Welsh Opinion Poll

MARKET RESEARCH WALES LTD MARKET RESEARCH 7 St Andrew’s Crescent WALES LTD Cardiff CF10 3DA OFFICE USE ONLY Serial No:

(1) (2) (3) (4)

WALES & BRITTANY OPINION POLLS JOB NO. CW 5108 FINAL WALES QUESTIONNAIRE (12/6/01) INTERVIEWER I.D. NO.

NAME ______() () () () ADDRESS ______REGION () ______NW Wales 1 NE Wales 2 POSTCODE ______SW & Mid Wales 3 Valleys 4 TEL NO. ______SE Wales 5 Cardiff 6 GENDER ()

Male 1 Female 2

Good morning/afternoon/evening. My name is ………………. from Market Research Wales Ltd. We are an independent market research company conducting an opinion survey about Wales. We’d also like your views on the Welsh language and education and training.

I’d like to ask you a few questions - it won’t take longer than 10 minutes or so and all the information provided will be kept confidential.

I declare that this interview was conducted within the Code of Conduct of the Market Research Society and that the respondent was unknown to me. I declare that all information given to me must be kept confidential.

Interviewer Sign ...... Date ......

Interviewer Print ......

S1 Would you prefer to be interviewed in English or Welsh? ()

English 1 Welsh 2 INSTRUCTION

INSTRUCTION: PROCEED IN CHOSEN LANGUAGE; IF WELSH, MAKE APPOINTMENT FOR CALLBACK IF NOT WELSH SPEAKING INTERVIEWER

S2 Firstly, can I just check, do you live within any of these local authority areas? (PLEASE ORDER BY REFERRING TO REGION) (READ OUT) () ()

NW Wales - Conwy 0 1 Gwynedd 0 2 Anglesey 0 3

NE Wales - Denbighshire 0 4 Flintshire 0 5 Wrexham 0 6

SW & Mid Wales - Pembrokeshire 0 7 Carmarthenshire 0 8 Swansea 0 9 Ceredigion 1 0 Powys 1 1

Valleys - Blaenau Gwent 1 2 Caerphilly 1 3 Neath Port Talbot 1 4 Rhondda Cynon Taff 1 5 Torfaen 1 6 Merthyr Tydfil 1 7

SE Wales - Bridgend 1 8 Monmouthshire 1 9 Newport 2 0 Vale of Glamorgan 2 1

Cardiff - Cardiff 2 2 INSTRUCTION

None of these THANK &CLOSE

INSTRUCTION:CHECK REGION QUOTA & THEN GO TO Q1

ROUTE

SECTION A Firstly, I’d like to ask you some questions about Wales and the way it is governed

Q1 What are your personal views on devolution for Wales, that is the creation of the National Assembly for Wales, which has taken over responsibility for areas such as health and education in Wales? Would you say you are….? READ OUT ()

Strongly in favour 1 In favour 2 Against 3 Strongly against 4

Don’t know 5 Q2

Q2 Would you please indicate your opinion on the following statements about the National Assembly for Wales. Do you agree strongly, agree , disagree or disagree strongly that…? Q3

Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don’t strongly strongly know

The quality of public services 1 2 3 4 5 has improved under the Assembly The say of people in decision- 1 2 3 4 5 making has improved under the Assembly The existence of the Assembly 1 2 3 4 5 has given Wales more lobbying power within the UK government The Assembly treats all 1 2 3 4 5 regions within Wales fairly

Q3A If the Assembly had more money to spend, what do you think should be its first priority in terms of spending? DO NOT PROMPT - SINGLE CODE IN COLUMN A BELOW INSTRUCTION

INSTRUCTION: IF NOTHING/DON’T KNOW GO TO Q4; ALL OTHERS GO TO Q3B

Q3B And what should be its second priority for spending? DO NOT PROMPT - SINGLE CODE IN COLUMN B BELOW

Column A Column B 1st Priority 2nd Priority () () () () Assistance to rural areas 0 1 0 1 Cultural activities 0 2 0 2 Environmental Issues 0 3 0 3 Getting people into jobs 0 4 0 4 Health service/hospitals 0 5 0 5 Improving the economy 0 6 0 6 Improving the roads 0 7 0 7 Promoting the Welsh Language 0 8 0 8 Public transport 0 9 0 9 Schools/education 1 0 1 0 Sport 1 1 1 1 Tourism 1 2 1 2 Training 1 3 1 3 Urban development 1 4 1 4 Other (please write in) 1 5 1 5

Nothing 1 6 Don’t know 1 7

Q4 Which one of these statements comes closest to your view on what you’d like to see happen in future in Wales? READ OUT – SINGLE CODE ()

Wales should become independent 1 Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament, which has law-making and taxation powers 2 Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected assembly, which has limited law-making powers only 3 Wales should remain part of the UK without an elected assembly 4

Don’t Know 5 Q5

Q5 Should the Assembly develop closer ties across Europe with similar bodies ? Are you..?. READ OUT ()

Strongly in favour 1 In favour 2 Against 3 Strongly against 4

Don’t know 5 Q6

Q6 Which of the following best describes the amount of Welsh you can speak and understand? READ OUT- SINGLE CODE ()

I am fluent in Welsh 1 I can speak and understand Welsh fairly well 2 I can speak and understand some Welsh 3 I can say and understand a few basic words of Welsh 4 I can’t speak or understand any Welsh at all 5

Don’t know 6 Q7

Q7 Now, I’m going to read out some statements about the Welsh language and I’d like you to tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly that…? READ OUT – ROTATE ORDER Q8 READ OUT Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don’t strongly strongly know

The Welsh language is an important part of 1 2 3 4 5 () Welsh identity Wales needs to train more bilingual Welsh 1 2 3 4 5 () and English speakers to fulfil the requirements in politics, business and the professions in Wales Children in Wales should be taught Welsh 1 2 3 4 5 () until the age of 16 All children in Wales should be educated 1 2 3 4 5 () bilingually, in Welsh and English, until the age of 16 Certain jobs in Wales should be reserved for 1 2 3 4 5 () bilingual Welsh and English speakers There should be restrictions on in-migrants 1 2 3 4 5 () buying properties in predominantly Welsh- speaking areas Welsh national life should increasingly be 1 2 3 4 5 () bilingual, that is Welsh and English

Q8 Which should be the primary political institution that makes decisions on the Welsh language? Should it be…? READ OUT – SINGLE CODE

The UK Government 1 The Assembly 2 Local government 3 The European Union 4

Another body (PLEASE SPECIFY) 5

Don’t know 6 Q9

Q9 Have you personally been on any sort of training course, that is a course that was related to improving your skills, how you work or your employability in the last 24 months? ()

Yes 1 No 2

Don’t know 3 Q10

Q10 Here are a series of statements about priorities for spending money on training in Wales. Please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with each one. Q11

READ OUT – ROTATE Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don’t ORDER Strongly Strongly know

Training Funds should be 1 2 3 4 5 managed directly by business leaders

Training funds should be 1 2 3 4 5 distributed mainly to the poorer parts of Wales

Training funds should be 1 2 3 4 5 given to the unemployed as a priority

Training funds should be 1 2 3 4 5 available to everybody

Q11 There follows a series of statements about who should make decisions concerning training policy in Wales. Please indicate which one you most strongly agree with READ OUT – SINGLE CODE. ()

Business leaders should mainly decide on training priorities in Wales 1 Social partners (i.e. employers and trade unions) should mainly decide on training priorities in Wales 2 Government agencies should mainly decide on training priorities in Wales 3 Q12

ROUTE

Q12 Which of the following measures do you think would be most effective in improving the training of young people in Wales? You can choose up to 2 of the following. READ OUT – CODE NO MORE THAN 2

Giving all young people training grants 1 () Increasing the number of apprenticeships 1 () Strengthening local careers services 1 () Strengthening vocational education, that is training for specific occupations 1 () Making it easier to get into higher education 1 ()

Don’t know 1 () Q13

Q13 Which one of the following is the better type of training, in your opinion ? READ OUT - SINGLE CODE ()

One that secures paid employment straight away 1 One that leads to a lasting qualification 2

Don’t know/depends 3 Q14

Q14 Should the Government impose a training tax on businesses with over 10 employees in Wales, based on a percentage of companies’ wage bills, to improve the general skills level?

()

Yes 1 No 2

Don’t know 3 Q15

Q15 Should there be a legal requirement that organisations with over 10 employees train their workforce? ()

Yes 1 No 2

Don’t know 3 Q16

Q16 Which one of the following political institutions do you think should make the most important decisions about training policy in Wales? By training policy, I mean the promotion and financing of learning activities leading to the acquisition of work based skills. Should it be….? READ OUT – SINGLE CODE ()

The UK government 1 The Assembly 2 Local government 3 The European Union 4

Another body (PLEASE SPECIFY) 5

Don’t know 9 Q17

SECTION D Finally, the last few questions are about you, to make sure we talk to a cross-section of people

Q17 If a General Election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you vote for? SINGLE CODE () ()

Conservative 0 1 Green Party 0 2 Labour 0 3 Liberal Democrat 0 4 Plaid Cymru 0 5 The Independent Wales Party 0 6 UK Independence Party 0 7

Other (PLEASE SPECIFY) 0 8

______

Refused 0 9 Won’t vote 1 0 Too young to vote 1 1

Don’t know/not yet decided 1 2 Q18

Q18 If an Assembly Election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you vote for? SINGLE CODE () ()

Conservative 0 1 Green Party 0 2 Labour 0 3 Liberal Democrat 0 4 Plaid Cymru 0 5 The Independent Wales Party 0 6

Other (PLEASE SPECIFY) 0 7

______

Refused 0 8 Won’t vote 0 9 Too young to vote 1 0

Don’t know/not yet decided 1 1 Q19

Q19 If you had to choose, which one of the following best describes the way you think of yourself….? READ OUT – SINGLE CODE ()

Welsh, not British 1 More Welsh than British 2 Equally Welsh and British 3 More British than Welsh 4 British,not Welsh 5

Other 6 Don’t know 7 Q20

Q20 How would you describe your current working status? SINGLE CODE ONLY () ()

Employed – full time 0 1 Employed – part time 0 2 Self employed 0 3 Unemployed 0 4 Student 0 5 Retired 0 6 Housewife 0 7 Not working 0 8

Don’t know 0 9 Refused 1 0 Q21

Q21 What is the occupation of the chief income earner in your household? PROBE FOR FURTHER DETAILS ONLY WHEN NECESSARY TO DETERMINE SEG (eg position/rank/grade; qualifications; number of staff responsible for) ()

A 1 B 2 C1 3 C2 4 D 5 E 6 Q22

Q22 In which country were you born ? PROBE IF NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH COUNTRY ()

Wales 1 England 2 Scotland 3 Northern Ireland 4 Southern Ireland 5 British 6 Other (please state) 7 Q23

Q23 How long have you lived in Wales ? ()

Less than 1 year 1 1-5 years 2 6-10 years 3 11-20 years 4 Over 20 years 5

Don’t know 6 Q24

Q24 Which of these age bands do you fall into ? READ OUT ()

16 – 17 18 - 24 1 25 – 34 2 35 – 44 3 45 – 54 4 55 – 64 5 65+ 6

Refused 7 Q25

Q25 Are you….? READ OUT ()

Married 1 Living with a partner 2 Single 3 Divorced/separated 4 Widowed 5

Refused 6 Q26

Q26 How many children in full time education do you have, if any? ()

1 1 2 2 3 3 4 or more 4

None 5 Q27

Q27 How would you describe your level of interest in politics? READ OUT – SINGLE CODE ()

Very interested 1 Interested 2 Not very interested 3 Not at all interested 4

Don’t know 5 Q28

Q28 What is the highest level of qualifications you have obtained? READ OUT – SINGLE CODE () ()

None - I have no formal qualifications 0 1 CSE/s or NVQ1 or Foundation GNVQ 0 2 GCSE/s or O Level/s or NVQ2 or Intermediate GNVQ 0 3 Technical or vocational qualification/s eg City and Guilds, BTEC 0 4 A or AS Levels or NVQ3 or Advanced GNVQ 0 5 Nursing qualification 0 6 International Baccalaureate 0 7 Teachers Training Qualification 0 8 First degree or NVQ4 0 9 Postgraduate qualification/higher degree or NVQ5 1 0

Other British qualifications (please specify) 1 1

Don’t know 1 2

THANK AND CLOSE

Etude BRITTANY MARKET RESEARCH WALES - N° 4185

Le répondant : L’Enquêteur :

Nom : ______Prénom : ______Nom : ______

Adresse : ______Prénom : ______

Ville :______Tel______

Signature :

Date Signature Relecture ......

Contrôle : Heure de rappel ...... préconisée ______h____

1 Etude sur ‘La Dévolution et la décentralisation en Bretagne et au Pays de Galles’

Bonjour / bonsoir, je suis ………………….., du cabinet d’études indépendant EFFICIENCE 3. Nous menons actuellement une étude pour le compte du Conseil Economique et social du Royaume-Uni et nous souhaiterions que vous y participiez. Cela ne vous prendra qu’une dizaine de minutes et vos réponses seront traitées dans la plus stricte confidentialité et dans le plus strict anonymat.

Question filtre :

QA. Votre résidence principale est-elle en Bretagne ?

Oui 1 (CONTINUER) Non 2 (REMERCIER ET CLORE)

Première partie

D’abord je voudrais vous poser quelques questions sur la Bretagne et la manière de gouverner la Bretagne.

Q1. Le Conseil Régional de Bretagne existe depuis 15 ans comme collectivité territoriale élue. Faites-vous personnellement confiance au Conseil Régional pour assurer le développement de la Bretagne ? (LIRE)

Tout à fait confiance 1 Plutôt confiance 2 Pas trop confiance 3 Pas du tout confiance 4

NSP 5 Refus 6

Q2. Etes-vous personnellement d’accord avec l’affirmations suivante : « le Conseil Régional traite toutes les parties de la Bretagne de la même manière » ? (LIRE)Te

Tout à fait d’accord 1 Plutôt d’accord 2 Pas trop d’accord 3 Pas du tout d’accord 4

NSP 5 Refus 6

Q3. Selon vous, l’existence du Conseil Régional renforce t’elle le poids de la Bretagne à Paris ?

Oui 1 Non 2

NSP 3 Refus 4

Q4A. Si votre Région avait de l’argent en plus à dépenser, dans quel domaine devrait-elle l’investir en priorité ? NE PAS LIRE – UN CODE UNIQUE DANS LA COLONNE « 1er CHOIX » - puis ALLER EN Q 4B

Q4B. Et ensuite ? NE PAS LIRE – UN CODE UNIQUE DANS LA COLONNE « 2ème CHOIX » - puis ALLER EN Q 5 1.…………………………………………………………. 2.………………………………………………………….

1er Choix 2e choix L’aménagement des villes (1) (1) L’aménagement des zones rurales (2) (2) L’apprentissage (3) (3) L’enseignement secondaire (4) (4) L’enseignement supérieur (5) (5) L’environnement (6) (6) La formation professionnelle (7) (7)

3 Le développement économique (8) (8) Le sport (9) (9) Le tourisme (10) (10) Les activités culturelles (11) (11) Les langues régionales (12) (12) Les routes (13) (13) Les transports collectifs (14) (14) Autre (15) (15) Rien (16) (16) NSP (17) (17) Refus (18) (18)

Q5. Êtes-vous très favorable, plutôt favorable, peu favorable ou pas du tout favorable au rattachement du département de la Loire Atlantique à la Région Bretagne ?

Très favorable 1 Plutôt favorable 2 Peu favorable 3 Pas favorable du tout 4

NSP 5 Refus 6

Q6. Il y a aujourd’hui en France un débat sur le degré de décentralisation. Quelle est votre préférence pour l’avenir de la Bretagne ? LIRE – UNE SEULE REPONSE POSSIBLE

Abolir le Conseil Régional 1 Maintenir un Conseil Régional aux pouvoirs limités 2 Doter le Conseil Régional de pouvoirs législatifs et fiscaux 3 Rendre la Bretagne autonome 4

NSP 5 Refus 6

Q7. Vous personnellement, vous sentez-vous : (LIRE)

Breton, mais pas Français 1 Plus Breton que Français 2 Autant Breton que Français 3 Plus Français que Breton 4 Français, mais pas Breton 5

NSP 6 Refus 7

Q.8. Si le Conseil Régional de Bretagne développait des relations, en Europe, avec des Assemblées de même nature, seriez vous… ? (LIRE)

Très favorable 1 Favorable 2 Pas favorable 3 Pas du tout favorable 4

NSP 5 Refus 6

Deuxième partie

Maintenant je voudrais vous poser quelques questions sur la langue bretonne et son rôle dans l’avenir.

Q9. Laquelle des phrases suivantes résume le mieux votre situation ? (LIRE)

Je parle le breton couramment 1 Je peux parler et comprendre le breton assez bien 2 Je peux parler et comprendre le breton un peu 3 Je peux dire et comprendre quelques mots en breton 4 Je ne parle pas et ne comprends pas du tout le breton 5

NSP 6 Refus 7

5 Q10. Maintenant, je vais vous lire quelques déclarations sur la langue bretonne et j’aimerais que vous me disiez si vous êtes tout à fait d’accord, assez d’accord, pas tout à fait d’accord ou pas du tout d’accord avec leur contenu. LIRE – FAIRE UNE ROTATION DES ITEMS

Tout à Assez Pas tout à Pas du Ne sait Refus fait d’accord fait tout pas d’accord d’accord d’accord

La langue bretonne est un élément important de l’identité bretonne. Il faudrait former plus de personnes qui parlent breton pour occuper des postes dans l’administration et la politique. Certains emplois en Bretagne devraient être réservés à des personnes bilingues, c’est-à-dire pouvant parler le breton et le français Il faut donner des aides publiques aux média bretonnants. Il faut donner des aides publiques aux associations bretonnantes.

Q.11 Avec laquelle de ces phrases êtes-vous le plus d’accord ? LIRE – FAIRE UNE ROTATION DES ITEMS – UNE SEULE REPONSE POSSIBLE

Le breton ne devrait pas être enseigné à l’école 1 Les enfants qui le souhaitent devraient pouvoir apprendre le breton à l’école 2 Tous les enfants de Bretagne devraient apprendre le breton à l’école, sauf avis contraire des parents 3 Tous les enfants de la Bretagne devraient apprendre le breton à l’école 4

NSP 5 Refus 6

Q12. Quelle organisation devrait, selon vous, prendre les décisions essentielles concernant la langue bretonne ? UNE SEULE REPONSE POSSIBLE - LIRE

Le Conseil Régional de Bretagne 1 Le Gouvernement français 2 Les autres collectivités territoriales (départements, villes) 3 L’Union européenne 4 Autre (préciser) : ______5 NSP 6 Refus 7

Troisième partie

Les questions que je vais vous poser maintenant concernent la formation professionnelle.

Q13. Avez-vous suivi un stage de formation au cours des derniers vingt-quatre mois ?

Oui 1 Non 2

NSP 3 Refus 4

7 Q14. Voici une série de propositions générales concernant l’usage des ressources publiques de la formation professionnelle en Bretagne. Veuillez nous dire si vous êtes tout à fait d’accord, assez d’accord, pas tout à fait d’accord ou pas du tout d’accord avec ces propositions. LIRE – FAIRE UNE ROTATION DES ITEMS

Tout à Assez Pas tout Pas du NSP Refus fait d’accord à fait tout d’accord d’accord d’accord Les ressources publiques de la formation professionnelle devraient être versées aux entreprises en priorité

Les ressources publiques de la formation professionnelle devraient être destinées en priorité aux zones les plus pauvres de la Bretagne.

Les ressources publiques de la formation professionnelle devraient être destinées en priorité aux chômeurs.

Les ressources publiques de la formation professionnelle devraient être accessibles à tout le monde.

Q.15 Qui doit, selon vous, déterminer les priorités en matière de formation professionnelle. Veuillez indiquer vos choix par ordre de préférence. LIRE

Les entreprises 1 Les partenaires sociaux, c’est-à-dire les syndicats d’employeurs et de salariés 2 Les pouvoirs publics 3 NSP 4 Refus 5 Aucun 6

Q.16 Parmi les mesures suivantes, lesquelles vous paraissent les plus efficaces pour améliorer la formation professionnelle des jeunes ? Vous pouvez indiquer deux choix par ordre de priorité. LIRE – 2 REPONSES POSSIBLES

Créer des congés individuels de formation pour tout jeune 1 Encourager les jeunes à devenir des apprentis 2 Développer l’information sur les formations et leurs débouchés 3 Valoriser l’enseignement professionnel 4 Renforcer l’enseignement supérieur 5

NSP 6 Refus 7

Q.17. Selon vous, une bonne formation est-elle : LIRE – UNE SEULE REPONSE POSSIBLE

Celle qui permet de trouver très vite un emploi 1 Celle qui donne une qualification durable 2

NSP 3 Refus 4

Q18. Quelle organisation devrait, selon vous, prendre les décisions les plus importantes concernant la formation professionnelle en Bretagne ? UNE SEULE REPONSE POSSIBLE - LIRE

Le Conseil Régional 1 Le Gouvernement français 2 Les collectivités intra-régionales 3 (communes, conseils généraux) L’Union européenne 4 Autre (préciser) ______5

NSP 9 Refus 10

9 Quatrième partie

Enfin, les dernières questions vous concernent vous plus particulièrement; elles nous permettent de vérifier que nous adressons à un échantillon représentatif de la population.

Q.19a Quel est votre département de résidence ?

Ille-et-Vilaine 1 Côtes d’Armor 2 Finistère 3 Morbihan 4 Loire Atlantique 5

NSP 6 Refus 7

Q.19b Il existe à l’intérieur de la Bretagne vingt et un ‘pays’. Dans quel pays habitez-vous ? LIRE

Pays de Fougères 1 Pays de Vitré 2 Pays de Rennes 3 Pays de Vallons de Vilaine 4 Pays de Saint-Malo 5 Pays de Dinan 6 Pays de Brocéliande 7 Pays de Redon et de Vilaine 8 Pays du Centre-Est Bretagne 9 Pays du Centre-Bretagne 10 Pays de Saint-Brieuc 11 Pays de Vannes 12 Pays de Pontivy 13 Pays d’Auray 14 Pays de Lorient 15 Pays du Centre-Ouest Bretagne 16 Pays de Guingamp 17 Pays de Lannion-Trégor-Goëlo 18 Pays de Morlaix 19 Pays de Cornouaille 20

10 Pays de Brest 21

NSP 22 Refus 23

Q20. Quelle est votre situation professionnelle actuelle ?

Salarié – temps plein 1 Salarié – temps partiel 2 Profession libérale 3 Au chômage 4 Etudiant 5 Retraité 6 Homme ou Femme au foyer 7 En formation (stages, Contrat Emploi-Solidarité…) 8 Ne travaille pas 9

NSP 10 Refus 11

Q21 Quelle est la fonction du chef de famille dans votre foyer ?

Cadre supérieur 1 Profession intellectuelle supérieure 2 Chef d’entreprise 3 Profession intermédiaire 4 Artisan 5 Agriculture 6 Employé 7 Ouvrier 8 Sans activité professionnelle 9 Retraité 10 Étudiant 11

NSP 12 Refus 13

Q22 Êtes-vous né en Bretagne ?

Oui 1 Non 2

NSP 3 Refus 4

Q23 Depuis combien de temps habitez-vous en Bretagne ?

Moins d’un an 1 1-5 ans 2 6-10 ans 3 11-20 ans 4 Plus de 20 ans 5 Toute ma vie / Depuis toujours 6

NSP 3 Refus 4

Q24 Quel âge avez-vous? (ENTOURER LA TRANCHE D’AGE)

16 – 17 ans 1 18 – 24 ans 2 25 – 34 ans 3 35 – 44 ans 4 45 – 54 ans 5 55 – 64 ans 6 65 ans et plus 7

Refus 8

Q25 Etes-vous….? (LIRE)

Marié 1 Vivant maritalement 2 Célibataire 3 Divorcé/séparé 4 Veuf / veuve 5 PACSE(e) 6

Refus 7

Q26 Avez-vous des enfants scolarisés à plein temps ? Si oui, combien ?

1 1 2 2 3 3 4 ou plus 4 Aucun 5

Refus 6

Q27 Quel est le diplôme le plus élevé que vous ayez obtenu ?

Niveau 6 (aucune qualification ) 1 Niveau 5 (CAP/BEP) 2 Niveau 4 (Baccalauréat général) 3 Niveau 4 (Baccalauréat professionnel, Brevet professionnel, Brevet de technicien) 4 Niveau 3 (DEUG) 5 Niveau 3 (BTS, Brevet de maîtrise, DUT) 6 Niveau 2 (Licence) 7 Niveau 2 (IUP, IUFM) 8 Niveau 1 (Doctorat, DESS) 9 Autre préciser : ______

NSP 10 Refus 11

13 Q.28 Vous intéressez-vous à la politique… (LIRE L’ECHELLE)

Beaucoup 1 Un peu 2 Pas beaucoup 3 Pas du tout 4

NSP 5 Refus 6

Q29 Si des élections législatives avaient lieu demain, pour quel parti voteriez- vous ?

Un mouvement d’extrême gauche 1 Parti communiste (PC) 2 Parti socialiste (PS) 3 Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) 4 Les Verts 5 Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Tradition (CPNT) 6 Démocratie libérale (DL) 7 Union pour la Démocratie française (UDF) 8 Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) 9 Front National (MNR comme FN) 10 Un mouvement régionaliste 11 Autres (préciser) 12 Vote blanc 13

Ne votera pas 14 NSP/N’a pas encore décidé 15 N’est pas inscrit sur les listes électorales 16

Refus 17

Q30 Et si des élections régionales avaient lieu demain, pour quel parti voteriez- vous ?

Un mouvement d’extrême gauche 1 Parti communiste (PS) 2 Parti socialiste (PS) 3 Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) 4 Les Verts 5 Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Tradition (CPNT) 6 Démocratie libérale (DL) 7 Union pour la Démocratie française (UDF) 8 Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) 9 Front National (MNR comme FN) 10 Un mouvement régionaliste 11 Autres ( préciser) 12 Vote Blanc 13 Ne votera pas 14 NSP/N’a pas encore décidé 15 N’est pas inscrit sur les listes électorales 16

Refus 17

MERCI

School of European Studies Cardiff University Humanities Building Colum Drive PO Box 908 Cardiff CF10 3YQ

‘Devolution and Decentralisation in Wales and Brittany’ Research Project

This questionnaire forms part of a large comparative research project into ‘Devolution and Decentralisation in Wales and Brittany’, financed as part of the Economic and Social Research Council’s Devolution and Constitutional Change programme. The project compares the politics, policies and polity building dynamics of devolution in Wales and decentralisation in the French region of Brittany. Through making comparisons in the area of training and language policy management, the project seeks to identify useful lessons for policy-makers on both sides of the channel, to test the underlying legitimacy of new forms of regional governance and to make recommendations for future public policy.

We would be very grateful if you were able to take the time to fill in this questionnaire. We have identified you as forming part of our informed opinion sample and your opinion will be greatly valued

ESRC Grant number L291 25 2007 R001W Page1

The questionnaire is organised in four parts. First we will ask you a series of questions about Wales and the way it is governed. These might appear to be very general, but it is important for methodological reasons for us to pose exactly the same questions to our mass and informed opinion samples. Second we will ask rather more precise questions in two areas of importance for our study: attitudes towards the Welsh language and to training policy. Finally, we will ask you a series of questions about yourself in order to make sure that we have a representative sample.

We recognise that some of the questions are likely to be more directly relevant to your experience than others. We would prefer you to answer all questions, but you may limit your answers to your own area of expertise (training or language)

SECTION A Firstly, we would like to ask you some questions about Wales and the way it is governed

Strongly in favour o In favour o Against o Strongly against o

Page 2

Q2 Would you please indicate your opinion on the following statements about the national Assembly for Wales. Do you agree strongly, agree , disagree or disagree strongly that…?

Please place a tick in the box that most closely corresponds to your opinion.

Agree Agree Disagree Disagree strongly strongly

The quality of public services has improved under the Assembly The say of people in decision-making has improved under the Assembly The existence of the Assembly has given Wales more lobbying power within the UK government The Assembly treats all regions within Wales fairly

Q3A If the Assembly had more money to spend, what do you think should be its first priority in terms of spending?

Q3B And what should be its second priority for spending?

Q4 There is a debate about the future of devolution in Wales. Which of these statements comes closest to your view?

Wales should become independent o Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament, which has law-making and taxation powers o Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected assembly, which has limited law-making powers only o Wales should remain part of the UK without an elected assembly o

Page 3

Q5 How important do you think the following institutions and actors are for influencing the policies that govern Wales?

Please place a tick in the box that most closely corresponds to your opinion.

Very Fairly Not very Not at all Important Important important important The UK government The Assembly and Assembly sponsored public bodies Private Businesses Trade Unions The voluntary sector Local government The European Union

Q6 What are the three main challenges that Wales currently faces?

Page 4

Q7 If you had to choose, which one of the following best describes the way you think of yourself?

Welsh, not British o More Welsh than British o Equally Welsh and British o More British than Welsh o British not Welsh o

Q8 Do you personally feel very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be….?

Very Fairly Not very Not Not proud proud proud at all Applicable proud Welsh British European

If not applicable please state why.

SECTION B

The Welsh language and its role in the future

Q9 Which of the following best describes the amount of Welsh you can speak and understand?

I am fluent in Welsh o I can speak and understand Welsh fairly well o I can speak and understand some Welsh o I can say and understand a few basic words of Welsh o I can’t speak or understand any Welsh at all o

Page 5

Q10 Would you please indicate your opinion on the following statements about the Welsh language. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly that…?

Agree Agree Disagree Disagree strongly Strongly

The Welsh language is an important part of Welsh identity Children in Wales should be taught Welsh until the age of 16 All children in Wales should be educated bilingually, in Welsh and English, until the age of 16 Wales needs to train more bilingual Welsh and English speakers to fulfil the requirements in politics, business and the professions in Wales Certain jobs in Wales should be reserved for bilingual Welsh and English speakers There should be restrictions on in- migrants buying properties in predominantly Welsh-speaking areas Welsh national life should increasingly be bilingual, that is Welsh and English

Q11 How important do you think the following bodies are for influencing policy towards the Welsh language?

Please place a tick in the box that most closely corresponds to your opinion.

Very Fairly Not very Not at all Important Important important Important The UK government The Assembly and Assembly sponsored public bodies Private Businesses Trade Unions The voluntary sector Local government The European Union

Page 6

Q12 Which should be the primary political institution that makes decisions on the Welsh language? Should it be…?

The UK Government o The Assembly o Local government o The European Union o

Another body (PLEASE SPECIFY)

Q13A Do you maintain regular contacts with those responsible for decision-making in the field of Welsh language activities ?

Yes o No o

Q13B If so, who are your three main contacts in this area?

Q14 What are the two main lessons that language policy makers in Wales can learn from experiences in other countries?

Page 7

Q15 Are you in contact with language policy makers in other European countries? If so which ones in order of frequency?

SECTION C Training and employment

Q16 Have you personally been on any sort of training course in the last 24 months.

Yes o No o

Q17 Here are a series of statements about priorities for spending money on training in Wales. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with each one

Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Strongly Strongly

Training Funds should be managed directly by business leaders

Training funds should be distributed mainly to the poorer parts of Wales

Training funds should be given to the unemployed as a priority

Training funds should be available to everybody

Page 8

Q18 There follows a series of statements about who should make decisions concerning training policy in Wales. Please indicate which ones you most agree with in order of preference.

Business leaders should mainly decide on training priorities in Wales o Social partners (employers and trade unions) should mainly decide on training priorities in Wales o Government agencies should mainly decide on training priorities in Wales o

Q19 There is an ongoing debate about who should pay for training. In your opinion, which of the following institutions or actors should pay for people in Wales to be trained? Please indicate which option best reflects your first preference and then your second preference.

1st preference 2nd preference

UK Government The Assembly Local government Private Businesses Trade Unions The voluntary sector Individuals should pay for their own training The European Union

Another body (PLEASE SPECIFY)

Page 9

Q20 Which of the following measures do you think would be most effective in improving the training of young people in Wales? Please indicate which option best reflects your first preference and then your second preference.

1st preference 2nd preference

Giving all young people training grants Increasing the number of apprenticeships Strengthening the local careers services Strengthening vocational education Making it easier to get into higher education

Q21 Which one of the following is the better type of training, in your opinion?

One that secures paid employment straight away o One that leads to a lasting qualification o

Q22 Should government impose a training tax on businesses with over 10 employees in Wales to improve the general skills level?

Yes o No o

Q23 Should there be a legal requirement that organisations with over 10 employees train their workforce?

Yes o No o

Page 10

Q24 How important do you think the following institutions and actors are for influencing training policies in Wales?

Please place a tick in the box that most closely corresponds to your opinion.

Q25 Which should be the primary political institution that makes decisions on training policy in Wales? Should it be…?

The UK Government o The Assembly o Local government o The European Union o

Another body (PLEASE SPECIFY)

Q26A Do you maintain regular contacts with those responsible for decision-making in the field of training policy activities ?

Yes o No o

Page 11

Q27B If so, who are your three main contacts in this area?

Q28 What are the two main lessons that training policy makers in Wales can learn from experiences in other countries?

Q29 Are you in contact with training policy makers in other European countries? If so, which ones in order of frequency?

Page 12

SECTION D Personal characteristics

Q30 In which region of Wales do you live?

NW Wales - Conwy o Gwynedd o Anglesey o

NE Wales - Denbighshire o Flintshire o Wrexham o

SW & Mid Wales - Pembrokeshire o Carmarthenshire o Swansea o Ceredigion o Powys o

Valleys - Blaenau Gwent o Caerphilly o Neath Port Talbot o Rhondda Cynon Taff o Torfaen o Merthyr Tydfil o

SE Wales - Bridgend o Monmouthshire o Newport o Vale of Glamorgan o

Cardiff - Cardiff o

Outside of Wales-

Page 13

Q31 If a General Election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?

Conservative o Green Party o Labour o Liberal Democrat o Plaid Cymru o The Independent Wales Party o UK Independence Party o Refused o Won’t vote o Too young to vote o

Other (PLEASE SPECIFY)

Q32 If an Assembly Election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?

Conservative o Green Party o Labour o Liberal Democrat o Plaid Cymru o The Independent Wales Party o UK Independence Party o Refused o Won’t vote o Too young to vote o

Other (PLEASE SPECIFY)

Q33 How would you describe your level of interest in politics ?

Very interested o Interested o Not very interested o Not at all interested o

Page 14

Q34 How would you describe your current working status?

Employed – full time o Employed – part time o Self employed o Unemployed o Student o Retired o Housewife o Not working o

Q35 What sex are you ?

Male o Female o

Q36 Were you born in Wales

Yes o No o

Q37 How long have you lived in Wales ?

Less than 1 year o 1-5 years o 6-10 years o 11-20 years o Over 20 years o

Q38 Which of these age bands do you fall into ?

16 – 17 o 18 – 24 o 25 – 34 o 35 – 44 o 45 – 54 o 55 – 64 o 65+ o

Page 15

Q39 Are you….?

