed to underpinning the spatial patterns of development initiated by colonial policies (see Chapter 2).
1.8 Thesis structure
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 utilises the analytical framework outlined above to explore the evolution and persistence of regional inequality in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The chapter also provides details on the research methods and data sources on which this research is based.
Chapter 3 provides the historical background to my main empirical chapters. Although the chapter traces Ghana’s North-South inequalities to pre-colonial times, especially during the period of the slave trade, it argues that the colonial state was especially responsible for laying the foundations of the contemporary North-South development gaps. The goal of colonial policies was to preserve the North as a labour reserve, and the pursuit of this agenda entailed a simultaneous exclusion of the region from public investments and political decision making processes on the one hand, and its adverse incorporation into the colonial economy as a source of cheap labour on the other. The chapter argues further that the failure of the immediate postcolonial regimes (1957-1992) to overcome the colonial legacy of uneven regional development relates to the inequitable terms upon which
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Northern elites were incorporated into the polity during this period, constraining their influence over resource allocation decisions in the interest of the North.
Chapter 4 focused on an analysis of the extent and nature of regional elites’ access to political power during 1993-2008. This period covers the administration of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) government under President Rawlings (1993-2000) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) administration under President Kufuor (2001-2008). The chapter lays the basis for understanding the implications of the spatial distribution of political power for the spatial patterns of public resource distribution during these periods in subsequent chapters. The analysis shows that the North continued to be disadvantaged in terms of regional political representation under both parties, especially that of the NPP regime of the 2000s. The chapter also highlights the importance of patronage forms of politics in understanding the politics of regional inequality in Ghana.
Chapter 5 is the first of the three main empirical chapters of the thesis, and focuses on exploring the politics of social service provisioning and their implications for regional inequalities in access to education and health care. It argues that an important factor that explains the persistent North-South inequalities with regards to health and education outcomes relates to the relative exclusion of the North from public expenditures in these sectors. These inequitable patterns of spending are underpinned by patronage forms of politics arising largely from growing electoral pressures; and the relatively weak influence of Northern elites over resource allocation decisions in favour of their constituents.
Chapter 6 explores the politics of donor-influenced type of expenditures in order to test the theory of political change that underlies the PRSP experiment. It does so through a case study of the Ghana HIPC Fund which was established within the framework of the country’s first PRSP. The chapter argues that the process-based conditionalities associated with the PRSP experiment has only been successful in shaping the content but not the actual implementation of Ghana’s PRSPs and have therefore not resulted in more pro-poor and equitable forms of development. The main explanatory factor lies in unequal power relations among regional elites, not least as the more powerful Southern-based elites rejected the application of an agreed pro-poor resource distribution criteria (that was to favour the North) and distributed HIPC Funds in ways that were deemed politically- desirable for maintaining political power.
Chapter 7 shifts the focus of inquiry from social provisioning to investments in economic productivity. It shows that the two key political processes that shape basic service provisioning, namely electoral incentives and the nature of elite coalitions – both entwined 46 with patronage forms of politics – are also important to understanding the politics of productive sector investments and their implications for regional income inequalities in contemporary Ghana.
Chapter 8 synthesizes the evidence on the ways in which political processes have historically underpinned Ghana’s regional inequalities, and draws out the implications of the findings for both theory and policy.
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Chapter 2. Adverse incorporation, social exclusion and regional inequality in sub-Saharan Africa: towards a methodological framework
“Social exclusion and adverse incorporation are underlying causal processes that sustain inequity through the power relationships between people and key institutions, such as the state and the market” (Jones, 2009:12).
2.1 Introduction
Adopting an AISE approach to examining regional inequalities demands that we look more closely at the relationships of power across multiple spheres – political, social and economic – and the ways in which such relationships shape both the reduction and reproduction of poverty. In keeping with the main interest of this thesis, which seeks to investigate the role of political forms of exclusion and/or adverse incorporation at the level of elites in shaping socio-economic forms of exclusion at the mass level, this chapter seeks to undertake three broad tasks. First, it seeks to show how the pursuit of the interests of colonial powers resulted in the simultaneous exclusion and adverse incorporation of some regions in sub-Saharan Africa, and how this in turn contributed to laying a foundation for regional inequality in the region. Second, in seeking to understand the persistence of the patterns of inequality created by colonial rule, the chapter explores the nature of postcolonial political settlements in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing particularly on 1) an understanding of the different ways in which regional elites have been incorporated into the polity and 2) how these differential forms of political incorporation have contributed to shaping resource allocation outcomes and their underlying implications for regional inequality. In a third step, the chapter presents the methodology for the rest of the thesis from an AISE/political settlements perspective.
2.2 Regional inequality in Africa: A colonial legacy
Although most contemporary African states were constructed under colonial rule, the foundation was in most cases laid by the consequences of European trade as well as political relations among kingdoms and tribes during the pre-colonial period (Osaghae, 2006). The advent of European trade, notably the slave trade, propelled “tribal” wars that changed the face of pre-colonial state formations and ethnic relations in Africa, not least as it introduced new relations of ‘superior-inferior’ groups based on military strength and new forms of conquest and dominance (Ibid). Although colonial rule marked the end of slave raiding in many countries, the colonial state itself set the stage for uneven regional
48 development in various ways. First, as part of a deliberate divide and rule strategy which sustained colonial rule, colonial powers systematically privileged certain ethnic groups over others (Chabal, 1992:131). The Germans clearly favoured the Ewe in Togo, the English the Baganda in Uganda, and the Belgians the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi, and the Lulua in Congo (Platteau, 2000, cited in Alwy and Schech, 2004). Importantly, because ethnic groups often correlate well with administrative regions in Africa (Groth and Wade, 1984:14), the patterns of inequalities created by these policies assumed ethno-regional dimensions.
Second, given that the primary interest in colonization was to exploit the colonies rather than enhance their development (Mohan, 2011; Vu, 2010), transport and communication infrastructure as well as the provision of basic social services (notably education) were “very unevenly distributed in nearly all the colonies” (Boahene, 1987:101). Such resources were largely concentrated in areas where exploitable natural resources were available and in coastal areas where colonial powers typically built their administrative centres (van de Walle, 2009:317). In the context of Ghana, this meant the concentration of various socio-economic development funds in the South where resources such as gold and timber were available for exploitation (see Chapter 3).
Third, regions characterised by limited exploitable resources were not only generally excluded from public spending (Rothchild, 1969, 1984); the human capital of these regions were also typically exploited through their adverse incorporation into the wider economy as sources of cheap labour. As part of a restructuring of indigenous economies in the interest of the colonial powers, one feature of colonial rule in Africa was the destruction of the pre-capitalist mode of production (Lemarchand, 1983:10). These restructuring processes, in many cases, involved the designation of the regions with limited resources of interest to the colonial powers as reservoirs for cheap labour. Thus in Zambia, to the extent that the Bemba speaking groups were located in regions with relatively low agricultural potentials, they “formed the bulk of the non-clerical, African labour force in the mines” (Dresang, 1974:1606). Historical accounts of the roots of the North-South inequalities in countries such as Nigeria (Mustapha, 2006) and Uganda (Mamdani, 1983) highlight how the British colonial administration discouraged the production of cash crops in the North, mainly with the objective of recruiting cheap labour from these areas for export-oriented production in the South. Colonial regimes initially resorted to coercive measures to securing an adequate labour force mainly from these deprived regions, but subsequently abandoned such methods in favour of more subtle measures such as the
49 imposition of taxation (Hyden, 1985:202). In sum, to the extent that the modernizing influences brought about by colonialism penetrated different ethno-regional groups in unequal degrees (Osaghae, 1994:142), this was both due to the simultaneous exclusion and adverse incorporation of some ethno-regional groups within the colonial economy.
It should be added that these two processes of exclusion and adverse incorporation tended to reinforce each other in underpinning high levels of deprivation among the marginalised ethno-regional groups. For example, the exclusion of such regions from productive investments, along with measures such as taxation played important roles in underpinning their adverse incorporation within the colonial economy as sources of cheap labour. Moreover, Lando and Bujra (2009:5-6) highlight how colonial policies impoverished certain ethno-regional groups in Kenya through their adverse incorporation as labour reserves, emphasising that “such policies were possible because ... institutions such as the Legislative Council (Legco) in which only white settlers were represented effectively ‘captured’ public policy for the interest of this elite”. van de Walle (2009) has similarly highlighted the various extractive tendencies of the colonial state in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, and argues that such policies were “made possible by the lack of political representation of the local population” (p. 319). All these observations point to the crucial role of political forms of exclusion in underpinning the socio-economic marginalisation of the populations concerned via their disempowering terms of inclusion in other spheres of the wider political colonial economy.
It is important to add that these differential patterns of incorporation also played a role in processes of postcolonial state formation in ways that was to set a tone for the continued dominance of the disadvantaged regions in the immediate post-independent period. In particular, the selective development of educational systems impacted the regional patterns of human capital formations, laying a foundation for the socio-economic and political dominance of the disadvantaged regions in the post-colonial period (Rothchild, 1985:84; van de Walle, 2009). Second, these discriminatory practices against some regions meant that the colonial state bequeathed a legacy of high social fragmentation which, as Chabal (1992:131) notes, was to prove “politically consequential for the post-colonial order”. One reason is that it set a basis for heightened opposition to, and redistributive demands from, the power holders of the newly independent states (Osaghae, 2006). Rothchild and Olorunsola (1983) classify such ethno-regional claims on the new rulings elites into low- intensity demands for distributional benefits to high-intensity demands for separate statehood which threatened the very existence of the state itself (p.10). Thus, the newly
50 independent African “state came to be seen as an arena of struggle between different groups vying for control over its resources” (Azarya, 1988:4). How then did the new ruling elites respond to such demands, and why has the attainment of political independence in sub-Saharan Africa failed to alter the patterns of regional disparities created by colonial rule?
2.3 Regional inequality and postcolonial African states
This section explores the strategies adopted by postcolonial African regimes in overcoming the colonial legacy of social fragmentations and the implications of such strategies for the problem of regional inequalities. I do so by focusing on one key political strategy, namely their incorporation of elites from the marginalised ethno-regional groups into ruling coalitions. But given that relations of “economic, social and political power are frequently intertwined in Africa” (Parpart, 1988:208), my particular interest in this discussion is to understand the ways in which the historically-marginalised regions were incorporated into the polity, the underlying motivation for their incorporation, and the implications of such forms of incorporation for their socio-economic development prospects. Before then, however, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the nature of the state in post- independent Africa. I do so by focusing on its neo-patrimonial characteristics.
2.3.1 The neo-patrimonial nature of African states: implications for inequality
In Chapter 1, I noted of the potential adverse implications of patron-client politics in undermining prospects for equitable regional development. This is because clientelist politics may mean that the distribution of public goods is diverted from a need-based approach to one aimed at meeting the political objectives of dominant elites. Although the previous chapter has also already noted of the prevalence of clientelist political settlements in all developing country democracies (Khan, 2011), it is important to draw attention to the perceived exceptional status of the African state in this regard. One of the most central themes in the Africanist literature has been the characterisation of the state as neo- patrimonial:
Although neopatrimonial practices can be found in all polities, it is the core feature of politics in Africa. ... Whereas personal relationships occur on the margins of all bureaucratic systems, they constitute the foundation and superstructure of political institutions in Africa” (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997: 62-63, original emphasis; also Chabal, 2005: 20).
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Neo-patrimonialism connotes a hybrid regime in which centralised elites in legal-rational state institutions mobilize political support by using their public positions to distribute state resources to loyal supporters in exchange for political support. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) identify three systemic characteristics of Africa’s neo-patrimonial regimes: presidentialism, clientelism, and the use of public resources for political legitimization (1997: 63-66).
There is some disagreement regarding the distributional effects of neo-patrimonial politics in Africa and the implications of patron-client relations for persistent inequalities more broadly. Some scholars claim that through the favours and services that political elites provide to their kin and ethnic communities, the spoils of the state are widely distributed with potential trickle down effects to a large number of citizens. Clientelism is therefore seen as a way of redistributing state resources from the wealthy to the poor (e.g. Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Schatzberg, 2001). In contrast, van de Walle (2009: 321) insists that “clientelism cannot be distributive” (p.321). He argues that political elites redistributes to their immediate kin rather than to the poor within their broader lineage or ethno-regional group, such that“the networks in which politically mediated financial gains are redistributed are extremely narrow”. It is therefore more useful, he argues elsewhere, “to think of the primary function of neopatrimonial politics in most African states as facilitating intra-elite accommodation in young, multi-ethnic and poorly integrated political systems” (van de Walle, 2003:312). I return to this point in the next section.
Another issue of interest here relates to the roots of clientelist politics in Africa. Many proponents of the neo-patrimonial paradigm attribute patron-client relations in Africa to issues of culture (e.g. Le Vine, 1980:666; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Chabal (2002:459) claims that “the neo-patrimonial system is deeply embedded in the African sociocultural matrix”. For Bratton (1994:8), an important consideration for understanding the prevalence of patron-client politics in Africa “is culture” (Bratton, 1994:8), not least as “Neopatrimonialism originates in the African extended family” (Ibid). Similarly for Kelsall (2008:7), because of the obligations associated with the extended family system in Africa, a “good [African] leader is not first among equals, he is a patriarch, and he is expected to provide for his followers or family, making personal donations of food and other resources”. It is this extended family system and the expectation that accompany it, Kelsall claims, that “provides the ideological underpinning for the practices of clientelism and neo-patrimonialism that are so prevalent in Africa today” (Ibid).
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Some analysts have criticised the above culturalist interpretation for failing to appreciate the significant impact of historical influences on contemporary African states, including colonial rule and the politics of postcolonial state formation (e.g. Ekeh, 1975:193). Notably, Allen (1995) persuasively explains neo-patrimoinialism in terms of the processes of decolonisation. He highlights the ways in which the emergence of radical nationalist movements during the 1940s compelled the colonial powers to abandon their initial gradualist strategy of decolonisation, and to take steps in granting independence to African countries in a peculiarly rapid manner. Consequently, “...elections were introduced with little notice, sometimes only a few months, requiring nationalist organisations to mobilise huge electorates in a very short time” (Allen, 1995:304). Crucially, the absence of effective party organizations, itself a product of the general exclusion of indigenous Africans from political decision-making, meant that the nationalist leaders had to find individuals who had local followers (e.g. chiefs and other ethno-regional notables), and using patronage to bind these individuals to the party, and the local voters to the candidates. These rapid transitions, Allen (ibid) argues, created power vacuums in which dominant elite coalitions quickly moved to use patronage to shore up the legitimacy of their rule, and which in turn made access to political office the focus of the populations’ material expectations (also Lockwood, 2005).
This study rejects the ‘culturalist’ explanations of political patronage in contemporary Africa, and suggests the need to think of this phenomenon more in terms of politics as it relates to the forms of pressures on political elites engendered by electoral competition; as well as political economy dynamics as with Khan’s (2005) suggestion that it is the size of the productive economy which effectively dictates the clienteslist character of politics in all developing country democracies (Chapter 1). Although the neo-patrimonial theory has been heavily criticised 2 it is with the characterisation of the state in Africa as neo- patrimonial that I now proceed to examine the political strategies adopted by the post- colonial state in an attempt to overcome its inherited social fragmentations, the motivating factors behind the adopted strategies and their underlying implications for the problem of regional inequality
2 One key criticism has been its failure explain the wide variations in state performance across African countries (Therkildsen, 2005; Whitfield and Therkildsen, 2011), 53
2.3.2 Postcolonial African states: addressing socio-economic inequalities through political inclusion?
One important feature of African politics during the immediate post-independence period was the incorporation of elites from different ethno-regional groups into ruling coalitions, such that “incorporative activities in the political realm” were “common” (Chazan, 1988:129). In their review of practices of coalition formation in a wide range of African countries, Rothchild and Foley (1988) showed that various regimes combined the use of formal rules (notably constitutional guidelines) and informal practices (notably ethnic quotas) in ensuring the ethno-regional representativeness of their cabinets. They argued that although the non-Marxist African states were “most adept at maintaining an unofficial ethnic balance in ministerial appointments” (p.242), even their Marxist and populist social counterparts also consciously adhered to the principle of balanced ethno-regional representation in government. Thus, “[d]espite regime differences, African ruling elites have in fact responded rather similarly to the overriding need to include ethnoregional intermediaries in the ruling coalition” (p.241).
Observers note that the imperative of ethno-regional inclusivity was sometimes pursued at the expense of institutional efficiency and economic productivity (Chazan, 1988:128; Rothchild and Foley, 1988:250; Lindemann, 2011a). This is because the enlargements of cabinets were “rarely a response to economic policy concerns” (van de Walle, 2005:80), but more of measures aimed at providing “the president an opportunity to improve ethnoregional balance by including additional spokesmen from underrepresented subregions in the central decision-making process” (Rothchild, 1985:83). These observations raise two questions of interest for this study. First, was the commitment to political inclusivity driven by a conscious effort of enhancing the access of previously excluded regions to vital state resources through their participation in national decision- making processes? Second, if governments were prepared to foster ethno-regional elite inclusivity even at the expense of aggregate economic production and efficiency, what has been the impact of the politics of inclusive coalitions on spatial inequality in postcolonial Africa?
There is broad agreement that the overriding need for the formations of broad-based ethno- regional governmental coalitions was essentially a means by dominant elites in co-opting their potential rivals so as to foster inter-elite cooperation and sustain their fragile and contested hold on state power (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982:19; van de Walle, 2003). This is what has been variously termed in the Africanist literature as the ‘reciprocal assimilation of
54 elites’ (Bayart, 1993:252), the ‘fusion of elites’ (Sklar, 1979:537; Lonsdale, 1981:153) or the ‘hegemonial exchange’ among elites, whereby “the dominant political elite... exchanges participation and distributable resources for local support and compliance with its regulations” (Rothchild, 1985:73). In such arrangements, “[p]aronage politics provided a material basis of consensus and control within ruling coalitions, oiling and structuring the processes by which regimes coalesced into economically dominant social strata” (Boone, 1994:127).
Several Africanists have attributed this form of politics to the ‘soft’ nature of the postcolonial state. This means that because the new ruling elites lacked the power to unilaterally impose their decisions on the various ethno-regional factions that challenged their authority, they resorted to incorporating potential ethno-regional challengers into the ruling coalition so as to “maintain the political system by means of co-optation” (Rothchild, 1985:79; see also Rothchild, 1997; Osaghae, 2006). Thus, the ‘fusion of elites’ in postcolonial Africa was not informed by any “joint interest other than the maintenance of a social order” (Lonsdale, 1981:153). Such observations echo North et al.’s (2009b:17) argument that the establishment of a stable political order requires the formation of a ‘dominant coalition’ among elites (that is, a political settlement), which limits access to economic rents to members and thereby creates incentives for elites to co- operate among themselves rather than fight. Parks and Cole (2010:11) similarly note that one important “method for sustaining a political settlement is through co-optation of potential threats from powerful excluded elites… by allowing these elite groups a role in the political settlement”.
Yet, there is some evidence to argue here that the underlying incentive for the ‘fusion of elites’ in postcolonial Africa has not been as conducive for enhancing balanced regional development as it might have been for the maintenance of ‘social orders’. Three main explanations can be offered for this. The first is that since the preoccupation with inclusivity was “an essentially elite affair”, it contributed to “a ‘de-emphasis on the other forms of equality which directly involve the majority of the population’” (Rothchild and Foley, 1988:250). Osagahe (2006) similarly argues that the political imperative of elite accommodation meant that instead of focusing on reducing the historical inequalities that accounted for the ethno-regional mobilizations against dominant elites, many regimes rather resorted to “half-hearted attempts at winning and building support bases within groups through the … appointment of elites from so-called marginalized, excluded, minority, and oppressed groups” (p.11). While such measures offered some benefits to the
55 elites concerned in the form of access to state patronage, they have “not translated into less domination, marginalization or exclusion of the group as a whole” (Ibid). This observation supports my earlier conjecture that it is ordinary citizens from marginalised regions who are more likely to bear the brunt of the adverse incorporation of their elites into the wider political system; the elites themselves may be able to benefit substantially in terms of building their personal socio-economic and political fortunes through access to state patronage (Chapter 1).
Second, the incorporation of elites from the historically-excluded regions into various informal political coalitions with central state officials had the danger of their “full cooptation into identification with the dominant political class [instead of their constituents], and the perils this change of attachment can present to an already fragile centre-periphery relationship” (Rothchild, 1984:165; also Boone, 1994:126). These observations played out strongly during Ghana’s first postcolonial regime, when Nkrumah’s strategies of co-optation worked so well that the few elites from the North who previously opposed government’s unfavourable policies towards their regions increasingly defected to the ruling coalition (see Chapter 3).
Third, and more importantly, the underlying motives for the incorporation of elites from marginalised regions meant that they were often included on inequitable or adverse terms. This took the forms of under-representing such regions vis-à-vis their population shares, and the tendency of dominant elites to “skew high level appointments, making the cabinet and bureaucracy more reflective of certain ethnic and class interests than of others” (Rothchild and Foley, 1988:233 and 252). This also seems to be the view taken by Sithole (1994) who sought to resolve the puzzle regarding the prevalence of ethno-regional inequalities and their related violent conflicts in many African countries despite the near universal commitment of governments to the principles of ‘ethnic arithmetic’ and ‘regional balancing’ in their public appointments. Sithole’s argument is that such policies have not been successful in overcoming conflicts and inequalities because: “[m]any of our leaders do not add and balance properly, and they deliberately fail to do it correctly. It is not a matter of having an equal number of each ethnic group, region...etc. represented, or following the ‘proportionality principle’. That alone is only recognition of the problem of representation, and not a solution to it. The real solution concerns the question of which candidates are to be ... appointed and to what post? ...The problem of power is not arithmetic: it is often algebraic, geometric – a matter of calculus” (p.162).
The above analysis suggests that the politics of inclusive coalitions in postcolonial Africa did not imply that the various ethno-regional groups have had equal capacity in influencing
56 resource allocation decisions and policy agenda more broadly. These differential patterns of incorporation into the polity are important to our understanding of why the ethno- regional disparities created by the colonial state persist in many countries today. As Rothchild and Foley (1988:252) have argued within the context of the personalised character of African politics, “[f]or a group leader to be left out of the inner circle of decision makers is to be ineffective in championing the claims of his her constituents”. Consequently, although the various ethno-regional intermediaries were in principle expected to extract as much central government’s resources as possible for the benefit of their constituents, only “those fortunate enough to gain entry to the inner sanctums of government itself” could easily live up to such expectations (Rothchild, 1985:76).
Elsewhere, Rothchild (1984) examined the resource allocation practices of a wide range of African countries in order to see if their distribution of public resources followed the principles of:
1) Non-proportionality , signifying the skewed distribution of state resources in favour of relatively advantaged regions; 2) Proportionality , meaning that state resources are distributed among regions vis-à- vis their population shares; and 3) Extra-proportionality , implying the redistribution of state resources in such a way as to disproportionately benefit the relatively disadvantaged regions. Although to varying degrees, his findings showed that state elites had in fact made use of all these principles in their sub-regional resource sharing practices. First, cases of non- proportionality were found to be “apparent in the region as a whole” (p.176), as “certain dominant elites … have taken advantage of their positions of power … to skew distributive patterns in favour of a relatively advantaged subregion” (p.167). Second, what was more “commonplace” across his cases was the application of the proportionality principle which, as he argued, played an important role in the management of ethno-regional conflicts across the region (p.176; also Rothchild, 1985:88). One reason was that by benefiting all ethno-regional groups according to their relative numbers, the principle of proportionality was generally “acceptable as inclusive and “fair” to all major ethnoregional actors” (p.172). However, from the point of view of balanced regional development, such emphasis on proportional allocation, Rothchild maintained, could “not prove sufficient to enable the relatively disadvantaged subregions to catch up or to balance the imbalances of the colonial past” (1984:176). Third, despite considerable level of rhetoric regarding the need for interregional corrective equity measures (p.168), in reality, the implementation of
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“extraproportional practises remain[ed] atypical” (p. 172). In Rothchild’s view, this was not simply a product of resource scarcity, but was also the result of dominant state elites’ “resistance to such policies” (p. 172). Such observations resonate with one central claim of the political settlement literature, namely that inter-elite power relations play more crucial roles in shaping development outcomes than institutions per se, in that the implementation of institutional arrangements that do not sufficiently satisfy the interests of the most influential political players face a high risk of being resisted (Khan, 2010; Parks and Cole, 2010).
Uganda is one country whose experiences strongly illustrate the above arguments. Here¸ where Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) has been purportedly implementing an all-inclusive coalition government for over two decades now, Lindemann (2011b) has recently analysed the distribution of government positions among different ethno-regional groups for the period 1986-2008. With appointments broken down into three different categories: Cabinet, Deputy Ministers and the ‘inner core’ of political power, his findings show that the distribution of political, economic, and military power have historically been heavily biased in favour of ethnic groups from the south-western parts of the country, especially in the more consequential positions in the inner core (Ibid). 3 In contrast, elites from the historically underdeveloped Northern region were often assigned “the most marginal positions”. This means that whereas they often “received a proportional share of deputies”, they were almost always “greatly under-represented in Cabinet and almost entirely excluded from the inner core” (p.401).
These differential patterns of incorporation tended to constrain the influence of political elites from the North over government agenda, and thereby undermining the development prospects of the region. It is in light of some of these observations along with the relatively unfavourable policies towards the North during both the colonial and post- colonial periods that some analysts have emphasised the need to understand the persistently higher levels of poverty in Northern Uganda as a function of “the region’s ‘adverse incorporation’ into the politics of state formation and capitalist development in Uganda over a prolonged period of time” (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010:1223).
The above observations closely resonates the experience of Côte d’Ivoire, a country also characterised by a serious socio-economic North-South divide. Although Côte d’Ivoire’s relative political stability during her first two decades after independence has frequently
3 The ‘inner core’ was defined as comprising the President and key ministers responsible for Defence, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Commerce, Agriculture, Local Government, and Justice. 58 been attributed to President Houphouët-Boigny’s system of ‘ethnic quotas’ which ensured a “fairly inclusive” government (Stewart, 2010a: 3; 2010b:149), detailed analysis reveals a more nuanced picture. Langer (2004; 2005) has analysed data on the level of representation of various ethno-regional groups in government vis-à-vis their demographic sizes for the period 1980-2003. He did so paying particular attention to the Baoulé – the largest sub-group of the Akan and the ethnic group of both President Houphouët-Boigny and his successor, Konan Bédié. Although his findings point to what one could refer to as an all-inclusive government, as no major ethnic group was fully excluded, his data also nevertheless point to a “significant over-representation of the Akans”.
Moreover, in order to access whether the inclusion of the various ethnic groups could be said to have translated into a more equal voice or decision-making powers, he presented data on the ethno-regional distribution of a set of key political positions – what he also termed ‘the inner circle of political power’. 4 The results of this exercise showed that the over-representation of the Akan and Baoulé was even “more pronounced” in these key political positions. The conclusion then was that “Houphouët-Boigny assigned the government positions of lesser importance to other ethnic groups” (Langer, 2004:23; 2005:9) – a clear form of political adverse incorporation. More importantly, Langer’s analysis point to a close association between this skewed distribution of real political power and the ethno-regional patterns of well-being. Analysing DHS data for the 1990s, he showed that both the Akan as a whole and Baoulé in particular improved their relative socio-economic position considerably during 1994-1998, such that the “Akan’s relative socio-economic prosperity was 40 per cent higher than Côte d’Ivoire’s average” (Langer, 2005:7). Brockerhoff and Hewitt’s (1998, 2000) survey data pointed to a similar trend.
The same story can be told of Kenya, where “access to political power by the president’s home determines the fortunes of that province and the resultant exclusion of other provinces” (Muhula, 2009:93; also Stewart, 2010b). Analyses of the ethno-regional composition of governmental coalitions in postcolonial Kenya confirm that both the Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Moi (1978-2002) regimes disproportionately favoured their respective ethno-regional groups (i.e. Central and Rift Valley Provinces), especially with regards to the distribution of the upper echelons of government positions in the Cabinet, the Military, Diplomacy, and Public Service (see Nellis, 1974:14-15). Consequently,
4 These political positions included the President, Prime Minister, President of National Assembly, President of economic and social council, minister of security, minister of economy and finance, minister of defence, minister of mines and energy, minister of agriculture, minister of interior, minister of justice and minister of foreign affairs. 59 charges of tribal domination of President Kenyatta’s ethnic groups (i.e. the Kikuyus) in the most ‘juicy’ government ministries were rife, with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry particularly seen essentially as “a Kikuyu Ministry” (see Rothchild, 1969:699-701). What is of particular interest has been the strong coincidence between the spatial distribution of government resources and patterns of access to political power in postcolonial Kenya. Under Kenyatta’s rule in 1979, whereas the Central Province had only 766 people per hospital bed, “politically excluded areas like Nyanza, Western and North Eastern Provinces had an average of over 1000 peoples per bed” (Muhula, 2009:95). Unsurprisingly, by the 1980s, child mortality levels among President Kenyatta’s ethnic group (i.e. the Kikuyu) were on par with those of many industrialized countries (UNICEF, 1997, cited in Brockerhoff and Hewitt, 2000:34). Data for 1969 and 1970 point to similar patterns with regards to access to educational facilities and government expenditures on housing (see Rothchild, 1984:157; Alwy and Schech, 2004:271).
The Moi era brought similar advantages to the Rift Valley Province, whose share of development expenditures for road construction remained disproportionately high during each year between 1979 and 1988 (see Barkan and Chege, 1989:449), with similar advantages conferred on this Province in the area of Health (Ibid). It is not surprising, therefore, that by the end of the Moi administration in 2002, Rift Valley had about 6000 people per health facility, the least of any Province in Kenya (SID, 2007, cited in Muhula, 2009:95). Variations in child survival followed a similar trend, whereby children of the ethnic group of President Moi, the Kalenjin, were 50 per cent less likely to die before age five years than others (Brockerhoff and Hewitt, 1998:22; 2000:34). In sum, the historical data is clear that “the distribution of public goods such as education facilities, health, water and physical infrastructure in Kenya have tended to follow patterns of access to political power” (World Bank, 2009d:9).
One country that appears somewhat exceptional to this form of politics is Zambia. According to Lindemann (2010a:244), postcolonial regimes in Zambia have made sustained efforts in forging inclusive elite coalitions, such that even “access to the ‘inner core’ of state power has always been shared more equitably”. Yet, there is some evidence to suggest that this is a somewhat exaggerated claim. Focusing on the ethno-regional breakdown of senior government officials such as Cabinet Ministers as of December 1968, not only did Dresang (1974:1611) find the Bemba and the Nyanja ethnic groups to be “overrepresented”; the former’s overrepresentation was especially “most striking in positions at the head of government commissions and ministerial departments”. 60
Nevertheless, Dresang’s findings do not fully refute the notion of a Zambian exceptionalism, not least as his further analysis of the ethno-regional distribution of development funds led him to conclude that “the pattern of development expenditures ... does more than demonstrate the absence of favouritism” (p.1613; also Rothchild, 1972).
2.4 Summary
The first part of this chapter has shown how colonial states laid a basis for regional inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa through the simultaneous exclusion of some regions from public investments and the adverse incorporation of those regions into the colonial economy as labour reserves. These processes contributed to uneven regional socio- economic development and a sense of comparative deprivation along ethno-regional lines that gave rise to conflicts over state power and resources after independence. Anxious to consolidate their hold onto power, postcolonial African regimes resorted to co-opting various ethno-regional political rivals into their ruling coalitions. Although this strategy played important roles in facilitating inter-elite co-operation and fostering regime stability, it did not play an equally important role in overcoming the colonial legacy of regional inequality.
A key reason was the tendency of dominant elites to bolster their own legitimacy by assigning the most consequential decision-making powers to themselves while fostering the inclusion of the historically marginalised regions on disempowering terms both by under-representing them vis-à-vis their demographic size, and by excluding them from the ‘inner sanctums of political power’ (Rothchild and Folley, 1988). Consequently, despite their inclusion, elites from the disadvantaged areas remained relatively powerless in influencing policy agenda in the interests of their constituents. This in turn undermined the equitable distribution of public resources, as those with access to real political power used their dominance over state institutions in consolidating their initial socio-economic advantages. The problem of persistent regional inequalities in postcolonial Africa has therefore largely been a product “of the intense political differences among the relatively advantaged and relatively disadvantaged subregions” (Rothchild, 1985:159).
These observations corroborate the value of the AISE/political settlements framework highlighted in Chapter 1, which 1) places considerable emphasis on the need to problematise the value of inclusion; and 2) to explore the ways in which elite interest shapes the design and actual functioning of state institutions (both formal and informal) and how this in turn influences development outcomes. Thus, from this perspective, the
61 most important question to ask when thinking of the development prospects of lagging regions is not simply whether they have been included or excluded from decision-making structures, but the terms and conditions of their representation. It is against this background that I now proceed to outline the methodological framework used to explore Ghana’s persistent North-South inequalities from an AISE/political settlements perspective.
2.5 Research design and methodology
This section presents the methodology adopted for exploring the politics of Ghana’s regional inequalities through an AISE/political settlements perspective. It starts by an explanation of the research methods and the key data gathering techniques employed. This is followed by a description of my research design, which details how the overarching question for the study was tackled. Information on my data sources is also provided in this section.
2.5.1 Research methods
My PhD research is mainly a qualitative inquiry into the politics of regional inequality in Ghana, but one which makes significant use of secondary quantitative data. The rationale for this approach lies in the objectives of the study. Unlike the many equity and resource allocation studies that focus only on establishing the extent of equity in allocations (Asante, 2006:107), this research seeks to both: 1) examine whether the regional patterns of public spending in Ghana have been equitable in terms of disproportionately benefiting the poorer Northern regions; and 2) explore the key underlying political drivers of the spatial patterns of public spending, with particular attention to the impact of inter-elite power relations. Three main sets of data are required for achieving these objectives: 1) the regional composition of public expenditure; 2) the regional distribution of government positions; and 3) an understanding of the ways in which politics and power relations shape resource allocation processes and outcomes in Ghana. On the one hand, the extent of equity in resource allocation as well as the degree to which the various regions have had access to political power can arguably only be established with quantitative data, such as the distribution of public expenditure and cabinet portfolios. On the other hand, the factors that shape the spatial patterns of expenditure allocations can at best be understood through a qualitative inquiry, given the value of qualitative research methods in uncovering complex causal relationships, and in enabling a holistic interpretation of the detailed processes and power relations that shape people’s lives (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996:143; 62
Hulme, 2007:13). I therefore relied mainly on qualitative approaches in investigating the questions of how and why the spatial distribution of political power shapes the spatial patterns of socio-economic resource allocation in Ghana. Qualitative research involves an “in-depth investigation of phenomena through such means as participant observation, interviewing, archival or other documentary analysis” (Ragin, 1994:91) – all methods which do not necessarily rely on, but can make significant use of numerical data (Collier, 2011:825).
The methodological approach employed here is broadly in line with the recognition of the pre-eminence of qualitative research methods when studying persistent poverty and inequality through the lens of the dynamic interplay between processes of exclusion and adverse forms of inclusion. Accordingly, while some scholars have usefully combined both qualitative and quantitative methods, others have questioned the usefulness of the latter. Kantor’s (2009) study on ‘Women’s Exclusion and Unfavourable Inclusion in Informal Employment’ in the Indian city of Lucknow is one example of a study which adopted the mixed method approach, combining focus group discussions, survey questionnaires and in-depth interviews. In contrast, du Toit and Neves (2007) relied exclusively on in-depth interviews in their study of spatial poverty in the Eastern Cape and Cape Town Provinces of South Africa, insisting that an understanding of spatial poverty traps cannot be reduced to the quantitative analysis of asset endowments (p.7). Similarly, Hickey and du Toit (2007:21) have suggested that not only does the relational and process- based character of adverse incorporation and social exclusion (AISE) suggests the centrality of qualitative research approaches, but also that “the quantitative approaches that dominate mainstream analysis of poverty are...at a disadvantage when used to study AISE”. Nonetheless, as noted above, the objectives of the present research could rarely be achieved without making significant use of some quantitative data.
The main data gathering techniques for this study were documentary analysis and key informant interviews. Document analysis involved a detailed examination of government documents such as development blueprints, parliamentary debates, and policy-related speeches by politicians. Also useful were political party manifestos, newspapers and secondary literature. Document analysis was complemented with interviews. My interviewees included current and past Ministers of state, senior civil servants, academics and staff of international organisations and local NGOs. In total, I conducted 39 interviews during an 11-month fieldwork in Ghana (Appendix 1). Semi-structured in nature, the aims of my interviews were two-fold: first, was to obtain a broad understanding of how politics
63 works in Ghana with regards to resource allocation decisions; second was to understand the underlying factors that shaped the implementation outcomes of some specific cases studies that formed part of my research design (see below). My respondents were assured that all information was collected on the basis of strict confidentiality and would not be used for any purposes other than academic research. Consequently, statements that are direct quotes from respondents have been acknowledged as such, but no direct attribution to the sources by name occurs.
2.5.2 Research design and data
This section provides details on how the above three sets of data required for achieving the objectives of this research was gathered and analysed. Before then, however, it is useful to state here that my empirical analysis focuses on Ghana’s Fourth Republic, mainly in the period from 1993-2008. The rationale for this focus is manifold. First, this period involves an alternation of power between Ghana’s two dominant parties, the NDC and NPP, with both ruling for two terms each. The period thus allows us to ask whether changes in government and the resultant changes in the composition of key political posts did make a difference in the regional patterns of socio-economic resource allocation during the period.
Second, with a sustained multi-party democratic practice since 1992, Ghana has arguably had a more conducive political environment for reducing regional inequality during its Fourth Republic. It is important to note that the newly promulgated Constitution that accompanied Ghana’s return to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s explicitly enjoined the state to ensure the inclusion of various regions both in relation to the distribution of public office appointments and the balanced development of all regions (see Chapter 4 for details). Moreover, Ghana has been one of the largest recipients of foreign aid over the past 20 years (Crook, 2010:485), providing substantial resources to various governments for reducing poverty and regional inequalities. These have included substantial resources via HIPC debt relief since 2002 and a US$ 547 million Millennium Challenge Account which has been “the single largest bilateral grant in the history of Ghana” (Ouma et al. , 2012:4). Whether and to what extent such resources have been applied in line with the constitutional requirement of ensuring balanced regional development is a question of interest in this study. Third, although geographically disaggregated public expenditure data in Ghana is generally sparse (Aryeetey and Abbey, 2006:43; Aryeetey and McKay, 2007a:163), obtaining such data becomes even more
64 difficult the farther one goes behind. Thus, even the expenditure data presented in this study is somewhat skewed towards the more recent NPP government of the 2000s.
Regional representation in government
The first pillar of my fieldwork was to collect data on the inter-regional distribution of state power (political and bureaucratic). Hence the first challenge was to compile lists of all ministers, deputies, and chief directors of all government Ministries during 1993-2008. This turned out to be an extremely difficult and time-consuming task, such that I had to extend the duration of my fieldwork twice. Although virtually every public official I spoke to expected such data to be available at the Ministry of Information, this Ministry could provide me with only an incomplete list of Ministers under the current NDC government that assumed office in January 2009 – a period even outside the main scope of my research. I initially suspected that the Ministry was perhaps unwilling to provide me with this information, but soon realised that this kind of data had never been systematically collected by the Ministry. The various Ministries did not have this information either, with the notable exception of the Ministries of Defence, Energy, Agriculture, and Trade and Industry (MoTI) which had photo frames of their various past Ministers. Yet, even this information generally fell far short for my purposes. This was not only because of several gaps in this data, but also because in none of these Ministries did the available information also include the positions of deputy Ministers and Chief Directors.
These difficulties notwithstanding, I still managed to find much of the data I was looking for, albeit with some gaps. Compiling the names of all ministers and their deputies turned out to be a relatively easy task, following my discovery that they are regularly being updated in the official reports of parliamentary debates. I found copies of these debates in the Library of the Parliament of Ghana, and also managed to obtain permission to photocopy the relevant pages. Finding the names of Chief Directors of the various Ministries proved a lot more difficult that I could not gather a full list of these portfolios across all the government Ministries. However, I was able to cover some important ministries such as Finance and Economic Planning, Trade Industry and Local Government & Rural Development.
Once I had compiled the different lists including a total of over 400 names (see Appendix 2 and 3) 5, the next challenge was to find ways to identify the regional affiliations of each office holder. This exercise also turned out to be difficult not least as such information is
5 Note however, a couple of these names are repetitive because of frequent ministerial reshuffles, especially during the 2000s 65 not also officially recorded. Moreover, the fact that the largest ethnic group in Ghana (the Akans) predominate in 5 out of the 7 regions in the South (Chapter 1) implies that the regional affiliations of individuals in Ghana cannot simply be inferred on the basis of name recognition. Thus, unlike Langer (2004; 2005) who inferred the ethnic backgrounds of government ministers in Côte d'Ivoire on the basis of names, I had to find a more reliable way of establishing the true regional backgrounds of my list of past political officeholders. Fortunately, I soon discovered some files in the House of Parliament which contained the CVs of many prominent politicians included in my list, especially under the NPP administration (2001-2008). Most of these CVs contained information regarding where these government officials considered as their ‘home towns’.
However, this source was also only partially helpful for two reasons. First, several gaps still remained, especially with regards to those who served in the NDC governments during 1993-2000. Second, the evidence from these CVs raised another important concern for my research. I noticed that some Ministers of state had served (or were presenting serving) as Members of Parliament for constituencies located in regions other than those they identified as their home regions. Such names were actually very few, but nevertheless still raised the question of what one could consider as the ‘true’ home regions of such politicians. In such cases, I decided to count those politicians as part of the regions in which they had either served or presently serving as Members of Parliament. I took this decision on the basis of arecognition of strong clientelist relations between Ghanaian MPs and their constituents in the literature (Lindberg, 2010; Coffey International Development, 2011; see also Chapter 4). Within the context of the increasingly competitive nature of Ghanaian elections (see Chapter 4), the patronage-based character of Ghanaian politics suggests that the loyalty (in terms of resource allocation) of most Ghanaian politicians will most likely be tilted towards the constituencies upon which their electoral survival directly depends.
I managed to get the remaining gaps filled through the patient help of former politicians who had been in government during the period. These officials assisted me in identifying the regional backgrounds of the officeholders. One of these politicians, who served as a cabinet Minister almost throughout the PNDC (1983-1992) and NDC (1993-2000) governments, sat with me in his house for several hours to go through this exercise. With the notable exception of one prominent Southern-based politician who responded to my request via email, others required me to leave my list with them for a couple of days to be filled out at their own time, enabling me to pick up the responses at a later point. Thus
66 altogether, I managed to collect a substantial set of original data and was able to identify what I strongly believe reflects the actual distribution of inter-regional access to political power during my period of study. The only gap in my data, to the best of my knowledge, relates to one David Gyewu who served for a brief moment as a Deputy Minister of Communication under the Kufuor government. Despite several attempts, including contacting him directly via two different emails, I was unable to establish his regional identity to my satisfaction and therefore decided to eliminate his name in my computations.
The next challenge, then, was an analysis and presentation of this data to give a sense of the regional distribution of political power. We should note that from the perspective of equitable regional development, there are at least two important issues to look for when determining the inclusiveness or otherwise of a political regime. The first is to relate each region’s percentage share of the total population to its level of representation in government in order to see if the quantitative distribution of political power has been equitable. The second is to recognise that the quantitative distribution of cabinet posts can understate inequalities in positions of power. This is to note that because the power of patronage varies significantly across different Ministerial portfolios, the qualitative distribution of actual governmental powers might be different from the quantitative distribution of positions in government. As Stewart (2010b) puts it, ethno-regional inequalities in prominent ministerial positions such as Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Defence “reflect not only a power imbalance but also lopsided possibilities of patronage and shares in rents” (p.142). Thus, even if the overall picture points towards more politically-inclusive coalitions, as has been the case in most postcolonial African countries (e.g. Rothchild and Foley, 1988), the most prominent positions and, therefore, the real decision-making powers might still be monopolised by the more powerful elites from relatively developed regions. This has the likelihood of undermining resource flows to historically lagging regions and thereby perpetuating the colonial patterns of inequalities. Thus, what is also required is to go beyond the broader quantitative distribution of ministerial positions to an analysis of the regional distribution of what may be considered as the ‘inner circle of political power’.
This raises another critical methodological issue, however, namely the question of who actually comprises the ‘inner core’ of power’ in a political regime. This is undoubtedly an extremely contentious question, particularly because the influence wielded by individuals in government may be shaped by factors other than the formal authority attached to their positions of power. For example, there was a widespread perception under the NPP
67 administration of the 2000s that some ordinary Ministers of state wielded a lot more influence in government than the Northern-born Vice-President (Aliu Mahama), in part because he was apparently an unknown party member, who was only incorporated into the regime as a means of courting votes from the North (Frempong, 2008; also Chapter 4 of this study). Similarly, there has been a strong belief in the current ruling NDC government (2009-2012) that the ‘true’ power brokers have neither been the President himself nor his Vice, but a couple of Presidential Advisors at the seat of the Presidency – the so-called ‘Ahwoi Brothers’. These observations resonate with those of Lindemann (2010a) in the Ugandan and Zambian contexts that it is not enough to simply focus on key ministers when determining the ‘inner core’ of a regime, not least as certain presidential advisors (and to this may be added party financiers) may really be more influential behind the scenes in terms of which regions get what and when.
Yet, and as in the case of Lindemann’s (2010a) research, a detailed analysis of the ‘true’ power holders behind the scenes turned out to be too costly for me both in terms of time and resources, not least given the large number of names involved as well as the frequent ministerial reshuffles that took place during my period of study, especially under the NPP regime of the 2000s (see Chapter 4). Moreover, although establishing the true power holders in any regime might require a large amount of interviews with those in power at any given point in time, questions relating to who’s who in government are typically reasons for distrust (Lindemann, 2010a). As a consequence, I decided to focus on the President/Prime Minister, Vice President and a number of highly recognised Ministerial positions that often tend to be occupied by key party insiders both within the Ghanaian context and elsewhere. Although these ministerial positions varied from one government to the other (see Chapter 4), they typically included the Ministers of Finance and Economic Planning, Defence, Security and Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Attorney-General, Food and Agriculture, Roads and Transport, Local Government and Rural Development, Mines and Energy, Education and Health. Most of these posts also generally fall within the category of what other authors have considered as the most prominent positions in the contexts of Cote d’Ivoire (Langer, 2004; 2005), Nigeria (Mustapha, 2006), Zambia (Lindemann, 2011a:1850), Uganda (Lindemann, 2011b:396) and Kenya (Stewart, 2010b:142). As Lindemann (2010a) has noted, although this approach is only a second- best strategy, it still arguably tells us a lot more about where real power lies than just simply focusing on all ministers and deputies.
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As a consequence, and based on the different types of ministerial positions in Ghana during the period under consideration here, I measured the composition of political power by the inter-regional distribution of: • Deputy ministers; • Cabinet Ministers; • Non-cabinet Ministers and Ministers without portfolios; • The ‘inner core of political power’; and • A ‘representation index’ (RI), which combines the foregoing measures.
First, I computed the relative representation (RR) of each region in each of the above government portfolios. Each region’s RR is calculated by subtracting its percentage proportion of government ministers from its percentage size in the entire population. Consequently, unity means proportional representation: values lower than 0 indicates underrepresentation and more than 0 indicates overrepresentation. In addition, I constructed a representation index (RI), calculated as an average of the relative representation for the various ministerial positions and the ‘inner core of political power’. Although I followed the works of Lindemann (2010a; 2010b; 2011a; 2011b) in calculating my RI, I did so with one important modification. For example, while Lindemann, in calculating his ‘index of representation’ gives an equal weight to the President, Vice President and his selected key ministers by virtue of they all being part of the ‘inner core’, it would seem that such an approach does not adequately reflect the differential power wielded by these key political officeholders. Notably, the fact that each cabinet member, ranging from the Vice President to the key ministers, are all appointees of the President who also has the power to remove them from office without rendering explanation to anyone (at least in the Ghanaian context) is enough to suggest that no other member of the ‘inner core’ or cabinet wields the same amount of power as the President. Therefore, in calculating my RI, I give different weights to the various political officeholders in the following order:
• President (3); • Vice President and other cabinet Ministers (2); and • Ministers without portfolios, non-cabinet and deputy ministers (1).
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Public expenditure analysis In order to establish whether the dominance of particular regions in the senior echelons of government leads to policy outcomes that advance the interest of such regions at the expense of others, we will first need to understand the regional patterns of public spending. A second key pillar of my fieldwork was therefore to gather regionally-disaggregated public expenditure data across a range of sectors. As noted briefly in Chapter 1, the study was designed in a way as to enable me provide evidence of whether and how the spatial distribution of political power influences the spatial allocations of different types of expenditures: social sector spending, productive-sector investments and donor-influenced types of expenditures. My social sector analysis focuses on the regional patterns of education and health spending (Chapter 5) – two important sectors which in Ghana together “account for about 90% of social sector spending with the remaining sub sectors each receiving a small proportion of expenditure” (GoG, 2003a:2). This means that a biased pattern of allocation in these sectors will not only have significant spatial implications in terms of access to basic social services; the exclusion of any region from public spending in these sectors can rarely be sufficiently compensated for by greater spending in other social sectors. Moreover, to the extent that the provision of education and health facilities are issues of high political visibility, they can provide us with additional advantages for understanding the politics of public spending. This is to state that if the pattern of ethno-regional dominance among senior government officials has any impact on the spatial distribution of development funds in Ghana, we will expect that impact to reflect in the distribution of educational and health expenditures and facilities.
I recognised however that even if my analysis of the national education and health sector expenditures point to a biased pattern of spending against the more deprived Northern regions, we may still be missing the important point that the unique development challenges of these regions might have been systematically addressed via specific social protection programmes whose expenditures are independent of the national education and health budgets. I address this concern by including two case studies on specialised education programmes designed with the explicit objective of targeting the poorest. These are the Ghana School feeding Programme (GSFP) launched in 2005 with the objective of enhancing school enrolment and pupil retention in marginalised regions; and the Model Secondary School Programme designed to reduce regional inequalities in secondary education (see Chapter 5). The two primary criteria for selecting these cases concerned their objectives of, and potential in, reducing regional inequalities in access to education; and the need to focus on predominantly state-driven initiatives rather than donor/NGO led 70 efforts. This is to ensure that my findings help unravel the specific role of national political processes in shaping the regional patterns of resource allocation.
However, the review of the literature in Chapter 1 also points to the influential role of donors in the policy making processes of aid-dependent poor countries like Ghana. This means that no equity-related study can lay claim to sufficient coverage without an understanding of the extent of donor leverage vis-à-vis domestic political incentives and forces in driving patterns of resource allocation. My research was also designed to address this concern by including a case on a donor-influenced type of expenditures through an exploration of the politics of Ghana’s HIPC Fund (Chapter 6). The HIPC Fund, which was established as part of Ghana’s PRSP processes, is particularly suitable for this study not least as the poverty reduction strategies have been the subject of considerable discussion in recent development debates. Moreover, to the extent that HIPC expenditures were tied to donor conditionalities that explicitly emphasised pro-poor spending, it can allow us to form a judgement regarding the effectiveness of the theory of political change that underlies the PRSPs in promoting more equitable forms of development (as discussed in Chapter 1).
However, all the above expenditure analysis relate largely to social service provisioning, and are thus susceptible to Vinson’s (2009:8) criticisms of ‘sticking plaster expenditures’ that are unlikely to be able to tackle the root causes of spatial inequality and exclusion. Thus, even if we found that the expenditures on health and education and their related case studies as well as the HIPC Fund were all distributed fairly equitably, there are still those who will maintain that such expenditures will not by themselves address Ghana’s North- South income inequalities highlighted in Chapter 1. It is these concerns that inform the final empirical Chapter of this thesis (Chapter 7) which shifts the focus of inquiry from the politics of social provisioning to the politics of productive sector investments. I do so with a specific focus on the agricultural sector. While agriculture is the mainstay of the Ghanaian economy, it is even the more so for Northern Ghana where over 70% of the population derive their livelihoods compared to a national average of 56% (Al-Hassan and Diao, 2007:3). This implies that the agricultural sector holds the key to poverty reduction in Northern Ghana (Ibid). Within agriculture, I focus mainly on the $547 million MCA on Agricultural Modernizing, and to a limited extent the President’s Special Initiatives (PSIs) which were a series of state-driven productive sector investments designed to create new pillars of growth for the economy during the 2000s. These are complemented with a brief commentary on the implications of agricultural policy in general for Ghana’s North-South divide.