Married o Living with a partner o Single o Divorced/separated o Widowed o

Q40 How many children in full time education do you have, if any?

1 o 2 o 3 o 4 or more o

None o

Q41 What is the highest level of qualifications you have obtained?

None - I have no formal qualifications o CSE/s or NVQ1 or Foundation GNVQ o GCSE/s or O Level/s or NVQ2 or Intermediate GNVQ o Technical or vocational qualification/s eg City and Guilds, BTEC o A or AS Levels or NVQ3 or Advanced GNVQ o Nursing qualification o International Baccalaureate o Teachers Training Qualification o First degree or NVQ4 o Postgraduate qualification/higher degree or NVQ5 o

Other British qualifications (please specify)

Thank you for answering this questionnaire

Page 16

La décentralisation régionale au Pays de Galles et en Bretagne

Projet de recherche financé par le conseil scientifique britannique (Economic and Social Research Council)

Questionnaire à renvoyer à l’attention du Professeur Alistair Cole Chercheur associé au Centre de Recherches Administratives et Politiques Unité associée au CNRS/URA 984 Institut d’ Etudes Politiques de Rennes 104 Bd de la Duchesse Anne 35700 Rennes CEDEX

Ou par courrier électronique à [email protected]

Ce questionnaire fait partie d’un projet de recherche comparatif sur les nouvelles formes de gouvernance régionale en Europe. Nous cherchons à comparer les édifices institutionnels, les systèmes d’acteurs et la gestion de l’action publique dans deux régions à forte identité – le Pays de Galles et la Bretagne. Notre problématique nous amène à concentrer nos recherches dans trois domaines privilégiés: la construction institutionnelle au niveau régional, la gestion des langues dites “régionales” et la formation professionnelle. Projet de sciences politiques, notre projet cherche également à identifer les leçons pratiques que les décideurs peuvent tirer par le biais d’une comparaison rigoureuse et multi-dimensionelle.

Dans la mesure où nous vous avons identifié comme un acteur important, nous vous saurions gré de bien vouloir remplir ce questionnaire. Cela devrait pas prendre plus de quinze minutes.

En vous remerciant vivement et dans l’attente de votre réponse, je vous prie d’agréer, Madame, Monsieur, mes salutations les plus distinguées.

ESRC Grant number L 219 25 2007 R068F Page 1

Tout d’abord, nous vous proposons une série de questions sur la Bretagne et la manière dont elle est gouvernée. Ces questions vous paraîtront sans doute très simples et très générales. En effet,pour des raisons méthologiques nous souhaitons les poser exactement dans les mêmes termes aux décideurs et à l’homme de la rue.

Suivront deux séries de questions, plus précises et plus techniques, concernant sucessivement le domaine de la gestion des langues régionales, d’une part, et celui de la formation professionnelle d’autre part.

Enfin, la quatrième partie du questionnaire est constituée de questions plus précises afin de vérifier que l’échantillon des personnes interrogées soit représentatif.

Première partie

La Bretagne et la manière de gouverner la Bretagne

D’abord je voudrais vous poser quelques questions sur la Bretagne et la manière de gouverner la Bretagne.

Q1 Le Conseil Régional de Bretagne existe depuis 15 ans comme collectivité territoriale élue. Vous personnellement, faites-vous confiance au Conseil Régional pour assurer le développement de la Bretagne

Tout à fait o Assez o Pas tout à fait o Pas du tout o

Q2 Vous personnellement, pensez-vous que le Conseil régional traite toutes les parties de la Bretagne de la même manière. Te

Tout à fait o Assez o Pas tout à fait o Pas du tout o

Page 2

Q3 Vous personnellement, pensez-vous que l’existence du conseil régional renforce le poids de la Bretagne à Paris ?

Tout à fait o Assez o Pas tout à fait o Pas du tout o

Q4 Si votre Région avait de l’argent en plus à dépenser, dans quel domaine devrait-elle l’investir en priorité ? Vous pouvez citer deux domaines, par ordre de préférence.

1 2

Q5 Êtes-vous très favorable, plutôt favorable, peu favorable ou pas favorable du tout au rattachement du département de la Loire Atlantique à la Région Bretagne ?

Très favorable o Plutôt favorable o Peu favorable o Pas favorable du tout o

Q6 Il y a aujourd’ hui en France un débat sur le degré de décentralisation. Quelle est votre préférence pour l’avenir de la Bretagne ?

Abolir le Conseil Régional o Maintenir un Conseil Régional aux pouvoirs limités o Doter le Conseil régional de pouvoirs législatifs et fiscaux o La Bretagne devrait être autonome o

Page 3

Q7 De manière générale, pensez-vous que les institutions ou les acteurs suivants jouent un rôle très important, assez important, pas très important, ou pas important du tout dans la gouvernance de la Bretagne.

très Assez pas très pas important important important important du tout L’État central Les services déconcentrés de l’Etat en Bretagne Le conseil régional Les entreprises Les collectivités locales Les associations L’Union Européenne

Q8 A votre avis, dans une perspective d’avenir , quels sont les trois principaux défis auxquels sont confrontés les décideurs régionaux en Bretagne ?

Page 4 3

Q9 Vous personnellement, vous sentez-vous :

Breton, pas Français o Plus Breton que Français o Autant Breton que Français o Plus Français que Breton o Français, pas Breton o

Q10 Êtes-vous très fier, plutôt fier, plutôt pas fier ou pas fier du tout :

Très fier Plutôt fier Plutôt pas fier Pas fier du tout d’être breton d’être français d’être européen

Deuxième partie

La langue bretonne et son rôle dans l’avenir.

Q11 Laquelle des phrases suivantes résume le mieux votre situation ?

Je parle le breton couramment o Je peux parler et comprendre le breton assez bien o Je peux parler et comprendre le breton un peu o Je peux dire et comprendre quelques mots en breton o Je ne parle pas et ne comprends pas du tout le breton o

Page 5

Q12 Voici quelques déclarations sur la langue bretonne. Êtes-vous tout à fait d’accord, assez d’accord, pas tout à fait d’accord ou pas du tout d’accord avec leur contenu ?

Tout à Assez Pas tout à Pas du tout fait d’accord fait d’accord d’accord d’accord

La langue bretonne est un élément important de l’identité bretonne.

Il faudrait former plus de personnes qui parlent breton pour occuper des postes dans l’administration et la politique.

Certains emplois en Bretagne devraient être réservés à des personnes bilingues, c’est-à-dire pouvant parler le breton et le français

Il faut donner des aides publiques aux médias bretonnants.

Il faut donner des aides publiques aux associations bretonnontes

Q13 Avec laquelle de ces phrases êtes-vous le plus d’accord ?

Le breton ne devrait pas être enseigné à l’école o Les enfants qui le souhaitent devraient pouvoir apprendre le breton à l’école o Tous les enfants de Bretagne devraient apprendre le breton à l’école, sauf avis contraire des parents o Tous les enfants de la Bretagne devraient apprendre le breton à l’école o

Page 6 Q14 Êtes-vous très favorable, assez favorable, pas très favorable ou pas du tout favorable à l’intégration des Écoles diwan dans le service national d ’éducation ?

très favorable o assez favorable o pas très favorable o pas du tout favorable o

Q15 On cherche maintenant à élucider l’influence de diverses institutions ou acteurs dans le domaine de la langue bretonne. Pensez-vous que les institutions ou les acteurs suivants ont une influence très importante, assez importante, pas très importante, ou pas importante du tout sur les décisions prises concernant la langue bretonne

Très Assez Pas très Pas importante importante importante importante du tout L’État central Les services déconcentrés de l’Etat en Bretagne Le conseil régional Les entreprises Les collectivités locales Les associations L’Union Européenne

Q16 Parmi ces acteurs (ou d’autres) quel est, à votre avis, celui qui devrait prendre les décisions les plus importantes concernant la langue bretonne ?

Q17 Avez-vous des contacts reguliers avec les acteurs intervenant dans le domaine de la langue bretonne ? Si oui, qui sont vos trois interlocuteurs principaux dans ce domaine ?

Page 7

Q18 Êtes vous en contact avec des acteurs intervenant dans le domaine des langues régionales dans d’autres pays européens? Si oui, lesquel(s).

Q19 Avez-vous entendu parler d’actions publiques visant à soutenir les langues régionales dans d’autres régions en Europe. Si oui, lesquelles?

Q20 Pensez-vous que la Bretagne devrait s’inspirer des régions européennes qui ont mis en place des politiques très volontaristes pour soutenir les langues régionales?

Q21 Y a-t-il des leçons dans le domaine de la gestion des langues régionales que la France peut tirer d’autres pays. Lesquelles ?

Page 8

Troisième partie

La formation professionnelle.

Q22 D’abord, avez-vous suivi un stage de formation au cours des derniers vingt-quatre mois ?

Oui o Non o

On va maintenant vous poser quelques questions sur la formation professionnelle.

Q23 Parmi les mesures suivantes, lesquelles vous paraissent les plus efficaces pour améliorer la formation professionnelle des jeunes ? Vous pouvez indiquer deux choix en ordre de priorité.

Créer des congés individuels de formation pour tout jeune o Encourager les jeunes à devenir des apprentis o Développer l’information sur les formations et leurs débouchés o Valoriser l’enseignement professionnel o Renforcer l’enseignement supérieur o

Q24 A votre avis, une bonne formation est-elle :

celle qui permet de trouver très vite un emploi o celle qui donne une qualification durable o

Q25 Êtes-vous tout à fait d’accord, assez d’accord, pas tout à fait d’accord ou pas du tout d’accord avec l’idée que la loi sur les 35 heures incite à un plus grand effort individuel de formation hors du temps de travail ?

Tout à fait d’accord o Assez d’accord o Pas tout à fait d’accord o Pas du tout d’accord o

Page 9 Q26 Voici une série de propositions plus générales concernant l’usage des ressources publiques de la formation professionnelle en Bretagne. Veuillez nous dire si vous êtes tout à fait d’accord, assez d’accord, pas tout à fait d’accord ou pas du tout d’accord avec les propositions suivantes :

Tout à fait Assez Pas tout à fait Pas du d’accord d’accord d’accord tout d’ accord Les ressources publiques de la formation professionnelle devraient être versées aux entreprises en priorité

Les ressources publiques de la formation professionnelle devraient être destinées en priorité aux zones les plus pauvres de la Bretagne.

Les ressources publiques de la formation professionnelle devraient être destinées en priorité aux chômeurs

Les ressources publiques de la formation professionnelle devraient être accessibles à tout le monde.

Q27 Qui doit, à votre avis, déterminer les priorités en matière de formation professionnelle ? Veuillez indiquer vos choix en ordre de préférence

Les entreprises o Les partenaires sociaux, c’est-à-dire les syndicats d’employeurs et de salariés o Les pouvoirs publics o

Page 10

Q28 On cherche aussi à élucider l’influence de diverses institutions ou acteurs dans le domaine de la formation professionnelle en Bretagne. Pensez-vous que les institutions ou les acteurs suivants jouent un rôle très important, assez important, pas très important ou pas important du tout sur les décisions prises concernant la formation professionnelle ?

très assez pas très pas important important important important du tout L’État central Les services déconcentrés de l’Etat en Bretagne Le conseil régional Les entreprises Les collectivités locales Les associations Les partenaires sociaux L’Union Européenne

Q29 Parmi ces acteurs (ou d’autres) quel est, à votre avis, celui qui devrait prendre les décisions les plus importantes concernant la formation professionnelle en Bretagne ?

Q30 Selon vous, quelles institutions ou quels acteurs devraient financer en priorité les actions de formation professionnelle en Bretagne? Veuillez inscrire les chiffres 1 et 2 en face de vos choix en ordre de préférence.

L’ État o Le Conseil Régional o Les employeurs o Les individus bénéficaires de formation o Les collectivités locales o (communes, conseils généraux) L’ Union européenne o

Page 11

Q31 Avez-vous des contacts reguliers avec les acteurs intervenant dans le domaine de la formation professionnelle en Bretagne? Si oui, qui sont vos trois interlocuteurs principaux dans ce domaine ?

Q32 Êtes-vous en contact avec des acteurs de la formation professionnelle en d’autres pays Européens? Si oui, qui sont vos contacts les plus proches?

Q33 Y a-t-il des leçons précises que les décideurs de la formation professionnelle peuvent tirer des expériences étrangères ? Lesquelles?

Page 12

Quatrième partie

Enfin, les dernières questions vous concernent vous plus particulièrement; elles nous permettent de vérifier que nous nous adressons à un échantillon représentatif.

Q34a Quel est votre département de résidence?

Ille-et-Vilaine ; Cotes d’Armor ; Finistère ; Morbihan ; Loire Atlantique, autre.

Q34b Il existe à l’intérieur de la Bretagne vingt-et-un ‘pays’. Habitez-vous dans un de ces pays?

Pays de Fougères o Pays de Vitré o Pays de Rennes o Pays de Vallons de Vilaine o

Pays de Saint-Malo o Pays de Dinan o Pays de Brocéliande o Pays de Redon et de Vilaine o

Pays du Centre-Est Bretagne o Pays du Centre-Bretagne o Pays de Saint-Brieuc o Pays de Vannes o

Pays de Pontivy o Pays d’Auray o Pays de Lorient o Pays du Centre-Ouest Bretagne o

Pays de Guingamp o Pays de Lannion-Trégor-Goëlo o Pays de Morlaix o Pays de Cornouaille o Pays de Brest o

Page 13 Q35 Quelle est actuellement votre situation professionnelle ?

Salarié – temps plein o Salarié – temps partiel o Profession libérale o Au chômage o Etudiant o Retraité o Homme ou Femme au foyer o En Formation o (stages, Contrat Emploi-Solidarité…) Ne travaille pas o

Q36 Quelle est la fonction du chef de famille dans votre foyer?

Cadre supérieur o profession intellectuelle supérieure o chef d’entreprise o Profession intermédiaire o artisan o agriculteur o Employé o Ouvrier o Sans activité professionnelle o retraité o étudiant o

Q37 Êtes-vous né en Bretagne ?

Q38 Depuis combien de temps habitez-vous en Bretagne ?

Moins d’un an o 1-5 ans o 6-10 ans o 11-20 ans o Plus de 20 ans o Depuis toujours o

Page 14 Q39 Quel age avez-vous?

16 – 18 ans o 18- 24 ans o 25 – 34 ans o 35 – 44 ans o 45 – 54 ans o 55 – 64 ans o 65 ans et plus o

Q40 Etes-vous….?

Marié o Vivant maritalement o Célibataire o Divorcé/séparé o Veuf / veuve o PACSE(e) o

Q41 Avez-vous des enfants scolarisés à plein temps ? Si oui, combien ?

1 o 2 o 3 o 4 ou plus o

Aucun o

Q42 Quel est le dernier diplôme que vous avez eu ?

Q43 Est-ce que vous vous intéressez à la politique beaucoup, un peu, pas beaucoup, pas du tout.

Beaucoup o un peu o pas beaucoup o pas du tout o

Page 15 Q44 Si des élections législatives avaient lieu demain, pour quel parti voteriez-vous ?

Un mouvement d’extrême gauche o Parti communiste (PS) o Parti socialiste (PS) o Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) o Les Verts o Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Tradition (CPNT) o Démocratie libérale (DL) o Union pour la Démocratie française (UDF) o Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) o Front National (MNR comme FN) o Un mouvement régionaliste o Autres ( préciser) o Vote blanc o Ne votera pas o NSP/N’a pas encore décidé o N’est pas inscrit sur les listes électorales o

Q45 Et si des élections régionales avaient lieu demain, pour quel parti voteriez-vous ?

Un mouvement d’extrême gauche o Parti communiste (PS) o Parti socialiste (PS) o Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) o Les Verts o Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Tradition (CPNT) o Démocratie libérale (DL) o Union pour la Démocratie française (UDF) o Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) o Front National (MNR comme FN) o Un mouvement régionaliste o Autres ( préciser) o Vote Blanc o Ne votera pas o NSP/N’a pas encore décidé o N’est pas inscrit sur les listes électorales o

MERCI Page 16 An digreizennail rannvroel e Kernbre hag e Breizh

Raktres enklask arc’ hantaouet gant ar C’ huzul skiantel breizhveurat (Economic and Social Research Council)

Goulennaoueg da adkas d’an Ao. Kelenner Alistair Cole Klasker ezel eus Kreizenn an Enklaskod Melestradurel ha Politikel Unvezh kevredet ouzh ar CNRS/URA 984 Ensavadur ar Studioti Politikei Roazhon 104 Bd an Dugez Anna 35700 Roazhon CEDEX

Pe dre hostel d’ar chomlec’h-ma?i : ColeA@Cardiff .ac.uk

Dent a ra ar c’houlennaoueg-mafi da harpaii ur raktres enklask a-berm kefiveriaii ar stummod gouarn rannvroel nevez en Europa. Ensavadurioil, reizhiadod obererien ha mererezh obererezh foran div rannvro dezho ur bersonelezh kreilv - Kembre ha Breizh - a glaskomp Iakaat keiiver-ha-keilver. Evit kas an enklask da berm vat hon eus ranket dibab ha plediii gant tri domani pennail : ar c’hrouifi ensavadurioii da live ar rannvro, mererezh ar yezhob a reer “rannvroel” anezho hag ar stummerezh micherel. Estreget gant tachenn ar skiantod politikel e fell dimp pledifi paglaskomp termenifi ar c’hentelioG a c’hell ar bolitikourien tennafi ha Iakaat e pleustr diwar ur geilveriadenn strizh ha da Iiveoii lies.

O vezailma sellompouzhoc’h evel ouzh un oberer a-bouez e vo stad ennomp ma teurvezit Ieuniail ar c’houlennaoueg- maii. Ne zlefec’h ket bezail ouzhpenn pemzek munut o Ieuniafi anezhi.

Ho trugarekaat a reomp a-greiz kalon ha gortoz ho respont. Degemerit, Aotrounez hag Itronezed, ma gwellaiT gourc’hemennoO.

E5CRGrant number L219252007R111F Pajenn 1 ba gregiil ganti e kinnigomp deoc’ h ur rummad goulennod a denn da Vreizh ha d ‘an doare ma vez gouarnet. Sur a-wale’h e kavoc’h anezho gwall eeun ha Iedan-tre o zachenn, rak evit heuliail an hentenn Iakaet ganeomp hon eus bet c’hoant da sevel ar goulennoii en ur implijout rik ar memes pozioh koulz gant ar bolitikourien ha gant an darn vrasati.

Goude-se e vo kinniget deoc ‘h pledifi gant daou rummad goulenno~ all, un tamm resisoc’ h ha teknikeloc’ h, an eil o tennaii da zomani mererezh ar yezhoti rannvro hag egile da hini ar stummerezh micherel.

Evit echuiii gant ar pevare Iodenn e vo graet goulennoii spisoc’ h ouzhoc’ h a-berm bezafi suremafiholl wiskado~ar boblails e stancfilhon an dud goulennataet.

Lodenn gentafi

Breizh hag an doare ma vez gouarnet Breizh

Da gentail-penn em befe c ‘hoant d’ober an nebeud goulenno&mati ouzhoc’ h diwar-berm Breizh hag an doare ma vez gouarnet.

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Sur tre Q Tamm-pe-damm D Pas tre Q Tamm ebet c1

G2 Ha sohjal a ra deoc’h-c’hwi e pled ar C’huzul-rannvro kenkoulz gant pep Iodenn eus Breizh ?

Sur tre c1 Tamm-pe-damm c1 Pas tre c1 Tamm ebet c1

E.SCR Grant number L219252007R111F Paienn 2 G3 Ha sofijal a ra deoc’ h-c’ hwi ez eus, a-drugarez d’ar C’ huzul-rannvro, muioc’h a bouez gant Breizhe Pariz? ,

Sur tre cl Tamm-pe-damm c1 Pas tre c1 Tamm ebet c1

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1 2

G5 AdstagaR departamant al Liger-Atlantel ouzh Rannvro Breizh : a-du krenn, a-du a- wale’h,untamm a-eneppea-enep krennemaoc’h ?

A-dukrenn Q A-du a-wale’ h Q Un tamm a-enep c1 A-enepkrenn Cl

G6 Er mare-mail ez eus divizoh diwar-berm derez an digreizennati e Frai%. Petra zo gwell ganeoc’ h evit dazont Breizh ?

TerriRar C’huzul-rannvro c1 Chomgant urC’huzul-rannvro met gantgalloudod bevennet a Pourvezati galloudod lezennadurel ha kemedel d’ar C’huzul-rannvro Cl Emren a rankfe bezati Breizh D

ESCRGrantnumber L219252007R111F Pajenn 3 G7 Drevras, hasofijal aradeoc'h odeusan ensavaduriod peanobererien-mafi ullevezona- bouez-bras, pouezus a-wale’h, dister a-wale’h pe dister a-grenn war doare gouarn Breizh ?

A-bouez-bras Pouezus Dister Dister a-wale’h a-wale’h a-grenn ArStadkreiz Servijoh ar Stad diqreizennet e Breizh ArC’huzul-rannvro An embregerezhiod Ar strollegezhiod Iec’ hel Ar c’hevredigezhiod Unaniezh Europa

G8 War ho meno, petra eo an 3 dae pennafi a zlef e politikourien rannvroel Breizh tree’ hifi warno war hir-dermen ?

ESCR Grant number L 219252007 R1llF Pajenn 4 3

G9 Piv oc’h-c’ hwi, hervez ho santimant ?

Breizhat on, n’on ket gall c1 Muioc’ h breizhat on eget gall cl Koulz breizhat ha gall on c1 Muioc’h gall on eget breizhat Q Gall on, n’on ket breizhat c1

610 Lore’h don zo ennoc’ h, un tamm fouge zo ennoc’h, n’eus ket kalz stad ennoc’h pe n’eo ket brav deoc’ h tamm ebet ?

Lore’ h don Un tamm fouge N’eus ket kalz N’ eo ket brav zo ennon... zo ennon... stad ennon... din tamm ebet...

bezati breizhat bezail gall I bezafi europat

Eil Iodenn

Ar brezhoneg hag e roll endazont.

G11 Pe hini eus ar f razenno&mai3 a glot ar gwellail ganeoc’ h-c’ hwi ?

Brav e teu ar brezhoneg ganin c1 Aes a-wale’ h eo din komz ha kompren brezhoneg c1 Komz ha kompren a ran un tamm brezhoneg c1 Distagail ha kompren a ran un nebeud poziod e brezhoneg D Ne gomzan ket brezhoneg ha ne gomprenan ket anezhati tamm ebet c1

E.SCR Grant number L 219252007 R1llF Paienn 5 612 Sed amati un nebeud diskl~riadurioh diwar-berm ar brezhoneg. A-du krenn, a-du a- wale’ h, un tamm a-enep pe a-enep krenn emaoc’ h gant ar pezh a vez embannet enno ?

A-du A-du Un tamm A-enep krenn a-wale’ h a-enep krenn

A-bouez eo ar brezhoneg er vreizhadelezh.

Ret e vefe stummafi muioc’h a dud o komz brezhoneg a-berm mont war bostofi melestradurel ha politikel.

Lod eus an implijoil e Breizh a rankfe bezafi gouestlet da dud divyezhek hag a c’ hall komz brezhoneg koulz ha galleg.

Ret eo reiti skoaziadennoti publik d’ar media e brezhoneg.

Ret eo reiil skoaziadennoil publik d ‘ar c‘ hevredigezhiod e brezhoneg.

G13 Pe hini eus ar f razennoknafi a zere ar gwellati deoc’ h ?

Ar brezhoneg n’en deus ket e bias er skol Q Ar vugale c’ hoant ganto da zeskifi brezhoneg a zlef e bezafi roet an tu dezho d‘ en ober er skol c1 An hell vugale e Breizh a zlefe deskiti brezhoneg er skol, nemet e savje o zud a-enep cl An hell vugale e Breizh a zlefe deski?i brezhoneg er skol c1

ESCR Grant numb~.r I 71q ?5 2007 RIIIF Paiwn 6 G14 Degemer ar Skoliod Oiwan e-barzh an beskadurezh-Stad : a-du krenn, a-du a-wale’ h, un tamm a-enep pe a-enep krenn emaoc’h ?

A-dukrenn D A-du a-wale’ h Cl Un tarnm a-enep Q A-enep krenn Q

615 Bremati evostudiet levezon anensavaduriod peanobererien abepseurt wardachennar brezhoneg. Hasofijal aradeoc'h odeusan ensavaduriob peanobererien-mafiul Ievezon a-bouez-bras, pouezus a-wale’h, dister a-wale’h pe dister a-grenn war an divizoti kemeret evit a sell ouzh ar brezhoneg ?

I A-bouez-bras Pouezus Dister Oister a-wale’ h a-wale’ h a-grenn Ar Stad kreiz I Servijod ar Stad I I I I I diqreizennet e Breizh Ar C’ huzul-rannvro An embreqerezhiod Ar strollegezhioti Iec’hel Ar c’ hevredigezhiob Unaniezh Europa

616 E-touez anobererien-mafi (pereall), pehinia zlefekemer andivizod pennafia-zivoutar brezhoneg, war ho meno ?

G17 Ha darempredod reoliek a vagit gant an obererien a bled gant tachenn ar brezhoneg ? Ma rit, gant piv e tarempredit ar muiail ?

1 2 3

ESCR Grant number L 219252007 R1llF Pajenn 7 618 Haliammaiia rit darempredodg ant obererienabledgant tachennar yezhod-rannvroe broio~ all en Europa ? Ma rit, pe re ?

619 Ha klevet ho peus komz e rannvroiofi all Europa eus obererezhiod foran zo o fal harpail ar yezhod-rannvro ?

G20 Ha sofijal a ra deoc’ h e tlef e Breizh kemer skouer war rannvroiod all en Europa e-lee’ h m’o deus diazezet politikerezhiod Ieviafi a-berm harpail ar yezhod-rannvro ?

G21 Ha kenteliofi a zo a c’ hall tenna?i Fratis eus skiant-prenail ar broiod all war dachenn mererezh ar yezho&rannvro ? Pe re ?

ESCR Grant number L 219252007 R1llF Paienn 8 Trede Iodenn

Arstummerezh micherel.

G22 Dagentaii, hagurstaj stummaiiho peus bet troda’heuliaii e-kerzhar pevar miz warn- ugenttremen ?

Ya Q N’am eus ket Cl

Bremafi e vo graet un nebeud goulennod ouzhoc’ h war ar stummerezh micherel.

623 E-touez an diarbennoh-maii, pe re a seblant deoc’ h bezail ar re ef edusail a-berm gwellaat stummerezh micherel ar re yaouank ? 2 ginnig a c’hallit dibab, da gentail an hini zo gwell ganeoc’h.

Krouifi ehanod stummati hiniennel evit an hell re yaouank Q Broudati ar re yaouank da zont da zeskidi Cl Diorren an titouriti war ar stummafi hag ar fred c1 Prizail ar c’ helennadurezh micherel Q Kretivaat ar c’ helennadurezh uhel Q

G24 War ho meno, ur stummadur a rank :

reifi da gavout fred buan-tre c1 reiil da gaout ur perzhekadur pad c1

G25 Lezenn ar 35 eurvezh a vroudfe pep hini d’en em stummail muioc’h e-maez an amzer Iabour. Petra eo ho sofij ? A-du krenn, a-du a-wale’h, un tamm a-enep, a-enep krenn ?

A-du krenn Cl A-du a-wale’h c1 Un tamm a-enep Cl A-enep krenn c1

ESCR Grant number L 21925 200712111F Pajenn 9 626 Sed amaii un toullad kinnigod hollekoc’h diwar-berm implij pinvidigezhiod foran ar stummerezh micherel e Breizh. Oiskouezit deomp hag-efi emaoc’ h a-du krenn, a-du a- walc’ h, un tamm a-enep pe a-enep krenn, mar plij.

A-du krenn A-du Un tamm A-enep a-wale’h a-enep krenn Pinvidigezhiod foran ar stummerezh micherel a zlef e bezafi roet d ‘an embregerezhiod kentail-wellail

Pinvidigezhiod foran ar stummerezh micherel a zlefe bezail gouestlet d ‘an takado~ paourafi e Breizh kentati-wellafi.

Pinvidigezhiod foran ar stummerezh micherel a zlefe bezafi gouestlet d ‘an dud dilabour kentai?-wellail

PinvidigezhioL foran ar stummerezh micherel a zlefe bezafi d’an hell.

G27 War ho meno, piv a rank termeniil an divizod pennati da gemer a-f et stummerezh micherel ? Merkit ho tibabod, da gentafi an hini zo gwell ganeoc’h.

An embregerezhiod Q Ar gevelerien sokial, sindikadoil implijerien hag implijidi anezho L1 Ar pennadurezhiod Q

ESCR Grant number L 219252007 RI1lF Paienn 10 G28 Studiet e vo Ievezon ensavaduriod pe obererien zo war ar stummerezh micherel e Breizh ivez. Ha .soi?jala ra deoc’ h o deus an ensavaduriob pe an obererien-maii UI Ievezon a- bouez-bras, pouezus a-wale’ h, dister a-wale’ h pe dister a-grenn war an divizoti kemeret a-fetstummerezh micherel?

A-bouez-bras Pouezus Dister Dister a-wale’ h a-wale’ h a-grenn Ar Stad kreiz Servijod ar Stad digreizennet e Breizh Ar C’huzul-rannvro An embregerezhiod Ar strolleqezhiod Iec’ hel Ar c’hevrediqezhioh Unaniezh Europa

G29 E-touez an obererien-mafi (pe re all), pe hini a zlefe kemer an divizod pennafi a-zivout ar stummerezh micherel e Breizh ?

G30 War ho meno, peseurt ensavaduriod pe obererien a zlef e arc’ hantaouifi oberiantiz stummerezh micherel Breizh kentati-wellail ? Merkit ar sifr 1 dirak an dibab zo gwell ganeoc’h ha 2 dirak an dibab a zeu da eil.

Ar stad c1 Ar C’ huzul-rannvro Q An implijerien Q An dud o deus ar gwir da vezati stummet U Ar strollegezhiod Iec’hel c1 (kumunioti, kuzuliod-departamant) Unaniezh Europa c1

ESCR Grant number L 219252007 R1llF Pajenn 11 G31 Ha darempredoti reoliek a vagit gant an obererien a bled gant tachenn ar stummerezh micherel e Breizh ? Ma rit, gant piv e tarempredit ar muiafi ?

2 2

G32 Ha Iiammai? a rit darempredoh gant obererien a bled gant ar stummerezh micherel e broiofi all en Europa? Ma rit, petra eo ho tarempredoti tostail ?

633 Ha kentelio~ resis a zo a c’ hall tennafi ar bolitikourien eus skiant-prenafi ar broiod estren war dachenn ar stummerezh micherel ? Pe re ?

ESCR Grant number L 219252007 R1llF Paienn 12 Pevare Iodenn

Da echuifi ganti, sed amafi goulennoil a sell muioc’ h ouzhoc’ h; a-drugarez dezho e c ‘hallomp bezati sur emaii hell wiskadotl ar boblaiis e- barzh hor standilhon.

634a E peseurt departamant emaoc’ h o chore?

11-ha-Gwilen; Aodo&an-Arvor; Penn-ar-f3ed; Mor-Bihan; Liger-Atlantel, unan all.

G35b Ur ‘vro’ warn-ugent zo e Breizh. En unan eus ar broiofi-mati emaoc’h o chore ?

Felger c1 Gwitreg D Roazhon D Kampoullennod ar Gwilen Q

Sant-Malo& c1 Dinan c1 Breselien c1 Redon hag ar Gwilen c1

Reter Kreiz Breizh Q Kreiz Breizh c1 5ant-Brieg a Gwened D

Pondivi cl An Alre cl An Oriant cl Korn6g Kreiz Breizh c1

Gwengamp c1 Lannuon Treger Gouelod c1 Montroulez c1 Kerne cl Brest Ci

ESCR Grant number L 219252007 R1llF Pajenn 13 G35 Petraeo hostadmicherel ermare-mafi?

Goprad - amzer Ieun c1 Goprcid - banter-amzer c1 Micher frank c1 Dilabour cl Studier El War ho Ieve c1 En oaled c1 E stummadur c1 (stajod, Kevrat Implij-kengred...) c1 Ne Iabourit ket c1

G36 Petra eo kefridi ar penn-tiegezh ?

Sterniad uhel c1 Micher kefredel uhel c1 Penn-embregerezh c1 Micher etre c1 Artizan c1 Labourer-douar c1 Implijad c1 Micherour c1 Oizoberiant D Retredad c1 Studier c1

637 Ha ganet oc’h bet e Breizh ?

G38 Pegeit zo emaoc’h o chore e Breizh ?

Dindan bloaz c1 1-5 bloaz c1 6-10 vloaz c1 11-20 vloaz c1 Ouzhpenn 20 vloaz 5 A-viskoazh u

ESCR Grant number L 219252007 R1llF Pajenn 14 G39 Pe oad OC’h ?

16-18 vloaz LI 18- 24 bloaz c1 25-34 bloaz c1 35-44 bloaz c1 45-54 bloaz c1 55-64 bloaz c1 65 bloaz hag ouzhpenn c1

640 Petra eo ho stad priedadel ?

Dimezet c1 O veva?i gant ur c’ h(g)avaliour(ez) c1 Dizimez c1 Dizimezet/dispartiet c1 Intafiv / Intativez c1 PACSEt c1

641 Ha bugale skoliet Ieun-amzer ho peus ? Pet ?

1 c1 2 c1 3 c1 4 pe ouzhpenn cl

Hini ebet c1

G42 Peseurt diplom ho peus bet da ziwezhafi ?

643 Ha dedennet oc’ h gant ar politikerezh ? Kalz, un tammig, pas re, tamm ebet ?

Kalz Cl Un tammig c1 Pas re c1 Tamm ebet c1

ESCR Grant number L 219252007 R1llF Pajenn 15 G44 Ma vef e dilennadegod Iezennadurel a-berm arc’ hoazh, evit peseurt strollad e votfec’ h ?

UI Iuskad tu-kleiz pellati c1 Ar strollad komunour (PC) c1 Ar strollad sokialour (PS) cl Luskad ar Geodedourien (MDC) cl ArreC’hlas c1 Chase, Pesketaerezh, Natur, Hengoun (CPNT) c1 Demokratelezh frankizour (DL) c1 Unvaniezh evit an Demokratelezh c’ hall (UDF) c1 Asambles evit ar Repubhk (RPR) c1 An Talbenn Broadel (MNR pe FN) c1 UI Iuskad ranrwroelour c1 Ur strollad all (resisait) c1 Votiti a reoc’h gwenn c1 Ne votoc’ h ket c1 Chore a reoc’ h rout/ N’ ho peus ket divizet c’ hoazh c1 N’emai3 ket hoc’h anv war roll an dilennadegob c1

645 Ha ma vef e dilennadegod rannvroel a-berm arc’ hoazh, evit peseurt strollad e votf ec’ h ?

UI Iuskad tu-kleiz pellail c1 Ar strollad komunour (PC) Q Ar strollad sokialour (PS) c1 Luskad ar Geodedourien (MDC) D Ar re C’hlas c1 Chase, Pesketaerezh, Natur, Hengoun (CPNT) c1 Demokratelezh frankizour (DL) c1 Unvaniezh evit an Demokratelezh c’hall (UDF) c1 Asambles evit ar Republik (RPR) c1 An Talbenn Broadel (MNR pe FN) c1 UI Iuskad rannvroelour c) Ur strollad all (resisait) c1 Votiil a reoc’ h gwenn c1 Ne votoc’ h ket c1 Chore a reoc’ h rout/ N’ho peus ket divizet c’hoazh L1 N’emati ket hoc’ h anv war roll an dilennadegod c1

TRUGAREZ DEOC’H

ESCR Grant number L 219252007 R1llF Paienn 16 A Thematic Guide to the Interviews

No. Iunctmn Ke} ml~nw~Ot’dwinlervleu 3 main prnblems/ Models cllalletlges/prlt} ri[lcs tbr [he t’olore —

1, Regional “fralaing Environment and Water No model [since fail of L’oanclllor. PCF Female ~Olp]O>llleOl Fo[orc of Agrn-kllmentfir} USSR) DIM AN tncios(ry Transport

2. Chamber at’ Bre[on Identitj Identity as fotore conception, No OWdCIS <’nmmcrcc, Mar!ie(iog Drit(any I1OI past Imiigc Qa]mper Graph, c Iangoage Globalisation nnd cthnlclt! EcononIy. Ident!lj and collarc Ilead or (110( Ifln:ongtl “L’oiloral dtstr]ct” project

3. (icneral - Sccretar} aod Comrol over Brctnn coltoml Problem of the War t’nr tbc Models: Spain and official Brittany Imovenwm Breton movement lreland Coltoral Breton idwtii> ‘Ilistorical reparations’ Instltolc Breton indqxndcacc Sorki\al at’ tbc Rreton Iangoage

4. President of Characteristics at “b]lmgaal’ ( i.e. lncabin mentalit> Of French No models nlcntiontd D1l-t[!N French-Brcton) cdocabon decision-makcri (Catholic The Bre[nn Iangoage and IIIC bllingoal) Need for rcgtt~nalis~tton ot’ Cconom) schools edocat ton The role ot’ Llorch schools in federation Britlan} Fotarc of IIrelon langoagc

5 Itead oftlle 1971 “1’rainiog I aw ll~dividllal-ccl]lrcd Iearniog No models n~en(i,~ndd /\ GE. FOS-PME Role of the OPCA train)ng (ieneral training Problems with 35 boor \\cek insorancc firm (OPCA) More tratning fnr very small t’irm 5

6. c) fflclal I listor> ot’ training ‘rr:tillll]g-cn]pl(]~ mcnt link Models (icrman} :ind “I’ra inin: +,IR(; OS+,.IRIANF Denmark cilvl~ion prngrammek (iraots to firnls (osin: (he Br]ttan! Kolc of Reglooal cooncll Region ) Regtooal (’k)oncll

7 I {cad (If tbc Raid of Regional ~ooncIl in Brittany’s relatlon~hip !LI Its Model: (icrmaoy r-’oltarc division supporting coltorc coltore (need to bc otit\\ilrd (dcccntralisation o t’ Ilrittaa) Central isat]na Olcoltore in looking) caltore) Rcyollill France Respect for lncal rultores L’ouncil DIU’AN witllln 13rit tan\ Iinaocc for rc~it)ni

8 l’lcsldcll( (1!’ Bretnn Iangoagc in higher (Limited aatonom) of I“rcncb No models (tk ;1 Rcnllc\ 2 edacatton [ Rennes and F3rest) onil, er$ltics negatikc nlodcl) [Jnltcrslt! Role of(’atllollc Chorcb and !3reton “Poblic sector” mental it! C’ertlficat!

9. I Icad nt’ [Ircton }Iistor! c)t’ pobl Ic Bretrrn Poblic service and Brcltln No lllOde)S liillgoa:c Iangoage broadcafll!lg Iangonge pr(lgranlmillg Brcton It10~08~C limited const IIucnc> f\lr 1[<.3 (telc\lslon) dccentrallsa(i~~a Brelon langoagc Fotorc c)fdccetl[r~tll~;lttoll. not aat on am \ 10 Ilcad of’ f;llll]lo~ lllelll/tl-alll illg lIn!i /$it l’A\lORl/l- Brclagot /\grl- buslllL!ss ‘I’raillltlg/clllll l{>} lllellt ltnk I rall]lng ]n50rance I’trm (OP(’/$

II, llistor~ of Reoncs Unlversitv I-lnanclng onlvcr51tlc\ No mndels

Relations ultll I’clu cation mloistr)

12. Rc:lollirl tlist~lry{~!”[lrittall> srndot’ Peripheral economic location Corsica (Nla(lylon r.’[lllllclll{)r. 1’s f3relrsn langoa~e of’ Britt an! agyxmenls) a m~IdIJl Illstor} of Socialist Pur[! In lnlbalanccs bctt$cctl north and Ilrsl Secrclar! Brittan) sooth within Brittany (lt’Ps. lilc-cl - Etreton Iaogoage today Aim bigooos prnspcct ol”a Vilalnc greater West IrcgIc~n

13. I’rench tllslor} ot’[)l WAN Need f[~ritlterkcl]tlc~llist Model: French Rasque represent attye. State of E3reton Iangoage Ipolictcs to salegoard language country I uropean I.angoagc and train in: Borcau of Role ot’a$soclallnns as l.csscr-used “so bstltut es’ t’or Inobltc I admiolstrat}on I Ilcad 0(’ Problel~l oflre]lcll~>Llblic lali ‘I’ I,4VRL3 coltore colttlr:ll association

[4 Frcncb cducatlon s>stem and Parisian cl Itcs No foreign modcl~. but the prodoctlon t)f Llnilorm elites IJK evrrlot ion positlIc Backutird Iooklngdcbrttts on lltcntl[} ofthc Pa}s dc la I oirc region

Tral,ce ,,ecds to recognise thd FI Rcglooal richness olits rtgions and Collncill(}r. abandon its Jacobin hmtagc’ Pays de la I.otre rdyonal COLITIC II

15. Prcsictent of Brdon ill bLlsilless ([)loll[NN) problell] ,,itll de fi!ling Brcton Model: lrclaod f)tORFNN Neologisms in t3rctnn langoage In (ermitlf (t3reton for F3reton asslgnailing, not ‘Identity’ businejs language planning octff {JrL ) Need ~{~r Brcton Iangoa:e to bave a real fonclifln

Needtl~li]lh/Brctc)tl and I husioess

16 Vice-Presidenl Role ot’[~rittany RcgIon In Models (:orstca ror Brcton Bt-eton medium ;duca!Ion (’eltic coonlrics. Ideoti(y. I’oture ol tht. ldngu

17 Prcitdcnl t>fthe Role ot’a Regional President .Agricultore Ncr models nlent]tlncd r13rittun> t3rit(ao) regional policy over Water/Ell$,cj(rt]!lllle!ll Regional Iangoage. cdocotlon. training 1 ransport Uoullcll Foture Ot’dccentral isatiotl Quality ofl. ife

18. Rcc{ilr. Role ofa Rector I Lack ofcomparatlle lcsst~n Models (jermanI. !\lxdcmjof L’{)lltrtictLlalisatl(lll Ivllhiil drau ing Spa Ill Brlt[ an) f?docatinn mtnlstr) l

-) Region> exercise Icadersflip Varioas ruglonal progl-ammcs Success of’ Brcton adtocacj (/\ Rl/\NI”. /\ R(; OS. Cl:) coalition In cdocat loo Parlial dccetl[rnlisa[it)llc)f f:otore ofticcclllriti]siltlclll train lag

20. I.cacler of’ IWBI. His[or-> t~l POBlalldr cla(iollsl!itl~” Need f’or f3retor Indcpcndcnce Models C’tltiil(ll]t~t (BrctOn centrc- rrthergroops( Ad Sirv. t)DB. Denmark rlgh[ parlj) Emgann. Franklz Druizh) Need Iorot’ficlai Iangoay Israel Breton laIIgoay pofic> (’ulloml and [>c~lttical!ll[)vcl]lcllt

21. official. State of Breton Iaogoage Models Wales Brittan\ l;otorc of DIM AN Catalonia (’oltofal Langoagc plaoning Ioslitote

22. Wales and Brittanyin 1950s Models Snaim tiistor> ol[lrcton III [Jntvt!r’sit} Wales (Renncsaod Brestschot~ls) State ot’[]reton l.angoay Crisis ot’all Insli totloos

$tattot’Breton Iangoage

23 1 onner I-listrrrj otthc Breton (Iegrce – F’reoch state and att]todc 10 Models. Wnlcs ;111( Prestdcni of 1981 nationalism otfler Ccltl( llrittan~ Hlstor! of’ f3rc[on movement coontries L’ollara] f-fistoryolflrelon cfepl al Fotore of lCf3 In$ti[o[e (lC’B). Renncs [!o!vcrsitj f~~rnler professor l(-B- hist[)r} of Brctoo f{t’nnes ?

24. [lnll~rs,t! Breton in the [Jnlversi[) s}stem ‘Iransmlsslon ol’llrcton No nlodcl\ f)rol’cs> or. The Frellcll State tllld[lle Iirngoag mentione(f Member of’ [)OB Bre(on Iangoagt Prospect ofpolltical Iiolcncc DIWAN 2001 ag?rccmen[ Need 10 solve language problem 25. tlca(fOt’ l.ncli ot’ laboar No Ino(fck Lraioiog Low skills Ietels mentioned f3ritl an> Rcglonal Role ot’FNSf A L’homher ,,1 AgrlcLlf lore Role of C’flambers of agricol tare -gcoeral

26. Head Ot’1. ocal Assisting yoon~ people Complexity tit’ l“IIIanc Ial No models VtISSIO II. rbncs Social exclosion and training circo its C’nmplei partnerships (Jnderprivllegcd jooth Female prccarity

27. problelllsc~tr~[ral Brittany Water No models Experience ofthe mayor ot’a Environment small COMMOOIJ (1973 r;cOl Og\ inhabltanfs) 28. Breton ldentit} What it is Brelon Aatononl! NO models Comul CIC$matlciats Brltann> (’[ll[orirl Instltttle Britlan} and [rainln:

29. ‘resident. Illstor> of ’[CB (cspeciall> role Models W’alm lri(lao! .ll’[] reton Iatlgoage) Flanders .’altaral Instla[e 1(’13) Fond4t]on de Ftrctitgoe

Role of flegional chamberof :ommerce

30. I raining and apprcntlccship NO models c\lts

3 & lll\lllul!J Brelon c~il(urc

Role or Br’lll an> Rcgl(lll ai COIIIIC II

40 I (}(llltler U[)13 F3rit!nn\ k’rancc ai)d lluri~pc French Ccnir:lllsalioll Iin{l Models Ireland. UDF3 and t3rcIon nc[\\orhs .lacohlnism Spain. Brclon l.an:uagc Need t’or ‘Iltilorlcul Reccll[l} (ill reparations’ ,Asynlnidrlc:ll I’cdcrilllhnl or independence

41 hla>{lr [~t’ ROIIJ ol’iI malor tlt’LI inl:lll IOUII I’u[urc {J1’cicccll(r:llis:itloll No models ( Ilcillcaogll-oll Brit[ an! region iInd Small SIZC 01’ I:rcncll reslons I ,Irmcr Vicc- ctillLlrill/l:]llg(lagc polic! Presidcni I’01 13ritlan} rc:ion nn(l Brussels (’ul[urc. Bnttan! Regltlllnl (’ouncil

42. Al;l!(lr L)I’ RoIL? of L3rlttan! region In Need for qaali[> 111prodtlclion Models. (’ataloni il. blori al I lJ\ economic dclelopmenl Need t’or [3rctt1r culture [o he other Cl!lllc dcput! } ormer Future OF deccnlrallsatmn more Ioruard lt]t~hing countrlcs Iuilice n]lnlstcr Dl\\’AN ks}mclr ical Ciclolut ion

43. Ilcad ,lI” ORI.1” Role oflht” f

Cnlplo>mcnl and and l’rollltng (ORI I’) trnilllng Tr:lllltl~g)ellll]l~~\ lUellt tlllh Need It) ccrttly >kllls OIMCI) :Ilor} ) Record of 131-itlan! Regii]v In traknlng

44. Ilcad {)1’ .\Rl:l C’orporatist tlrg:lnlsotl(Jtl 01’ pr,,blCIII ,)1’[lrililcllc~ and No lllOd C/S [3 I P I’r:ilnlng Frcncll training pro~css tonal dcl’lultlon~ (~1’ Illhurancc t’lrm trointng needs (OPL’. \) Ill thC I’raining and Ihc huIld Iny [rnde

hl)lldl)l~ :lI)L{ Complex it> 1)1 Ircnch lr:IImng pu[IIIc uorhs s\ stem sector French cducatIc~IIal modul and training

45 Iicad 01 SLOI all ~O\C [it’ Skol an l.lllsa\ a]]d Future of Brltton! and I“mnch N n model> I nlsil\ Breton adult lcarnlng state mentioned

ot’ficl:ll Brcton and Business I Ilturc 01’ 13rcto11 languo~t Ilrllt: in! comnlun!t> L’ul[[)r:ll Coullcll (1’(’}3) Attitl]dc 10 I>IW I\N

rhk of”C(H

46, OI’I’ILI: II Ili(ll l mcnt I;nlplo}mcnt Model [JK and rcsponsllltl it! polic! (T RA(’F. SF’IR) Statc- Regional-state c~~llal~[}ration Systenl 01 Nv(j\ It)r Cdutillioll RegImI plan 2000-2006” ilnd (raining Rcgionoi Regionol prclecture, RegIoIlal pl-ctcclurc council and lrainlng

Manage n]ent o I I :uropc~m structural funds

47 Iiead 01 Brittau} as uational min(lrity IIrcton ailtonoo]! Models $1>/1111 l)\slLILl Role ~llculturnl ass{lciations lnter}cnti(lllisr pol IcIes to Scotland (Collcctll): Respect I’br lhc Brcl{~n culture Sllpp[lrt [lIL’ F31cloll Iflngutlgc (l-adlti(]n:ll I’osslbiltt} (it’ lcl-rorlsnl Brtlol] In(l.lc) t8 [ ornlcr (icncfal - I-ltstor! olL’[’l.ll\ l)clelop Bre[(,n ldcntit> t~l Model (’(ir~(ca \ccl-ctar> (II’ L’h:lllcngc> I“(jr Britlau\ l{lda} compclc lt]tertlil(loiliill\ (1111{ RIJum1’! E3rtt{oil! llttll I ~lIIc

— nc[\ior’k bosiness in Britt an> — 58. I !Ca(l. Local Role oftbc PLll: Nonv mentloncd No models r Conollllc In5crtion Plan Disadvantaged )00111 and (P1 IE:), Reones Regional Cooncil

Employment of ‘dit’ficult’ yoan: people. — 59 Ilecld of Role of Yc~alh and Sports None menli oned DennlarL I’rililltllg, YOatll mlntstr! (pr{lt’ession ai Sweden and .Spor15 certlficatmn) Cknnany nllnts(r\ in Ftrl(lan) State- fleglon collvergellccsjc(ltlllict — 60. Acadcllllc (Xganlsatlon ol’t{du cation None men[loned UK, Canada. Inspector. ministry in Fioistere [inlst~re departemen[ dcpar!mcnt Attit(lcle t)t’Ec{tlc:]ti[Jn ministry to DIWAN an(i Breton Iangaage leaching

Rela(lonshlps at the departmental level . 61. I lead otBreton Role of MEDEF and training obstacles to ~()~li}l I mployers (PARF. VAP) partnership No models Fcdcra( ion (( IPIB) Role ot (1PIH and C’oatra(s W’eigh( of Education mlnis(r> d’oblec(i}cs

Soc]ai partnership

—

62 } Icad of I aboor ‘I-raining and employment Complexity ot’ [ralnln: s>stem No models and ‘Iralnlng State-f]naaced progrmnmcs Poor co-ordination bet fvecn n]inlstry Partnerships parlners (D R1”EF P), Vcstecl inlercsts Brit[any — 63. Trade onion Role of tbc trade onions (CFDT Training bcnet’ils those !iho NO models (Cl; l) I ) ot’1’lcial especially) are already trairrcd Social partnership and training I,c)l\,er s[alltsjtllls do not Laboar needs reqoire tralolng rrainiilgllrc>kiclcrs unsarc of Iheir futare — 64. Ma?tlr or France and national minorities Need for genoinc No explicit models [.andcrncaa, r+ decentralisation Rcglona] The merits [Ifclecell(rzllls:ltiorl Slroog ELlrop L’all (’[~onclll(~r Balance \\ltbln llrlllan~ regional i5nl I n ParA)\es olBreton identl{y general (Inclodlng (and lan:Llage) Need to save tllc Breton Wales) ta]lgoage — 65 N’la> t>r ol Breton l?logoast! Development oftbe Iangoagt Model Corsica [’arllali DIM’AN nod SChOO15 (aced to ratif’! [:aropcan [.ocal tangaagc ptanning ~’harlcr) Attitadeto Regional C’ooocil Need for Breton aotonorn} lleallsc~’ultarcl ‘Iechnopole — 56. lformcr carator Bi-eton idcnti[! Lack ot’credible Brcton No models tI1’ the hlu~ regton to lake a [cad. — ,? ,,, ,. -,, . .. . ,,. ., . . ,,, >/. I Iltil(l (?1 [ Kole 01 Kennes cnamner III I ivone nlen[Ionccl I uerman 111() o c I () I lralnlng. Renncs [rainiag indastri~l traiaing C’hamkr 01’ commcrcc Dis[inctlons het\\een ‘Formation professional inili ale’ and ‘formation profess ionnel con[inae”

Relations with regional coancil Interview with [x]

Would you please briefly describe your political career to date?

On the National Assembly and Public Policy

Two years after the implementation of devolution, has the National Assembly won the hearts and minds of the Welsh people.

What are the main policy areas in which the National Assembly has made a difference during this period?

You have a background in local government, as well as great experience in educational matters. In this respect:

Ø How best would you describe relations between the Assembly and local government? How is this relationship likely to evolve?

Ø What is your position on current proposals for a Welsh Baccalaureate?

The role of the Welsh language has been much debated lately, not least during the recent Culture Committee review of the Welsh language.

How effective do you think the recent ETAG proposals can be/have been in tackling the economic, social and educational challenges facing Wales? How different is this from English experience?

Lessons, contacts and the future

What are the main lessons that policy makers in Wales can learn from experiences in other countries? We would be grateful if you would answer specifically relating to Education and Lifelong learning and Culture.

Are you in contact with polic y makers in other European countries? If so which ones in order of frequency?

What are the principal problems likely to face Wales over the next decade?

Ron Davis once famously remarked that devolution was a process not an event. What are the likely future scenarios for the Welsh Assembly: status quo ante? status quo? tax raising and legislative powers? Independence?

Function Main themes addressed in the interviews

1 Resources director, – Role of Finance Wales Finance Wales – Finance Wales and Devolution – Finance Wales and the Welsh Development Agency

2. Wales European – Role of WEFO and EU funding regimes (objective one especially) Funding Office – 3 Assembly Member, – Attitudes to education and training (especially Welsh Baccalaureate Plaid Cymru debate) – Limited nature of Assembly

4 Regional Director, – Role of the WDA in North Wales North Wales WDA – relations with the Assembly and effect of devolution – issues of inward investment and skills in Wales.

5 Assembly Member. – National Assembly and Objective One Labour. – The Assembly and Europe – First Two Years of the Assembly

6 Assembly member. – The role of ministers in the National Assembly Labour – Agricultural policy-making under devolution – The voluntary sector

7 Director, CBI Wales – The Role of CBI-Wales – The CBI and devolution – The CBI and economic development

– 8 Assembly member. – The Role of a new Assembly member Liberal Democrat

9 Assembly Member, – Agriculture Plaid Cymru – local government – organisation of Plaid Cymru – Welsh language policy –

– 10 Assembly Member, – Assessment of first term Labour – Assembly and Welsh language policy

11 Lifelong learning – Cardiff Council’s policies towards lifelong learning manager, Cardiff – Cardiff and the Assembly Council

12 Director of Strategy – Role of WDA and Chief Economist, – Relations with ELWa Welsh Development – Relations with Assembly Agency. – Relations with the English RDAs

13 Assembly Member, – Role of the Assembly’s Agricultural committee Conservative – Attitude of the Conservatives to devolution

14 Chief Executive of – Role of the WCVA (Welsh Council for Voluntary Action) the Wales Voluntary – The voluntary sector and devolution Action Council – the partnership councils – ELWa and training.

15 Member of National – Role of ELWa in May 2003 Council- ELWa – The 5 drivers of learning in ELWa – Learning networks.

– 16 Director of Teaching – The Assembly and Adult education in Welsh here in the Welsh – 2003 census results Teaching Centre

17 Assembly Member, – The Role of the Labour Chief Whip Labour. Chief Labour – Views on devolution Whip – Assembly and local government

18 Business development – The Role of ELWa in North Wales manager, ELWa, St – Features of North Wales Asaph – Relationship with the WDA

19 Community – Role of the Newport CCET Consortium for – Relations with ELWa Regional organisation Education and – Relations with the National Assembly Training, Newport

20 Assembly Member, – General remarks on the workings of the Assembly Plaid Cymru – inherent limitations of Government of Wales Act – Welsh Language

21 Deputy Minister – Economic development (Labour) – Management of European Union affairs

22 Chief Executive of – Further Education sector and devolution Fforum – Challenges facing Wales in basic skills – Role of Fforum

23 Assembly member. – Role of the presiding office Deputy Presiding – Relations with the Welsh executive. Officer – Future of the devolution settlement.

24 Director, Institute of – Role of the IWA Welsh Affairs – Argument for the Welsh Baccalaureat – Problems of devolution.

25 Chief Executive, – Role of ACCAC ACCAC – Welsh Baccalaureat – Welsh-medium education and provision

26 Assembly member, – Role of an Assembly member Conservative – Viewpoint of the conservatives on various issues (especially education and language issues)

27 Secondary School – Role of a secondary school head Head, Cardiff – Local management of Schools – Relations with ELWa and the National Assembly

28 Policy Officer - – Organisation of the FSB in Wales and the UK as a whole Wales, Federation of – Relations with the Assembly Small Businesses – Issues relating to the Assembly and economic development – 29 Presiding Office – Role of the Committee Secretariat official – role of Assembly committees

30 Welsh Representative, – Role of training in the house-building sector National Federation of – Business and the Assembly Housebuilders – Training and the building trade

31 Welsh Officer, – Training and the Construction industry Construction Industry – The Sector Skills Councils Training Board – ELWa (CITB)

32 Head of Market – ELWa and the Assembly Intelligence, ELWa, St – ELWa and the Sector Skills Councils Asaph – Wales and the broader UK context

33 Training manager, – Ford and its training programmes Ford, Brigend – Ford and Modern Apprenticeships – Ford and relationships throughout Wales

34 Chair of the New – The CCW and the use of Welsh language Deal Taskforce for – Relations between the National Assemb ly and non-devolved agencies Wales; Chair of the – The New Deal in Wales Countryside Commission for Wales

35 Assembly Member, – Views on the Assembly and economic development Plaid Cymru – Devolution and Welsh civil society – Future of devolution

36 First Minister – Role of the First Minister under devolution – Achievements of devolution – Political situation in Wales and likely evolution of devolution

37 Head of Public – Marketing ELWa Affairs, ELWa – Organisation of ELWa – ELWa’s relationships

38 Leader, Chief – Role of Cardiff as a capital city Executive and Policy – Relations between Cardiff Council and the Assembly Advisor, Cardiff – Relations between Cardiff council and central government (the County Council modernisation agenda)

39 Minister for Assembly – Role of the Minister for Assembly business Business – Role of the cabinet – Role of the civil service

40 Leader, Newport – Newport and City Status Borough Council – Role of the Welsh Local Government Association – Newport and the National Assembly – Newport and Welsh Language

41 Minister of Finance – Role of the cabinet and Local Government – Role of junior ministers – The budgetary round. 42 CCET Manager – Role of the CCETs Caerphilly – Problems of training and skills shortages in Caerphilly – Dysfunctioning of ELWa.

43 Leader, Liberal – Nature of the Partnership Agreement Democrats – Input/output models of training – Diplomatic activity of the Assembly.

44 Member, ELWa – Higher Education and devolution National Council – HEFCW – Functioning of ELWa as an organisation

45 Economic – Swansea and economic development Development – Swansea and the Assembly managers, Swansea – The Objective One programme monitoring committee County Council – Modernising Local Government agenda

46 Member of National – Role of the former Training and Enterprise councils Council, ELWa – Role of ELWa national and regional organisation – Future for ELWa

47 Trade Union official – Trade unions and the Assembly (UNIFI) – Training and call centres

48 Equal Opportunities – Role of Assembly and the equality agenda Commissioner for – Role of Equal Opportunities Commission Wales – Cross-cutting agendas

49 Head of the National – Role of the NFU in Wales Farmers Union in – Relations with the Assembly (especially during Foot and Mouth crisis) Wales – NFU and Europe.

50 Education and lifelong – Assembly’s education and learning strategy [from child care to learning minister University) – Differences from England – ELWa

51 Assembly Member, – Events surrounding devolution in 1997/98 former Secretary of – Achievements of devolution State – Future of devolution

52 Director of – History of the TECs and their achievements Communications, – History of the creation of ELWa ELWa – How devolution makes a difference

53 Assembly member - – Experience as deputy-education minister Labour – Assembly and education issues.

54 Director Wales, Job – Role of Job Centre Plus - Links with Assembly, ELWa Centre Plus – small country effects and policy communities in Wales – success of New Deal in Wales

88 Contemporary Wales -15

CONCLUSION

The different context in which elections in Wales are fought makes a 11. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLICY difference to the pattern of constituency campaigning. Targeting strategies in 2001 reflected not only party strengths in the previous general election but PREFERENCES AND PUBLIC OPIN1ON IN also the constituency results in the first Welsh Assembly elections in 1999; WALES AND BRITTANYI they involved not only the calculations of party strategists in London but also those of the Welsh leadership in Cardiff. Unsurprisingly, Labour has the strongest campaigns overall, but Plaid are by far the most intense campaigners in north and west Wales. Given that they hold no seats, the Al&tair Cole with J Barry Jones, John Loughlin, Colin Williams campaigns mounted by the Conservatives are, perhaps surprisingly, strong and Alan Storer and it would seem that they campaign particularly strongly in the few seats where they have a chance of winning. Apart from two or three seats, Liberal Democrat campaigning is weak. The research project from which this article is drawn investigates processes Despite our analysis being hampered by the small numbers of con- of regional governance in two cognate yet distinctive regions: Wales and stituencies involved, we have shown that Labour and Plaid Cymru cam- Brittany. It is a binary comparison that does not pretend to exhaust the paigning had an electoral pay-off. Both did better where they campaigned possibilities of other binary or multivariate comparisons. Starting from the more strongly. An improvement of around 2 per cent of the electorate premise that the common challenges of regional governance are at least as achieved by stronger campaigning may seem like a small return for the effort important as its institutional variations, we engage in three distinct exercises involved. This translates into a greater proportion of the votes cast, however, in comparative investigation: at the level of policy communities (through in- and in close contests could well make the difference between winning and depth interviews in the two regions); issue-networks (through a detailed losing. questionnaire); and public opinion (through a mass opinion poll carried out in both regions in July–August 2001).2 This article presents some important *The research on which this arti$le is based was supported by the ESRC results of the attitudinal surveys carried out in Wales and Brittany in 2001. (grant reference number ROO0239396). These findings illustrate what people living in Wales and Brittany think of their regions and how they envisage their future development. REFERENCES . Why compare Wales and Brittany? Before addressing this issue, we need to determine what is the function of comparison. For policy-makers, Denver, D. and Hands, G. (1997). Modern Constituency Efecfioneering, London, comparison is bound up with practical politics. Within the policy commun- Frank Cass. ity, comparison is envisaged primarily in aspirational terms. This process is Denver, D., Hands, G., Fisher, J. and McAllister, I. (forthcoming, 2002). ‘The important, as the National Assembly for Wales is currently working out its imDact. of constituency campaigning in the 2001generalelection’,British Elections and Parties Review, 12. diplomatic priorities. The most obvious comparators are those within the Mitchell, J. and Bradbury, J. (2002). ‘Scotland and Wales:the first post-devolution UK itself, as the Welsh look with some envy on the Scottish Parliament with general election’, in Geddes, A. and Tonge, J. (eds), Labour’s Second Lanaklide: its primary legislative and tax-raising powers. Outside of the UK, Welsh The British General Election 2001, Manchester Manchester University Press, policy-makers look to regions such as Catalonia, or to nation states such as 201-18. Ireland or Denmark as models.3 These comparisons are sometimes quite unrealistic. Wales compares itself with the Irish Republic or the Scandinavian democracies but does not yet possess the requisite political sovereignty to make such a comparison meaningful. Unlike Ireland or 90 Contemporary Wales -15 Political Institutions and Public Opinion in Wales and Brittany 91