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Given the diverse nature of these cases, the expenditure data for the study was obtained from a different variety of sources. In order to understand how far government education expenditures have been equitably distributed during the period under review, I used official government annual enrolment and regional expenditure data to calculate an expenditure- enrolment index ( EEI) for each region at three different levels of education: primary, junior secondary and senior secondary. Following Penrose (1996), the EEI is calculated by dividing each region’s actual percentage share of government expenditure with its percentage contribution to national enrolment rates. Thus, an index of 1 indicates proportional distribution, while figures less than 1 indicate under-spending. This computation was complemented with an analysis of public spending per school pupil by further dividing the total actual funding allocation in each educational level by the number of students enrolled in the corresponding level in each region. All my actual expenditure data were obtained either directly from the Accounts Office of the Ghana Education Service (GES) in Accra (2000s) or extracted from the GES Internal Budget Books (1990s). All computations were done using Microsoft Excel which was also used to generate basic charts in order to present some of my findings in graphical forms.
An analysis of health sector spending is much more difficult mainly because of an extremely sparse nature of regionally-disaggregated expenditure data in the Ghanaian health sector (Asante, 2006:118; UNICEF, 2009:3). Although I managed to obtain very detailed expenditure data from both the office of the Financial Controller of the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the Budget and Planning Unit of the Ghana Health Service (GHS) from 1998-2009, this data was not sufficiently disaggregated as to be useful for a regional expenditure analysis. However, based on a public expenditure review undertaken by the Ministry of Finance in 1998, I obtained some useful data for three consecutive years during the 1990s (1995, 1996 and 1997) which enabled me to estimate the regional per capita health spending for these years based on the 2000 population census data. Thus, my analysis on health sector spending was limited to these three years. However, in order to provide further insights of whether there has been a reallocation of health sector resources to under-served regions, I complemented this expenditure data with an analysis of the regional distribution of professional health staff (doctors and nurses) and publicly-financed health facilities based on MoH and GHS data. Both indicators are recognised as important proxies for public health funding allocations (see UNICEF, 2009).
While my expenditure data for the GSFP (2005-2008) was obtained from the programme’s National Secretariat in Accra, regional expenditure data on the HIPC Fund as well as the
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Model School Programme were extracted from the GoG’s Annual Progress Reports (APRs) that tracked implementation of Ghana’s PRSPs – the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I, 2002-2005) and the Growth and Poverty and Reduction Strategy (GPRS II, 2006-2009). Further details on my data sources are provided in the individual chapters.
Exploring the politics-expenditure nexus The first two components of my research design presented above are based on two key assumptions. First, I assume that the dominance of particular regions in the senior echelons of government or the most prominent ministerial positions leads to policy outcomes that advance the interest of such regions at the expense of others. Second, I assume that one way of testing these relationships is to examine patterns of development expenditures in the regions, given that resource allocation decisions are generally taken by senior public officials. But how do we distinguish between correlation and causation? Identifying the actual cause(s) of an observed phenomenon is fundamental in all research (Bachman, 2005; Collier, 2011). In this research, three main approaches were adopted to making causal claims regarding the impact of the regional distribution of political power and other forms of politics on the regional patterns of resource allocation.
The first was an interrogation of various alternative (and feasible) explanations. This is one key strategy in making causal inferences in qualitative research, whereby a researcher tries to identify a wide range of alternative explanations that would threaten the proposed explanation and then search for ‘clues’ as to whether these processes were actually operating in a given case (Maxwell, 2004). The ability of the researcher to rule out other feasible explanations means that “the confidence in the suggested explanation will be increased” (Bennett and Elman, 2006:460). I adopted this strategy in making causal inferences in all my three main empirical chapters (Chapters 5-7). This means that before interpreting the observed expenditure patterns on the basis of politics and power relations, I began most of my explanations by first interrogating various official explanations offered for the ‘actual’ criteria that guided the distribution of the resources concerned.
Maxwell (2004:257) notes that “the main challenge in using this strategy in qualitative research is coming up with the most important alternative explanations” and then specifying in enough detail that such “rival hypotheses” cannot be taken as the causal mechanisms of the observed social phenomenon. Arguably however, for research seeking to establish a causal linkage between the spatial patterns of political representation and resource sharing, there can be no better alternative explanation than the ones offered by those who have been directly involved in the formulation and implementation of the
73 policies and programmes concerned. Therefore, the alternative explanations interrogated throughout my empirical chapters are not simply those that I personally deemed feasible; they are specifically those offered by the policy makers involved in the formulation and implementation of my individual case studies. Evidence for such official explanations was drawn from sources such as key informant interviews, parliamentary debates, and other official government’s data/documents.
Second, process tracing was also used to explain my observed patterns of public spending in relation to my case studies on the HIPC Fund (Chapter 6) and the MCA (Chapter 7). Process tracing is a method of causal analysis that “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (cause) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005:206; also Bennett, 2010; Collier, 2011). In this approach, causation is “thought of as a process involving the mechanisms and capacities that lead from a cause to an effect” (Bennett and Elman, 2006:457). As shown in Chapters 5-7, my analysis found inter-elite power relations and clientelist politics to be the main explanatory variables that shaped the actual distribution of public spending in these two case studies. The only partial exception was the MCA where the ruling NPP’s political discourse around private sector-led development clearly played a role in explaining the selection of some beneficiary districts and regions (Chapter 7).
In cases where I was able to obtain regionally-disaggregated expenditure data on both budgetary allocations and actual spending for the same year, my third approach in establishing causality was to compare the two. This was meant to understand the regional patterns of deviations, which were then compared to the regional distribution of political power. This is arguably an important way of establishing the influence of political representation on public spending not least as the two processes are widely reported to be shaped by formal rules and informal practices respectively in many developing countries (DFID, 2007). Evidence from Tanzania shows, for example, that although politicians and public bureaucrats typically include all districts in allocating budgetary resources, it is the political and bureaucratic elites in government Ministries that make the de facto decisions about actual allocations (Therkildsen, 2000, cited in Therkildsen, 2008). Similarly, Rakner et al. (2004) characterise Malawi’s budgetary processes as “a theatre” that only masks the real distribution of actual spending. Based on these observations, I suggest that an inter- regional comparison of budgetary allocations and actual spending can give us a sense of the impact of the spatial distribution of political power on the spatial patterns of actual
74 resource allocation. If the observed deviations arise from other factors such as funding shortfalls, for example, we will expect the pattern of shortfalls to be fairly uniform across regions. However, if those with limited access to political power are also those that frequently experience high levels of shortfalls in actual spending vis-à-vis their annual budgetary allocations, then we can reasonably attribute this to power relations and the vested interests of more influential political and bureaucratic elites.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I first explored the value of an AISE framework in understanding the evolution and persistence of regional inequality in sub-Saharan Africa. The central focus of this framework (see Chapter 1) is on the interaction between processes of adverse incorporation and social exclusion in perpetuating spatial inequalities through differential access to political power among regional elites in shaping resource allocation decisions. The review pointed to a value addition of an AISE framework in understanding both the colonial roots of regional inequality in African countries and their persistence during the postcolonial era. Against this background, I went on to present an analytical framework for exploring the phenomenon of persistent regional inequalities in Ghana from an AISE/political settlements perspective.
In the remaining six chapters of this study, I present analyses on Ghana’s regional inequalities based on this approach, starting with an in-depth historical analysis on the colonial and early post-colonial periods (Chapter 3). This is followed by a discussion on the politics of ethno-regional inclusion in Ghana’s Fourth Republic (Chapter 4) before turning to examine the implications of inter-elite power relations and other forms of politics on social sector spending (Chapter 5), donor-influenced type of expenditures through a case of the Ghana HIPC Fund (Chapter 6) and productive investments (Chapter 7). An overall conclusion is drawn in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 3. A historical account of power relations and regional inequality in Ghana
“Our politics is shaped by our history” (Interview, Northern Member of Parliament, 04.07.11)
3.1 Introduction
This chapter traces the political history of Ghana, going back briefly to pre-colonial times and continuing through independence up until 1992. The period from 1993 marked a new phase of Ghana’s political history, and is the subject for discussion in Chapter 4. In the present chapter, I aim to offer an historical account of how inter-elite power relations shaped resource allocation decisions and policy choices more broadly, and how this has in turn shaped the spatial patterns of socio-economic development during the period. In so doing, the chapter provides a context for understanding contemporary Ghanaian politics as it relates to the problem of persistent regional inequalities. Particular attention is paid to the broader North-South divide, as in all the subsequent chapters of this study. The overall interest, then, is to understand the key factors and processes that shaped Ghana’s postcolonial political settlements with regards to the North-South inequality. Here, however, I introduce another major societal division that is important to understanding the politics of regional inequality in Ghana, namely the Ashanti-Ewe rivalry in Ghanaian politics. Evidence for the Chapter is drawn heavily from a review of extant literature, and complemented with limited interview and archival materials based on Parliamentary debates around the time of independence.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 briefly discusses the nature of pre-colonial North-South (political) relations before turning to examine the implications of British colonial policies for the country’s North-South inequalities. Section 3.3 discusses the emergence of ethno-regional competition for state power and resources as independence approached. Section 3.4 discusses the main strategies adopted by the first postcolonial government under Nkrumah in suppressing various opposition elements and their underlying implications for the North-South inequality. Section 3.5 reviews the main socio-economic and political strategies adopted by various post-colonial regimes in addressing the colonial legacy of uneven regional development. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
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3.2 Ghana and the colonial legacy of regional inequalities
There is a long history of skewed relations between Northern and Southern Ghana, dating back to pre-colonial relationships between kingdoms and tribes. The Asante kingdom in the forest zone is noted to have had a more sophisticated military organization, and much of its wealth was accrued from the plunder of war and the slave trade (Bourret, 1960:15). In the 18 th century, Asante launched an incursion into Northern Ghana and defeated the two most dominant traditional states of the region, namely the Gonja and Dagbon kingdoms, from which they henceforth collected a regular tribute, mostly in the form of slaves. It is reported that Dagomba chiefs were forced to pay an annual tribute to Asante consisting of “500 slaves, 200 cows, 400 sheep, 400 cotton cloths and 200 silk cloths during this period of vassalage” (Fynn, 1971:116; also Wilks, 1975:67). Indeed, the need to provide slaves for Asante resulted in the establishment of a further subordinate relationship between the Northern states and their stateless counterparts, such that “the non-centralised societies ... formed a pool of manpower that the Gonja raided to supply... the Ashanti with slaves” (Goody, 1967:182-3). Asante continued to exact tributes from the Northern states until 1874 following the former’s defeat by British forces (Buah, 1980).
The above brief account indicates that pre-colonial Northern Ghanaians appeared in the South partly in an inferior capacity as slaves, and thus laying a foundation for Southerners’ perception of Northerners as uncivilized and the latter’s perception of the former, especially Ashantis, as ‘black imperialists’ (Saaka, 2001:140). Although the advent of colonial rule ended tributary slave raiding in the North, it also marked the beginning of reinforcing the region’s subordinate position to the South in several ways. By 1946, the Gold Coast, as colonial Ghana was called, was a multiple dependency, comprising the Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti, the mandated territory of Togoland (all in present day Southern Ghana) and the Northern Territories (NTs) or present day Northern Ghana (Dickson, 1975). Driven by the pursuit of colonial economic interests in the extraction of primary commodities such as cocoa and gold, the Southern areas received the bulk of colonial capital investment, especially as it relates to building infrastructure such as roads and railway links.
In contrast, the colonial administration dismissed the North as poor and possessing no resources (Bourret, 1960), and accordingly incorporated the region into the colonial capitalist economy on adverse terms as a pool of reserved labour. In 1912, Sir James Thorburn, then Governor of the Gold Coast ( 1910-1912) reportedly remarked that:
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“Until the Colony and Ashanti have been thoroughly opened up and developed, the Northern Territories must be content to await their turn, and any extensive program designed to render the area more accessible ‘must be suffered to stand over’ for a long time to come” (Ghana National Archive, ADM 5/1/21, quoted in Abdul- Korah, 2004: 55).
In the following sections, I show how this overarching decision resulted in the simultaneous exclusion and adverse incorporation of the North into different spheres of the colonial political economy and how these processes of exclusion and inequitable forms of incorporation in turn reinforced each other in the production and reproduction of poverty for its citizenry.
But it is important to briefly address one question before delving deeply into this discussion: could colonial policies towards the North be explained in terms of the region’s lack of resources or ‘bad geography’? Sutton (1989:638) noted that the formal annexation of the NTs in 1902 was preceded by a resource inventory of the region, with valuable resources found to have included (and still include) livestock, rice cultivation, cotton, shea nut, tobacco and groundnut, among others. It is on grounds of such observations that Plange (1979a) has strongly criticised explanations of colonial policies towards the North as being informed by the region’s lack of resources, and described such claims as ‘naturalistic fallacies’. He emphasised the need to distinguish between natural resources and colonial resources, seeing the latter as only a subset of the former, in that a given colonial power, on the basis of its own economic interests, decides to exploit certain items. A factor of primary importance in explaining the subordination of the interest of the North to that of the South, he argues, was therefore the former’s lack of colonial resources. Nevertheless, as we will see below, it was these ‘naturalistic fallacies’ and the advancement of the capitalist interest of the colonial state that resulted in the pursuit of differential policies for the North and South, with important adverse implications for the development of the former.
3.2.1 Adverse incorporation and Northern underdevelopment
There is considerable agreement that the North was incorporated into the colonial economy “primarily as a recruiting ground for labour to the capitalist enclaves” of Southern Ghana (Plange, 1984:36). The colonial administration’s erroneous notion that the NTs lacked any important natural resource gave rise to a deliberate strategy to transform the area into a reservoir of cheap labour for the mines and cocoa farms in the South and for the construction of roads and railways in that part of the colony (Plange, 1979a). Kimble’s
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(1963:42) computations suggest that by 1917, an annual supply of about 15,000 Northern labourers to the South had been established. Labour was initially forced out of the region through the enactment of compulsory recruitment laws, the payment of ‘head money’ to Northern chiefs to recruit their own subjects mainly for underground mining activities in the South, and the punishment of ‘recalcitrant’ chiefs who flouted recruitment processes (Plange 1979a, 1979b; 1984; Kimble, 1963). To an extent, these observations point to the contribution of colonial rule to clientelist and other forms of corrupt behaviour in Africa (Ekeh, 1975), rather than simply viewing such phenomena as being rooted in pre-colonial ‘cultural’ practices.
Although forced labour recruitment was eventually abolished in 1925 (Lentz, 1998, cited in Laube, 2007:58), the colonial administration created new pressures that ensured the ‘voluntary’ flow of Northern labour southwards. These included the introduction of herd tax in 1936 which encouraged the need for cash (Owusu, 1992), and the continuous exclusion of the North from productive investments, inclusive of a deliberate discouragement of cash crop production in the region (Konings, 1981:8). Thus, while Northern labour played a pivotal role in the development of the South, its impact on the North was overwhelmingly negative and arguably remains so to this day (see Chapter 7). One reason was that the conscription of able-bodied men undermined the productive capacity of households in the region (Plange, 1979a:9; Konings, 1981:10). Moreover, in view of the perception that migrants would ‘desert’ the mines if they made impressive savings quickly, wages for Northern labourers were purposefully designed to keep them on a bare subsistence account, hardly making it feasible for meaningful remittances for productive investments back home (Plange, 1979b:674).
More importantly, the North’s function as a pool of reserve labour served to discourage the need for productive investments in the region. Drawing evidence from the Ghana National Archives, Plange (1976:148) quoted one Colonial Secretary to have cautioned that “those interested in the planting of cotton [in the NTs] have also to contend in the colony with labour competition of the mines”. This observation corroborates Sutton’s (1989:656) argument that the availability of Northern labour for the Southern export economy “was considered whenever northern agricultural schemes were proposed”. The underdevelopment of the productive resources of the NTs therefore needs to be understood within the context of the vital need for Northern labour in the South, and not the former’s lack of natural resources as proponents of the ‘bad geography’ arguments might want us believe (see Chapter 1).
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Moreover, perceived to be inhabited by people with martial qualities, the NTs was also “the traditional recruiting area for military manpower” (Killingray, 1982:85), with the largely illiterate rank-and-file of the Gold Coast Regiment (GCR) recruited almost exclusively from these areas (Killingray, 1978:52). Available records show that the NTs, with only about 20% of the colony’s population (Bourret, 1960:2), accounted for 90% of the rank and file of the GCR recruited for World War I (Metcalfe, 1964:564; see also Thomas, 1975; Kasanga and Avis, 1988:66), and some 62% of all Gold Coast military manpower during World War II (Killingray 1982:89 and 92). All these tended to constrain the development prospects of the region, for reasons explained below.
3.2.2 Colonial educational policies and the exclusion of Northern Ghana
In line with the objective of sustaining the peripheral role of the North as a reservoir of cheap labour, European-style education was introduced in the North very late, such that while the first secondary school in the Gold Coast was established in 1876, the NTs had their first government secondary school only in 1951 (Quist, 2003:188 and 199). Governor Guggisberg has been specifically credited for his contribution to the educational advancement of the Gold Coast as a whole (see Thomas, 1974), but as Kimble (1963:121) has noted, “even Guggisberg’s drive... could not correct the regional disparities in education that had grown up over the years”. Some analysts have even suggested that educational reforms under Guggisberg could have possibly exacerbated the North-South educational gaps, not least as the regime restricted the highest level of educational attainment in the North to standard III (Brukum, 1997:261). The underlying thinking of this policy, as explained by one colonial officer, was that since agriculture was the most important economic activity among the Northerners,
“their need is not a high academic standard but enough English education to carry on business and practical acquaintance with such trades as will fit them to be useful members of the community” (quoted in Thomas, 1974:441).
Guggisberg’s educational reforms in the North would thus seem to have been designed to train Northerners only for an improved village life, and not for their participation in the more ‘civilised’ aspects of national life.
Moreover, although Christian missions contributed significantly to the advancement of education in both Ashanti and the Colony, the colonial powers initially prevented and subsequently slowed down the extension of Christian missionary education in the North (Kimble, 1963:79; Plange, 1984:38), with significant adverse consequences for the
80 educational advancement of the region. Table 3.1 shows that the number of Government schools in the South in 1919 were not significantly different from those in the North, with both Ashanti and the NTs having four each. However, whereas Ashanti and the Colony had 19 and 194 Government-Assisted Mission schools respectively, the NTs had none. The limitation of mission education would therefore seem to have been very critical in retarding the educational advancement of the NTs (Bening, 1990:30; Ladouceur, 1979:58). Together, these policies meant that compared to 10% and 8.1% in the Colony and Ashanti respectively, only a mere 0.5% of the population of the NTs were in school in 1950 (see Foster, 1965: 117), with no single Northern University student until the mid-1950s (Ladouceur, 1979:87).
Table 3.1: Official Statistics on Schools in the Gold Coast in 1919
It is important to emphasise here that this educational exclusion played a pivotal role in sustaining the North’s peripheral status within the wider political economy as a labour reserve. For example, although the exclusion of the region from productive economic activities along with the introduction of taxes ensured the continuous flow of Northern labour southward, the region’s exclusion from educational opportunities meant that Northern migrants remained incorporated into the Southern export economy on adverse terms. Plange (1979b) has offered one of the most interesting explanations of the ways in which the North’s educational exclusion underpinned its marginal status within the colonial economy as a supplier of cheap labour:
“As primary schools were reluctantly introduced in Northern Ghana they created a mass of ‘educated’ people without corresponding jobs being available in the Region. Consequently, those who finished their elementary education were compelled to move to the South, only to find themselves ‘un-trained’ for the types of jobs available for educated people. The only recourse then was to take menial and manual jobs, or to accept employment in households as cooks, stewards, gardeners, and night-watchmen” (Plange, 1979b: 675-76).
Moreover, Ladouceur (1979) explained that the presence of many Northerners in the security institutions in countries such as Benin and Togo during the colonial period was subsequently turned into considerable political advantage, as ambitious army Officers who 81 later became heads of state (mostly through coups) ensured “increased allocations of government expenditures for their regions of origin” (p.268). In contrast, Northern Ghana was unable to make use of its large numbers in the GCR during the post-colonial period. A key reason was that whereas the North dominated the rank-and-file of the army, there was no Northerner in the higher echelons of the security apparatuses prior to the 1970s (Ibid) arguably because of the limited educational opportunities in the region. This implies that with the educational exclusion of the North, its inhabitants also remained incorporated into the colonial security apparatuses on adverse terms, such that Northerners were never in a position to assume the mantle of political leadership in the immediate post-colonial period. Importantly, the educational exclusion of the North would also seem to have contributed to the full exclusion of the region from the key decision making structures of the colonial state in ways that in turn underpinned its integration into the wider political economy on adverse terms.
3.2.3 Political exclusion and Northern underdevelopment
The exclusion of the NTs from representation in national political institutions was equally evident, one which flowed directly from the need to ensure that it remained a labour reserve (Plange, 1976) but which was underpinned significantly by its educational exclusion. David Apter described the Northern Territories as “the stepchild of central Gold Coast politics” (Apter, 1963:138). One case in point relates to representation on the Legislative Council. The first Southerner (George Cleland) was nominated to this Council as early as 1885 (Boahene, 1975:57), and by the 1930s, all the Southern regions were represented in the Legislature by a combination of interest groups, chiefs and Western- educated Africans (Plange, 1984:41). In contrast, “northern members were deliberately excluded from the legislative council until [September] 1950” (Plange, 1984:41; also Ladouceur, 1979:60). Even then, however, their perceived political immaturity implied that the first Northern members were initially admitted into the Council on unequal terms with their Southern counterparts: “they were actually extraordinary members with no casting votes” (Saaka, 2001:146; also Boahene, 1975).
This move from political exclusion to differential and arguably adverse form of political incorporation is critical to our understanding of the diverse development trajectories of the North and South during the colonial era. One reason is that unlike the South where, for example, the early “political representation on the Legislative Council limited the significant use of either direct or indirect forced recruitment of soldiers” (Thomas, 1975:58), the North’s exclusion from such decision-making institutions arguably 82 underpinned the adverse terms upon which its inhabitants were incorporated into the wider political economy. It is important to note that in addition to its general exclusion from the key decision-making structures of the colonial state, policy discussions pertaining to critical development issues in the NTs were officially prohibited. Consequently, until 1934 when the Legislative Council was first empowered to legislate for the North, there was virtually “no constitutional method whereby Northern Territories affairs could be publicly debated” (Kimble, 1963:536). These predicaments were further compounded by the systematic efforts made by the colonial administration “to encourage southern politicians to think in terms of the interest of the Colony ... instead of the country as a whole, and to divert public attention from the uneven rate of social, economic and political development as between the three major territorial divisions” (Ibid., p.431).
Explanations for the North’s exclusion from the decision making processes often highlight two main factors: the absence of qualified educated elite to occupy requisite positions in government (Plange, 1984); and the resultant lack of political consciousness in the NTs as to lead to demands for participation in national politics (Ladouceur, 1979:68). Such explanations are convincing, but also tend to conceal the role of the restrictive colonial educational policies for these Northern predicaments. The crucial point here is that by restricting the development of European-style education in the North, the colonial administration ensured “a protracted delay in the emergence of an indigenous educated élite ” (Kimble, 1963:536) in the region, which in turn “helped to delay there the modern political challenge to the old social order” (Ibid., p.534). Unsurprisingly, while the 1951 Gold Coast Legislative Assembly had seventeen university graduates from the South, “Northern Ghana did not have a single university graduate to represent it” as late as 1956 (Ladouceur, 1979:87).
Moreover, and as in the case of other African countries noted in Chapter 2, the differential policies in the educational and political spheres proved powerful in shaping processes of state formation in ways that was to set a tone for the dominance of the South in national politics after independence. Nonetheless, by the early 1930s, an embryonic Northern consciousness had began to emerge, as was manifested in an organized protest by the chiefs and few educated elites in the region who, inter alia , demanded an increase in educational facilities and an end to labour conscription from the region. However, none of these resulted in any major change in the political representation of the North until the Northern Territories Territorial Council (NTC) was formed in the mid-1940s (Plange, 1984).
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3.3 The politics of decolonization and rising ethno-regional agitations
The Second World War marked a significant milestone in the political development of the African continent, prior to which colonial rule appeared to have had an unlimited time- scale in the continent (Ladouceur, 1979). These developments had significant implications for Gold Coast nationalism, evident for example, in the formation of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in August 1947, the Colony’s first political party. This was followed shortly by the more militant Convention People’s Party (CPP) in June 1949 with Nkrumah as its leader. The formation of the CPP marked a rapid ascendancy of militant nationalism in the Gold Coast, and the colonial administration soon yielded to pressures for constitutional reforms. In December 1949, the Coussey Committee was constituted to draw up a new Constitution for the Gold Coast. The membership of this Committee included the Northern Territories Territorial Council (NTC), which was originally established in 1946 as a step towards the creation of a central legislature for the country (Ladouceur, 1979:72). One top colonial Official remarked that the inclusion of the NTC in this Committee was meant to encourage “the idea of common citizenship throughout the Gold Coast” (Ibid., pp. 73 & 74) – an acknowledgement that inhabitants of this area had previously been incorporated into the colonial state on adverse terms as ‘subjects’.
Fearing that their regions would be dominated by the more educated and politically- sophisticated Southern elites, the Northern politicians on the Coussey Committee were apprehensive about the pro-self-government orientation of their Southern counterparts. Northern elites argued for the need to delay independence until such a time when the North was on the same level of development with the South (Ladouceur, 1979:93). Indeed, the Northern politicians could justify this claim by pointing to the fact that of the 219 African civil servants in senior positions as at October 1949, none was of Northern origin (Ladouceur, 1973:133; 1979:91). But as it became increasingly clear to the Northern political leadership that they had little control over the timing of independence for the country, they began to place a lot more emphasis on demanding concessions for their regions, without which they were unwilling to be governed as part of an independent Ghana. Between 1952 and 1953, key concessions demanded included the guarantee of one quarter of cabinet posts for the North, an appointment of a Minister responsible for the accelerated development of the region, and the right of the North to secede if its political leadership felt unsatisfied with new constitutional reforms. Nkrumah did not accept many of these demands, but assured the Northern politicians that his government would establish a “special development organization” to look after the development of their regions as well
84 as ensure their “adequate representation in the cabinet” (Ladouceur, 1979: 108-9; also Brukum, 1997:335) – all promises which never materialised.
Ladouceur (1979) argued that the Northern political leadership were unsatisfied about these rather vague promises, and accordingly went ahead to form the Northern Peoples Party in April 1954. The expressed aims of this party were to safeguard Northern culture and to have the socio-economic gaps with the South bridged before the attainment of independence (Kelly and Bening, 2007). Along with other ethno-regional parties, this Northern party contested the 1954 national elections. 6 Although Nkrumah’s CPP won the elections by securing 72 out of a total 104 parliamentary seats (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004:24), the Northern Peoples Party emerged as the largest opposition block in Parliament, having won 15 out of the 26 seats in the North as against 8 for Nkrumah’s CPP (Austin, 1964:244). However, Nkrumah objected to the party being recognised as official opposition on grounds that “it represented an ethnic-regional movement rather than a national political party” (Smock and Smock, 1975:69; also Austin, 1964:252). This stance was in reflection of Nkrumah’s (1951:177) earlier caution that:
“If we tolerate the formation of political parties on regional, sectional or religious bases, we shall not only be heading for political chaos but, worse still, we shall be sowing the destruction of our national existence. Coming events cast their shadows before them, and the Government shall consider what steps should be taken to eradicate this emerging evil in our national life” (quoted in Brukum, 1997:357).
Shortly after the elections, however, a more powerful ethno-regional party emerged, the National Liberation Movement (NLM). The NLM was largely an Ashanti–based movement whose formation was triggered by cocoa farmers’ dissatisfaction with Nkrumah’s cocoa pricing policies – specifically the government’s decision in 1954 to peg cocoa producer prices at their pre-existing level for five years (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991:85; Buah, 1980:162). Nkrumah was strongly influenced by socialist ideas, and justified taxes on cocoa as a means of raising sufficient revenue to be able to implement his ambitious development projects across the country. However, this policy aroused public sentiments in the cocoa growing Ashanti region and provided the basis for launching the NLM. Bafuor Osei Akoto, the leader of the Movement and a chief linguist of the Asante monarch (Buah, 1980:161), spoke of the “highhanded manner of pegging cocoa prices which affects Asantes more than any other group in the country” (Andoh, 1984, quoted in Frempong- Ansah, 1991:85).
6 Thse ethno-regional parties included the Muslim Association Party (MAP), the Togoland Congress (TC) and the Anlo Youth Association (AYA), both formed in the Volta Region and favoured seceding from Ghana and joining Togo (Frempong, 2001) 85
The rise of the NLM shaped subsequent Ghanaian politics by raising the question as to what kind of constitution independent Ghana was to have. While the CPP insisted on a unitary constitution, the NLM stood for a federal type of government. It should be noted here that the central concern of the N.L.M was much “less economic than ethnic” (Smock and Smock, 1975: 68), as its quest for a federal arrangement was primarily meant to enable “Ashantis to use their region’s wealth to benefit themselves rather than to subsidize development in the less affluent parts of the country” (Ibid). Thus, a federal type of arrangement would have ensured a redirection of a greater proportion of cocoa revenues to the areas of its derivation, namely Ashanti.
The NLM’s agitations prompted the colonial administration to insist on national elections in 1956 to determine popular wishes regarding the character of the independence constitution. Although the CPP again managed an overall victory in this election, it became clear that parties based primarily on ethnic-regional appeals demonstrated their strength in their respective ethno-regional strongholds, with the largely Asante-based NLM winning “nearly two-thirds of the vote in the ‘true Ashanti’ states” (Austin, 1964:353). Having been defeated in the election, the NLM forged an alliance with the Northern Peoples Party and other opposition parties in threatening the secession of Ashanti and the North unless their demand for a federal-type constitution was met. It should be added however, that the alliance between the Northern Peoples Party and the NLM was at best one of an “uneasy relationship” (Ladouceur, 1979:177 and 132) as the interests of these ethno-regional movements differed substantially. Notably, whereas the NLM wanted the regional allocation of government resources to be commensurate with revenues collected in each region, the NPP wanted the North to be assigned a disproportionate share of government revenues. In the end however, the former was able to win a number of concessions from the latter, inclusive of an agreement that future state revenues, should the alliance ever form government, would be shared both “on the basis of derivation and needs” (Ladouceur, 1979:133).
For the sake of convincing the British to grant independence, Nkrumah accepted the inclusion of Regional Assemblies in the independence Constitution through which the various regions were to retain significant powers (Smock and Smock, 1975:230). Thus, even though the independence Constitution maintained the unitary state, it also conceded a greater measure of administrative power to the regions (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). Still unsatisfied, the Northern Peoples Party and the NLM now felt that their only recourse was to appeal directly to the colonial authorities, and accordingly sent a delegation to
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London in September 1956 to plead their cause with the Secretary of State for the Colonies. A key objective of the Northern delegation was to secure concessions for the North in the event of independence. One senior Northern politician and top-ranking cabinet Minister under the current NDC government (2009-2012) summarised the main message of the Northern delegation to London in the following words:
“Look, now we are going independent but here we are, we don’t have educated people because you deliberately did not introduce education to the area early enough... We are virtually being sold into slavery [because] we are not on equal terms with our counterparts in the South who have had education” (Interview, senior Northern politician, 11.08.11).
Four days after the London meeting, the colonial administration announced the date for independence for the Gold Coast, and thus throwing the Northern opposition into a state of panic: they now feared that “independence might come with no guarantees or concessions at all being made to the North, which would then be ruled by a hostile Southern-dominated government” (Ladouceur, 1979:159). In a subsequent meeting with Lennox-Boyd, then Secretary of State for the colonies in January 1957, the NPP leaders indicated their willingness to support the independence agenda if the British Government was prepared to make available a sum of £3 million a year for ten years for developing the North – a proposal that received favourable response from the colonial administration. Around the same time, however, Nkrumah also held a meeting with the Northern politicians at which he indicated that his government was unwilling to countenance any arrangement whereby Great Britain would make funds available for the development of the North, as this would mean a continuation of British influence in a manner incompatible with Ghana’s status as an independent state. Instead, Nkrumah proposed that the money should go to the CPP government in the form of a loan for the development of the North. The Northern opposition leaders felt that they had a firm promise of substantial development funds after independence, and therefore now agreed to cease their objections to independence (Ladouceur, 1979:161).
Importantly however, when after independence, the Northerners approached Nkrumah to see what action had been taken on the creation of their special development fund, Nkrumah did an about-face, saying that he wanted independence without strings. With overt support for Nkrumah’s position by the now largely co-opted Northern members of the CPP (see next section), the Northern opposition leaders “were powerless” (Ibid., p.167), such that “the idea of a special development scheme for the North simply vanished” (ibid). Nonetheless, this political elite bargaining would seem to have served as the basis of a
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Northern Scholarship Scheme that was to be instituted by the Nkrumah government in the early 1960s (see section 3.4.3).
3.4 The newly independent state and the suppression of ethno-regional agitations
In the months immediately following independence, the CPP government became even more vulnerable than before, as regionally-based opposition parities continued to emerge (Smock and Smock, 1975:227; Ladouceur, 1979:162). This section highlights two main strategies adopted by Nkrumah in dealing with such opposition, and the implications of such strategies for the North-South inequalities. The first measure for suppressing the opposition elements was the passage of various repressive laws and amendments to the independence Constitution that increased state control over society. These measures started with the passage of the Avoidance of Discrimination Act (ADA) in December 1957, which rendered all political parties built primarily on regional, ethnic, or religious bases illegal. Under the ADA, all the existing opposition parties became illegal, prompting them to merge into a single party called the United Party led by Busia.
The ADA was followed by the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) of 1958, which provided for detention without trial for up to 5 years. Further, the constitutional provision which required power-sharing between the central government and the regions was abolished (Smock and Smock, 1975:230). Gyimah-Boadi (2003:123) comments that this amendment would appear to have “put a permanent lid on the issue of federalism and, to all practical intents and purposes, decentralized local government” in post-independent Ghana. Moreover, by 1960, Nkrumah had pushed through a new Republican Constitution, which concentrated extraordinary powers in the hands of the President, and in 1964, Ghana became a de jure one-party state under Nkrumah’s CPP. These dictatorial measures are noted to have contributed significantly to restoring a degree of order in the country (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004), even if this must have been achieved at the expense of denying the relatively excluded regions the necessary voice for expressing their grievances.
The second major measure was the co-optation of opposition politicians into the ruling coalition, a strategy facilitated by the distribution of public resources along patronage lines. Ladouceur (1979:174-5) has drawn attention to how Nkrumah’s government combined the effective manipulation of local forces and traditionally-based disputes with the judicious use of threats of punishment and promises of rewards to encourage Northern politicians to join the government party. These strategies proved so effective that by 1958, a significant number of the small group of leaders who had collectively worked in the interest of the
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North had defected to Nkrumah’s CPP. For example, of the original fifteen members of the Northern Peoples Party in the National Assembly in 1954, only four remained on the opposition side by July 1960 (ibid., p.168). Ladouceour observed that the prestige of office associated with being part of the ruling coalition played a major role in understanding these defections. Here, chiefs and educated Northerners began to appreciate the benefits of supporting the government in office: positions of honour, jobs, development projects and local improvements of various sorts – all spoils of political power which an opposition party cannot effectively deliver.
Moreover, Nkrumah had a strategy of using the co-opted Northern politicians in countering Northern opposition to his regime, such that when the NPP decided to send its delegation to London, it was one of the Northern CPP Ministers, J. H. Allassani who was sent “to the North to undermine the delegation” (Ladouceur, 1979:158). Thus, many of Nkrumah’s appointments of Northern politicians, according to Ladouceur, were “largely political” (p.266), aimed primarily at containing opposition to his regime. 7 There are strong echoes here with the discussions in Chapter 2, whereby the generally ‘soft’ nature of the postcolonial African state implied that it frequently adopted the “easiest” means to sustaining political power:
“it co-opts the various ethnic and modernist interest group spokespersons into an elite coalition at the top of the system. Such a state utilizes its superior access to public resources to induce interest group representatives to participate in the decision-making process; it incorporates to reduce alienation and opposition” (Rothchild and Folley, 1988:250).
In the face of these measures, however, it is claimed that the distribution and redistribution of socio-economic public goods as well as appointments to ministerial positions were also part of the strategies adopted by Nkrumah and subsequent governments in fostering ethno- regional inclusion and addressing the colonial legacy of regional inequality more generally (e.g. Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh,1999; Gyimah-Boadi, 2003). A key remaining question however is whether these distributional measures were equitable enough or reflected the principle of what Rothchild (1985) called ‘extra-proportionality’ (see Chapter 2) as to lead to regional convergence in living standards. Alternatively, were such measures merely tokenist gestures aimed at containing the ethno-regional antagonisms that accompanied the granting of independence, as many postcolonial states did (Chapter 2)? It is to this question that the rest of this chapter is devoted.
7 Key appointments in this respect included J. A. Braimah, J. H. Allassani (see Saaka, 2001:147). 89
3.5 Addressing regional inequalities? Socio-economic and political policy responses of post-colonial regimes, 1957-1992
This section examines what I consider to be the main political and socio-economic strategies adopted by various post-colonial governments between 1957 and 1992 to address the colonial legacy of regional inequalities. However, I start the discussion from 1951, as this year marked the beginning of substantial internal self government to the Gold Coast, following Nkrumah’s appointment as the Leader of Government Business. Much of the discussion in this section focuses on the Nkrumah-CPP regime (1951-1966) during which a number of structural shifts led to the adoption of certain measures that have continued to influence the character of Ghanaian politics through to today. Outside of Nkrumah, I focus more on the military administrations of General Acheampong (1972-1979) and Jerry Rawlings (1981-1992) whose policies have had some notable implications for the North- South inequalities, both positive and negative. All other administrations in between these periods were generally short-lived (some lasting only four months) as to have any significant impact on the problem under investigation here, and therefore generally ignored in the following discussions.
3.5.1 Responses in the political system and their consequences
This sub-section discusses the key political responses to the problem of uneven regional development, focusing on the North-South divide and the Ashanti-Ewe rivalry in Ghanaian politics. Ghana’s First Republic (1960-1966) came to an end with the overthrow of Nkrumah in February 1966, and the establishment of the National Liberation Council (NLC) headed by J. A. Ankrah. In 1969, the NLC government handed over power to the democratically elected government of Abrefa Busia and his Progress Party (PP), ushering Ghana into its Second Republic (1969-72). The Busia government came to an end through another coup d’état by a military colonel, I.K. Acheampong in 1972, bringing into power the National Redemption Council (NRC). Acheampong reconstituted his NRC into the Supreme Military Council (SMC) in response to ensuring tensions arising from growing economic hardships, but with this reshuffle making no real positive impact on the Ghanaian economy (Langer, 2008). Two coups soon followed, one in July 1978 and another in June 1979 led by Flight Jerry Rawlings. Rawlings handed over power to a democratically elected government of the Peoples National Party (PNP) under the leadership of Dr. Hilla Limann in September 1979, marking the beginning of Ghana’s Third Republic. However, Rawlings soon returned to power again through another coup
90 d’état in December 1981 which ruled under the banner of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) until the return to multiparty democracy in 1992.
There has been some significant continuity in the strategies adopted by all these regimes in redressing the problem of ethno-regional exclusion. Notably, although Nkrumah’s Avoidance of Discrimination Act was strongly opposed by the opposition parties at the time, the prohibition of ethno-regional political parties has since his overthrow remained an enduring feature of Ghana’s postcolonial political settlements. Accordingly, the Second, Third and Fourth Republican Constitutions all contained measures aimed at proscribing ethno-regional political parties and ensuring that parties have a national character (see Chapter 4). The authoritarian measures initiated by Nkrumah were also continued by the various military regimes during 1966-1992 (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh, 1999:151; Gyimah-Boadi, 2003:123). Another key strategy which is of particular interest in this study was the regional distribution of cabinet positions, as discussed in some detail below.
The North-South Divide and the politics of political posts
Concerned primarily with national unity and integration, Ghanaian governments have since independence made conscious efforts to include Northerners in ministerial appointments (Shepherd et al., 2004:26). Based on studies that have analysed the ethnic composition of various governments, Table 3.2 presents the North-South distribution of ministerial positions under selected Ghanaian governments during the period 1952-1988. The evidence shows that with the notable exception of the Acheampong-SMC regime in 1975, all the regimes during the period did include at least one ethnic Northerner in their governments. However, the distribution of ministerial positions has been highly inequitable, as evidenced in the relative representation (RR) of ‘Northerners’ and ‘Southerners’ during the period. As explained in Chapter 2, each region’s RR is calculated by subtracting its percentage proportion of government ministers from its percentage size in the entire population. Consequently, unity means proportional representation: values lower than 0 indicates underrepresentation and more than 0 indicates overrepresentation.
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Table 3.2: North-South Composition of governments (Ministers only), 1952-1988
It is evident that relative to their population share, Southern Ghanaians have consistently been overrepresented in the distribution of ministerial positions, while Northerners have been underrepresented. The only notable exception was the Rawlings-PNDC government of 1981 when the North’s level of representation was about 9% more than its share in the total population (Table 3.2). Excluding the Acheampong-SMC regime of 1975 when the North was fully excluded from the distribution of ministerial positions, the relative representation of Northerners ranged between -13.3% to -0.9% in the period 1952-1988 (see also Langer, 2009).
It should be noted that the secondary literature upon which the above Table is based does not provide disaggregated information as to enable an analysis of the regional representation in different ministerial posts such as those with cabinet status and what one might refer to as the ‘inner core’ of political power. However, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the North had been especially excluded from the most consequential positions of political power. For example, in terms of leverage over national resources, the Ministry of Finance is arguably the most consequential Ministry, and the fact that no ethnic Northerner has ever been Ghana’s Minister for Finance since independence is itself an indication of how the North has historically been excluded from the ‘inner circles’ of political power. Outside of ministerial appointments, the North has only been marginally represented in the ruling councils of various military administrations, with none of the military regimes during 1966-1992 having more than two Northerners (Shepherd et al. 2004:26). Moreover, since the 1950s, the South has produced nearly all heads of state under both military and civilian governments. For example, of 7 heads of state during the
92 period under investigation here, only Dr. Hilla Limann hailed from the North, but with his PNP administration also being the shortest-lived civilian government in Ghana’s postcolonial history (1979-1981).
Outside of these formal positions of power, Northern elites have hardly had any real influence in most of the regimes during the period under discussion here. Ladouceur’s (1979) interviews with prominent Northern politicians in Nkrumah’s Ghana led him to conclude that “Northerners were [only] tolerated in national positions, but not regarded as political heavy weights” (p.264), and that Northerners “played a minor and entirely marginal role, and to have had little if any influence on central government policies” (p.187). The main reason was that “[t]hey do not figure in the inner circle of power in the government or in the party...” (Ibid). Similar observations were made with regards to the NLC and Busia governments, with the former described as the period when “the North was easily ignored” as there was virtually “no one to defend its interests” (p.261).
The Busia regime did include a relatively significant number of Northern Ministers (three out of 18), but this did not mean that Northerners had much influence in national political life. According to Ladouceur, the power and influence of the Northern ministers under Busia was far “more symbolic than real” (Ibid., p.232), and that this together with the short-lived nature of the regime explained why very “little was done to develop the North”. Moreover, while the North as a whole was included in the distribution of political power, all the three Northern Ministers were appointed from the present Upper West while both the Northern and Upper East Regions were fully excluded. This suggests that the incorporation of Northern politicians into the Busia government was more of a strategy of consolidating the regime’s political support base in the North (i.e. the Upper West area) rather than a deliberate strategy of ethno-regional balancing in political representation. Evidence from outside of the North supports this conjecture, as the exclusion of the Ewes and Volta Region would seem to suggest (see below).
Ethno-regional favouritism and The Ashanti-Ewe political rivalry
Beyond the North-South inequalities, one issue that is relevant to understanding the dynamics of regional inequalities in contemporary Ghana is the Ashanti-Ewe rivalry in politics. Many observers have written of Nkrumah’s “ethnically blind” stance in his political appointments and the relative absence of ethnocentricity during Ghana’s First Republic (Smock and Smock, 1975:238; Brown, 1982:41). Following Nkrumah’s overthrow, however, ethnic conflicts soon began to develop as many non-Ewes, especially
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Ashantis, began to suspect the new military regime, the NLC, of being partial to Ewe and Ga interests – the main ethnic groups in the Volta and Greater Accra Regions respectively (Chapter 1). Such perceptions, according to Smock and Smock (1975), were informed largely by the dominance of these two ethnic groups within the NLC. Thus, when in 1967 an abortive coup resulted in the death of some Ewe officers, this was generally interpreted by the Ewes as an effort planned by Ashantis to wrestle control of the NLC from them (Ibid). Frempong (2001:145) asserts that by the time the NLC handed over power to Busia in October 1969, the regime “had split into factions with the Ashantis and Ewes poles apart”.
However, it was during the Busia government (1969-72) that the Ashanti-Ewe cleavage was most heightened, arising particularly from the regime’s complete exclusion of the Ewes/Volta Region from cabinet. Busia’s range of choice of Ewes into his cabinet was admittedly constrained because while the 1969 Second Republican Constitution required him to select his cabinet from amongst MPs, his Progress Party was unable to win any parliamentary seat in the largely Ewe-speaking Volta region. However, some observers argue that if Busia was committed to fostering ethno-regional inclusion, he could have either named an Ewe from another party, sought a constitutional amendment to name a non-member of Parliament from his party (Smock and Smock, 1975; Danso-Boafo, 1996) or even demonstrate a strong commitment to an equitable distribution of resources across different ethno-regional communities. However, all these strategies were ignored, and the political exclusion of the Ewes would rather seem to have translated into the socio- economic exclusion of the Volta Region. Smock and Smock (1975) assert that the allocation of government revenues in many sectors tended to discriminate against the Ewe such that while the rate of construction of government financed community water projects nearly doubled in the country as a whole during the first two years of the regime, the corresponding rate in the Volta Region declined by 30%. Similar charges of discrimination against the region in the area of new road construction were noted (Ibid).
Another important issue which heightened the Ashanti-Ewe cleavage under Busia was the government’s dismissal of some 568 public servants in February 1970. Ewe Members of Parliament compiled a roster of the dismissed workers and concluded that a disproportionate number of them were Ewes (Smock and Smock, 1975; Danso-Boafo, 1996). In a parliamentary debate on these dismissals, one Ewe MP (Godfred Agama) described Busia (an Akan) as a “tribal prime minister” (Langer, 2007:12). This prompted a response from Busia’s Minister for External Affairs (an Akan) that Agama himself
94 belonged to “a tribe that has been notorious for its inward-looking tribalism” (Ibid). The Acheampong regime that overthrew Busia was initially able to dissipate the prevailing ethnic tensions by including an equal number of Akans and Ewes in his 11-member NRC (Smock and Smock, 1975). But such gestures were short lived, as Acheampong also soon started using the alleged threat of ‘Ewe tribalism’ as a means of mobilising support for his regime (Brown, 1982). The Asante-Ewe political rivalry did not feature much during the Third Republic under Limann, but resurfaced during the PNDC administration under Rawlings (an ethnic Ewe) which was criticised of an Ewe-bias in public appointments (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
As will be shown in the later chapters of this research, this ethno-regional rivalry remains an important feature of Ghanaian politics today, evident not only in regional voting patterns and the distribution of ministerial positions (Chapter 4), but also in the distribution of public resources to the Volta and Ashanti regions under Ewe and Asante-dominated governments respectively (Chapters 5&6).
3.5.2 Economic policy responses to the North-South inequality
The Nkrumah era, 1951-1966
Although the Nkrumah government launched a number of development plans during the 1950s, there is no evidence to suggest that these plans made any significant achievement in addressing the colonial legacy of a North-South divide. Ladouceur’s (1979:202-203) assessments of the implementation of Nkrumah’s development plans indicate that the North had “a relatively minor share of the development funds”, not least as “Northerners had little influence over the allocation of development funds”. This ‘little influence’ arose not only from the limited political representation of the North in the Nkrumah governments, but also from the co-optation or adverse incorporation of leading Northern politicians into the ruling coalition. Songsore and Denkabe (1995:17) argue that one reason why development continued to lag in the North during the early post-colonial period was the “the political immaturity, the ethnic fragmentation of the Northern elite and hence their easy co-optation by the dominant social forces in the national political sphere”. One major issue which arguably highlights this point was the question of extending the railway from the South to the North during the early 1950s (Box 3.1).
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Box 3.1: The adverse incorporation of Northern politicians and the Northern Railway project Shortly after his appointment as Minister of Communications and Works, J.A. Braimah from the North presented a memorandum to the cabinet in which he recommended that the railway line be extended from Kumasi to the NTs. This recommendation received a favourable cabinet approval, and the Ten-Year Development Plan approved in September 1951 included a sum of £10 million to undertake this project. The plan initially received universal approval from all Northern politicians. However, disagreement soon broke out as to which route the railway should follow, with those not on the chosen route now beginning to question it. The Nkrumah government therefore decided to shelve the entire project for the next 15 years, claiming that it did not want this issue to divide Northern political leaders.
But given the deliberate effort made by the CPP government in breaking the unity among the Northern politicians (See section 3.4), such an explanation could not have been the real reason behind the cancellation of the Northern railway project. In fact, some Northerners suspected that Nkrumah persuaded the Northern CPP Ministers and other politicians to challenge their colleagues on the question of the routes in order to use it as an excuse for abandoning the Northern railway project. This, it was suspected, was to make more funds available for the regime’s favoured Volta River Project which not only appeared to be economically viable, but also promised to provide the basis for Nkrumah’s ambitious industrialisation agenda.
Sources : Ladouceur (1979) and Brukum (1997)
During the early 1960s, the CPP government launched a Seven-Year Development Plan (1963-70), with particular emphasis on boosting the productive sectors of the economy. One important feature of this plan was its perceived desire to ensure equitable regional development. Indeed, the Plan intended “to ensure that the rate of progress in the less favored parts of the country is greater than the rate of progress in those sections which have hitherto been more favored”, and was therefore to “pay special attention to the modernizing of agriculture in the savannah areas of the Northern and Upper Regions” (quoted in Dickson, 1975:110). Yet, there are reasons for suggesting that this perceived concern for equitable regional development was deceitful.
First, in reality, the plan placed a lot more emphasis on quick returns on investments, as industrial projects were to be “sited so as to make the maximum use of the infrastructure facilities that Ghana already built up at such great cost instead of being sited where this will necessitate more of such non-productive investment” (Ibid). This implied the concentration of most of the proposed industrial projects in the South, as colonialism systematically deprived the North of any meaningful infrastructural development. This perhaps explained why the three cities chosen for the establishment of industrial complexes under Nkrumah (i.e. Accra-Tema, Secondi-Takoradi and Kumasi) were all concentrated in the South (Owusu, 1992:63). Consequently, “the North continued to receive a minimal share of government resources...”. (Ladouceur, 1979:260). It came as no surprise,
96 therefore, when one Northern CPP Member of Parliament, Mr. S.I. Iddrisu, vehemently criticised his own government for its relative exclusion of the North in its so-called national industrial drive (see Ghana Parliamentary Debates, April 23-July 12, 1957, Cols.587-588)
Second, although the North also benefited from a number of agro-processing industries 8 and the establishment of some large scale irrigation schemes (e.g. in Vea and Bontanga), it is questionable if these were driven by any conscious effort aimed at bridging regional inequalities. Songsore and Denkabe (1995:18) argue that the distribution of development projects under Nkrumah tended to be concentrated in areas where electoral support for the ruling CPP was strong, such that even the few industrial establishments in the North consistently excluded the Upper West area which remained an opposition stronghold throughout the Nkrumah era (also Abdul-Korah, 2004:74). Third, it is argued that far from a deliberate effort aimed at bridging the North-South inequalities, the idea of boosting agricultural production in the Northern savannah was principally aimed at providing cheap food to the growing urban population of Southern Ghana, not least as rising food prices increasingly threatened the legitimacy of the regime during the early 1960s (Konings, 1986). Elsewhere, Konings (1981) has reminded us that “[h]igh food prices in the Southern towns was one of the main causes of the 1961 Sekondi-Takoradi railway strike which was the first serious threat to the post-colonial state and the party in power”. Unsurprisingly, even as state marketing boards were established to offer guaranteed markets for agricultural produce, prices offered to Northern peasants by state corporations and opportunistic Southern middlemen were often low (Ibid). It is these observations that informed Koning’s conclusion of his detailed analysis of the Vea Irrigation Project of the Upper Region that:
“the project was not primarily planned (and has not worked out) in the interest of (at least, most) local peasants, but in the interest of the state in the control and exploitation of the Northern labour for capital accumulation and food supplies in the South” (Konings, 1981:1).
In sum, it would seem that despite some improvements, the rate of economic development that might have occurred in the North during Nkrumah’s Ghana could hardly have surpassed that of the more developed Southern regions as to lead to a more balanced pattern of regional development.