Denmark, Wales is not an EU member state. Others look to Spanish regions A FRENCH REGION WITH A DIFFERENCE BRITTANY such as Catalonia, which share a similar model of asymmetrical devolution to that of Wales within the UK. Or, indeed, to German liinder, which appear One of the most distinctive regions of France, Brittany has a strong sense of as important nodes within the evolving EU multi-layered polity. Or again to its specific position within French society (Favereau, 1993; Flatres, 1986; Canada, which has institutionalized the bilingual society to which many in Ford, 1993; Le Bourdonnec, 1996; Le Coadic, 1998; Martray, 1983). Wales aspire. There is obviously much to be said for comparing Wales and Formerly an independent Duchy (from 818 to 1532), then a French province Catalonia or a Canadian province. But, whatever their merits, such compar- with special prerogatives (1532–1789), reduced for long to being a collection isons are broadly aspirational; they present an idealized vision of what of disparate d~partements before becoming an administrative then political Wales might become. The economic and demographic underpinnings for region, modem Brittany is a French region with a difference. Unlike many such comparisons need to be demonstrated in a more rigorous manner than other French regions, Brittany can look to its past existence as an inde- is usually the case. pendent nation state, with an elaborate set of state institutions and founding Our interest as academics is rather different. Through comparison, we myths. Though the symbols of statehood have long been repressed, the seek to illustrate diversity, as well as similarity. The comparisons we seek to region retains many distinctive characteristics. The Breton language is the draw are multidimensional ones. We are interested in the analytically only Celtic language spoken in continental Europe. The enduring symbolic separate dimensions of national context, regional identity, public policy and importance of the Roman Catholic religion is ever present physically in the popular legitimization. We contrast distinct traditions of territorial architecture of Breton villages, as well as in higher than average rates of administration in France and Britain, but concentrate our attention on two religious practice. The spectacular growth of Breton cultural movements regions – Wales and Brittany – facing many similar structural challenges and (dance, theatre, costume) is testament to a revival of Breton values and self- strategic choices. Through making comparisons in the area of education and consciousness. At a more abstract level, observers have noted the capacity of training and language policy management, we seek to identify useful lessons Breton actors to join forces to promote their common interests and to for policy-makers on both sides of the channel. On the basis of successfully defend Brittany against attacks from the outside world (Martray, 1983). commissioned mass opinion surveys in Wales and Brittany, we are able to Breton solidarity can also be gauged more intuitively by the effectiveness of test the underlying legitimacy of new forms of regional governance. Breton elite-level networks in Paris and Brussels and by the importance of We have identified the Wales-Brittiany pair as being the most appropriate the Breton diaspora in retaining a sense of distinctiveness. within the overarching context of France-British comparisons. We argue that The dominant political culture is one of political accommodation. Breton the mix of similarity and difference makes the Wale*Brittany pair excellent politicians of all parties, however divided they are internally, will tend to for comparative analysisj in terms of their physical location, their population close ranks against threats from the outside, Despite a strong regional size, their economic activity, their linguistic specificity and – not least – their identity, however, Brittany has not produced significant regionalism parties, common historical ties. Of course, there are important institutional differences or at least parties which have been capable of winning seats in departmental, between the two. The powers of French regions are much weaker than those of regional or national elections. Only one left-wing regionalism party, the the National Assembly for Wales. In this respect, the project starts from a Union D6mocratique Bretonne (UDB), has managed some victories at the position of qualitative difference between France and Britain. The British municipal level and then usually in collaboration with the Socialist Party union state was always far more flexible than its French unitary counterpart. (PS). Le Coadic (1998) interprets this phenomenon as a consequence of the On balance, however, the UK has more in common with the unitary state deeply rooted legitimist strand within Breton public opinion. Imbued by a tradition than it does with the federal one. This historical dimension of the Catholic, conformist ethic, the Breton public is not prepared to support pro- comparison is deeply important for understanding how the predominant state independence or pro-autonomist parties. We should also note that the tradition is perceived in regions with strong identity such as Wales and mainstream political parties in Brittany have adopted regionalism themes and Brittany. Before considering in some detail our comparative opinion poll are more ‘regionalism’than their national counterparts. This is true even of finding$ we now present the Brittany region within its national context. the Gaullist (RPR) president of the Brittany region, Josselin de Rohan, who Political Institutions and Public opinion in Wales and Brittany 92 Contemporary Wales -15 93 has a much more ‘regionalism’discourse than his RPR colleagues in most of Government of Wales Act (GWA) of 1998 is heavily imbued with the legacy the rest of France. Although Breton regionalism has, at times, been violent, of the Welsh office, from the precise functions transferred to the key civil this never reached the levels experienced in Corsica, the Spanish Basque service personnel involved in assuring the transition (Rawlings, 1998; Cole country or Northern Ireland. and Storer, 2002). Brittany is sometimes taken as a litmus test for the health of regional After the narrowest of victories for the Yes Campaia in the 1997 identity within France. In post-war Brittany, there has been a strong political referendum, the Government of Wales Act (1998) created a National consensus among the regional elites in favour of enhanced regionalization. Assembly with secondary legislative powers, rather than with primary From 1950 onwards, Breton actors of all political persuasions co-operated legislative and budgetary powers as in Scotland. In the Welsh model of closely in the CELIB (Comitk ddtude et de liaison des intt!rkts bretons), the executive devolution, there is an implicit division of labour between the archetype of a post-war regional advocacy coalition. The CELIB could devolved and central governments (Rawlings, 2001; Patchett, 2000). The claim the credit for many of the improvements in transport infrastructure in core functions of the state remain with central government. These are the Brittany region in the 1960s and 1970s. Brittany is probably the most defence, taxation, social security, immigration and nationality laws. The distinctive region in mainland France today. This distinctiveness adds a Government of Wales Act transfers eighteen fields but there is no precise, foresight dimension to the Wales–Brittany comparison. Brittany is the constitutionally based division as in a genuine federal system. The Assembly birthplace and driving force of regional political identity (and institutions) ‘has the exact powers of the Secretary of State’, though the secretary of in France and, if UK-style devolution ever comes to France, it will un- state had been part of central government with a voice in cabinet. The doubtedly prosper in Brittany more than anywhere else. powers transferred to the Assembly were those of the old Welsh OffIce, powers that had evolved in an arbitrary and haphazard manner, usually reflecting different traditions within Whitehall departments. Consistent with WHERE SHOULD DECISIONS BE MADE? the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, and the principle of secondary The questions we asked in our comparative opinion polls were general ones legislative powers, Westminster retains legislative pre-eminence even in attempting to capture the rather different situations in Wales and Brittany. transferred areas. Conforming to the traditional local government model, There are differences, of course, between Wales and Brittany. Wales has a moreover, the Assembly can only act where it has precise statutory fairly long history of administrative decentralization and a recent history of responsibilities. It cannot invest itself with new responsibilities, nor can it political devolution (Jones and Osmond, 2002; Chancy, Hall and Pithouse, raise additional sources of finance. It can, however, make primary 2001; Marinetto, 2001; McAllister, 2000). Brittany has a history of more legislation within secondary legislation (through statutory instruments and limited administrative clgcentraltiation and a longer, but weaker, Political circulars), which vests it with a distinct policy formulation role. For one of decentralization (Cole and John, 2001). Before analysing the poll findings in the architects of devolution, the only advantage of this hybrid and ob- more detail, we now briefly compare and contrast the distinctive features of fuscated system was that it helped to deliver devolution to Wales. The Welsh Welsh devolution and French decentralization. public, apathetic when not antipathetic, would not have accepted a bolder Wales had a history of administrative devolution from 1964 to 1999, scheme. which laid the foundations for a more autonomous form of regional However we define devolution in Wales, the Brittany regional council’s governance. Many areas of public policy were, de facto, managed by Welsh functions are weaker. The regional institution in France is the result of a civil servants acting independently of their Whhehall colleagues, with long process of what might be called ‘creeping institutionalization’ as it was minimal supervision exercised by a secretary of state and two junior gradually (and grudgingly) granted a position in the politico-administrative ministers. Though subject to the political inconsistencies of UK gover- system alongside the dkpartements and the communes (Dupoirier, 1998; Nay, nmentsand the sensitivities of successive secretaries of state, civil servants in 1997; Loughlin and Mazey, 1995). Brittany became an administrative region the Welsh Ofllce were usually left to get on with the serious business of in the late 1950s, acquiring its own indirectly elected regional authority in policy implementation. The model of executive devolution contained in the 1972. The 1982 decentralization reforms introduced direct elections4 for the Political Institutions and Public opinion in Wales and Brittany 92 Contemporary Wales -15 93 has a much more ‘regionalism’discourse than his RPR colleagues in most of Government of Wales Act (GWA) of 1998 is heavily imbued with the legacy the rest of France. Although Breton regionalism has, at times, been violent, of the Welsh office, from the precise functions transferred to the key civil this never reached the levels experienced in Corsica, the Spanish Basque service personnel involved in assuring the transition (Rawlings, 1998; Cole country or Northern Ireland. and Storer, 2002). Brittany is sometimes taken as a litmus test for the health of regional After the narrowest of victories for the Yes Campaia in the 1997 identity within France. In post-war Brittany, there has been a strong political referendum, the Government of Wales Act (1998) created a National consensus among the regional elites in favour of enhanced regionalization. Assembly with secondary legislative powers, rather than with primary From 1950 onwards, Breton actors of all political persuasions co-operated legislative and budgetary powers as in Scotland. In the Welsh model of closely in the CELIB (Comitk ddtude et de liaison des intt!rkts bretons), the executive devolution, there is an implicit division of labour between the archetype of a post-war regional advocacy coalition. The CELIB could devolved and central governments (Rawlings, 2001; Patchett, 2000). The claim the credit for many of the improvements in transport infrastructure in core functions of the state remain with central government. These are the Brittany region in the 1960s and 1970s. Brittany is probably the most defence, taxation, social security, immigration and nationality laws. The distinctive region in mainland France today. This distinctiveness adds a Government of Wales Act transfers eighteen fields but there is no precise, foresight dimension to the Wales–Brittany comparison. Brittany is the constitutionally based division as in a genuine federal system. The Assembly birthplace and driving force of regional political identity (and institutions) ‘has the exact powers of the Secretary of State’, though the secretary of in France and, if UK-style devolution ever comes to France, it will un- state had been part of central government with a voice in cabinet. The doubtedly prosper in Brittany more than anywhere else. powers transferred to the Assembly were those of the old Welsh OffIce, powers that had evolved in an arbitrary and haphazard manner, usually reflecting different traditions within Whitehall departments. Consistent with WHERE SHOULD DECISIONS BE MADE? the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, and the principle of secondary The questions we asked in our comparative opinion polls were general ones legislative powers, Westminster retains legislative pre-eminence even in attempting to capture the rather different situations in Wales and Brittany. transferred areas. Conforming to the traditional local government model, There are differences, of course, between Wales and Brittany. Wales has a moreover, the Assembly can only act where it has precise statutory fairly long history of administrative decentralization and a recent history of responsibilities. It cannot invest itself with new responsibilities, nor can it political devolution (Jones and Osmond, 2002; Chancy, Hall and Pithouse, raise additional sources of finance. It can, however, make primary 2001; Marinetto, 2001; McAllister, 2000). Brittany has a history of more legislation within secondary legislation (through statutory instruments and limited administrative clgcentraltiation and a longer, but weaker, Political circulars), which vests it with a distinct policy formulation role. For one of decentralization (Cole and John, 2001). Before analysing the poll findings in the architects of devolution, the only advantage of this hybrid and ob- more detail, we now briefly compare and contrast the distinctive features of fuscated system was that it helped to deliver devolution to Wales. The Welsh Welsh devolution and French decentralization. public, apathetic when not antipathetic, would not have accepted a bolder Wales had a history of administrative devolution from 1964 to 1999, scheme. which laid the foundations for a more autonomous form of regional However we define devolution in Wales, the Brittany regional council’s governance. Many areas of public policy were, de facto, managed by Welsh functions are weaker. The regional institution in France is the result of a civil servants acting independently of their Whhehall colleagues, with long process of what might be called ‘creeping institutionalization’ as it was minimal supervision exercised by a secretary of state and two junior gradually (and grudgingly) granted a position in the politico-administrative ministers. Though subject to the political inconsistencies of UK gover- system alongside the dkpartements and the communes (Dupoirier, 1998; Nay, nmentsand the sensitivities of successive secretaries of state, civil servants in 1997; Loughlin and Mazey, 1995). Brittany became an administrative region the Welsh Ofllce were usually left to get on with the serious business of in the late 1950s, acquiring its own indirectly elected regional authority in policy implementation. The model of executive devolution contained in the 1972. The 1982 decentralization reforms introduced direct elections4 for the 94 Contemporary Wales – 15 Political Institutions and Public Opinion in wales and Brittany 95

regional councils in 1982 (operational since 1986) and reinforced their policy TABLE 11.1 responsibilities. It is important to stress the limited character of French Institutional preferencesin WalM and Brittany decentralization and regionalization. The regional institution was established while retaining the longer-established and, in many ways, more Q. There is a debate today in France4WaIes Brittany Wales on the future of decentralization/Devolution. powerful ddpartements. Large cities and towns had also become powerful Which one of the folfowingoptions do you prefer? levels of sub-national government (Cole and John, 2001). The regions might, therefore, be considered the poor cousins of French subnational Abolish the Regional Council/National Assembly for Wales 2 24 government. Decentralization in Brittany (and throughout France) is less Retain a Regional Council/National Assembly with limited powers 44 24 overtly linked with territorial identity than in the case of Wales or Scotland. Regional structures do not respect the informal boundaries of France’s Create an elected parliament with tax-raising and legislative powers 33 38 historic regions. Thus the French Basque country – squeezed into the Midi- An autonomous Brittany/an independent Wales 12 11 Pyrenees region – does not even have its own dkpar(emen(. Alsace and Lorraine are two separate regions. Historic Brittany has been divided ever Don’t know 9 3 since Marshall Petain’s decision to remove the Loire-Atlantique d~partement (and its capital Nantes) from Brittany in 1941. To allow France’s historic regions to exist would be tantamount to admitting the existence of a union How should we interpret these tindings? Let us first consider the case of state of the UK variety, rather than the French unitary version. Decentral- Brittany, where regional institutions are well established. In Brittany, as in ization was not intended to give political recognition to specific ‘ethnic’ Wales, we observe overwhelming support for consolidating or strengthening groups within France. The only partial exception to this rule is Corsica existing regional institutions. There is virtually no constituency for the status which has had a specific statute since 1982. quo ant~ regional institutions are fully accepted as part of the normal Decentralization in France was supposed to promote better governance, democratic process. Breton opinion is very evenly divided between those not to challenge the underlying principles of the French unitary state. There satisfied with existing arrangements (44 per cent) and those advocating is no real equivalent in Brittany of the National Assembly’s capacity to either an assembly with legislative and tax-raising powers (33 per cent) or an adapt primary Westminster legislation. There are examples in the overseas ‘autonomous’ Brittany (12 per cent). These findings confirm the existence of French territories, in New Caledonia and French Polynesia especially. The a Breton regional political consciousness. They leave entirely open the Matignon agreements, if ever implemented, would give the Corsican question of whether the Breton public would support a more thoroughgoing Assembly the power to adapt primary legislation and make regulations. regional or federal evolution. This survey question has been asked in no Nowhere in mainland France, however, is UK-style devolution yet on the other mainland French region, but the consensus expert view emphasizes the agenda. But the regional councils do have precise legal responsibilities in complex pattern of multiple Breton identities and a willingness to envisage economic development, secondary education, training, transport and more advanced forms of political decentralization than elsewhere in France several other fields. Moreover, elected French regions have limited tax- (Pillet, 2001). As in Wales, the autonomy solution is confined to the margins varying powers that are not available to the National Assembly for Wales. of the political spectrum, a discovery confirmed by the absence of support They have used their powers ambitiously and are actively seeking new for a strong autonomist political movement. powers. The republican belief that all parts of the French territory must be Our poll indicates not only strong support for regional political institu- treated exactly the same is increasingly contested, not least from Breton tions in Brittany, but also a desire to strengthen the regional over the local, politicians and public opinion. national and European levels in specific areas (notably education, training Though Wales and Brittany represent distinctive forms of political and language, our fields of policy investigation). Following the annual decentralization, our polling evidence reveals a strong demand in both surveys conducted by the Paris-based think tank, the OIP (Observatoire regions for effective regional political institutions (see Table 11.1). Interr&gional du Politique), these trends are more pronounced in Brittany 96 Contemporary Wales – 15 Political Institutions and Public opinion in Wales and Brittany 97 than elsewhere. This sense of regional ownership is well demonstrated by dissatisfaction with the devolution introduced by the Government of Wales our Brittany-specific question on the administrative reunification of the Act and a desire to move towards primary legislative powers. The Welsh, while historic Brittany region. Historic Brittany consisted of five ddpartements, never the constitutional pace-setters now look to follow Scotland’s lead. stretching from the far western Atlantic coast to the Loire. During the Other tindings from the poll confirmed the Welsh public’s more positive wartime authoritarian regime of Marshal Petain, Loire-Atlantique (and its attitude to the devolution process in Wales. When asked the question, ‘What capital Nantes) was separated from the rest of Brittany. Recovering the are your personal views on devolution for Wales, that is the creation of the Loire-Atlantique has been a rallying cry of the Breton political movement National Assembly for Wales, which has taken over responsibility for areas ever since 1941. Our poll suggests strong public support for the reunification such as health and education in Wales?’, a majority (51 per cent) were in of historic Brittany (61 per cent). This attachment to the physical embodi- favour or strongly in favour of devolution, with only 32 per cent against.s ment of historic Brittany is itself a powerful form of ‘regionalit y effect’. Our There would appear to have been a shift in popular opinion since the Welsh survey demonstrates that it is shared across the political and geographical referendum in 1997. When asked more specific questions about the effective- spectrum, with only minor variations according to d~partement, partisan ness of the National Assembly, the Welsh people appeared to be less allegiance or other variables. confident about the Assembly. Firstly, the majority (60 per cent) of those In Wales, the poll was primarily designed to measure general attitudes asked disagreed with the statement that ‘The quality of public services has towards devolution in Wales and the National Assembly during the first two improved under the Assembly’, indicating that the Welsh public is still years of its operation. By any measure the National Assembly’s formative waiting for ‘the Assembly to deliver’. This is to be expected. The Assembly years have been stormy. The wafer-thin majority in the 1997 referendum was only two years old during the polling exercise and only in the longer term raised doubts about the commitment of the Welsh voters and the legitimacy will it be able to impact on the deep-seated economic and social problems of the whole project. The departure of one Welsh secretary (Ron Davies), facing the country. On the issue of whether the existence of the Assembly has and the appointment of another (Alun Michael) generally regarded as democratized political processes in Wales, respondents were split almost having been imposed by Tony Blair did little to enhance the devolutionary evenly, with a small majority against the proposition that ‘The say of people process. Furthermore, the failure of the Welsh Labour Party to win an in decision-making has improved under the Assembly’. This is an immediate overall majority in the f~st Assembly elections frustrated the expectation of problem for the Assembly which appears to reflect the general strong and consistent policies, argu’ably one of the main justifications for disillusionment with politics in the UK, indicated by the low general election devolution. The resultant scenario of ‘all-party inclusive policy-making’ was turnout of 2001. The Assembly still needs to convince a large section of the less than convincing and eventually led to Alun Michael’s losing a vote of no Welsh public that devolution is bringing Welsh politics closer to the Welsh confidence. It was aga~~st this background of institutional initiatives, people. Proponents of devolution and the Welsh Assembly Government in political experimentation and plain damage limitation that our poll of particular will take comfort from the slight majority of people who agreed Welsh public opinion was taken in late June 2001. that ‘The existence of the Assembly has given Wales more lobbying power The results presented in Table 11.1 are remarkable on three counts. Only within the UK government’. This view represents a quite sophisticated 24 per cent supported the pre-devolution arrangements. The prediction by assessment, recognizing, on the one hand, the limited nature of the legislative Ron Davies that devolution would be a process rather than an event powers devolved to Wales and, on the other, the enhanced lobbying capacity appeared to have been vindicated. Furthermore, 49 per cent of respondents exercised by a ‘democratic Assembly’ compared with a secretary of state supported the strengthening of the National Assembly to give it powers at heading a small central-government department, We draw the conclusion, as least equivalent to those of the Scottish Parliament. This shift in public in the Western Mail leader, that public opinion is ‘warming to the Assembly’. opinion is consistent with the majority view encountered in over forty We deduce a strong underpinning of support for regional political interviews in and around the National Assembly that the current system institutions in Wales and Brittany. But these basic similarities mask essential suffers from a lack of clarity and a confused and unworkable attribution differences between Wales and Brittany. This becomes apparent when we of functions. Our in-depth interviews demonstrated a deep-seated consider preferences for regional expenditure. 96 Contemporary Wales – 15 Political Institutions and Public opinion in Wales and Brittany 97 than elsewhere. This sense of regional ownership is well demonstrated by dissatisfaction with the devolution introduced by the Government of Wales our Brittany-specific question on the administrative reunification of the Act and a desire to move towards primary legislative powers. The Welsh, while historic Brittany region. Historic Brittany consisted of five ddpartements, never the constitutional pace-setters now look to follow Scotland’s lead. stretching from the far western Atlantic coast to the Loire. During the Other tindings from the poll confirmed the Welsh public’s more positive wartime authoritarian regime of Marshal Petain, Loire-Atlantique (and its attitude to the devolution process in Wales. When asked the question, ‘What capital Nantes) was separated from the rest of Brittany. Recovering the are your personal views on devolution for Wales, that is the creation of the Loire-Atlantique has been a rallying cry of the Breton political movement National Assembly for Wales, which has taken over responsibility for areas ever since 1941. Our poll suggests strong public support for the reunification such as health and education in Wales?’, a majority (51 per cent) were in of historic Brittany (61 per cent). This attachment to the physical embodi- favour or strongly in favour of devolution, with only 32 per cent against.s ment of historic Brittany is itself a powerful form of ‘regionalit y effect’. Our There would appear to have been a shift in popular opinion since the Welsh survey demonstrates that it is shared across the political and geographical referendum in 1997. When asked more specific questions about the effective- spectrum, with only minor variations according to d~partement, partisan ness of the National Assembly, the Welsh people appeared to be less allegiance or other variables. confident about the Assembly. Firstly, the majority (60 per cent) of those In Wales, the poll was primarily designed to measure general attitudes asked disagreed with the statement that ‘The quality of public services has towards devolution in Wales and the National Assembly during the first two improved under the Assembly’, indicating that the Welsh public is still years of its operation. By any measure the National Assembly’s formative waiting for ‘the Assembly to deliver’. This is to be expected. The Assembly years have been stormy. The wafer-thin majority in the 1997 referendum was only two years old during the polling exercise and only in the longer term raised doubts about the commitment of the Welsh voters and the legitimacy will it be able to impact on the deep-seated economic and social problems of the whole project. The departure of one Welsh secretary (Ron Davies), facing the country. On the issue of whether the existence of the Assembly has and the appointment of another (Alun Michael) generally regarded as democratized political processes in Wales, respondents were split almost having been imposed by Tony Blair did little to enhance the devolutionary evenly, with a small majority against the proposition that ‘The say of people process. Furthermore, the failure of the Welsh Labour Party to win an in decision-making has improved under the Assembly’. This is an immediate overall majority in the f~st Assembly elections frustrated the expectation of problem for the Assembly which appears to reflect the general strong and consistent policies, argu’ably one of the main justifications for disillusionment with politics in the UK, indicated by the low general election devolution. The resultant scenario of ‘all-party inclusive policy-making’ was turnout of 2001. The Assembly still needs to convince a large section of the less than convincing and eventually led to Alun Michael’s losing a vote of no Welsh public that devolution is bringing Welsh politics closer to the Welsh confidence. It was aga~~st this background of institutional initiatives, people. Proponents of devolution and the Welsh Assembly Government in political experimentation and plain damage limitation that our poll of particular will take comfort from the slight majority of people who agreed Welsh public opinion was taken in late June 2001. that ‘The existence of the Assembly has given Wales more lobbying power The results presented in Table 11.1 are remarkable on three counts. Only within the UK government’. This view represents a quite sophisticated 24 per cent supported the pre-devolution arrangements. The prediction by assessment, recognizing, on the one hand, the limited nature of the legislative Ron Davies that devolution would be a process rather than an event powers devolved to Wales and, on the other, the enhanced lobbying capacity appeared to have been vindicated. Furthermore, 49 per cent of respondents exercised by a ‘democratic Assembly’ compared with a secretary of state supported the strengthening of the National Assembly to give it powers at heading a small central-government department, We draw the conclusion, as least equivalent to those of the Scottish Parliament. This shift in public in the Western Mail leader, that public opinion is ‘warming to the Assembly’. opinion is consistent with the majority view encountered in over forty We deduce a strong underpinning of support for regional political interviews in and around the National Assembly that the current system institutions in Wales and Brittany. But these basic similarities mask essential suffers from a lack of clarity and a confused and unworkable attribution differences between Wales and Brittany. This becomes apparent when we of functions. Our in-depth interviews demonstrated a deep-seated consider preferences for regional expenditure. 98 Contemporary Wales -15 Political Institutions and Public Opinion in wales and Brittany 99

issue areas justifies the search for Welsh solutions to intractable policY WHAT PRIORITIES FOR REGIONAL ACTION? problems (of educational underachievement or of health standards below Regional public spending priorities are indicative not only of actual policy the UK average).c On the other hand, not only do health and education choices, but also of the appropriateness of public intervention of different present seemingly irresolvable policy dilemmas, but both fields also contain levels in specific policy fields, Even in the most federally inclined system, It their own complex pre-existing actor systems and their own path depend- would be difficult to imagine defence expenditure being a major priority for encies. Health and education symbolize the semi-sovereign nature of a sub-central authority. The survey proceeded to ask an open-ended Assembly policy-making. There is a gulf between the expectations placed on question (’If your region had more money to spend, where should its first the Assembly and the constraints of interdependent, semi-sovereign politics two priorities lie?’) seeking to elicit the Welsh and Breton public’s prefer- (Cole and Storer, 2002). There is no general legislative competency for the ences for regional public expenditure. Table 11.2 presents a hierarchy of the Assembly in these devolved areas: the Assembly can only act where it has a first preferences. We now consider the implications of these figures for Wales statutory basis for action. It can decide to shift resources to health or and Brittany. education, but some other policy field will lose out. As ‘Treasury rules’ apply to Wales, the Treasury continues to control the purse strings. Without tax- TABLE 11.2 varying powers, the Assembly depends upon executive-led negotiations with First priority for regional expenditure in Wales and Brittany the Treasury, which are undertaken by the secretary of state and not by the Assembly itself (which must, however, be consulted). Breton first priority % Wetsh fsst priority % That the Assembly makes a difference is not in doubt, however. Its Environmental issues 20 NHS/hospitals 43 existence has proved a powerful bargaining chip with the Treasury, testified Economic development 9 Schools/education 21 by the resources obtained in the last two budgetary rounds. The Assembly Improving the roads 9 Public transport 6 Tourism 8 Getting people into jobs 4 can engage many reforms which are resource neutral: the power of the purse Training 6 Urban development 3 does not determine everything. Its impact can be demonstrated in the sphere 3 Culture 5 Improving the roads of education and lifelong learning, one of our fields of investigation. It has Education 5“ Support for small business 2 Urban development 4 Environmental issues 2 abolished the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECS) and created a Rural assistance 3, Children’s facilities 2 complex new institutional structure co-ordinated by Education and 5 Public transport 3 Other Learning Wales (ELWa). In the field of pre-16 education, it has rejected Sport 2 Don’t know/nothing 9 Other 15 premier Blair’s specialist schools and pledged to retain the comprehensive Don’t know/nothing 11 system. It has also rejected all private finance initiatives in education. But . .. education is an area of interdependent policy-making and the Assembly does not exercise control over all secondary legislation concerning education Public opinion in Wales has fully integrated the significance of devolution in Wales. One interviewee lamented the fact that ‘since devolution, more into its thinking. Its priorities for future regional expenditure involve generic secondary legislation affecting Wales on education has been passed through spending areas – such as health and education – rather than more narrowly the Westminster parliament than the Assembly’. Teacher’s pay and condi- defined Welsh interests such as culture or language. The priorities for tions in particular were entirely decided by London. In the area of health, Assembly expenditure are broadly in line with those of the UK as a whole. the Assembly has reformed the structures of health care (the creation of Health and education are the overwhelming concerns, with the Welsh area-wide NHS ot%ces) and enacted a number of symbolic egalitarian electorate demonstrating an awareness that the Assembly now makes many measures (such as free eye tests for pensioners), but the specific solutions it essential decisions in these areas. Health and education are two areas where can adopt are limited within the structures of the NHS as it currently exists. the Assembly has devolved powers to define and apply Welsh solutions. The The counterpart to the Welsh electorate’s concern with health and lessons for the Assembly are mixed. On the one hand, the salience of these education is that other Assembly priorities – such as the environment. social 100 Contemporary Wales -15 Political Institutions and Public Opinion in Wales and Brittany 101 inclusion, transport, urban development and rural assistance – did not spending areas. They suggest a strong ‘regional effect’ . The first priority was figure highly in the public’s perceptions of important spending priorities. the environment. Environmental issues are high on the political agenda in This hierarchy confirms the polity-building dimension of Welsh devolution Brittany, which has to face specific challenges unknown to most other that we explore below. While polity-building is deeply satisfying, there is a French regions. The second priority for regional expenditure identified in danger that the Assembly (and the Welsh Assembly Government in par- the survey is economic development. There is an established post-war ticular) will be identified in the eyes of public opinion as a rather distant tradition of public intervention in supporting the Breton economy, whether Cardiff-based administration rather than a proximate authority bringing through direct investment or through providing transport infrastructure. By decision-making closer to the people. distinguishing economic development as the second priority for regional In Brittany, the findings differ in important respects from those observed expenditure, the Breton public again identified an area where regional action in Wales, where health and education dominated popular preferences. These could (or should) make a difference. Amongst the other priorities for results do not imply that the Breton public cares less about health and regional expenditure we can identify two further areas closely linked to the education. In the Breton case, expenditure priorities demonstrated a realistic specific attributes of Brittany: tourism and culture. Brittany is one of appraisal of the limited powers of the French regions much more than a lack France’s major tourist regions. That Bretons look to the regional authority of interest in the areas of health and education. Breton public opinion has to promote tourism supports the proximity argument; regional investment is fully integrated the constraints of decentralization into its preferences. It is appropriate because the region has detailed knowledge of local conditions. because health and education are not identified as areas of regional policy We might make a similar observation with respect to culture. It is entirely intervention that they do not appear as high priorities for regional expend- appropriate for the regional authority to promote culture, not only because iture. We would certainly not expect health to top the list of spending culture is worth promoting, but also because it has a strong regional priorities for a French regional assembly. The French system of health care is dimension. elaborately – and expensively – managed by a social partnership of employers In Wales and Brittany, we subjected two policy areas to more intense and trade unions, increasingly closely monitored by the central state. The scrutiny: training and regional languages. In Brittany, as in Wales, support regions do not have any responsibilities therein (though the departments do). for expenditure on regional languages was very low down the list of popular The low ranking of education is rather more intriguing. Though France priorities – fewer than 1 per cent of first preferences in both cases. We prides itself on its national education system, implying uniform standards should exercise some caution when interpreting this figure. Priorities for and practices throughout the country, French regions also have important public expenditure do not automatically equate with issue saliency. In an responsibilities in secondary and higher education. The regions build and area such as support for regional languages, policy objectives might be maintain upper secondary schools (lycdes) and some universities provide achieved with minimal additional public expenditure. In Wales (50 per cent) equipment, participate in ~ilucational planning and – of great importance in and in Brittany (53 per cent) a majority of respondents identified the Brittany – can make grants to private schools. Education is by far the largest National Assembly for Wales or the Brittany regional council as the ap- spending post of all French regions, around 50 per cent in the case of propriate level for decision-making on language-related issues. The findings Brittany. We surmise that, though there is intense interest in Brittany in for training policy provide further support for the regional level in both education, this issue area is perceived primarily either as a national or a more countries. Welsh and Breton public opinion was remarkably similar in localized policy responsibility. The regional councils have not yet drawn preferring the regional institution as the ‘primary political institution much political capital from their major budgetary investment in education making decisions in the area of training policy’, rather than the EU, over the past fifteen years. Education is one area where the central state has national government or local government.’ succeeded in shedding responsibilities to the periphery (regional councils and Our second series of questions lead us to refine our argument somewhat. state field services) while retaining strategic control (Balme, 1999). A logic of appropriateness appears to be at work. Whether consciously or Unlike in Wales, in the case of Brittany the public’s expenditure prefer- not, the Welsh public appears to have integrated the evolutionary character ences pinpoint issues of specific regional importance, rather than generic of devolution into its calculations. It looks to the Assembly (in an 100 Contemporary Wales -15 Political Institutions and Public Opinion in Wales and Brittany 101 inclusion, transport, urban development and rural assistance – did not spending areas. They suggest a strong ‘regional effect’ . The first priority was figure highly in the public’s perceptions of important spending priorities. the environment. Environmental issues are high on the political agenda in This hierarchy confirms the polity-building dimension of Welsh devolution Brittany, which has to face specific challenges unknown to most other that we explore below. While polity-building is deeply satisfying, there is a French regions. The second priority for regional expenditure identified in danger that the Assembly (and the Welsh Assembly Government in par- the survey is economic development. There is an established post-war ticular) will be identified in the eyes of public opinion as a rather distant tradition of public intervention in supporting the Breton economy, whether Cardiff-based administration rather than a proximate authority bringing through direct investment or through providing transport infrastructure. By decision-making closer to the people. distinguishing economic development as the second priority for regional In Brittany, the findings differ in important respects from those observed expenditure, the Breton public again identified an area where regional action in Wales, where health and education dominated popular preferences. These could (or should) make a difference. Amongst the other priorities for results do not imply that the Breton public cares less about health and regional expenditure we can identify two further areas closely linked to the education. In the Breton case, expenditure priorities demonstrated a realistic specific attributes of Brittany: tourism and culture. Brittany is one of appraisal of the limited powers of the French regions much more than a lack France’s major tourist regions. That Bretons look to the regional authority of interest in the areas of health and education. Breton public opinion has to promote tourism supports the proximity argument; regional investment is fully integrated the constraints of decentralization into its preferences. It is appropriate because the region has detailed knowledge of local conditions. because health and education are not identified as areas of regional policy We might make a similar observation with respect to culture. It is entirely intervention that they do not appear as high priorities for regional expend- appropriate for the regional authority to promote culture, not only because iture. We would certainly not expect health to top the list of spending culture is worth promoting, but also because it has a strong regional priorities for a French regional assembly. The French system of health care is dimension. elaborately – and expensively – managed by a social partnership of employers In Wales and Brittany, we subjected two policy areas to more intense and trade unions, increasingly closely monitored by the central state. The scrutiny: training and regional languages. In Brittany, as in Wales, support regions do not have any responsibilities therein (though the departments do). for expenditure on regional languages was very low down the list of popular The low ranking of education is rather more intriguing. Though France priorities – fewer than 1 per cent of first preferences in both cases. We prides itself on its national education system, implying uniform standards should exercise some caution when interpreting this figure. Priorities for and practices throughout the country, French regions also have important public expenditure do not automatically equate with issue saliency. In an responsibilities in secondary and higher education. The regions build and area such as support for regional languages, policy objectives might be maintain upper secondary schools (lycdes) and some universities provide achieved with minimal additional public expenditure. In Wales (50 per cent) equipment, participate in ~ilucational planning and – of great importance in and in Brittany (53 per cent) a majority of respondents identified the Brittany – can make grants to private schools. Education is by far the largest National Assembly for Wales or the Brittany regional council as the ap- spending post of all French regions, around 50 per cent in the case of propriate level for decision-making on language-related issues. The findings Brittany. We surmise that, though there is intense interest in Brittany in for training policy provide further support for the regional level in both education, this issue area is perceived primarily either as a national or a more countries. Welsh and Breton public opinion was remarkably similar in localized policy responsibility. The regional councils have not yet drawn preferring the regional institution as the ‘primary political institution much political capital from their major budgetary investment in education making decisions in the area of training policy’, rather than the EU, over the past fifteen years. Education is one area where the central state has national government or local government.’ succeeded in shedding responsibilities to the periphery (regional councils and Our second series of questions lead us to refine our argument somewhat. state field services) while retaining strategic control (Balme, 1999). A logic of appropriateness appears to be at work. Whether consciously or Unlike in Wales, in the case of Brittany the public’s expenditure prefer- not, the Welsh public appears to have integrated the evolutionary character ences pinpoint issues of specific regional importance, rather than generic of devolution into its calculations. It looks to the Assembly (in an 102 Contemporary Wales -15 Political Institutions and Public Opinion in Wales and Brittany 103 exaggerated manner) to concentrate its resources on remedying deep-rooted TABLE 11.3 problems in health and education. To all extents and purposes, the Welsh The Moreno identity scale for Britiany and Wales public implores its Assembly to act as a government, divided opinions over Brittany devolution notwithstanding. The Breton public wants regional public Vo Commentary Wales Y. expenditure to be concentrated in areas where regional institutions might Breton, not French The results of centuries of ‘national’ Welsh,not British ~ make a difference, or where the image of Brittany itself is involved. We assimilation is to suppress a More Breton than 37 might conceive of this as a bounded regionality. There is no equivalent 1 17 homogeneous Breton identity; More Welshthan French regional identity remains strong British process of state-building to that one might infer from the findings in Wales. 1 Health and education provide a useful contrast to training and regional Equally Breton and 56 Confirms representation of the Equally Welshand 35 French languages. In the core areas of health and education, even in regionally Iegitimist nature of Breton political British culture minded Brittany, there is a preference for a system of national regulation, consistent with French public service doctrine, equality of standards and the More French than Three-quarters express some sort of More British than Breton 26 Breton identity, in spite of traditions Welsh 22 legacy of 150 years of ‘republican’ ideology. French, not Breton } of Jacobin centralization British, not Welsh }

INSTITUTIONS, IDENTITIES AND VOTING INTENTIONS IN Don’t know 1 WALES AND BRITTANY Other 6 How best can we comprehend these institutional viewpoints in Wales and Brittany? Full analysis of the structural and attitudinal variables contained in the poll lies outside the scope of the present article. We will limit our between national and regional identities. Multiple identities are more easily analysis here to two criteria – multiple identities and intended voting assumed in Brittany than in Wales. behaviour in an Assembly or regional election – which allow for meaningful Simple cross-tabulations suggest that in the two cases there is some sort of comparisons to be draw_nbetween Welsh and Breton public opinion. relationship between identity and institutional preferences. Clear relation- Does identity matter? We asked respondents in both surveys to state ships were established between identity and institutional preferences at the whether they considered themselves to be more Welsh than British (more two extremes. Those considering themselves to be uniquely or pre- Breton than French), equally Welsh and British (equally Breton and French) dominantly Welsh or Breton were far more likely to advocate either a or more British than Welsh (more French than Breton ). The results are Scottish-style parliament or independence (autonomy in the case of presented in Table 1113. The table is highly revealing. A far higher Brittany) than were those considering themselves to be primarily or entirely proportion of the Welsh survey – around one-third – considered itself to be British or French. There also appears to be some sort of relationship exclusively or primarily Welsh than was the case in Brittany. A sense of between the ability to speak a regional language (Breton or Welsh) and an Welshness as being essentially opposed to Brutishness is firmly rooted in a institutional preference in favour of greater regionalization or autonomy. sizeable minority of Welsh people. In Brittany, by contrast, the sense of Our poll suggests that fluency in the Welsh language appears to be a major regional identity is strong, but this is not considered as being in opposition explanatory factor of institutional preferences. Those declaring themselves to an overarching French nationhood. Regional identity is not a surrogate to be fluent in Welsh (some 12 per cent) were more likely to espouse an nationality. This finding is consistent with the mainstream portrayal of independent Wales than those with little or no knowledge of the language. A Breton political culture and society we investigated above. There is much less similar tinding was observed in Brittany, though the numbers were smaller. of a conflict between Breton and French identities than is the case for Wales Do partisan preferences matter? We asked both populations how they and the UK. The greatest difference between Wales and Brittany, therefore, intended to vote if a general or a regional election were to be held tomorrow. lies not so much in institutional preferences for the future as in the linkage We then cross-tabulated regional voting intention with institutional 102 Contemporary Wales -15 Political Institutions and Public Opinion in Wales and Brittany 103 exaggerated manner) to concentrate its resources on remedying deep-rooted TABLE 11.3 problems in health and education. To all extents and purposes, the Welsh The Moreno identity scale for Britiany and Wales public implores its Assembly to act as a government, divided opinions over Brittany devolution notwithstanding. The Breton public wants regional public Vo Commentary Wales Y. expenditure to be concentrated in areas where regional institutions might Breton, not French The results of centuries of ‘national’ Welsh,not British ~ make a difference, or where the image of Brittany itself is involved. We assimilation is to suppress a More Breton than 37 might conceive of this as a bounded regionality. There is no equivalent 1 17 homogeneous Breton identity; More Welshthan French regional identity remains strong British process of state-building to that one might infer from the findings in Wales. 1 Health and education provide a useful contrast to training and regional Equally Breton and 56 Confirms representation of the Equally Welshand 35 French languages. In the core areas of health and education, even in regionally Iegitimist nature of Breton political British culture minded Brittany, there is a preference for a system of national regulation, consistent with French public service doctrine, equality of standards and the More French than Three-quarters express some sort of More British than Breton 26 Breton identity, in spite of traditions Welsh 22 legacy of 150 years of ‘republican’ ideology. French, not Breton } of Jacobin centralization British, not Welsh }

TABLE 11.4 TABLE 11.6 Institutional preferences and multiple identities in Wales (% roundedup or Voting intention in a National Assembly for Wales election and institutional down) preference (!/o roundedup or down)

Welsh, not More Welab Equally Welsh More British Con Lab Llb Dem Plaid Cyrrrru Total British than British and British than Welsh An independentWales 4.5 4 7 1 28 11 Walesshouldbecome independent 26 18 4 Remainpart of the UK, 30 24 44 43 51 38 Remain part of the UK, Withelected 41 44.5 39 withelectedparliament parliamt%t Remainpart of the UK, 17 30 27 12 23 Remain Dartof the UK, withelected 15 24 26 25 withelectedassembly assembl~ Remainpart of the UK 54 15 27 6 23.5 Remain part of the UK withoutan 13 12 30 36 withoutan electedassembly electedassembly Don’t know — 3.6 1.4 2.3 4.1

TABLE 11.5

Institutional preferencesand multiple identities in Brittany (!40 roundedup or TABLE 11.7 down) Voting intention in a Brittany Regional election and institutional preference (% roundedup or down) Breton but More Breton EquattyBreton More French French but not French than French andFrench than Breton not Breton Total Ps Greens RPR UDF

Abolish the ConseilRegional – 1 2 2 1 Regionalcouncilwithlimitedpowers 44 49 45.5 54 42 The ConseilRegionalstloukt 29 31.5 42 57.5 56 remain with limitedpowers Electedparliamentwithtax-raising 20 34 36 39 32 46 Give the ConseilRegional 19 3’5 36 33 and legislativepowers law-makingand taxation powers 33 25 10 3 15 Brittany should become Autonomyfor Brittany 12 8 14 6 4 independent 6 Stronglyin favourand in favourof 63 67 68 62 79 unitingLoire-Atlantiqued&partement withBrittany preferences (and, in the case of Brittany, with attitudes towards recovering the Loire-Atlantique). In-Brittany, we observed surprisingly few differences political conflict within the Brittany arena. Moreover, national political according to voting intention. Socialist Party (PS) voters were scarcely more parties are infused with Breton cultural values. There is also a distrust of favorable than RPR voters to enhanced regional autonomy. Though we political extremes, except in specific sub-cultural circumstances. While not must treat these figures with caution, they bear out the belief expressed in going as far as to suggest a cross-partisan consensus on the broad issues many interviews that institutional preferences cut across existing parties. facing Brittany, there is an underlying consensus to defend Breton interests Institutional choices can not be reduced to a simple left-right cleavage. The to the outside world and limit political conflict. RPR president of the Brittany region, Josselin de Rohan, might have a Such a consensus is less obviously apparent in the case of Wales. Within sceptical position on greater autonomy, but many RPR voters did not share the Welsh electorate, we can identity three distinct positions, ranging from a this view. Likewise, while the Socialist Party leader Jean-Yves Le Drian has residual Conservative hostility to the principle of devolution, to over- repositioned the party in favour of greater regional autonomy, more whelming support from intending Plaid voters for at least a Scottish-style socialist voters are happy with existing arrangements than in favour of a parliament, with Labour and Liberal Democrats occupying a median Scottish-style parliament. These tindings are consistent with existing position favorable to going beyond executive devolution. Rather like the representations of Breton political cleavages. There is a moderation of 104 Contemporary Wales – 15 Political Institutions and Public Opinion in Wales and Brittany 105

TABLE 11.5

Abolish the ConseilRegional – 1 2 2 1 Regionalcouncilwithlimitedpowers 44 49 45.5 54 42 The ConseilRegionalstloukt 29 31.5 42 57.5 56 remain with limitedpowers Electedparliamentwithtax-raising 20 34 36 39 32 46 Give the ConseilRegional 19 3’5 36 33 and legislativepowers law-makingand taxation powers 33 25 10 3 15 Brittany should become Autonomyfor Brittany 12 8 14 6 4 independent 6 Stronglyin favourand in favourof 63 67 68 62 79 unitingLoire-Atlantiqued&partement withBrittany preferences (and, in the case of Brittany, with attitudes towards recovering the Loire-Atlantique). In-Brittany, we observed surprisingly few differences political conflict within the Brittany arena. Moreover, national political according to voting intention. Socialist Party (PS) voters were scarcely more parties are infused with Breton cultural values. There is also a distrust of favorable than RPR voters to enhanced regional autonomy. Though we political extremes, except in specific sub-cultural circumstances. While not must treat these figures with caution, they bear out the belief expressed in going as far as to suggest a cross-partisan consensus on the broad issues many interviews that institutional preferences cut across existing parties. facing Brittany, there is an underlying consensus to defend Breton interests Institutional choices can not be reduced to a simple left-right cleavage. The to the outside world and limit political conflict. RPR president of the Brittany region, Josselin de Rohan, might have a Such a consensus is less obviously apparent in the case of Wales. Within sceptical position on greater autonomy, but many RPR voters did not share the Welsh electorate, we can identity three distinct positions, ranging from a this view. Likewise, while the Socialist Party leader Jean-Yves Le Drian has residual Conservative hostility to the principle of devolution, to over- repositioned the party in favour of greater regional autonomy, more whelming support from intending Plaid voters for at least a Scottish-style socialist voters are happy with existing arrangements than in favour of a parliament, with Labour and Liberal Democrats occupying a median Scottish-style parliament. These tindings are consistent with existing position favorable to going beyond executive devolution. Rather like the representations of Breton political cleavages. There is a moderation of 106 Contemporary Wales -15 Politics! Institutions and Public Opinion in Wa[es and Brittany 107

AMs interviewed, few support the existing settlement, with the status quo the legal and political means for its policy ambitions. Even the Conservative option arriving in third position in each electorate (’retain an elected group accepted that a clarification of the Assembly’s powers was essential; Assembly with limited powers’). Executive devolution appears as the hollow such a clarification will await the next election at the earliest. core of regional governance in Wales. In association with a narrowing of positions within and between parties, Our tindings are nonetheless remarkable. Only the Conservative section of our findings also suggest that traditional regional cleavages have lessened in the electorate continues to oppose devolution, by a small margin. Devolu- intensity. The gap between those regions most favorable and least favora- tion is a cleavage that has traditionally cut across existing political parties, ble to devolution is only 9 per cent. There is little regional difference in the most especially the Labour Party. The principle of an elected Assembly/ preferences for future political developments. The Scottish option, a Parliament is now accepted overwhelmingly in each section of the electorate, parliament with law-making and taxation powers wins almost equal support except that of the Conservatives. While divisions remain in each party, the across Wales, with the exception of Cardiff which is most sceptical of such a centre of gravity amongst intending Labour and Liberal Democrat voters change. However, strongest support is expressed almost equally in north and (the governing coalition) has shifted beyond accepting devolution towards south: 42 per cent in north-west Wales and 43 per cent in the Valleys. The advocating a Scottish-style parliament. The Plaid Cymru section of the figures suggest that a more cohesive Welsh attitude to devolution is emerging electorate is the most cohesive, in its large majority dissatisfied with the across the whole of Wales. limited devolution introduced by the Government of Wales Act. We can observe this paradigm shift in favour of devolution in operation at CONCLUSION the level of political practice and inter-party relations. The founding fathers were convinced that the majoritarian traditions of Westminster politics Devolution and decentralization in Wales and Brittany are best understood would be inappropriate for Wales. The rhetorical commitment to all- as two alternative forms of territorial institution-building. We observed inclusive politics implied new forms of cross-party dialogue and the involve- above that, in important respects, the Wales–Brittany comparison is asym- ment of non-governing parties in policy-making decisions. The arrival in metrical. There are certain disadvantages in asymmetrical comparisons, but power of Rhodri Morgan and the creation of the Labour-Liberal Democrat there are also countervailing arguments. As developed throughout this coalition in September- 2000 marked two important watersheds in the article, devolution and decentralization present two alternative models: one history of Welsh politics. The vict&y of Rhodri Morgan represented the focused on territorial identity and polity-building, the other on proximity as coming of age of ‘a specifically Welsh Labour Party, cognisant above all of a response to policy solutions. Comparing comparable regions, even in its core territorial interests. Party opponents, even when critical of the distinctive institutional settings, allows for judgments to be made about the coalition, recognize the +.emancipation of the Welsh Labour Party. The efficacy or otherwise of specific regional political institutions. A fuller formation of the “Lib-Lab coalition was difficult to square with ‘all- comparison of devolution and decentralization in Wales and Brittany would inclusivit y’, especially as Rhodri Morgan does not conceal his preference for need to go beyond measuring institutional preferences, the purpose of this a single-party administration after the 2003 elections. In some important article. We need to develop an index that combines criteria drawn from the respects, however, all Welsh parties have moved closer together since 1999. study of institutions, networks, social capital, identity formation, public There is general agreement across all parties that the Assembly’s powers policy co-ordination and central regulation. Such an index would allow a need to be revised, though institutional preferences differ greatly. For the more realistic appreciation of the potential for regional governance than a UK-based parties, moreover, there is an awareness that devolution limited description of rule-making capacity. encourages a territorial adjustment of their core political message. Even the While awaiting such an exercise, the present article has focused on Welsh Conservatives have learned this lesson. In extensive interviews in and comparing public opinion and political institutions in two neighboring EU around the National Assembly in 2001 and 2002, Assembly members from states. From our empirical investigations we observe rather different all parties expressed strong demands for new powers. Deprived of full processes at work in Brittany and Wales. Devolution in Wales emerges as a legislative powers in the transferred domains, the National Assembly lacks dynamic process with unintended consequences. When evaluating the 108 Contemporary Wales -15 Political Institutions and Public Opinion in wales and Brittany 109 potential for regional governance in Wales, we must draw a distinction that is, a non-exclusive identity broadly shared across the political spectrum between constitutional constraint and political dynamic. Constitutionally, and within Breton society. Wales needs to look to the example of regions the power to act is spread across endless acts of Parliament. Politically, a such as Brittany which harness their identity to developing a strong sense of consensus is emerging within Wales for a strengthening of the powers of the social and human capital. Assembly. This consensus represents a paradigm shift by comparison even with the results of the Welsh referendum in 1997. The question is no longer NOTES whether devolution will survive, but whether the Welsh Assembly should be given powers equivalent to those in Scotland. This consensus has solid 1. Research for this article was carried out as part of the ESRC’S devolution and support within public opinion. constitutional change programme (’Evolution and Decentralisation in Wales and Brittany’: grant number L 219 25 2007). The award holders are Alistair Cole No such conclusion can be drawn in Brittany where, in spite of a strong (principal researcher), Barry Jones, John Loughlin and Colin Williams. Alan Storer undercurrent of support for a federal evolution, the status quo is the most is the research assistant. The award is based in the school of European studies at widely supported position. Taken as a whole, Breton public opinion adopts Cardiff University (the department of Welsh is also involved). We thank the council a median position. There is little appetite for autonomy. This can be gauged for its support. by several criteria: the weak level of support for autonomist parties; the lack 2. Market Research Wales and Etllcience 3 simultaneously carried out the public opinion surveys in Wales and Brittany in June and July 2001. A representative of consistent positions one way or the other from the main parties; the real, sample of 1,007, selected by quotas of age, gender, socio-economic group and but limited, constituency declaring itself in favour of autonomy; the locality, was interviewed in each region. Brittany-specific focus of regional expenditure priorities. Bretons are widely 3. These examples were those most frequently cited in extensive interviews in and attached to a legitimist form of regionalism. There is a strong sense of around the National Assembly for Wales in 2001 and 2002. Interviews took place in regional distinctiveness, but also a deeply embedded reluctance to transgress the following organizations: the National Assembly for Wales, ELWa, the CCETS business organizations (CBI, FSB, Chambers-Wales, IoD, House-Builders the established order. On the other hand, our findings suggest on balance Federation, the Economic Fora), trade unions ( TUC, GMB, Unify), WEFO, WDA, that, while respectful of established norms and processes, the Breton public local government, WLB, New Deal Taskforce, CCW, European Commission, EOC. would welcome a move towards greater regionalization. Almost one half (45 Interviews are ongoing. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. per cent) of the Breton public supported going beyond the existing limited 4. Direct election is a slight misnomer. Up to and including 1998, elections for the form of French decentralization and adopting powers analogous to those of French regional councils took place on the basis of departmental party lists. The proportional representation system used – a 5 per cent threshold and the ‘highest the Scottish Parliament. average’ methods of allocating votes to seats – marginally favoured the larger parties. Politicians in both regions refer to traditions, or ambitions of all- The electoral constituency for the 2004 elections will probably be that of the region, inclpsivity. Evidence froLn our quantitative and qualitative investigations rather than the a%partements. suggests a more comfortable and harmonious relationship between identity, 5. The precise results were as follows: strongly in favour 11 per cent, in favour 40 per institutions and territory in the case of Brittany than in Wales. There is a cent, against 19 per cent, strongty against 13 per cent, don’t know 18 per cent. 6. The situation is, however, regionally differentiated. In relation to education, definite tension between being British and being Welsh for around one-third standards across Wales are very varied, with high levels in rural areas, but much of Welsh people. The proportion of those constructing their Breton identity lower ones in the declining industrial areas, especially in the Valleys. The pattern for against being French is much weaker. Divisions within Breton society are health is rather similar. The Valleys are a health black spot, where the situation is less affirmed than in Wales, where linguistic, territorial and political compounded by the high rate of respiratory illnesses. As in Brittany, demands on divisions persist, in spite of a rallying to the new devolved institutions. healthcare are exacerbated by the high numbers of elderly pensioners retiring in Wales. Wales has a more developed system of political devolution than Brittany, 7. In the case of Brittany, 43.5 per cent favoured the regional council as the but in many other respects it can learn from observing the French region. appropriate level for training policy, followed by 24.5 per cent for local government, Welsh politicians tend to engage in aspirational comparisons with 20.5 per cent for central government and oniy 3.1 per cent for the European Union. Catalonia, Ireland or Canada, but these are quite unrealistic. Welsh In the case of Wales the figures were the Assembly (41.5 per cent) the UK politicians need to encourage something akin to the pride in being Breton: government (25.3 per cent), local government (23.4 per cent) and the European Union (3. 1 per cent). 108 Contemporary Wales -15 Political Institutions and Public Opinion in wales and Brittany 109 potential for regional governance in Wales, we must draw a distinction that is, a non-exclusive identity broadly shared across the political spectrum between constitutional constraint and political dynamic. Constitutionally, and within Breton society. Wales needs to look to the example of regions the power to act is spread across endless acts of Parliament. Politically, a such as Brittany which harness their identity to developing a strong sense of consensus is emerging within Wales for a strengthening of the powers of the social and human capital. Assembly. This consensus represents a paradigm shift by comparison even with the results of the Welsh referendum in 1997. The question is no longer NOTES whether devolution will survive, but whether the Welsh Assembly should be given powers equivalent to those in Scotland. This consensus has solid 1. Research for this article was carried out as part of the ESRC’S devolution and support within public opinion. constitutional change programme (’Evolution and Decentralisation in Wales and Brittany’: grant number L 219 25 2007). The award holders are Alistair Cole No such conclusion can be drawn in Brittany where, in spite of a strong (principal researcher), Barry Jones, John Loughlin and Colin Williams. Alan Storer undercurrent of support for a federal evolution, the status quo is the most is the research assistant. The award is based in the school of European studies at widely supported position. Taken as a whole, Breton public opinion adopts Cardiff University (the department of Welsh is also involved). We thank the council a median position. There is little appetite for autonomy. This can be gauged for its support. by several criteria: the weak level of support for autonomist parties; the lack 2. Market Research Wales and Etllcience 3 simultaneously carried out the public opinion surveys in Wales and Brittany in June and July 2001. A representative of consistent positions one way or the other from the main parties; the real, sample of 1,007, selected by quotas of age, gender, socio-economic group and but limited, constituency declaring itself in favour of autonomy; the locality, was interviewed in each region. Brittany-specific focus of regional expenditure priorities. Bretons are widely 3. These examples were those most frequently cited in extensive interviews in and attached to a legitimist form of regionalism. There is a strong sense of around the National Assembly for Wales in 2001 and 2002. Interviews took place in regional distinctiveness, but also a deeply embedded reluctance to transgress the following organizations: the National Assembly for Wales, ELWa, the CCETS business organizations (CBI, FSB, Chambers-Wales, IoD, House-Builders the established order. On the other hand, our findings suggest on balance Federation, the Economic Fora), trade unions ( TUC, GMB, Unify), WEFO, WDA, that, while respectful of established norms and processes, the Breton public local government, WLB, New Deal Taskforce, CCW, European Commission, EOC. would welcome a move towards greater regionalization. Almost one half (45 Interviews are ongoing. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. per cent) of the Breton public supported going beyond the existing limited 4. Direct election is a slight misnomer. Up to and including 1998, elections for the form of French decentralization and adopting powers analogous to those of French regional councils took place on the basis of departmental party lists. The proportional representation system used – a 5 per cent threshold and the ‘highest the Scottish Parliament. average’ methods of allocating votes to seats – marginally favoured the larger parties. Politicians in both regions refer to traditions, or ambitions of all- The electoral constituency for the 2004 elections will probably be that of the region, inclpsivity. Evidence froLn our quantitative and qualitative investigations rather than the a%partements. suggests a more comfortable and harmonious relationship between identity, 5. The precise results were as follows: strongly in favour 11 per cent, in favour 40 per institutions and territory in the case of Brittany than in Wales. There is a cent, against 19 per cent, strongty against 13 per cent, don’t know 18 per cent. 6. The situation is, however, regionally differentiated. In relation to education, definite tension between being British and being Welsh for around one-third standards across Wales are very varied, with high levels in rural areas, but much of Welsh people. The proportion of those constructing their Breton identity lower ones in the declining industrial areas, especially in the Valleys. The pattern for against being French is much weaker. Divisions within Breton society are health is rather similar. The Valleys are a health black spot, where the situation is less affirmed than in Wales, where linguistic, territorial and political compounded by the high rate of respiratory illnesses. As in Brittany, demands on divisions persist, in spite of a rallying to the new devolved institutions. healthcare are exacerbated by the high numbers of elderly pensioners retiring in Wales. Wales has a more developed system of political devolution than Brittany, 7. In the case of Brittany, 43.5 per cent favoured the regional council as the but in many other respects it can learn from observing the French region. appropriate level for training policy, followed by 24.5 per cent for local government, Welsh politicians tend to engage in aspirational comparisons with 20.5 per cent for central government and oniy 3.1 per cent for the European Union. Catalonia, Ireland or Canada, but these are quite unrealistic. Welsh In the case of Wales the figures were the Assembly (41.5 per cent) the UK politicians need to encourage something akin to the pride in being Breton: government (25.3 per cent), local government (23.4 per cent) and the European Union (3. 1 per cent). 110 Contemporary Wales -15

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Balme, R. (1999). Les Politiques de Nt+o-rkgionalisme,Paris, Economics. Chancy, R, Hall, T. and Pithouse, A. (eds) (2001). Post-Devolution Wales: New 12. THE WELSH ECONOMW A STATISTICAL Governance – New Democracy? Cardiff, University of Wales Press. Cole. A. and John, P. (2001). Local Governance in England and France, London, PROFILE Routledge. Cole, A. and Storer, A. (2002). ‘An emerging policy community’, in Jones, J. B. and Osmond, J. (eds), Creating a Civic Culture, Cardiff, IWA. Dupoirier, E. (cd.) ( 1998). R4gions, la Croist!edes Chemins, Paris, Presses de Sciences David Brooksbank Po. Favereau, F. (1993). Bretagne Contemporaine: Langue, Culture, Identitk, Morlaix, Editions Skol Vreizh. Flatres, P. (1986). Lu Bretagne, Paris, PUF. Ford, C. (1993). Creating the Nation in Provincial France: Religion and Political Identity in Brittany, Princeton, Princeton University Press. INTRODUCTION Creating a Civic Culture, Jones, J. B. and Osmond, J. (eds) (2002). Cardiff, IWA. This article is the annual statistical profile of the Welsh economy. The Le Bourdonnec, Y. (1996). Le Miracle Breton, Paris, Calmann-L6vy. Le Coadic, R. (1998). LIdentiti Bretonne, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes. format in terms of statistical content remains the same as that which Loughlin, J. and Mazey, S. (eds) (1995). The End of the French Unitary Slate: Ten appears in volumes 9 to 14 inclusive of Contemporary Wales. The discussion Years of Regionalization in France, 1982-1992, London, Frank Cass. in the main text covers seven topics: Output, Income and Expenditure; Marinetto, M. (2001). ‘The new settlement and the process of devolution: territorial Employment; Unemployment; Earnings; House Prices and Regional Com- politics and governance under the Welsh Assembly’, Political Studies, 49, 2, 306-22. petitiveness. The sixteen tables are based on information made available Martray, J. (1983). Vingt ans qui transformirent la Bretagne. L’epop4e du CELIB, prior to 1 June 2002 and, as noted in previous surveys, compilation and Paris France Empire. production lags with respect to certain ot%cial statistics mean that ‘latest’ McAllister, L. (2000). ‘The new politics in Wales rhetoric or reality?, Parliamentary figures occasionally ‘lag’ by two or three years. Affairs, 53,3, 591+04. Much of the focus of this edition of Contemporary Wales is on the slowly (1997). La Rkgion, une Insti~ution. La Representation, le Pouvoir et la Regle Nay, O. emerging impact that the European Structural Funds are having on both the clansl’Espace R&gional,Paris, l’Harmattan. Patchett, K. (2000). ‘The New Welsh Constitution: The Government of Wales Act economy and society of the country, The first rounds of expenditure under 1998’, in Barry Jones and Denis Balsom (ed~), The Road to the National Assembly the European Structural Fund arrangements have now been underway for for Wales, Cardifi University of Wales Press, p. 229. approximately eighteen months and many of the initial ‘fast track’ projects Pillet, D. (2001). ‘La Bretagne. Un modele? Non, un exemple’, OueSMrance,23 are nearing the stage of completion or extension. The first chance to November. evaluate the programmed and change the way in which the Single Pro- Rawlings, R. (1998). ‘The new model Wales’, Journal of LUW and Society 25, 4, 461-509. gramming Documents target particular development needs will come at the Rawlings, R. (2001). ‘Quasi-legislative devolution: powers and principles’, end of 2002. As noted in Contemporary Wales for the past four years, the unpublished paper considered by the National Assembly Review Procedure. information summarized in the tables below illustrates the profound nature of the economic development challenges that still lie ahead. Under the guidance of a new administration, commentators and analysts alike await the publication of each new set of economic data with keen anticipation. The unprecedented scrutiny which economic development initiatives and programmed will undergo during this period of European funding has concentrated the minds of policy-makers on securing real change and Publishing Regional Srudiu, Vol. 37.3,pp.26>276,2043 Carfax 4!!)Tayiw&.FranckCfcW

Beyond the Unitary State? Public Opinion, Political Institutions and Public Policy in Brittany

ALISTAIR COLE and JOHN LO UGHLIN School of Ewopean SttJdies, Card@ Universit~ Cardif CF1 O 3YG, UK. Emails: ColeA@Cardijac. talk; lot4.ghlin@[email protected]

(Received January 2002; in revised form September 2002)

COLE A. and LOUGHLINJ. (2003) Beyond the unitary state? Public opinion, political institutions and public policy in Brittany Reg. Studies 37, 265–276. This paper investigates the new regionalism in Brittany, one of France’s historic regions. It is based on findings from a mass opinion survey carried out in July 2001, as well as on insights drawn from over 70 semi-structured interviews. The quantitative and qualitative evidence is interpreted through reference to four hypotheses, concerning issues of Breton identity, autonomy pragmatism and political opportunity structures. While our findings allow us to establish the pertinence of the new regionalism problematic in Brittany, we conclude that, in the French case, theories of ‘new regionalism’ must be understood within the tlamework of an overarching state tradition that regulates and channels regional pressures and creates strong incentives for a system of national political regulation.

Governance Decentralization Brittany France Public opinion

COLE A. et LO UGHLIN J. (2003) Au-deli de l’Etat unitaire?: COLE A. und LO UGHLI NJ. (2003) Jenseits des Einheitsstaats? l’opinion publique, 1.s institutions politiques et la politique Offentliche Meinung, politische [nstitutionen und Regie- publique en Bretagne, Reg. Stl~dies 37, 265–276. Cet article rungspolitik, Reg. Stvdies 37, 265–276. Dies.. Aufsatz unter- cherche i examiner 1. nouveau .Lgionalisme en Bretagne, sucht den neuen Regionalismus in der Bretagne, eine der l’une des rtgions historiques de France. 11 est fond~ sur un historischen Regionen Frankreichs. Er stiitzt sich sowohl auf sondage trt% dt%illt ftit au mois de juillet 2001, ainsi que Befimde einer Massenmeinungsumfrage, die im Juli 2001 sur des aperqus tirt% de plus de soixante-dix interviews semi- durchgeftihrt wurde, als such auf Einsichten, die in mehr ah structur6es. Les preuves quantitatives et qualitative sent 70, mehr oder weniger gegliederten Interviews gewonnen interpr6t6es en fonction de quatre hypotheses concernant wurden. Die quantitativen und qualitative Beweise werden des questions relatives i l’identit6 bretonne, i l’autonomic, unter Bezugnahme auf vier Hypotheses interpretiert, die au pragmatism et ~ la structure des possibilit~s politiques. sich mit Fragen der [dentitat und Autonomic, des Pragma- Tan&s que les preuves permettent d’6tablir la pertinence de tisms und Strukturen politischer Moglichkeiten befassen. la nouvelle probl~matique r6gionaliste en Bretagne, on con- Obschon die Befunde den Autoren gestatten, die Sachdien- clut que, pour ce qui est des 6tudes de cas frangaises, il faut lichkeit de. neuen regionalistischen Problematic in de. considixer les th60ries du ‘nouveau r6gionalisme’ clans 1. Bretagne unter Beweis zu stellen, ziehen sie den SchluB, da13 cadre d’une tradition 6tatiste globale qui r@le et canalise la im Falle Frankreichs Theorien des ‘neuen Regionalismus’ pression r6gionale et qui cr6e de fortes incitations en faveur im Rahmen einer iibergeordneten Staatstradition verstanden d’un syst?me de r@#ation politique d’envergure nationale. werden miissen, die regionalen Druck reguliert und in Kanide leitet, und krafiige Anreize t%. ein System uberregionaler Gouvernement Decentralisation Bretagne politischer Satzungen schafft. France Opinion publique Regierung Dezentralisierung Bretagne Frankreich Offendiche Meinung

INTRODUCTION policies designed by national governments to bring about a convergence of economically weaker regions Since 1945, the ‘regional question’ has rarely been off with the most advanced. The basic aim of this approach academic and political agendas. However, the way in was, from a political perspective, to produce integrated which the question has been conceptualized and poli- national polities and, fkom an economic perspective, to tical and public policy approaches to it have varied bring into productivity those territorial regions that quite considerably. During the heyday of the Welfare had fallen behind. The expectation during this period State, ‘regions’ were generally viewed as objects of on the part of political elites and most academic

0034-3404 print/ 1360-0591 online/03 /030265-l 2 C)2003 Regional StudiesAssociation DOI: 10.1080/0034340032000065424 http://www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk 266 Alistair Cole and]ohn Loughlin

theorists was that regions would be eventually assimi- distribution of social capital, the linkages between lated into a homogeneous state system. ‘Regionalism’, identities and institutions and the nature of territorial * and, u -f_ortiori, ‘ethnic nationalism’, were viewed as policy problems. Through comparison within and expressions of political backwardness and conservatism. across nations, we will eventually provide a framework This was especially the case in France. It was not for considering new regionalism within unitary states. surprising, therefore, that the fkst regionalism move- It makes much more sense to test for the emergence ments developed as movements which were primarily of a new regionalism in a traditionally unitary state concerned with formulating a political project that such as France, or a union state such as the UK, than was in line with this dominant thinking and, only in states with longer established federal (Germany) or secondarily, with protecting their traditional languages regionalism (Spain) traditions, where one would expect and cultures. Brittany was an exemplar in this regard as strong regional institutions. We started with a number we show below. of working hypotheses designed to uncover the exist- By the 1990s, the context throughout Europe had ence or otherwise of a regional Breton identity, its changed radically. After a period of about 20 years linkage with institutional and policy preferences and the in which a number of wider forces – globalization, likely future institutional development of regionalism in Europeanization, neo-liberalism, new public manage- France. ment approaches – had reshaped the nature, role and Our first hypothesis was that Breton identity is weak functions of nation-states, the ‘regional question’ came and, by implication, debate about the new regionalism to be formulated quite differently from the early 1980s. is misplaced in France. We rejected this hypothesis By this time, the top-down regional policies of the from the outset. The Pans-based Observatoire Inter- Keynesian state had given way to a new bottom-up r~gional du Politique (O 1P) has been tracking support model of regional development, based on notions such for regional political institutions in France from 1986 as the ‘innovative’ or ‘learning’ region, where regions onwards. In the annual O IP survey, Brittany consis- became political actors in their own right and were tently emerges as the mainland French region with the engaged in a situation of competitiveregionalism,This strongest sense of its own identity. Through selecting time the fi-amework in which these processes were Brittany, we are consciously studying a highly distinc- occurring was no longer simply the nation-state tive region within a nation-state – France – that is (although this remains a key frame or reference) but a usually taken as the paradigm of a strong centralized wider context encompassing the European Union and state. A second hypothesis, long consistent with official also the wider international arena. Although there was attitudes within the French state, is that there is no some early interest in the notion of a ‘Europe of the demand for enhanced regional autonomy, a hypothesis Regions’ this soon gave way to a more realistic appraisal we test (and reject) below. which toned down the issue to a recognition that A third hypothesis (consistent with the traditional regions (and other sub-national authorities) are now French republican models) posited that citizens in key players in a wider system of European governance. Brittany were likely to adopt an instrumental or prag- At the same time, national governments remain even matic stance towards extending the domain of regional more important players alongside the supranational policy intervention, though this in no way implied institutions of the European Union. The nature and the absence of regional consciousness. Bretons have consequences of these changes is still the subject of a traditionally placed their ftith in the French state (rather vast debate in the social sciences. In any case, it is than the Breton authorities) to deliver public goods, possible to speak today of a ‘new regionalism’ although convinced that Brittany has fared well from the top- this term is used in different ways to cover a wide down, centralized pattern of territorial management. variety of normative and analytical positions with regard Playing up Breton identity serves a useful function, to ‘the regional question’ (K EAT IN G and Lo UGHLI N, insofar as it encourages the central state to channel 1997; KEATING 1998; LOUGHLIN, 2001) scarce resources to its peripheral, and potentially rebelli- This paper investigates the new regionalkm in Brit- ous region. This hypothesis presupposes that Bretons tany, one of France’s historic regions. It forms part of fall on the instrumental side of the instrumental/ a much larger project comparing processes of regional identity spectrum and that they are conscious of the governance in Wales and Brittany, where we investigate limits of regional capacity building within the context , devolution and decentralization as two alternative forms of French republicanism. of regional institution building undertaken in two Moving from the electorate, strictosemu, to the wider states – France and the UK – with distinctive non- policy community, a fourth hypothesis focuses upon . federal (unitary or union) traditions.’ Though both the political opportunity structure. As political parties devolution and decentralization were initialJy envisaged aggregate interests, so parties are more likely to Shape as new technocratic forms of steering at a distance, voter preferences than the other way around. The each has assumed a specific character dependent in part Breton political scene has always been dominated by upon narrow institutional arrangements, but also more national parties rather than regionally spectilc ones. generally upon political opportunity structures, the Bretons have been spectacularly successfld in posi- Public Opinion, Political Institutions and Public Policy in Brittany 267 tioning themselves as national leaders – in all parties – planning. They have been fully operational sub- and have had little to gain by raising symbolic divisive national authorities only since 1986, with their main issues such as language or enhanced devolution. Brit- (limited) responsibilities in economic development, tany’s political elite has adapted to the French logic of transportation, education, training and culture. French territorial decentralization, having itself had a major regions were created in a standardized form throughout influence in forcing decentralization onto the political the French territory, including in areas where no agenda, and in obtaining disproportionate resources regional tradition existed. The region of the Centre through playing up, within limits, its territorial distinc- thus enjoys exactly the same prerogatives as Brittany. tiveness. This model of influence is a traditional one of Regional boundaries do not usually respect the bringing pressure to bear in Paris. informal boundaries of France’s historic regions. To Both the first and the second hypotheses allow us – institutionalize France’s historic regions would be by their refutation – to establish the pertinence of the tantamount to admitting the posthumous existence of new regionalism problematic in the Breton case. In the a union state of the UK variety, rather than the French case of the third and fourth hypotheses, theories of unitary version. This highlights the technocratic nature ‘new regionalism’ must be understood within the of French decentralization; proximity would produce framework of an overarching state tradition that regu- more effective decision making, but was not intended lates and channels regional pressures and creates strong to give rise to ‘cownunautarkm’or regionalism identities. incentives for a system of national political regulation. Decentralization was intended to promote local We consider the pertinence of these hypotheses in the democracy and administrative eficiency, not to chal- conclusion. First, we set out the context of regionalism lenge the underlying principles of the French unitary in France and the specific characteristics of the Brittany state, although some of the older regionalism demands region. (e.g. a Corsican Statut Partiudier) were taken on board while others (e.g. a unified Basque d~partemettt) were REGIONALISM IN FRANCE quietly dropped. We should note that administrative ‘reconcentration’ (the creation of the regional Regionalization in France dates back to the late 1950s prefectures in 1964) preceded political decentralization but reached its high point in the period 1982–86 with by two decades. This is important, as the tentacular the setting up of elected regional councils as part of a French State has never abandoned its territorial wider programme of decentralization (L OUGHLI N and ambitions. MAZEY, 1995; COLE and JOt+N, 2001). The regional Some of the regional councils such as Rhc5ne-Alpes institution in France is the result of a long process of (despite its artificial character and lack of regional what might be called ‘creeping institutionalization’ as identity) have succeeded in carving out a niche for it was gradually (and grudgingly) granted a position in themselves as ‘strong’ regions, while others, such as the politico-administrative system alongside the d@arte- Languedoc-Roussillon, have manifestly failed to do so. tnents and the cmwwties. The regional institution was Brittany today finds itself somewhere in the middle of established while retaining the longer established and, these two extremes. The term ‘region’, as applied to in many ways, more powerful d;parterne~ts. Large cities Brittany, is ambiguous in that it can refer to both the and towns had also become powerfiul levels of sub- institution embodied in the current regional council national government (LE GALES, 1995; HO FFMANN with its four departments (C&es-d’Armor, Finist&e, MART [NOT, 1999). The regions might, therefore, be considered the ‘poor cousins’ of French subnational Ille-et-Vilaine and Morbihan) and to the geographically government. wider historic ‘region’, including the Loire Atlantique To a large extent, the 1982 reforms were carried out d.ipartetnent, corresponding more or less to the ancient in the context of the Keynesian welfare state approaches Duchy of Brittany. The survey on which this paper is that we identified above. These reforms considerably based was carried out in the area covered by the existing modified the French politico-administrative landscape region, known sometimes as B4. This paper presents and its system of central–local relations although not some preliminary findings of the attitude survey we particularly through making them more transparent carried out in Brittany. These findings illustrate what and coherent. On the contrary, decentralization and people living in Brittany think of their region and how regionalization have produced a rather chaotic and they envisage its future development. The paper is unclear situation in which different levels of govern- structured around three groups of questions asked in ment and different actors, including the field services the survey. Where should decisions be made? What are of the central state, compete for scarce resources. Con- the priorities for regional public expenditure? How sistent with the territorial management policies of the does public opinion envisage future institutional devel- post-war French state, French administrative regions opments? In the conclusion, we address the possible were first established in the 1950s as technocratic implications of our findings for the future development advisory bodies to assist in strategic functions of of the French polity. We begin with a brief presentation economic development, transportation and territorial of politics in post-war Brittany. 268 Alistair Cole and Jolwt Ixn.ig}din