8 These included a meat processing factory in Zuarungu and a tomato canning factory at Pwalugu 97
The Acheampong regime and capitalist rice farming in Northern Ghana, 1972- 1978
Since Nkrumah’s overthrow, only the Acheampong government is noted to have “had a positive vision for the development of the north” (Shepherd et al., 2004:13) in post- independence Ghana, as the region benefited from the regime’s extensive promotion of capitalist rice farming. Through extensive state subsidies, Ghana not only attained self- sufficiency in rice production in the mid-1970s, but also exported significant quantities to neighbouring countries, much of which came from the North (Zakaria, 2003; Khor, 2006). Reviewing the performance of the agriculture sector in the 1970s, one World Bank document acknowledges that agricultural production in general grew less rapidly than population during the period, but that “[t]he only exception was rice, which became a flourishing minor crop” partly as a result of “privileged access to highly subsidized inputs, including fertilizer and tractor services” (World Bank, 1995a: 70). Cotton production also received substantial state support, and by 1976/77, the Ghana Cotton Board had sponsored over 38,000 farmers in cotton production, nearly all from the North (Shepherd, 1981).
But contrary to perceiving these initiatives as constituting a ‘positive vision’ for Northern development, some observers argue that Acheampong’s massive agricultural investment programmes in the North were also primarily meant to address Ghana’s rising food imports and its resultant depletion of foreign exchange reserves (Konings, 1984). Consequently, those who profited most from the Northern rice boom were not so much poor farming households as those tied to the centres of political power (Ibid) such as senior public servants and army officers, some of them from the South (see Aryeetey, 1985). Indeed Konings (1986: 218-19) reported how ‘stranger farmers’ siphoned off huge profits made from rice cultivation in the North to their home regions with hardly any contribution to redressing local peasants’ precarious food supplies and to local development more generally. Unsurprisingly, there is hardly any evidence to point to a significant closure of the North-South divide during the 1970s. For example, utilising a wide range of socio- economic indicators, Ewusi’s (1976) seminal work found that not only were the Northern and Upper regions the least developed regions in the mid-1970s, but also that these regions had equivalent to only 11 per cent and 7 percent respectively of the level of development found in Greater Accra. Similarly, Dickson (1975:106) utilised nine different parameters to assess the levels of development of the various regions, concluding that the “Northern and Upper regions do not need to be commented upon specifically: they are by every index the least developed parts of the Ghana”.
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Nonetheless, the improved local rice industry also appeared to have had some positive impact on the development of the North. For example, for the first time, an integrated regional labour market emerged in the region (Shepherd et al., 2004), with some pointing to a significant decline in the North-South migration and a rapid urbanisation of the Northern regional capital (Tamale) as signs of progress arising mainly from rice production (e.g. Konings, 1984:104; Songsore, 2009:15). Shepherd et al. (2004) note that had state support for the domestic rice industry been sustained, and more serious attention given to organised marketing and quality processing, Ghana could probably be a major producer of rice today, with significant potential for poverty reduction in the North. But state support for the local rice industry was rapidly abandoned. There is broad agreement that one important factor that explains this relates to a series of challenges faced by the national economy, including a large external debt and severe droughts in 1978/79 and 1982/83 which made state subsidies for the agricultural sector generally unviable (Mensah, et al., 2006, cited in Langer and Stewart, 2007).
The PNDC and the era of structural adjustment, 1981-1992
Driven by the economic malaise inherited from the Acheampong government, the PNDC regime launched an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983, followed by a structural adjustment programme (SAP) from 1986 to 1991 with support from the IMF and World Bank (Aryeetey and McKay, 2007a:147). The impact of these reforms had been hailed as “salutary” (Oelbalum, 2007:15), especially with regards to restoring economic growth and macroeconomic stability (Langer and Stewart, 2007). However, with the rising tide unable to lift all boats, the benefits were unevenly spread across regions. Ghana’s ERPs/SAPs were predicated on restoring economic growth through a rehabilitation of the export economy, with the result that most of the public investments went to Ghana’s core industrial region, Greater Accra, as well as the cocoa, timber and mineral producing areas in the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Western regions. By contrast, the historically disadvantaged Regions of Northern Ghana, which have economies dominated by the production of basic agricultural commodities, were largely excluded from public investments during most of the adjustment era (Konadu-Agyeman, 2000; Songsore, 1989; 2003). To be fair, however, the adjustment era also witnessed some major infrastructural investment projects in the North, most notably the extension of the national electricity grid to the region and the rehabilitation of some North-South roads (Langer, 2009). Yet, apart from charges that such gestures were driven significantly by Rawlings’ attempt to create a 99 rural power base and establish a Northern clientele (Laube, 2007:75) as the country was preparing for redemocratization, it should be noted that the positive impact of these projects were also generally limited when analysed within the context of: 1) the massive investments in the infrastructural base of the Southern export economy (Aryeetey-Attoh & Chatterjee, 1988); and 2) the general neglect of the main cash crops in the region under SAPs (i.e. shea and cotton) as well as the staple crop sector – a sector upon which most farm households in the North depend.
There is substantial evidence that “the SAP favoured export-sector agriculture, mainly cocoa, which saw some benefits flowing to large farmers in the South and Centre of the country” (Mohan, 2002:13; also Anyinam, 1993:454). Roe and Schneider (1992:77) point out that between 1983 and 1987, there was more than a sevenfold increase in the price paid to cocoa farmers. However, as cocoa production in Ghana is wholly a Southern-affair due to geographical variations, the lagging North did not benefit from the increased incentives to cocoa producers. One consequence was that Northern farmers were “further marginalised by liberalisation” (Mohan, 2002:140). The adverse impact of SAPs on the North arose both from the removal of agricultural subsidies for food crop farmers and the unbridled liberalization of the cotton and shea industries (Chaflin, 2004; MacKay et al., 2005), as well as the food crop sector in ways that opened the floodgates for cheap food imports, notably rice. McKay et al (2005) note that unlike Burkina Faso which continued to provide substantial state protection for its cotton sector, the unbridled liberalisation of this sector in Ghana occurred at a time when it was most in need of state support. In contrast, and despite donor insistence on the complete liberalisation of the cocoa industry (see World Bank, 1995b:64; African Development Bank, 2002:18), the Ghanaian Government insisted in its Cocoa Sector Development Strategy that when it becomes necessary to liberalise the external market of cocoa, “Ghana must evolve its own strategy and be in the driver’s seat” (Ministry of Finance, 1999:61). In essence, this means that the cocoa industry of Southern Ghana was only partially liberalised, as government offered (and continue to do today) minimum guaranteed prices to cocoa farmers for their produce under SAPs, in ways that has contributed to poverty reduction among cocoa producers. Such observations draw our attention to the ways in which a region’s lack of ‘agenda- setting powers’ can indeed organise its interest out of politics and from the mandates of public policy and state institutions (Mosse, 2007; 2010).
There have been varying accounts regarding the differential treatment of cocoa and the rest of the agricultural sector under SAPs, but with many analysts emphasising the role of the
100 sector in generating foreign exchange earnings and economic rents for ruling elites (e.g. Williams, 2009; Whitfield, 2011a; 2011b). From the political perspective, McKay et al (2005:28) point to the important role of organised lobbying: “The power of horizontal lobby groups – cocoa farmers, civil servants, has been considerable, and probably goes a long way to explain why Accra and the forest region have done so well out of the structural adjustment and liberalisation period”. By contrast, food crop farmers in Ghana have generally not been well organized as to be able exert sustained pressure on government, and to advocate for policies in their interest more generally. Adedeji (2001) offers a slightly different explanation, however, arguing that the relative gains accrued to cocoa farmers under SAPs was not so much driven by the organisational and lobbying capacities of cocoa producers as the PNDC government’s ‘rational’ calculations as to what a neglect of this sector could mean for its own political survival. He pointed to how the lack of organization of farmers in general made them “politically expendable” under SAPs, but with the caveat that “in terms of cocoa producing regions, the government was hard pressed not to pay them more attention, especially as they formed a new source of support and legitimacy for the authoritarian regime”.
3.5.3 Social service provision: a focus on education
The Nkrumah regime is widely credited for its contribution to redressing the colonial legacy of North-South educational inequalities (e.g. Smock, 1976). Notably, Nkrumah established a Northern Scholarship Scheme in 1961 which provided grants to people of Northern extraction at various levels of the educational system. These included grants targeted at deserving students to gain access to secondary education; special maintenance grants for all Northern students entering University; and the payment of boarding fees for secondary school students (Songsore and Denkabe, 1995:65). Outside of the broader subsidization of Northern education, however, it has been observed that similar to the spatial patterns of industrial establishments noted above, most of Nkrumah’s social sector public spending excluded the Upper West where strong opposition to the CPP was sustained (Ibid., p.17). Ladouceur (1979:189) has similarly drawn attention to how Nkrumah’s approach to politics ensured “that those areas which sill supported opposition personalities were at a distinct disadvantage in competing for schools, hospitals and roads” and how this in turn resulted in the “almost total neglect” of the present Upper West.
Moreover, the special attention paid to Northern education under Nkrumah needs to be understood within the context of the ethno-regional political bargains that characterised the decolonisation processes (see section 3.4). Indeed, evidence from Parliamentary debates 101 show that even after independence, the few resilient Northern leaders continued to exert pressure on the government regarding the need for special concessions for the North, especially in the area of education:
“We were hoping that when Ghana was independent the newly all-African Government would provide the North with all that was required to free the North from ignorance... [I]nstead this the Government dominated by Southerners, are doing all they can to keep the Northerners down so that they can use them as servants... We feel that this government composed mainly of Southerners must give priority consideration in so far as education and other projects are concerned, to the North. They must do this because they committed the North to self-government” (C. K Tedam, MP from the Upper West – see Ghana Parliamentary Debates Official Report, 18 Feb-19 March, 1958, p.85). To these charges J. A. Briamah, another Northern MP, added: “I think it is because there are no persons holding responsible posts in the administration who could draw the attention of the Government to this.... In the Cabinet we have only one resident Minister ... [whose] voice is just one in the wilderness...”. (Ibid., p.91).
Similar charges against the government were made regarding the relative exclusion of the North from the distribution of health facilities (Ibid, March 18, 1958, p.330). Interestingly however, both Tedam and Braimah are among Ladouceur’s (1979:168) list of Northern politicians who had defected to the CPP government by June 1958 and July 1959 respectively. This finding resonates Saaka’s (2001:147-8) observation regarding how Nkrumah’s appointment of some of “the most vocal” Northern politicians into Ministerial positions undermined the united stand of the Northern political leadership as the Northern CPP Ministers soon became “defenders of some of the very government policies they had so ardently promised to oppose”. This also resonates well with Rothchild’s (1984:165) argument with regards to sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, namely that because the various ethno-regional spokespersons were in practice members of the ruling coalition, there was always the danger of the “full cooptation” of elites from lagging areas into identification with the dominant political class instead of their constituents (Chapter 2).
The NLC government continued to implement some of Nkrumah’s special educational programmes in the North (Smock, 1976:123). However, by the early 1980s, the Northern Scholarship Scheme had come “under severe attack”, with the result that only one component of it remains operational today. 9 Songsore and Denkabe (1995) note that part of the hostility towards the Scheme relate to a growing feeling among Southern elites that the continuous special treatment of the North constituted a form of discrimination against the South. Moreover, the economic decline of the 1970s affected the provision of many
9 This is the payment of boarding fees at the secondary school level. 102 social services across the country, in ways that further resulted in regressions from earlier achievements in Northern education during the 1960s (Songsore et al., 2001). However, it was the era of structural adjustment in the 1980s and early 1990s that worsened the plight of the poorer Northern regions. One reason was that the cost recovery element attached to the provision of education and health services under SAPs made access to such services unaffordable. These policies resulted in significant declines in both school and hospital attendance across the country, but with the impact “particularly” felt “in the northern Savannah where the rise in the share of costs borne by the households … seriously eroded the capacity of subsistence croppers and pastoralists to access quality education for their children” (UNDP and ISSER, 1997:33).
There is some evidence to argue however that the differential adverse impact of the ERP arose not only from the cost recovery elements of the programme, but also from the relative exclusion of the North from public spending during the period. From 1986, the GoG began to prepare a three year rolling Public Investment Programmes (PIPs) as part of the ERP/SAPs. The PIPs were purportedly designed to give “adequate consideration ... to the regional distribution of projects to ensure equitable and balanced development of all regions” (Republic of Ghana, 1995:13). In 1989, the Government began to monitor the implementation of these programmes through an analysis of the distribution of current and capital expenditure across a range of Ministries. The first PIP analysis covering the period 1989-1991 does not contain regionally disaggregated expenditures (see World Bank, 1989), but the overall conclusion of the 1992-1994 PIP show that the rhetoric on equitable regional development was not translated into action. The Education sector analysis found, for example, that:
“whether we take the budgeted or the actual figures, the discrepancies between the regions are large. In particular, the Upper West, Upper East, and Northern Regions continued to do badly. Between them they have 19% of the total population but only 11.6% of actual PIP expenditure” (World Bank and Republic of Ghana, 1992:17). 10
The use of the word ‘continued’ in this quotation would seem to suggest that previous government expenditures did not favour the North either. The conclusion of the Health sector analysis was similar: “[t]he under-endowed regions do not receive a larger share of the investments than those which are better off” (Ibid., p.16).
10 There is perhaps something wrong with the publication date of this study (September 1992), as the data presented in it covers actual PIP expenditures up to 1994. 103
Thus, one can conclude that the poorer Northern regions suffered some levels of exclusion in terms of both productive and social sector spending under SAPs. The GoG’s adoption of the Programs of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in 1988 whose target groups included rural households in the North (Roe and Schneider, 1992:78) would seem to have been an implicit acknowledgement of this fact. However, the overall impact of PAMSCAD was limited, both due to poor targeting of available resources (Konadu-Agyemang, 2000) and underfunding. For example, of total funding commitment of $84 million to support PAMSCAD by the international donor community for the period 1988-89, only $15 million (or 18%) was disbursed by July 1990 (Roe and Schneider, 1992:117-8). Perhaps, this is not wholly surprising, not least as PAMSCAD’s “motivations were clearly political” (Hutchful, 2002:116), designed mainly to “enhance the sustainability and acceptability of the ERP” (Ibid).
3.6 Conclusion
Most historical accounts of Ghana’s North-South inequalities typically emphasise the neglect of the North by the colonial powers in terms of public investments (e.g. Kimble, 1963; Staniland, 1975). This is illustrated in particular by Sutton’s (1989:669) assertion that “[t]he aim of colonial policy was to develop the south, ignoring rather than under developing the north”. This chapter has argued that the simple language of indifference or exclusion cannot sufficiently explain the nature of colonial policies towards the North. Rather, it was the simultaneous exclusion and adverse incorporation of the North into different spheres of the colonial capitalist political economy that best explain the role of colonial policies in laying the foundation of the contemporary North-South inequalities in Ghana.
Much of the North’s development predicaments stemmed from the colonial policy that designated the region as a labour reserve, whose role in the resource extraction strategies of the colonial powers was the provision of cheap labour for export-oriented production in the South and for the rank-and-file of the colonial army. The key strategies for sustaining this peripheral role for the region included the exclusion of the region from: 1) productive economic activities which itself had a direct impact on poverty in the region; and 2) educational opportunities. The educational exclusion of the region took several forms, including limited public investments, the restriction of missionary education, and the setting of lower educational standards in Northern schools. Importantly, while the exclusion of the region from productive investments along with the introduction of taxes
104 ensured the ‘voluntary’ flow of Northern labour southwards, their half-baked educational status, itself partly a product of the region’s educational exclusion, meant that Northern migrants could only undertake menial, life-threatening and less rewarding jobs in the South (Plange, 1979b). In this way, exclusion from production and education reinforced each other in reproducing poverty both for Northern migrants and their families. This is what Gore (2003:1) calls ‘poverty traps’: “a situation in which poverty has effects which act as causes of poverty” and in which poverty outcomes reinforce themselves through processes of circular and cumulative causation.
Moreover, the educational exclusion of the region ensured the simultaneous exclusion of Northerners from the top hierarchy of the colonial army and their resultant adverse incorporation into this institution as rank-and-file; as well as the initial full exclusion of Northern elites from, and subsequently (from September 1950 onwards) their adverse incorporation into, the Legislative Council. Crucially, these forms of political exclusion and/or adverse incorporation in turn underpinned the region’s adverse incorporation into the colonial economy as labour reserve, not least as there was virtually no avenue through which such disempowering forms of inclusion could be challenged (Kimble, 1963). There was thus a vicious circle whereby processes of exclusion and adverse incorporation into different spheres of the colonial political economy operated in mutually-reinforcing ways in the production and reproduction of poverty in the North.
Given their differential incorporation during much of the colonial period, Northern political leaders envisaged the domination of their regions by the more educated Southern elites in the postcolonial period, and accordingly objected to being governed as part of independent Ghana without special protections. Informed mainly by these ethno-regional agitations in the North and other parts of the country, the reduction of ethno-regional inequalities appeared high on the agenda of many postcolonial governments. Thus, in addition to paying special attention to the lagging North in the field of education since the postcolonial government, appointments to cabinet positions and membership of ruling military councils were often informally balanced to reflect the ethno-regional and cultural diversity of the country. It has been observed that this ‘system of rough equity’ contributed significantly to containing the pre-independent ethno-regional animosities (e.g. Gyimah- Boadi and Daddieh, 1999; Gyimah-Boadi, 2003). Such observations corroborate North and colleagues’ (2009a) argument that the maintenance of social and political stability requires the creation of a ‘dominant coalition’ at the level of elites, and that as members of this coalition enjoy certain privileges, incentives are created for inter-elite co-operation.
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However, and reflecting the broader pattern in sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter 2), the incorporation of Northern elites into various ruling coalitions has not been equally successful in overcoming the colonial legacy of the North-South development disparities. The key explanation relates to Northern elites’ relatively weak access to political power under various regimes, and the tendency of Southern politicians to use their dominance over decision making structures in shaping institutions and resource allocation decisions in ways that best served the interest of the South. Although various regimes have demonstrated some commitment toward ethno-regional coalition formation, as had been the case in most postcolonial African regimes (see Chapter 2), the North was neither proportionally represented in government nor did it ever form part of the ‘inner core’ of power in any regime. The implication was that although being ‘included’ in nearly all regimes, the North nevertheless remained “virtually a colony under the rule of southern bureaucrats” (C. K. Tedam, MP from Upper West – see Ghana Parliamentary Debates Official Report, First Series, Vol. 9, 18 Feb-19 March, 1958, p.86). This, together with the patronage-based character of politics in turn undermined substantial resource flow to the North. These observations support the claims noted in Chapter 2 that from the perspective of equitable regional development, the problem of political power is more of a matter of “calculus than arithmetic” (Sithole, 1994) not least as a region’s exclusion from the “inner sanctums” of power can undermine its access to vital public resources (Rothchild and Folley, 1988).
Indeed, the disempowering terms upon which Northern elites were incorporated into the polity coupled with the co-optation of the few vocal Northern politicians had meant an inadvertent reinforcement of the patterns of development set during the colonial period. Here, the socio-economic interests of the North became subordinated to that of the South, with the former often viewed in terms of what it could do to advance the interest of the latter. Thus, even as the capitalist rice farming projects of the Nkrumah and Acheampong governments have been hailed for their modest contributions to bridging Ghana’s North- South inequalities, the overarching rationale of these projects was not so much about improving the living standards of Northern peasants as the provision of cheap food to feed the growing urban populations of the South. Thus, while these initiatives somewhat altered the peripheral role of the North as a supplier of cheap labour for the national economy, that change occurred largely in a manner that “suited the southern-based state’s definition of its own interests” (Shepherd, 1981:172).
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To sum up, the persistent North-South inequalities during the immediate post-independent period must be understood within the context of the political adverse incorporation of Northern elites and their resultant marginal command over resource allocation decisions. Against this background, the next Chapter focuses on an analysis of the extent and nature of Northern elites’ access to political power during the 1990s and 2000s. The rationale is to provide a basis for analysing the implications of the spatial distribution of political power for the spatial patterns of public resource distribution in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
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Chapter 4. The politics of ethno-regional inclusion in Ghana’s Fourth Republic (1993-2008): implications for regional inequalities
“Are Northern Politicians meant to play the second fiddle?” ( The Northern Advocate , 11– 15 October 2004, quoted in Kelly and Bening, 2007:189).
“Our brother Aliu Mahama was Vice President for 8 years. I was Vice President for 3 and half years. For almost 12 years, we have tasted Vice Presidency. It’s no longer exciting. It’s no longer what we want” [President Mahama from the Northern Region, November 11, 2012). 11
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 provided a detailed political history of Ghana, highlighting the tensions and ethno-regional animosities that characterised the immediate post-independence period during the 1950s. These tensions were underpinned mainly by the emergence of ethno- regional political parties that competed for control over state power and resources. The discussion also showed how various post-independent governments attempted to foster national cohesion and address the colonial legacy of unbalanced regional development through a combination of the symbolic distribution of public resources, the incorporation of rival ethno-regional elites into ruling coalitions (albeit on inequitable/adverse terms), and various authoritarian measures that suppressed opposition elements. All these measures contributed to minimize the emerging ethno-regional tensions that characterised the early post-independence period (Gyimah-Boadi, 2003), and thereby reflecting the processes outlined by North et al (2009a) as the building blocks of limited access social orders , namely the co-optation of excluded elites into a ‘dominant coalition’ (see Chapter 2).
Within this context, one key concern associated with the return to multi-party democracy in the early 1990s was the fear that electoral competition would encourage the formation of ethno-regional political parties, result in ethno-regional struggles for access to state power and eventually plunge the country into chaos (Asante, 2004). This chapter examines how successive governments in Ghana’s Fourth Republic have tackled the problem of regional inequalities since the country’s return to multiparty democracy in 1993. It does so by exploring a) the distribution of political power among regional elites during 1993-2008; and b) the relationship, if any exists, between regional inequalities of political power and
11 See Radioxyzonline (November 11, 2012), ‘Northerners are tired of playing second fiddle to the presidency – Mahama’. Available at: http://www.spyghana.com/politics/northerners-are-tired-of- playing-second-fiddle-to-the-presidency-mahama/ [accessed 11.11.12]
108 regional socio-economic disparities within the context of Ghana’s multiparty democratic environment.
The chapter is arranged as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief political context of Ghana’s Fourth Republic. Section 4.3 explores the political strategies for curbing ethno- regional exclusion, focusing on legal and institutional measures and the regional distribution of political power during 1993-2008. Section 4.4 analyses why one might expect the inclusive/exclusive nature of ruling coalitions to affect resource allocation outcomes and therefore the regional patterns of socio-economic development. This is followed by a discussion of other factors identified as important for understanding regional inequalities in Ghana, including the prevalence of patronage forms of politics (section 4.5), as well as the role of Northern political elites (section 4.6) and donors (section 4.7). Section 4.8 summarises the discussion and concludes the chapter.
4.2 Ghana’s Fourth Republic: a brief political context
Ghana adopted a new Constitution by popular referendum in April 1992, ushering in the country’s Fourth Republic which was formally inaugurated in January 1993. The first elections under the new Constitution were held in November 1992, and elections have been held every four years since then. Although several parties have contested all five set of elections between 1992 and 2008, only two parties dominate, with the NPP and the NDC consistently winning over 90% of presidential votes. The NDC is the civilian metamorphosis of the PNDC, while the NPP represents the Danquah-Busia tradition in Ghana’s political history which evolved from the UGCC, the NLM, the UP, and the Progress Party led by K. A. Busia during the Second Republic ( Chapter 3). Between these parties, the presidency has changed hands twice between 1993 and 2008. Having won both the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1996 under J.J. Rawlings, the NDC lost to the NPP in 2000 and 2004 under the leadership of J.A. Kufuor, which in turn lost to the current ruling NDC in December 2008 under the leadership of J.E.A. Mills. 12
Ideologically, the NPP regards itself as a pro-market, pro-business party, and touts the private sector as the main engine of growth and poverty reduction (NPP, 2012: 46). Unsurprisingly, the NPP regime (2001-2008) saw the creation of a Ministry of Private Sector Development for the first time in Ghana’s history. In contrast, the NDC claims that it is a ‘social democratic’ party that seeks to “marry the efficiency of the market and
12 Attah-Mills died while in office in July 2012, and was replaced by the Vice President John Dramani Mahama, until the scheduled national elections on 7 December 2012. 109 private initiative with the compassion of state intervention to protect the disadvantaged and the marginalized and to ensure optimum production and distributive justice” (NDC, 2004: 12). It is argued however that these parties remain generally non-programmatic in practice, and that both adhere strongly to the same neo-liberal set of economic policies when in power (Ninsin, 2006; Abdulai and Crawford, 2010). But as we will see, the NPP’s strong endorsement of a private sector-led development would seem to have played a crucial role in informing its selection of MCA beneficiary districts and the exclusion of the poorer Upper regions from the MCA (Chapter 7).
Table 4.1: Regional voting patterns in Ghana, 1992-2008
There is strong ethno-regional basis to electoral competition in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, with the NPP viewed as an Akan/Ashanti party, while the NDC is seen as an Ewe/Volta region party. The NPP has its geographic strongholds in the Ashanti region, while the Volta region has consistently remained the NDC’s ‘vote bank’. Though to a less dramatic extent, the three Northern regions have also been the NDC’s strongholds, with more than half of eligible voters in each of these regions consistently voting for this party in all 5 presidential elections since 1992 (Table 4.1). On the other hand, the traditional stronghold of the NPP is Ashanti, and to a lesser extent the Eastern region. The remaining four regions (Greater Accra, Central, Brong Ahafo and Western) are generally considered to be swing regions because contests between the two main parties have become increasingly close there. Although not presented here, patterns of voting in parliamentary elections tend to follow similar patterns. Studies of voting behaviour have also identified an urban/rural cleavage in Ghanaian politics. Here, the NDC and NPP are considered to be dominant in
110 rural and urban communities respectively (Bawumia 1998, Nugent 1999), but with more recent election results showing that this pattern is waning (Whitfield, 2009a).
4.3 The politics of ethno-regional inclusion
4.3.1 Legal and institutional framework for ethno-regional inclusion
The 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution contains extensive provisions aimed at curbing the promotion of sectional interests in Ghanaian society and for fostering the inclusion of all regions both in government and in the distribution of public resources (Republic of Ghana, 1992). The Constitution obliges political parties to have “a national character” by ensuring that their membership is “not based on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions” [Article 55 (4)]. The ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’, enshrined in the Constitution, takes these provisions further by enjoining the state to “ensure reasonable regional… balance in recruitment and appointment to public office” [Article 34 (6b], as well as enhance “even and balanced development of all regions and every part of each region of Ghana” [Article (36) (2d)].
One other important – but often overlooked – provision aimed at addressing political inequalities is the requirement that sitting Presidents select majority of their Ministers from within Parliament (Article 78). One of the consequences of the 1969 Second Republican Constitution – which required all government Ministers to be selected from amongst MPs – was the complete exclusion of the Ewes/Volta Region from the distribution of Ministerial positions as the then ruling Progress Party was unable to win a parliamentary seat in this region. Learning from the ethno-regional animosities engendered by this development (Chapter 3), the Constitution for the Fourth Republic requires Presidents to select some, but not all, their ministers from amongst MPs. This provision seeks to enable “the President to pick Ministers from outside Parliament in order to create a regionally or ethnically representative cabinet in situations where the President’s party in Parliament is not sufficiently diverse ethnically” (Coffey International Development, 2011:27). The questions that arise then are: have various governments adhered to these Constitutional provisions by fostering the inclusion of all regions in government? Do the regional patterns of political inclusion matter in the regional patterns of public resource allocations in contemporary Ghana? It is to these questions that I now turn.
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4.3.2 Regional distribution of political power in Ghana: 1993-2008
The discussion in the previous chapters highlighted the crucial role of unequal access to political power at the elite level in underpinning socio-economic inequalities at the mass level. Within the context of the patronage-driven political environments of poor countries, access to positions of power is especially critical as it provides various regions “a ‘say’ in decision making and control over government resources” (Lindemann, 2010a:52). This section analyses the regional distribution of political power in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, focusing on the Rawlings-NDC (1993-2000) and the Kufuor-NPP (2001-2008) administrations. A full picture of the dispersion of political power and its implications for public resource allocation outcomes would require consideration of the politicians in government such as Ministers and deputy ministers of state, leadership positions in political party structures, senior bureaucrats in various government institutions as well as many other decision makers in various political institutions. But as explained in Chapter 2, although my initial plan was to collect detailed data on ministerial as well as senior civil service positions by region, data challenges and time constraints compelled me to focus on what is arguably the most significant reflection of the spatial dispersion of political power in Ghana, namely the Presidency, vice presidency and the distribution of ministerial positions. Thus, although some material is presented here to give us a sense of the level of Northern elites’ representation in the bureaucracy, my detailed analysis focuses on the regional distribution of political power. This is measured by the regional distribution of:
• deputy ministers; • ministers (Cabinet and non-cabinet); • the ‘inner core of political power’, comprising the President, vice President and key ministerial positions; and • a ‘representation index’ (RI), which combines the forgoing measures (see Chapter 2). As explained earlier, I compute each region’s RR by subtracting its percentage proportion of government ministers from its percentage size in the entire population.
4.3.3 The regional composition of the Rawlings-NDC governments, 1993-2000
The Rawlings-led NDC governments of the 1990s would seem to have been generally guided by the need for regional inclusivity, as all the ten administrative regions had a share in the distribution of ministerial positions in absolute terms (Figure 4.1a). However, if the level of representation is analysed relative to their population shares, it becomes evident
112 that the distribution of political power during the period was highly inequitable. Figure 4.1b shows that the Central, Volta and Upper West regions were overrepresented during 1993-2000, while all the other regions (especially Ashanti and Greater Accra) were underrepresented. The North was generally well represented, such that throughout the period from 1993-2000, only the Upper East experienced a noticeable level of under representation of -2% during 1993-1996. If one takes the entire eight-year period of the regime into account, we see that the Volta region (Rawlings’ home region) was the most privileged in terms of access to political power. This was followed very closely by the Central Region which produced the two vice-presidents during the period. The only other regions that enjoyed overrepresentation, even if to a much less dramatic extent, were the Upper West (2.3%) and Northern (0.4%) regions, with all the remaining regions being underrepresented relative to their population shares (see Appendix 4).
Figure 4.1: The regional composition of the Rawlings-NDC government, 1993-2000 Figure 4.1a: Absolute distribution, Figure 4.1b: Distribution relative to 1993-2000 average population shares, 1993-2000 average 25 20
20 15
10 15 5
Percent 10 0 Percent -5 5 -10
0 -15
1993-1996 1997-2000 1993-1996 1997-2000
Source: Author based mainly on monthly Parliamentary Hansards during the period.
In line with Langer’s (2004; 2005) studies on Côte d'Ivoire and that of Lindemann (2011b) on Uganda (see Chapter 2), Table 4.2 shows that the predominance of the Volta and Central regions were much more pronounced in the more consequential positions in cabinet and the ‘inner core’ of political power than the aggregate picture presented above suggests. While the Central region dominated both cabinet and the inner core positions during 1993-1996, this shifted significantly to the Volta region during the period 1997- 2000. The three Northern regions had varying experiences in these two key arenas of
113 political power. While the Upper West was slightly overrepresented in both cabinet and in the ‘inner core’ positions, the Northern and Upper East regions were both underrepresented, but with the latter overrepresented (12%) among deputy ministers. This implies that the slight overrepresentation (2.3%) reported for the Upper East during 1997- 2000 (Table 4.2) was primarily a product of the region’s over representation in the second- fiddle position of deputy ministers. The only three regions that consistently experienced underrepresentation throughout the Rawlings regime and across all the different portfolios were Ashanti, Greater Accra and Brong Ahafo.
Table 4.2: Distribution of political power relative to population shares (%), 1993-2000
4.3.4 The regional composition of the Kufuor-NPP governments, 2001-2008
Similar to the Rawlings regime, the Kufuor-led NPP government broadly reflected a national outlook, as none of the ten regions was completely excluded in the distribution of political power. Again however, the evidence points to significant variations in the levels of representation. This was especially so during Kufuor’s second-term (2004-2008) when the average index of representation varied from 31% for Ashanti to less than 5% for the Volta, Upper East and Upper West regions (Figure 4.2a). If one subjects the data to the regional distribution of population during the period, we see that throughout the Kufuor governments, the Ashanti, Eastern, Central and Brong Ahafo regions were consistently overrepresented, while the Greater Accra, Volta, Western, Upper East and Upper West were consistently underrepresented. The Northern region had a more nuanced experience,
114 being initially over represented during 2001-2004 (albeit only slightly), but experienced a marginal underrepresentation (-1.3%) during 2005-2008 (Figure 4.2b).
Figure 4.2: The regional composition of the Kufuor-NPP government, 2001-2008
Figure 4.2a: Absolute distribution, Figure 4.2b: Distribution relative to 2001-2008 population share, 2001-2008 35 15 30 10 25 20 5 15 Percent Percent 0 10 -5 5 0 -10
2001-2004 2005-2008 2001-2004 2005-2008
Source: Author, based on monthly Parliamentary Hansard during the period
But a further disaggregation of the data shows that only two regions – Ashanti and Eastern – were consistently overrepresented in the more consequential positions in the ‘inner core’ of political power. During Kufuor’s first term, the Ashanti region, with an approximately 19.4% of the national population, controlled some 24.4% of cabinet positions and 39.4% of the ‘inner core’, corresponding to an over representation of 5% and 20% respectively (Table 4.3). The prominence of Ashanti in these relatively ‘juicy’ positions included President Kufuor himself as well as control over the powerful Ministries of Defence; Finance and Economic Planning (during February 2005-2008); Trade and Industry; Road and Transport; Energy; Local Government and Rural Development; and the office the Chief of Staff and Presidential Affairs. Though to a less dramatic extent, the over representation of the Eastern region was also significant both in cabinet (9%) and in the ‘inner core’ positions (8%). Except the Brong Ahafo and Central regions during Kufour’s first and second-terms respectively (Table 4.3), virtually all the other regions were excluded from both cabinet and in the ‘inner core’ positions. Another exception relates to the trivial overrepresentation of the Northern region in cabinet, one which was enhanced in particular by the position of the Northern vice president, Aliu Mahama.
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Table 4.3: Distribution of political power relative to population shares, 2001-2008 13
If attention is focused on the less powerful positions of deputy ministers, however, one finds that only the three Northern regions and Brong Ahafo enjoyed over representation during Kufuor’s first-term in office. This was particularly the case for the Northern region which had about 10% of the national population but accounted for 16% of all deputy ministerial positions during Kufuor’s first term (Table 4.3). In general, the evidence shows that the exclusion of the Northern regions from full ministerial positions were compensated by President Kufuor’s appointment of a more than proportionate number of deputy ministers from among the Northern regions. 14 This finding implies that the relatively higher index of representation for the Northern region during Kufuor’s first term in office was clearly explained by the over representation of this region in deputy ministerial positions – a much less influential position in government with regards to leverage over resource allocation decisions (Lindemann, 2011b). Although President Kufour undertook several ministerial reshuffles during his second term, these only tended to reinforce the dominance of the Ashanti region, with a further extension of an Ashanti-dominance into both cabinet and deputy ministerial positions (see Table 4.3). While the Brong Ahafo, Central and Eastern regions were all proportionally represented within the ‘inner core’
13 Data for one Deputy Minister (David Gyewu for Communications) is excluded in this table as his regional identity proved difficult to establish (see Chapter 2). 14 See also Langer’s (2009:543) analysis of the ethnic composition of Ghanaian governments. 116 positions during this period, all the other regions experienced some level of marginalisation, with Greater Accra the most disadvantaged.
It is important to add that this analysis, based on average values of the different positions, does not sufficiently reveal the extent of inequities in the spatial distribution of political power during the period. The overrepresentation of some regions and the resultant exclusion of others were much more pronounced in some of President Kufuor’s reshuffles than the aggregate figures suggest. Notably, in his April 2006 ministerial reshuffle, the Ashanti region with an estimated 19.8% share of the national population had 33.3% of cabinet members and almost half (46.7%) of the ‘inner core’ positions (see Appendix 5). Relative to its population share, this corresponded to an overrepresentation of 13.5% and 26.9% respectively (Appendix 6). This experience contrasts sharply in particular with that of the two Upper regions of Northern Ghana. In fact, throughout Kufour’s first-term in office from January 2001-December 2004, the Upper East region had no cabinet-rank Minister. During this period, the only substantive Minister from the region was [the late] Hawa Yakubu for the non-cabinet ministerial position of tourism. Following Hawa’s replacement with Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey (from Greater Accra) in 2003, the Upper East was left fully excluded not only from cabinet but in all substantive ministerial positions. It was not until another ministerial reshuffle in April 2006 that Joseph Kofi Adda, a native of the Upper East and MP from the region, was appointed as Minister for Energy – a position he lost again to Felix Owus-Adjapong (from the Eastern Region) before the end of the Kufuor regime in December 2008.
The experience of the Upper West was perhaps even worse than that of Upper East, with the former initially fully excluded in Kufuor’s first set of 27 ministers during the first nine months of his government. It was only after substantial public criticisms that President Kufuor co-opted into his government a representative from the Upper West in October 2001 by elevating Professor Kassim Kasanga from the position of a Deputy Minister of Lands and Forestry to the substantive Minister of that Ministry. This was a ministerial position of non-cabinet status, however, and it was only in April 2003 that Kasanga became a cabinet-rank Minister, albeit in a relatively powerless position as Minister for Science & Environment. Moreover, by February 2005, Kassim Kasanga had been reshuffled out of government, again leaving the Upper West fully excluded from the distribution of ministerial positions until the appointment of Ambrose Derry as Attorney- General and Minister for Justice in 2007, only about a year to the end of the NPP regime.
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Summary The above analysis suggests that Northern elites have not been effectively represented in the ruling coalitions of both the NDC and NPP governments of the 1990s and 2000s respectively, especially in the more consequential cabinet portfolio. However, there have been significant variations in the levels of Northern inclusion during these regimes, with the NDC administrations much more inclusive than the NPP’s. Thus, whereas the Upper West region was one of the most privileged in terms of access to political power under Rawlings, it became one of the most politically-excluded during the Kufuor-led NPP governments of the 2000s. These finding are in line with Shephered et al.’s (2004:26) description of the level of Northern political inclusion during the 1990s as “a record”. By contrast, the regional distribution of political power during the Kufuor governments “became considerably less balanced” (Langer, 2007:18), especially with regards to the North in general and the Upper regions in particular.
Although the above analysis has focused on the distribution of political power, there is some evidence to suggest that the North has suffered similar levels of under representation in various bureaucratic institutions during the period under discussion here. In the Ghanaian civil service, a high premium is placed on the positions of Chief Directors who double as the bureaucratic heads of government ministries and the chief advisors to their respective sector ministers (Asante and Gyimah, 2004). Yet data obtained on these positions on some key ministries clearly point to a pattern of Northern underrepresentation. For example, of five substantive Chief Directors at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning between September 1993 and October 2011, none was a Northerner, in as much as no ethnic Northerner was among the seven Chief Directors at the Ministry of Trade of Industry between 1991 and 2011. This pattern is also evident in terms of the regional representation at the top hierarchy of the Office of Head of Civil Service (OHCS), including the heads of this Office as well its Chief Directors. Between 1980 and 2011, the OHCS has had six different heads, of which only one (Mr. Joe D. Issachar, 2008-2010) has been of Northern origin (see Appendix 3 for more details). Asante and Gyimah-Boadi (2004:86) also found that of the total of 17 Chief Directors appointed by the Rawlings-led NDC government in 1993, only one (or 5.9%) was an ethnic Northerner, compared to two out of 17 appointed (or 11.7%) by the Kufuor-led NPP regime in 2003. Such findings are line with the observation that Southern Ghanaians “have tended to occupy the top positions in politics and the public services” (Shepherd et al., 2004:26) in part because of their numerical advantage as well as educational and professional attainment. In contrast, “the level of northern representation in technocratic senior public service positions has been 118 generally low” (Ibid). The underrepresentation of the North would therefore seem as pronounced in the distribution of ministerial positions as in the case of key positions within the bureaucracy. What then does this mean for overcoming the North-South inequality?
4.4 The politics of representation and regional development in Ghana
Having shown the extent of regional political inequalities in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, this section examines the implications of the above observed inequalities on the regional distribution of government-controlled resources. Decker’ (2006:5) field interview notes identifies “the lack of political clout” among Northern elites as a particularly “major barrier for developmental change” in Northern Ghana. For Whitfield (2009b:30), the fact that the North has not had a “strong representation in national politics” has meant that there has historically been “no leader championing the cause of redressing the economic marginalisation of the north since colonial times”. Akolgu and Van Klinken (2008) similarly argue within the Ghanaian context that because “often, economic power goes hand in hand with political power” (p.3), one in which those in possession of the latter use their dominance over state institutions in influencing policy choices in the interest of their constituents, Ghana’s North-South divide “has become more marked and significant”. They attribute this outcome to the North’s lack of a strong “political muscle” under various postcolonial governments (p.5).
Bob-Milliar’s (2011a) understanding of the way politics works in Ghana has strong resonance with these claims. In his investigations concerning the persistent electoral loyalty of the Upper West region to the NDC, he argues that the party’s popularity in the region is driven mainly by its developmental records in the region, especially in the areas of roads and communication. Among others, he enumerated the Rawlings-led P/NDC government’s developmental records in the region to include the creation of the region itself; the establishment of the University for Development Studies which remains the only public university for the North till date (with campuses spread across the three Northern regions); the extension of the national electricity grid as well as digital telephone service facilities to the region in 1995 and 1996 respectively. These developmental projects, he argues, were driven largely by Rawlings’ incorporation of the “sons and daughters from the region” into his government by assigning them “high-profile portfolios” in government. 15 “By contrast, the NPP demonstrated that it had no respect for the people of the region when former President John Kufuor refused to appoint any person from UWR as
15 These included the Minister for Roads and Transport (Edward Salia) and the longest serving Minister for Defence in Ghana’s political history (Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu). 119 a cabinet minister” (Ibid., p.467) in ways that “denied the region a chief patron” (p.468) through whom state resources could be channelled to the masses. Bob-Milliar summarised his argument by quoting a local Ghanaian proverb that: “when one’s mother is in the funeral house one is certain of being served when the food is shared. Having sons serving in government in cabinet positions ensured development projects got to the region” (p.467).
Such arguments are in line with the broader recognition of a strong “north – south divide in identity between the NPP and the NDC” (Coffey International Development, 2011: 41), whereby the NDC is generally seen to be more pro-North in relation to the distribution of both political power and public resources.
One key assumption of all these claims is that if success in bringing about developmental change in Ghana’s poorer regions are to be achieved, then “it is .important to improve the political representation and commitment of northern leaders” (Decker, 2006:5). Unsurprisingly, when in October 2001 the then Northern-born Vice President, Aliu Mahama, called for an All Northern Peoples Development Conference, some observers questioned the potential of such a move. Such observers argued that what the North has historically lacked and which explains its relative developmental backwardness is not an appropriate development blue print per se , but political power (Northern Advocate, October 2001). The solution to the North-South inequality is therefore about enhancing “equity in the allocation of power, putting Northerners in strategic positions” in order to move the region’s development agenda forward (Ibid., p.11).
Interview evidence tends to support these claims. One Northern politician and Member of Parliament explained that:
“It looks more like we take up political positions not to run the country as such but for the country to give us the opportunity to fight for the interest of our people. So it shouldn’t surprise you that if the Minister of Health or the Director of the [Ghana] Health Service comes from say the Volta region, you may have the Volta region pacing up in terms of health facilities” [Interview, Northern MP, 04.07.11].
Similarly, another Northern MP and a former Minister of state explained that his experience in politics suggests that Ghanaian politicians often tend to “look at issues in a narrow sense than in a nationalistic perspective” when making resource allocation decisions:
“You see when people have power, they ... not only appoint their people [to strategic positions] but when a decision is to be made and resources to be distributed, and they find a way of getting it more to their people…. When you are given the opportunity to make a decision and you are in the driver’s seat, people 120
tend to benefit their people ....So you see, it is the space that you have to operate that also creates opportunities for you” (Interview, Northern MP, 07.06.11).
Indeed, asked whether his narrative tends to point to the pre-eminence of regional political representation for regional socio-economic development, his response was brief, but emphatic: “It matters a lot, a lot! If you are not represented, you are not counted” (Interview, Former minister of state and Member of Parliament, 7 June, 2011). But why does a region need to be ‘represented’ in order to be ‘counted’ in the distribution of public resources? An important part of the answer relates to the prevalence of clientelist political settlements in all developing country democracies (Khan, 2011), and the perceived exceptional neo-patrimonial character of African states in particular (Chabal, 2005). I discuss this in detail below.
4.5 The growing politics of patronage in Ghana
In line with the characterisation of the African state as neo-patrimonial (Chapter 2), Booth et al (2004) note that “there are deep and persistent neo-patrimonial features in the way the society and state of Ghana work” (p.16). McKay and Aryeetey (2004:57) similarly describe clientelist politics as a “huge reality in Ghana”, while Keefer (2007:137) suggests that “the best explanation” for the politics of development in Ghana’s Fourth Republic “is, indeed, clientelism” (Keefer, 2007:137). More recently, Whitfield (2011a; 2011b) has highlighted the competitive nature of clientelist politics in Ghana, arguing that since the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in 1993, “politics in Ghana has been increasingly characterised by competitive clientelism” (Whitfield, 2011a:6).
This section discusses the main factors that underpin clientelist politics in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, with a particular objective of teasing out the implications of this form of politics for the problem of regional inequalities. In doing so, the section also seeks to enhance our understanding as to why patterns of political representation can be important in explaining the regional patterns of socio-economic resource allocation. The prevalence of clientelist politics in Ghana has been attributed to a variety of factors. These include explanations that emphasise the ‘cultural roots’ of neo-patrimonial politics in Africa as a whole (see Chapter 2) as well those that emphasise the vulnerability of ruling elites within the context of multi-party competitive elections (Chapter 1). Three main factors are discussed in the following sections, namely increased electoral competition; socio-cultural norms; and excessive executive/presidential powers.
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4.5.1 Electoral competition
Electoral competition has been one of the most prevalent explanations for clientelist politics in Ghana (Booth et al., 2004; Aryeetey and McKay, 2007a; Fox et al., 2011; CDD- Ghana, 2012), with public spending increasingly linked to electoral cycles (Sandbrook, 2000; Barbone et al 2006; Akonor, 2006). Electoral competition has become increasingly intense in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, such that the margin of votes by which candidates from the two main parties won the Presidency has consistently shrunk from one election to the other since 1992 (Figure 4.4). Ruling coalitions have therefore been increasingly characterised by a high degree of vulnerability in power, which in turn lead to the pursuit of politically-motivated public spending for electoral gains.
Figure 4.3: Margins (%) between NDC and NPP presidential candidates, 1992- 2008
Source: Author, based on data from the official website of the Ghana Electoral Commission. NB : This is the percentage difference between these two parties in the various elections
Keefer (2007:178) notes that although multiparty competition has contributed to a shift towards more “responsive politics” in Ghana, with Ghanaian politicians increasingly becoming more sensitive to “distributional issues” (p.175), this responsiveness has been “especially to the particular demands of narrow or targetable groups of citizens” (p.178). In a study of education expenditures during the 1990s, Miguel and Zaidi (2003) attribute patronage politics to the finding that the ruling NDC targeted a disproportionate amount of expenditures toward its ‘core’ electoral supporters. In contrast, André and Mesplé-Somps (2011) found that during 1998-2000, districts that voted for the opposition party received more public goods than others in an attempt by the ruling NDC to consolidate its position by appeasing potential opposing forces. Banful (2011:380) has argued that Ghanaian 122 governments achieve sophisticated political targeting goals even within the confines of well established institutions that emphasise needs-based allocation of public goods. She studied the sharing of resources of the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) amongst Ghana’s administrative districts over the period 1994-2005. Although the DACF is supposed to be allocated in keeping with a national formula, which is designed to favor needs-based allocation, her analysis showed that the DACF formula “does not eliminate politically motivated targeting of the grants”. Except for 2003, per capita DACF grants were consistently found to be higher in districts where vote margins in the previous presidential election were lower, suggesting that swing districts were targeted.
The vulnerability of ruling elites and its attendant patronage-based politics is compounded by the availability of strong lower level factions within ruling coalitions such as ‘party foot soldiers’. Party foot soldiers are the party zealots at the constituency level who engage in crucial vote-mobilization efforts for their parties. Given their importance in winning elections, ruling elites across the two major parties have increasingly strived to appease their ‘foot soldiers’ through the clientelist distribution of state resources (Bob-Milliar, 2011:2). This has in turn contributed to the inequitable distribution of state resources, not least as foot soldiers’
“demands- for special favours; for jobs and other income-earning opportunities, and for their trusted patrons or leaders to be appointed to patronage-rich positions in government - typically require that the government set aside meritocratic considerations and apply crude partisan political criteria in making all manner of public resource allocation decisions” (Coffey International Development, 2011:35).
It would also seem that although the increasing need to court votes countrywide has given rise to an inter-party consensus of redressing inequalities in recent years, the electoral logic of spreading resources to reach as many potential voters as possible has in turn often made it difficult to target resources disproportionally to poorer regions. During the 2008 electioneering campaigns, for example, the presidential candidates of the two main parties both promised to generously finance affirmative action programmes for the North. This ranged from a $1billlion pledge into a Northern Development Fund (NDF) by the NPP to a pledge and subsequent launch of a Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) to oversee the development of the Northern savannah by the NDC. Yet, these developments cannot be simply interpreted as a genuine inter-party consensus towards more distributive forms of politics. The evidence so far suggests that the same electoral pressures that informed the launch of SADA have also played important roles in undermining its effective implementation. For example, while SADA is officially designed 123 to bridge the North-South divide, the eagerness to create a broad-based project that reaches as many potential voters as possible has also meant that the programme has been extended to cover a number of districts in two other regions in the South, including the NDC’s ‘vote bank’ region of Volta. This observation resonates with the ethno-territorial patronage politics of the Northern Ugandan Social Action Fund which, though designed to enable the lagging North ‘catch up’ with the rest of the country, was subsequently extended to reach other districts in the East in part because the Minister responsible for the programme wanted to ensure that his home area was covered (Hickey, 2003). Moreover, while the electoral promise was to establish SADA with a seed fund of GH¢200 million and a further “annual contributions from Government of 100 million each year for 20 years” (NDC, 2008:77), this has not happened, leaving SADA under-funded since its creation in 2010. More importantly, although the limited resources to SADA are often explained in relation to ‘lack of funds’, electoral incentives have meant that the regime in question also subsequently announced more affirmative action programmes for virtually every region in Ghana. 16 Such observations point to the potentially ambiguous role of multiparty democracy for the implementation of pro-poor and equitable development policies especially within contexts where clientelist politics remain prevalent.
Finally, electoral competitiveness has introduced new dynamics into the distribution of political power in recent years, with some implications for the North-South divide. Since the 2000 elections, a convention has emerged in Ghana’s Fourth Republic whereby the need for courting votes from the Northern regions has consistently driven the two dominant parties to choose their vice presidential candidates from the North. Yet thus far, there is little evidence to suggest that the vice Presidential position has been of significant value in terms of enhancing the development prospects of the North. Frempong (2008) argues that Kwadwo Mpianim, a long time confidante of President Kufuor, played a more high profile role in the NPP government than the Northern-born Vice President, Aliu Mahama during the NPP governments. Cataloguing a number of factors including President Kufour’s refusal to support the presidential bid of Aliu that contributed to his humiliating defeat in the NPP flag bearer race in December 2007, Frempong (Ibid) concludes that the vice presidential slot for Aliu was simply more for ticket-balancing (also Shepherd et al., 2004:31-2; Kelly and Bening, 2007) rather than an attempt to provide the North with stronger voice in government. Thus, even the Northern Vice President would
16 See President Attah-Mills’ 2011 State of the Nation Address.
124 only seem to have been adversely incorporated into the NPP ruling coalition. This observation echoes the opening statement of this chapter in which the Northern Advocate asked whether Northern politicians are only “meant to play the second fiddle”.
4.5.2 Political patronage in Ghana: a socio-cultural norm?
Echoes of the ‘culturalist’ explanations of patron-client politics in Africa (e.g. Chabal, 2002) are evident in recent literature on Ghanaian politics. Booth et al. (2004:7) argue that answers pertaining to the neo-patrimonial character of the Ghanaian state must be sought in the “requirement” and “basic obligation of powerful individuals to support their kin and other “followers””. A more recent study on Ghana’s political economy similarly made reference to an “entrenched culture of political patronage” (Coffey International Development, 2011:6), arguing further that this phenomenon partly “reflect the deeply historical and entrenched structures and expectations of society” (p.36).