BRITTANY: A FRENCH REGION (left Catholicism, social partnership, links with volun- WITH A DIFFERENCE tary associations) (H ANLEY, 1994; SAW ICKI, 1993). . One of the most distinctive regions of France, Brittany The French Communist Party (PC F) also established has a strong sense of its specific position within French its own strongholds in the ‘red triangle’ of north-west , society. Formerly an independent Duchy (from 818 to and central Brittany and was supportive fmm an early 1532), then a French province with special prerogatives date of many of the Breton movement’s ‘anti-colonial’ (1532–1789), reduced for long to being a collection of demands (L EBESQUE, 1970). Long resistant to national disparate ddparternertts before becoming an administra- trends, the recent decline of the PC F in Brittany tive then political region, modern Brittany is a French represents the beginning of the end of an original region with a difference. Unlike many other French model of rural communism, largely to the benefit of regions, it can look to its past existence as an independ- the P S. Only the far-right Front national has failed to ent political entity, with its own founding myths and establish solid bases in Brittany, notwithstanding Jean- political institutions. Though the symbols of statehood Marie Le Pen’s Breton origins. The case of the FN have long been repressed, the region retains many illustrates well the innate cohesion of Breton political distinctive characteristics. The Breton language is the culture. Having been spared the ravages of excessive European continent’s only Celtic language. The endur- urbanization, industrial decline and unemployment, ing symbolic importance of the Catholic religion is Brittany’s social networks have remained largely intact, ever present physically in the architecture of Breton providing a barrier to the breakthrough of the far-right villages, as well as in higher than average rates of movement. The persistence of Catholicism and weak religious practice. The spectacular growth of Breton immigration are also powerfiul explanatory factors, as cultural movements (dance, theatre, costume and the Catholic clergy at all levels explicitly opposed racist music) is testament to a revival of Breton values and and xenophobia attitudes among their followers. self-consciousness. The dominant political culture is one of political At a more abstract level, observers have noted the accommodation. Breton politicians of all parties, how- capacity of Breton actors to join forces to promote ever divided they are internally, will tend to close their common interests and to defend Brittany against ranks against threats fkom the outside. Despite a strong attacks from the outside world. Breton solidarity can regional identity, however, Brittany has not produced also be gauged more intuitively by the effectiveness of significant regionalism parties, or at least parties that Breton elite-level networks in Pans and Brussels, and have been capable of winning seats in departmental, by the importance of the Breton diaspora in retaining regional or national elections. Only one left-wing a sense of distinctiveness. Breton politicians have been regionalism party, the Union Dimocratique Bretonne especially assertive in the defence of Breton interests in (UDB) has managed some victories at the municipal Paris. From 1950 onwards, -Breton actors of all political level and then usually in collaboration with the PS. persuasions co-operated cIoseIy in the CEL IB (Comit6 This apparent paradox might be explained by the de d’Etude et de Liaison des Int(x+ts Bretons) the predominance of the consensual political traditions archetype of a post-war regional advocacy coalition. mentioned above. LE C OADIC, 1998, interprets this The CELIB could claim credit for many of the phenomenon as a consequence of the deeply rooted improvements in transport infi-astructure granted to the legitimist strand within Breton public opinion. Imbued Brittany region in the 1960s and 1970s. The form of by a Catholic, conformist ethic, the Breton public is lobbying Paris to obtain resources for Brittany repre- not prepared to support pro-independence or pro- sented a regionaI adaptation of traditional welfare- autonomist parties. This conformist sentiment is onented intergovernmental models theorized with reflected in the modest scores obtained in elections by talent by CROZIER and THOENIG, 1975. the UDB and the smaller Breton regional or autonom- If all main political tendencies have been well ist parties. We should note that the mainstream political represented in post-war Brittany (except the Front parties in Brittany, especially the P S but also the UD F national) the prevalent post-war political tradition is and Rassemblement Pour la R6publique (RP R), have best described as one of political centrism. In the adopted regionalism themes and are more ‘regionalist’ immediate post-war period, Brittany was the birthplace than their national counterparts. This is true even of r and one of the bastions of French Christian democracy the R PR President of the Brittany Region, Josselin and, though in decline, powerfid vestiges remain. With De Rohan, who has a much more ‘regionalism’ dis- the creation of the Fifth Republic, it could not resist course than his R P R colleagues in most of the rest of . the national pull of Gatdlism, though Gaullism only France. Although Breton regionalism has, at times, slowly created a space for itself in local government. been violent, this never reached the levels experienced Brittany also contributed markedly to the rise of the in Corsica, the Spanish Basque country or Northern new Socialist Party (PS) fmm the 1970s onwards, with Ireland. the Socialist Party in Brittany subtly imbued with values We now look at where decisions should be made in representative of the underlying Breton political culture more detail. Public Opinion, PoliticalInstitutions and Public Policy in Brittany 269

Table 1. Tmst in the Brittany Regional Council (%)

Strongly Fairly Not very Not at aU trusting trusting trusting trusting Don’t know Total

Do you trust the regional council to undertake the development of Brittany? 29 53 85 2 75 100

WHERE SHOULD DECISIONS BE departmental council then unanimously voted a motion MADE? PUBLIC OPINION AND in favour of being incorporated into Brittany. Unanim- POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN ity was short-lived, however, as in October 2001, the BRITTANY Rennes municipal council opposed unification: the leading role of the Breton capital would be challenged We will now examine the attitudes of the general by a reunified Brittany. population towards the regional institution as it func- This general support for the regional level is con- tions at present and how it ought to develop. It is firmed in the specific areas of policy decisions regarding against the backdrop of 20 years of partial and untidy the Breton language and training policy. The compara- decentralization in a traditionally unitary state that we tive project born which this paper is drawn focuses in undertook our fieldwork in Brittany. As a preliminary part on these two policy issue areas where a strong case to answering our question ‘where should decisions be can be made for regional policy action, either on the made’, we sought fkst to establish the degree of trust that existed in the Brittany Regional Council as its basis of proximity or identity This claim is borne out currently functions. The results are presented in in our comparative surveys. Public opinion in Brittany Table 1. (and Wales) strongly believes that the regional authori- Table 1 reveals a high measure of trust in the Brittany ties o@t to make the main decisions in the two fields regional council as a political institution, despite its of training and regional languages. In Brittany, the limited powers. Trust evokes sentiments of honesty, a region comes out ahead of other levels – national, local culture of co-operation and a high level of social or European. In the case of the Breton language, the capital. One would expect Brittany to score highly on regional council is identified as the appropriate level by such a measure, given the importance of co-operative a majority of respondents (53Yo). This is all the more movements (in mutual banks and agricultural co- remarkable in that the region has no formal respon- operatives) and consensual Breton political traditions. sibility for taking decisions concerning language and There is also overwhelming support for the principle does not have a particularly active record in this area. of decentralization, a theme we develop in more detail Unlike in Wales, for example, there has been no effort, below. These findings suggest a strong political capital even symbolic, to use Breton in Regional Council for the Brittany region, evidence consistent with the proceedings. Until 1998, the region provided grants to conclusions of the annual regional surveys conducted the Breton-medium Diwan schools and to a host of by the Pans-based O I E? From 1995 to 1999, Bretons Breton cultural movements, but successive regional were consistently amongst the most enthusiastic majorities fought shy of taking a firm position on ‘regionalists’ in France and were the most likely to promoting the Breton language. Following the excep- identifjr the Brittany region as an historic entity Our tional circumstances of the 1998 regional election in findings suggest a strong groundswell of general support Brittany, there has been a marked change. The centre- for regional political institutions in Brittany. right (Union pour la D6mocratie Fran~aise (UD F) – Bretons do not simply identify their region with RPR – Democratic Lib&ale (D L)) list only held onto the geographical boundaries of the current regional the majority as a result of a deal struck with four institution (B4) but see it as also including the fifth autonomist-minded independents, led by Jean Yves ‘lost’ ddpartetnentof Loire-Adantique. This is shown by Cozan, a UD F dissident from the Finist&e department. the responses to our question on the reunification of Cozan was offered a new portfolio – Breton identity. the five dipartetnents. Our poll suggests powerfltl public Occupying a pivotal position within the regional coun- support for the reunification of historic Brittany (over cil, Cozan has used his influence to increase the culture 62% strongly in favour or in favour), a sentiment shared budget and to create a set of institutions to promote across the political and geographical spectrum, with the use of the Breton language. The creation of the only minor variations according to dpatternent, partisan Breton Language Otlice (O@ ar Brezhoneg) in 1999 allegiance or other variables. There was heightened heralded the new priority adopted by (or imposed awareness of this issue during fieldwork in Brittany. On upon) the Brittany region in favour of the Breton 30 June 2001 – 40 years afier the division of historic language. Increased budgets for Breton language and Brittany – a mass demonstration took place in culture followed. Despite the paradox of a hesitant Nantes in favour of reunification. The Loire Atlantique region adopting stronger policies in favour of the 270 Alistair Cole and]ohn Loughlin language, the importance of this finding in favour of the constraints of French decentralization into its . the region should be emphasized. The French govern- preferences. ment is seen not only as too distant, but also too The survey proceeded to ask an open-ended ques- ambivalent towards the Breton language which our tion (’If your region had more money to spend, where findings indicate is viewed with a capital of cultural should its first two priorities lie’) seeking to elicit sympathy, even though its use is marginal. These find- the Breton public’s preferences for regional public ings are a clear challenge to the traditional viewpoint expenditure. Table 2 presents a hierarchy of the of the French government in favour of a system of expressed fkst and second preferences. national linguistic uniformity. Other political institu- The Breton public’s regional expenditure preferences tions – local government and the European Union – pinpoint issues of specific regional importance: the are not considered as serious contenders for the exercise environment; economic development; transport; tour- of influence in this area. ism; training; and culture. The first priority was the The findings for training policy provide further environment. Environmental issues are high on the support for the regional level. Training is the inter- political agenda in Brittany, which has to face specific dependent policy domain par excellence;there are many challenges unknown to most other French regions. In policy stakeholders involved. The region is in charge part this is a consequence of its geographical position as of youth training – of 16 to 26 year olds – and has a a peIIlnSUla at the western-most point of the EUrOpean growing influence in continuing and adult education. continent. Brittany has suffered from a string of eco- The French state retains control over many training logical disasters, the most recent being the running programmed and specific populations. The European aground of the Erika oil tanker in December 1999 Union is determined to push its own influence over (GEMIE, 2001). Identi&ing the environment as the regional training policies. Many French local authorities most important priority for regional expenditure is in themselves (communes, inter-communal structures and part testament to the active record of the Brittany region dlparternents) have launched their own training pro- in this domain and to the perceived proximity of the grammed. Social partners (trade unions and employers) regional level. It also represents a reaction against the are also far more active in training than in the language failings of the French state. Breton public opinion was domain. Given this complexity, the high proportion of harsh in its criticism of the regional prefecture and of those considering training to be a regional policy the French Environment minister over the Erika affair. domain adds to the legitimacy of regional intervention Paradoxically, the awareness of environmental issues has in this sphere. also been heightened by a reaction against the intensive Our first series of questions allow us to deduce a farming methods of the type that for long underpinned strong underpinning of support for regional political the Breton agricultural model (CANEV ET, 1992). institutions in Brittany, as well as a desire to enhance Awareness of the environmental damage caused by the regional level in some specific areas over the local, intensive farming (pollution, water contamination, soil national and European levels. But we must be cautious erosion) has been a painful discovery for one of France’s in the conclusions we draw from these findings; this main agricultural regions. This finding backs up evi- becomes apparent when we consider preferences for dence from published monographs, which credit regional expenditure. Bretons with a strong attachment to their natural environment (LE COADI C, 1998) We can also deduce an economic motive, as important sectors of the regional economy – farming, fishing and the agro-alimentary WHAT PRIORITIES FOR REGIONAL industry – depend on a clean environmental image and ACTION? PUBLIC OPINION AND practice. SPENDING PRIORITIES IN The second priority for regional expenditure identi- BRITTANY fied in the survey is economic development. There is Regional public spending priorities are indicative not an established post-war tradition of public intervention only of actual policy choices, but also of the beliefs in in supporting the Breton economy, whether through the appropriateness of public intervention at different direct investment or through providing transport infra- levels in specific policy fields. Even in the most federally structure. Brittany’s post-war economic take-off was { inclined system, for example, it would be diff]cult to driven fmm the mid-1950s by central state directed imagine defence expenditure being a major priority for investments and priorities. In the 1960s and 1970s, a sub-national authority. On the other hand, services Brittany obtained more EE C funding than any other . such as education or health can be organized at a French region. From the early 1970s also, the Brittany variety of levels of territorial governance. The findings regional council took part in the combined effort to presented below for Brittany demonstrate a realistic pufl Brittany into the post-war industrial era (BIG NON, appraisal of the limited powers of the French regions, 2000). Under the leadership of nationally renowned providing strong support for our third hypothesis. They political figures – Ren6 Pleven, Raymond Marcellin, suggest that Breton public opinion has filly integrated Yvon Bourges – the Brittany region established a Public Opinion, Political Institutions and Public Policy in Brittany 271 reputation for eflicient intervention in promoting of transport-related issues as the policy province of the economic development. Brittany’s post-war economic Regional council augurs well for central government performance has been assisted by public intervention, efforts to strengthen the responsibilities of the regions but the region has also developed its own endogenous in this area. models of agricultural and industrial development, Amongst the other priorities for regional expenditure based on an ethic of social co-operation, political we can identifj three further areas closely linked to the consensus and rural–urban equilibrium and exchange specific attributes of Brittany: tourism; culture; and (PHLIPPONNEAU, 1995). The strong economic devel- training. Brittany is one of France’s major tourist opment of Brittany in the 1980s was consistent with regions. That Bretons look to the regional authority to the model whereby the creation of new industrial promote tourism supports the proximity argument; wealth is the most effective in traditionally non- regional investment is appropriate because the region industrial regions, where labour organizations are has detailed knowledge of local conditions. We might weaker and labour flexibility greater. The tailing-off of make a similar observation with respect to culture. It growth in the 1990s highlighted the fairly narrow basis is entirely appropriate for the regional authority to of Breton industry (agro-alimentary, telecommuni- promote culture, not only because culture is worth cations, defence) and its dependency upon a cocktail promoting, but also because it has a strong regional of public contracts and external investment, as well as dimension. This is also the case for training which, endogenous innovation. The importance of agriculture along with regional language policy, we subjected to for the Breton economy, likewise, is a source of some more intense scrutiny. anxiety given reforms of the Common Agricultural In Brittany, support for expenditure on regional Policy and the crisis affecting intensive farming in the languages was very low down the list of popular past decade. By distinguishing economic development priorities. Fewer than 1% (4 of 1,007) spontaneously as the second priority for regional expenditure, the identified support for Breton as the principal preference Breton public again identified an area where regional for future regional council expenditure. We should action could (or should) make a difference. The two exercise some caution when interpreting this figure. spending priorities of environmental policy and eco- Priorities for public expenditure do not automatically nomic development illustrate a certain dilemma and equate with issue saliency. In an area such as support for uncertainty that Bretons face. On the one hand, they regional languages, policy objectives might be achieved wish to continue their story of the Breton ‘economic with minimal additional public expenditure. And, as miracle’ (LE BOUIWONNEC, 1996) On the other we demonstrated above, a majority of respondents hand, this very success, based as it was on intensive identified the region as the appropriate level for agricultural methods, has endangered one of Brittany’s decision makhg on language-related issues. But there greatest assets – its reputation for unspoiled natural may also be awareness that the region can do little in products. this regard at present and the central state should be Transport-related issues (’Improving the roads, public the target of pressure in this field. transport’) were the third most popular priority. Ever The case of training is rather different. It is also since the early 1950s the opening-up (d&enclavetnent) widely considered that training ought to be a regional of Brittany has been a major demand of Breton political level responsibility (Table 2). Unlike language policy, and business actors. The Brittany rail and roads plans the French regions have precise responsibilities in this of the early 1960s laid the bases for the development of policy area. We can surmise that regional preferences a modern transport infrastructure (M ART RAY, 1983). for increased spending on training (the public’s fifth first Improving the transport infrastructure has been a tradi- priority) are derived from a combination of Brittany’s tional demand of the Breton business community. This specific training needs, an expectation of public expec- has been supported by the region’s principal decision makers. In our qualitative interviews, we identified the table 2. Decision+naking arenasfor training and language existence of rival advocacy coalitions over this issue. (%) Most business and political actors favoured developing the region’s transport infrastructure, arguing for the Which of the following institutions extension of the fast speed train (TG V) to Brest as an shotdd take the main decisions concerning the Breton language/ Breton absolute priority to alleviate the geographical isolation training? language Training of Brittany. A minority of interviewees feared that an improved transport infrastructure would threaten Brittany regional council 53 43.5 Breton identity by bringing the region closer to the French government 21 20.5 Local government 10 245 rest of France. Our poll suggests the former priority European Union 6 3 figures more prominently within public opinion at Others 1 2 large. Not content to prioritize areas where the region Don’t know 9 6.5 can make a difference, Breton public opinion also Total 100 100 appears to be anticipating change. The identification 272 Alistair Cole andJohn Laughlin

Table 3. Prioritiesfor regional expenditure 15 years. Education is one area where the central state has succeeded in shedding responsibilities to the ● 0?0 of periphery (regional councils and state field services) V. of first second First priority preferences Second priority preferences while retaining strategic control. Our second series of questions lead us to refine our “ Environmental issues 201 Economic argument somewhat. A logic of appropriateness appears development 8.7 Economic Environmental issues 7.2 to be at work. The Breton public favours a form of development 10 bounded regionality. It wants regional public expendi- Improving the roads 87 Improving the roads 63 ture to be concentrated in areas where regional institu- 5.4 Tourism 79 Tourism tions might make a difference, or where the image of Training 5.6 Education ~. 1 Brittany itself is involved. In the core public policy Culture 48 Culture 4.1 Education 46 Rural support 4 areas of health and education, there is a preference, Urban development 39 Public transport 4 even in regionally minded Brittany, for a system of Public transport 32 Sport 36 national regulation, consistent with French public 2.9 Rural support 31 Training service doctrine, equality of standards and the legacy Sport 27 Urban development 2,7 of 150 years of ‘republican’ ideology. Supporting regional languages 08 Other 150 Other 20.2 Don’t know/nothing 104 Don’t know/nothing 25 WHAT FUTURE FOR BRITTANY? Total 100 100 The Breton public seems remarkably well informed of the practical politics of French regionalism as it currently operates. But what are its preferences for diture in this area and a cognizance of the actual policy the fbture? Table 4 summarizes responses to the key responsibilities undertaken by the regional council. institutional question we posed in our comparative Training is also closely linked to economic development survey. which, as we have seen, is one of the two top priorities Rei%ting our second hypothesis, our findings con- for public opinion. firm the existence of a Breton regional political The Breton public’s regional expenditure preferences consciousness. We observe overwhelming support for pinpoint issues of specific regional importance, rather consolidating or strengthening existing regional institu- than generic spending areas such as health and educa- tions. There is virtually no constituency for the sta~ns tion. Table 3 indicates expenditure preferences; it also quo arst~regional institutions are fully accepted as part reveals what regional authorities are perceived not to of the normal democratic process. They leave entirely do. Consistent with our third hypothesis, we would open the question of whether the Breton public would not necessarily expect health to top the list of spending support a more thoroughgoing regional, or federal priorities for a French regional council. The French evolution; #O/o were in favour of retaining the current system of health care is elaborately – and expensively – situation (a regional council with limited powers) and managed by a social partnership of employers and trade only 20/0wished to abolish it. On the other hand, the unions, increasingly closely monitored by the central answers to this question reveal a sizeable minority of state. The regions do not have any responsibilities 34°A which is ‘regionalism’ in the sense of seeking therein (though the dipurtenterztsdo). The fairly low greater powers for the regional council similar to ranking of education is rather more intriguing. Though those possessed by the Scottish Parliament (an elected France prides itself on its national education system, parliament with tax-raising and legislative powers) and implying uniform standards and practices throughout a further 129’0 wish to see an autonomous Brittany.z the country, French regions also have important respon- The autonomy solution is confined to the margins sibilities in secondary and higher education (Co LE, of the political spectrum, a discovery confirmed by the 2001) The regions build and maintain upper secondary schools (Zycies) and some universities, provide equipment, participate in educational planning and —of great Table 4. Views on thejhre of Brittany . importance in Brittany – can make grants to private There is a debate today in France on the future of schools. Education is by far the largest spending item decentralization, Which one of the following options of all French regions, around 50°/1 in the case of do you prefer? % Brittany. We surmise that, though there is intense Abolish the regional council 2 interest in Brittany in education, this issue area is Retain a regional council with limited powers 44 perceived primarily either as a national or a more Create an elected parliament with tax-raising and localized policy responsibility. The regional councils legislative powers 34 An autonomous Brittany 12 have not yet drawn much political capital fmm their Don’t know 8 major budgetary investment in education over the past Public Opinion, Political Institutions and Public Policy in Brittany 273

Table5. Identit~ votin~intention and institutionalpreference . More Equally More Breton than Breton and French than Total French French Breton Ps Greens RPR UDF

Retain existing arrangements 44 31 42 57 49 45 54 42 Elected parliament with tax-raising and legislative powers 34 35 36 33 36 39 32 46 Autonomy for Brittany 12 25 10 3 8 14 6 4 Other/don’t know 10 9 12 7 7 2 8 8

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Note; The horizontal row represents percentage responses to Q.6 (’Views on the fiture of decentralization’). These are cross-tabulated with the three main positions on Q.7 (’Moreno Identity Scale’) and voting intentions for the four main political formations in a Regional Election (Q.30). Forthesake of clarity, figures are rounded up or down tothenearest percentage point.

absence of support for a strong autonomist political a clear relationship between the ability to speak Breton movement. Yet the existence ofa strong body of public and an institutional preference in favour of greater opinion favorable to an accelerated regionalization regionalization or autonomy. But the vast majority of represents a challenge to the traditional model of respondents are neither Breton speakers, nor do they bargained influence exercised by Breton politicians, consider their identity as being primarily Breton. one anticipated in advance by the increasingly Do parties matter? We observed surprisingly few regionalism theses espoused by Breton politicians of all differences according to voting intention. PS voters ‘national’ parties were scarcely more favorable than R P R voters to To what extent are these contrasting viewpoints enhanced regional autonomy. Though we must treat embedded in distinctive attitudes or party preferences? these figures with caution, they bear out the belief We sought to investigate further by cross-tabulating expressed in many interviews that institutional prefer- identity, voting intentions and Breton language compe- ences cut across existing parties. Institutional choices tence with institutional preference. We also tested for cannot be reduced to a simple lefi-right cleavage. The relationships between a range of structural attributes RPR President of the Brittany Region, Josselin de (age, gender, socio-economic group, education, local- Rohan, might have a sceptical position on greater ity) and institutional preferences. Full analysis of these regionalization, but many R P R voters do not share variables lie outside of the scope of the present paper. this view. Likewise, while the P S leader, Jean-Yves Le We will limit our analysis here to identity and voting Drian, has repositioned the Socialist Party in favour of preference – both of which involve agency as well as greater regional autonomy, most Socialist voters are structure – rather than structural attributes for the happy with existing arrangements. These findings are purposes of making distinctions within public opinion. consistent with existing representations of Breton poli- Does identity matter? We asked respondents to state tical cleavages. There is a moderation of political con- whether they considered themselves to be more Breton flict within the Brittany arena. Moreover, national

than French (1 s~.), equafiy Breton and French (S7~O) political parties are infused with Breton cultural values.

or more French than Breton (22Yo). In the case of There is also a distrust of political extremes, except in Brittany, the median position – equally Breton and specific sub-cultural circumstances. While not going as French – overwhelmingly prevailed. This is consistent far as to suggest a cross-partisan consensus on the broad with received images of Breton political culture and issues facing Brittany, there is an underlying consensus society. The sense of regional identity is strong, but to defend Breton interests to the outside-world and this is not considered as being in opposition to an limit political conflict. overarching French nationhood. Regional identity is not a surrogate nationality. Detailed analysis allowed us to explore certain rela- CONCLUSION tionships in more depth. As expected, clear relationships were established between identity and institutional The findings presented in this paper back up the preferences at the two extremes. Those considering analysis of regional governance in Brittany as a meso- themselves to be uniquely or predominantly Breton level phenomenon. There is a marked sense of regional were far more likely to advocate either a fully-fledged consciousness, based on a high measure of social con- regional assembly or an ‘autonomous’ statute for Brit- sensus. Brittany is France’s most distinctive mainland tany, than were those considering themselves to be region. Bretons are proud of their region within the primarily or entirely French. There also appears to be French nation. 274 Alistair Cole andjohn Loughlin

In our introductory section, we developed four hypo- Brittany) in the constitutional status of the region and theses related to issues of Breton identity, autonomy, those who wish to maintain the status quo (440A), as pragmatism and political opportunity structures. The revealed in Table 4. There is little explicit support for evidence we have presented here allows us to reject the the region to take on board a number of policies which first two hypotheses. Breton identity is strong and there might be deemed ‘regionalism’, for example, greater is widespread support for regional political institutions. financial support for the Breton language or regional While our findings allow us to establish the pertinence competency in areas such as health and education. of the new regionalism problematic in the Breton case, Furthemlore, there is no support in the regional council our third and fourth hypotheses emphasize that theories for autonomist parties. This apparent surprise finding of ‘new regionalism’ must be understood within the is not so surprising when placed in the context of the framework of an overarching state tradition that regu- nature of the current regional institutions, which are lates and channels regional pressures and creates strong not widely regarded as being, at present, the kind incentives for a system of national political regulation. of region that Breton regionalists (that 46% of the While the majority of Bretons support the present insti- population) would like to see eventually as their pre-

tutions jiiute de tnietlx, a significant proportion would ferred form of regional government. While Breton like them to be changed. Pragmatically, they accept that politicians have traditionally fought shy of raising the current institutions will not be able to deliver all the potentially divisive issues – such as language – which regionalism promises they would like, but they support emphasize the distinctiveness of France’s Celtic region, them anyway (hypothesis 3). The region is identified as there is some evidence that change is afoot. The the appropriate space for most matters directly affecting decentralization agenda of the new Raffarin govern- all Bretons: the regional economy; urban and rural ment, which is the first to be led by a President of a development; environmental issues; culture; training; regional council (Poitou-Charentes), promises to create language; transport. We observe, at the very least, a form an environment where even Brittany’s reluctant of bounded regionality, which provides firm bases for a regionalists are encouraged to envisage bolder solutions. move to more enhanced forms of regional governance Whether France’s partial and untidy decentralization at a later date. will be allowed to develop further will be one of the Above all, Breton regionalism political demands have major questions for the new Raffarin government. traditionally been mediated by a system of national Though we have not engaged in explicit comparison political parties. We have already alluded to some of in this paper, an explicitly comparative exercise would the reasons for the lack of electoral support for depict France as the only one of the five major Euro- regionalism parties in regional (and legislative) elections. pean nations not to be engaging in a form of poly- The political opportunity structure of the French Fifth centric state development on its mainland. Germany, Republic has generally inhibited the explicit mobiliza- Spain, the UK and Italy have each undergone develop- tion by national political parties of regionalism themes. ments that can in some senses be labelled as federal, or The great national political parties – RPR, UD~ PS – quasi-federal. Not so in mainland France, where the have eschewed a regionalism discourse as they represent territorial uniformity underpinning the French State interests across France. The power to influence decision tradition outweighs in importance any cross-national making at a regional level continues to be mediated by moves towards emulation. We touch here at the core a system of national regulation. Breton politicians of of state sovereignty which, in the French case, is all (national) parties have looked as a priority to exercise intimately tied in with perceptions of national prestige influence in Pans, where power lies. The last three and territorial hierarchy. Presidents of the Brittany region (Josselin de Rohan, We should quali$ our remarks. If the Matignon Yvon Bourges and Raymond Marcellin) have all been agreement runs its course, by 2004 France itself will nationally prominent Gaullist politicians, who have have agreed to some legislative powers in Corsica, a continued to occupy national elective offices. As his major break with the principle of territorial equality predecessors at the head of the Brittany region, the across the Republic. Though it is hazardous to extrapo- present incumbent, Josselin de Rohan, is also a Senator late the fiture on the basis of the exceptional case of who, in the derogatory opinion of one of his regional Corsica, developments in the ;le de beauti+might presage opponents, ‘governs Brittany from Paris’. Our findings a more audacious regional decentralization after the . support our third (pragmatism) and fourth (political next presidential elections. Brittany is the most distinc-

opportuniv structures) hypotheses. tive of France’s mainland regions, but Bretons are The survey findings reveal a dynamic tension between attached to a legitimist form of regionalism. There is a underlying demands for enhanced regional autonomy strong sense of regional distinctiveness, but also a deeply and a reluctance to challenge the status quo. Despite embedded reluctance to transgress the established order. their strong regional identity, Bretons are fairly evenly It is unlikely that conformist Brittany will pose a direct divided between those seeking a radical change (46%), threat to the integrity of the French state, unless the (with 34% seeking an elected parliament with tax- French state itself decides to lead the way. While raising and legislative powers and 120/0an autonomous respectful of established norms and processes, our ftnd- Public Opinion, Political Institutions and Public Policy in Brittany 275 ings suggest on balance that the Breton public would distinctive regions: Wales and Brittany. We compare the welcome a move towards greater regionalization. The politics, policies and polity building dynamics of devolu- capacity to accommodate increased regional diversity tion in Wales and decentralization in the French region will be a test for the long-term evolution of the French of Brittany. In particular, we compare three distinct dimensions of the policy system: policy communities (through Republic itself in-depth interviews in the two regions); issue-networks (via a detailed questionnaire); and public opinion (through a mass opinion poll carried out in both regions in July- Acknowledgements – This research is part of an ES RC- August 2001 ). This paper presents preliminary attitudinal financed project on Devolution and Decentralization in data fmm the Brittany poll. Market Research Wales and Wales and Brittany (Grant no. L 219 25 2007). We thank Eflicience 3 simultaneously carried out the public opinion the council for its support. We thank all our interviewees for surveys in Wales and Brittany in June and July 2001. A their co-operation, as well as the following organizations: representative sample of 1,007, selected by quotas of age, AGEFAFORIA; AGEFOS-PME; ANPE; ARE F-BTP; gender, socio-economic group and locality, was inter- AR I FO PE; Association of Breton-speaking firms; Associa- viewed in each region. We also carried out 72 interviews tion ‘Identit6 Bretonne’; Brittany Chamber of Agriculture; in Brittany iiom April-September 2001. These interviews Brittany Chamber of Commerce; Brittany Cultural Council; were taped and transcribed. They lasted an average of one Brittany Cultural Institute; Brittany Economic and Social hour. We identified three types of actor: regional political Chamber; Brittany Regional Council; Brittany Regional actors; language policy actors; and training policy actors. Prefecture (S GA R); CEREQ; C FD T, C IJB; Communes We started with several names suggested to us by our of Lorient, Nantes, Rennes, Carhaix and Chateaugiron; advisory group and then relied upon the snowball tech- DASTUM; DIHUN; DIORENN; DIV’YEZH; nique to ensure a wide coverage. D IW AN; Education ministry; European Bureau of Lesser 2. These four alternatives were intended to capture a pro- Used languages; FR3; Helio Ouest SA; Kuzul ar Brezhoneg; gressive scale of regionalization. Though functional equi- Labour and training ministry; Local Mission Rennes; O@ ar valence guided our survey design, the possibilities offered Bre.zhoneg; O P CA-RE G; Pays de la Loire Regional Coun- to public opinion differed slightly between Wales and cil; PLI; Proj”efNEC; PS; Quimper Chamber of Conmlerce; Brittany, in order to take into consideration linguistic and Rennes Chamber of Commerce; Rennes University (l); cognitive differences. In the case of Wales, we offered Rennes University (2); Saveol; SA; .S/eolOber; Skol an Emsav; independence as a solution, consistent with the wording STUMDI; TES; TIAVRO; TV Breizh; UPIB; and the of the Wales referendum survey of 1997. In the case of Youth and Sports ministry. Brittany, upon the advice of our control group we preferred ‘autonomy’, the term used by the UD B. ‘Auto- nomy’ signifies a large measure of constitutionally NOTES enshrined self-government within a quasi-federal system. It goes beyond the Scottish solution of tax-raising and 1. The research project fmrn which this paper is drawn investi- legislative powers which could, in theory, be reclaimed gates processes of regional governance in two cognate yet by the centre.