Investigations into the relationship between Ghanaian MPs and their constituents have made similar claims. A survey by Staffan Lindberg explores what factors influenced Ghanaian voters in parliamentary elections and how the electorate in turn influenced elite behaviour (Lindberg 2010a, 2010b). Lindberg (2010a) argues that because majority of the electorate have strong expectations for community development projects from their elected representatives, most MPs “go out of their way and use every possible means to provide community development benefits to their constituents”, including spending “a lot of time lobbying ministers and top-level bureaucrats to bring development projects to their constituencies” (p.128). Lindberg emphasises however that the clientelist relations between Ghanaian MPs and their constituents cannot be fully explained by electoral calculus alone, but that this problem also stems from the infusion of the office of the MP with traditional notions of ‘head of family’. Here, MPs are seen as having ‘parental’ responsibilities over their constituents who are expected to act as the “mother or father of the constituency and take care of constituents like his/her children’” (Lindberg, 2010b:7-8). Such claims strongly echo the attribution of neo-patrimonial politics in Africa to the 'extended family' system in the region (e.g. Kellsal, 2008). Indeed, Lindberge (2010a: 136) claims that MPs who fail to meet their ‘parental responsibilities’ towards their constituents are sanctioned not only through the ballot box, but also through informal accountability mechanisms such as daily harassments and collective punishment of the family.
If the above explanations are accepted, then there are several important implications for spatial inequalities here. First, in so far as rational politicians are aware of the various informal expectations from their kith and kin, it may mean that resource allocation 125 decisions by those in positions of some power would be driven more by sectional considerations rather than the need for a more equitable provision of public goods. Second, in a context where MPs’ access to state resources for their constituents are shaped by their ability to lobby higher government officials such as ministers of state, it is reasonable to expect that citizens in the regions with a significant number of ruling party MPs would be better placed to gaining access to public goods, as their elected representatives are more likely to have better connections within the ruling coalition. A third and related point is that ruling party MPs who simultaneously serve in ministerial positions (see next section) would almost unquestionably use their influence in government to shift state resources in favour of their regions, if not for electoral purposes but at least for fulfilling their ‘parental’ obligations as ‘family heads’.
4.5.3 Excessive executive power
In what appears to be a confirmation of Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997) claim that ‘presidentialism’ – “the concentration of political power in the hands of one individual” (p.63) – is one key factor that underpins Africa’s neo-patrimonial regimes (Chapter 2), o ne of the most salient features of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana is its excessive concentration of political power in the Presidency. 17 Fox et al. (2011:26) argue that this executive/presidential dominance has “created a parallel system of political patronage in which members of the winning party are rewarded for their allegiance”, and that: “The reason that inequality is growing in Ghana relates directly to the concentration of power in the executive branch, and, in particular, the way that political power influences the distribution of resources” (p.21).
An important aspect of executive dominance in Ghanaian politics relates to an executive control over Parliament, as various governments tend to exploit the Constitutional requirement that a majority of government’s ministers be selected from amongst MPs in promoting an upward-accountability of MPs to the President. In his 2005 ministerial reshuffle, 74% of Kufuor’s cabinet Ministers were MPs, compared to an average of 50% under Rawlings (Lindberg, 2010a). This means that cabinet decisions are taken virtually by the same set of elites who also doubled as MPs. Given the clientelist relations between MPs and their constituents discussed above, the implication of this observation for the problem of regional inequality is that cabinet decisions pertaining to the regional distribution of resource investments could be influenced significantly by the extent to which a region ‘counts’ in terms of cabinet representation.
17 For detailed discussion on this, see Abdulai (2009b). 126
Executive powers also extend down to the local level, again with implications for the clientelist distribution of state resources. Although the 1992 Constitution speaks of making “democracy a reality by decentralizing the ... machinery of government to the regions and districts” (Article 35[6][d], the actual reality in Ghana, as elsewhere in Africa (see Crook, 2003), has been the active promotion of decentralisation by ruling elites “as a means of consolidating rural support” (Mohan, 2002: 149). The President appoints 30 percent of District Assembly (DA) members and District Chief Executives (DCEs) – the political heads of the districts. DCEs are generally selected from amongst the key office-holders in the local branch of the governing party, and have accordingly tended to serve as conduits through which governing elites exert control on local politics and development (Crawford, 2010:118). Consequently, key local government officials have become little more than extensions of the executive branch, and as such, have little to offer as autonomous regional centres of power capable of representing and advocating effectively for the interest of their regions. Second, as the two dominant parties typically rely upon their appointees in mobilizing voters at the local level, empirical research has shown that DCEs typically use their positions in pursuit of “inequitable distribution of resources within the districts” (Crawford, 2009:69) in seeking for votes for the parties that appointed them. Horowitz and Palaniswamy (2010) have recently highlighted the clientelist nature of politics at the local level, with DCEs generally perceiving themselves as primarily responsible for helping their parties win elections and remain in power.
4.6 Northern political leaders and Northern underdevelopment
The above discussion has so far interpreted Ghana’s North-South inequalities as essentially a product of the political adverse incorporation of Northern elites, and their resultant inability to steer policy agenda in the interest of the North within the context of the prevalence of clientelist forms of politics. While Northern politicians tend to share in this view, their Southern counterparts generally perceive Northern elites themselves as the main source of the problem. This ‘Southern-elite view’ holds that politicians from the North rarely actively identify with their regions both with regards to public service and private investments (e.g. McKay et al. 2005; Decker, 2006; Shepherd et al 2004). My field interviews provide some support for these observations. For example, when one Southern- based former Minister of Finance was asked as to whether his regime had done well enough to address the development deficits of the lagging North, his immediate reaction was to emphasise the need not to underestimate the role of Northern elites in this problem:
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“I think it is not enough to say that people [in government] promise and they must deliver....Most of them (Northern politicians) live in Accra; they have their houses in Accra. ... So they should begin to move their own personal funds there” (Interview, Southern Member of Parliament and former Minister of state, 06.06.11).
Some have also argued that one of the major factors that undermine the development prospects of the North relates to the fragmented nature of Northern elites, whereby Northern politicians often align behind the two main political parties. This means that rather than working together in confronting the alarming development challenges of their regions, Northern politicians generally tend to act “either as NPPs or NDCs” (Northern Advocate, June-July 15, 2002). Citizens of Northern extraction have occasionally called on their national-level political representatives to “refrain from trying to prove their commitment and loyalty to their parties while their Southern counterparts lobby unobtrusively for projects in their areas” (Northern Advocate, July 2000). One senior Northern politician and a Member of the Council State 18 described the relatively high level of poverty in the North as a “self imposed” phenomenon, in that:
“Our politicians still haven’t got that patience to come together and form one unit...The best thing would have been for us to accommodate our local differences and unite for national issues because it is the national issues that can resolve your local problems. But our minds are so blocked; people are so married to the local problems that they are not even in speaking terms” (Interview, Senior Northern politician, 15.08.11).
Alban Bagbin, then Minority Leader in Parliament and an MP from the Upper West, also noted earlier in an interview with the Northern Advocate that:
“we seemed to have one problem with MPs from the Northern Region, it is very difficult to get MPs from Northern Region to come together. You know the inter- ethnic conflicts and chieftaincy problems we have in the Region have been a serious draw back on our unity and our fight for Northern interest” (Northern Advocate, Aug-Sep 15, 2002, p.11) . There may be several factors underpinning various ethnic and chieftaincy conflicts in the North, but the most widely known of such factors is party politics (Daily Graphic, December 5, 2011; Ahorsu and Gebe, 2011). The point is that different conflicting factions in nearly all conflicts in the North align themselves with either the NDC or NPP. As elections have become increasingly competitive, the imperative of winning and maintaining political power has in turn made it difficult for the two dominant parties to dispense the kind of justice that is required to provide lasting solutions to these conflicts. Consequently, governments’ responses to most Northern conflicts have been characterised
18 The CoS is the highest advisory body to Ghanaian Presidents. 128 by the establishment of committees of enquiry whose reports are often unpublished and whose recommendations are scarcely implemented; as well as the tendency for governments to apply partisan political yardstick as opposed to principles of fairness and justice in dealing with such conflicts (Shepherd et al., 2004). All these guarantee “that national politics intrudes into regional/local conflicts and creates a see-saw effect which ties conflict management and settlements with changes in political regime” (Ibid., p.31).
4.7 Donor influence
The discussion has so far framed the persistent North-South inequality in Ghana as an endogenous problem, underpinned principally by the adverse incorporation of Northern elites into the polity, and the fragmented nature of the Northern political leadership. This section shifts the focus of attention to a brief discussion on the role of donors in shaping the spatial patterns of development in Ghana. One way in which donors have historically influenced Ghana’s North-South inequality has been the concentration of their projects in the lagging North, contributing significantly to an improvement in access to basic services in that part of the country (Chapter 1).
As in other poor developing countries, observers note that the financial power of donor agencies also enable them to wield substantial influence over major policy choices, with implications on broader developmental outcomes (e.g. Cheru, 2002; Whitfield and Jones, 2009). For example, Ghana’s decision to join the HIPC initiative in 2001 was strongly believed to have been orchestrated by donors, who gave a strong signal that there would be no major foreign aid without a HIPC agreement (Aryeetey and Peretz, 2005; Tsikata, 2001). By signing on to HIPC, Ghana saw $1.5 billion of its stock of debts (in nominal terms) cancelled and benefited from an additional $3.5 billion in debt relief from her creditors. Savings in debt service cost amounted to over $200 million annually for twenty years (Coffey International Development, 2011:39). As a condition, the GoG agreed to undertake a number of key policy actions, including the formulation and satisfactory implementation of a full PRSP (IDA and IMF, 2002a:33). The GoG implemented its first PRSP, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) from 2003-2005, followed by the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) from 2006-2009. The donor-driven nature of Ghana’s PRSPs has been highlighted by several observers, with the GPRS I particularly noted to have been drawn up in haste “with an emphasis on policies believed to be important to qualify for HIPC debt relief” (Aryeetey and Peretz, 2005:iii; also Killick and Abugre, 2001; Whitfield, 2005; Crawford and Abdulai, 2009).
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However, disagreements remain regarding the extent of donor leverage over public policy choices and their implementation in Ghana. For example, contrary to recent claims that donor conditionality has been influential in stimulating the formulation and implementation of pro-poor and inclusive development policies in Ghana (CDD-Ghana 2012:29), Bryceson’s (2006) assessment suggests that donor conditionality has generally remained “ineffective in bringing about sustained policy change where this has been opposed by domestic interests ... within government” (pp.39-40). The findings of this research (Chapter 6) provide support for this relatively pessimistic perspective, as well as those who have questioned the potential of the PRSP experiment in leading to equitable development outcomes more generally (e.g. Booth, 2005).
4.8 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that Ghanaian governments have continued to pursue policies of ethno-regional inclusion in terms of elite representation in government. With the notable exception of the first few months of the NPP government (2001-2008) when the Upper West was fully excluded from cabinet, the distribution of political power has generally been characterised by regional inclusivity since the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in 1993. However, both the quality and quantity of representation have varied significantly among regions. Notably, and similar to the early postcolonial governments, elites from the lagging North have continued to be incorporated into ruling coalitions on inequitable terms. While they tend to be generally well represented in relatively insignificant positions such as deputy ministers, they are often excluded from the more consequential positions in cabinet and the ‘inner core’ of political power. This kind of politics was especially evident during the Kufuor-NPP governments (2001-2008) whose exclusion of the North from cabinet was generally compensated for by the disproportionate appointment of Northern elites for deputy ministerial positions. These findings echo the experiences of Uganda (Lindemann, 2011b) and Côte d'Ivoire (Langer, 2005) reviewed in Chapter 2, where dominant elites sought to bolster their own legitimacy through the rhetoric of regional inclusivity, but while in practice monopolising the most strategic decision-making powers in ways that undermined the ability of others to influence public policy choices in their interest.
These differential patterns of political incorporation should be of particular interest in thinking of measures towards overcoming the problem of Ghana’s North-South inequalities not least because of the ways in which patterns of representation tend to shape
130 the distribution of government-controlled resources. This chapter has illustrated how a number of factors have combined to produce a political system that is underpinned by patronage in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, and which in turn renders access to real political power crucial in shaping the spatial distribution of public goods. The findings suggest that patronage politics tends to underpin ethno-regional voting patterns and drives the distribution of political power along ethno-regional lines. Thus even though ruling elites have tried to achieve ethno-regional balance in forming their governing coalitions, the most prominent ministerial positions are often monopolised by elites from the main electoral strongholds of the two dominant parties. Thus, while the NDC’s ‘vote bank’ of Volta was the most privileged during the NDC governments of the 1990s, the eight-year rule of the NPP clearly ushered in a period of strong Ashanti predominance in the distribution of political power during the 2000s.
It would thus seem that the more the electorate of a region contributes to the electoral victory of any of the two dominant parties, the more elites from such regions are likely to be rewarded with high profile positions in government. These elites in turn engage in the strategic targeting of public resources so as to maintain the ruling regime in power. This observation is supported not only by the experiences of Volta and Ashanti, but also by the varied experiences of the Northern regions during the 1990s and 2000s. The NDC, which has consistently out-performed the NPP in the North in national elections, also had more Northern ministers. In contrast, a feature of the NPP regime was its low proportion of Northerners in government and the over-representation of the Ashanti and Eastern regions in the distribution of political power. These patterns fit well with the NPP’s poor electoral performance in the North and its popularity in these two Southern regions. As we will see, such variations would also seem to have translated into varied experiences for the North in terms of access to development largesse during these periods.
The patronage-driven nature of contemporary Ghanaian politics is especially a product of increased electoral competition between the two dominant parties. As ruling elites have become increasingly vulnerable in power due both to the presence of strong opposition and strong lower level factions of ruling coalitions, political elites generally tend “to court electoral support through the strategic targeting of the provision of public goods” (Horowitz and Palaniswamy, 2010:8, original emphasis). Issues concerning equitable regional development are therefore generally subject to what is deemed desirable for maintaining political power. The importance of political representation in this patronage- driven political environment is even the more important as public resource allocation
131 decisions are driven largely by ruling party MPs. Given the hybrid nature of the 1992 Constitution, many ruling party MPs tend to serve in cabinet and other ministerial positions and thereby commanding direct influence over the distribution of state resources. MPs who double as cabinet Ministers use their ministerial positions to attract more public goods for their constituents, while those without appointive positions within the executive branch of government feel compelled to ‘go all out’ to lobby government Ministers for development projects for their constituents (Lindberg, 2010a). Given the patronage-based character of Ghanaian politics, such a political system has obvious implications for the unequal distribution of public goods, ones which tend to favour not necessarily the neediest but those with access to influential positions in government. Indeed, in a patronage-driven political environment like Ghana where a vast majority of cabinet ministers also double as MPs, as was the case during the eight-year rule of the NPP, it would be naïve for us to expect resource allocation decisions to be driven at all times by equity concerns rather than the strategic distribution of public goods in order to meet the high expectations of electoral constituents, including party foot soldiers.
In the next 3 empirical chapters, I seek to explore whether and how these various political factors – electoral calculus, the nature of elite coalitions and patronage politics – have influenced the regional patterns of resource allocation and their underlying implications for persistent regional inequalities. As already explained in some detail in Chapter 2, the interest in this study is to see how these factors shape patterns of public spending in relation to social sector expenditures such as education and health care delivery (Chapter 5), donor-influenced type of expenditures (Chapter 6) and productive investments (Chapter 7).
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Chapter 5. The politics of social service delivery and regional disparities in Ghana
5.1 Introduction
In their paper on ‘The politics of what works in service provision’, Mcloughlin and Batley (2011:3) observed that although there has been growing consensus regarding the importance of politics in shaping “how and to whom basic services are provided, studies seeking to explain service performance rarely give any account of the role of political incentives, actors and institutions”. Focusing on education and health care delivery, this chapter employs the analytical framework developed in the previous chapters to explore the politics of service delivery in Ghana. The main aim is to provide critical insights into the key political factors that drive patterns of service provision in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. I do so by specifically exploring the ways in which elite incentives shape resource allocation processes, and how these in turn shape regional disparities in access to education and health care in Ghana (see Chapter 1). With this approach, the chapter is informed by the core claim of the political settlements literature that “development outcomes in poor countries depend fundamentally on the political incentives facing political elites and leaders” (Booth and Therkildsen, 2012:3).
As noted in Chapter 2, much of the literature on African politics maintains that the prevalence of patron-client relations in the region implies that public resources are distributed in ways that reward the loyal supporters of ruling regimes (Van Wyk, 2007). In contrast, the emerging political settlements literature suggests that because ruling elites are motivated primarily by the need to maintain political power, the allocation of public resources can take different directions, including targeting opposition strongholds depending on political calculations (see Kjaer and Therkildsen, 2011). What these arguments share in common is their emphasis on the importance of electoral competition in framing the incentive structures of political elites, and the tendency for dominant elites to use the power at their disposal in shaping policy outcomes in ways that advance their own interests. This chapter seeks to show whether and how these political factors play out in shaping the regional distribution of public resources in the education and health sectors of Ghana.
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows. Section 5.2 examines the regional distribution of public expenditures in the education and health sectors, covering both the NDC and NPP regimes of the 1990s and 2000s respectively. Section 5.3 explores the 133 influence of politics on the observed patterns of public spending. Section 5.4 takes the analysis beyond the national budgets to an exploration of the politics of specific social protection programmes aimed at bridging regional disparities in access to primary and secondary education. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Public spending and educational inequalities in Ghana, 1994-2008
With a focus on basic and senior secondary education, this section analyses the regional composition of public education expenditures. 19 Based on official annual enrolment and actual expenditure data, Table 5.1 presents the regional expenditure-enrolment index (EEI) for 1997 at three levels of education: Primary, Junior Secondary and Senior Secondary (now termed Junior High and Senior High respectively). As explained in Chapter 2, the EEI is the ratio of each region’s percentage share of actual expenditures to their contribution to national enrolment rates, such that an index of 1 indicates proportional spending (Penrose, 1996). Thus, from the perspective of bridging existing inequalities, we will expect the EEI of the historically disadvantaged Northern regions to be above the national average of 1. It can be seen that there are wide regional disparities in public education spending, with the three Northern regions among the most marginalised. With the exception of the Northern Region whose EEI was equivalent to the national average for Primary education, the ratio of each of the Northern regions was consistently below 1.0. These patterns are further shown in Figure 5.1, which presents the per capita allocations by region during the period.
Table 5.1: Expenditure/Enrolment Rates, 1997
19 Basic education in Ghana comprises Kindergarten, Primary and Junior High Education 134
Figure 5.1: Education subsidies 1997 (recurrent expenditures only) 45
40 )
35
30
25
20
15
10 Expenditure Expenditure per child (GH 5
0 AR BAR CR ER GAR VR WR NR ERR UWR Ghana Primay 4.76 4.66 3.91 1.34 3.74 5.17 3.19 3.61 2.39 0.53 3.62 Junior High 7.94 10.45 5.11 9.52 0.17 9.88 6.74 5.3 6.52 1.05 6.73 Senior High 19.1 42.33 12.85 25.56 14.16 20.06 25.98 10.83 11.76 2.09 19.19
Sources: Based on MoE enrolment data and actual expenditure data extracted from GES Internal Budget Books.
Although the above data is for 1997 only, there is evidence to argue that these findings are broadly reflective of patterns of public spending during the 1990s. The World Bank (1996) analysed recurrent GoG’s education expenditures for 1992-1994, finding that the “Upper East and Upper West, two of the most disadvantaged regions, spent only US$22-23 per primary school pupil in 1994 against the national average of US$52” (p.10). Utilising a more comprehensive data which covered both recurrent and development expenditures at all levels of education, a subsequent public expenditure review by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) noted that: “the expenditure pattern in the regions shows that greater proportion of the expenditure made in 1997 went to the Eastern, Ashanti and Volta Regions.... [while] the least expenditures were made in the Northern, Upper West and Upper East regions with the share of Upper East region being only 0.8%” (MoF, 1998: 12-13). Canagarajah and Ye (2002) reported a similar finding for 1999. These authors utilised MoE expenditure data and the number of school-aged children in each region in order to reflect what would have been the case if all school-age children were enrolled. Their finding was that for both primary and Junior Secondary education, “[t]he three poorest [Northern] regions benefited the least from public spending” (p.13), with Volta as the only Region whose subsidy per school-aged child was significantly above the national average at both levels of education (p.9).
When the NPP government assumed office in January 2001, it was very much aware of the inequities in the educational sector and pledged to correct this through a more equitable
135 pattern of public spending ( see GoG, 2003a:144). Indeed, the regime’s Education Strategic Plan (2003-2015) claimed that “[i] n allocating resources, particular emphasis will be given to poorer areas in order to reduce inequities within the system” (GoG, 2003b: 8). Yet, the evidence clearly shows that actual patterns of` basic education expenditures during the NPP regime were at variance with such policy pronouncements. Based on data from the Accounts Office of the GES Headquarters, Figure 5.2 shows that average expenditures per basic school pupil in the North either stagnated (Upper East and Upper West) or even declined (Northern) during 2004 -2008. With the notable exception of the Northern Region in 2004, annual per child expenditures in Northern Ghana consistently fell below the national average during this period. In contrast, the relatively well -off regions (i.e. Greater Accra, Ashanti and Eastern) were the most favoured in terms of per pupil basic education spending.
Figure 5.2 : Annual per child expenditure (in GH ¢) for basic education, 2004 -2008 Figure 5.2: Annual per child expenditure (in GH ¢) for basic education, 2004-2008 250 ) ¢ 200
150
100
50 Expenditure perpupil (GH
0 AR BAR CR ER GAR NR UER UWR VR WR Ghana 2004 62.2 50.5 40.7 55.1 59.7 51.6 31.6 45 18 63.7 50.2 2005 85 70 58.2 79.8 84.1 50.4 34.7 44 20 62.8 57.38 2006 90.2 84 76.1 111.9 105.6 43.3 31.5 41.6 21.3 57.7 71.58 2007 102 100.5 85.2 120.4 120.7 41.7 36.4 49.1 24.7 54 79.51 2008 187.1 183.2 156.4 217.2 218.9 71.8 63.6 84.7 44.9 96.9 146.94
Source : Author’s computations and presentation based on GES enrolment data and actual expenditure data from GES Accou nts Office, Accra As noted in Chapter 1, school attendance in Ghana exhibits substantial variations along the North-South divide , with the North lagging behind. This implies that if one were to relate patterns of government spending to the number school -aged chil dren by region rather than on the basis of actual enrolment figures, the marginalisation of the Northern regions would become more pronounced than Figure 5.2 reveals. Thus, public basic education spending during the NPP administration only tended to reinforce the historical North -South educational divide. The data also reveals, however, that the most marginalised of all the 10 136 regions throughout 2004-2008 was the Volta Region of Southern Ghana. In 2008, per capita expenditure in Volta was an abysmal GH¢45, compared to a national average of GH¢147 and over GH¢200 in both Ashanti and Greater Accra.
Although to a less dramatic extent, the evidence shows that expenditure patterns at the post-basic education level broadly followed the same trends. Here again, whereas the Ashanti, Eastern and Greater Accra Regions were the most favoured, the Volta Region retained its status as the most excluded (Table 5.2). While average spending was highest in the Upper West in 2007, it is important to bear in mind the limited school attendance rates in the North when interpreting this data (GSS, 2008:12). These findings are consistent with other reviews, with the Education Ministry itself acknowledging in 2008 that “current levels of subsidy to post-basic education are highly regressive” (MoE, 2008a:68; also Casely-Hayford, 2011). More recently, the World Bank (2011b) argued with respect to senior secondary education that the proportion of children studying under ‘sub-standard per child expenditure’ – defined as those below the bottom third of the national average –witnessed “a substantial increase in the Northern region between 2006 and 2008” (p.131). The study therefore attributed the persistence of “significant and stubborn regional differences” in educational outcomes during this period to “a very large amount of under spending” (p.129) in the North.
Table 5.2: Public on SHS Education (in GH¢), 2006 and 2007
In sum, despite high levels of rhetoric of bridging the North-South educational disparities, public spending in both basic and post-basic education in Ghana has continuously 137 privileged the relatively affluent South at the expense of the lagging North. The analysis suggests that this finding holds true irrespective of which of the two dominant parties had been in power.
5.3 Public health spending and regional inequalities
This section reviews health sector funding allocations during the NDC and NPP governments of the 1990s and 2000s respectively. Available evidence for the 1990s indicates that the Volta Region, one of the most favoured in per capita government education spending (see above), was also the most privileged in public health expenditures. Based on data from a GoG public expenditure review (Ministry of Finance, 1998) and regional population estimates based on the 2000 population census data, Figure 5.3 reports on public health spending on per capita basis from 1995-1997. Here, the regions are arranged according to their funding allocations in a descending order. Two important observations are worth noting. First, per capita public spending varied considerably, with the Volta region as the most privileged. Second, compared to the education expenditures presented above, the level of health spending in the North was much better, especially for the Upper West where per capita spending was higher than the national average.
Figure 5.3: Per capita Recurrent and Development Health Expenditures, 1995-1997 average
National average per capita
Source : Author, based on Ministry of Finance (1998: 21, Table 3.4) and regional population data estimated on the basis of the 2000 population census. 138
If this data is disaggregated further into recurrent and development expenditures for the three years for which this data was available, the imbalances become particularly evident on government spending on development projects. The evidence shows that the regional per capita recurrent health spending did not vary significantly, except the strong imbalances favouring the Upper West in 1997 (Figure 5.4a). In contrast, the more important aspect of development-related expenditures such as the provision health infrastructure exhibited a significantly high level of overspending in the then ruling NDC’s traditional ‘vote bank’ of Volta (Figure 5.4b). Notably in 1996, an election year, total development-related health spending to the regions amounted to about ¢15.4 billion cedis, of which the Volta Region alone accounted for about ¢9.6 billion or 62.5% (see Appendix 7). In per capita terms, this meant that while about ¢6,385 was spent per person in the Volta Region, the corresponding amount for all the nine other administrative regions was less than ¢1,000 cedis (Figure 5.4b). Except in 1997 when per capita spending in Brong Ahafo was much higher than the national average “on account of the large amount of matching funds provided in that year for the ECGD-loan-funded Brong Ahafo regional hospital project at Sunyani” (Ministry of Finance, 1998:21), per capita spending on development projects in all the other regions were almost always below the national average.
Figure 5.4 : Regional Per Capita Health Expenditures, 1995-1997
Figure 5.4a: Per Capita Recurrent Fig. 5.4b: Per Capita Health Spending on Health Spending, 1995-1997 Development Projects, 1995-1997
8,000 7000
7,000 6000
6,000 5000
5,000 (¢) 4000 4,000 3000
3,000 Amount Amount (¢) Amount 2000 2,000
1000 1,000
0 0
1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997
Data Sources : Author, based on Ministry of Finance (1998: 21, Table 3.4) and the 2000 population census
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Table 5.3 : Per capita GoG health funding by region in 2000 (amounts in ¢)
Using data for 2000, one MoH-commissioned study pointed to a similar trend, whereby the Volta Region enjoyed the highest per capita health spending, followed very closely by the Upper West (Table 5.3) as in the case during 1995-1997 (Figure 5.3). However, if we focus on non-salary expenditures alone, we see that it was the Upper West that enjoyed the highest per capita spending followed by the Upper East. In the latter in particular, average expenditures were more than twice the national average (Table 5.3). These patterns of spending also reflect in the distribution of public health facilities such as hospitals and health clinics during the 1990s. Data from the MoH shows that whereas an average of 11,000 people shared one public health facility at the national level in 1998, the corresponding figure for the Volta Region was only about 4000 (Figure 5.5). This evidence confirms the “exceptionally high number of health facilities” reported for the Volta Region during the 1990s by one World Bank-commissioned study (Canagarajah and Ye, 2002:25). The level of public health facilities in the two Upper regions were equivalent to the national average, with the Eastern Region the most marginalised. These findings are in line with claims concerning the relatively favourable development outcomes for the North during the NDC governments of the 1990s (e.g. Bob-Milliar, 2011a).
Again, although the policy emphasis on re-directing health-related resources to the most deprived regions was very high during the NPP government, there is no evidence to suggest that this actually happened. The first Five-Year Programme of Work (2002-2006) which guided public health interventions during the NPP regime had the sub title ‘Partnerships for Health: Bridging the Inequalities Gap’, and set for itself an “overall goal...to reduce health inequalities in Ghana – between North and South, urban and rural areas, as well as inequalities linked to gender, education, and disability” (MoH, 2003:1;
140 also MoH, 2005:48). However, an accurate spatial analysis of public health spending in the 2000s is difficult; as noted in Chapter 2, disaggregated expenditure data in the Ghanaian health sector is extremely sparse (Asante, 2006:118; UNICEF, 2009:3). The discussion below therefore focuses on two other important indicators that can help give us a sense on public health funding allocations – the distribution of professional staff and publicly-financed health facilities.
Figure 5 .5: Regional Disparity in He alth Facilities, 1998
Source: Based on MoH, The Health Sector in Ghana: Facts and Figures 1999
One indicator for measuring health resource allocation is to measure the ratio of population per health professional such as medical doctors and nurses. In general, a high population to doc tor and nurse ratio indicate a shortage of health professionals and vice versa. T he distributional pattern of health workers in Ghana is strongly skewed in favour of the South, with a particularly marked gap between the best and the worst -served regions: while the Korle Bu Teaching Hospital in Greater Accra alone employs more than 25% of Ghana’s doctors, only 7% are present in the three Northern regions combined (MoH, 2011:47). In 2008, the total number of doctors in Ghana was 1,855, of which the Ashanti and Greater Accra regions alone accounted for 71.3%. While this trend points more to an Accra and Ashanti-bias rather than what can reasonably be depicted as a North -South divide, the poorer Northern regions nevertheless remain the most marginalized. In t he Northern region, each doctor served on average, 72,000 people in 2008 — about five times higher than the national average and 14 times higher than Greater Accra (see Appendix 8). While the regional distribution of nurses is somewhat less skewed, it is notable that the worst population-nurse ratio in 2008 was again recorded in the Northern Region (Appendix 9). With the GoG component of health sector spending going almost entirely into personnel 141 emoluments (MoH, 2010:82), and with salaries alone accounting for 91% of all the GoG’s health sector spending in 2003, compared to a mere 0.1% for investment expenditures (MoH, 2004:24), the implication of this skewed pattern of medical personnel for the regional patterns of health sector expenditures cannot be underestimated. In sum, despite the difficulty in obtaining actual expenditure data, there are some grounds for believing that the regional patterns of health sector expenditures have been as regressive as those in the educational sector during the NPP governments of the 2000s.
5.4 Exploring the politics of public education and health spending in Ghana
Observers argue that it is often at the point of implementation that development programmes often encounter vested interests, with potential adverse consequences for equitable outcomes (DFID, 2007; Mcloughlin and Batley, 2011). This section explores the questions of whether and to what extent the interests of dominant political and bureaucratic elites in the Ghanaian education and health sectors can provide us with answers regarding the skewed patterns of resource allocation discussed above. Based on the material available, I adopt two different approaches in exploring these issues. On education, my analysis focuses on a comparison of the actual expenditures of each region with its approved budgetary allocations. The objective is to understand the regional patterns of deviations, and then to compare these patterns to the regional distribution of political power. This approach, as argued in Chapter 2, can help us establish the influence of representation in government on patterns of public spending. This is because of the recognition of formal decision-making processes such as budgetary allocations in poor countries as ‘theatre’, with informal practices such as clientelist politics being the main drivers of actual allocation outcomes (DFID, 2007). On health, I compare the rate of change in the provision of public health facilities and personnel during the two presidential regimes of Jerry Rawlings (1993-2000) and John Kufuor (2001-2008) using data for 1998/1999 and 2008. This is to see if changes in government and the resultant changes in the composition of ministerial positions had any implication for the regional patterns of health resource allocation. In undertaking such an exercise, one must pay particular attention not only to the broader North-South divide but also to the specific experiences of the Volta and Ashanti Regions of Southern Ghana. These are the regions that represent the two extreme ends of ethno-regional bloc voting patterns in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, and which also tended to be the most dominant in terms of the distribution of ministerial positions during the 1990s (Volta) and 2000s (Ashanti) (see Chapter 4).
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5.4.1 Education
Data limitations make a detailed comparison of planned and actual educational spending for the 1990s difficult. The only year for which I obtained data on both budgetary allocations and actual spending was on recurrent expenditures on primary education for 1995. However, a comparison of this data does not point to any clear pattern of political targeting as the levels of deviations were not only generally minimal; they were also fairly uniform across regions, ranging from -2.1% in the Northern Region to +4.8 in Ashanti. However, this does not provide sufficient basis for ruling out politically-motivated targeting during the 1990s, especially as the more detailed data in the previous sections shows that the most favoured in terms of educational expenditures during the Rawlings- NDC governments was the regime’s ‘vote bank’ of Volta. Moreover, previous empirical investigations have pointed to politically-motivated patterns of public spending during this period. For example, drawing evidence from Ghana to address the question of whether ‘politicians reward their supporters’, Miguel and Zaidi (2003) found some support for the core supporter hypothesis. They found that annual central government educational expenditure per student in 1998 was 27 percent higher in districts that voted overwhelmingly for the then ruling NDC in parliamentary elections – a pattern they attributed to patronage forms of politics.
Table 5.4: Percentage deviations between budgetary allocations and actual expenditures (recurrent only) for primary education, 1995
More detailed data was obtained for the 2000s, which enables a computation of the percentage differences between budgetary allocations and actual expenditure by region for basic education during 2004-2008. Table 5.4 shows that there had been a dramatic redistribution of resources in favour of the Greater Accra, Ashanti, and Eastern Regions, and a corresponding chronic under-funding for the Volta and three Northern Regions during the period. The evidence shows that while average spending at the national level during 2004-2008 was 6.4% higher than budgeted sums, not every region benefited from this marginal overspending. The most favoured in these deviations were either the two main NPP electoral strongholds that also happened to be the most prominent in terms of elite representation in government (Ashanti and Eastern) or one of the most notable swing 143 regions (Greater Accra). In contrast, four regions, including the two poorer Upper regions experienced shortfalls in their allocated sums, but with these deviations varying significantly from less than -2% in Western to nearly -60% in Volta. The only region that consistently experienced substantial shortfalls during the period was Volta, one of the most marginalised in terms of cabinet representation during the two NPP regimes as well (see Chapter 4).
Table 5.5: Deviations between budgetary allocations and actual education expenditures (%), 2004-2008
If we focus attention specifically to the election years of 2004 and 2008, we see that the observed deviations were most strongly skewed in favour of the two main swing regions of Western (2004) and Greater Accra (2008). For example, while nearly every region experienced some shortfalls in 2004, actual spending in Western was in excess of +65% relative to its allocated sum for the year. Similarly, although on average, the Western Region recorded a marginal decline of -1.3% in its actual expenditures during 2004-2008, the disaggregated yearly picture shows that it received substantially more than its allocated sums in both 2004 (+65%) and 2008 (+29%). What this means is that the negative deviations experienced in this region occurred only in between the election years, and thus corroborating the possibility of some form of political targeting for electoral purposes. This argument is supported by the patterns of allocation in Greater Accra where actual spending was nearly double (+98%) its budgeted sums in 2008, a crucial election year.
Altogether, the evidence points to some strong regional biases in the distribution of education expenditures that favoured the Ashanti, Eastern, Greater Accra and Western Regions, with the Volta and Northern Regions the most marginalised. Arguably, the 144 consistency with which these two Regions had been disadvantaged in this game of redistribution make it quite hard to refute the suggestion that these distortions must have been driven in part by the vested interest of dominant political and bureaucratic actors within the education sector. As Therkildsen (2000, cited in Therkildsen, 2008) has argued in the context of Tanzania, while politicians and public bureaucrats typically make sure that they include all districts in budgetary allocations on the basis of a supposedly equitable allocation formula, it is the senior political and bureaucratic elites in key state institutions that make the de facto decisions about actual allocations. These decisions are typically not based on spatial equity concerns, but significantly on political considerations such as electoral calculus. The arguments also reinforce findings from Killick’s (2005) study on ‘The Politics of Ghana’s Budgetary System’. His analysis discovered “regularly large deviations between budget estimates and actual spending” (p.1) in three government Ministries and Departments, with mean deviations ranging from ±42% and ±68% in the Education and Health sectors respectively. In Killick’s view, a key factor behind such deviations is the ability of powerful elites, both political and bureaucratic, to manipulate resource allocation processes in their own interest at the expense of those with weaker influence over policy agenda. Thus, while characterising the Ghanaian budgetary system as “largely a ritualised façade” (p.2) in view of its limited bearing on actual patterns of government spending, he also quickly added that “the reality of ritualisation is that ministers and high [public] officials are able to set aside what the budget says and dispose of public monies according to quite other decision processes” (p.3).
5.4.2 Health
There had also been significant redistribution of resources in the health sector during the period under discussion here. Table 5.6 compares the regional distribution of public health facilities during 1998 and 2008. These years fall within the second-terms of the NDC and NPP regimes, and thus allow a judgement of whether changes in the composition of ministerial positions had any implication for the regional patterns of health resource allocation. The evidence points to significant variations in access to public health facilities during these periods, with much of the improvements concentrated in the Eastern, Ashanti and Greater Accra regions. My comparison of the number of publicly financed health facilities for 1998 and 2008 showed that the Eastern region attracted the largest number of new public health facilities during the period. Accordingly, the population per public health facility in this Region declined substantially from about 26,000 in 1998 to only 12,000 in 2008. In contrast, the Volta and three Northern regions were the least favoured,
145 such that whereas in 1998, only about 4,000 people shared a public health facility in the Volta Region, by 2008, this figure had risen to about 18,000. This contrasts sharply with the experiences of the Ashanti, Eastern and Greater Accra regions where substantial increments in the number of public health facilities translated into significant improvements in the population-to-health facility ratios.
Table 5.6: Rate of change in public health facilities and personnel, 1998-2008
Data on population per doctor followed a similar pattern during these periods. Based on MoH data, Shepherd et al. (2004:19) note with respect to the Rawlings-led (P)NDC governments that “[t]he ratio of doctors to population improved between 1986 and 1999 only in Volta and Brong Ahafo, while it worsened elsewhere” . Table 5.6 showed that this trend changed dramatically during the 2000s, such that whereas about 18,000 people shared a doctor in Volta in 1999, this increased to about 28, 000 in 2008. The evidence shows that the regions that experienced the highest improvements in their population/doctor ratios during the 2000s were the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Greater Accra and the Upper East. Such findings also support claims concerning the North–South identity with respect to the NPP and the NDC (Coffey International Development, 2011), whereby the NDC – which draws its electoral support from the North and also had more Northern ministers – generally tends to be more pro-North than the NPP (see also Chapter 7).
There are arguably two main explanations for the underlying drivers of the patterns of resource shifts observed here, namely electoral incentives and the nature of ruling coalitions. First, if we focus attention on just the most favoured regions of Volta (1990s), Ashanti and Eastern (2000s) during these periods, we could attribute these expenditure shifts to the patronage or ‘core voter’ thesis whereby ruling elites tend to target greater
146 public spending to their most loyal supporters in order to give them an assured political return. This is because, as pointed out in Chapter 4, while Volta has remained the NDC’s ‘vote bank’, the NPP continues to draw its core electoral support from Ashanti and to a lesser extent the Eastern Region. The second explanation, which is not independent of the first, relates to the nature of elite coalitions during the periods under discussion here. Three main observations support this interpretation. First, it should be noted that the excessive allocation of health expenditures to Volta in 1996 coincided with a period when the then Minister of Health (Captain Stephen George Obimbeh), was not only a native son of Volta, but was also an MP from the region seeking re-election in the 1996 parliamentary election.
Second, that these deviations were especially strong in relation to capital (rather than recurrent) expenditures support the findings of Khemani (2004) and Kawaura (2011) that between capital and current expenditures, it is often the former that dominant political elites allocate disproportionately to their home regions (see Chapter 1). This is mainly because of the visibility of capital expenditures and the political capital associated with such expenditures. Unlike recurrent expenditures, the provision of physical infrastructure like health facilities are more visible, and therefore provide stronger evidence of government commitment to the health needs of the people in the regions where they are located. Capital expenditures therefore tend to have greater potential for stimulating political support for ruling elites.
Third, interviews with key stakeholders in the health sector point to the crucial role of access to decision making structures in shaping the extent to which the various regions ‘count’ in the distribution of health-related resources (Chapter 4). One senior public servant at the GHS explained that “[t]he politics of it is a challenge for us in this country, not only in the health sector but in all sectors because depending on who is behind the wheel, you have more focus to some areas than others”. He narrated further that the question of ‘who is in charge’ even
“sometimes reduces to the personal level where if I am in charge of a programme, I have to make sure that my people or people from my area benefit and others will have to come and lobby me” (Interview, senior GHS official, 20/08/11). These views were corroborated by another GHS official, who explained that the role of the interests of dominant politicians in shaping the direction of resource investments has become such an important part of the Ghanaian health sector that: “you only need to manage it. That is the only thing because you can’t avoid it. You can’t ignore it because you’ve got to understand that it is the same people [politicians] you want to serve through policy... And you know the role [that] politics plays in our country” [Interview, GHS official, 26/07/2011]. 147
Similarly, Asante and Zwi’s (2009) investigation of the ‘Factors influencing resource allocation decisions and equity in the health system of Ghana’ drew attention to several views “expressed by key senior policy makers who as technocrats, felt powerless to stop the Government from shifting resources in line with their political agenda rather than with planned policy strategies” (p.374). They quoted one policy maker at the Ghana Health Service as saying that:
“My duty is to tell Government of what I know and what I think should be done, and that is as far as I can go. Government has got its own agenda...they are politicians....as far as I am concerned, I give what is a technocratic advice” (Ibid).
Elsewhere, one of these authors noted of the “the limits of bureaucrats to influence political decisions when it comes to resource allocation” (Asante, 2006:226), and attributed this in part to citizen pressures on elected politicians. He argued that various interest groups have increasingly put pressures on their elected politicians to provide their communities with health facilities. As politicians succumb to these pressures for their own political survival, they in turn pressurise bureaucrats to shift public resources in line with their political agenda rather than with planned policy strategies. Together, such observations would seem to highlight the limits of public bureaucrats in influencing resource allocation decisions vis-à-vis the political heads that appoint them. This in turn suggests that a region’s strong access to political rather than bureaucratic power may be more consequential in shaping its access to vital state resources in Ghana.
Although without explicitly highlighting the power of political elites vis-à-vis bureaucratic elites, there are several studies that seem to recognise the crucial role of political representation in shaping resource allocation outcomes in the Ghanaian health sector. McKay et al (2005:16) note of the likelihood “that the dominance at national level of leaders from the Volta Region between 1983 and 2000 lies behind the greatly increased ratio of doctors and nurses to population in that region”. In contrast, with its political support-base in Ashanti and urban business classes, they predicted that the NPP government, dominated by political elites from the Ashanti region (see Chapter 4), could “confirm the ‘natural’ inequalities which characterise the Ghanaian economy, with its inherited urban bias and dependence on forest based products for critical foreign exchange” (Ibid).
Ensor et al. (2001:13) similarly argue that decisions concerning capital intensive investments such as the construction and rehabilitation of hospitals “are generally more subject to political pressure that does not necessarily reflect population need”. One
148 subsequent study confirmed that capital investment projects that receive government funding are essentially those deemed to be of some sort of “political priority” (Appiah- Denkyira et al., 2005:45), and that the selection of such projects remain driven by “political underpinnings” (p.27). These two latter studies, both commissioned by the Health Ministry, arguably offer important ‘insider’ perspectives into the politics of public health expenditures in Ghana, not least as the authors of both studies involved senior policy makers within the MoH and GHS 20 – the two key institutions responsible for health policy formulation and implementation respectively. With ‘political priorities’ subject to changes in the political leadership, one can expect patterns of regional inclusion and exclusion in health care delivery to be closely shaped by the question of who is in the ‘driver’s seat’. This conjecture is confirmed further below in my analysis of some specific social protection programmes in the education sector.
5.5 Case Studies on the politics of social service delivery
This section undertakes an analysis of two case studies on the politics of service delivery in Ghana, focusing on programmes designed to bridge regional inequalities on basic education (Ghana School Feeding Programme), and senior secondary education (the ‘Model’ secondary school programme). 21 As noted in Chapter 2, the selection of these cases was informed both by their equity objectives and potential for reducing regional inequalities in educational outcomes.
5.5.1 Case Study I: The Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSFP)
A brief context of the GSFP The GSFP was launched in 2005 with the long-term goal of contributing to poverty reduction and food security in Ghana (GoG, 2006:21). Designed as part of Ghana’s efforts towards the MDGs on hunger, poverty and primary education, the programme provides children in public primary schools in the poorest areas with one balanced meal per each school attendance using locally-grown foodstuffs. It is envisaged that these meals will improve the nutritional status among children, while the demand for home-grown food is expected to provide a ready market for food crop farmers – the poorest economic group in Ghana. With this approach, the GSFP hopes to achieve three-pronged objectives: i) reduce
20 The first study involved George Dakpalla (Director of Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation at the MoH) and Daniel Osei (Deputy Director of PPME at the GHS), while the lead author of the second (Appiah- Denkyira) is the Director for Human Resources at the MoH. 21 The case studies for this section initially included an analysis the Deprived District Incentive Scheme, which was designed to bridge inter-regional inequalities in access to health personnel. But as I was confronted with word limits at the point of submission, this case study was dropped. 149 hunger and malnutrition; ii) increase school enrolment, attendance and retention; and iii) boost domestic food production (GoG, 2006:21). The potential of the GSFP in bridging the North-South educational disparities is evident in its declared objective of targeting “the most deprived districts/communities and the poor” (GoG, 2006:20), one which was to be achieved via its poverty-oriented beneficiary selection criteria (Box 5.1). But was this criteria upheld?
Box 5.1: GSFP’s criteria for Beneficiary Selection
The GSFP and the exclusion of the poor The actual implementation of the GSFP showed a distinct deviation from its original plan of targeting the poor. To contribute to poverty reduction and food security (GSFP’s long- term goal) through a reduction of hunger and malnutrition (the second objective), the Upper East and Upper West, where poverty and food insecurity challenges are most prevalent, would seem a priority. And to increase school enrolment (the first GSFP objective), one would expect areas with the lowest enrolment and literacy rates to be a crucial target. A comparison of these targets indicates however that the opposite has happened. For example, of some 991 GSFP beneficiary schools in the 2006/07 academic year, the two Upper regions had 18 schools each (or 1.8%), compared to well over 200 schools each for the Greater Accra and Ashanti regions where primary school enrolment rates are nearly universal (Table 5.7).
A similar pattern is evident in the distribution of GSFP expenditures. During 2005-2008, total GSFP expenditures was about GH¢50.5 million, of which only 3.6 million (representing 7%) went to the three Northern regions. The data also shows that the North- South divide was widening: a comparison of the 2005/06 and 2007/2008 academic years’ allocations shows that the share of the North in total GSFP expenditures decreased by about 67% while that of the South increased by 12% (Table 5.8). The Ashanti regiona received the highest amount of 28%, compared to only 1% for the poorest region, Upper
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West (Figure 5.6). Thus, the GSFP has arguably served as a tool for further widening, rather than bridging, the North-South inequalities with regards to educational opportunities. One caveat is that the language of a North-South dichotomy does not accurately capture the overall pattern of GSFP expenditures, with the data also pointing to significant regional variations even within the South. Here, it is again the Volta Region that was most disadvantaged, performing as poorly as the three Northern regions (Figure 5.6) as in the case of government spending at the basic and secondary education levels (see section 5.2.).
Table 5.7: Selected socio-economic indicators and GSFP allocations
Table 5.8: North-South GSFP expenditures (in thousands GH¢), 2005-2008
Regions 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2005-2008 Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % South 741.8 84.0 22114.7 92.0 24018.5 94.0 46,875.0 93.0 North 143.5 16.0 1826.9 8.0 1613.9 6.0 3,584.3 7.0 Total 885.3 100.0 23,941.5 100.0 25,632.3 100.0 50,459.3 100 Source: GSFP National Secretariat, Accra
How then might we understand the contradictions of the GSFP, which though formally designed to target the poor appears to have rather excluded the poorest? First, it is important to state that not every public official interviewed for this study shared the view that the GSFP has been poorly targeted. In the following sections, I outline the four key explanations offered by such officials, and then argue that such explanations are unconvincing. An alternative explanation follows.
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Figure 5.6: Regional GSFP expenditures (%), 2005-2008
Marginalising the poor in the GSFP: official explanations and their weaknesses
Based on evidence from key informant interviews and Parliamentary debates, four distinct official explanations that purportedly guided GSFP expenditures can be identified. The first attributes the ‘perceived’ poor targeting of the programme to regional variations in the number of public primary schools and their respective enrolment rates. In reaction to Northern elites’ criticisms of the ‘perceived’ exclusionary outlook of the programme, the then Local Government Minister (who was the programme’s sector Minister) explained that if one took into consideration the regional distribution of public primary schools and enrolment rates, one might realize that the three Northern regions, in per capita terms, “have had even more schools than other areas” (Parliamentary Debates Official Report, 4th June 2008, Col. 350) or that “we may be feeding more schools in these areas than any part of the country” (Ibid., Col. 355).
If the above explanations are true, then we would expect the regional variations in GSFP expenditures to correspond with the regional differences in the number of public primary schools and enrolment rates. Based on data from the MoE/EMIS annual school census, Figure 5.7 shows that in the 2007/2008 academic year, Ashanti and Greater Accra accounted for 17.1% and 8.7% of total enrolment in public primary schools respectively.
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Yet, their shares of GSFP expenditures were 27% and 18.8% respectively. Relative to their enrolment rates, all the other regions, apart from Brong Ahafo, received a less than proportionate share of GSFP allocations, with the Volta and three Northern regions again experiencing the largest shortfalls. The same pattern is observed with regards to the spatial distribution of primary schools, such that while Greater Accra accounted for only 5.9% of the total number of public primary schools during the period, it had 18.4% of the total number of schools covered by the programme. This contrasts with the experience of the Northern Region which accounted for 13.6% of public primary schools (more than Accra), but had only 4.4% of its schools benefiting from the GSFP.
Figure 5.7: Per capita GSFP expenditures, 2007/08
Figure 5.7: Per Capita GSFP Spending, 2007/2008
South North
U/WR U/ER NR WR VR G/AR ER CR B/AR AR
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
AR B/AR CR ER G/AR VR WR NR U/ERU/WR North South Share of expenditures 27 26 6.2 7.1 18.8 2.7 6 3 1.2 2.2 6.2 93.8 Share of primary enrolment 17.1 10.4 10.1 11.6 8.7 8.9 10.7 11.9 6.5 4.1 22.5 77.5 Share of public primary schools 15.9 11.6 9.6 13.7 5.9 10.9 10.7 13.6 3.7 4.3 21.7 78.3
Sources: Based on Ministry of Education, Science & Sports (2008b); and GSFP National Secretariat, Accra .
Another explanation by the Minister was government’s recognition of the need to tackle a growing problem of urban poverty in the South (see Ghana Parliamentary Debates, Ibid, Col. 350). This explanation was repeated by some interviewees during my field research. Yet, the evidence shows that even within the cities, the GSFP was actually not directed to the urban poor. This is illustrated by the rejection of GSFP food by school pupils in the relatively affluent, urban-based communities, as has been the case in the Achitmota Primary School in Greater Accra. One Senior GSFP official explained to me that the GSFP has recently been withdrawn from this school by the new NDC government (2009- 2012) because:
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“If you go to Achimota, many of the children were not eating the food. And when we relocated, not a parent complained from Achimota…. With the least resistance, we took it from Achimota, and nobody complained because already the children were not eating the food; they come to school with their packed lunches” (Interview, Senior GSFP official, 10/10/11).
This finding corroborates one SNV report which pointed to the rejection of GSFP food by some school children in Greater Accra, a phenomenon that noted to have been “particularly popular in some of the urban schools, where children are coming from more affluent homes” (SNV, 2008: 11-12).
Another explanation, again offered by the Minister in Parliament, has been that international NGOs, notably the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Catholic Relief Service (CRS), were already implementing feeding programmes in the North. This explanation suggests that an extensive extension of the GSFP to these areas would inevitably result in duplication of resources. The Minister argued that the WFP and CRS were already feeding such a “large number” of school pupils in Northern Ghana that he did “not think it will be prudent for the programme to go to the same schools and feed the same children”. He therefore saw greater targeting of GSFP expenditures towards the North as a “duplication of efforts” (Parliamentary Debates, op cit, Cols. 353-354). Similarly, when one senior government official at the Local Government Ministry was asked as to how justifiable it is for state elites to rely on NGO interventions in downsizing the benefits of the poorest in a supposedly ‘national’ programme, the response was that:
“So if it is a donor programme and they are there, are you going to add more food to the children, what they are eating?” (Interview, Senior Public Servant, 27/07/11).
At first sight, these arguments appear to have some credence, because the CRS and the WFP have had a long history of implementing SFPs in Northern Ghana. But a closer scrutiny reveals some significant weaknesses. First, such arguments do not explain to us the inequities embedded in the programme within the South, notably the extreme marginalisation of the Volta Region where such NGO projects are not available. Second, the scale of the interventions of the NGOs in question is relatively small compared to the number of public primary schools in the North, such that a more extensive coverage of the GSFP in these regions would not necessarily result in duplication. To illustrate, of the over 6,000 public primary schools across the three Northern regions, only 200 were covered by the WFP (WFP, 2010:37), while the CSR covers only about a third (Anderson et al., 2005: van den Berg, 2008:27). Third, by 2004, the two agencies in question had started phasing out their SFPs in the North, an issue which was clearly acknowledged in the GSFP 154 programme document published in 2006 (GoG, 2006:2). Consequently, one recent study on the three Northern regions reported that:
“Very few of the communities visited have access to the School Feeding Programme (SFP) and dropout rates have reportedly started to rise following the closure of feeding programmes by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the World Food Programme (WFP)” (GoG et al., 2011:58).
In sum, the marginalisation of the North from the GSFP cannot be explained by the various official explanations that emphasise the regional distribution of public primary schools/ enrolment rates, the concentration of NGO feeding programmes in the North and the so- called effort to tackling the largely Southern-based urban poverty phenomenon.
The GSFP and the exclusion of the ‘deserving poor’: a political interpretation
In a review of school feeding programmes (SFPs) in developing countries, Del Rosso (1999:11) observed that “[s]ince SFPs are highly visible and can offer a significant income transfer to families they will always be inherently political”. This section offers a political explanation to the exclusion of the poorer Northern regions in the GSFP. The findings show that the marginalisation of the poorer regions was initially driven by electoral pressures to ensuring ethno-regional balance in resource allocation, before being subsequently stimulated by the two-related factors of pork barrel politics and the differential political clout of regional and district-level elites in lobbying GSFP officials for additional schools for their communities. These are discussed in detail below.
Electoral pressures and regional balance in resource allocation
When the GoG developed the idea of the GSFP, it would seem that it had the twin objectives of reducing poverty as well as stimulating political support for the ruling NPP (Interview, NGO representative). These competing objectives, along with concerns for national unity, would seem to have led to one significant contradiction regarding the design and implementation arrangements of the programme. On the one hand, although the programme was designed to focus on “the most deprived districts” (GoG, 2006:20), it was on the other, supposed to be a “national” programme with its intended geographical coverage stated as public primary schools in “all 138 districts in Ghana” (Ibid.,p.ii). This ‘national’ orientation of the programme and the objective of targeting poor communities would not necessarily be contradictory if every district in Ghana can claim to be deprived. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 1, poverty mappings in Ghana point to significant variations in
155 levels of deprivation among districts, especially along the North-South divide. This then raises the important question as to how a programme designed to target ‘hunger hotspots’ would be implemented in all administrative districts, when not every district could actually be labelled deprived or food insecure?
My field interviews suggest that such contradictions arose mainly from ruling elites’ concerns for national unity and what they deem politically sensible in winning elections on the one hand, and what they deem desirable in overcoming the problem of regional inequality on the other. While political leaders apparently recognise the significance of spatially-sensitive interventions for equitable development, the implementation of such interventions tend to be distracted by: 1) concerns for national unity which requires the avoidance of explicitly excluding any part of the country from the distribution of the ‘national cake’; as well as 2) politicians’ sensitivity to the logic of electoral politics which requires that visible symbols of development largesse be spread as thinly as possible to cover the widest spectrum of voters before the next election (see also Chapter 6). As noted in Chapter 4, this latter concern in the current political context is driven mainly by an extremely high level of electoral competition between the two dominant parties that make it difficult for resource allocation decisions to be wholly independent of the logic of winning elections. Thus, in the struggle between equitable development policies and electoral calculus, it is often the former that loses, as pro-poor policies in Ghana’s Fourth Republic “ tend not to be priority vote-catchers” (OECD, 2007:5). One result has been that contrary to the pro-poor orientation of the GSFP, at no point in time was a conscious effort made to ensure the concentration of the programme to the poorer regions. Rather, right from the beginning, the dominant idea had always been to distribute GSFP schools equally to the regions, albeit with elites from the more politically-connected regions being able to lobby for additional schools for their constituents.
Implementation of the GSFP started in late 2005 with 10 primary schools drawn from each of the 10 administrative regions (i.e. one school per region). After piloting the programme for about half a year, a first up-scaling was undertaken in June 2006 by extending it to 2 schools each per district. With additional funding from the Dutch government, a major up- scaling took place towards the end of the 2005/6 academic year, when the programme’s National Secretariat decided on yet another equal distribution criterion of five (5) schools per district. The Secretariat wrote to District Assemblies across the country to select five schools each for inclusion in the programme (Abu-Bakr, 2008) and by December 2006, the
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GSFP had been expanded to cover 598 schools, benefiting a total pupil population of 234,800 (GoG, 2007:1).
GSFP official reports describe these ‘achievements’ as “laudable” (ibid), albeit without highlighting the fact that these beneficiary schools and pupil were not necessarily those from the most hungry, food insecure parts of the country. Rather, and arguably motivated mainly by the quest for re-election, they were spread thinly all over the country in a manner that rendered the programme less effective as a social safety mechanism for the poorest. Of course, this phenomenon is not unique to Ghana, and it is precisely the same political logic, namely the fear of potential future electoral sanctions by some regions, that explain Tanzanian political elites’ dislike for pilot projects (Therkildsen, 2008). Here, recent programmes that in the past would have been pilot tested “are now started countrywide from the outset” (Ibid., p.15), as pilot testing new development projects in specific areas is interpreted to be openly demonstrative of “an unequal treatment of regions”, and therefore a “cause for considerable political concern” (Ibid).
Although the GSFP was pilot tested, the application of the equal distribution criteria of one primary school per region meant that a vast majority of districts from the poorer Northern regions had to await their turn in order to make room for every region to benefit from what was ostensibly seen as a ‘national programme’. Thus, to the extent that the GSFP lost its original pro-poor focus right from the beginning, this would seem to have been driven by the electoral logic of spreading visible symbols of development largesse thinly across regions rather than specifically targeting the poorest in the interest of geographically equalising outcomes. Such electoral pressures were further evident in the 2008 election manifestos of the two dominant parties, whereby a pledge was made to extend the programme to “cover all primary schools in the country” (NDC, 2008:72) or more precisely, “to all children in the next 2 years” (NPP, 2008:8). That the new NDC government that has been in office since January 2009 has been unable to fulfil this pledge after four years in office would seem to suggest that such pledges were made without taking into account the amount of resources available to the state and the differential level of needs among school pupils across different parts of the country. The argument here does not seek to depict universal social protection programmes as inherently inequitable, but to concur with the view that “such policies may fail to achieve truly universal outcomes if they rely too heavily on methods that do not take into account the additional challenges faced in spatial poverty traps” (Higgins et al., 2010:20).
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Political patronage and pork barrel politics
In line with Khan’s (2011) characterisation of all developing country democracies as clientelist and the characterisation of the African state in particular as ‘neo-patrimonial’ (Chapter 2), there is some evidence to attribute the patterns of GSFP expenditures to pork barrel and clientelist forms of politics. Although implementation started with the notion of ‘equality’ in distribution, strong political incentives soon came into play. One GSFP official, who has been with the programme since its inception, told me that there seemed to have been a strong feeling within government cycles that:
“Even if you send them [GSFP schools] to certain areas, they will still not vote for you. So why not just limit it somewhere? So if you were not in the good books of the then administration, don’t expect to get....It was like a pay-back period” (Interview, GSFP Official, 4/07/11).
This claim tends to be supported by the regional patterns of GSFP expenditures which appear to be more closely associated with political targeting, whereby the then ruling NPP’s ‘traditional’ electoral stronghold of Ashanti (Chapter 4) was also the highest recipient of GSFP expenditures during 2005-2008. Although the political affiliations of Brong Ahafo, one of the most favoured GSFP regions, cannot be held out as an NPP strong hold, a crucial parliamentary by-election was at stake in one of the districts in this region – the Nkoranza district – and the available evidence shows that the significantly large amount of GSFP expenditures in Brong Ahafo were channelled to this area. Indeed, that the Nkoranza district experienced a sharp rise in the number of schools benefiting from the GSFP in the months preceding the election, does not seem to be fortuitous, but arguably demonstrates the role of ‘pork barrel’ politics in explaining the skewed distribution of GSFP schools discussed in the previous sections. The GSFP official cited above explained further that although politicians lobbied the programme’s leadership at all times for GSFP schools for their constituents (see next section), such political pressures were especially more intensive during crucial by-elections such as the one in Nkoranza:
“They [politicians] used to lobby us a lot. If there is a by-election from any district, be rest assured that that district that time will get all the schools” (Interview, GSFP official, 4/07/11).
Political patronage would thus seem to explain the fact that in July 2007, Nkoranza, one small district in Southern Ghana alone had 30 GSFP schools, while the opposition NDC’s
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‘vote Bank’ in the South (i.e. Volta Region) with a total of 18 districts had only 32. 22 The number of GSFP beneficiary schools in Nkoranza also compared very favourably with those of the three Northern regions – all the main NDC strongholds as shown in Chapter 4.
To an extent, the ‘political targeting’ of the programme would seem to have been facilitated by important positions occupied by key ruling party activists within its implementation structures. One senior civil servant responsible for coordinating the programme in one of its line ministries appeared to have found nothing surprising about the GSFP’s poorly targeted outcomes, in view of government’s appointment of card- bearing members of the ruling party to crucial positions within the programme. Thus, when asked whether and to what extent electoral incentives contributed to the skewed patterns of GSFP expenditures, this respondent reluctantly commented: “Yeah, but it was political heads who were in charge. So that is what brought about the wrong targeting” (Interview, Senior Government Official, and GSFP focal person, 27/07/11 ). Asking rhetorically as to whether any political appointee could have been expected to behave differently, the remark was that: “definitely you would want to take it to your community, why not? So that is what brought the wrong targeting” (Ibid).
Official data along with interviews with GSFP officials confirm that much of the poor targeting occurred under the leadership of Dr. Amoaku Tuffuor, the first Executive Chairman of the programme appointed by President Kufuor. Dr. Tufuour is a Founding Member of the NPP who also served as the Chief Advisor to the Vice President during the time of his leadership role in the GSFP. 23 It would seem that the appointment of such a trusted party stalwart opened up the programme to political abuses, not least as it provided grounds for more politically-connected regions to exploit their networks within the ruling government in attracting more schools to their constituencies. This effectively left the regions with weaker political connections to the ruling party excluded from the programme. These observations provide some support for Rigg et al.’s (2009) argument that those often at the ‘margins’ in development processes “are marginal not because they are far from centres of agglomeration” – as the WDR 2009 suggests – but mainly “because they are distant from centres of [political] power” (p.134).
The GSFP also faced the general problem regarding the politics of (de)centralisation in much of sub-Saharan Africa, whereby decentralised structures are used by governing elites
22 For details on this data, see the Finance Ministry’s website: http://www.mofep.gov.gh/documents/school%20feeding%207.pdf [Accessed 30.01.12] 23 See The Chronicle , ‘All NPP card-bearing members must vote – Amoako Tuffuor’. Available at: http://ghanaian-chronicle.com/all-npp-card-bearing-members-must-vote-amoako-tuffuor/ [Accessed 06.11.12] 159 to building clientelist networks at the local level in ways that undermine broad-based development outcomes (e.g. Crook, 2003). Although in theory, the selection of GSFP schools was a collective responsibility of a District Implementation Committee (DIC) at the local level, in reality, the politically powerful DCE (see Chapter 4) enjoys extensive agenda-setting powers in this process, enabling the use of the programme for building clientelistic power bases at the local level. One NGO monitoring report revealed that in about 30% of districts visited, the selection of GSFP schools was the exclusive reserve of the DCE, while “other major stakeholders...were conspicuously sidelined” (SEND- Foundation, 2008:15). Indeed, even when consultations with other members of the DIC were undertaken in the school selection process, more recent evidence suggests that:
“the final decisions [still] remained with the District Chief Executive and key district officers. This often resulted in selection based on attempting to balance political constituency demands which could override the initial selection carried out by the technical departments such as education” (WFP, 2010:36).
Together, these observations not only point to the power of the political over the technical dimensions of policy implementation in Ghana, but also corroborate the claims regarding the growing level of patronage politics in the country’s increasingly consolidated democracy (see Chapter 4). The Ghanaian experience is therefore illustrative of the tendency of multiparty electoral competition to reinforce rather than counteract clientelist politics (Lindberg, 2003).
Unequal power relations and political lobbies
Another factor which is important to understanding the distributional pattern of GSFP expenditures is unequal power relations, particularly as it relates to the differential access to political power by regional elites in lobbying for schools for their constituents. Apparently driven by the visibility of the programme and the potential political capital associated with it, local politicians (notably MPs and DCEs), engaged in lobbying GSFP officials to attract more schools to their constituents in ways that also contributed to its skewed distribution:
“When we started the programme, it was fantastic; one region, one school. …All of a sudden we were beginning to experience pressures across board. So instead of continuing with that pattern, it just dropped” (Interview, GSFP Official, 4 th July, 2011).
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Explaining how these ‘pressures’ occurred, this interviewee noted that “mostly, it was the case where DCEs and some Ministers or MPs will just come here with some lists for us to input” (ibid), or at times with caterers visiting the Programme’s Secretariat with list of schools accompanied by introductory letters from influential political figures (ibid). To validate this claim, I asked whether and how it could be proven to an outsider that there were indeed such political pressures. Responding, this interviewee pulled out two different files containing letters from one MP, both ‘recommending’ to the then Executive Chairman of the Programme, to extend the programme to certain schools specifically as an avenue for providing employment opportunities to one caterer.
Such pressures on GSFP officials would seem to have increased in the period leading to the December 2008 elections. In September 2008, one newspaper article captioned, ‘Politicians take over school feeding’, highlighted the extent to which “politicians ... engaged in serious lobbying to get schools in their districts and constituencies to be selected for the programme” and how this in turn contributed to “forcing the GSFP to set aside its distribution formula for the selection of schools” ( Public Agenda , 15 September 2008). This claim was confirmed by one GSFP official who vehemently debunked any notion of consciously targeting the programme to selected political constituencies. Yet, when subsequently asked the two-related questions as to whether the programme’s leadership was lobbied by government officials, and if so, whether this in turn played a role in influencing which regions received more GSFP schools and expenditures, he responded diplomatically:
“That one, I think to some extent, I will agree...because come to think of it, anywhere in this world, lobbying is now like a legitimate thing... So definitely I will not discount that” (Interview, GSFP official, July 4, 2011).
In the context of these political lobbies, the paramount consideration for spreading the benefits of the programme was no longer the equal distribution criteria with which implementation started, nor was it the poverty-oriented criteria spelt out in the programme document. Rather, it was essentially the differential political power among regional elites in lobbying GSFP officials and the strength of one’s political networks within the ruling coalition more generally. With core and influential party faithful better positioned to use their political networks in attracting more schools to their constituencies, the GSFP, it would seem, was effectively reduced into a tool for excluding regions that had the weakest access to political power within the NPP governing coalition, and where the ruling party was less present in terms of parliamentary representation. It does not appear to be coincidental, therefore, that the four traditional electoral strongholds of the then opposition 161
NDC (i.e. the North and Volta) – which also happened to have been among the least represented in the NPP governing coalition (Chapter 4) – were also those that consistently attracted the least GSFP schools and funds during the period under discussion. With this evidence, it is of little surprise that that the Dutch Government which had earlier pledged to support the GSFP at an annual budget of about 11 million Euros for 4 years (2007-2011) had by 2008 withdrawn its support for the programme. One reason was that:
“The implementation of the programme is excessively Politicised . The role of the national secretariat is not always clear and the rationale for decisions is rarely explained. .... Many decisions affecting implementation, such as school selection ... are not made transparently...” (SNV, 2007:3, original emphasis].
5.5.2 Case Study II: The Model Secondary School Programme
In fulfilment of its 2000 electioneering campaign promise to “ensure equitable geographical spread of top SSS schools in the country” (NPP, 2000:28), the Kufuor-led NPP government instituted a model secondary school programme in 2003. The programme involved upgrading selected senior secondary schools (SSS) to ‘model’ status, one which officially aimed “to address the issue of geographical disparities in access to quality secondary education” (National Development Planning Commission, 2005: 43). It should be noted however that the strategy for achieving this objective was not to focus on poorer areas, but was to provide “one model senior secondary school in each of the 110 districts in Ghana” (GoG, 2005a: 92) – again emphasising equality rather than equity in resource distribution. More importantly, however, even this equal distribution formula was sidelined at the level of implementation, as in the case of the GSFP. Implementation of the model school policy started in 2003, following government’s release of 48 billion (old) cedis to the Education Ministry to upgrade the first batch of 30 selected schools to ‘model’ status across the country (NDPC, 2003:55). If the equal distribution plan was to be adhered to, each of the 10 administrative regions would have been allocated an average of 3 schools and a corresponding amount of ¢480 million.
The evidence shows, however, that right from the beginning, the Ashanti Region was able to attract 3 additional schools relative to its expected allocation, while all the three poorer Northern regions received less than a fair share of their expected shares (Table 5.8). The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Annual Progress Report 2002 noted that it was unclear among top officials of the Ministry of Education as to “who actually did the selection” (NDPC, 2003:105). What remains unquestionable however is that the actual distribution of these schools shows a clear bias in favour of Ashanti, and to a lesser extent the Eastern and
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Brong Ahafo regions – all with a much stronger representation in the NPP ruling coalition than the other regions (Chapter 4).
A particularly important observation here relates to the fact that two districts in the most politically-salient region of Ashanti, specifically the Afigya Sekyere and Sekyere East districts, benefited from two schools each instead of the stipulated policy stance of one school per district. Interestingly, the 6 beneficiary schools in this region included the Konongo Odumase Senior High school in the Asante-Akim North district, an area where the then Minister for Education (the late Hon. Kwadwo Baah Wiredu) was also a Member of Parliament seeking re-election in the 2004 election. The key point here is that much as it is difficult to establish with certainty as to ‘who actually did the selection’ to the disproportionate benefit of Ashanti, a particularly strong speculation relates to the vested interests of dominant actors within the MoE that had the mandate of selecting beneficiary districts for the programme. Indeed, in a country like Ghana where MPs “use every possible means to provide community development benefits to their constituents as a key strategy to get re-elected” (Lindberg, 2010a:128), such developments cannot be simply dismissed as coincidental. Rather, they point to the clientelist distribution of public resources by dominant elites as a way of winning elections and maintaining political power. Such findings also draw attention to the importance of access to political power at the elite level in underlying the spatial patterns of resource distribution at the mass level.
Table 5.9: List of first 30 beneficiary Secondary Schools for the model school programme
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5.6 Conclusions
In their discussion of the underlying drivers of spatial inequality in Ghana, Aryeetey and McKay (2007a) note that “[p]atterns of public spending by region ... are believed to be highly unequal, but [that] no data are available to clarify the situation” (p.163). This chapter has made some contribution to clarifying the role of public spending in the regional patterns of development in Ghana. Focusing on the education and health sectors, the chapter set out to investigate whether and to what extent public expenditures have either contributed to redressing or reinforcing the historical North-South divide; and to explore the key political drivers of the regional patterns of service delivery in the country. Two broad findings emerged from the above analysis. The first is that a key factor that explains the persistent North-South inequalities with regards to education and health outcomes is expenditure discrimination in favour of some regions in Southern Ghana. These expenditures, instead of compensating for the historical exclusion of the most deprived regions, exacerbate them by allocating fewer resources to the regions where access to education and health care delivery are already lower than the national average (Chapter 1).
Second, although there has been considerable emphasis on improving equity in access to education and health care delivery in national policies, the actual implementation of such policies have frequently been undermined by: 1) a bias towards national coverage in an attempt to spread visible symbols of development largesse to as many potential voters as possible; and 2) the ability of dominant political actors to steer resource allocation processes to their regions to the disadvantage of those with less political influences at the level of policy implementation. Thus, even social protection programmes designed with the formal objectives of targeting the ‘poor’ often end up discriminating against the three most impoverished, but politically less prominent regions of Northern Ghana in terms of representation in government. It is these two principal political factors that have rendered the quest for an equitable provision of basic social services in Ghana’s Fourth Republic illusive.
The Ghanaian experience thus provides evidence of a strong relationship between political power and socio-economic well-being, one in which those with stronger agenda-setting powers use their dominance over decision making structures in directing resources to themselves often at the expense of non-power holding regions. Thus, the region that controls political power in Ghana also tends to exert significant control over the direction and magnitude of public resources, with regional disparities in the availability of social services shaped (at least in part) by patterns of political representation. Consequently, the 164
Volta Region, home of former President Rawlings, and which boasted a significant level of representation in the NDC governments of the 1990s (Chapter 4), also enjoyed better access to social services, particularly health, than the rest of the country during the 1990s. The regime of President Kufuor and the NPP brought similar advantages to the Ashanti and Eastern regions in terms of political representation (Chapter 4) in ways that translated into significant improvements in the socio-economic well-being of these regions. Indeed, that the Volta Region of Southern Ghana could so easily transform from being one of the most favoured under Rawlings to being one of the most excluded under Kufuor, especially in public education expenditures, demonstrates the primacy of politics and the power of regional political elites in shaping the spatial allocation of public goods. It is this relationship between access to political power and the spatial patterns of resource allocation that helps explain the persistent North-South inequality, as political elites from the North have rarely ever been the power brokers of any political regime in Ghana’s post- independent history (Chapters 3 and 4).
These findings challenge recent arguments within the context of Ghana’s Fourth Republic that “democratic politics has driven successive administrations to take serious measures to address inequalities” (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009:11). As we have seen, while the rhetoric of the need for equitable development policies may have increased in recent years, it is evident that the same cannot be said of the actual implementation of such policies. Democratic politics along with donor preferences has led to the formulation of pro-poor and more equitable development policies. However, the logic of maintaining power within the context of increased electoral competition propels political elites to behave in ways that undermine the effective implementation of such policies. Policy outcomes therefore turn out to be the exact opposite of their stated goals of ‘Bridging the Inequalities Gap’ (MoH, 2003:1). This observation supports recent research findings regarding
“the tendency of competitive clientelism, especially in its democratic form, to generate policy incoherence – bold policy gestures that are neither followed up with implementation nor accompanied by the necessary complementary measures” (Booth and Therkildsen, 2012:18).
Given Ghana’s unquestionable democratic credentials (World Bank, 2009b), such findings reinforce the call on donor agencies to shelve their ideological bias towards liberal democratic modes of governance, and to refocus attention on deeper forms of politics (notably inter-elite power relations) that shape policy outcomes in poor countries. It is along these lines that recent research by the Centre for the Future State (CFS) has emphasised the need for mainstream development practitioners to refocus attention on 165 understanding the relationships, interests and incentives that underpin the functioning of state institutions instead of prioritising reform of formal institutions themselves (CFS, 2010). As we will see, even donor conditionalities that emphasise pro-poor spending remain generally ineffectual in overriding the above two principal political factors that undermine the actual implementation of equitable development policies in contemporary Ghana. Increased donor resources therefore arguably only tend to increase regional inequalities (see Chapter 6 below).
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Chapter 6. The PRSPs and the politics of excluding the poorest: the case of Ghana’s HIPC Fund
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter explored the politics of service delivery in Ghana’s Fourth Republic with the view to understanding the influence of domestic political processes on regional inequalities in access to basic health and education services. The main findings were two- fold. First, an important factor that explains the persistent North-South divide with regards to health and education outcomes (Chapter 1) has been the relative marginalisation of the North from public expenditures, including those related to programmes specifically designed to target the poor. Second, these inequalities are underpinned principally by clientelist politics, exacerbated in more recent years by increased electoral competition; and the relatively weak influence of Northern elites over resource allocation decisions in the interest of their constituents within this patronage-driven political environment.
This chapter is also concerned with the politics of service delivery, but one which situates the analysis within the context of the ‘new aid architecture’, underpinned partly by the PRSPs and the HIPC Initiative. This is important because donor agencies, as noted in Chapter 1, are central to the decision-making processes of developing countries, even to the point of purportedly “capturing the state” (Gutierrrez, 2011:6) in some aid-dependent countries. In this respect, some analysts have emphasised the potential role of donors in strengthening the commitment of state elites towards broad-based developmental outcomes in aid-dependent countries. As Mutesa (2005:84-85) has argued in relation to Zambia, “[t]o the extent that donor conditionality and donor money are responsible for change in government policies, donors are important sources of change”. Thus, and as noted in Chapter 1, the shift towards the PRSPs in the late 1990s was driven partly by the continuous search for better measures aimed at enhancing the poverty reduction impact of foreign aid in poor countries. This ‘new aid architecture’ emphasised greater civil society participation in policy making which was expected to enhance governments’ accountability to poor citizens (Hickey and Mohan, 2008), and thereby translate into equitable and efficient development outcomes (Booth, 2005).
Have these expectations materialised in the Ghanaian context? Through an analysis of Ghana’s HIPC Fund, this chapter aims to understand whether the theory of political change that underlies the PRSP experiment has contributed to enhancing equitable regional development in Ghana. Ghana joined the HIPC initiative in 2002, and was therefore
167 obliged to formulate an acceptable PRSP that was to demonstrate how HIPC resources would be shifted towards activities that demonstrably benefited the poor (see Chapter 4). Thus, “the need to submit a PRSP was the immediate occasion for producing GPRS I” (GoG, 2005a:2). Under HIPC, Ghana expected total debt relief of some US$3.7 billion over a 20 year period, of which 20 percent was to be used for domestic debt servicing, while the remaining 80 percent was to be channelled into poverty-related programmes spelt out in the GPRS I (GoG, 2003a). Through these resources, the GoG established a “special HIPC fund” at the Bank of Ghana where HIPC relief monies were to be deposited (Ibid., pp.-216-217).
In this chapter, I am interested in understanding whether and to what extent HIPC-related resources were targeted to the poorest regions, as well as the key political factors that shaped the regional distribution of these resources. The analysis is guided mainly by the literature that expresses pessimism about the implicit theory of political change that underlies the PRSPs (see Chapter 1). This relates in particular to the tendency of proponents of the PRSP experiment to exaggerate the role that can be played by the introduction of formalised spaces for civil society actors within contexts where power relations and informal institutions such as clientelist politics frequently undermine the implementation of formal institutional arrangements (Bwalya et al 2004; Booth, 2005; Parks and Cole, 2010).
The chapter is arranged as follows. Section 6.2 lays out the policy intent of the GPRS with regards to bridging the North-South gaps, before turning to examine the empirical evidence regarding the actual distribution of HIPC expenditures during 2002-2008 (section 6.3). Section 6.4 interrogates the key official explanations offered for the observed spatial distribution of HIPC resources, before turning to offer an alternative explanation based on politics and power relations (section 6.5). Section 6.6 draws conclusions.
6.2 Including the historically-excluded Northern regions? The GPRS rhetoric
Reducing regional inequalities was a central theme of the GPRS I. The policy document notes that regional inequalities have persisted in Ghana because “past policies for a more equitable distribution of resource investment have not been implemented” (GoG, 200a3:31). It therefore went on to declare an urgent need for “[p]ositive action to redress gross imbalances in geographical distribution of resource investment” (Ibid). Thus, the “main goal” of the GPRS 1 was to “ ensure sustainable equitable growth, accelerated poverty reduction and the protection of the vulnerable and excluded ” (p.30, original
168 emphasis). One of the priority areas of this strategy was therefore to implement ‘special programmes for the vulnerable and excluded’. With the North specifically singled out as the most excluded in spatial terms, the provision of “extra per capita expenditure for the three northern Regions” (GoG, 2003a: 44) was envisaged. This was to be achieved through an application of a weighted formula in the regional distribution of public expenditure. In this formula, the three Northern regions were to receive, in per capita terms, four times that for Greater Accra and two times that for the six other regions of Southern Ghana. In essence, this meant that nearly half (48%) of resources meant for GPRS implementation was planned to be allocated to the North (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1: GPRS weighting criteria for regional resource distribution
Geographical zones Groups Regions Weighting (%) Northern Ghana Group A Northern, Upper West & Upper East 48% Central, Brong Ahafo, Volta Group B 48% Southern Ghana Ashanti, Eastern & Western Group C Greater Accra 4% Source: GoG, 2003a:185
What explains this extra-ordinary pro-poor orientation of the GPRS? The literature suggests that an overwhelming majority of the first generation PRSPs were donor-driven, designed mainly to please donors and secure HIPC debt relief (Stewart and Wang 2003; Abrahamsen 2004; Piron and Evans, 2004; Brown 2004). In the specific Ghanaian context, the strategic value of the HIPC Initiative in the overall development strategy of the NPP government was its link to the obligation to undertake certain interventions agreed with external creditors. For example, Ghana’s access to HIPC resources was conditioned upon compliance with a set of requirements called ‘HIPC triggers’, which included the preparation of the GPRS as well as the need to demonstrate greater commitment to “education and health special spending targeted … (at) the poor” (World Bank, 2002:12). This latter trigger was specifically meant to improve upon “deprived basic schools... with emphasis on the 3 Northern regions” (GoG, 2003a: 179). In this context, the question of whether the pro-poor outlook of the GPRS towards the North was genuinely reflective of the NPP government’s interest in overcoming the North-South inequalities or whether this was more of a donor-driven agenda can best be understood by first looking at the actual distribution of HIPC expenditures.
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6.3 The Reality of the HIPC Fund: A tool for widening regional inequalities?
Drawing on data from the GoG’s Annual Progress Reports (APRs) that tracked implementation of the GPRS I and II, this section undertakes a regional analysis of the distribution of HIPC expenditures during 2002-2008. Ghana started receiving HIPC debt relief in 2002, and by 2006, “actual HIPC spending stood at ¢6,812.2 billion, of which ¢1,003.0 billion was allocated to domestic debt payment” (African Development Bank, 2009:63). It is important to state at the outset that the analysis in this Chapter does not cover the entire HIPC debt relief amount. The allocation of HIPC funds to the regions took the forms of both direct releases to District Assemblies (DAs) across the country and through central government Ministries, Departments and Agencies for the implementation of specific programmes. In this Chapter, my analysis focuses on those released via the DAs for which regionally-disaggregated data is available. Importantly, however, this partial coverage does not in any way undermine the validity of the conclusions to be drawn in this Chapter. One reason is that the then Finance Minister (Yaw Osafo Marfo) explained that because of the strategic importance of the HIPC initiative to the GPRS, the utilization of HIPC “funds were guided by the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy document” (Parliamentary Debates Official Report, 5 March, 2003, Col. 1649). If this were the case, then we would expect the disbursements of HIPC resources via the DAs to be guided by the equity-based resource allocation criteria proposed in the GPRS as those through central government MDAs. Moreover, a look at the utilisation of HIPC resources by the two Government Ministries that received the largest chunk of HIPC funds, namely the Education and Health Ministries (African Development Bank, 2009) indicates that concerns for equity were clearly relegated to the background (see Section 6.3.3).
With the above observations, the findings here provide evidence indicating that the actual distribution of HIPC expenditures was significantly at variance with the policy directions of the GPRS. Direct disbursements of HIPC expenditures to the districts started in April 2002 following an announcement by the then Finance Minister that some 117 billion (old) cedis was to be lodged into the HIPC accounts of all DAs across the country. As announced by the Minister, the amount of money allocated to each district varied not on the basis of levels of poverty, but rather according to whether a particular local government jurisdiction was a Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assembly (Table 6.2). With population distribution serving as the key determinant of how a local government authority
170 is characterised in Ghana 24 , this pattern of disbursement tended to favour the more populous regions such as Greater Accra and Ashanti.
Table 6.2: HIPC Fund Allocations to District Assemblies, 2002
It is important to note however that although implementation of the GPRS started in 2002 (NDPC, 2003:1), it was not until February 2003 that the official GPRS policy document was published. This suggests that one could be criticised for expecting funds disbursed in 2002 to be guided by the equity-based resource distribution formula proposed in the official GPRS policy document. Still however, the 2002 allocations show that the distribution of the HIPC Fund had a poor start in terms of addressing spatial inequality. Moreover, as will be shown below, subsequent disbursements of HIPC expenditures during GPRS implementation (2003-05) continued to ignore the regional variations in levels of poverty.
6.3.1 The GPRS I and Regional HIPC Allocations, 2003-2005
This section examines the regional allocation of HIPC funds during the implementation of the GPRS I between 2003 and 2005. Data extracted from the GPRS APRs show that an amount of about ¢423.3 billion of HIPC funds was disbursed directly to the various districts during this period (Table 6.2). Utilising regional population data based on the 2000 census, my computations show that if the allocation of this amount was guided strictly by the GPRS resource sharing formula noted above, the expected amount for the three Northern regions would have been ¢139.6 billion instead of the ¢28.9 billion that they actually received. The key reason is that four out of the seven regions in the South (Greater Accra, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Western) received significantly more than their expected shares, ranging from as much as an excess of ¢64.6 billion for Greater Accra to
24 A local government in Ghana is either Metropolitan (population over 250,000), Municipal (population over 95,000) or District (population 75,000 and over).
171 about ¢41.4 billion for Ashanti. The actua l share of the three other regions in the South was less than their expected sums, with the Volta Region again experiencing the largest shortfall of some ¢17.6 billion (Table 6.3).
Table 6.3 : Comparison of Ex pected and Actual HIPC Expenditures (in million ¢) by Region (2003 -05)
Figure 6.1: Expected and Actual per capita HIPC allocations (in thousands of cedis), 2003-2005 average
Source: based on Table 6.3.
Moreover, contrary to the GPRS rhetoric of providing “extra per capita expenditures” to the Northern regions, it was the rela tively endowed Southern regions that actually enjoyed
172 the highest per capita HIPC spending. Figure 6.1 shows that average actual per capita HIPC expenditures in the North amounted to ¢7, 000, compared to ¢30,000 in the South. More strikingly, the per capi ta allocations for the poorest Upper West (¢2,400) was only 7% of that of Ashanti (¢33, 900). Unsurprisingly, while poverty has reduced significantly since Ghana’s adoption of the PRSPs, regional inequality has actually increased, such that currently, “the highest poverty incidence occurs in the Upper West, where the figure increased from about 84 percent in 1998/99 to about 88 percent in 2005/06” (GSS, 2007:13). The marginalization of the North is more vividly illustrated in Figure 6.2, which reports on th e regional deviations between the expected and actual per capita HIPC allocations during 2003 -2005. The evidence also shows that within the South, the Volta region was the least beneficiary of HIPC resources in per capita terms.
Figure 6.2: Deviations between expected and actual per capit a HIPC allocations ( in thousands of cedis), 2003-05 average
Source: based on Table 6.3. Note that negative figures indicate under -funding
These findings are consistent with other reviews. The first APR of the GPRS acknowledges that “the first allocation of HIPC funds [in 2002] did not conform to the outlook expressed in the GPRS”, and accordingly recommended the need for future HIPC expe nditures “to target very poor districts that are identified as poverty endemic, if the poverty gap is to be bridged” (NDPC, 2003:95). A subsequent study analysed the regional distribution of HIPC funded projects in the education, health, water and sanitat ion sectors during 2002-2004, finding that “the 3 northern regions that are the poorest in the country received the least items of projects and programmes financed from the HIPC funds” (SEND-Foundation, 2006:5). Although this observation was made on the ba sis of projects executed during 2002 -2004, subsequent evidence shows that nothing had changed.
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HIPC expenditures continued to be driven, at least in principle, by the question of whether a particular local government jurisdiction was a district or metropolitan Assembly, and not the spatial concentration of poverty. The final (2005) APR of the GPRS I gives an indication of how an amount of some ¢199 billion was to be disbursed: each of the then 124 DAs was to be given 1.2 billion cedis; Municipal Assemblies were to be given 2 billion each; while allocation to the then 4 Metropolitan Assemblies varied between 5.2 to 10 billion cedis (see NDPC, 2006:53). As no Northern district was of Metropolitan status at the time, all the districts in Northern Ghana had to contend with the fixed allocation of 1.2 billion cedis for DAs, except the Tamale Municipal Assembly that was to be allocated 2 billion. Yet, given the meagre per capita allocations for these regions reported above, it is questionable if all the Northern districts actually received their allocated shares.
6.3.2 The GPRS II and regional HIPC expenditures: a paradigm shift?
The regional distribution of HIPC resources under GPRS II (2006-2009) was relatively more equitable, with allocations to the North improving significantly in relative terms: from less than 7% over the period 2003-2005, cumulative HIPC expenditures for the North during 2006-2008 was a little over 20%. Per capita allocations followed a similar pattern, such that i n 2006, not only was per capita HIPC spending in Northern Ghana above the national average of GH¢1.53; the poorest Upper West was also the highest beneficiary on per capita basis (GH¢ 3.76). T he data also points to significant expenditure shifts among the regions within the South whereby the previously most excluded region, namely Volta, was the highest recipient of per capita HIPC expenditures in both 2007 and 2008 (Table 6.4).
Whether these shifts were actually driven by a deliberate strategy of poverty targeting or some other considerations is discussed in a later section. Here, however, I emphasise that these perceived pro-poor expenditure patterns should be interpreted with some caveats in mind. The first is that the improved allocations to the North still fell far short of what was envisaged in the GPRS I policy document. For example, of 2,303 HIPC-sponsored projects in the health, education, water and sanitation sectors in 2006, the combined share of the three Northern regions was only 23% (NDPC, 2007:70). Second, HIPC expenditures in the North, as in other regions, were much smaller during GPRS II. For example, while the Northern Region alone received slightly over ¢20billion during GPRS I, cumulative HIPC expenditures to the three Northern Regions during GPRS II amounted to only about ¢16 billion (old cedis). This means that the perceived improvements in equity during GPRSII could hardly have been sufficient to compensate for the extreme marginalisation of the 174
North under GPRS I. The important question then is w hy the actual disbursements of HIPC resources generally tended to deviate from the pro-poor stance of the GPRS policy document.
I address the above question by first interrogating the key official explanations regarding the ‘actual’ criteria for distributing HIPC expenditures (section 6.3), before turning to offer a more politically-attuned explanation (section 6.4).
Table 6.4: Regional HIPC Expenditures (million GH¢) under GPRS II (2006-2008)
2006 2007 2008 2006-2008 Total HIPC/ Total HIPC/ Total HIPC/ Total HIPC/ Regions Exp. Capita Exp. Capita Exp. Capita Exp. Capita Ashanti 4.5 1.05 4.2 0.95 2.6 0.57 11.4 0.86 B/Ahafo 2.5 1.23 3.3 1.57 1.1 0.5 7 1.10 Central 2.8 1.61 1.7 0.93 1.1 0.61 5.6 1.05 Eastern 3.2 1.44 2.7 1.21 2 0.9 8 1.18 G/Accra 2.9 0.77 2 0.51 7 1.73 11.9 1.00 Volta 2.7 1.53 5.5 3.03 3.8 2.09 12 2.22 Western 2.7 1.19 2.1 0.88 4.1 1.68 8.9 1.25 Northern 2.9 1.42 2.2 1.04 1.4 0.63 6.5 1.03 U/East 2.3 2.33 2 2.08 0.5 0.47 4.8 1.63 U/West 2.3 3.76 1.7 2.82 1.2 1.89 5.2 2.82 Ghana 29 1.53 27.5 1.5 24.7 1.1 77.9 1.38 Source: Author’s calculations based on: a) regional HIPC expenditure data extracted from the GPRS II APRs from 2006-2009; and b) regional population data produced by the Ghana Statistical Service (see http://www.statsghana.gov.gh ).
6.4 The HIPC Fund and Northern exclusion: questioning the official explanations
Based on evidence from Parliamentary Hansards, official explanations concerning the regional distribution of HIPC resources can be summarised into three main factors. These are population distribution, the need to tackle pockets of urban poverty in relatively well- off regions, and a more equitable allocation of HIPC resources via key sector Ministries. This section argues that such explanations are questionable.
The first key explanation emphasised the spatial patterns of population distribution, as explained by the then Finance Minister in Parliament:
“Mr. Speaker, poverty reduction in the GPRS identified areas which at a point in time had certain levels of poverty. And of course, the three northern regions...were in a class of their own, in terms of poverty. Mr. Speaker, poverty in the cities... could be even more dangerous than they could be in the rural areas. And therefore when we were looking at the distribution of the resources we were influenced by 175
population concentration. And it is obvious that Greater-Accra has the maximum number of people, followed by Kumasi and others. That was why we staggered it along those lines” (Parliamentary Debates Official Report, March 5, 2003: Cols. 1653-1654).
There are two important observations worth highlighting about this statement. First, such an explanation, which emphasises the spatial concentration of population as the most important consideration for distributing state resources, is strongly at variance with the pro-poor outlook of the GPRS. This also supports Parks and Cole’s (2010) argument regarding the highly malleable nature of state institutions in poor countries, as dominant elites frequently use their power in adjusting formal governance institutions in order to help create conditions that advance their interests. Second, contrary to the Finance Minister’s explanation, the substantial variations in the per capita HIPC allocations reported above raises important questions regarding the conscious allocation of HIPC resources on the basis of population concentration. This is to note that if there was such a conscious effort to allocate HIPC resources on the basis of population distribution, we would have expected each region’s HIPC expenditures to be at least roughly proportional to its share in the national population.
Another explanation emphasised the ‘widespread’ nature of poverty in Ghana, and hence the need to avoid discrimination against the more urbanised Southern regions on the basis of the perception that they are rich. Thus, in contrast to a recognition of poverty in Ghana as “largely a rural phenomenon” (GoG, 2003a:15), the Finance Minister was emphatic that he “would not want people to associate poverty with the rural setting” (Parliamentary Debates, March 5, 2003, Cols 1654), claiming further that “when we talk about poverty, certain parts of Greater Accra, in terms of facilities, in terms of water and sanitation, in terms of health facilities, are as bad as they could be in other rural areas” (Ibid). The irony of this argument is that whereas it was advanced to justify why government needed to avoid the exclusion of the South from HIPC resources, we have seen how the much poorer Northern regions were marginalised in the distribution of these resources. Moreover, although there are certainly pockets of poverty across all regions in Ghana, it remains a questionable claim to suggest that actual patterns of HIPC disbursements were meant to tackle such pockets of poverty across the country. As noted above, the spatial distribution of HIPC resources during GPRS I implementation was officially guided by the question of whether a particular local authority was a district, municipal or metropolitan assembly and not the level of poverty. Consequently, whereas the Accra Metropolitan Assembly in Greater Accra with a poverty incidence of 8% 176 received as much as 3.5 billion cedis in the first tranche of HIPC disbursements in 2002, the Dangbe East – the poorest district in this region with a poverty incidence of 54% – was allocated one billion.
The third explanation offered by the Finance Minister emphasised government’s commitment to equity, but one which was to be achieved at the sectoral level:
“Aside this disbursement, a bigger sum of the [HIPC] money has been distributed directly through the Ministries... We have given as much as about ¢38 billion to the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education will use its knowledge of which areas of Ghana we do not have good schools, to intervene. We have given a similar amount to the Ministry of Health to also intervene specifically. That is why we make the others uniform and do not discriminate in terms of which district is poor and which district is rich” (Ibid., Cols. 1654-1655).
Two important questions arise from this explanation. Did the Ministries in question apply their shares of HIPC resources more equitably? If so, upon whose insistence and for what motives did these Ministries appear more committed to the goals of equitable development? I address the first question here while the second is deferred to the next section. If we focus our attention on the major programmes on which the Ministries of Education and Health expended much of their HIPC resources, then it can be argued that the pattern of distributing HIPC resources by these Ministries was not significantly different from the broader patterns explained above, whereby the poorer Northern regions tended to be marginalised.
I suggest that whether the distribution of HIPC resources by the ministries in question were more equitable can be understood by looking at the distribution criteria of the major HIPC-funded programmes of these ministries. One of MoFEP’s press briefings on the HIPC Funds listed 5 main interventions into which the MoE channelled its HIPC-related expenditures: provision of basic school infrastructure; subsidising the cost of Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE) fees, as well as funding the capitation grant scheme, the senior secondary ‘model’ school programme and the first phase of the Ghana School Feeding Programme (MoFEP, 2006:4-5). Chapter 5 has already noted of the marginalisation of the North from the GSFP and the model school programme. Moreover, allocations of both the BECE subsidies and the capitation grant scheme 25 are based solely on the number of enrolled Primary and JHS pupil in each region, ones which do not take into account existing disparities with regards to access to education. These programmes
25 Introduced in 2005, the capitation grant policy involves an annual allocation of 30,000 Cedis per enrolled pupil, and is paid directly to the school in order to cover the non-salary costs, which would previously have been covered by school levies (see Osei et al., 2009; CDD-Ghana, 2010). . 177 cannot therefore be claimed to have had any strong equalising effect in terms of bridging the North-South educational gaps. Indeed, given that the capitation grant scheme leads to increased public expenditure in regions with high enrolment rates, its potential for further fuelling the North-South inequality cannot be completely ruled out, in view of the relatively limited enrolment rates in Northern Ghana (Chapter 1).
However, evidence from the GPRS APRs suggests that of 685 three-unit classrooms blocks constructed with HIPC savings, 420 (61.3%) were located in the three Northern Regions, while 96 (21.8%) of the 440 six-unit classroom blocks under construction nationwide were also located in the North (NDPC, 2006:120). Moreover, through HIPC- related resources, the GoG introduced exemptions from maternal delivery fees in September 2003 in the four most deprived regions of the country (i.e. the Central and three Northern regions) before making it a nation-wide programme in April 2005. These observations suggest that although to a limited extent, the Health and Education Ministries did utilise their HIPC resources in ways that potentially benefited the poorer Northern regions disproportionately. As will be argued later, however, even this moderate attempt to ensure equity would seem to have been driven mainly by donor conditionalities that emphasised pro-poor spending in these two specific sectors.
6.5 Understanding the rhetoric-reality gaps of the HIPC Fund: a political interpretation
Chapter 2 and the introductory section of this chapter highlighted some important debates regarding the potential of the PRSPs to stimulate pro-poor policy outcomes. While proponents claimed that the principles of participation and ‘national ownership’ embedded in the PRSP experiment would strengthen domestic accountability and elicit governments’ commitment to more equitable forms of development, critics pointed to the possibility of such reforms to be undermined by informal institutions, notably the “neo-patrimonial power relationships inherent in national institutions” (Bwalya et al., 2004:5). This section explores the underlying political drivers of the poorly targeted outcomes of HIPC expenditures. The findings point to three important factors for understanding the politics of the HIPC Fund, namely 1) electoral pressures and its associated processes of clientelist politics; 2) unequal power relations among regional political elites; and 3) the logic of securing donor aid.
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6.5.1 The imperative of winning elections: between patronage and the politics of regional balance
In Chapter 5, I noted of the tendency of Ghanaian governments to spread public resources thinly across regions both because of concerns for national unity and the desire to reach out to many potential voters in order to win elections and maintain political power. Several of the Finance Minister’s explanations in Parliament suggest that such political motivations were also at play in the disbursements of HIPC resources.
The Minister argued, for example, that government’s objective was to expend the HIPC Fund in ways that would “bring everybody up almost simultaneously” (Parliamentary Debates Official Report, March 5, 2003, Col. 1654) – an argument that emphasises equality rather than equity in resource sharing. Such emphasis on broad-based targeting was also evident in the argument that each part of the country, rich or poor requires a share of national resources to develop, because “when you are to reduce poverty, you are talking about not also making those who are rich poor” (Ibid). A related argument was that targeted government spending towards the chronically poor can produce undesirable zero- sum outcomes, whereby gains for the poorest might lead to the exclusion of previously wealthy regions in ways that can have significant adverse implications for national political stability (Ibid). All these explanations emphasise the point that the criteria for determining public resource distribution must be more of whether every region is getting an equal share of the national cake and less of whether a particular geographical location has greater or lesser need, for resources. But if the ruling elites were so much concerned about regional balance, why was the actual distribution of HIIPC expenditures unreflective of both the population and poverty maps of Ghana?
As in the case of the findings in Chapter 5, the answer is that the rhetoric of regional balance was overshadowed by patronage politics at the level of implementation. The data suggests that there was a tactical use of the HIPC Fund for electoral gains. During GPRS I, HIPC expenditures were disproportionately directed to the regions with large NPP supporters and to an extent the main ‘swing’ voting regions (i.e. Greater Accra, Western and Central), and a corresponding marginalisation of the main opposition electoral strongholds, namely Volta and the North (Table 6.5).
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Table 6.5: Regional HIPC expenditures and ruling party support
a b c Source: Author, based on official election results; Table 6.3 ; Table 6.4
That this pattern is essentially the same with government per capita spending at the basic and senior secondary education levels as well as the GSFP (Chapter 5) would seem to confirm that there was some level of consciously targeting HIPC resources to the regions that were deemed more politically-supportive of the ruling party. While the Eastern region is an exception to this argument, the fact that Volta was again the only region in the South with per capita HIPC expenditures below the national average would seem to confirm theutilisation of the HIPC Fund as a ‘carrot and stick’ instrument for electoral purposes.
Moreover, although the pattern of allocations under GPRS II were much more equitable in terms of disproportionately benefiting the North, it is difficult to attribute this wholly to a deliberate effort aimed at targeting the poorest. One reason relates to the continuous substantial allocations to the wealthiest region (i.e. Greater Accra) which alone accounted for 28.3% of total HIPC allocations in 2008 – a crucial election year. Moreover, if the expenditure shifts during GPRS II was driven by equity concerns, we would have expected the poorest region in the South (i.e. Central) to be the highest recipient of HIPC resources during this period. Yet as we saw, it was the Volta Region, the opposition NDC’s ‘vote bank’, that was strongly favoured, receiving the highest per capita HIPC expenditures in both 2007 and 2008 (Table 6.4). HIPC expenditures under GPRS II therefore appear to have been targeted at opposition strongholds in order to broaden the electoral support base of the ruling elites. This is in line with the argument that because ruling elites are motivated primarily about how to maintain political power, the allocations of public resources can take different directions, including targeting opposition strongholds depending on political calculations (on Mozambique, see Kjaer and Therkildsen, 2011).
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Perhaps, that the Kufuor-led government sought to employ the HIPC Fund in stimulating support for the ruling NPP through patronage spending cannot be fully understood without taking into account the broader political context within which Ghana opted for the HIPC Initiative. When the NPP government announced its decision in March 2001 to seek HIPC debt relief, a public debate on the issue ensued for several weeks. The popular sentiment at the time was that Ghana was not poor, and that signing on to HIPC was an indictment on national pride. Moreover, the main opposition NDC (that had previously rejected the HIPC initiative in 1999) succeeded in politicizing this issue, arguing that HIPC would damage Ghana’s international reputation and block access to international capital in the future. The NPP government was thus aware of the unpopularity and potential political costs associated with its decision “to go HIPC”, and accordingly sought to use HIPC resources as a patronage tool for redeeming its political image mainly by appeasing its core electoral supporters. Unsurprisingly, HIPC-sponsored micro-projects, such as school blocks and public toilets, were given big labels indicating ‘HIPC Benefits’ (Figure 6.4). This was clearly deemed important for winning elections.
Figure 6.3: Picture of a HIPC toilet facility in the Northern Regional capital, Tamale
Source: Author, July 2011 The political context within which the GPRS II (2006-2009) was implemented was significantly different, and targeting loyal supporters was arguably not more a good 181 electoral strategy. Notably, the polarised HIPC-related debates that characterised the early 2000s were not more relevant. Moreover, as President Kufuor was to step down due to constitutional term limits, the NPP was required to feature a new candidate for the 2008 presidential elections and was perhaps therefore expecting new challenges in the forthcoming elections. Targeting HIPC resources to opposition strongholds and swing voters from 2006 onwards does not therefore appear so surprising in this context.
6.5.2 Unequal power relations and the exclusion of the North
One key concern of the AISE/political settlements framework highlighted in Chapter 1 is its emphasis on the need to understand spatial inequality in relational terms, whereby some regions become and stay poor because of their lack of power in shaping policy outcomes in their own favour (Parks and Cole, 2010:7). From this perspective, persistent regional inequalities are understood not as a failure of the poor in lagging regions, but mainly as a product of relationships of unequal power, with emphasis here on “power as political representation” (Mosse, 2010:1157). The politics of the HIPC Fund is arguably a classic example of how unequal political power relations between the relatively prosperous South and the historically lagging North have contributed to underpinning chronic poverty in the latter.