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Lou G H LIN J.(2001) Subnu[krml Democrwy in fke .EwopeanLko/?: ckr~~er~~esandopportunities. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Lou G HLtN J. and M AZ EY S. (Eds) (1995) The End of fhe Fret~ch Unitary Sfute: Ten Years ofl?egiotdiza[ion iti France, 1982– 1992. Frank Cass, London. MAR TRAY J. (1983) VirrgfAN gui Transfortm?renfla Bretagne: L’Epopie du CEL.IB. France Empire, Paris. OBSERVATOIRE INTERREGIONAL DU POL]TIQUE (OIP) (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999) I-e Fait Rdgiomd. OIP, Paris. > PH LtPPONNEAU M. (1996) Le mod?le industrial breton, Itforrmfion Ceogmpkique 59(1), 2–8. SAWic K[ F. (1993) La structuration du parti socialist; milieux partisans et production d’identitts, PhD thesis, University of Paris 1. i Committee report (which established the when we consider the National Asse-mbly Civil Service Code and the Management of the Assembly. There is uncertainty Cabinet Office and the basis of modem for Wales. The Whitehall Civil Service Code provided a basis of stability and where any dossier should be treated public administration). The Scottish and was hostile and innately conservative, some instruments of leverage for officials within the Cathays Park administration, Welsh offices were based upon territorial, and remained so during the 1979 devolu- in dealing with their new ministers-as resulting in inevitable turf wars and ar- rather than functional criteria. The Welsh tion referendum in Wales. Notwithstand- well as avoiding the enormous job of bitration by the permanent secretary. In Office represented more of an innovation ing whitehalJ ambivalence, tie Welsh devising parallel new codes as part of the area of economic development, for than the Scottish Office, in so far as there Office expanded its financial budgets devolution planning. example, one of the main areas of Assem- had previously been no separate admin- and persomel resources. In 1965/6, the Why was it decided not to go rdong the bly action, there is no single division that istrative or legal system for Wales. In the Welsh Office employed only 376 people; same path in Wales and Scotland as in matches the remit of the Economic Devel- ,,. case of Scotland, powers had been by 1989/90 this had increased to 2,215 Northern Ireland? There were reasons of opment Minister, or of the Assembly’s transferred as early as 1939, and there and by 1996/7 to 3,000. By 1995, the principle and of practice. First, the con- Economic Development Committee. The had always existed a Scottish advocate- Wefsh Office had a budget of some stitutional theory. In line with the prin- coalition agreement (’partnership agree- general. c7,000 miflion, 70 per cent of total public ciple of the union state, the UK remains a ment’) between Labour and the Liberaf If the Welsh Office was conceived as a expenditure in Wales.3 These vast sums union under the Crown. There is a devo- Democrats of October 2000 acknow- territorial department, it had a political of money were spent without any demo- lution of competencies, not a separation ledged the difficulties caused by the salience disproportionate to the size and cratic accountability at the level of the of powers. Civil servants serve the sover- imperfect mix of structures and functions scope of its activities. It was setup follow- territory-Wales-for which they were eign, whose prerogatives are determined in the various parts of the Assembly. The ing an election pledge made by Labour in destined. Much of the argument put for- by Parliament. In practical terms, devo- agreement was clear in its ambition: the its 1959 and 1964 manifesto. Welsh ad- ward by pro-devolution campaigners re- lution requires close cooperation be- executive would ‘review the existing ministrative decentralisation developed flected the desire to move away from the tween Westminster and the Northern structures and workings of Assembly in a random, incremental fashion. Initi- secretive world of the Welsh Office ad- Irish and Scottish executives and the officials to ensure that they are in tune ally vested with executive functions in ministration and towards more open and Welsh Assembly government. There are with the reality of political devolution. housing, local government and transport, accountable govemment.4 We conclude many overlapping interests. Westminster We seek to move towards an increasingly the Welsh Office acquired new functions that the experience of the Welsh Office, passes Acts of Parliament which affect all independent and Welsh-based civil as new policy problems arose. Powers in spite of its shortcomings, proved to be of the UK and in the drafting of which service.” transferred were contained in specific a useful apprenticeship for devolution the devolved territories need to make The principal official is Jon Shortridge, pieces of legislation, covering for ex- from 1999 onwards. sure their voice is heard. The main rea- the permanent secretary, head of the Civil ample building regulations and water re- son for retaining the Home Civil Service Service in Wales. All officials working for sources (1968), health (1969), welfare was to assuage a nervous Civil Service the Natioml Assembly—including those services (1969), some parts of agriculture The ‘organisation of the Civil hierarchy in London (rather than in the working for the legislaturereport to (1969), planning (1970), and primary and Service under devolution devolved territories themselves). In the Shortridge and are allocated tasks by secondary education (1970). k 1974, the 1970s, there had been fierce Civil Service him. Senior appointments at afl levels Office was upgraded. The permanent In the Welsh and Scottish devolution resistance to devolution. This was not the have to be approved by the British Prime 4 under-secretary was replaced by a per- settlements, the civil servants working i case in 1997, when the Scottish and Minister (upon the advice of the Scottish manent secretary, with the same status as for the Welsh and Scottish Offices remain Welsh Offices were the lead departments and Welsh First Ministers). While Short- other permanent secretaries in the White- part of the Home (British) Civil Service. charged with drafting the devolution ridge is the uncontested authority among hall machine. In 1975, the Office obtained Such a decision to retain the unified legislation, provided with back-up from civil servants in Cathays Park, in practice a range of new economic powers. All the Home Civil Service was not predeter- the Cabinet Office. the Presiding Office (serving the Assemb- regional powers of the industry ministry mined. Northern Ireland has its own civil There remains a good deal of ambigu- ly in Cardiff Bay) has developed its own were transferred. In 1978, the Office was service and the principle of separate ity surrounding the organisation of the administrative channels that do not granted responsibility for what remained corps-such as the Diplomatic Service Civil Service in Wales. AU civif servants directly depend upon orders from the of agriculture, plus further and higher or the armed forces—is accepted. Accord- are employed by and accountable to the permanent secretary.’ The Presiding Of- education (excluding the University of ing to Richard Parry, the maintenance of ‘National Assembly’, a generic term that fice apart, the role of Permanent Secretary Wales). Finally, in 1979, the Welsh Office the Home Civil Service in the devolution incorporates the National Assembly for Shortridge has much in common with was given the power to negotiate directly settlements was a recognition of the fears Wales in Cardiff Bay and the Welsh that of other permanent secretaries in with the Treasury for the level of the of civil servants that professionalism and Assembly government in Cathays Park, Whitehall. However, the ambiguities of block grant for Welsh local authorities. impartiality might be compromised by respectively the putative legislative and the devolution settlement leave many The Welsh Office was set up against devolution, especially by the introduction executive branches. Since devolution, questions of accountability unanswered. Whitehall. opposition and a degree of of practices similar to those of local gov- there has been no root-and-branch reform Jn some areas, such as the implementa- obstruction, a theme that wilf echo later emment.5 The retention of the existing of Welsh Office divisions to match those tion of Cabinet decisions, the permanent

224 A. COLE WITH J. B. JONES AND A. STORER o W PolIucalQuarterlyPubkbingCo LtdZIXU O The Pohhcal Quarterly ?.bhshmtg Co. Ltd. 2023 INSIDE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES 225 Committee report (which established the when we consider the National Asse-mbly Civil Service Code and the Management of the Assembly. There is uncertainty Cabinet Office and the basis of modem for Wales. The Whitehall Civil Service Code provided a basis of stability and where any dossier should be treated public administration). The Scottish and was hostile and innately conservative, some instruments of leverage for officials within the Cathays Park administration, Welsh offices were based upon territorial, and remained so during the 1979 devolu- in dealing with their new ministers-as resulting in inevitable turf wars and ar- rather than functional criteria. The Welsh tion referendum in Wales. Notwithstand- well as avoiding the enormous job of bitration by the permanent secretary. In Office represented more of an innovation ing whitehalJ ambivalence, tie Welsh devising parallel new codes as part of the area of economic development, for than the Scottish Office, in so far as there Office expanded its financial budgets devolution planning. example, one of the main areas of Assem- had previously been no separate admin- and persomel resources. In 1965/6, the Why was it decided not to go rdong the bly action, there is no single division that istrative or legal system for Wales. In the Welsh Office employed only 376 people; same path in Wales and Scotland as in matches the remit of the Economic Devel- ,,. case of Scotland, powers had been by 1989/90 this had increased to 2,215 Northern Ireland? There were reasons of opment Minister, or of the Assembly’s transferred as early as 1939, and there and by 1996/7 to 3,000. By 1995, the principle and of practice. First, the con- Economic Development Committee. The had always existed a Scottish advocate- Wefsh Office had a budget of some stitutional theory. In line with the prin- coalition agreement (’partnership agree- general. c7,000 miflion, 70 per cent of total public ciple of the union state, the UK remains a ment’) between Labour and the Liberaf If the Welsh Office was conceived as a expenditure in Wales.3 These vast sums union under the Crown. There is a devo- Democrats of October 2000 acknow- territorial department, it had a political of money were spent without any demo- lution of competencies, not a separation ledged the difficulties caused by the salience disproportionate to the size and cratic accountability at the level of the of powers. Civil servants serve the sover- imperfect mix of structures and functions scope of its activities. It was setup follow- territory-Wales-for which they were eign, whose prerogatives are determined in the various parts of the Assembly. The ing an election pledge made by Labour in destined. Much of the argument put for- by Parliament. In practical terms, devo- agreement was clear in its ambition: the its 1959 and 1964 manifesto. Welsh ad- ward by pro-devolution campaigners re- lution requires close cooperation be- executive would ‘review the existing ministrative decentralisation developed flected the desire to move away from the tween Westminster and the Northern structures and workings of Assembly in a random, incremental fashion. Initi- secretive world of the Welsh Office ad- Irish and Scottish executives and the officials to ensure that they are in tune ally vested with executive functions in ministration and towards more open and Welsh Assembly government. There are with the reality of political devolution. housing, local government and transport, accountable govemment.4 We conclude many overlapping interests. Westminster We seek to move towards an increasingly the Welsh Office acquired new functions that the experience of the Welsh Office, passes Acts of Parliament which affect all independent and Welsh-based civil as new policy problems arose. Powers in spite of its shortcomings, proved to be of the UK and in the drafting of which service.” transferred were contained in specific a useful apprenticeship for devolution the devolved territories need to make The principal official is Jon Shortridge, pieces of legislation, covering for ex- from 1999 onwards. sure their voice is heard. The main rea- the permanent secretary, head of the Civil ample building regulations and water re- son for retaining the Home Civil Service Service in Wales. All officials working for sources (1968), health (1969), welfare was to assuage a nervous Civil Service the Natioml Assembly—including those services (1969), some parts of agriculture The ‘organisation of the Civil hierarchy in London (rather than in the working for the legislaturereport to (1969), planning (1970), and primary and Service under devolution devolved territories themselves). In the Shortridge and are allocated tasks by secondary education (1970). k 1974, the 1970s, there had been fierce Civil Service him. Senior appointments at afl levels Office was upgraded. The permanent In the Welsh and Scottish devolution resistance to devolution. This was not the have to be approved by the British Prime 4 under-secretary was replaced by a per- settlements, the civil servants working i case in 1997, when the Scottish and Minister (upon the advice of the Scottish manent secretary, with the same status as for the Welsh and Scottish Offices remain Welsh Offices were the lead departments and Welsh First Ministers). While Short- other permanent secretaries in the White- part of the Home (British) Civil Service. charged with drafting the devolution ridge is the uncontested authority among hall machine. In 1975, the Office obtained Such a decision to retain the unified legislation, provided with back-up from civil servants in Cathays Park, in practice a range of new economic powers. All the Home Civil Service was not predeter- the Cabinet Office. the Presiding Office (serving the Assemb- regional powers of the industry ministry mined. Northern Ireland has its own civil There remains a good deal of ambigu- ly in Cardiff Bay) has developed its own were transferred. In 1978, the Office was service and the principle of separate ity surrounding the organisation of the administrative channels that do not granted responsibility for what remained corps-such as the Diplomatic Service Civil Service in Wales. AU civif servants directly depend upon orders from the of agriculture, plus further and higher or the armed forces—is accepted. Accord- are employed by and accountable to the permanent secretary.’ The Presiding Of- education (excluding the University of ing to Richard Parry, the maintenance of ‘National Assembly’, a generic term that fice apart, the role of Permanent Secretary Wales). Finally, in 1979, the Welsh Office the Home Civil Service in the devolution incorporates the National Assembly for Shortridge has much in common with was given the power to negotiate directly settlements was a recognition of the fears Wales in Cardiff Bay and the Welsh that of other permanent secretaries in with the Treasury for the level of the of civil servants that professionalism and Assembly government in Cathays Park, Whitehall. However, the ambiguities of block grant for Welsh local authorities. impartiality might be compromised by respectively the putative legislative and the devolution settlement leave many The Welsh Office was set up against devolution, especially by the introduction executive branches. Since devolution, questions of accountability unanswered. Whitehall. opposition and a degree of of practices similar to those of local gov- there has been no root-and-branch reform Jn some areas, such as the implementa- obstruction, a theme that wilf echo later emment.5 The retention of the existing of Welsh Office divisions to match those tion of Cabinet decisions, the permanent

224 A. COLE WITH J. B. JONES AND A. STORER o W PolIucalQuarterlyPubkbingCo LtdZIXU O The Pohhcal Quarterly ?.bhshmtg Co. Ltd. 2023 INSIDE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES 225 secretary is accountable to the First advocate of the emergence of a genuine parliamentary (National Assembly) com- allowed civil servants to develop their Minister and ultimately to the Assembly legislature. mittees, whereas before there had only ideas at a leisurely pace. Siice 1999, there as a corporate body. Ln other areas, such Having presented briefly the structure been one (the Welsh Affairs Committee in has been much closer contact with the as ensuring that the Civil Service in Wales of the National Assembly administration, Westminster). Civil servants working in minister. In most departments there is operates as professionally as the Civif we now delve in more depth into civil the Presiding Office afso complained now a policy board, where the minister Service in any other department, the servants’ perceptions of life under devo- about the workload, Each Assembly com- meets with senior and middJe-ranking permanent secretary is accountable to lution. Jn our interviews in Cathays Park mittee (there are seven subject commit- civil servants once a month to discuss the Head of the Home CiviJ Service in and Cardiff Bay, we sought to probe the tees and the four regional committees) forthcoming proposals and identify pri- Westminster. view from officials in the forefront of the has a clerk attached to it, and finding orities. Informally, heads of department Before considering the operation of the Assembly’s activities by eliciting re- enough people with the relevant expert- are in contact with ministers on a daily post-devolution Civil Service in more sponses to the following questions: How ise is very difficult. The Assembly has basis. For middle-ranking officials, con- detail, we should note three further in- has fife changed under devolution? How had to co-opt people on temporary contact ranges from supporting the minister novations of devolution in Wales: the have relationships with ministers and tracts from legislatures elsewhere in the in committee to organizing internal meet- creation of a policy unit; the nomination others evolved, within and beyond Commonwealth to assist in staffing the ings and assisting the minister in outside of special advisers to assist ministers; and Wales? Who are the new masters of committees. meetings. Much work occurs in liaison the development of the Presiding Office. Welsh civil servants? What linkages One consequence of this increased ac- with the special advisers, another new The policy unit, set up in 1998, played bind civil servants in Wales to their col- tivity is that there is ‘a lot less thinking development that civil servants have an important role in helping to prepare leagues elsewhere? What expectations do time’, while ministers are constantly de- had to get used to. and adapt the old Welsh Office Civil civif servants have of the future? There manding higher levels of expertise and If the main challenge for civil servants Service for the transition to a demo- follows an attempt to reconstruct the imposing a set of procedures that build was working with ambitious ministers, cratically elected National Assembly sense of these interviews, in order to extensive cooperation into the organ- most ministers interviewed recognised and the greater poJicy-making role that gain an insight into the functioning of isational mores of the Assembly. The the hard work and the loyahy of civil came with it. It is a cross-departmentd the administration in the era of devolu- equaJ opportunity and environmental servants in developing new policies for body directly responsible to the perman- tion. sustainability agendas meant that every the Assembly and making a success of ent secretary. The policy unit has acted as policy had to be viewed through these devolution. The education minister a facilitator in the creation of a cross- lenses whether to do so was appropriate praised the expertise and loyalty of her cutting policy ethos at all levels of gov- How has life changed under or not. The main reason explaining this staff. On the other hand, one former ernment, including Cabinet. devolution? increased activity was the determination minister doubted the loyalty of civiJ ser- Special advisers are temporary political of ministers to make a difference. vants during her time as minister. There appointees, whose principal task is to IrL r&ponse to this question, cdl inter- Whereas the Secretary of State had were channels of information from promote the party agenda. The civiJ ser- viewees complained of their increased been hands-off, with a very broad and WhitehaJJ to the senior civil servants, so vants interviewed professed to have a workJoad. In the words of one official: general brief, the Assembly is much more that the latter were much better informed strong relationship with the special ad- ‘We are much busier than before. We are interventionist. There are nine Cabinet than ministers. This put ministers at a visers, an innovation by comparison to dealing with one minister, whereas pre- secretaries (or ministers) and seven As- disadvantage. These rather conflicting the old Welsh Office. Whereas the policy viously I dealt with Peter Hain, the Se- sembly subject committees, each of which accounts probably testified to differing unit is accountable to the permanent cretary of State, who was involved with focuses on a particular area of public experiences on the part of the two minis- secretary, the special advisers are accoun- everything. We also have the committees policy. This activism has placed increased ters in question, but they also demon- table to their ministers and to the First and the policy boards to deal with.’ burdem on civil servants. From being strated the futility of defining cast-iron 1, Minister in particular. Officials had to prepare for, and occasion- general administrators, civil servants rules of interaction between civiJ servants The formal role of the Presiding Of- ally appear in front of committees, some- have had to become policy specialists. and ministers, when so much depends on fice-in full, the Office of the Presidimg thing of which most of them had In the past regime, ministers rarely the force of personality of the individuals Officer-is to organise Assembly busi- previously had no experience. In the engaged with civil servants. The briefs concerned. ness, both in plenary session and in the view of one official, there has been a of ministers were interdepartmental, Though the workload has increased seven subject committees that exercise a tenfold increase in parliamentary ques- and communications tended to be by hugely, the biggest difference from the L:. powerful influence on Assembly policy tions since devolution. Whereas in pre- written documents, rather than face-to- Welsh Office days was qualitative. There r outputs. Informally, the Presiding Office devolution days Welsh questions used to face contact. As there were only three is a lot of pressure from ministers to be 1“ j. defends the interests of the Assembly as a take place once a month, now question ministers-a secretary of state and two different, especially from experience in ,4 putative legislature, ensures that the ex- time in the Assembly takes place every junior ministers-they were heavily reli- England. Jn the devolved areas they ‘are ,,, ecutive does not encroach upon Assem- week. Moreover, civil servants have to ant for their information on the Welsh very interested in producing Made in bly members’ rights and is a powerful prepare answers for around a dozen Office civil servants. This dependency Wales policies’. Civil servants are now

226 A. COLE WITH J. B. JONES AND A. STORER o llw Pdikd ouarterly PubMmg Co. Lti. 2023 O The Pokcal Quarterly Publ)sl)mgCO.Ltd 2033 INSIDE THE N.4rroNAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES 227

>‘.;“.,‘. “’ 1 secretary is accountable to the First advocate of the emergence of a genuine parliamentary (National Assembly) com- allowed civil servants to develop their Minister and ultimately to the Assembly legislature. mittees, whereas before there had only ideas at a leisurely pace. Siice 1999, there as a corporate body. Ln other areas, such Having presented briefly the structure been one (the Welsh Affairs Committee in has been much closer contact with the as ensuring that the Civil Service in Wales of the National Assembly administration, Westminster). Civil servants working in minister. In most departments there is operates as professionally as the Civif we now delve in more depth into civil the Presiding Office afso complained now a policy board, where the minister Service in any other department, the servants’ perceptions of life under devo- about the workload, Each Assembly com- meets with senior and middJe-ranking permanent secretary is accountable to lution. Jn our interviews in Cathays Park mittee (there are seven subject commit- civil servants once a month to discuss the Head of the Home CiviJ Service in and Cardiff Bay, we sought to probe the tees and the four regional committees) forthcoming proposals and identify pri- Westminster. view from officials in the forefront of the has a clerk attached to it, and finding orities. Informally, heads of department Before considering the operation of the Assembly’s activities by eliciting re- enough people with the relevant expert- are in contact with ministers on a daily post-devolution Civil Service in more sponses to the following questions: How ise is very difficult. The Assembly has basis. For middle-ranking officials, con- detail, we should note three further in- has fife changed under devolution? How had to co-opt people on temporary contact ranges from supporting the minister novations of devolution in Wales: the have relationships with ministers and tracts from legislatures elsewhere in the in committee to organizing internal meet- creation of a policy unit; the nomination others evolved, within and beyond Commonwealth to assist in staffing the ings and assisting the minister in outside of special advisers to assist ministers; and Wales? Who are the new masters of committees. meetings. Much work occurs in liaison the development of the Presiding Office. Welsh civil servants? What linkages One consequence of this increased ac- with the special advisers, another new The policy unit, set up in 1998, played bind civil servants in Wales to their col- tivity is that there is ‘a lot less thinking development that civil servants have an important role in helping to prepare leagues elsewhere? What expectations do time’, while ministers are constantly de- had to get used to. and adapt the old Welsh Office Civil civif servants have of the future? There manding higher levels of expertise and If the main challenge for civil servants Service for the transition to a demo- follows an attempt to reconstruct the imposing a set of procedures that build was working with ambitious ministers, cratically elected National Assembly sense of these interviews, in order to extensive cooperation into the organ- most ministers interviewed recognised and the greater poJicy-making role that gain an insight into the functioning of isational mores of the Assembly. The the hard work and the loyahy of civil came with it. It is a cross-departmentd the administration in the era of devolu- equaJ opportunity and environmental servants in developing new policies for body directly responsible to the perman- tion. sustainability agendas meant that every the Assembly and making a success of ent secretary. The policy unit has acted as policy had to be viewed through these devolution. The education minister a facilitator in the creation of a cross- lenses whether to do so was appropriate praised the expertise and loyalty of her cutting policy ethos at all levels of gov- How has life changed under or not. The main reason explaining this staff. On the other hand, one former ernment, including Cabinet. devolution? increased activity was the determination minister doubted the loyalty of civiJ ser- Special advisers are temporary political of ministers to make a difference. vants during her time as minister. There appointees, whose principal task is to IrL r&ponse to this question, cdl inter- Whereas the Secretary of State had were channels of information from promote the party agenda. The civiJ ser- viewees complained of their increased been hands-off, with a very broad and WhitehaJJ to the senior civil servants, so vants interviewed professed to have a workJoad. In the words of one official: general brief, the Assembly is much more that the latter were much better informed strong relationship with the special ad- ‘We are much busier than before. We are interventionist. There are nine Cabinet than ministers. This put ministers at a visers, an innovation by comparison to dealing with one minister, whereas pre- secretaries (or ministers) and seven As- disadvantage. These rather conflicting the old Welsh Office. Whereas the policy viously I dealt with Peter Hain, the Se- sembly subject committees, each of which accounts probably testified to differing unit is accountable to the permanent cretary of State, who was involved with focuses on a particular area of public experiences on the part of the two minis- secretary, the special advisers are accoun- everything. We also have the committees policy. This activism has placed increased ters in question, but they also demon- table to their ministers and to the First and the policy boards to deal with.’ burdem on civil servants. From being strated the futility of defining cast-iron 1, Minister in particular. Officials had to prepare for, and occasion- general administrators, civil servants rules of interaction between civiJ servants The formal role of the Presiding Of- ally appear in front of committees, some- have had to become policy specialists. and ministers, when so much depends on fice-in full, the Office of the Presidimg thing of which most of them had In the past regime, ministers rarely the force of personality of the individuals Officer-is to organise Assembly busi- previously had no experience. In the engaged with civil servants. The briefs concerned. ness, both in plenary session and in the view of one official, there has been a of ministers were interdepartmental, Though the workload has increased seven subject committees that exercise a tenfold increase in parliamentary ques- and communications tended to be by hugely, the biggest difference from the L:. powerful influence on Assembly policy tions since devolution. Whereas in pre- written documents, rather than face-to- Welsh Office days was qualitative. There r outputs. Informally, the Presiding Office devolution days Welsh questions used to face contact. As there were only three is a lot of pressure from ministers to be 1“ j. defends the interests of the Assembly as a take place once a month, now question ministers-a secretary of state and two different, especially from experience in ,4 putative legislature, ensures that the ex- time in the Assembly takes place every junior ministers-they were heavily reli- England. Jn the devolved areas they ‘are ,,, ecutive does not encroach upon Assem- week. Moreover, civil servants have to ant for their information on the Welsh very interested in producing Made in bly members’ rights and is a powerful prepare answers for around a dozen Office civil servants. This dependency Wales policies’. Civil servants are now

226 A. COLE WITH J. B. JONES AND A. STORER o llw Pdikd ouarterly PubMmg Co. Lti. 2023 O The Pokcal Quarterly Publ)sl)mgCO.Ltd 2033 INSIDE THE N.4rroNAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES 227

>‘.;“.,‘. “’ 1 involved in ‘poJicy development’, an evo- vants of the National Assembly was I broader Welsh policy community. As a hall department. In the case of health, for lution with which not alJ felt comfortable. much more important than their status ~.-eenera----I cmnrrrent,–– there was a belief example, some policy areas remained Some officials complained about the LM- as members of the Home Civil Service. In among aU interviewees that devolution with central government-such as the realistic expectations held by ministers in the words of one official:’ We do not think depends too much on personal relation- regulation of the medical profession, or relation to policy development and the of ourselves as part of the same Civil ships, in the absence of any fixed ‘rules of abortion-but everything else (9o per abiJity to produce original policies. On Service family as someone in the Treas- the game’. For civil servants comfortable cent of ao heaJth areas) has been de- the other hand, the pressure to produce ury, ,but I doubt whether someone work. with established procedures, this proved volved. In this case, the relationship is Made in Wales policies placed Assembly mg m a dOle Officein Aberdeen wOuld, something of a chaUenge. mainJy about benchmarking. The rela- officials at the centre of a network of either. The Civil Service is a very broad Relations with WhitehaU were initiatly tionship was very different with educa- organisations with a deeper reach than family.’ Most civil servants in Wales somewhat fraught. According to one tion, the interdependent area of policy- ever before into Welsh society. We con- work not for the Assembly, but for non- well-placed source ‘For the first two making par excellence. Lssues such as tea- sider this dimension below. devolved setices such as social security years of devolution, we had an awful lot chers’ pay or student grants are not and the IrcJandRevenue. The sense of being overburdened was I of run-ins, some of them very well docu- devolved, but the Assembly has a strong pervasive in each interview carried out, In his study of top officials in the four mented, others not. These were turf wars; interest in these issues and to some extent as was the belief that res.mutes had not nations of the United Kingdom, Parry there were a range of disputes about what can circumvent the DfE.9 The contrasting increased commensurably with respons- reports the fears of supporters of a uni- constituted primary legislation and what attitudes of Whitehall departments pro- fied Home Civil Service that the ‘Civil ibilities. Though there had been some I did not. There were a lot of conflicts with duced distinctive and varying policy out- expansion in staff, this increase had oc- Service ethos’ of neutrality, anonymity Whitehall departments.’ There remains puts. For example, while the Transport curred mainly at the Cardiff Bay end, in and public service would be weakened among Welsh civil servants a feeling Act of 2000 made abnost no reference to the Presiding Office. One official ex- by more autonomous Welsh and Scottish that WhitehaJl ‘does not know how to Wales, the Learning and Wills Act of 2000 pressed the view that numbers needed administrations.s For our interlocutors, deal with an institution which is not contained a large measure of devolved to rise steeply to allow civil servants to Whitehall has no right to claim to be the part of collective responsibiJi~. It goes secondary powers. carry out their new role ‘During the guardian of the ethos. The CiviJ Service in against the Whitehall spirit of norm- and We asked each of our interlocutors Welsh Office days, we were staffed as the devolved Welsh administration is rule-based consensus among civil ser- whether the frequency of contact with an offshoot of Whitehall, relying on the above all committed to working with vants throughout the United Kingdom. Whitehall had increased or diminished lead department of Whitehall to do the -sters and developing ita own expert- These conflicts formed part of a learning with devolution. Responses varied some- ise and professionslism, almost irrespec- I buJk of the legwork. We tuned gover- I process, as Whitehall and the National what according to the seniority of inter- nmentpolicy to the Welsh perspective. We tive of what goes on in London, a theme 1 Assemblv gradually came to terms with viewee, but there was a general beliefthat are now being asked to act as a free- to which we shall return. devoluti~n’. contacts had [email protected] sharply since standing government.’ If the Assembly in sum, civiJ servants are much busier I The response of Wtdtehall departments devolution. llough there were good prcl- than before devohrtion, enjoy much clo- administration were not given more re- I to devo{ution has varied somewhat fessionaJ working relationships between sources, Welsh civil serv~ts would once ser relationships with ministers, are more I across policy issue areas. Assembly mem- officers, there were fewer contacts. This involved in policy development, have again look to Whitehall departments for I bers of alf parties were critical of the created problems, as everything in the examples of best practice, going against inadequate resources to carry out their absence of consistent principles steering devohstionary process depends on con- the injunction to produce Made in Wales new duties but pledge their primary relations between London and Cardiff. tacts-there are no hard and fast rules. In policies. Whitehall templates could easily loyalty to the National Assembly. They One prominent former secretary of state most cases, Whitehall departments be adapted to Wales, whereas new sec- are also involved in a series of changing criticised Whitehall departmental tradi- simply ignored Wales, Scotland and ondary legislation that departed from relationships. tions for the lack of a consistent approach Northern Ireland. There were two vari- ~ltehall regulations would require to Wales. Different ministers took oppo- ants on this: the first was to assume that expertise. The easy solution would be to Changing relationships site stances on transfer of function orders, the devolved territories would fall into copy Whitehall. for instance, and there was little inter- line; the second was the view that Wales, When asked who were their new mas- Interpersorud and interinstitutional rela- ministerial coordination. Some depart- ScotJand and Northern Ireland no longer ters, Welsh civil servants were unani- tionships feature prominently in the liter- ments ‘have been better than others’ at belonged to the UK.’OIn neither case did mous they worked for the National ature on organiaatioml sociology, as well understanding what devolution is about. the Whitehall machine actively seek out Assembly (and principally the Welsh in actor-based models of public policy- Though we can explain these very differ- the expertise of the civil servants based in Assembly government). In the unlikely making such as that of policy networks. ent relationships across Whitehall depart- the devolved territories. event of conflict between the devolved hr our interviews with top officials, we ments in par-fby personal relations (’and Nonetheless, elite-level contacts are uncovered the changing nature of their administration and the UK government, I you can’t legislate for personalities’), maintained between politicians and civil their principal duty would be to the relationships with Whitehall depart- more important is how the devolved/ servants in Wales and their counterparts ments, as welJ as with others in the NationaJ Assembly. Their status as ser- I nondevolved spJitruns through a White- in London and the other devolved on, p.,,~calCWr&lYFubti&CoLld 2tl@ , 22S A. COLE WITH J. B. JONES AND A. STORER O ‘II. k,l,td Cn,mterlyPubl,.hq C. Ltd 2CU3 INSIDE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES 229 involved in ‘poJicy development’, an evo- vants of the National Assembly was I broader Welsh policy community. As a hall department. In the case of health, for lution with which not alJ felt comfortable. much more important than their status ~.-eenera----I cmnrrrent,–– there was a belief example, some policy areas remained Some officials complained about the LM- as members of the Home Civil Service. In among aU interviewees that devolution with central government-such as the realistic expectations held by ministers in the words of one official:’ We do not think depends too much on personal relation- regulation of the medical profession, or relation to policy development and the of ourselves as part of the same Civil ships, in the absence of any fixed ‘rules of abortion-but everything else (9o per abiJity to produce original policies. On Service family as someone in the Treas- the game’. For civil servants comfortable cent of ao heaJth areas) has been de- the other hand, the pressure to produce ury, ,but I doubt whether someone work. with established procedures, this proved volved. In this case, the relationship is Made in Wales policies placed Assembly mg m a dOle Officein Aberdeen wOuld, something of a chaUenge. mainJy about benchmarking. The rela- officials at the centre of a network of either. The Civil Service is a very broad Relations with WhitehaU were initiatly tionship was very different with educa- organisations with a deeper reach than family.’ Most civil servants in Wales somewhat fraught. According to one tion, the interdependent area of policy- ever before into Welsh society. We con- work not for the Assembly, but for non- well-placed source ‘For the first two making par excellence. Lssues such as tea- sider this dimension below. devolved setices such as social security years of devolution, we had an awful lot chers’ pay or student grants are not and the IrcJandRevenue. The sense of being overburdened was I of run-ins, some of them very well docu- devolved, but the Assembly has a strong pervasive in each interview carried out, In his study of top officials in the four mented, others not. These were turf wars; interest in these issues and to some extent as was the belief that res.mutes had not nations of the United Kingdom, Parry there were a range of disputes about what can circumvent the DfE.9 The contrasting increased commensurably with respons- reports the fears of supporters of a uni- constituted primary legislation and what attitudes of Whitehall departments pro- fied Home Civil Service that the ‘Civil ibilities. Though there had been some I did not. There were a lot of conflicts with duced distinctive and varying policy out- expansion in staff, this increase had oc- Service ethos’ of neutrality, anonymity Whitehall departments.’ There remains puts. For example, while the Transport curred mainly at the Cardiff Bay end, in and public service would be weakened among Welsh civil servants a feeling Act of 2000 made abnost no reference to the Presiding Office. One official ex- by more autonomous Welsh and Scottish that WhitehaJl ‘does not know how to Wales, the Learning and Wills Act of 2000 pressed the view that numbers needed administrations.s For our interlocutors, deal with an institution which is not contained a large measure of devolved to rise steeply to allow civil servants to Whitehall has no right to claim to be the part of collective responsibiJi~. It goes secondary powers. carry out their new role ‘During the guardian of the ethos. The CiviJ Service in against the Whitehall spirit of norm- and We asked each of our interlocutors Welsh Office days, we were staffed as the devolved Welsh administration is rule-based consensus among civil ser- whether the frequency of contact with an offshoot of Whitehall, relying on the above all committed to working with vants throughout the United Kingdom. Whitehall had increased or diminished lead department of Whitehall to do the -sters and developing ita own expert- These conflicts formed part of a learning with devolution. Responses varied some- ise and professionslism, almost irrespec- I buJk of the legwork. We tuned gover- I process, as Whitehall and the National what according to the seniority of inter- nmentpolicy to the Welsh perspective. We tive of what goes on in London, a theme 1 Assemblv gradually came to terms with viewee, but there was a general beliefthat are now being asked to act as a free- to which we shall return. devoluti~n’. contacts had [email protected] sharply since standing government.’ If the Assembly in sum, civiJ servants are much busier I The response of Wtdtehall departments devolution. llough there were good prcl- than before devohrtion, enjoy much clo- administration were not given more re- I to devo{ution has varied somewhat fessionaJ working relationships between sources, Welsh civil serv~ts would once ser relationships with ministers, are more I across policy issue areas. Assembly mem- officers, there were fewer contacts. This involved in policy development, have again look to Whitehall departments for I bers of alf parties were critical of the created problems, as everything in the examples of best practice, going against inadequate resources to carry out their absence of consistent principles steering devohstionary process depends on con- the injunction to produce Made in Wales new duties but pledge their primary relations between London and Cardiff. tacts-there are no hard and fast rules. In policies. Whitehall templates could easily loyalty to the National Assembly. They One prominent former secretary of state most cases, Whitehall departments be adapted to Wales, whereas new sec- are also involved in a series of changing criticised Whitehall departmental tradi- simply ignored Wales, Scotland and ondary legislation that departed from relationships. tions for the lack of a consistent approach Northern Ireland. There were two vari- ~ltehall regulations would require to Wales. Different ministers took oppo- ants on this: the first was to assume that expertise. The easy solution would be to Changing relationships site stances on transfer of function orders, the devolved territories would fall into copy Whitehall. for instance, and there was little inter- line; the second was the view that Wales, When asked who were their new mas- Interpersorud and interinstitutional rela- ministerial coordination. Some depart- ScotJand and Northern Ireland no longer ters, Welsh civil servants were unani- tionships feature prominently in the liter- ments ‘have been better than others’ at belonged to the UK.’OIn neither case did mous they worked for the National ature on organiaatioml sociology, as well understanding what devolution is about. the Whitehall machine actively seek out Assembly (and principally the Welsh in actor-based models of public policy- Though we can explain these very differ- the expertise of the civil servants based in Assembly government). In the unlikely making such as that of policy networks. ent relationships across Whitehall depart- the devolved territories. event of conflict between the devolved hr our interviews with top officials, we ments in par-fby personal relations (’and Nonetheless, elite-level contacts are uncovered the changing nature of their administration and the UK government, I you can’t legislate for personalities’), maintained between politicians and civil their principal duty would be to the relationships with Whitehall depart- more important is how the devolved/ servants in Wales and their counterparts ments, as welJ as with others in the NationaJ Assembly. Their status as ser- I nondevolved spJitruns through a White- in London and the other devolved on, p.,,~calCWr&lYFubti&CoLld 2tl@ , 22S A. COLE WITH J. B. JONES AND A. STORER O ‘II. k,l,td Cn,mterlyPubl,.hq C. Ltd 2CU3 INSIDE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES 229

Employment Services; the Countryside 4 K. Morgan and G. Mungham, Redesigning Commission for Wales; the European Dmocracy: The Making of the National As- Commission; the Equal Opportunities sembzy for Wales, Bridgend, Poetry Wales Commission; Ford and British Aerospace; Press, 2000. and various education and training pro- 5 R. Parry, ‘Evolution, Integration and viders. Interviews continue. All inter- Modernisation in the United Kingdom viewees were guaranteed anonymity. Civil Service’, Public Policy and Administrat- Research for this article was carried out ion, vol. 16, no. 3,2001, pp. 53-67. as part of the ESRC’S Devolution and 6 Putting Wales First: A Partnership for the Constitutional Change programme (’Ev- People of Wales, Cardiff, 2000. olution and Decentralisation in Wales 7 In the words of a source within the Pre- and Brittany’: grant number L 219 25 siding Office, ‘We now have guidelines 2007). The award holders are Alistair which say to civil servants: though you Cole (principal researcher), Barry Jones, are still a member of the Home Civil John Loughlin and Colin Williams. Alan Service, you are to behave as a member Storer is the research assistant. The award of the Presiding Office.’ is based in the School of European Studies 8 Parry, ‘Evolution, Integration and at Cardiff University (the Department of Modernisation in the United Kingdom Welsh is also involved). We thank the Civil Service’. Council for its support. 9 The case, notably, for the introduction of 2 J. B. Jones, ‘Welsh Local Government A student grants for Welsh students. Blueprint for Regionalism?’, Local Gcmrn- 10 As one official said, in sorrow rather than ment Studies, Sept./Ott. 1986, pp. 61–74; anger: ‘One gets the impression we are J. B. Jones, ‘The Welsh Office: A Political now regarded as a foreign country, almost. Expedient or an Administrative Irmova- As we go our own way on policy, we are a tion?’, Transactions of the Royal Society of different government. It is nothing to do Cymmrodorion, 1990; J. B. Jones, ‘Changes with them, All Whitehall departments are to the Government of Wales, 1979–1997’, the same. Whitehall thinks that Wales and in J. Barry Jones and D. Balsom, The Road to Scotland have fallen off the edge; there is the National Assembly for Wales, Cardiff, no need to talk to them. But it did make a University of Wales Press, 2000. lot of sense to continue to talk. They think 3 Jones, ‘Changes to the Government of we are a “banana republic”.’ Wales, 1979-1997’.