Various official sources indicate that decisions concerning the disbursements of HIPC expenditures were at the discretion of the NPP Cabinet, particularly the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP, 2006; Ghana Parliamentary Debates, 5 March, 2003, Col. 1649) – all institutions in which the North was grossly underrepresented (Chapter 4). This underrepresentation, especially within the NPP ‘inner circle’ of power (Chapter 4), and the resultant lack of agenda-setting powers by Northern elites, is crucial to our understanding of the exclusion of the North from the HIPC Fund. This power play was palpably demonstrated in March 2003 when one Northern opposition party MP, Benjamin Kumbour, asked the Finance Minister whether the distribution of the HIPC savings was guided by the GPRS resource allocation criteria:
“I want to ask the hon. Minister whether he is aware that the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) requires that the three regions in the North should get four times as much as Greater Accra, and all other regions should receive twice as much as Greater-Accra, from the HIPC savings. And if so, whether this has been applied in the disbursements” (Parliamentary Debates Official Report, March 5, 2003, Col. 1653).
Responding, the Minister did not deny the concentration of extreme poverty in the North (see section 6.4), for which reason one would have expected the ruling NPP elites to 182 reconsider their allocation of HIPC resources in a more equitable manner. This did not happen, however, and the Finance Minister was to insist that “[w]e shall continue to give the districts the same amounts” (Ibid., Col. 1655). This argument was somewhat supported by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs (Hackman Owusu Agyeman, himself a Southern- based MP) when he quizzed:
“[I]f per chance, we were to do a per capita distribution, would he say that the people of the Northern Region are “short changed”?... [H]as he got any statistics to show whether the people in the northern regions cited are in any way disadvantaged on a per capita basis – whether there is any disadvantage” (Ibid).
While the point here was to imply that the North was perhaps not marginalised on per capita basis, we have already seen that the exclusion of these regions was even more pronounced when analysed in per capita terms (section 6.2.1).
These observations may appear surprising within the context of the exemplary pro-poor orientation of the GPRS that repeatedly emphasised government’s commitment to redistributing public resources in favour of the lagging North. However, they become less surprising if understood within the context of the prevailing clientelist political settlements in Ghana, one in which “formal institutions are rarely independent of the informal power relations that de facto govern the country” (Parks and Cole, 2010:10). More broadly, such findings provide support for the growing recognition of the crucial role of power relations in shaping and adjusting formal state institutions in ways that produce development outcomes in favour of the most powerful actors in the political game. It is along these lines that the WDR 2006 reminds us:
“Policies and institutions do not arise from a benign social planner who aims to maximize the present value of social welfare. They are the outcomes of political economy processes in which different groups seek to protect their own interests. Some groups have more power than others, and their views prevail. When the interests of dominant groups are aligned with broader collective goals, these decisions are for the common good. When they are not, the outcomes need be neither fair nor efficient” (World Bank, 2005:20).
That the actual distribution of HIPC resources was neither sufficiently ‘fair nor efficient’ needs to be understood as a product of the spatial distribution of political power within the NPP ruling coalition. By asking whether the distribution of HIPC resources was being guided by the GPRS, political elites from the poorer North were apparently reminding the ruling elites of their pledge to provide “extra per capita expenditures” to these regions. However, with the weaker representation of Northern politicians in government and their corresponding lack of ‘agenda-setting powers’ within the ruling coalition, the government 183 was ostensibly not obliged to heed to the equity-based criteria that itself had proposed in the GPRS. This analysis provides support for those who have emphasised the importance of altering existing power relations when thinking of measures aimed at addressing persistent poverty and inequalities (e.g. CPRC, 2004; World Bank, 2005). As Hickey and du Toit (2007:24) also note in their discussion of the ways in which processes of adverse incorporation and social exclusion can underpin chronic poverty and inequality: “[m]any adversely incorporated regions are likely to remain so unless their political... position within the nation-state is radically re-thought at the centre”.
Nonetheless, the specific Ghanaian experience suggests that addressing the North-South divide will require more than simply enhancing Northern politicians’ access to influential positions in government. As noted in Chapter 4, political elites from the North remain divided along the NDC-NPP lines, with their loyalty tilted more towards their national- level party grandees than to their constituents back home. Evidence here in support of this claim relates to the fact that as in the case of the GSFP (see Chapter 5), the Northern politicians who opposed the inequitable distribution of HIPC resources were opposition party MPs, and there was a conspicuous silence of Northern NPP politicians over this issue.
6.5.3 Northern Ghana and the GPRS rhetoric: the politics of securing donor aid?
In line with the general criticism of the first generation PRSPs as donor-driven (e.g. Abrahamsen, 2004), studies have described the GPRS I as a donor product whose main “function was to secure debt relief” (Whitfield, 2010:721). The analysis in this chapter supports this view, evident in the contradictions between the exceptional pro-poor orientation of the GPRS I towards the North and the non-application of the resource allocation criteria proposed in this strategy for distributing HIPC-related expenditures. But why did the Health and Education Ministries appear to have applied their shares of HIPC resources more equitably (see section 6.3.3)? With the inception of the PRSPs, bilateral and multilateral donors have introduced the use of health and education outcome disbursement triggers, and it would seem that the relatively pro-poor application of the HIPC Fund within these sectors was more of a by-product of what the GoG deemed crucial in securing foreign aid. Here, the context of a shift towards general budget support through a Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) mechanism appears crucial.
Signed between the GoG and nine donor agencies in 2003, the MDBS is a mechanism through which some donor agencies assist the Ghanaian state with general budget support
184 for implementing its poverty reduction initiatives.26 Substantial sums were involved, and it would seem that the participating donors had very little trust that the GoG would implement their preferred policy choices.27 Therefore, right from the beginning, a performance assessment framework (PAF) matrix was developed, comprising a list of reform elements that the GoG was required to implement in order for donor monies to be released. Lawson et al (2007:33) have noted of the exclusive donor-driven nature of these disbursement triggers, and that it was not until 2005 that the GoG first made inputs into proposals for these triggers.
The MDBS performance-based triggers emphasised, among others, greater provision of social services in chronically-deprived regions, with education and health-related triggers specifically including the following: • Increase access, completion and quality in basic education, particularly in the three most deprived regions of Northern Ghana (PAF trigger-2003); • Increase the proportion of supervised deliveries for under-served regions (PAF trigger-2003); • Develop policy to encourage deployment of teachers and health workers to remote and rural areas (PAF trigger-2003); • Increase gross primary enrolment in the three poorest Northern regions (PAF trigger-2005); and • Increase the utilisation of health services in the poorer Northern regions (PAF trigger-2005) (see NDPC 2004:154; Azeem et al., 2006:22). It should be added that the GoG was required “to prove”, on annual basis, that the various MDBS “triggers were being met in order to receive further funding” (Woll, 2008:80). Thus, government’s failure to meet two (out of sixty-seven) of the MDBS triggers in 2006 meant that some $24 million of the performance payment was withheld by donors (Whitfield, 2009c: 200; also Lawson et al., 2007:38). One can therefore argue that rather than a conscious policy of improving resource flows to the poorer Northern regions, the relatively pro-poor stance of the health and education Ministries with regards to the use of HIPC funds was primarily meant to satisfy donor conditionalities in order to ensure the continuous inflows of development assistance. Unsurprisingly, of the over 30 government MDAs that benefited directly from the HIPC Fund in 2004 (NDPC, 2005: 39), only the Health and Education Ministries, to the best of my knowledge, specifically set aside a
26 The original MDBS signatories included the African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the European Union, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, and the World Bank. 27 Total MDBS funding commitments from DP’s totalled 232.6 million Euros in 2003 alone (NDPC, 2004:148). 185 portion of their share for implementing pro-poor initiatives to the disproportionate benefit of the lagging Northern regions, even if the impact was very limited. Nonetheless, this suggests that the ‘triggers’ for the release of MDBS monies must have played a role in informing the relatively pro-poor stance of the Ministries in question in their utilisation of HIPC resources. This argument reinforces Whitfield’s (2010:728) argument that policy measures that got implemented during the first Kufuor-led NPP government (2001-2004) were mainly those that
“were tied to the release of significant monies, including the conditions negotiated in the HIPC agreement, conditions in the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Support Credit and the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, and (from 2003) conditions in the Multi-Donor Budget Support Mechanism”.
She concludes, therefore, that any attempt to fully comprehend what Ghanaian state elites find desirable and feasible with regards to policy formulation and implementation would remain “incomplete without taking into consideration aid dependency and the ideas and incentives that it generates” (p.724).
However, the findings of this chapter also raise some important questions: if the actions of state elites are driven by donor conditionalities, why was donors’ insistence on targeting HIPC resources to the poorer Northern regions not fully adhered; and why did such non- compliance go unpunished by donors? The answer to the first question lies in the fundamental weakness of the theory of political change that underpins the PRSP experiment. As critics argue, the technocratic approach that underpins the PRSPs – namely that the introduction of formal participatory processes will reshape governance into accountable and more responsive forms (Hickey and Mohan, 2008) – fails to appreciate the importance of clientelist politics in shaping the actual functioning of formal state institutions and how this in turn influences development outcomes (Booth, 2005). Parks and Cole (2010:9) similarly argue that such assumptions also tend to ignore the broader distribution of power in society and the ways in which powerful elites frequently ignore or co-opt formal state institutions, “often by making enforcement impossible”.
Regarding the second, it would seem that the non-fulfilment of some social indicators such as those in relation to access to education and health care were not viewed by donors with the same seriousness as the non-fulfilment of triggers relating to specified fiscal and structural reforms. For one thing, to the extent that the expenditure data reported in this chapter is based on the GPRS APRs, all of which had been approved by the joint-Boards of the World Bank and IMF, it is difficult to assume that the non-application of the various
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HIPC triggers regarding the poorer Northern regions went unnoticed by donors. Yet, the donor decision to withhold some funds in 2006 was solely due to the GoG’s failure to meet an MDBS trigger in relation to Budget & Public Expenditure Management Systems (Lawson et al., 2007:38). Such findings reinforce the claim that the political reforms associated with the PRSPs have been less about empowering states and citizens and more about enhancing the effectiveness of implementing specific policy conditions (Hickey and Mohan, 2008:252), especially those in relation to macroeconomic indicators (Seshamani, 2005).
6.6 Conclusion
In their assessment of Ghana’s Interim-PRSP which preceded the GPRS, the IMF and the World Bank emphasised the need for “[a]dditional regional targets .... to be considered in view of the large disparities seen in the [country’s] poverty data”, and therefore that:
“The full PRSP should go one step further and identify the costs of the key elements of the proposed strategy and their allocation among sectors, geographic areas and the poor” (IMF and IDA, 2002b:3). This chapter has argued that whereas this type of conditionality was instrumental in shaping the content of the GPRS as a way of securing donor aid, it clearly fell short of overriding domestic political processes with regards to the actual implementation of this strategy. Having formulated the GPRS as a pre-condition for receiving HIPC debt relief, one would have expected the distribution of HIPC resources to be guided by the equitable resource allocation criteria proposed in this strategy. Yet this did not happen, as dominant Southern-based elites conspicuously sidelined the GPRS formula and disbursed HIPC expenditures in ways that were deemed desirable for maintaining political power. Consequently, the poorer Northern regions that were earmarked to benefit disproportionately from the HIPC savings were the most marginalised in the actual distribution of HIPC resources. Such findings corroborate the somewhat pessimistic arguments that the PRSP experiment has neither enhanced the effectiveness of aid (Dijkstra, 2005:462) nor has it been successful in changing the political incentives of state elites towards more pro-poor policy reforms (Booth, 2005).
A fundamental reason for the non-application of the GPRS allocation formula was the apparent incompatibility between the distribution of power among regional elites, and the distribution of benefits that was to accrue from this formula. While the NPP ‘inner circle of political power’ was heavily dominated by Southern elites (Chapter 4), it was the North – whose elites lacked ‘agenda-setting powers’ within the governing coalition – that was to
187 benefit disproportionately from the equitable expenditure distribution formula of the GPRS. The HIPC case study therefore strongly illustrates the argument that developmental outcomes are not shaped by the actual design of institutions per se , but rather by the power relationships within which such institutions are embedded. This is because powerful elites will most likely resist the implementation of institutional structures that do not offer them an acceptable distribution of benefits (Khan, 2010), either by adjusting formal state institutions in line with their interests or by establishing “informal arrangements that sidestep or undermine formal state institutions” (Parks and Cole, 2010:6). This observation also resonates with Booth’s (2005:3) argument that the institutional reforms required to give life to the PRSPs “have almost everywhere suffered severe slippages” because “those who exercise real power in a country are not interested in promoting them”. As will be shown in the next Chapter, such embedded power relations are critical to shaping patterns of resource allocation not only in the social sector but also in relation to the productive sectors of the Ghanaian economy.
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Chapter 7. The politics of productive sector investments in Ghana: implications for regional economic disparities
“Productive work and employment are central elements of development as well as decisive elements of human identity...” (United Nations, 2005:56)
7.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters have highlighted the crucial roles of inter-elite power relations and clientelist politics in undermining the equitable provisioning of basic social services in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. These factors remained significant whether we look at the national education and health budgets, the implementation of specific social protection programmes aimed at bridging interregional inequalities (Chapter 5) or donor influenced- type of expenditures via HIPC conditionalities that emphasised pro-poor spending (Chapter 6). This final empirical chapter shifts the focus of inquiry from social provisioning to productive investments. As noted in Chapter 1, some analysts insist that it is job creation via productive investments that “offers the best route out of poverty” (Turok, 2011:83). Addressing regional income inequalities, in this context, also requires public policies that “enhance income opportunities and well-being in lagging regions” (World Bank, 2005:204). Such perspectives stand in direct conflict with the “main message” of the WDR 2009, namely that because economic growth will remain unbalanced, any attempt “to spread out economic activity is to discourage it” (World Bank, 2009a: xxii).
This chapter has two main aims. First, it explores the extent to which the key political factors identified in the previous chapters play out in the productive sectors of the Ghanaian economy and their underlying implications for regional economic development disparities. Second, it addresses the question of how far governments have tackled the problem of regional inequality through greater productive investments in the lagging North. While the first issue is examined through a detailed exploration of the politics of the $547 million Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) on agricultural modernisation, the second is addressed by examining broader national economic development policies and programmes beyond the MCA.
The chapter is arranged as follows. Section 7.2 introduces Ghana’s MCA programme. Section 7.3 interrogates the official criteria for the programme’s beneficiary district selection, and argues that such criteria cannot sufficiently explain the regional patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the MCA. Section 7.4 explores the underlying political incentives and forces for the ‘targeting errors’ faced by the programme. Section 7.5 189 examines broader national productive sector development policies and programmes, before drawing conclusions (section 7.6).
7.2 Ghana’s Millennium Challenge Account: a brief introduction
In February 2004, the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) announced Ghana’s qualification for funding under the MCA, a new tool for international development assistance created by the US government in 2002. The GoG submitted its proposal in October 2005, resulting in an approval of a five-year $547 million for Ghana – “the single largest bilateral grant in Ghana’s history” (Ouma et al , 2012:4). 28 With an overall goal of reducing poverty through economic growth led by agricultural transformation (GoG, 2005b:13), the Ghanaian MCA programme is divided into three broad components:
i. Commercialization of agriculture project ($241 million) which aims to remove the constraints in agricultural production through the provision of irrigation schemes and investments in feeder roads, among others; ii. Transportation infrastructure development project ($143 million) which seeks to reduce transportation costs affecting agricultural commerce at sub-regional and regional levels; and iii. Rural Services Project ($101 million), which entails the provision of social infrastructure and rural financial services ( http://mida.gov.gh ).
Implemented in 23 districts selected from 6 out of Ghana’s 10 administrative regions, the MCA Compact anticipates to lift out some 1.02 million people out of poverty during its first 10 years of implementation (GoG, 2005b: 2&16). However, what is of interest to this study are the likely spatial consequences of the programme, as the distribution of MCA resources fully excluded the two poorest regions in the country, the Upper East and Upper West (see Appendix 10). Although excluded along with the Brong Ahafo and Western regions, the case of the Upper regions is particularly crucial because of their persistently high levels of extreme poverty and chronic food security problems (see GSS, 2003), and the fact that food security concerns are an integral part of the MCA compact (GoG, 2005b).
Therefore, in this chapter, I focus on the exclusion of these two regions. However, I do so alongside an investigation of the substantial inclusion of districts in the Afram Plains Basin of Southern Ghana which covers parts of the Eastern and Ashanti regions. The Afram
28 Actual implementation of the MCA commenced in February 2007 and ended in 2012. 190
Plains is also of interest because my interviews revealed that its inclusion in the Compact was only made possible by a sustained government commitment. From the beginning, government’s particular interest, as expressed through the Finance Minister who was part of the proposal team, was to use MCA funds to expand cocoa production in the forest zone around the Afram Plains. However, this idea failed to attract substantial buy-in within the proposal team and among MCC officials. The MCC was particularly interested on the production of high value horticultural crops. But here again, the Afram Plains presented a particularly difficult situation, as it required that a whole lot of infrastructural development be undertaken in order to make this feasible. 29 When the ideas of boosting cocoa production as well as creating a horticulture zone in this zone failed to gain broad-based support, concerns for food security and rural poverty reduction through increased food crop production became the grounds for justifying the inclusion of this area in the proposal (field interviews; see also GoG, 2005b). In the end, the Afram Plains became part of the approved proposal, with its number of beneficiary districts also subsequently expanded from one to six. The question therefore is: why was there such a sustained political commitment to including the Afram Plains, while the inclusion of two most food insecure regions was never considered?
7.3 The MCA and the politics of beneficiary selection
My field research along with evidence in the literature (e.g. CDD-Ghana, 2006) indicates that the selection of the 23 MCA beneficiary districts was purportedly guided by three technical criteria: i) degree of rural poverty; ii) proven success in private sector investments; and iii) agricultural growth potential. This section interrogates these criteria in order to see the extent to which they can actually explain the regional patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the MCA.
7.3.1 Rural poverty incidence
In view of the concentration of poverty in rural areas in Ghana, the first consideration that supposedly guided the selection of beneficiary districts was the degree of rural poverty. Yet the full exclusion of the Upper East and Upper West – the regions where the incidence of rural poverty has historically been highest – raises questions about the application of this consideration in the actual selection of MCA beneficiaries. Official district poverty data indicate that the incidence of rural poverty among the 6 administrative districts in the
29 According to one interviewee, these included the construction of new bridges across the Volta Lake whose estimates were high enough as to consume the entire budget ceiling of Ghana’s proposal. 191
Upper East varied between 98- 99% in 2000. A similar situation prevailed in Upper West where the incidence of rural poverty among its 5 administrative districts ranged between 96-98% (Figure 7.1). It is therefore difficult to sustain the claim that the selection of MCA beneficiary districts was guided by the spatial patterns of poverty in rural areas. This is even the more so as some districts in the Afram Plains with rural poverty incidences of as low as 31% (e.g. Yilo Krobo) and 35% (e.g. Akuapim South) succeeded in making their way into the MCA Compact.
Figure 7.1: District-level rural poverty incidence in Ghana, 2000
Source: Author, based on GoG’s (2005a) district-level poverty data, Appendix Table I, PP.76-77
7.3.2 Private sector-led investments
The second consideration for beneficiary selection was the proven success of districts in previous private sector investments. This seems to be in line with the NPP government’s neoliberal ideology, and more specifically the regime’s emphasis on the “private sector as the main engine of wealth creation and poverty reduction” (GoG, 2005a:22). Indeed, most of my interviewees noted that: 1) of the three considerations for the beneficiary district selection, greater emphasis was placed on the availability of relevant private sector investments in the districts upon which MCA investments could build; and 2) a key factor that explained the exclusion of the Upper Regions was the limited level of private sector investments in these regions. Although it is impossible to fully track the regional patterns of private investments in Ghana (Shepherd et al., 2004:18), data on the regional
192 distribution of start-up investment projects point to significant North-South inequalities in private sector activity. During 2001-2007, the three Northern regions accounted for a mere 1.2% of such projects registered with the Ghana Investment Promotion Council, with the two Upper regions being particularly by-passed by private investments of all kinds (see Appendix 11). On this basis, it is easy for us to understand why the poorer Upper regions were simply not good candidates for MCA investments.
However, we should also ask whether the NPP government made substantial efforts to improve the investment climate of the North. This is because private sector investments are generally encouraged by state-led investments in basic socio-economic infrastructure. Yet, there is some evidence to suggest that the NPP government did rather too little to improve the investment climate of the North as a whole. One example relates to the exclusion of the Northern regions from the PSIs (see section 7.5.1), which in the words of President Kufuor, was the NPP government’s main “instruments for the promotion of private sector”, ones through which “government is creating enabling environments by providing appropriate infrastructures for private sector operators”.30 Second, one study on ‘Economic Growth in Northern Ghana’ notes of the spatially-blind nature of the regime’s ‘Private Sector Development Strategy’ (PSDS). The PSDS involved a large range of institutional reforms aimed at creating a conducive environment for private sector investments, but with no attention to the specific constraints faced by private sector investments in the North (ODI and CEPA, 2005) such as the issue of conflicts in these regions. It does not appear fair enough therefore to exclude these most impoverished regions from the MCA Compact on the grounds of their depth of private sector activity when the regime in question itself did little, if any, to create an enabling environment for private sector investments in the North.
7.3.3 Excluding the Upper regions from the MCA: a product of bad geography?
In line with some of the literature on spatial inequalities that highlight the role of geographic factors in explaining persistent regional inequalities (e.g. Kanbur and Venables, 2005a; Escobal and Torero, 2005), the notion of ‘bad geography’ features quite prominently in explanations of Ghana’s North-South disparities:
“One hindrance is geography. The three northern regions are far from the ports, railways, markets, industrial centres and fertile farming areas that help stimulate greater economic and human development in southern Ghana” (Harsch, 2008: 4).
30 See President Kufuor's 2004 'State of the Nation Address' delivered on, 22 January 2004.
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A similar view has recently been expressed by some senior World Bank staff who examined the role of infrastructure connectivity in Ghana’s development processes (Lall et al., 2009). They argue that whereas improving connectivity in the South would increase manufacturing productivity by 3.1% nationally, improving connectivity by the same degree in the North would reduce national productivity by 0.15%. They went on to dismiss industrialisation as a potentially viable solution to the development predicaments of the North, and suggest that:
“investments in basic services such as water supply and sanitation, and improving education and health outcomes are likely to be sharper instruments to improve living standards of people in the Northern region” (p.5).
Findings from my field research show that variants of this ‘bad geography’ argument were among the key explanations for the exclusion of the Upper regions from the MCA. One senior civil servant and a leading member of the MCA proposal team argued that the MCA was meant to reduce poverty specifically through economic growth within the 5-year Compact duration, and that this requirement in turn necessitated: a) the selection of areas with high agricultural growth capabilities; and b) building upon initiatives that were already on the ground. In his view, these two factors meant that the two Upper regions, though poorer, were not good candidates for MCA investment priorities because of their weaker capabilities in terms of increased agricultural productivity. 31 Thus, asked whether there weren’t any agricultural ventures within these regions where MCA investments could be channelled to yield the desired quick gains, he rhetorically questioned:
“What can you tell me? Tell me where you can put that money [in those regions].... You are from the North. Where will you put it?” (Interview, senior government official, and MCA proposal team member, 30.09.11).
Echoing the message of the WDR 2009, he argued further that this lack of growth potential in much of the North means that the recipe for stimulating broad-based development in Ghana is not to spread productive investments across-board, but to “invest in a place where you can have a quick gain and then plough back that gain into where you can have a slow growth” (ibid). For him, therefore, the poorer Northern regions did not deserve any substantial attention with regards to the allocation of MCA projects, in part because their relatively ‘bad geographies’ implied that previous public investments in these regions did not produce good results:
31 For a similar argument by one Southern-based Member of Parliament and Minister of State under the NPP government, see Ghana Parliamentary Debates, 21 June 2006, Cols. 1298-1299). 194
“There have been a lot of projects that have been implemented to alleviate poverty in the North. You are from the North.... You are swamped with a lot of NGOs who are there saying they are trying to reduce poverty. What has been their effect till today? People just cry out that the three Northern regions are poor and so everything should go there. Yes it is true [that these regions are poorer]. But what is the impact of all the government initiatives that has gone to the three Northern regions? You can’t find anything” (Interview, senior government official, and MCA proposal team member, 30.09.11).
In his view, poverty has therefore persisted in the North because: “they [Northerners] have made up their minds that they won’t change: they want to continue receiving subsidized things” (ibid). This explanation echoes some recent controversial comments by another Southern-based MP in July 2011. In what was to generate controversy in the Ghanaian Parliament, he allegedly argued that the current SADA initiative risks failing because of the ‘bad culture’ of Northerners: “[Northerners] lack a culture of property owning which makes them very lazy; they always have to be spoon fed… They are always involved in tribal and community wars so the place is not stable; they are always on the move. Vandalism has also become a culture there” (Joy online news, July 21, 2011). 32
Apparently, such residualist readings into the history of Northern underdevelopment tend to blame certain innate characteristics of the North for its socio-economic backwardness, such as the North’s ‘bad geography’ and Northerners’ passion for violent conflicts (see Chapter 1). The question that arises therefore is: are the two Upper Regions such a destitute for enhancing agricultural productivity growth as to warrant their exclusion from the MCA on this ground?
The agricultural growth potential of the Afram Plains has been widely acknowledged, and was indeed one argument behind its inclusion among the list of MCA beneficiaries (GoG, 2005b). Yet, to depict any of the three Northern regions as lacking the potential for increased agricultural productivity lacks credibility. The North has frequently been hailed as Ghana’s potential “food basket” (Ahorsu and Gebe, 2011:29) – an idea that has repeatedly found expression in the NPP’s election manifestos since the 1990s (NPP, 1996:23; NPP, 2012:65). Indeed, when in 2007 the Kufuor-led NPP government proposed to launch a ‘Northern Development Fund’ (see Chapter 4), its main objective was to “transform the economy and society of Northern Ghana, in a manner that will ensure
32 For some details on this comment, see Joy online news, July 21, 2011, ‘Inusah Fusieni withdraws petition against Fanteakwa MP’. Available at: http://politics.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201106/66810.php [Accessed 14.08.12]
195 effective utilization of the region’s competitive advantages in food production” (Republic of Ghana, 2008:250).
One study has identified several agricultural products in which “Northern Ghana has an absolute advantage in producing” (ODI and CEPA, 2005:15), and this includes rice, soya beans, cotton and shea (Ibid). A key missing link to harnessing the agricultural growth potential of the North is infrastructure, with irrigation in particular considered to be of paramount importance in this regard (GoG, 2003a:192; World Bank, 2007). Yet, of the 10,000ha of irrigation schemes that currently exist in the country, “less than one-quarter are located in Northern Ghana” (World Bank, 2011a:55). One study noted with respect to the Builsa District of the Upper East Region that “dry-season gardening ... can generate financial returns about ten times those that can be obtained from rain-fed traditional crop farming”, and recommended that “[t]he provision of irrigation facilities, dams and wells for dry-season gardening and farming will be one way to increase agricultural productivity and production” (GoG et al, 2004: 78-9). Thus, if the goal of government was to achieve broad-based economic growth through an inclusive agricultural transformation in Ghana (World Bank, 2007:132), one would have expected the inclusion of the Upper regions in the MCA, not least as the provision of irrigation infrastructure is one of the main investment priorities for which Ghana’s MCA funds have been channelled (GoG, 2005b).
It is therefore evident that the underdevelopment of the Northern regions has more to do with a failure to tap the North’s agricultural potential than the non-existence of such potential. How then do we understand the views regarding the North’s perceived lack of productivity potential and the resultant exclusion of the two poorer Upper regions from the MCA?
7.4 Understanding the distribution of MCA projects: a political explanation
Researchers at the Elites, Poverty and Production Programme argue that state elites’ policy choices are shaped both by their motivations and other factors such as the resources available to them and the coalitions from which they draw political support. 33 Following this, I suggest that, firstly, attempts to understand the exclusion of the Upper regions from the MCA must consider exploring both the incentives that made the exclusion of these regions desirable and the underlying forces that made their exclusion feasible . Secondly,
33 See the Report for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared by the research team on this project. Available at: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Subweb/Elites_production_and_poverty/EPP_report_for_MFA_final- _as_forwarded-5-11-09.pdf [Accessed 26.01.12]
196 understanding the motivational basis of the exclusion of these regions requires that we go beyond the specific case of the MCA to examine the NPP government’s overall approach to developing the North within the context of the regime’s broader national development policies. Based on these assumptions, three main factors are identified here as important for understanding the distribution of MCA beneficiary districts, particularly in relation to the Upper regions and the Afram Plains. These are the weaker influence of Northern political elites over policy agenda within the NPP governing coalition; electoral calculus and the NPP’s ideological bias towards private sector-led development; and a broader neglect of productive economic investments in the development discourse of the North. I explain these below.
7.4.1 Exclusive elite coalitions and the exclusion of the poorest from the MCA
In the previous two chapters, I have argued that the nature and extent to which elites from different regions are incorporated into political institutions are important to understanding the regional patterns of resource allocation, and therefore the regional patterns of development. This section advances this point further, arguing that the exclusion of Northern elites from the NPP’s ‘inner circle of political power’ (Chapter 4) and the resultant marginal influence of Northern elites within the NPP governing coalition is important to understanding the exclusion of the Upper regions from the MCA.
One of the proposal team members was wholly convinced that if the power brokers within the NPP government were interested in including these regions in the programme as they were with regards to the Afram Plains, both regions would most likely have made their way into the final Compact. In his view, these regions were therefore eventually excluded from the Compact because “the political will here was lacking; that was indeed the problem” (Interview, MCA team member, 29.09.11). Responding to my question of whether the MCC’s interest in high value horticultural products was partly to blame for the exclusion of the poorest Upper regions, he noted that:
“The problem was not MCC imposing its will on us. Yes, they definitely wanted a good business case. They wanted an economically justifiable program. But the real problem was Ghana, the political leadership here” (ibid).
That the political leadership ‘was indeed the problem’ is supported by the fact that much as the MCC’s interest was in horticultural crops, the Corporation also insisted on the need for proposed projects that would have a big impact on poverty reduction. This, together with the persistently high levels of chronic food insecurity problems in the Upper regions arguably meant that a case could easily have been made for their inclusion among the 197
Compact’s beneficiaries. This was particularly so after government’s insistence on the inclusion of the Afram Plains contributed to a push for adding an aspect of food crop production into the proposal. Yet, evidence from various drafts of the Ghanaian proposal as well as field interviews with members of the proposal clearly show that at no point in time was the inclusion of these regions given any serious consideration. This was even after an upward revision of the number of targeted districts from an initial three to twenty- three. Yet, the MCA proposal had no difficulty in highlighting the role of high levels of poverty in Northern Ghana in explaining the persistence of “serious inequalities” (GoG, 2005b:9) in the country as a whole. Such findings draw attention to one important way in which the North remains adversely incorporated in the country. While its poverty is frequently being used in securing donor resources, it is the constituents of the more powerful Southern-based elites who benefit most from such resources (also Chapter 6).
However, some of my interviewees discounted the influence of the NPP political leadership in shaping the regional patterns of inclusion in the programme on the grounds that the Compact proposal was prepared mainly by private/professional consultants rather than hard-core politicians. Yet, such arguments are unconvincing. One study notes that some of the professional consultants owed their positions within the proposal team by virtue of their “close connections to the then Minister of Finance” (Whitfield, 2011c: 31), and that they also “engaged directly with President Kufuor and the Cabinet” (ibid) in the process of developing the proposal. This suggests that although dominant political elites within the NPP ruling coalition might not have been directly involved in the proposal team, they arguably wielded a direct influence over it. In fact, official explanations regarding the substantial inclusion of the Afram Plains provide strong support for this argument. The proposal document states that local government officials from the Afram Plains appealed “to the government to include their district in the list of beneficiary districts for the Millennium Challenge Account”, and that it was “[i]n response to this appeal … [that] MCA Ghana decided to expand the scope of the proposal to include the whole Afram Basin area” (GoG, 2005b:12). If this is true, then it was clearly in the power of the NPP political leadership to ensure the inclusion of the poorer Upper regions in the MCA if it so wanted. This observation prompts me to ask as to what the reaction of Northern elites to the exclusion of the Upper regions had been and what were the responses from their more powerful Southern counterparts?
Indeed, there appeared to have been more vigorous appeals by Northern elites for the inclusion of the Upper regions than had been made by local government authorities from
198 the Afram Plains. The strategies adopted by the Northern political leadership ranged from a formal petition to government through the then Vice President (himself a Northerner), a press conference held by the Northern Caucus in Parliament to impress upon government to review the planned distribution of the Compact grant, as well as a combination of criticisms and appeals to government during Parliamentary debates. Within Parliament, these appeals, which came solely from opposition party MPs, were generally grounded on the notion that:
“[I]f you say you want to ameliorate poverty with an intervention of $547 million and you exclude the areas in Ghana most affected by poverty, for me it is a contradiction… The danger is that, if we do not spread it across, we will exacerbate the imbalances in the country… that is why we [are suggesting the need to] have some interventions that would take care of the … most deprived regions of Ghana” (MP from Northern Region , Parliamentary Debates Official Report, 13 July 2006, Cols. 2122-23).
This kind of request was repeated by other Northern politicians during various parliamentary debates, with one MP emphasising the inappropriateness of reducing the development discourse of the North to one of the distribution of wealth created elsewhere in the country: [I]t is important that, Mr. Speaker, we bring the other regions on board because as people of the same country, even if initially the thinking was that we would invest in some areas where we thought we could reap maximum benefit and then share to the other areas, …it is important to look at it that we should all produce together and share together. It should not be the case where some people would produce and distribute or share to others who are disadvantaged” ( MP from Upper West , Parliamentary Debates Official Report, 12 July 2006, Col. 2026).
Yet, responses to such requests by key members in government were generally unreceptive. One repeated response was that there were already several ongoing ‘poverty reduction’ programmes in the Upper regions, and hence the need to channel MCA funding to other “equally deprived” regions. In a statement presented in Parliament, the then Local Government minister argued that because there were already some ongoing ‘development’ projects in the Upper East and West, there was simply no basis for depicting the exclusion of these regions from the MCA as unfair: “there are various instances where interventions are targeted at certain districts or regions to the detriment of others sometimes and when others are obtained there is no reason why they cannot be extended elsewhere for them to also develop” (Parliamentary Debates, June 21, 2006, Col. 1298).
This argument, which found expression among other members of the NPP governing coalition, is problematic in at least three ways. First, although the Minister supported his 199 argument by providing evidence of “what government has been doing to assist the northern part of Ghana with development” (Ibid., Col. 1296),34 it is important to note that Greater Accra, Volta and Central – all MCA beneficiaries – were also benefiting from three out of the six projects cited by the Minister as basis for excluding the Upper regions. Second, many of the programmes listed by the Minister were generally small-scale. 35 Third, with the notable exception of the Rural Enterprise Development Project, which was in any case “implemented in 66 districts nationwide” (see http://www.afdb.org ) rather than solely in the North, none of the programmes cited by the minister had a strong objective of reducing poverty through increased production. Indeed, the overwhelming thrust of most of these projects was to enhance the provision of basic social services, including those aimed at strengthening local institutions to enhance the sustainable management of potable water and sanitation facilities. 36
A related response emphasised the need for Northern politicians and other critics to appreciate the fact of Ghana as ‘one nation’, and to support the government’s proposal to secure the MCA funding irrespective of which region/district was to benefit. Thus, the Works and Housing Minister was to caution Northern elites to refrain from their continuous criticisms of the proposed targeted districts for the programme “because whatever we do it is one nation, one Ghana and I do not think that anybody is just compartmentalising this to the extent that we are going to fall over ourselves” (Parliamentary Debates Official Report, June 21, 2006, Col 1310). It was along these lines that another highly placed member of the NPP ruling coalition subsequently argued that:
“Any part of this country that improves as a result of this Compact, it is Ghana that is benefiting.... We are not going to give the idea that Ghana is somehow some disintegrated, disaggregated entity where there are little pockets that go here and there. Each is all part of the whole that benefit from these” (Minister for Foreign Affairs – see Parliamentary Debates, Feb 2, 2007, Col. 144).
Yet, such explanations could rarely have been made in the genuine interest of national cohesion. This is because, as noted in Chapter 1, there is broad agreement that the
34 These were the District Wide Assistance Project (DWAP); the Northern Region Poverty Reduction Programme (NORPREP); the Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBRM) Project; District Capacity-building Project (DISCAP); Rural Enterprise Development Project (REDP); and the Danish Support to District Assemblies Project (DSDA II) 35 For example, the total funding commitments of some of these initiatives meant to be spread across the three Northern Regions were as little $7.5 million as in the case of the Rural Enterprise Development Project (REDP) and some $10.9 million for DISCAP meant to be spread across 34 districts in the three Northern regions for an eight-year period (2000-2007) (for details, see the DISCAP Project Completion Report at http://www.discap.org/Publications/Project%20Completion%20Report%20Final%20Oct%2031.pdf [Accessed 03.11.12] 36 This is in reference to the DISCAP. 200 promotion of national unity hinges not on the exclusion of the poorest from the distribution of public resources, but on taking steps to address severe horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2002). Such arguments would therefore seem to have been driven mainly by dominant elites’ search for reasons that would enable them divert public resources to their own constituents. It was arguably such underlying motives that also informed arguments such as “there is nothing... in the MCA negotiation that says that every region in Ghana must have a project” (Parliamentary Debates, June 21, 2006, Col. 1298), or that “There is no part in this country where poverty cannot be cited” (Ibid., Col 1312). Another Southern- based NPP politician claimed that “the MCA wasn’t meant to reduce the poverty rate of the poorest but to reduce poverty in Ghana” as a whole (Interview, MCA team member and former Minister of state, 11.08.11). He argued further that allocating productive resources to relatively well-off regions is a much more effective strategy of achieving rapid economic growth and poverty reduction. Thus, when probed as to whether the MCA would most likely have made the greatest impact on poverty reduction if the more impoverished Upper regions were significantly targeted, his response was an emphatic “No! Honestly, reducing poverty is easier not on the poorest of the poor; that is those who are deeply mired in poverty. Those at the margin can easily cross the poverty line. As for those at the very low end of the poverty line, you need to make a lot more efforts to be able to lift them out of poverty” (Ibid).
The irony is that although such arguments were often meant to justify the ‘fairness’ of extending the MCA to the selected districts in the South, the inherent unfairness embedded in the exclusion of the chronically poorer Upper regions would seem to have been reduced to David Mosse’s notion of “non-issue” (Mosse, 2007; 2010) whereby the interest of poorer and politically marginal regions are “often excluded from the political agenda, from the mandates or institutions of public policy” (Mosse, 2010:1165).
Therefore, the exclusion of the poorer Upper regions from the MCA needs to be understood as a product of the generally marginal influence of Northern elites within the NPP governing coalition. Although the then Vice President was a Northerner, his unpopularity and lack of power within the NPP ruling coalition were well known (Frempong, 2008). This is partly because his co-optation into the NPP government was primarily motivated by the need to court votes from the North (Chapter 4). Unsurprisingly, while the number of beneficiary districts in the Afram Plains was expanded purportedly because of ‘appeals’ to government by local government officials from that area, Northern politicians’ petition to government via the Vice President was unable to change the stance of government towards the inclusion of the two most impoverished regions in the MCA.
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What then was the motivation behind the inclusion of the Afram Plains, and why was the exclusion of the poorer Upper Regions generally considered a ‘non-issue’? Much of the answer seems to lie in electoral calculus and the electoral incentives facing the NPP ruling coalition
7.4.2 Electoral calculus, ideas and ideology?
Electoral calculus is one important explanation for the exclusion of the two Upper regions from the MCA. One of the most established voting patterns in Ghana’s Fourth Republic has been the continuous electoral endorsement of the NDC in the North, especially in the Upper West region (see Chapter 4). Outside of the NDC’s main ‘vote bank’ (i.e. Volta), the Upper West was the only region where the NPP failed to secure a single parliamentary seat in both the 1996 and 2000 elections. Although this improved slightly in 2004, the NPP could manage to secure just one out of the 10 seats in the region, with the NDC winning an overwhelming 80% of the total seats. One view has been that the Upper West’s consistent hostile reception to the NPP incurred the displeasure of the party’s political leadership, for which reason the region was deliberately being neglected by government in various ways. Writing on the NPP administration, Songsore (2011:262) argues that one of the socio-economic costs of the voting patterns in the Upper West was “the almost complete exclusion of the region from presidential favours and initiatives and investment capital except the normal district Assembly allocations”. This perhaps also explains the initial full exclusion of the region from the distribution of ministerial appointments despite constitutional requirements for broad-based ethno-regional inclusion in appointments to public offices (Chapter 4). One newspaper reported that because the NPP consistently suffered strong electoral defeats in the Upper West, “President Kufuor was at pains naming a cabinet minister from that region” and that “[i]t took intense lobbying to convince the president to change his mind” (Public Agenda, 18.01.05).
Allegations of an NPP bias against the North and the Upper West in particular for electoral reasons have also been made with regards to road sector investments. The Upper West is noted to have “received the least amount” of road sector expenditures during 2002-2005 (Parliamentary Debates, July 6, 2005, Col. 1665). These claims were made in a statement presented in Parliament by one former MP from the Upper West in which he suggested the need for the Kufuor-led NPP government to “do something more positive on the roads in the region to curtail the prevailing perception that the people of the Upper West Region are being deliberately neglected or punished for obvious reasons” (Ibid., Col.1667). What was referred to as “obvious” here was to be made explicit by another MP from the region, who 202 claimed to have heard leading NPP members publicly justified the general exclusion of this region on the grounds that “the Upper West Region does not vote for the party” (Ibid., Cols. 1683-1684). 37 Although these claims were both made by opposition (NDC) party MPs and therefore need to be interpreted with caution, they tend to be in line with evidence from official government sources. One report by the Ministry of Roads and Transport (MRT) indicates that of some 1,323km of paved feeder roads in 2006, the respective shares of the Northern, Upper East and Upper regions were 9.2km (0.69%), 22km (1.72%) and 22.7km (0.65%) (MRT, 2006:94). The GPRS Annual Progress Reports point to similar patterns of road sector investments (see NDPC, 2005:65-66), and thus making it hard to dismiss the above assertions as mere allegations.
That electoral incentives arguably played important roles in shaping the patterns of inclusion in the MCA is also supported by the allocations to Volta – the traditional ‘vote bank’ of the then opposition NDC. It is notable that no other region received more MCA districts than Volta (6), but with an exclusion of the only electoral constituency in the region that had an NPP Member of Parliament. This finding is in agreement with the ‘swing voter hypothesis’ whereby ruling elites sometimes target public resources to opposition strongholds as a way of inducing them with economic benefits in order to broaden the electoral support-base of the ruling coalition. In Mozambique, for example, to the extent that recent years have witnessed successful efforts in revamping the sugar industry, the ruling elites “did so to win votes in opposition strongholds” (Kjær and Therkildsen, 2011:4). But if the substantial inclusion of Volta was partly informed by an attempt to target opposition strongholds with MCA resources, how do we explain the complete exclusion of the two Upper regions, both of which have also consistently remained NDC strongholds? There are two main plausible explanations, one in relation to politics and the other to ideas and ideology. Politically, there are substantial variations in the population of the Volta and two Upper regions, with Volta having an equal number of electoral constituencies (26) with that of the two Upper regions combined. This means that compared to Volta, targeting substantial resources towards the Upper regions is unlikely to bring the same level of electoral benefits.
The second relates to the NPP government’s neoliberal ideology (see Chapter 4), as it relates in particular to the regime’s emphasis on a private sector-led development (GoG, 2005a: 22). In fact, the MCA proposal was itself “informed by the objective of poverty
37 He cited Otchere Darko, a senior member of the NPP, and presently the Executive Director of the pro-NPP Think tank, the Danquah Institute, as an example. 203 reduction and wealth creation within the government’s agenda of creating an enabling environment for increased private sector activity, to realize the objective of a ‘golden age of business’” (GoG, 2005b:4). Such an ideological-bias towards the private sector and the desire for quick economic returns on MCA investments in turn explains the selection of MCA beneficiary districts on the grounds of their proven success in previous private sector investments. Here, unlike the significant depth of private sector activity in the North in general and the Upper regions in particular, some private sector organisations were already engaged in the production of horticultural crops such as mango, pineapples and banana in the Volta Region. This also fit quite well both with the MCC’s interests in high value horticultural products, and the district selection criteria of building upon existing private sector investments. Such observations corroborate recent research findings that ideas and ideologies about how to bring about development sometimes play important roles in shaping the policy choices of ruling elites (Birner and Rensick, 2010; Therkildsen, 2011; Hickey, 2012).
7.5 Excluding the North from productive investments: beyond the MCA
In an informal conversation, one former Minister of state and a Southern-based Member of Parliament described historical attempts to bridging the North-South inequalities as being driven by “the politics of distribution rather than the politics of development”. This implied a particular kind of ‘development’ approach that focuses on the tokenistic distribution of social welfare services – what has been criticised as ‘sticking plaster’ solutions to socio- economic exclusion (Vinson, 2009) – while effectively neglecting measures aimed at spurring economic growth through increased production and wealth creation. The MCA case study discussed above supports this argument. This is evidence in the citation of projects aimed at ensuring improved sanitation as basis for the exclusion of the two most economically deprived Northern regions from the programme. This section argues that the exclusion of the Upper Regions from the MCA is reflective of a broader pattern of excluding the North from productive investments.
One indication of reducing the development discourse of the North to distributioinist strategies was the exclusion of the three Northern regions from the President’s Special Initiative (PSIs). Launched in 2001, the PSIs were the flagship project of the economic policies of the NPP government. A series of state-driven productive sector investments, these initiatives were designed to create new pillars of growth for the economy; generate mass employment for the rural poor; and expand the export revenue base of the state
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(World Bank, 2007). Implementation of the PSIs began by targeting four areas for support: cassava starch, garments and textiles, salt and palm oil – all concentrated in the South (Table 7.2). Substantial public investments had been undertaken in each of these initiatives. For example, under the Cassava PSIs, the government set up a new cassava starch processing plant, the Ayensu Starch Company in the Central Region at a cost of US$7 million (UNCTAD, 2011:84). In contrast, although a PSI on a Northern crop like cotton was announced in 2003, it would seem that this was more in response to public criticisms concerning the full exclusion of the North from these initiatives. Consequently, very “little” or “nothing” was done in terms of its actual implementation (ODI & CEPA, 2005:29), such that the poorer Northern regions did not benefit from the PSIs in “any significant way” (Songsore, 2011:264). Such observations draw attention to the ways in which a region’s lack of ‘agenda-setting powers’ can organise its interests out of politics and from the mandates or institutions of public policy (Mosse, 2007; 2010).
Table 7.1 : Regional distribution of PSI projects
Evidence at a more macro level supports the above arguments, whereby the policies of the NPP governments generally tended to favour the South at the expense of the North. For example, although the reduction of rural poverty through agricultural modernization was a key objective of both the GPRS I and II (GoG, 2003a:144), the main beneficiaries of the various government interventions aimed at achieving this objective were the cocoa producing regions in the South. The final APR of the GPRS I makes the point that implementation of this strategy placed undue “emphasis on improving farm and non-farm incomes through improvement in cocoa production” (NDPC, 2006:73). Consequently, the benefits of government interventions during this period were largely limited “to cocoa farmers alone” (Ibid). Innovative measures in support of the cocoa sector under the NPP governments included the free mass spraying of cocoa farms, the provision of subsidized fertilizers to cocoa producers, and the payment of farmer bonuses bi-annually, among several others. Unsurprisingly, cocoa production in Ghana followed a dramatic upward trend during the NPP government, reaching a historic 740,458 tons in the 2005/2006 cocoa season (Figure 7.2). 205
Figure 7.2: Cocoa produ ction in Ghana, 1977/78-2007/08
Source: Author based on data from COCOBOD, Accra
In contrast, the two main agricultural export products in the North (cotton and shea) were significantly neglected. During my field work, I conducted some interviews wit h senior officials at the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), which until recently had the direct mandate over the cocoa and shea sectors. 38 Although space limitations have made a detailed incorporation of this material into this thesis impossible, it is worth mak ing some brief comments about the shea industry here. Several observers have highlighted the poverty reduction potential of the shea industry in the North, and the failure to realise this potential due to systematic policy neglect of the industry (UNDP an d JICA, 2010; Reinecke, 2010). Akologo and van Klinken (2008:3) note of how this industry has for a very long time been “left to the poverty -stricken women to collect a meagre income during lean times. Market agents then buy it opportunistically from the women at the time that they are looking for small cash in the ‘hunger season’ and hoard it till prices have risen”.
Notably, although shea nuts have been Ghana’s leading non -traditional agricultural export product since 2005 (Figure 7.3), government inte rventions in this sector during the 2000s were generally small -scale, limited mainly to the occasional provision of wellington boots to shea nut pickers (field interviews with COCOBOD officials; also the various GPRS
38 I conducted these interviews be cause my original research plan involved a comparison of the main drivers of government policies in these two purely Northern (shea) and Southern (c ocoa) crops.
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APRs). Unsurprisingly, and as the incre ased poverty levels in the North during the 2000s attest (see Chapter 1), the significant contribution of the shea sector to foreign exchange earnings to the government did not seem to have been matched by the sector’s contribution to poverty reduction in the North.
Figure 7.3: Value of main non -traditional agricultural export crops, 2000 -09
Source: MoFA (2010b) It is important to add , however, that the patterns of agricultural investments that emphasise cocoa at the expense of the key Northern agricultural products has largely been a continuation of the policies initiated by the PNDC and NDC governments since the 1980s. Cocoa has historically been Ghana’s “holy cow” (Whitfield, 2011a:29) , receiving differential support from most postcolonial governments, including the PNDC and NDC governments of the 1980s and 1990s respect ively because of its substantial contribution in generating rents for ruling coalitions (see Chapter 3). However, the NPP government had the added incentive that Ghana’s cocoa producing belt stretches across its key electoral strongholds in the Ashanti a nd Eastern regions. Songsore (2011) argues that the unprecedented support for the cocoa sector during the NPP governments and the differential patterns of poverty reduction that favoured cocoa producing regions during this period must be understood within the context of the electoral incentives of dominant elites. He argues that these regions were perceived to have “played a major role in the NPP’s electoral success”, and were therefore “adequately rewarded” (p.262 ) for their electoral support.
That elect oral incentives of powerful elites play important roles in understanding patterns of productive economic investments is further supported by a comparison of the 207 developmental records of the two dominant parties towards the North. Notably, there have been substantial efforts by the second NDC government (2009-2012) to overturn the historical neglect of both the shea and cotton industries with an explicit objective of turning these products into viable export crops. Recent government interventions in this respect have included the completion of a $40 million shea nut processing factory in the Northern region in May 2012, the creation of a sheanut unit within MoFA which is expected to evolve into a full Sheanut Development Board (modelled along the COCOBOD), and the introduction of minimum guaranteed prices for shea nut pickers and cotton farmers over the past two years. These observations also help draw attention to the regional character of these two parties, whereby the NDC, which draws its electoral support from the North, is also generally more favourable to these regions both in terms of the distribution of political power and public resources.
What then have been the implications of the North’s exclusion from productive economic investments? Two important implications are highlighted here, namely the concentration of economic growth and poverty reduction in the cocoa producing areas of Southern Ghana, and the continuous North-South migration started by colonial policies (Chapter 3). The GLSS data shows that households in the cocoa producing localities, namely the ‘rural forest’ that have been experiencing faster progress in economic growth have also recorded faster poverty reduction than rural communities elsewhere in the country (McKay et al 2005:10). This pattern has been attributed “in large part to the cocoa sector, which is concentrated in the rural forest areas and also benefits the coastal areas” (World Bank, 2007:48). In contrast, with the benign neglect of the staple crop sector as well as the cotton and shea sub-sectors – all sectors of crucial importance to farm households in the Northern savannah – it is not surprising that “the contribution of the Rural Savannah to total poverty in Ghana has consistently been increasing” (GSS, 2007:8).
At the regional level, McKay et al (2005) also show that average annual growth rates during the 1990s varied from -5.3% in Upper East to +6.5% in the Western Region. Such growth trends generated considerable inter-regional divergence in the incomes of the poorest, as the poor economic growth rates in the North meant that poverty in these regions either reduced very marginally or even increased during the 1990s (Chapter 1). The Ghanaian case therefore “provides a typical illustration of the unevenness of pro-poor growth at sub-national level, and the extent to which these differences determine how poverty is distributed spatially” (Williams et al., 2005:3; also Aryeetey and McKay, 2007b). These findings clearly suggest the need to rethink the 2009 WDR’s argument that 208
“rising concentrations of economic production are compatible with geographic convergence in living standards” (World Bank, 2009a:2).
The second important implication has been a reinforcement of the historical North-South labour migration. But here again, whereas the WDR 2009 suggests that “[t]he way to get both the benefits of uneven growth and inclusive development is through economic integration” via processes such as migration (World Bank, 2009a:1), there is no evidence of the contemporary North-South labour migration playing any significant role in reducing poverty in the lagging North. A recent GoG report acknowledges how “decades of economic under-investment” have continued to drive large numbers of Northern male youth to engage in various forms of “illegal pay-dirt works” in the South (GoG et al, 2011:27). The report also highlights several challenges faced by Northern migrants, emphasising in particular the inability of most migrants to gain access to lucrative jobs in the South. It adds, however, that even those who manage to gain a foothold in the local economy “generally lack tenure security”, while those with settler status remain “weakly integrated in the recipient communities and endure repeated prejudices ranging from taunting to open hostility and persecution” (GoG et al., 2011:41). The World Bank (2011) similarly argues that: “Migrants from the North tend to migrate out of desperation and, given their lower education levels, migration often results in them doing high risk jobs or putting themselves in positions of vulnerability. The young girls who carry heavy loads on their heads in Accra’s markets, sleep on the streets and earn 2 Ghana Cedis a day, as well as the illegal miners, who risk their lives and their health are reminders of the risks that people from the North take in search of a better life” (World Bank, 2011a: viii).
Such observations give an indication of how the exclusion of the North from productive investments has continued to underpin the region’s adverse incorporation into the wider economy as a source of cheap labour that contributes to economic accumulation in the South at the expense of the North. Thus the North, which functioned largely as a labour reserve during the colonial period (Chapter 3), arguably continues to play this role in more subtle ways today.
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter set out to examine how far the development strategies of Ghanaian governments have tackled the problem of regional inequality through productive investments; and to explore the key political drivers of productive investments in Ghana’s
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Fourth Republic as well as their underlying implications for regional economic disparities. Three main concluding points are worth highlighting. First, I have argued that Ghanaian governments have put little emphasis on direct productive investments in the North, such that “currently the north depends on ‘trickle down’ from elsewhere in the country” (Shepherd et al., 2004:23). One consequence of this approach has been the reinforcement of the historical North-South labour migration. However, this phenomenon does not seem to play any significant role in reducing poverty in the North (World Bank, 2011a:59), not least as the limited educational attainment of Northern migrants along with various discriminatory practices means that Northern “[m]igrants are adversely incorporated in economic and social processes” (GoG et al., 2011:41) as sources of cheap labour in the South. Such findings suggest the need to rethink the recent emphasis of the 2009 WDR regarding the need to concentrate productive investments in leading regions, while invariably relying on moving the poor from lagging regions to more economically dynamic regions as a means to reducing regional economic disparities (World Bank, 2009a).
Second, the central message of the 2009 WDR that the objective of inclusive development can best be achieved within the context of unbalanced growth (World Bank, 2009a) can be problematic, especially within the context of the patronage-driven political environments of many developing countries. Such arguments tend to depict development outcomes as essentially a product of ‘good policies’ and not of politics and power relations. The MCA case study suggests that such assumptions are problematic. We have seen how the generally marginal influence of Northern elites within the NPP ruling coalition accounted for the exclusion of the two most impoverished Upper regions from the MCA. In contrast, the interest of the more influential Southern-based elites meant that districts in the Afram Plains with much lower poverty incidences could make their way into the list of MCA beneficiaries. These findings provide strong support for the argument of the WDR 2006 that:
“When actors in advantaged regions control ... decision-making and policy formation processes, and the terms of the policy debates on which lagging regions depend, regional “catch up” is much more difficult” (World Bank, 2005:204).
Finally, the findings suggest that the MCA proposal was broadly grounded within the context of the NPP’s ideological-bias towards a private sector-led development. Consequently, a key consideration for the selection of beneficiary districts was the notion of proven success in private sector investments. As infrastructure development in the Upper regions remain poor, private sector investments in these regions are also extremely
210 low, and thereby provided strong grounds for justifying the exclusion of these regions from the MCA. Such findings resonate with recent arguments that policy decisions by state elites are sometimes motivated by their desire “to influence the ideological direction of development” (Therkildsen, 2011:34). Nevertheless, whereas progressive ideas and ideologies can play positive roles in motivating state elites to adopt pro-poor reforms (Hickey, 2012:1239), the findings here suggest that other forms of ideologies and the ideas they engender can also contribute to reinforcing historical patterns of inequalities. The idea of building upon ongoing private sector initiatives was meant to ensure quick returns on MCA investments. However, it also carried the danger of favouring regions that had historically been favoured both by public and private sector investments at the expense of those that have previously been excluded from such investments.
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Chapter 8. State elites and the politics of regional inequality: conclusions
8.1 Introduction
This thesis set out to offer a political analysis of the problem of persistent regional inequalities in Ghana, with particular attention to the country’s North-South divide in which the North has historically lagged far behind (see Chapter 1). The central objective of the study was to deepen our understanding of the politics of (in)equitable regional development by focusing on the role of power relations in shaping institutional arrangements, both formal (e.g. democratic politics) and informal (notably patron-client relations), and how this in turn shapes the regional patterns of development. Thus, I asked whether, how and why the spatial distribution of political power among regional elites has played a role in underpinning Ghana’s historical North-South inequalities in recent years.
Two main interrelated arguments have been advanced in the previous chapters. First, I have argued that a key factor that explains Ghana’s stark unbalanced regional development has been the continuous exclusion of the historically poorer Northern regions from a fair share of public spending. Despite government rhetoric of ensuring equitable regional development, it is the most impoverished Northern regions that have frequently benefited least from both social and productive sector investments in recent decades. Second, the socio-economic marginalisation of these regions has been underpinned principally by the prevalence of clientelist politics, and especially the ways in which: 1) patronage-based politics shapes the composition of ruling coalitions and the resultant distribution of political power, and; 2) how these in turn influence the allocation of public resources and therefore the regional patterns of development.
In this context, the persistence of North-South inequality in Ghana has primarily been a product of the adverse incorporation of Northern elites in politics. This means that although hardly ever been fully excluded from government, Northern elites have historically been incorporated into the polity on terms that do not enable them to wield a significant level of influence over resource allocation decisions and the policy agenda of various governments more broadly. Therefore, and within the context of the clientelist nature of Ghanaian politics, Northern politicians have historically been powerless in terms of their ability to sway resource allocation outcomes in favour of their constituents and the North more generally. The development predicaments of the North has further been exacerbated by the formal proscription of ethno-regional political parties since the 1950s, which not only denies the North a distinct political entity with which to defend its interests, 212 but also tends to facilitate the adverse incorporation of Northern elites into the national political sphere. This political explanation differs significantly from extant literature on Ghana’s North-South inequality, much of which often tend to blame certain innate characteristics of the North for its relative socio-economic backwardness, such as its ‘bad geography’ and Northerners’ proclivity for violent conflicts (or ‘bad culture’).
In what follows, this concluding chapter highlights the above arguments in detail. It starts by focusing mainly on the questions of whether and how the spatial distribution of political power shapes the spatial patterns of resource allocation (section 8.2), before turning to the why component of this question (section 8.3). I used the word mainly here to emphasise the inter-related nature of these questions and the difficulty in attempting to answer them in an exclusive fashion. This is followed by the implications of my findings both for theory (section 8.4) and policy (section 8.5). The theoretical discussions focus on: 1) the nature of contemporary African politics as it relates to the underlying political drivers of resource allocation outcomes; and 2) reflections over the concepts of adverse incorporation and social exclusion (AISE) in understanding the problem of spatial inequality. The policy implications highlight the need for direct productive investments in lagging regions in overcoming spatial inequalities; and the need for mainstream development practitioners to: 1) shelve their ideological bias towards liberal democratic forms of governance in favour of deeper forms of politics that undermine pro-poor policy reforms in developing countries; as well as 2) refocus their attention from the current civil society paradigm in international development to political actors such as ruling political elites. Section 8.6 concludes the thesis and offers some suggestions for possible future research.
8.2 Understanding persistent regional inequalities: the primacy of politics and power relations
This section pulls together the empirical findings of this research to address the question of whether and how politics and power relations have been at the forefront in underpinning the problem of unbalanced regional development in Ghana. I have argued that power relations are central to understanding both the emergence and persistence of regional inequalities in Ghana. During the colonial period, it was the interests of the metropolitan powers that determined the regional patterns of development, with the Southern regions, which possessed the resources of interest to the colonial powers, attracting significant colonial investments. The colonial era therefore witnessed some level of development in the South, even if this outcome was more of an accidental by-product of the processes of resource extraction by the colonial powers. 213
In contrast, by virtue of their perceived lack of ‘colonial’ rather than natural resources (Plange, 1976), the North was subjected to simultaneous processes of exclusion and adverse incorporation in ways that entrapped its people into poverty. The colonial state undertook virtually no infrastructural investments in the North, and also excluded the region from educational opportunities and participation in national politics. All these forms of exclusion helped to preserve the adversely incorporated status of the region as a labour reserve, with processes of exclusion and adverse incorporation operating in mutually- reinforcing ways in underpinning poverty in the North (see details in section 8.4 below). Thus, previously an important source of slaves for the more powerful Ashanti kingdom in the South during the pre-colonial period, the North became a large-scale supplier of migrant labour to the other regions during the colonial era, contributing substantially to their increasing wealth at the expense of the North (Kimble, 1963:534).
The exclusion of the North from educational opportunities and participation in national politics fed into processes of state formation, in which ethnic Southerners were to dominate the newly independent state. However, as serious ethno-regional competition over state power and resources increasingly threatened the legitimacy of the new ruling elites at the time of independence, the post-colonial period witnessed a shift in which various regimes became adept in ensuring ethno-regional inclusion in various spheres – political, social and economic. As in other African countries (Chapter 2), this shift was driven largely by the ‘soft’ nature of the newly independent state, which necessitated the incorporation of elites from different ethno-regional groups so as to maintain the stability of the political system (Rothchild and Foley, 1988). Thus, as Chapters 3 and 4 showed, apart from the Acheampong regime of the 1970s, Northern politicians have consistently been included in the distribution of ministerial positions by all post-colonial governments during 1952- 2008. Observers have highlighted the significant role of these measures in helping to contain the ethno-regional political agitations that characterised the early post- independence period in Ghana and in minimising the political saliency of the North-South cleavage (e.g. Gyimah-Boadi, 2003). Langer (2009:544-45) has also more recently emphasised that one reason why there has not been a north-south conflict in postcolonial Ghana has been the inclusion of Northern elites into the polity by various governments:
“[T[he political inclusion of the northern elites was a crucial complementary strategy aimed at preventing the political mobilization of the north. A largely informal policy of ethno-regional balancing ... meant that the northern political elites had few incentives to mobilise their constituents along ethno-regional lines” [original emphasis].
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The Ghanaian experience therefore reflects North et al.’s (2009a & 2009b) arguments that the establishment of a stable political order requires the creation of a ‘dominant coalition’ among elites, and that as the distribution of certain privileges are limited to members of this coalition, incentives are created for elites to co-operate rather than fight. However, as the analyses in this study show, the underlying incentives for the establishment of ‘dominant coalitions’ through the ‘fusion of elites’ in postcolonial Africa – namely the desire of dominant elites to maintain order and consolidate their power by means of co- optation (Rothchild, 1985) – has not been as conducive to addressing the problem of uneven regional development as it might have been for the maintenance of social orders. The key reason is that in many African states, including Ghana (see Chapters 2-4), the perceived shift towards more inclusive elite coalitions did not imply that the various ethno- regional groups had a fairly equal capacity to influence resource allocation decisions in the interests of their constituents. Rather, what was more prevalent was the tendency of dominant state elites to co-opt enough ethno-regional spokespersons to maintain regime stability, but whilst skewing high level appointments in the interest of their own ethno- regional groups.
The implication of these differential patterns of incorporation for the persistence of the patterns of inequalities created by colonial policies need to be understood within the context of the patronage-based character of African states. Here, access to real political power tends to serve as important means to socio-economic advancement while the lack of it reinforces socio-economic exclusion. Thus, whereas the various ethno-regional representatives in the ‘dominant coalition’ were in principle expected to extract as much central government’s resources as possible for the benefit of their constituents, only “those fortunate enough to gain entry to the inner sanctums of government itself” could actually live up to such expectations (Rothchild, 1985:76). In contrast, the exclusion of a regional leader from the ‘inner circle of political power’ was to practically render him “ineffective in championing the claims of his or her constituents” (Rothchild and Folley, 1988: 252).
The above observations are critical to our understanding of the persistent North-South inequality in postcolonial Ghana, not least because of the patronage-based character of Ghanaian politics at least since decolonisation (see next section). The point here is that, apart from the consistent underrepresentation of the North in the distribution of political posts vis-à-vis their demographic size, Northern politicians have mostly been assigned relatively ‘light weight’ portfolios in government (e.g. deputies), constraining their influence in terms of command over state resources and policy agenda more broadly
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(Chapters 3 and 4). The result has been that the political inclusion of Northern elites in post-colonial Ghana has not translated into an opportunity for systematically redressing the socio-economic backwardness of their regions. This interpretation of Ghana’s persistent North-South inequality as a product of the adverse incorporation of Northern elites is a view shared by other academics and Northern elites. Ladourceur (1979: 268) attributed the relatively limited public spending in Northern Ghana during the early postcolonial years to the fact that “[w]henever the North was represented in the national government, it was always as a decidedly junior partner”. Songsore (2011: 262) similarly argues that the historical patterns of poverty reduction that favoured cocoa producing regions at the expense of the North during the Kufuor-led NPP governments of the 2000s “can be attributed to the political clout of the regional elites”. A more recent public speech by one Northern former Deputy Minister of State under the NPP government is illustrative of these claims:
“With all the political parties we have been committed and loyal to, what have they [Southern elites] delivered to us? Have we gotten the true meaning of democracy? Have we gotten the true meaning of elections? ... Majority of northerners are followers and not beneficiaries of the two main political parties… We are being used [because] . .... the most vocal people in the political parties are northerners yet when it comes to resource allocation we are marginalized. When it comes to the positions, the positions they give us does not empower us to bring development to our people directly” (Speech by Amin Anta, April 25, 2012).39
This account corroborates the growing acceptance of the relational approach to poverty analysis. As noted in Chapter 1, this perspective emphasises the need to understand persistent spatial inequalities not as a failure of the poor in lagging regions, but more importantly as the consequence “of the terms of their engagement with various institutions, mechanisms and processes that enmesh them in poverty” (CPRC, 2008b:2). Here, the deeper roots of Ghana’s North-South inequalities needs to be understood “as the consequence of historically developed economic and political relations” (Mosse, 2010:1157), with particular reference to the ways in which the North has historically been incorporated into the wider political economy at various periods of the country’s colonial and postcolonial history. Such findings strongly echo the Ugandan experience (Chapter 2), whose persistent North-South inequalities, it has been argued, has been a product of the North’s “‘adverse incorporation’ into the politics of state formation and capitalist
39 For excepts from the speech, see Joy FM online news of April 25, 2012, ‘Northerners have not benefitted from NPP, NDC - Amin-Anta’ Available at: http://politics.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201204/85488.php [Accessed April 25, 2012]
216 development in Uganda over a prolonged period of time” (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010:1223). More broadly, van de Walle (2009) has also recently made a case for the need to understand the problem of spatial inequality in sub-Saharan Africa “as a side product of a process of elite formation in the states of the region” (p.309). He highlights the ways in which dominant elites, who were often from the ethno-regional groups favoured by colonial policies, used political power to reinforce their initial socio-economic advantages after independence, concluding that:
“Insofar as political power has been used to gain economic advantages during the postcolonial era, inequality has little changed in the past 40 years...” (p.325).
Such accounts differ significantly from: 1) much of current mainstream thinking concerning the underlying drivers of spatial inequalities in developing countries in general, as for example, the economic geography approach of the WDR 2009 (see details below); as well as 2) explanations regarding Ghana’s North-South inequalities. As shown in Chapter 7, there has been a tendency for both academics and policy makers to put the blame squarely on certain innate characteristics of the North such as the region’s fewer production potentials associated with its ‘bad geography’ and Northerners’ proclivity for violent conflicts. Such residualist accounts tend to view the relative socio-economic backwardness of the North from the perspective of Northerners themselves and not their relations with broader social and political formations. Importantly, it is such residual interpretations of the North’s underdevelopment that frequently informs policy recommendations for overcoming the North-South inequality, including those offered by donor officials (e.g. Lall et al., 2009).
In line with Amin et al (2003), I argue that such recommendations fail to grasp the reality that the persistent North-South inequality in Ghana has mainly been the product of a long history of unequal power relations between the North and the South. As we have seen, it has mainly been the profound spatial concentration of political power in Southern Ghana that explains the marginalisation of the North in the distribution of both social (Chapters 5 and 6) and productive sector investments (Chapter 7). Indeed, with hardly any substantial influence of Northern elites over resource allocation decisions, even programmes and policies designed to target the ‘poor’ often end up discriminating against the poorer Northern regions. This has been demonstrated by my analysis of the Ghana School Feeding Programme and the Model Secondary School Programme in Chapter 5, as well as the HIPC Fund in Chapter 6.
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Moreover, as the HIPC and MCA (Chapter 7) case studies show, whereas the poverty levels of the North have often been invoked in securing donor resources, it is the constituents of the more powerful Southern-based political elites that benefit most from such resources. Notably, having used the poverty situation in the North to justify Ghana’s qualification for HIPC funding, one would have expected the distribution of HIPC resources to be guided by the predetermined equitable resource allocation formula for disbursing the funds. But as it turned out, the poorer Northern regions that were earmarked to benefit disproportionately from the HIPC savings were the most marginalised in the actual distribution of these resources. This arose mainly from the decision of the more powerful Southern-based political elites to put aside the GPRS formula and strategically distributed HIPC resources in ways that were deemed more politically sensible for maintaining power. Consequently, during 2003-2005, Southern Ghana as a whole attracted a lot more than its fair share of HIPC funding, but with the benefits heavily skewed towards the more politically and economically dominant regions such as Ashanti and Greater Accra (Chapter 6). Such findings draw attention to one important way in which the adverse incorporation of Northern elites into the polity has itself underpinned the adverse incorporation of the North as a geographical entity whereby its impoverished status is often used in securing donor resources from which Northerners are the least beneficiaries (also Chapter 7).
The case of the HIPC Fund therefore confirms the view of those who have described the theory of political change that underlies the PRSPs as a ‘mistaken’ understanding of the forms of politics that underpin development policy-making in most aid-dependent countries (Booth, 2005). Here, proponents of the PRSs expected greater civil society participation and ‘national ownership’ to lead to more equitable development outcomes, without taking into account the prevalence of clientelist politics and power relations that shape the actual functioning of state institutions (Parks and Cole, 2010). As Bwalya et al. (2004:5) cautioned, whereas “greater national ownership may challenge the power of external agents, it does not follow that it would also alter the domestic, neo-patrimonial power relationships inherent in national institutions”.
The foregoing findings reinforce the core argument of the emerging political settlements literature that it is not institutions per se that are the primary drivers of development outcomes, but rather the inter-elite power relationships within which such institutions are embedded and the ways in which elite incentives shape the character and performance of state institutions (Khan, 2010; Parks and Cole, 2010; Putzel and di John, 2012). Put
218 another way, contrary to the ‘institutions matter’ mantra that dominated development thinking during much of the 1990s (e.g. North, 1990), the findings here suggest that developmental outcomes are not necessarily predetermined by adequate institutional design but more importantly by the underlying configuration of political power that shapes the actual functioning of such institutions. This is especially so in the clientelist-driven political environments of developing country democracies (Khan, 2011) where the mostinfluential political players frequently use the power at their disposal to manipulate state institutions in ways that best serve their interests. Here the implementation of policy decisions depends largely on the extent to which the distribution of power is compatible with the expected distribution of benefits from such policies. This is because, as Khan (2010:4) notes, “if powerful groups are not getting an acceptable distribution of benefits from an institutional structure, they will strive to change it”. Apparently, it was this incongruence between the distribution of political power within the NPP ruling coalition and the expected distribution of benefits from the GPRS resource allocation formula that explains why the more powerful Southern-based elites unanimously rejected the application of this formula in the distribution of HIPC resources (Chapter 6).
That the Ghanaian experience provides evidence of a strong relationship between the distribution of political power at the elite level and socio-economic well-being at the mass level is further demonstrated by 1) the variations in the development prospects of the North under the administrations of the country’s two dominant parties in recent years; and 2) the contrasting experiences of the Volta and Ashanti Regions during the 1990s and 2000s. The NDC governments that have had more Northern ministers have also had better developmental records in the North (see Chapters 4 and 5), including the party’s more recent attempts to revamp the cotton and shea industries of Northern Ghana (Chapter 7). In contrast, a feature of the NPP was the extremely low proportion of Northerners in government, which corresponded with an extreme marginalisation of the North in terms of the distribution of development largesse. Consequently, whereas the NPP administration (2001-2008) achieved some major development success in a range of policy areas, “there was a regional character to this success which favoured those in the South at the expense of those in the North” (Coffey International Development, 2011:40).
Evidence beyond the broader North-South divide supports the above arguments, whereby access to real political power often play an important role in shaping the development prospects of various regions. During the 1990s, the Volta Region was the most dominant in the distribution of political power (Chapter 4), and this also coincided strongly with well
219 above average social service spending in the region, especially in health staffing and the provision of health facilities (Chapter 5 ). With the transfer of power from the NDC to the NPP in 2001, the balance of political power shifted dramatically from Volta to Ashanti, and the distribution of various public goods shifted accordingly. Consequently, the Volta Region which was one of the most favoured under the Rawlings-NDC regime of the 1990s became the most marginalised along the three Northern regions during the Kufuor-NPP administration of the 2000s (Chapters 5&6). Evidence from Chapter 5 showed, for example, that throughout the period 2004-2008, the Volta Region was the least favoured in public education spending (both at the basic and secondary levels). In 2008, average per child basic education expenditure in Volta was less than a quarter of what was expended in Ashanti, and only about a third of the national average (Chapter 5). That this pattern repeated itself in the distribution of HIPC resources during 2003-2005 (Chapter 6) lend support for Songsore’s (2011:330) argument within the Ghanaian context that “it is the structure of power relations and the interests...generated therein which determines the processes, pace and direction of development within the national space”.
In sum, the persistence of North-South inequality in Ghana needs to be understood as a product of the differential concentration of political power in the North and South of the country respectively. This means that whereas the incidence of poverty has been highest in the North, political power has mostly been concentrated in the South, and there has been a tendency of Southern elites to use their dominance over key state institutions in shaping such institutions in ways that advance their own interest. The important question then is: why has this form of politics appeared to have persisted throughout Ghana’s postcolonial history and across different political regimes, democratic and authoritarian alike? It is to this question that I now turn.
8.3 The politics of resource allocation: why access to political power matters
The findings of this thesis suggest that a key reason why access to real political power has historically played important roles in shaping the regional patterns of resource allocation can be attributed largely to the vulnerability of ruling elites in power since decolonisation, and the strategies that have been adopted by various governments in managing such vulnerabilities in order to maintain political power. The discussion in Chapter 2 showed that colonial rule bequeathed many African countries with a legacy of high social fragmentations, ones that proved “politically consequential for the post-colonial order” (Chabal, 1992:131). In line with this, Nkrumah’s Ghana was confronted with ethno-
220 regional tensions during the immediate pre-independence and early post-independence periods, especially after the emergence of strong ethno-regional parties in 1954. Nkrumah’s approach to containing these opposition elements were mainly three-fold: the co-optation of Northern elites into the government’s party; the distribution of public resources along patronage lines that in turn heightened the significance of access to influential positions in government in shaping access to state resources; and the proscription of ethno-regional political parties (Chapter 3).
In the previous section, I have already highlighted how the co-optation or differential incorporation of Northern elites into the various postcolonial regimes adversely impacted prospects for overcoming the North-South inequalities by undermining the ability of Northern politicians to sway resource allocation decisions in favour of the North. This section therefore focuses on the latter two points, with the objective of highlighting their continuities under various post-colonial regimes and their roles in underpinning the historical North-South inequalities.
Patronage politics
The evidence in Chapter 3 showed that one strategy adopted by the Nkrumah government in facilitating the stability of his regime was the distribution of development projects along patronage lines, whereby “those areas which still supported opposition personalities were at a distinct disadvantage in competing for schools, hospitals and roads” (Ladouceur, 1979:169 and 174). Most postcolonial regimes after Nkrumah remained highly vulnerable when in power, and accordingly also resorted to politically expedient public spending in maintaining the stability of their regimes. The return to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s did not change the clientelist character of Ghanaian politics, but only “marked a return to competitive clientelism, which had characterised most periods in Ghana’s political history” (Whitfield, 2012:2). As the two main parties have become more competitive, clientelist politics and ‘pork barrel’ allocations of state resources have increasingly become a key strategy for winning and maintaining political power by the two dominant parties, the NDC and NPP.
My findings suggest that political patronage shapes the composition of ruling coalitions, which in turn shapes the ways in which state resources are allocated. Chapter 4 revealed that the regional electoral performance of the two dominant parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic generally follows the regional patterns of representation in the ensuing governments, with the most prominent ministerial positions often monopolised by elites
221 from the regions in which ruling parties draw their core electoral support. Thus, and as noted above, while the Volta region was the most politically privileged during the NDC governments (1993-2000), the eight-year rule of the NPP clearly ushered in a period of strong Ashanti predominance in the regional distribution of political power.
Moreover, second-term pressures would seem to be further contributing to clientelistic practices in the distribution of political power under both regimes. As we saw, the predominance of political elites from the Volta and Ashanti regions during the NDC and NPP governments were particularly pronounced towards the end of their constitutional second-term limits. For example, in President Kufuor’s April 2006 ministerial reshuffle, the Ashanti region with an estimated 19.8% of the national population had 33.3% of cabinet ministers and almost half (46.7%) of the ‘inner core’ positions (see Chapter 4). The importance of such patterns of elite coalitions lies in my discussion in the previous section, whereby access to real political power plays important roles in the advancement of socio-economic interests, while the lack of it reinforces socio-economic exclusion. Unsurprisingly, the Volta Region with only about 9% of the national population could account for 60% of development-related health expenditures in 1996 – an election year (Chapter 5). Similarly, even as the Kufuor-NPP government introduced its Model School Programme to provide each district with one secondary school of ‘model’ status, we saw how the actual distribution of the first 30 selected schools disproportionately benefited districts in Ashanti (Chapter 5), including those in which the then Minister for Education was also an MP (i.e. the late Kwadwo Baah Wiredu). It would thus seem that the more the electorate of a region contributes to the electoral victory of a particular regime, the more its elites are likely to be rewarded with the distribution of political power. These elites in turn use their positions in government in strategically influencing resource allocation decisions in the best interest of the ruling coalition so as to maintain political power.
The clientelist distribution of public resources in Ghana’s Fourth Republic has been somewhat exacerbated by the formal political rules in the 1992 Constitution, which authorises the appointment of majority of cabinet Ministers from amongst MPs. Consequently, many ruling party MPs tend to serve in cabinet and other ministerial positions, and thereby directly commanding substantial influence over the distribution of state resources. Elected Parliamentarians seek to deliver various socio-economic public and private goods to their constituents in general and to specific groups within their constituencies due partly to demands placed on them by party foot soldiers (Chapter 4). All these have important implications on the ways in which regional political elites behave in
222 the game of resource distribution, and thus making strong elite representation in government an important factor in shaping the spatial patterns of resource allocation. One can argue therefore that competitive elections have been the key underlying driver of competitive clientelism in Ghana’s Fourth Republic.
These findings suggest the need to reconsider the ‘culturalist’ interpretations of clientelist politics both in the specific Ghanaian context (Booth et al., 2004), and in sub-Saharan Africa more broadly (Bratton, 1994; Kelsall, 2008). There are at least three main reasons why such culturalist interpretations, especially those that emphasise the extended family system in the region, are problematic. First, the Ghanaian experience indicates that rather than the clientelist distributions of personal benefits to kith and kin – as proponents of the so-called ‘extended family system’ often suggest – patronage politics now increasingly takes the form of ‘pork barrel’ allocations to electoral constituents. As the review of the literature in Chapter 1 clearly indicated, pork barrel politics is not a distinct ‘cultural’ problem in Africa, but a phenomenon that is characteristic of almost all ‘modern’ Western political systems, including those in advanced democracies like the United States and Japan.
Second, that patron-client politics is more of a political rather than a cultural problem in Africa is evident in the ways in which the transition to multi-party democracy has increasingly changed the conduct of patronage politics in the region. My findings (Chapters 6 and 7) corroborate recent research findings that since political elites now increasingly need to win competitive elections and gain legitimate access to power, there has been a tendency among ruling elites to distribute patronage not to their kith and kin or even their core electoral supporters, but sometimes to opposition strongholds (Kjær and Therkildsen, 2011). Third, such culturalist interpretations lead to pessimism about possibilities for pro-poor policy reforms in Africa in that they implicitly assume that there is hardly anything that can be done to reduce the prevalence of clientelist politics in the region.
Moreover, relative to the explanations that emphasise culture, my findings provide more support for Khan’s (2005) political economy explanation which argues that it is the size of the productive economy which effectively dictates the clienteslist character of politics in developing country democracies. Khan draws attention to how the economic characteristics of developing countries make it hard for dominant political entrepreneurs to satisfy their interests through fiscal policies such as taxation, and how this in turn encourages “the use of state power to create a large range of rents that directly benefit the
223 factions in power” (p.712). As repeatedly noted in this study, that Northern Ghana is poorer does not amount to denying the existence of “pockets of deep underdevelopment in all regions of the country” (Shepherd et al., 2004:16). This reality provides reasonable grounds for the more powerful Southern elites to justify directing public resources to their constituents in the name of ‘development’ and ‘poverty reduction’. Thus, whether it was in relation to the GSFP, the HIPC Fund or the distribution of projects under the MCA, the notion that “There is no part in this country where poverty cannot be cited” 40 had frequently been invoked to explain why the North does not deserve a disproportionate share of public resources at the expense of the South. I would argue that given the crucial role of electoral competition in framing the incentive structures of ruling elites, there is no guarantee that Ghanaian governments would necessarily distribute public resources more equitably if the size of the productive economy was bigger. Nevertheless, there is reason to argue that in developing country contexts where even better-off regions face a raft of pressing fiscal demands, we can at best expect the spatial patterns of resource allocation to be driven more by the differential bargaining powers of regional elites rather than any abstract ethical principle like equity.
The proscription of ethno-regional parties
One of the most obvious continuities in Ghana’s postcolonial political settlements, which itself stems partly from the personalised character of Ghanaian politics, has been the ban on ethno-regional political parties. As noted in Chapter 2, against the background of the emergence of ethno-regional political parties that sought to promote partisan interest, the first postcolonial regime under Nkrumah introduced the Avoidance of Discrimination Act (ADA) in December 1957 which prohibited the formation of political parties along ethno- regional, religious and other sectional lines. The reasoning behind the ADA has since remained a salient feature of Ghanaian politics. Thus, the 1969 (Second Republic), 1979 (Third Republic) and the current 1992 (Fourth Republic) Constitutions of Ghana all contain provisions aimed at curbing ethno-regional political parties (see Chapters 3 and 4). The implications of these strategies for Ghana’s development processes have been ambiguous.
On the one hand, the introduction of the ADA and its subsequent institutionalisation has contributed to containing the ethno-regional animosities that accompanied the attainment
40 As noted in Chapter 7, this is the way one Southern-based MP put it during Parliamentary debates in relation to the exclusion of the poorer Upper Regions from the MCA (Parliamentary Debates Official Report, June 21, 2006, Col. 1312). 224 of independence and in minimising ethno-regional political mobilizations in postcolonial Ghana more generally. Moreover, such measures have compelled the two dominant parties to vigorously seek votes outside of their regional and/or ethnic strongholds in recent years, and thus further helping to minimise the forms of ethnic-based politicking that have triggered violent conflicts in many African countries. All these measures have in turn contributed to Ghana’s current positive image as a stable democratic polity in sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, however, these same measures behind Ghana’s democratic ‘success story’ would also appear to have played important roles in underpinning her problem of unbalanced regional development. One reason is that such measures have since the 1950s denied the North of a distinct political organisation with which to defend Northern interest. This is important because the major boost in Northern education through Nkrumah’s Northern Scholarship Scheme was driven mainly by the pressures exerted by Northern leaders through institutions such as the Northern Territorial Council (NTC) and the Northern Peoples Party, both of which ceased to exist following the passage of the ADA.
Moreover, the proscription of ethno-regional parties has arguably facilitated the co- optation or adverse incorporation of Northern elites into the national political sphere. This is because as political elites have virtually ruled out regional-based parties, Northern elites who want to remain in active politics and share in the spoils of state resources have little choice than to align behind the Southern-dominated political movements. Thus, one result of the dissolution of the NTC and the Northern Peoples’ Party during the 1950s was the latter’s merger with the newly formed Southern-dominated United Party (Chapter 3), in the same way as Northern politicians continue to identify themselves with the two Southern- controlled NDC and NPP today. Thus, there remains a strong fragmentation of Northern elites along the NDC-NPP divide (Chapter 4), undermining the ability of Northern elites to articulate the concerns of the North in a collective manner.
In addition, given the increasingly competitive nature of elections between these two main parties, Northern politicians who find themselves in government with either of them often find it hard to criticise unfavourable government policies towards the North. Northern politicians in government therefore often tend to act as part of “a rapacious national elite” (McKay et al., 2005:18), concerned more with the electoral victories of their parties through which they advance their own personal economic and political interests. But while they appear to be benefiting from their ‘adverse’ incorporation in terms of access to state patronage, it is often difficult to see significant benefits trickling down to their poorer
225 constituents. All these reinforce the widely held view that Northern politicians’ allegiance has been more to their party grandees at the national level than to their constituents back home (Chapter 4). However, it is the argument of this thesis that the continuous fragmentation of Northern elites along the NDC-NPP divide and its adverse implications for overcoming the North-South inequalities needs to be understood within the broader political context of what is considered as acceptable political arrangements in Ghana’s post-independence history.
8.4 Conceptual and theoretical implications
This section highlights how the above findings relate to broader theoretical and conceptual debates on the phenomenon of spatial inequalities in developing countries. It begins with a reflection on the value of an AISE framework in improving our understanding of persistent regional inequalities. The central focus of the discussion is on the question of whether the concepts of social exclusion and adverse incorporation are more of alternative or complementary frameworks when investigating spatial inequalities. The section also discusses the nature of contemporary politics in Africa as it relates to the key underlying drivers of resource allocation and their implications for persistent regional inequalities. The discussion here is situated within 1) the context of the neo-patrimonial character of African states and what that means for the spatial distribution of public resources; and 2) current mainstream thinking concerning the main underpinnings of unbalanced regional development, with particular attention to the 2006 and 2009 WDRs.
8.4.1 Understanding persistent regional inequalities from an AISE perspective
In Chapter 1, I pointed to how some critics of the social exclusion discourse have increasingly questioned its usefulness in accounting for persistent poverty and inequality. Those analysts argue that since any part of a country has hardly ever been entirely ‘left out’ of the functioning of the state, a more appropriate concept for uncovering the underlying politics and power relations that underpin poverty and inequality is the notion of adverse incorporation (see Murray, 2001; Bracking, 2003). This line of thinking is also evident in Du Toit’s (2004:1003) argument that “[w]hat defines marginality is not exclusion... but the terms and conditions of incorporation”. This study’s findings support those who have cautioned against presenting these two concepts as competing or alternative frameworks (e.g. Hickey and Du Toit, 2007; Mosse, 2010).
As argued in Chapter 3, much of the North’s development predicaments stemmed from the decision to designate the region as a labour reserve, whose role in the resource extraction 226 strategies of the colonial powers was the provision of cheap labour for export-oriented production in the South and for the rank-and-file of the colonial army. The key strategies for sustaining this peripheral role for the region included the exclusion of the region from: 1) productive economic activities which had a direct impact on poverty for the North; and 2) educational opportunities, including the restriction of missionary education and the prevention of educational advancements in the North beyond certain levels.
Along with the introduction of taxes, the exclusion of the region from productive investments and the pressures of underdevelopment that accompanied it ensured the continuous flow of Northern labour southwards. However, the half-baked educational status of Northern migrants, itself partly a product of the region’s exclusion from educational opportunities, meant that Northern migrants in the South often found “themselves ‘un-trained’ for the types of jobs available for educated people” and therefore had “to take menial and manual jobs, or to accept employment in households as cooks, stewards, gardeners, and night-watchmen” (Plange, 1979b:675-76). Consequently, while the region was actively integrated into the colonial economy, the terms and conditions of its incorporation remained so adverse that a large number of its households were caught in ‘poverty traps’: they resorted to labour migration in order to cope with poverty but which only further reinforced their poverty (Gore 2003). Exclusion from production and education therefore reinforced each other in reproducing poverty for Northern migrants and their families.
Moreover, the educational exclusion of the region ensured the simultaneous exclusion of Northerners from the top hierarchy of the colonial army and their resultant adverse incorporation into this institution as rank-and-file; as well as the initial full exclusion of Northern elites from, and subsequently their adverse incorporation into, key political decision making structures and processes. Crucially, these forms of political exclusion and/or adverse incorporation in turn underpinned the region’s adverse incorporation into the colonial economy as a reservoir for cheap labour, not least as there was virtually no avenue through which such disempowering forms of inclusion could be challenged. This was even the more so as policy discussions pertaining to critical development issues in the North were officially prohibited until the late colonial period (Kimble, 1963). There was thus a vicious circle in which processes of exclusion and adverse incorporation operated in mutually-reinforcing ways in the production and reproduction of poverty in the North.
These relationships changed somehow after independence, such that the language of exclusion could no longer accurately capture the particular form of politics that
227 underpinned Northern underdevelopment. Unlike during much of the colonial period when the North was fully excluded from both the Legislative and Executive Councils, Northern elites have almost always been included in the distribution of political power in postcolonial Ghana, but often as junior partners to their Southern counterparts. These differential patterns of incorporation have meant that whereas Northern political elites have historically lacked agenda-setting powers, their Southern counterparts have continued to exploit their dominance over political institutions in shaping policy decisions in the interest of the South at the expense of the North. The persistent North-South inequality has therefore mainly been the product of the nature of elite coalitions in postcolonial Ghana. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 7, the continuous exclusion of the North from productive investments in postcolonial Ghana, itself partly a product of the adverse incorporation of Northern elites in politics, has in turn underpinned the historical phenomenon of North- South labour migration, whereby Northerners are “motivated by push factors that expel them out of desperation to poor quality jobs” in the South (World Bank, 2011:viii). Thus, similar to the colonial period, although the North generally remains an out-migration area, the rewards of migration have been limited in part because people who migrate have limited educational skills and are, therefore, limited to entering the informal job market where wages are low. This is not entirely surprising in view of the continuous exclusion of the Northern regions from educational expenditures, with per pupil actual spending in the Northern regions remaining significantly lower than the national average across different stages of the educational ladder (Chapters 5). Together, this means that while the political adverse incorporation of Northern elites has served to underpin the socio-economic exclusion of Northerners at the mass level, these forms of exclusion have in turn meant that a significant number of Northern migrants remain integrated into the national economy on adverse terms.
These observations draw attention to the multiple and complex ways in which different forms of socio-economic and political exclusion and/or adverse incorporation can reinforce each other to underpin spatial inequality. It is thus important to avoid casting these two concepts in an either-or fashion as if they are necessarily substitutes rather than potential complements. As Moore et al (2008:13) have also noted, it is possible for people and indeed whole geographical regions to “be both excluded and adversely incorporated”. A multidimensional approach is therefore more useful in uncovering how peoples’ simultaneous exclusion and adverse incorporation into different domains of the wider political economy underpin their poverty. This also means that it is premature to dismiss the language of exclusion as a relevant concept in understanding spatial inequality while 228 projecting the idea of adverse incorporation as a concept that sufficiently captures the dynamics of power relations that shape processes of development and underdevelopment. Indeed, I would argue that the differential incorporation of any region will not in itself undermine its development prospects unless that form of inclusion necessarily result in its exclusion from the distribution of certain developmental benefits. In sum, whether persistent spatial inequality is a function of exclusion, adverse inclusion or even possibly a combination of both will most likely depend on context-specific factors, the broader distribution of power in society and the ways in which power relations shapes the distribution of developmental largesse.
8.4.2 The African state and the politics of resource sharing
The second cluster of findings from this thesis deals with the literature on contemporary politics in Africa. Contrary to the prevailing conclusion that African governments allocate disproportionate shares of public resources to their electoral strongholds, it is the contention of this thesis that: 1) it is not only the voting behaviour of a region that shapes its access to public resources, but also the manner in which elites from various regions are incorporated into the polity; and 2) the extent to which such forms of incorporation either enhance or undermine their influence over policy agenda.
Most observers accept that neo-patrimonial rule is the principal mechanism that regulates political and economic life in African countries (see Chapter 2), such that “[c]ontemporary politics in Africa is best understood as the exercise of neopatrimonial power” (Chabal, 2005:21). The findings of this research provide as much support for the characterisation of African politics in these terms as they challenge them. One the one hand, the previous sections have already drawn our attention to the patronage-based character of Ghanaian politics, and the ways in which electoral competition has increasingly motivated ruling elites to pursue politically expedient public spending. On the other hand, however, the evidence here also justifies questioning some of the conventional wisdom regarding the ways in which clientelist politics shape the behaviour of African ruling elites in allocating public resources to different regions. Here, the important question is: who benefits from the persistence of neo-patrimonial practices at the mass level? Current research suggests three competing explanations, all of which only emphasise the voting behaviour of receiving regions. As noted in Chapter 2, the perceived entrenched logic of political patronage in Africa has frequently been invoked to argue that political elites, especially those in the young democracies of sub-Saharan Africa, consciously target a disproportionate share of public resources to their most loyal supporters. Thus, the 229
“prevailing empirical conclusion about resource sharing in Africa is that governments provide more funds to regions that support them politically” (Banful, 2009:1). An alternative approach argues that in highly competitive electoral environments like that of Ghana, rational vote-seeking politicians will often try to redistribute public resources towards opposition strongholds or to areas that do not show clear preference for any particular political party so as to induce them with development benefits and thereby ‘swing’ votes in favour of the ruling coalition (e.g. Dixit and Londregen 1996). There is yet a third, and more nuanced perspective, however, which holds that winning elections require that ruling parties will both be interested in increasing their vote shares among opposition or marginally supportive regions as well as in maintaining high levels of votes in their historical electoral strongholds (Weinstein, 2010). From this perspective, the most likely distribution strategy would be an equitable allocation of public resources across regions, with the spoils of the state thus distributed more widely rather than being targeted to a narrow set of citizens (Therkildsen, 2005).
The evidence in Chapter 5 provides support for the ‘core’ voter hypothesis, as demonstrated by the disproportionate shares of public education expenditures for Volta (1990s) and Ashanti (2000s) – the two traditional ‘vote banks’ of the two dominant parties in power during these spells (NDC and NPP respectively). However, the distribution of HIPC resources from 2006 onwards (Chapter 6) and, to a limited extent,the selection of MCA beneficiary districts (Chapter 7) pointed to a pattern of allocation that favoured opposition strongholds like Volta. This supports the theory that since ruling elites are motivated largely by the desire to stay in power, the allocation of public resources can also be targeted disproportionately to opposition strongholds in order to expand the support- base of ruling elites. However, we need to ask whether the favourable treatment of Volta (1990s) and Ashanti (2000s) was simply a product of the ‘reward the loyal supporter strategy’ as the patronage thesis holds, or whether this was driven more by the dominance of these regions within the NDC and NPP ruling coalitions (Chapter 4). The answer to this question is almost certainly ‘both’, because as noted above, the regional compositions of ruling coalitions under both regimes corresponded quite closely with the relative electoral performance of these parties in the different regions (see section 8.3).
Nevertheless, we can account for the relative explanatory power of the ‘patronage hypothesis’, namely that ruling elites disproportionately target public resources to their core supporters. One way of doing this is to consider the experiences of the poorer Northern regions, given their clear and consistent electoral support for the NDC.
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Therefore, based on the conventional wisdom that public resources in Africa’s neo- patrimonial regimes are concentrated in areas where ruling politicians have their most loyal supporters, we would have expected the poorer Northern regions to have been substantially favoured by the NDC regime from 1993-2000. I have already noted of the NDC’s better developmental records in the North, ones which have their roots from a combination of Northern elites’ better access to political power within the NDC’s governing coalitions and the party’s overall interest in maintaining its electoral strength in the North. However, this ‘good’ developmental record needs to be understood within the context of the extreme marginalisation of the North by the Kufuor-led NPP governments, but not when analysed in absolute terms or in comparison with Volta. Arguably, the fact that income poverty actually increased in the North during the 1990s (Chapter 1) suggests that there had been no any real attempt by the first NDC administration to transform the Northern Ghanaian economy (Laube, 2007; Songsore, 2003). Moreover, unlike Volta which attracted substantial per capita public education and health expenditures during the 1990s, the same could not be said of any of the three regions in the North (Chapter 5).
I argue that an important factor that helps explain the continuous marginalisation of the North vis-à-vis the South (irrespective of which political party is in power) has been the persistently marginal influence of Northern political elites under both the NDC and NPP regimes. This means that it is not simply the voting behaviour of a region that shapes its development prospects in the young democracies of sub-Saharan Africa, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the manner in which elites from various regions are incorporated into the polity and their resultant differential power over resource allocation decisions and policy agenda more broadly. The relationship between political support and the spatial patterns of resource allocation is therefore partly mediated by the spatial distribution of political power. Consequently, the electoral strongholds of a ruling regime can suffer from sustained exclusion from the distribution of public goods if elites who directly represent their interests within governing coalitions are not part of the ‘inner sanctums’ of decision-makers (Rothchild and Folley, 1988). This argument resonates with Nelson’s (1989:80) position that “there is no one-to-one correlation between economic gains and political support; much depends on how the gainers fit into existing political institutions and processes”.
This analysis suggests the need to rethink the general preoccupation of many Africanist who, as noted above, frequently invoke the concept of neo-patrimonialism to argue that political accountability in many African countries is strongly shaped by some “well-
231 established norms of reciprocity” (Chabal, 2005:21) whereby public resources are frequently targeted to political strongholds of ruling regimes in exchange for political support. While this research confirms the influence of political patronage and electoral calculus in framing the incentive structures of political elites in their resource allocation decisions, the evidence also shows that the influence of these factors can hardly be properly understood independently of the nature of elite coalitions. Thus, by merely focusing on political support at the mass level and ignoring, or at least downplaying, the nature or composition of governing coalitions at the elite level in shaping the spatial patterns of resource distribution, proponents of the neo-patrimonial paradigm are often missing the point. This argument resonates well with several recent studies that insist that the neo-patrimonial paradigm, on its own, does not provide an adequate analytical basis for understanding African politics (e.g. Therkildsen, 2005; 2010). As Sumich (2008:112) has argued in his paper on ‘A Critique of Neo-Patrimonial Interpretation of African Elites’, the neo-patrimonial thesis “misrepresents complex historical processes” in Africa. More recently, Crook (2010: 489) has also argued that “the currently dominant neo-patrimonial model of African governance is not a convincing explanation either for lack of political commitment to public service improvement or for general developmental failure”.
The above findings also suggest the need to rethink, at least in the African context, some of the mainstream assumptions regarding the underlying drivers of uneven regional development in developing countries. This relates in particular to the 2009 WDR’s explanation of the spatial patterns of development as being shaped by the intersection of density, distance and division (see Chapter 1). Such arguments see development outcomes as simply a matter of ‘getting the policy right’ rather than a function of politics and power relations. As the Report notes: “With good policies, the concentration of economic activity and the convergence of living standards can happen together” (World Bank, 2009a: 20). I return to this claim in the next section, but focus here on noting that such arguments tend to ignore a key argument of the WDR 2006. This Report argues that far from arising from a benign social planner, institutions and the policies that they formulate and implement are more of “political economy processes in which different groups seek to protect their own interests” (World Bank, 2005: 204). Thus, having asked: “Why do inequalities of opportunity persist, if they are both unfair and inimical to long-term prosperity?”, the Report’s “answer is that political systems do not always assign equal weights to everyone’s preferences” (Ibid.). Persistent regional inequalities, in this context, are seen as a product of “long-standing, unequal relations of power between advantaged and lagging regions…”
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(Ibid). That the overall findings from this study provide support for the argument of the WDR 2006 is especially evident in Chapter 7 which explored the politics of Ghana’s MCA Compact on agricultural modernization. The evidence pointed to how the marginal influence of Northern elites within the NPP governing coalition accounted for the exclusion of the two most impoverished Upper regions. In contrast, the interest of the more influential Southern-based NPP elites meant that districts with significantly lower levels of poverty were able to make their way into the list of MCA beneficiaries.
However, although much of my findings point to the crucial role of inter-elite power relations in shaping the regional patterns of resource distribution, they also suggest some role for ideas and ideology in understanding the politics of spatial inequality. In line with recent research findings that policy choices by state elites are sometimes motivated by ideological factors (Therkildsen, 2011), Chapter 7 showed that the Ghanaian MCA proposal was broadly informed by the NPP government’s ideological-bias towards a private sector-led development. This in turn led to an emphasis on the notion of the various districts’ proven success in private sector investments in the selection of beneficiary communities. This idea was meant to ensure good and quick economic returns on MCA investments, but it also contributed to justifying the exclusion of the poorer Upper regions that had previously been marginalised by both public and private sector investments. The implication of this finding is that whereas some progressive ideas and political discourses (e.g. those around nation building) can play positive roles in motivating state elites to implement pro-poor reforms (Hickey, 2012), other forms of ideologies and the ideas they engender can also contribute to reinforcing spatial inequalities.
8.5 Lessons and policy implications
This section highlights some lessons and policy implications of the findings of this research. First, the findings (Chapters 3 and 4) suggest that even within the context of the monopoly of real political power by dominant elites, the marginal incorporation of various regional elites in ruling coalitions can help attenuate feelings of exclusion among marginalised regions and thereby enhance prospects for social and political stability (Gyimah-Boadi, 2003; Langer, 2009). However, within the context of the patronage-driven political environments of many developing countries, the development prospects of a region are shaped not simply by virtue of the inclusion or exclusion of its elites from the distribution of political power, but more importantly on the extent to which such forms of inclusion either enhance or derail their influence over policy agenda. This means that the
233 forms of political representation that may be sufficient for enhancing political stability may not necessarily be sufficient for enhancing more equitable forms of development.
The second set of findings relates to the policy debates concerning the efficacy of spatially- targeted approaches in overcoming regional inequalities. As noted in Chapters 1 and 7, while some have emphasised the need for targeting productive investments to lagging regions (e.g. see WDR 2006, p.204), others suggest the need to concentrate such investments in regions with high growth potentials, while encouraging lagging regions to send their populations to the fast growing areas to take advantage of the development taking place there (e.g. WDR 2009). It is this latter perspective that some senior World Bank staff have recently described as the “more useful” approach to overcoming Ghana’s North-South inequalities (Lall et al., 2009:1). The findings of this research suggest, however, that such an approach has the danger of leaving the already lagging North farther behind by not developing its economic potentials. Four important reasons support this argument.
First, far from a trend towards convergence in living standards, the North-South income inequality has continued to diverge despite more than 100 years of active North-South migration. Second, recent research shows that “the costs of migrating ... represent important barriers to labour mobility in Ghana” (World Bank, 2011a:61). This means that the provision of connective infrastructure does not necessarily mean that the poor will be able to migrate to take advantage of the concentration of economic activity in leading regions. Third, the discussion in Chapter 7 showed that the reasons why migration has historically not been an effective strategy in overcoming Ghana’s North-South inequalities has a lot more to do with the adverse incorporation of Northern migrants, including the general lack of tenure security among migrants and the repeated prejudices they endure in the recipient communities (GoG et al., 2011:41). Relying on migration as an exit route out of spatial inequality can thus be problematic not only to those regions that are not “well connected to those prosperous parts” (World Bank, 2009a:2) of a country, but also to those that are fully connected through adverse forms of inclusion. Fourth, the evidence in Chapters 3 and 7 suggests that a potentially important reason for the widening North-South income inequalities relates to the continuous concentration of various forms of productive investments in Southern Ghana. Within agricultural policy, this relates in particular to the over emphasis of the Southern-based cocoa sector and the longstanding neglect of food crop production as well as the key export crops of importance to the Northern Ghanaian economy (i.e. cotton and shea). Indeed, to the extent that much of Ghana’s economic
234 growth since the 1990s has been stimulated largely by increased cocoa production – of which Northern Ghana has no contribution – the country’s impressive economic “growth did not benefit the three poor northern regions and the development gap has increased between the south and north” (Al-Hassan and Diao, 2007: vi).
All these suggest that spreading economic production as far as possible to reach those who are currently excluded should be seen as an important strategy to overcoming problems of regional economic disparities. This is to emphasise the need for more direct productive investments in lagging regions as the most effective means of overcoming spatial inequalities rather than relying on redistributionist strategies through processes such as migration. Although this suggestion is not new, both within the specific Ghanaian context (e.g. World Bank, 2007; Al-Hassan and Diao, 2007) and elsewhere (e.g. World Bank, 2005), it is nevertheless worth repeating because of the tendency of ruling elites to assess the distribution of productive resources in terms of measures of economic efficiency, as has been the case since the first postcolonial regime under Nkrumah (see Chapter 3).
The third set of findings concern the role of international development agencies in the development processes of poor countries. Although the findings here provide strong support for donors’ growing appreciation of the role of politics in shaping the success of pro-poor reforms (Chapter 1), they also challenge some of their understandings of the ways in which politics in developing countries works. First, the evidence from the HIPC case study reinforces the view of those who have emphasised “the need to rethink the current civil society paradigm in international development, and to re-focus more clearly on political actors, particularly political elites” (Hickey, 2006:47). As other close observers have argued, to the extent that the mobilization of civil society around pro-poor reforms can rarely achieve significant results in contexts where such efforts are faced with heavy resistance by powerful state elite (Parks and Cole, 2010), development strategies that focus solely on bottom-up pressures possibly amount to a “distraction from dealing with the main drivers of bad governance” (Booth, 2011a:2).
Second, the findings reinforce the call on donors to shelve their ideological bias towards liberal democratic modes of governance, and to think of other ways in which pro-poor policy changes can be engineered in developing countries. The analysis of Ghana’s post- independent history indicates clearly that an authoritarian/democratic dichotomy is not a useful way to understand the politics of public expenditure and its implications for the spatial patterns of development. This relates in particular to the ways in which patronage- based politics has permeated and undermined the implementation of equitable development
235 policies across virtually all post-independent regimes of different types, military and civilian, and democratic and authoritarian alike. There is thus need to move away from the democracy-dictatorship debates in Africa (Booth, 2011b), and to think more deeply of the forms of politics that undermine the pursuit of pro-poor and equitable development policies in developing countries. Within the context of the patronage driven political environments of most developing countries, this research has identified the effective representation of elites from lagging regions as one important way of stimulating the implementation of policies that can help address spatial inequalities. This suggestion resonates with Stewart's (2009:334) argument that the cases where states have taken successful measures in overcoming horizontal inequalities have mostly been those where the deprived groups dominated the political system.
Nevertheless, the specific Ghanaian case would seem to suggest that strategies that focus solely on enhancing the influence of Northern elites in national politics as to enable them channel more resources to the North is unlikely to make any significant impact for several reasons. This is to argue that although the lack of effective political representation of Northern politicians has been a major factor in explaining the historical exclusion of the North, there are grounds for believing that overcoming the North-South inequalities on a sustained basis does not necessarily lie in the hands of Northern elites. First, given that Northern elites have themselves rarely shown any serious commitment to vigorously pursuing the development of the North (also Shepherd et al., 2004), merely enhancing their access to more influential positions in government without a correspondent effort to address the ethno-political divisions that characterise the Northern political leadership may be counterproductive. Second, given the sparsely populated nature of the Northern regions, even a committed and Northern-dominated government that attempts to play the ethno-regional card by vigorously redistributing public resources at the expense of the South is unlikely to hold on to political power beyond the minimum four-year electoral cycle without being voted out of office by the more densely populated Southern regions. This is especially so because of the persistence of deep pockets of underdevelopment across the country and the fact that there is yet to emerge a genuine acceptance by ethnic Southerners regarding the need for disproportionately targeting public resources to the lagging North (Chapter 7).
On the basis of these, two broad suggestions are made below as a way forward to enhancing more inclusive forms of development in Ghana. First, strategies should as far as possible be directed at forging a fairly broad elite consensus on regional equity beyond the
236 current rhetoric. A particularly important challenge here relates to the question of how political elites from the South can be made to seriously consider the Northern problem as a national problem. The current competitive electoral environment plays an important role in framing the incentive structures of political elites within the two dominant parties, and the significant vote shares in the three Northern regions could be capitalised upon in forging this form of consensus.
Beyond elections however, greater attention needs to be drawn to the potential eruption of violent conflicts that can trigger national political instability should poverty continue to deepen in the North. In recent years, a pressure group calling itself the Northern Patriots in Research and Advocacy (NORPRA) and claiming to represent the three Northern regions has consistently called on the state to implement meaningful policies and strategies to address the inequalities in development between Northern and Southern Ghana. 41 In addition to its frequent engagement with the media on policy issues relating to the North, NORPRA organised mass demonstrations across the three Northern regions in 2007 against what they perceived to be the marginalization of the North by the NPP government. Given the extent to which regional agitations for equal distribution of national resources have resulted in conflicts in many West African countries, the work of groups like NORPRA is a reminder to policymakers of the possible consequences of continually excluding some regions in national development processes.
Second, it would seem, however, that eliciting the commitment of Southern elites towards distributional equity in the interest of the North will depend significantly on a change of attitude of Northern politicians themselves. This relates in particular to the ability of the Northern political leadership to overcome their fragmentation along the NDC-NPP divide and to demonstrate strongly that their commitment is first and foremost to the North rather than to party grandees at the national level. What this means is that rather than direct efforts at enhancing Northern elites’ access to political power, particular attention needs to be paid in forging a more united Northern political leadership. Indeed, given the growing electoral significance of the North to Southern politicians, even a limited, but united Northern political leadership would be sufficient to hold the balance of power in the interest of the North, which can in turn lead to the attraction of substantial development
41 Formed by some 65 undergraduate students from the North in 2005, NORPRA’s main purpose “is to advocate for equitable allocation of state resources” (See http://www.ibiswestafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=187%3Abringing-citizens- rights-to-northghana&catid=44%3Aarticles-and-cases-from-ghana&Itemid=138&lang=es ).
237 resources to these regions. This analysis also shows that there will be no easy answer to solving the North-South development disparities in Ghana.
8.6 Concluding remarks and suggestions for future research
This thesis has argued that the possibilities of overcoming regional inequalities depend substantially on the way political power is distributed among regional elites. Policies that skew benefits towards the poorest are more likely to be implemented when elites who directly represent the interest of those segments of the population have substantial influence over resource allocation decisions. In developing country contexts where clientelist politics remain widespread, the challenge of overcoming regional inequality can be especially daunting if policy making and implementation processes and structures are dominated by elites from advantaged regions. Strategies that aim to bridge interregional development gaps should therefore also consider ways to shift interregional power relations in favour of poorer regions. This suggestion is not exactly the same as UNRSID’s (2010:14) recent argument that because “correcting horizontal inequalities is inherently political”, there is very little chance of implementing effective remedial policies for disadvantaged regions without the political inclusion of such regions at the level of elites. The overall findings of this study support such views, but go further to emphasise that while political inclusion matters for socio-economic development, it is the terms and conditions of inclusion that are especially critical in shaping the distribution of costs and benefits.
However, this argument is based on an exploration of the politics of Ghana’s North-South inequalities, and there is need for further research in order to see whether and to what extent such arguments hold true for other contexts. Given that many other African countries are also characterised by serious North-South inequalities 42 , one important avenue for future research would be to extend the number of case studies in order to see whether variations in the regional distribution of political power can also account for the regional patterns of resource allocation beyond the Ghanaian experience. My review of the literature in Chapter 2 suggests that the findings here may indeed be applicable to many other sub-Saharan African countries, especially those of Uganda and Côte d’Ivoire. Future research could initially focus on exploring the detailed experiences of these countries, but could also subsequently take a comparative form, as for example, a comparison of the Ghanaian experience to that of Uganda or Côte d’Ivoire.
42 These include Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Benin, Nigeria and Uganda. 238
Moreover, the available literature would seem to depict a country like Zambia as somewhat exceptional to the form of politics highlighted here whereby dominant elites tend to distribute political power and public resources in the interest of their own ethno-regional groups at the expense of others (Dresang, 1974; Rothchild, 1985; Lindemann, 2010a; 2011a). This also provides a useful avenue for future research in at least two ways. First, research could usefully try to explain variations in the inclusiveness of governmental coalitions. Why, for example, did Zambia’s post-colonial leaders forge and maintain inclusive governmental coalitions with regards to the ‘inner core’ positions of political power while their Ghanaian counterparts did not? A second avenue for research could be to compare the experiences of any of the above African countries to the partially ‘deviant’ case of Zambia. As Lindemann (2011a:1846) has recently argued, the ‘deviant case method’ is useful in understanding theoretical and empirical anomalies, and can therefore help shed some light on the often complex relationship between elite power-sharing and developmental outcomes.
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Ghana Parliamentary Debates, National Assembly, Official Report, First Series, Vol. 6, April 23- July 12, 1957 Ghana Parliamentary Debates, National Assembly, Official Report, First Series, Vol. 9, 18 Feb- 19 March, 1958 Ghana Parliamentary Debates Official Report, Fourth Series, Vol. 38, No. 25, March 5, 2003 Ghana Parliamentary Debates Official Report, Fourth Series, Vol. 50, No.2, July 6, 2005 Ghana Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Fourth Series, Vol. 53, No. 21, June 21, 2006 Ghana Parliamentary Debates Official Report, Fourth Series, Vol. 53, No. 33, July 12, 2006 Ghana Parliamentary Debates Official Report, Fourth Series, Vol. 53, No. 34, July 13, 2006 Ghana Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Fourth Series, Vol. 55, No. 2, Feb. 2, 2007 Ghana Parliamentary Debates Official Report, Fourth Series, Vol. 59, No. 10, June 4, 2008
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Appendices
Appendix 1: List of interviewees
Name Designation and Institution 1. Kweku Boateng Budget Officer, Ministry of Health 2. Osei Ofori Director for Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Ministry of Health 3. Benjamin Daniel Planning and Budget Specialist, Ghana Health Service. 4. Dr. Jones Quartey Director of Human Resources, Ministry of Health 5. Dr. James Nkansah Deputy Director, Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Ghana Health Service 6. Danniel Appiah Head of Capital Investments Unit, Ministry of Health 7. Jonatan Ofori Deputy Finance Director, Ghana Health Service 8. Sharif Ussif Former Advisor, SNV-Ghana (in charge of GSFP) 9. Kweku Sarah Advisor, SNV-Ghana (in charge of GSFP) 10. Ursula Osei Owusu Assistant Director and GSFP Focal person, Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Environment 11. Kewku Banful Former Member of Parliament; GSFP National Co- ordinator. 12. Bukari Sulemana Programme Officer, GSFP 13. James M. K. Public Relations Officer, GSFP Ampaiw 14. Samuel Z. Akolgu Country Director, Social Enterprise Development Foundation 15. Benjamin Addo Senior Advisor, GTZ 16. Abukari Gomda Member of Parliament, Chairman of a Parliamentary Committee, 17. Godfrey Osei Member of Parliament, former deputy Minister; and MCA Aggrey team member 18. Cheif Executive Officer, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Ebenezer Quartey MCA team member 19. Yaw Sarpong Private Consultant, MCA team member. 20. MCA team member, Ministry of Finance and Economic Joseph Osei Manu Planning 21. Francis kweku- Member of Parliament, Former Deputy Finance Minster Yeboah 22. Joseph Yeboah Member of Parliament, and former Attorney-General and Minister of Justice
23. Alhassan Sumani Former Minister of state, Member of the Council of State 24. Zakaria Mahama Former Minister (1990s); Minister of state (Jan 2009—to date; former vice presidential candidate 25. Jonathan Graham Head, Department of the Human Resources Directorate, Ghana Health Service 26. Francis Osei Owusu Director of Shea Unit, Ghana Cocoa Board, Health Service 27. George Kwadwo Deputy Managing Director, Ghana Cocoa Board Boateng 28. Wahab Suleiman Research Officer, Shea Unit, Ghana Cocoa Board 265
29. Nana Akomeya Principal Research Officer, Ghana Cocoa Board 30. Dr. Eugene Ofori- Regional Manager, Cocoa Swollen Shoot and Virus Gyamfi Diseased Control Unit, Ghana Cocoa Board
31. Paul Ntim Principal Research Officer, Ghana Cocoa Board 32. Paulinus Terbobri Deputy Research Manager, Ghana cocoa Board COCOBOD, Research Officer 33. Hon. Rufai Azong MP, Deputy Majority Leader in Parliament; former Minister of state 34. Haruna Maamah Head, of Ecam Consultancy, Private consultant and leader of the Ghana Cocoa, Coffee, and Shea-Nut Farmers Association 35. Prof. Ramatu Northern elite, Associate Professor Department of Issahaku Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, University of Ghana 36. Prof. Wayo Seini Politician and Academic, Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, University of Ghana 37. Prof. Bruce Sarpong Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, University of Ghana 38. Prof. Jacob Songsore Professor, Department of Geography, University of Ghana. Publishes on poverty in Northern Ghana. 39. Kwesi Jonah Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana Note: Actual names of most interviewees and dates and interviews conciously withheld to help protect the anonymity of respondents
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Appendix 2: List of key political office holders in Ghana, 1993-2008
Appendix 2.1: List of political office holders by region, 1993-2000
Presidents, Vice Presidents and Ministers Region Name Portfolio Total E. M. Osei-Owusu** Interior Chapter 9. Chritina Ashanti Amoako-Nuama** Environment (1993-1997) 3
*George K. Akosa Science & Technology *J. H. Owusu- Acheampong** Parliamentary Affairs Brong Ahafo 2 *David K. Amankwah** Lands & Forestry Kow Nkensen Arkaah** Vice President Dr. Kwesi Botchway** Finance & Econ. Planning Anthony Kofi Forson** Justice & A-G Chapter 10. Mary Grant and later ** & later Education (1993-1995) entral Dr. Esi Sutherland Addy (both Central) 8 Kwamena Ahwoi** Local Gov’t & R. Dev’t *Emma Mitchell** Trade & Industry *Dr. Ato Quarshie Roads & Highways E.Kobina Fosu (without portfolio) Vida Yeboah (without portfolio) Eastern 2 Kwame Peprah** Mines & Energy (1993-1995) Greater Harry Sawyer** Education 2 Accra E. T. Mensah Youth & Sports Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu** Defence Ibrahim Adam** Food & Agriculture Northern 4 *Alhaji B.A Fuseini (without portfolio) *Alhaji amidu Sulemana (without portfolio) Upper East *Dr. Stephen A. Adidiya Tourism 1 Edward Salia** Transport & Comm. Upper West Edward Salia** (Mines & Energy (Ag) 3 *Godred Abulu (without portfolio) Jerry John Rawlings** President Dr. Obed Y Asamoah** Foreign Affairs Obed Y. Asamoah** Justice & A-G Volta *Stephen G. Obimpeh** Health 7 Dr. Kwabena Adjei** Lands & Forestry Cled Mawuku K. Sowu, Sqdr Works and Housing Ldr (Rdt) Kofi Totobi Quakyi** Information Dr. Eunice Brookman-Amisah** Health ( 1996-99) Western 2 *David Sarpong Boateng** Employment & Social Welfare *Members of Parliament; ** Cabinet-rank ministers
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Appendix 2.2: List of political office holders by region, 1993-2000
Deputies Regional Region Name of Minister Portfolio Total Lt. Col E.K.T Donkor Defence *Peter Keneth Owusu Transport & Communications Ashanti *Kofi A Peasah Sci. & Technology 5 Nana Akwasi Agyeman Environment, Science & Tech. *P. M. G. Griffiths Transport &Communications Kwabena Kyere Education 2 Brong Ahafo Local Government & R. Cecilia Johnson Development *Kwaku Addae Gyambra Mines & Energy *Ama Benyiwa-Doe Employment & Social Welfare Central 4 E. A. Ayireb-Acquah Youth & Sports *Kojo Yankah Information *Samuel Nuamah Donkor Health *Major Emmanuel Tetteh Food & Agriculture Eastern *Jonathan R. Owiredu Trade & Industry 5 *Owraku Amofa Tourism Alex B. Akuffo Works and Housing Greater Margaret Clarke-Kwesie Health 1 Accra *Amadu Seidu Roads & Highways Northern 2 *Mohammed Ibn Chambers Foreign Affairs Martin Amidu Justice & Attorney-General Upper East 2 Simon Abingya Mines & Energy Local Government & R. Upper West *Francis G. Kobrieh 1 Development Victor Selormey Finance Victor Atsu Ahedor Food & Agriculture Volta *Kwabena Adjei Lands & Forestry 5 Prof. N. K. Kofi Nti Education *Dan Abodakpi Trade & Industry K. B. Amissayh-Arthur Finance *Kwaku A. Bonful Interior Western Dr. Farouk Briamah Environment 5 Sam Pee Yalley Environment, Science & Tech. Peter Vaughan Williams Employment & Social Welfare *Members of Parliament
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Appendix 2.2c: List of political office holders by region, 1997-2000
Presidents, Vice Presidents and Ministers
Regional Regions Name Portfolio Total Samuel Nuamah Donkor** Health (1998-99) Chieftaincy Affairs & State D. O. Agyekum protocol Ashanti 3 10.1.1 Christine Amoaku- Lands & Forestry (1998-2000) Nuamah**
*I. K.Adjei-Mensah Works and Housing Brong Ahafo 2 *J. H Owusu Acheampong** Food & Agriculture John E. Attah-Mills** Vice President Ekow Spio-Garbrah, Christine Amoaku-Nuamah (1997- Education 1998)** Central 5 Kwamen Ahwoi** Planning & Econ. Cooperation *J. E. Afful (without portfolio) Cecelia Johnson** Local Gov’t & Rural Dev’t Lt. Col E.K.T Donkor** Defence Kwame Peprah** Finance (1995-2001) (Minister of state without Eastern *AKuamoah Ofosu-Boateng 4 portfolio) Kwaku Danso Boafo** Health ( 2000- Jan.2001) *Nii Okaija Adamafio** Interior Greater *E. T. Mensah Youth & Sports 4 Accra *Margaret Clarke Kwesie (without portfolio) *Mike Gizo Tourism *M. A. Seidu (without portfolio) *John D. Mahama** Communications Northern 4 *Mohammed Mumuni** Employment & Social Welfare *Alhaji Abdulai Salifu (without portfolio) Upper East *Cletus Avoka** Env’t, Sci. & Tech. 1 Upper West Edward Salia** Roads & Transport 1 Jerry John Rawlings** (*2) President *Kwabena Adjei ** Parl. Affairs James Victor Gbeho** Foreign Affairs Volta 7 Obed Asamoah** Justice & Attorney-General Kofi Totobi-Quakyi** National Security *Dan Abodakpi** Trade & Industry Eunice Brookman-Amisah** Health ( 1996-98) Western 2 *Dr. Frank Abu** Mines & Energy Members of Parliament; ** Cabinet-rank ministers
269
Appendix 2.2d: List of political office holders by region, 1997-2000
Deputies Regional Region Name Portfolio Total Cdr. P.M.G. Griffiths (ethnic Trade & Industry Fanti) Ashanti Dr. Tony Aidoo Defence 3 Nana Paddi Acheampong Tourism *J. Aseidu Nketia Food & Agriculture Brong Ahafo 2 Kwabena Kyere Education *Mike Hammah Roads & Transport Central 2 *Ama Benyiwa-Doe Employment & Social Welfare Owraku Amofa Communications Peter Kwasi Wiafe Pepera Trade & Industry Eastern Charles Martey-Akrasu 5 Health Kpabitey Mike Akyeampong Food & Agriculture Alex Akuffo Works & Housing *Rebecca Adotey Communications J. A. Laryea Foreign Affairs Greater Accra 4 Javis Pepra Trade & Industry Prof. P. A.K. Addy Youth & Sports M. Ibn Chambers Education Northern Moses Nayong Bilijo Lands & Forestry 3 *Alhaji Amadu Seidu Works and Housing Moses A Asaga Finance Matin Amidu Justice & Attorney-General Upper East *Clement Bugase Food & Agriculture 5 *Simon Abingya Mines & Energy Sylvester Azantilow Youth & Sports Upper West *Francis Kobrieh Local Gov’t & Rural Dev’t 1 Victor Selormey Finance & Econ Planning *Steve S. Akorli Roads & Transport Volta 4 *Austin Gamey Employment & Social Welfare Dr. Moses Adibo Health *K. A. Bonful Interior *Richard D. Nartey Lands & Forestry Environment, Sci. & Western *Dr. Farouk Briamah 4 Technology Environment, Sci. & Lee Tandoh ocran Technology *Members of Parliament; ** cabinet ministers
270
Appendix 2.2e: List of political office holders by region, Jan. 2001-April 2003
Presidents, Vice Presidents and Ministers Region Name Portfolio Number J. A. Kufuor** (*2) President *Dr. K. Addo-Kufuor** Defence Dr. K. K. Aprakuu** Trade & Industry Ashanti *Dr. Richard Anane** Road Transport 8 Local Government & Rural *Kwado Baah-Wiredu** Development A. Kan Dapaa** Energy *Edward Osei-Kwaku Youth & Sports Snr. Minister, Chairman of *Joseph H. Mensah** Economic Mgt. Team Brong Ahafo 3 Prof. Ameyaw Akumfi** Education *K. Adjei-Darko ** Mines *Prof Dominic Fobih** Environment & Science *Yaw Barimah Works and Housing *Kwamena Bartels Private Sector Dev’t & PSIs Central *Christine Churcher Prim, Sec. & girl child educ. 6 Econ Planning & Reg. Paa Kwesi Nduom Cooperation *Charles O. Nyanor Office of the President Nana Akufo-Addo** Attorney-General &Justice *Hackgman O. Agyeman** Foreign Affairs Eastern 4 *Mr. Yaw Osafo Marfo** Finance & Econ. Planning *Felix K. O. Adjapong** Communications & Tech. Jake Obetsebi Lamptey** Info. and Presidential Affairs G/Accra Cecelia Bannerman** Manpower Dev’t & Emp't 3 *Ishmael Ashitey Min of state for Fisheries Aliu Mahama** Vice President Northern Malik Al-Hassan Yakubu** Interior 3 Ben Salifu NDPC U/West Kassim Kasanga Lands & Forestry (Oct 2001- 1 U/East *Hawa Yakubu Minister for Tourism 1 *Mjr Courage Quashigah** Food & Agriculture Volta 2 Ms. Elizabeth A. Ohene Office of the President Kwaku Afriyie** Health Western *Gladys Asmah** Women & Children Affairs 3 *Papa Owusu Ankomah Parliamentary Affairs *Members of Parliament; ** Cabinet-rank ministers
271
Appendix 2.2f: List of political office holders by region, April. 2001-Jan. 2005 Reshuffle
Presidents, Vice Presidents and Ministers Name Portfolio Number J. A. Kufuor** (*2) President *Dr. K. Addo-Kufuor** Defence *Kwado Baah-Wiredu** Educations & Sports Ashanti Alan Kyeremanteng** Trade & Industry 8 *Albert Kan-Dapaah Communications *Dr. Richard Anane Road Transport Regional Cooperation & *Kofi Konadu Apraku NEPAD Snr. Minister (responsible for *Joseph H. Mensah** Public Sector Reforms) Local Gov’t & Rural B/Ahafo *K. Adjei-Darko** 3 Development Prof. C. Ameyaw-Akumfi Harbour & Railways *Prof Dominic Fobih** Lands &Forestry Paa Kwesi Nduom** Energy Manpower, Youth & *Yaw Barimah Central Employment 4 *Kwamena Bartels Private Sector Dev’t & PSIs Primary, seco., & girl child *Christine Churcher educ. Nana Akufo-Addo** Foreign Affairs *Hackgman O. Agyemang** Interior Eastern 4 *Mr. Yaw Osafo Marfo** Finance & Economic Planning *Felix K. O. Adjapong** Parliamentary Affairs *Nana Akomea Information Tourism & Mod. of Capital Jake Obetsebi Lamptey** City G/Accra Cecilia Bannerman** Mines 6 Samuel Nii Noi Ashong Finance & Economic Planning *Ishmael Ashitey Trade, Inustry & PSI *Edward Martey Akita Food & Agriculture (Fisheries) Aliu Mahama** Vice President Northern *Mustapha Iddris** Works & Housing 3 Ben Salifu Office of the Senior Minister U/East 0
Environment & Science (from U/West Kasim Kasanga** 1 Oct. 2001-) *Mjr Courage Quashigah** Food & Agriculture Volta *Rashid Bawah Youth & Sports 3 In charge of Tertiary Ms. Elizabeth A. Ohene Education (MoES) *Papa Owsu-Ankomah** Attorney-General &Justice Western Kwaku Afriyie** Health 3 *Gladys Asmah** Women & Children Affairs *Members of Parliament; ** Cabinet-rank ministers
272
Appendix 2.2g: List of political office holders by region, February 2005 cabinet Reshuffle
Presidents, Vice Presidents and Ministers Regional Region Name Portfolio Total J. A. Kufuor** (*2) President *Dr. K. Addo-Kufuor** Defence *Kwado Baah-Wiredu** Finance & Economic Planning Alan Kyeremanteng** Trade & Industry Ashanti Mr. Kwadwo Mpiani** Presidential Affairs 9 *Albert Kan-Dapaah Communications *Dr. Richard Anane Road Transport Regional Cooperation & *Kofi Konadu Apraku NEPAD Snr. Minister (responsible for *Joseph H. Mensah** B/Ahafo Public Sector Reforms) 3 *Ernest K. Debrah** Food & Agriculture Chritopher A. Akumfi Harbour & Railways *Prof Dominic Fobih** Lands, Forestry & Mines Central *Christine Churcher** Environment & Science 4 *Kwamena Bartels Private Sector Dev’t & PSIs *Paa Kwesi Nduom Public Sector Reforms Nana Akufo-Addo** Foreign Affairs *Hackgman O. Agyeman** Works & Housing Eastern *Mr. Yaw Osafo Marfo** Educations & Sports 5 *Felix K. O. Adjapong** Parliamentary Affairs Dan Botwe Information Mr. Ayiko Otoo** Attorney General & Justice Tourism & Modernisation of Jake Obetsebi Lamptey** 3 Capital City *Prof Mike Oquare** Energy Aliu Mahama** Vice President Northern *Hajia Alima Mahama** Women & Children Affairs 3 Local Gov't & Rural *Charels B. Bintim** Development Manpower, Youth & U/East *Joseph Kofi Adda 1 Employment U/West 0
Maj. C.Quashigah** Health Volta In charge of Tertiary 2 Ms. Elizabeth Akua Ohene Education (MoES) *Papa Owsu-Ankomah** Interior Western 2 *Gladys Asmah Fisheries *Members of Parliament; ** Cabinet-rank ministers
273
Appendix 2.2h: List of political office holders by region, May 2006 cabinet Reshuffle
Presidents, Vice Presidents and Ministers Regional Region Name of Minister Portfolio total J. A. Kufuor** President (*2) *Dr. K. Addo-Kufuor** Defence *Kwado Baah-Wiredu** Finance & Economic Planning Alan Kyeremanteng** Trade, Industry & PSIs Ashanti Albert K. Dapaah ** Interior 10 Francis Poku** National Security Mr. Kwadwo Mpiani** Chief of Staff &Presid.Affairs *Dr. Richard Anane Road Transport Sampson K. Boafo Culture & Chieftaincy *Ernest K. Debrah** Food & Agriculture B/Ahafo C. Ameyaw-Akumfi Ports & Railways 3 K. Adjei Darko Office of President *Prof Dominic Fobih** Lands, Forestry & Mines Local Government & Rural *Stephen A. Boateng** Central Dev’t 4 Information & National Kwamena Bartels Orientation *Paa Kwesi Nduom Public Sec. Reforms Foreign Affairs, Reg. Int. & Nana Akufo-Addo** NEPAD *Hackgman O. Agyeman** Works & Housing Eastern 4 *Papa Owusu Ankomah** Educations, Science & Sports *Felix K. O. Adjapong** Parliamentary Affairs *Mike Ocquaye** Communication Tourism & Diasporan G/Accra Jake Obetsebi Lamptey** 3 Relations Gloria Akuffo Aviation *Hajia Alima Mahama** Women & Children Affairs Northern Manpower Dev’t & *Boniface Saddique Employment 4 Aliu Mahama** Vice President Charles Bintim Office of President U/East *Joseph Adda** Energy (2006-08) 1 U/West 0
Maj. Courage Quashigah** Health Volta 2 Ms. Elizabeth A. Ohene Office of President Joe Ghartey ** A-G & Justice Western 2 *Gladys Asmah Fisheries *Members of Parliament; ** Cabinet-rank ministers
274
Appendix 2.2i: List of political office holders by region, 2007-Jan. 2009 Reshuffle
Presidents, Vice Presidents and Ministers
Regional Region Name Portfolio Total John A. Kufuor President Albert Kan Dapaah** Defence Foreign Affairs, Regional Int. Akwasi Osei-Adjei** & NEPAD *Anthony Akoto Osei** Finance & Economic Planning Ashanti Abraham Osei Aidooh** Parliamentary Affairs 10 Francis Poku** National Security Chief of Staff &Presidential Mr. Kwadwo Mpiani* Affairs Addo Kufuor** Interior (2008-Jan 2009) Sampson K. Boafo Culture & Chieftaincy K. Adgei Darko** Local Government & RD B/ *Ernest K. Debrah** Food & Agriculture 4 Ahafo C. Ameyaw-Akumfi Ports & Railways K. Adjei Darko Office of President Kwamena Bartels** Interior (2007-2008) Dominic Fobih** Educ., Science & Sports Central *S. Asamoah-Boateng** Tourism & Diasporan Relations 4 Samuel Owusu Agyei Public Sector Reforms Ben Aggrey Ntim** Communication Eastern Esther Obeng Dapaah** Lands, Forestry & Mines 3 *Felix K. O. Adjapong** Energy (2008-January 2009) Information & National Oboshie Sai-Cofie Orientation Manpower Dev’t & G/Accra *Nana Akomea 3 Employment Gloria Akuffo Aviation Aliu Mahama** Vice President Northern *Hajia Alima Mahama** Women & Children Affairs Water Resources, Works & 4 *Boniface Saddique** Housing Charles Bintim Office of President U/ East *Joseph Adda** Energy (2006-2008) 1 *Ambrose Derry** Attorney General & Justice U/West 2 *Godfred T. Bonyon Road Transport Courage Quashigah** Health Volta 2 Ms. Elizabeth A. Ohene Office of President *Gladys Asmah Fisheries Western Joe Baidoo Ansah** and later P. 2 Owusu Ankoma Trade, Industry & PSIs (both Western, so counted once) *Members of Parliament; ** Cabinet-rank ministers
275
Appendix 2.2j: List of political office holders by region, Jan 2001-March 2003
Deputies
Regional Region Name of Minister Portfolio Total *Dr. Mathew K. Antwi Food and Agriculture *Grace Coleman Finance & Economic Planning Ashanti Joe Aggrey Youth & Sports 5 Edward Osei Kwaku Presidential Affairs Akwasi Osei Adjei Trade & Industry *Anna Nyamekye Environment & Science
*Alhaji Moctar M. Bamba Presidential Affairs B/ Ahafo Local Govt’t & Rural *Nkrabea Effah Dartey 4 Development Kwaku Agyeman Manu Communications & Technology Manpower Dev’t & Joe Donkor Central Employment 2 *K. T Hammond Energy Eastern *Yaw Barimah Interior 1 *Edward Martey Akita Defence *Theresa A. Tagoe Works & Housing G/Accra 4 *Nana Akomea Tourism Gloria Akfuo Attorney-General & Justice Local Govt’t & Rural *Alima Mahama Development Manpower Dev’t & John Bennam Jabaah Employment Northern Abdel Majeed Haroun Food and Agriculture 7 *Mustapha Ali Iddris Foreign Affairs *Boniface Saddique Trade & Industry *John S. Achuliwor Communications & Technology *Alex Seidu Sofo Roads & Transport U/ East Dr. G. Adombila Agambila Finance & Economic Planning 1 *Moses Dani Baah Health U/ West 2 *Clement N. L Eledi Mines Volta *Rashid Bawah Education 1 Western 0
*Members of Parliament
276
Appendix 2.2k: List of political office holders by region, Apr. 2003-Jan 2005 Deputy Ministers
Deputies
Regional Region Name of Minister Portfolio Total Akoto Osei Finance & Econ. Planning Joe Aggrey Youth & Sports * Akwasi Osei Adjei Foreign Affairs Ashanti 6 *Mathew Kwaku Antwi Environment & Science *Joe Donkor Education *I. Kofi Poku Adusei Women & Children Affairs *Moctar M. Bamba Office of the President *Nkrabea Effah Dartey Local Govt’t & Rural Dev’t B/Ahafo 4 *Ann Nyamekye Food and Agriculture Kwaku Agyeman Manu Finance & Econ. Planning Central *K. T Hammond Energy 2 Asamoah Boateng Information Manpower Dev’t & Dr. Angela Ofori Attah Employment Mercy Bempo Addo Office of the President Eastern Kwadwo Afram Aseidu Trade & Industry 5 *Charles Brempong Yeboah Works & Housing Thomas Broni Interior Gloria Akfuo Attorney-General & Justice G/Accra *Emmanuel Adjei Boye Roads & Transport 3 *Theresa A. Tagoe Lands & Forestry Issah Ketekewu Local Govt’t & Rural Dev’t Manpower Dev’t & John Bennam Jabaah Employment *Clement N. L Eledi Food and Agriculture Northern Alima Mahama Trade & Industry & PSIs 7 Tourism and Mod. Of Capital *Abubakar S. Boniface City Abdel-Majeed Haroun Mines *Alex Seidu Sofo Roads & Transport Andrew Awuni Information *Joe Akudibilla Defence U/East 3 Dr. G. Adombila Agambila Ports, Habours & Railways *Moses Dani Baah Health U/ West 2 *Ambrose Derry Attorney-General & Justice Volta 0
Western 0 Note: one person has not been accounted for here (David G yewu, Deputy Minister for Communications & Technology) *Members of Parliament
277
Appendix 2.2l: Political office holders, February 2005 Reshfulle Deputies Region Name of Minister Portfolio Regional Total I. K. Opoku Adjei Local Govt’t & Rural Dev't *Akoto Osei Finance & Economic Planning * Akwasi Osei Adjei Foreign Affairs Dr. G. A. Agambila Environment & Science Osei Bonso Amoah Education & Sports Ashanti *Cecelia Abena Dapaah Works & Housing 11 *E. Asamoah Owusu-Ansah Attorney-General & Justice *Magnus E. Opare-Asmoah Roads & Transport *K. T Hammond Energy *Gifty Ohene-Konadu Trade & Industry *J.B. Danquah Adu Women & Children Affairs *Ann Nyamekye Food and Agriculture Kwaku Agyeman Manu Finance & Economic Planning B/Ahafo *Prof. G.Y. Gyan-Baffour* Finance & Economic Planning 5 *Nkrabea Effah Dartey Interior K. Ampofo Twumasi Education & Sports Abraham Odoom Local Govt’t & Rural Dev’t Tourism and Mod. of Capital *S Asamoah-Boateng Central City 4 *Andrew Adjei-Yeboah Lands & Forestry *Samuel Owusu-Agyei Health Manpower Dev’t & Charles Brempong Yeboah Employment *Kofi Osei Ameyaw Trade & Industry Eastern Kwadwo Afram Aseidu Trade & Industry 6 William Ofori Boafo Defence Dr. B Aggrey Ntim Communications Mercy Bempo Addo Office of the President Dannie Dugan Fisheries Manpower Dev’t & A. Frema Osei-Opare Employment G/Accra Dr. W. Nii Okai Hammond Food and Agriculture 6 *Shirley A.Botchway Information *Theresa A. Tagoe Lands & Forestry *Dr. Gladys N. Ashitey Health *Clement N. L Eledi Food and Agriculture Northern * Issah Ketekewu Works & Housing 3 *Rita Tani Iddi Lands & Forestry U/East 0
U/West *Moses Dani Baah Private sector dev’t & PSIs 1 Volta 0
*Angela Baiden-Amisah Education & Sports Western Joe Ghatey Attorney-General & Justice 3 *Christopher Addae Ports, Habours & Railways *Members of Parliament 278
Appendix 2.2m: Political office holders, May 2006 Reshuffle
Deputies Region Name of Minister Portfolio Regional Total I. K. Opoku Adjei Local Gov’t & Rural Dev't Foreign Affairs, Reg. Int. & * Akwasi Osei Adjei NEPAD Water Resources, Works & *Cecelia Abena Dapaah Housing Ashanti K. Osei Prempeh Attorney-General & Justice 8 *Magnus E. Opare- Roads & Transport Asmoah *K. T Hammond Energy *Dr. Akoto Osei Finance & Economic Planning *Gifty Ohene-Konadu Trade & Industry *Anna Nyamekye Food and Agriculture *Prof. G.Y. Gyan-Baffour Finance & Economic Planning B/Ahafo 4 Agyeman Manu Interior K. Ampofo Twumasi Education & Sports Local Govt’t & Rural Abraham Odoom Development Central 3 *Andrew Adjei-Yeboah Lands & Forestry *Samuel Owusu-Agyei Health Osei Bonso Amoah Education & Sports Manpower Dev’t & Charles Brempong Yeboah Employment Eastern Kwadwo Afram Aseidu Trade & Industry 6 William Ofori Boafo Defence Dr. B Aggrey Ntim Communications Mercy Bempo Addo Office of the President Foreign Affairs, Reg. Int. & *Shirley A.Botchway NEPAD Dannie Dugan Fisheries Manpower Dev’t & G/Accra A. Frema Osei-Opare 5 Employment Information & National Oboshie Sai-Cofie Orientation *Dr. Gladys N. Ashitey Health Northern Rita Tanliddi Iddi Lands & Forestry 1 U/East 0
U/West *Clement N. L Eledi Food and Agriculture 1 Volta 0
Tourism and Mod. of Capital Joe Baidoo Ansah City Water Resources, Works & Christopher Addae Western Housing 4 *Angela Baiden-Amisah Education & Sports Sophia Horner-Sam Ports & Railways *Members of Parliament
279
Appendix 2.2n: List of political office holders by region, 2007-Jan 2009
Deputies Regional Region Name of Minister Portfolio Total Maxwell Kofi Jumah Local Gov't & Rural Dev’t *Gifty Ohene-Konadu Trade, Industry & PSIs K. Osei Prempeh Attorney-General & Justice Ashanti *Magnus E. Opare-Asamoah Road Transport 7 I. K. Opoku Adjei Fisheries Frank Agyekum Info & national Orientation *K. T. Hammond Interior *Anna Nyamekye Food and Agriculture *G.Y. Gyan-Baffour Finance & Economic Planning B/Ahafo 4 *K. Agyeman Manu Trade, Industry & PSIs *K. Amporfo Twumasi Energy A. Dwuma-Odoom Health Central 2 *Andrews Adjei-Yeboah Lands, Forestry and Mines *C. Y. Brempong Yeboah Foreign Affairs *William Ofori Boafo Defence Eastern F. Opare-Ansah Communications 6 Kofi Osei-Ameyaw Tourism & Diasporan Relations Mercy Bampo Addo Office of President Osei Bonsu Amoah Education, Sci. & Sports *Dr. Gladys N. Ashitey Health *Shirley A. Botchway Trade, Industry & PSIs G/Accra Manpower, Youth & 4 A. Frema Osei-Opare Employment Daniel Dungan Women & Children Affairs Northern *Rita Tani Iddi Lands, Forestry and Mines 1 U/West Clement N. L. Eledi Food and Agriculture 1 U/ East A. Awudu Yeremia Local Gov’t & Rural Dev’t 1 Volta 0
Western Christopher Addae Works & Housing Sophia Horner-Sam Ports, Habours & Railways 3 *Angelina Baiden-Amisah Education & Sports *Members of Parliament
280
Appendix 3: Regional representation in key bureaucratic positions
Name Period of service Region Heads of Office of the Civil Service 1. G. K. Sackey 1980-1986 Fante, Central 2. Mr. E. A. Sai 1986-1993 Greater Accra 3. Dr. Robert Dodoo 1993-2001 Greater Accra 4. K. Obeng Adofo (Acting) March 2001-Jan 2003 Eastern 5. Dr. Alex Glover Quartey 2003-2006 Guan, Greater Accra 6. Mr. Joe D. Issachar 2006-2010 Northern 7. W. K. Kemevor 2011... Volta Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Chief Directors, 1993-2011 1. K. Opoku Manu Sep. 1993- Sep. 2000 Ashanti 2. J. A. Yamoah 2001-May 2003 Central 3. Paul O. Agyiri June 2003-June 2005 Central 4. Juaben Siriboe 2005- Oct. 2009 Region 5. Mrs. Effie Simspson Ekuaben 2009—2011 Central Ministry of Trade and Industry, Chief Directors, 1991-2011 1. Mr. J.K Bebaaku-Mensah 1991-Aug. 1993 Volta 2. Mr. Haldane Lutterodt 1993-1998 Central 3. J. S. Darlymple Hayfron 1998-2004 Central 4. Kwadwo Agyapon 2004-2005 Asante 5. Seth Evans Addo 2005-2009 Central 6. William Kofi Larbi 2009-2011 Eastern 7. Nii Asan Adjaye 2011--- Greater Accra Min. of Local Government and Rural Development, Chief Directors 1 Addae Kyeremeh As at May 2003 Brong Ahafo 2 F. T. Nartey Greater Accra 3 S. Y. Zanu Feb. 1997-Feb 2001 Volta 4 F. N. Andan June 2001-Oct 2002 Northern 5 Danniel Amadu Nyankamawu Feb 2004-Oct 2006 Northern Ministry of Education, Chief Directors 1. John Scott Darlymple-Hayfron Sep 1993-Aug. 1998 Central 2. Christian. A. Atiemo Dec 2001-Jan 2003 Ashanti 3. Ato Essuman June 2003-June 2008 Central
281
Appendix 4: Regional distribution of Political power, 1993-2000
Absolute distribution, 1993-2000 (%) Distribution relative to population shares (%) Region 1993-1996 1997-2000 1993-2000 1993-1996 1997-2000 1993-2000 Ashanti 9.7 8.2 9.0 -8.8 -11.0 -9.9 B/ Ahafo 4.1 6 5.1 -5.5 -3.7 -4.6 Central 23.1 13.9 18.5 14.3 5.3 9.8 Eastern 10.3 12.4 11.4 -1.7 1.0 -0.4 G/ Accra 4.6 10.4 7.5 -9.5 -4.9 -7.2 Western 8.8 7.6 8.2 -0.2 -1.2 -0.7 Volta 20 20.4 20.2 10.1 10.2 10.2 Northern 9.2 10.8 10.0 -0.4 1.1 0.4 U/ East 3.1 6.8 5.0 -2.2 1.8 -0.2 U/ West 7.1 3.8 5.5 3.9 0.7 2.3 Total 100 100 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Source: Author’s compilation and calculations
282
Appendix 5:Absolute distribution of political power, 2001-2008
Jan 2001-March April 2003 April 2006 Feb 2005 Reshuffle 2007-Jan 2009 2003 Reshuffle Reshuffle All Cabinet IC Deps All Cabinet IC Deps All Cabinet IC Deps All Cabinet IC Deps All Cabinet IC Deps
Ashanti 21.2 28.6 41.2 18.5 20.6 20 37.5 18.8 25.8 23.8 35.3 27 28.1 33.3 46.7 25 26.5 30.3 40.8 25.5 B/Ahafo 9.1 14.3 11.8 14.8 8.8 10 12.5 12.5 9.7 9.5 11.8 13.5 9.4 4.8 6.7 12.5 11.8 7.6 10.2 13.3 Central 18.2 4.8 5.9 7.4 14.7 10 12.5 6.3 12.9 9.5 5.9 10.8 12.5 9.5 6.7 9.4 11.8 10.6 8.2 9.2 Eastern 12.1 19 17.6 3.7 11.8 20 18.8 15.6 16.1 19 11.8 16.2 12.5 19 13.3 18.8 8.8 16.7 10.2 18.4 G/Accra 9.1 9.5 0 14.8 17.6 10 0 9.4 9.7 14.3 11.8 16.2 9.4 9.5 0 15.6 8.8 7.6 4.1 15.3 Volta 6.1 4.8 5.9 3.7 8.8 5 6.3 0 6.5 4.8 5.9 0 6.3 4.8 6.7 0 5.9 4.5 6.1 0 Western 9.1 9.5 5.9 0 5.9 10 6.3 0 6.5 4.8 5.9 2.7 6.3 4.8 6.7 12.5 5.9 4.5 6.1 8.2 Northern 9.1 9.5 11.8 25.9 8.8 10 6.3 25 9.7 14.3 11.8 8.1 12.5 9.5 6.7 3.1 11.8 12.1 8.2 5.1 U/East 3 0 0 7.4 0 0 0 6.3 3.2 0 0 2.7 3.1 4.8 6.7 0 2.9 3 4.1 2 U/West 3 0 0 3.7 2.9 5 0 6.3 0 0 0 2.7 0 0 0 3.1 5.9 3 2 3.1 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
North 15.1 9.5 11.8 37 11.7 15 6.3 37.6 12.7 14.3 11.8 13.5 15.6 14.3 13.4 6.2 20.6 18.1 14.3 10.2 South 84.9 90.5 88.2 63 88.3 75 93.7 62.4 87.7 85.7 88.2 86.5 84.4 85.7 86.6 93.8 79.4 81.9 85.7 89.8
Source: Author’s compilation and calculation. Notes : IC = Inner Core; Deps: Deputy Ministers
283
Appendix 6: Relative distribution of political power (%), 2001-2008
Jan 2001-March 2003 April 2003 Feb 2005 Reshuffle April 2006 2007-Jan 2009 Reshuffle Reshuffle
All Cabinet IC Deps All Cabi IC Deps All Cabi IC Deps All Cabi IC Deps All Cabi IC Deps net net net net Ashanti 2.1 9.5 22.1 -0.6 1.2 0.6 18.1 -0.6 6.2 4.2 15.7 7.4 8.3 13.5 26.9 5.2 6.6 13.4 21.3 4.2 B/Ahafo -0.5 4.7 2.2 5.2 -0.7 0.5 3 3 0.2 0 2.3 4 -0.1 -4.7 -2.8 3 2.3 -1.2 2.3 4.3 Central 9.8 -3.6 -2.5 -1 6.5 1.8 4.3 -1.9 4.8 1.4 -2.2 2.7 4.5 1.5 -1.3 1.4 3.9 4.6 3.9 -1 Eastern 1 7.9 6.5 -7.4 1.2 9.4 8.2 5 5.8 8.7 1.5 5.9 2.3 8.8 3.1 8.6 -1.3 2.4 -4.2 10.6 G/Accra -6.3 -5.9 -15.4 -0.6 1.3 -6.3 -16.3 -6.9 -7.1 -2.5 -5 -0.6 -7.8 -7.7 -17.2 -1.6 -8.6 -17.4 -17.4 -3.6 Volta -2.5 -3.8 -2.7 -4.9 0.4 -3.4 -2.1 -8.4 -1.7 -3.4 -2.3 -8.2 -1.8 -3.3 -1.4 -8.1 -2.1 -3.8 -2.1 -8 Western -1.1 -0.7 -4.3 -10.2 -4.4 -0.3 -4 -10.3 -3.9 -5.6 -4.5 -7.7 -4.2 -5.7 -3.8 2 -4.6 -6.3 -4.6 -0.2 Northern -0.5 -0.1 2.2 16.3 -0.8 0.4 -3.3 15.4 0.1 4.7 2.2 -1.5 3 0 -2.8 -6.4 2.3 3 -3.6 -6.1 U/East -1.9 -4.9 -4.9 2.5 -4.7 -4.7 -4.7 1.6 -1.3 -4.5 -4.5 -1.8 -1.3 0.4 2.3 -4.4 -1.5 -0.2 1.5 -1 U/West 0 -3 -3 0.7 0 2.1 -2.9 3.4 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -0.1 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 0.3 3.1 5.5 3.1 0.6
North -2.4 -8 -5.7 19.5 -5.5 -2.2 -10.9 20.4 -4.2 -2.6 -5.1 -3.4 -1.1 -2.4 -3.3 -10.5 3.9 2.8 1 -6.5 South 2.4 8 5.7 -19.5 5.5 -7.8 10.9 -20.4 4.6 2.6 5.1 3.4 1.1 2.4 3.3 10.5 -3.9 -2.8 -1 6.5
Source: Author’s compilation and calculation. Notes : IC = Inner Core; Deps: Deputy Ministers
284
Appendix 7: Actual health expenditures, 1995-1997 (in ¢ Million)
1995 1996 1997 1995-1997 Average
Recurrent Development Recurrent Development Recurrent Development Recurrent Development Regions Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % AR 3,858 10.9 744 13.7 4,747 9.6 1,217 7.9 5,454 8.4 1,020 7.4 14,059 9.4 2,981 8.6 BAR 3,218 9.1 479 8.8 5,247 10.6 310 2.0 6,204 9.6 8,383 60.9 14,669 9.8 9,172 26.5 CR 3,395 9.6 675 12.4 4,330 8.8 566 3.7 6,599 10.2 214 1.6 14,324 9.6 1,455 4.2 ER 5,729 16.1 709 13.0 6,803 13.8 741 4.8 9,432 14.6 744 5.4 21,964 14.7 2,194 6.3 GAR 5,111 14.4 527 9.7 7,520 15.2 825 5.4 8,786 13.6 714 5.2 21,417 14.3 2,066 6.0 VR 4,920 13.9 452 8.3 6,357 12.9 9,612 62.5 6,679 10.3 877 6.4 17,956 12.0 10,941 31.6 WR 3,433 9.7 798 14.7 4,571 9.3 904 5.9 6,452 10.0 536 3.9 14,456 9.7 2,238 6.5 NR 2,498 7.0 615 11.3 4,792 9.7 688 4.5 6,746 10.4 899 6.5 14,036 9.4 2,202 6.4 UER 1,814 5.1 365 6.7 2,656 5.4 432 2.8 4,310 6.7 241 1.8 8,780 5.9 1,038 3.0 UWR 1,503 4.2 83 1.5 2,365 4.8 88 0.6 4,020 6.2 136 1.0 7,888 5.3 307 0.9 Total 35,479 100.0 5,447 100 49,388 100.0 15,383 100.0 64,682 100.0 13,764 100.0 149,549 100.0 34,594 100.0 Source : Based on Ministry of Finance (1998, p.21, Table 3.4) ‘Public Expenditure Review 1997: Managing Social Sector Expenditure for Human Capital Development, August 1998
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Appendix 8: Population per doctor by region, 2002 -08
90,000
80,000 70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
Populalation 30,000
20,000
10,000 0
2002 2004 2006 2008
Source : Author, based on data from official website of the Ministry of Health (http://www.moh- ghana.org)
Appendix 9: Population per nurse by region, 2008
Appendix 5.3: Population per nurse by region, 2008 1800
1600 Ghana Average 1400 1200 1000 800 Population 600 400 200 0
Source : Ibid
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Appendix 10: MCA beneficiary regions and districts
Zones Regions Number of MCA targeted districts Ashanti 4 Afram Plains Basin B/Ahafo 0 Eastern 6 Central 2 G/ Accra 1 Southern Horticultural Belt Volta 6 Western 0 Northern 5 Northern Agricultural Upper East 0 Crescent Upper West 0 All zones All regions 23
Appendix 11: Registered projects by sectors, Jan. 2001-Dec. 2007
Regions Sectors
Grand Percenta
total ge share of Grand
Agric total Services Tourism Building &Building Construction Export Trade General Trade Manufacturing Ashanti 6 18 4 10 6 14 9 67 4.80 Brong Ahafo 2 1 3 0 1 1 0 10 0.71 Central 13 11 1 0 4 3 9 41 2.94 Eastern 12 8 0 1 3 5 6 35 2.51 G. Accra 34 350 41 228 96 310 104 1163 83.37 Volta 8 7 1 0 0 2 1 19 1.36 Western 3 9 2 4 2 12 11 43 3.08 Northern 2 3 2 2 1 1 2 13 0.93 Upper East 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 0.22 Upper West 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.07
South 78 404 52 243 112 347 140 1378 98.8 North 2 4 3 2 1 2 3 17 1.2 National 80 410 55 245 113 349 143 1395 100
Sourc e: Author’s aggregation, based on data from Ghana Investment Promotion Council, Accra Note: This excludes investments in mining, petroleum, stock exchange and projects in the free zones area of Ghana – all concentrated in the South, implying that the north is even more excluded from private sector investments as this data presented here can depict.
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