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.. . ouest Rennes ~e@redi 23 novembre 2001 ,:

I’+Jo17&0 - T&l. 0299326000 Wvw.ouest-france.fr f ..— rance

En’ces temms oh Ie r6aionalisme fait d6bat dark la soci&6 at interpel- Ie Ie pouvoir politique, Ies r6sultats du sondage r6alis6 en Bretagne par une 6quipe d’universitaires gallois sent riches d’enseignements. Les traces de sentimentantifranqais sent> ici, quasiment imperceptible: 2% seulement des personnes interrog~es se d6clarent bretonnes, pas franqaises. Quant A la revindication autonomist (et non pas ind6pendan- tiste), elle demeure fort minoritaire. Les Bretons n’en sent pas moins extr6mement attach6s aux traits de ieur singularit~. A cette iangue surtout, qu’on ne parle plus gu&e, mais qu’ils ch&issent comme un tr6sor. Elle fait Ie socle d’un pays dent Ies Iimites ddpassent Iargement ce que fut jamais sa sphdre d’influence. Pour comprendre cette apparente contradiction il fau?chercher au tr& fends de l’~me bretonne. Bien stir, une collectivity n’a pas d’Zimeet Jean Boissonnat a raison de Ie souligner (l), se souvenantde toutes Ies horreurs commises au nom de l’~me surmos6e de tro~ de nations. II n’emp~che: Ie ciment d’une com- munaut6 est Ie produitde bien d’autres (ic[dans une 15coleDiwan), souhaitent /e rmtachen?eti~’d~ ‘f~ Loke-At/a@’@e, mais ne courent pas aprds I’autonomic. ..’ attaches que Ies liens mat&iels enga- ,’, , geant ses membres entre eux. En Bretagne, la composition de ce monde. La passionmise Adtwelopper, Le singulier de, la Brkkgne ckfk .’; ciment-1~ est faite du godt des autres clans tous Ies secteurs, Ies nouvelles nit-ii aujourd’hui -une sorte de’#7@& et des 6changes; il a, de tout temps, technologies,en thoigne avec force. [e communautaire? .,~~ -.:’ pouss6 Ies Bretons sur Ies mers du Au fond, on ne pourrait rien com- ModMe, ce serala $tiisto~re d’~n I globe, gonf16 Ies voiles de I’esprit prendre ~ la fkre Bretagne, figure de juggr, mais [email protected];@,rernek ~Au : missionnaire, donrk au mouvement proue d’un Vieux Continent encore sens de l’atiittid’~ti~fiduedd~” Eur+ , mutualiste des Iettres de noblesse plein d’ambitions, ~ I’observer avec @ens par le@$@dehtWAque, Vaclav et enracin~ la R6gion clans I’Europe. des Iunettes corses. II faut chausser Havel, A I’hegre de I%largissement, C’est aussi la capacit6 d’initiative, des verres 21double foyer, associant pour d~montrer qu’il est possible de l’app&it pour Ies &udes, I’amour de tradition et modernit6, enracinement *coop&er pacifiquement d diff6renta la nature et du vivant. Et surtout, ia local et mondialisation, pour saisir niveaux, sane ~.*. & ..m ~ m~~~ —

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On n’impoee rfen A un Sreton. Fier de son idenUt6 et de as fsngue, U est Jaloux de ss Ii- bert6. Et if revendique tout autant sa nathnsI~6 fran@se. C’est ce qua nous enselgne un sondzsge britannfque (lh

Une 6quipe de I’university de Cer- diff, dirigbe par Alistair Cole, professeur de sciences politiques, mbne, depuis un an, une &ude comparative sur la d6centralisation r6- gionale au pays de Galles et en Bretagne. Les n+.sultats, que nous publions aujourd’hui (Ike aussi en rubrique ~ Po/itique*) et demain, bousculent quelques idbes reques A I’heure ou Ie Conseil d’f%t remet en cause l’integration de Diwan et ~::.IIfautdonnardesaidespubliques l-l \_y auxassociationsbratormantes 393 oh ie conseii r6gional d6cide de fa- “:: I voriser ie biiingulsme.

Un mlliier de sondds e 16bmtonciwrarnment I‘- Si la tri?sgrande majorit6 des Br& ljJ tons (85 “A) considbrent la Iangue ~~Je peuxperterat comprendre II ~‘,Iebretonasaezbien 5,5 1,1 7,- bretonne comme un pilier de l’lden- tite regionale, ils sent prssque aussi nombreux A refuser des mesures contraignantes: 57 0/0ne veuient pas ~.~Je peuxdireet comprsndra I . - I --”.’ I --: I .--ii% que I’on forme davantage de bre- ‘~:quelqueamoteenbreton 2-’ tonnants pour occuper des postes clans I’administration et la poll- tique et 5470 refusent qu’on rtsetve des emplois aux personnes bi- ~~Autrear6Donses 11.41U11 Iingues. Seui.$ ceux qui parlent bra- ton son! majoritairement favorable a de telles mesures. Les Bretons – seul des 1007 sond& estime qu’11’ sabilit~ du gouvernement et 60/0 /’instM Eff/cience3, se/on la nrWrode des firrancdepar /e Consei/ y compris Ies non-bretonnants- sou- faudrait Ie consacrer priorltairement de Bruxelles. quotas. hude de recherche 6conorn/que et sociele haitent en revanche que Ies ass- A la Iangue bretonne. Et, pour 53%, du Royauma-Uni. ciations (740A) et Ies medias bra- ce type de dbci$ions concernant Ie Bernard RICHARD. tonnants (67 “A) re$oivent une aide breton doit bien relever du conseil (1) 1007 adultesde plus 16 ans, r6si- Demain: Les Bretons et publique. Mais il faut reiativiser. Si r6gional, alors que 21 ‘A estiment dant en Bretagne, lnterrog6spar tc+lh la R6gion avait plus d’argent, un qu’elles doivent &re de la respon- phone, du 25 juln eu 7 ]ulllet 2X21,par Ies institutions rdgionales Le point de vue d’Allistair Cole t Pro fesseur de sciences politiques breton. S’ii existe une majorit6 pour ~~. ;,,,JJ5M ;., :;:,. ,~ ;::,i.; . Cae donn6es se conferment en ,*j,f. ,, *,,:.,$,,*.,.,,;.,,, ~ / ‘universit6 de Cardiff, Allistair une politique de soutlen aux m& ,,. ::i,:,. . regardant Ies choix concernant ,,, ,,..~,..; Cole tire trois conclusions prlnci- alias et aux associations breton- . ..’t,,,,:,,,, i’avenir institutionnei de la Bretagne. !..,~..,,, pales du sondage effectu6 clans Ie nantea, I‘id&rede r&seryer des qu@ !,’JF,~, Les Bretons se divlsent entre ceux cadre de I’r$tude comparative qu ‘il tas d’emplois pour des bretonnants ~,j+:a: qul ae disent satisfaits du degrb conduit sur la d6centralis@ion r6- rencontre une ferme opposition, de ,. de d6centraiisation actuei et ceux g gionale au pays de Galles et en m~me que I’obligation de la for- 1,j, qui pr6nent une aesemb16e r6gi& g~, nale renforc6e. Notons toute de Bretagne. Trois conclusions prin- mation profesaionneile en breton .X,; cipals, qui ont trait d la Iangue bre- pour Ies cadres dea administra- suite l’extr6me faiblease de ceux q tormg,d /’identit6 des Bretons et. tions. On rappelle queces masures ~ prbnant un retour en arribre, et aux institutions r4gionales. . sent, de facto, effective clans I’existence d’une minorit6 cons6- certains secteurs au pays de g quente wr faveur de I’autonomic (la uD’apr& ce sondage, on estime Galles. D’autre part, ie principe de & position c#ficielle de I’UDB). A un peu moins de 200000 ceux I’enseignement facultatif du breton Quelles conclusions faut-ii en ti- qui parlent Ie breton a couram- h, i’kole eat. tn% ,iargement sou-, rer? D’abord,f’ldentit6 ne S’eXPriMe ment>~, un chiffre qui !s’616Aw A tenu, h l’oppos6 de i’enseignement , pas principalernent par i’appren- 300000 maximum avec ‘une dbfi- obligatoire. * ‘ , tissage dsla Iangue, rn6me si.celle- nition 6iargie (uJe parle /e bra-” ; :ci peuts’appuyer aur un trbs fort ton assez blen M). f-e bretonnant Une ardeur regionaliste i -:capitai de aympathie. Enauite, ia moyen a plus de 65ans (prbs de temp6r6e !. Bretagne est assukrment ‘une R& 70% de ceux qui parient Ie br- ~ 9iOn A identit6 fork?, maie,les Br+ ton couramment) et habite Ie Fi- uLe sentiment d’identit6 bretonne i tons sent partlaans d’un r6giona- nistbre ou la partie ouest des est trts fort, mais non pas exclu- ,, 1 Iisme temM6. Enfin, la traduction Cr3tes-d’Armor. sive. Prbs des troia quarts de la po- poiitique de ce r6gionalkime teim ~ Alors que sa faible pratique pulation expriment un sentiment Allistair Cole, professeurd i’universit6 p6r6 eat ambigud. Les Bretons sou- se confirme, it y a un tr&s fort ca- d’identit6 bretonna. Plus de ia de Cardiff, au pays de Galies. tiennent Ie principe de la d6cen- pital culturel pour la Iangue bra- moiti6 sent 6galement ~ [raise avec tralisation et font confiance, grosso tonne. Ceile-ci est un Wment im- ieurs identittrs bretonne et franqaise. que franqaise, aiors qu’au pays de modo, au conseil rbgional pour portant de l’identit6 bretonne La comparison avec Ie pays de Galles, un gros tiers construit son assurer ie dbveloppement de la Bre- pour 65 O/. des r6pondants. Une fois Galles, une autre r6gion d’identit6 identit6 contre son appurtenance tegne. S’ii y a peu d’app&it pour ce constat fait, on observe un forte, permet de peaufiner cette britannique. Ii y a harmonle entre I’autonomic, presque la moiti6 manque d’enthousiasme certain image des Bretons A ,1’ardeur rb- ies identk bretonnes et frars~ises, des Bretons seraient favorable & A i’egard des politiques pubiiques gionaiiste temp6r6e. Une frange n% A condition toutefois que cerfaines un reinforcement du pouvoir des ins- interventionnistes pour soutenir ie duite se considbre plus bretonne normes soient respact$es. titutions r6gionaies. m I

25 novembre 2001 Reaion dimanche 11 11sreagissent au sondage sur la Bretagne Cinqpersonnalit& r&gionaless’exprimentw- l’identitkbretonne,la langue, l’autonornie...

ous avons fait r6agir des personnalit&s de la majorit6 des sond6a (60,9 “A)sorrtfavorable au rat- I’sise clans Ies structures politiques r6gionales ac- r6gion Bretagne et de la Loire-Atlantique A tachementde la Loire-Atlanfique&la Bretagne. 23,5 Y. tuellee.83 Y. fontcorrfianceau corv3ailr6@onalpw ae- N l’~tude d’un univeraifaire gallois sur I’ldentit& sent contre tandis que 13 ‘A des personnes interr@ surer Ie d6veloppement de la Bretagne. 44 0/0 sent (voir Ouest-Frarrce de vernfredi et d’lrler), Pour m6- gbes ne se prononcent pea. partisans de Ie maintenir clansses pouvoira actuels. moire, voici Ies principauxvksultafsd’unsondage r&a- Aktonela Iangue brefonne,sarisI’hpoaer. M6me si 33% aimeraient Ie voir doter de pouvoira 16gislafifael tisbpour cette btude (l). elle n’estPIUSparka caurammentqua par 10YOdee Brs fiscaux (comme la Corse) tandis que 12 Y. sent fav~ Un fort sentiment d’identfti. 8$’. se dlsent franqais tons te Iangueat un61&nentImportantde f’idenfit6pur rabies ~ une Bretagne autonome. et pee breton,17 % se sententplusfranqaisque breton. 85 V. dee sond&. Et elle m6rite d’6tre aid6e financii+ A I’inverse, 17% se d6clarent plus breton que fran- rement par Ies pouvoirs publics h travers ses asso- (1) Sondage r6alis6 par Efficiency 3, aupr+s de pais. En fait majoritairement A 57 ‘Yo,Ies sondbs se ciations(74 V. sent pour).Etsurtoutenseignbe A I’&ole 1007 personnes ilg~es de plus 16 ans, ksidant en sentent autant breton que fra~ais. &64i%. Une condition: que ce ne soit pas obtigatoire. Bretagne, du 25 juin au 7 juillet 2001, selon la m@hode Une Bretagne A clnq d6partementa, Une t?rnorme R6glonalisme temp6r6. Les Bretona semblent A des quotas.

Christian Guyonvarc’h, UDB: Aian Stiveil, musiciin: <

ur 1ssBretons, la R& ~ dor~navant ~ l’id~e d’une n Ie sait, la Bretagne divers selon Ies Iieux. Ou Pglen eat un acfeur poli- autonomicr4giorralami%e ome passionne depuis store,iltautsupprimerfcate fique d’avenlr: 82 VOdes - et@ rresurprendra per- toujours. Les tendances rnatkre obllgatoire qui ne aond6eIuifontplut6tw tout I aonne-sl i’adf’ksionse fait g6n6rales de ce sondage serf pee forc6ment clansla Afaiicornlancefmurasaurer plusais6menfquand I’idt+e me r6jouissent car elles vie (maths, Iitkxature fran- Ied&&ppementde la Bre [ est explicittre ( doter Ie vent clans Ie sens de mes qaise..,). S1la culture g$- tagne.LasBratorrscnfaussi Conseil r6gional de pou- proprea sentimentsdepuis rkwde et Ie d6velcppement 1s8icks claire9sur.scmP& voltskgielatifsetfiacaux,~). mon enfance. de la peraonnalit6, en har- rimbtre. 11ssent presque Le paradoxe politiquedea Je note qu’une comfor- monia avec Ie paya oh I’on frois fois plus nombreux ~ Bretons est ici r&sum6: Ie table majorlt6 est pour Ie habite, ont un sens, on ne voutoirIe rafkhernent de la f!~~onterlude l}auto~mles& rattachement de la Loire- peut se passer du breton. Lok*Atlentique ti la R6gion tilt de plus en PIUS,la re- At[antiqueAla r~gion Bre- Enfkr, concernant Ies Bretagne qu’~s’y opposer. vendlcationclansson prin- tagne. Les responsables oouvoirsdu Conseil r60io- Quant au conflitd’idert- cipe pas encore. Qui a dit politiques oppos6s h ce al,, j’assiste depuls mon tit6s,itne concerne pas Ies que la politique consistait changement vent-iis slier enfarrce$iune &oiution in- Bretons. 89 “h dea soncka se senten~ h clansI’arf du diacoure? clans Ie sens de I’opinion ou vent-ils croyable de I’opinion bretonne. A desdegr6sdivera,Bretonaet Frar@a. Le II me semble que Ies Bretons, continuer~ se comporteren aristocrats l’6poque on traitait de fou celui qul par- risque de u poudribre balkanique. que corracientequeIacorsfmcfkmaarop&me m6prisant Ie peuple ? Iait daseembke bretonne. Aujourdhui certains agitentcomme unchiffonrouge va de pair avec un reinforcementdes en- Ence qui cortcemeIe brefonAI%cole, 2 !/. seulement voudraient revenlr au wur combatfre touter~gionalisafionest We r6gionalee, sent engag& clansune 18 minist~re concern6 et Ie Parlement . tout d6partement.. Pendant des d6- une affebulation. nwteflonPWique quidevraitleaconduire ontde groa efforts&faire pour se mettre cennies, une partie du mouvement bre- Mals I’enseignementmajeur de cette ~ revendiquerune Bretagnedot6ed’une en ad6quatlon avec la demande popu- ton ne r6clamait rien de plus que Ias enqu&e Portesur Ie rapportdee Bretone reelle autonomic l~gislatlve et fiscale Iaire. Je auis pour 18brefonmatkre den- pouvoira actuels du Conseil r6gional. au pouvoir d6cisionnaire de Is R6gion. dana18cadre d’uneR@ubliquefra~ise seignement normal (done obllgatoire, Ce temps perdu n’a-t-ilpaa W un grand PrW dun Bretonsur deux (43 O/D)adh&e r6gionalis4.e,voire f6d&ale. mais Ie mot est moche) h des degr6s gAchis?

Joei Batteux, maire de Saint-Nazaire: Andrew Lhwoin, pr6sident de Diwan: Josseiin de Ftottan, pr6ddentdu Conseii (cNe pas se recroqueviiier >) (( Un iarge consensus sur ie breton ~) r6gionai: a Toi6raI& et ii~raux n

a volont6 populaire esoodage esfunebelle e trouve que Ies Lne s’exprime clai- cr&30nee~ fousceuxqui JBretonaontunwm- rement que par Ie suf- portement trbs mo- frage universel. Quant c’esfleiWememnt C’eei deme. A une 6poque aux sorrdages,on peuf au confraireune ldentit6ou- de mondialisation, Ieur faire dire bien des vwta WI n’esfpasbaa4asur clans un monde choses. Les derniers unan@cniame quelccrique d%chenge,Ies bomea, sondages montrent un et qui semble bien adapt4e Ies barriha, Ies obs- retour spectaculaire au morrdeclansIequelncas tacles auxquels s’at- vers lea valeurs de la Vivona. tache untea de relents R6publique et une 57%desgenseea@el-lt nationalistee,commu- grande aspiration 2r elltanftiquefmrqai slta nautaristes et x6no- l’unit~ nationale face souhaitent une harmonic phobes... toutceci est aux risques et aux d6- enfre la culturebretcsmaet &ranger Ala merrtalit6 fis A venir. la culture fran@se, bas6e breto;ne. Si I’on devait rattacher la Loire-Atlanfique.4 la Bre- sururremmr&wwe mutuelle.Ceia a“deAcwnprendre Les Bretons sent forfement identitaires. 11sont le tagne, que deviendraient Ies autres d6partements WJf@l’tiWWa@md~avecJ@ sentiment d’avoir un pafrimoine culturel, une identit6 de Sarthel de Mayenne, de Vend6e... Derri6re cette re- Lang)&sit historique.L’opinionpubliqueeouhaiteque la qui Ies distingue des autres, mais ~a n’en fait pas pour vindication, se cache en r~alit~ I’ambition de cer- IkmgueMafonneaituneplacepubliqueetcifoyannedansla autant des gene agressifs, isol~s, nationalists. tains d’aller vers I’autonomic de la Bretagne, aprbs soci&6fran@ee, ~ ccmrnencerpar l’~ducationnafionale. Dans ce sondage, 57 % se sentent autant bretons t, I’annexion x d’un d6partement ~ fort POtf3i7tki 6CO- Ententquepr6eiderrfde Diwan,je nepauxt%requ’heu- que fran~ais. Je suis totalement en ad6quafion avec nomique. reux.IIy a untrts large consensussur f’importancede la mei concitoyena. L’avenir de la Bretagne n’est pas de se recroque- Iangue bretonne. Mieux, elle a toutesa place & I%cole. Aufre t~moignage en faveur des Bretons: la Iangue viller sur elle-m~me reals, au contraire, de s’ouvrir & Seuls5 % des personnesintemog6eseontcontresonen- bretonne. Elle doit pouvoir Mre 6tudi6e A l’6cole, dea cooptrations avec sea voisinee, Pays de la Loire seignement. mais ~ condition qu’on Ie fasse Iibrement. Nous et Poitou-Charentes, “pourconforter notre recherche Je noteauaei I’insfancedes sond6esur [e Iibre choix sommes aux antipodes des Talamoni, Quastana... et nos activit6s maritimes, Iittorales et portuaires, par des famillea.Cela montreque I’objectifprincipaldu bre- ces nafionalistes corses qui veulent imposer Ie corae exemple. tcmen Bretegnedoit&rededeneifier Ie r&eau des.$coIes Atout Ie monde y compris h ceux qul sent Mrangera Oui la pratlque de la Iangue bretonne doit &re d6- bilinguee(Dlwanet Iesaufrea)pourpermettreune 6galit6 h I’ile, fendue, tout comme la culture et Ies artistes bretons. d’acctrsAcesfypeadenseignemarls pourleefamiliesqui Ala difference,k Bretonssent dea esprifaIibbraux, Qui s’y oppose ? Personne ! Tr6ve de po16miques et Ieeouhaitent. tol&anfa. Ila sent affach6s A Ieur patrimoine reals ils de fausses querelles, 43%desswrd4escmtasezdacxmrd(44%aontcmrfre) ne veulent pas qu”onIeur impose un mod+le totalitaire D6fendons ensemble tout ce qui fait la richesse avec l’id6ede r6server des emplois~ dea pereonnesbi- de ce que doivenf @trela culture et la Iangue. de la R6publique et qui respecte ses principes et ses Iingues.C’eatuneminorit&cerfes,maisje notequa Ied4- valeurs. bateatouvert Propoe recueilfis par Mfchef DERRIEN. O-S181–09Z1”

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Rmlmu rHoRr4urw Political Correspondent ‘weneedtime’ RHODRI Morgm said, “Over the TIiE Welsh administration has a long next 24 months we must make sure way 10 go in clelivering key services, we deliver what the public wants First Ministet Rimdri Morgan adrnit- us to delivec a more effective and [ed last night. bigger-capacity NHS mtd likewise A study shows that less than a for education.” qumer of the population believes the He admitted his administration National Assembly has improved the was slill rated as not having quality of public services in ,arryway, achieved much but pointed out that However, greater powers. for the key policies had- been introduced Clu-dit’f Bay body are now favoured rekently such ix+free SCI1OO1mi Lk by almost half of (he Welsh public. and a freeze on prescription According to reseiirch published charges. “Tinle, and time again, today less than a qwuter of the Welsh aIthou.gh they are beneficial, we population supports the pre-devolu- have said they are smili things atrd tion armtrgements. Fifty-one per cent the Assembly needs time to deliver are iu thvour or strongly in favour of the big things.” devolution, with 32pc against. — -., Worryingly for the Assembly (he Assembly that the Scottish option dmiuistration, only 2pc of people elicits such support among the Welsh ilg~e(t strongly that the quality of pub- public and that there are indications lic services hds improved under the of an underlying mood to challenge two-year-old body. the hybrid devolution offered in the An additional 22pc think public referendum.” services have improved but in Mr Morgan said be was mildly contrast 60pc do not believe the encouraged by sotne of the findings, Assembly has made a difference. but asking people about their attitude The study - Wekh Public Opinion to devolution was a strange question. and the Welsh Nalionu[ Assetnbly: to- “What we want to be marked on wards a new consensus? - carried out isn’ t the existence of the institution by academics at Cardiff University’s but whether we as a government are School of European Studies, provides delivering the lcind of things people is positive measure of the clevo]ution want,” he said. process since the referendum in 1997. “i wish sotne academics would ask “[t might be argued that Welsh the question aboul the performance identity, for so long the product of the Assembly in the context of the different levels of government – there Greatdivkie ‘iwgirtsto heal- page14 are four levels of government, local Comment - page 14 councils, the Assembly, Westminster exclusively of cultural criteria, htts and Europe – but they will never ever now acquired an institutional base,” do it and I don’t understand why.” said tbe academics. “III other words, Nevertheless, Mr Morgan said be the Assembly mighl be a poor, weak was mildly encouraged by the appar- institution but it is ours.” ently reduced hostility to the exis- On specific questions about policy tence of the Assembly. people are far less confident about the “What’s not so encouraging is that Assembly, indicating that they are we’re doing well on the question that stili w.]iting for it to deliver. I dun’t regard as really reIevarrt, while “This is to be expectecl,” said the on the one I do regard as relevant – ;Lcxlclmim. “The Assembly is only how we are pert”onning as a gover- tww years old and only. in the longer nment in the Assembly – we’re not term will it be able to impact on the doing so \vell.” deep-seated economic and social Mr Morgan attacked the study for problems Facing the country.” claiming health and education bud- The report concludes that the initial gets were closely monitored by the findings are paradoxical. UK Treasury. “The Assembly no longer divides “None of that’s true at all; that’s the nation into eastern and western rubbish,” he said. “The absence of a halves, but it is also apparent that the reference to job creation in the list of Assembly is operating in a policy- . our prime responsibilities is another making arena well beyond i~scapaci- major disagreement between me and ties. However, it must be reassuring the academics.” to Welsh AMs intent on reforming [email protected]

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH COUNCIL POLARIS HOUSE NORTH STAR AVENUE SWINDON SN2 1UJ Tel: 01793 413000 Fax: 01793 413001 GTN 1434

END OF AWARD REPORT

This is the ESRC End of Award Report form. The form should be completed in full and returned along with seven additional copies to The Reports Officer, Policy and Evaluation Division at the ESRC on or before the due date. Award holders should also submit eight copies of the summary and research reports and any nominated papers or other research outputs to be evaluated along with the Report.

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ESRC AWARD REFERENCE L219252007 NUMBER

DEVOLUTION AND DECENTRALISATION IN WALES AND BRITTANY AWARD TITLE

AWARD TERMINATION 30/03/2003 DATE

END OF AWARD REPORT DUE DATE 30/06/2003

AWARD AMOUNT £146297

RTF PED July 2002

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Completed End of Award Report Form Declaration 1: Conduct of the Research Declaration 2: Regard Declaration 3: Data Archive Project Details Questionnaire

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Plus separate copies of: Nominated Outputs (Optional) A maximum of two

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ESRC END OF AWARD REPORT: PROJECT DETAILS

AWARD NUMBER: L219252007 AWARD TITLE: (the box will accommodate up to 4 lines of text)

AWARD START DATE 01/01/2001 TOTAL AMOUNT £ 141492 AWARD END DATE 30/03/2003 EXPENDED:

AWARD HOLDER(S): NB. This must include anyone named as a co-applicant, as originally listed in the research proposal. TITLE INITIALS SURNAME DATE OF BIRTH No HOURS PER WEEK/ % TIME ON PROJECT Prof A.M. Cole 13/04/19549 80% Mr J.B. Jones 20/11/1938 50% (except periods of illness) Prof. C.H Williams 20/10/1950 15% Prof. J. Loughlin 09/09/1948 10%

PRINCIPAL AWARD HOLDER'S FULL OFFICIAL E-MAIL: ADDRESS(please list other addresses on a separate sheet if necessary)

Professor Alistair Cole, EUROS, 65-68 Park Place, Cardiff, CF10 3YQ TEL:

FAX:

THE FOLLOWING REPORT FORMAT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED; Activities and Achievements Questionnaire 1. Summary of Aims, Objectives and Significant Achievements In Section 1 overleaf, please summarise: · the aims and objectives of the research, noting briefly if these have changed since the original proposal. · in no more than 200 words, suitable for a lay reader, the findings and most significant achievements of the research. The latter might include: theoretical developments, new findings, new methods, new datasets, impact of the research on academics, policy-makers, practitioner’s etc.

2-8. Dissemination, Nominated Outputs, Staffing, Virements, Major Difficulties, Other Issues and Unexpected Outcomes, Nominated Rapporteur

Report Executive Summary In no more than 1000 words, please describe the main research results in non-technical language.

Full Report of Research Activities and Results A full report of no more than 5000 words should accompany this form, please see the attached guidelines (2.6) for a list of standard headings to follow.

ACTIVITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Summary of Aims, Objectives and Significant Achievements

1). Aims and Objectives

We set out to investigate the politics, policies and polity-building potential of devolution in Wales and decentralisation in the French region of Brittany. The original research proposal set out five precise aims and objectives, which have been each been addressed throughout the project. Theory building has involved developing a framework for analysing comparative regional governance. We understand governance as wider than government, encompassing institutions, actors, authoritative processes and policy outputs. In contemporary European societies, the classic institutions of government have had to adapt to new types of endogenous and exogenous demand, to the emergence of new stakeholders and changing political agendas. We are primarily interested in regional governance, defined as the interaction of institutions and actors engaged in policy-making in distinct sectors, territories and nation-states. We believe that governance is contextual, mediated by national, functional and place specific variables. The real value of governance is that it facilitates the formulation of precise research questions that can be investigated comparatively. Consistent with our other aims and objectives, we have collected a new body of inherently important information. Our research methodology in turn allowed us to highlight lessons from policy practice, a theme we develop in the main report. International academic collaboration has been greatly enhanced in ways set out in the main report.

2). Significant achievements and findings. i). Innovative methods We conducted around 200 face to face interviews in Wales and Brittany, convened a Welsh language focus group, carried out a path-breaking comparative opinion survey and developed and distributed an elite questionnaire in four languages (English, Welsh, French and Breton). We are preparing four new datasets. ii). Impact. The project has made a major impact, well above the average for an ESRC project. We have brought policy- makers in Wales and Brittany together in innovative ways that would not have occurred without the project. We have influenced public policy formation in Wales and Brittany. We have contributed in an expert capacity to debates about the future of devolution in Wales and decentralisation in France (especially Brittany) and promoted cross-national learning. iii). Lessons. We identify several lessons for Welsh policy-makers in the report and engage an evaluation of devolution in Wales from a comparative perspective iv). Dissemination The project has been widely disseminated v). Media. The project has been extensively reported in the media, including the Independent, the Economist, the Western Mail, the South Wales Echo, Ouest-France, the Télégramme de Brest, the Gazette des Communes, Réforme, BBC Wales, HTV, Real Radio, S4C, FR3 (the French third channel) and others.

2. Dissemination a: Please outline any specific plans you have for further publication and/or other means of dissemination of the outcomes and results of the research.

The project has been very thoroughly disseminated. By the end of the project (June 2003) the team had over 40 separate entries in the REGARD database, excluding an important number of forthcoming and planned publications. We aim to complete an overarching project book by end-December 2003. In addition, Colin Williams is editing a volume on Language Governance (University of Wales Press) that stems from the November-December 2001 conferences. We have presented the project in many varied arenas and professional fora, details of which are contained in the REGARD database. These have included: the PSA (2002, 2003), the IBG (2002), the ECPR (2003), the ECPR Standing Group on Regionalism (2002), the French Political Science Association (2002) and ASMCF (2001, 2002). In addition, the project has been presented to non- academic users in conferences in Pau, Lorient, Lille, Reims, Marly-le-Roi in France, as well as to the National Assembly for Wales and at one-day conferences in Glamorgan and Aberystwyth. The project has organised two major conferences, in December 2001 and March 2003, bringing together academics, research users and policy-makers from Wales, Brittany, Scotland, Ireland, Quebec and Canada.. Barry Jones organised a series of seminars in 2002 that brought together academics, Assembly members and Welsh Assembly Government officials. The project has been extensively covered in the Welsh and French Press, with references in the Independent, the Economist, the Western Mail, the South Wales Echo, Ouest-France, the Télégramme de Brest, the Gazette des Communes, and Réforme. We have also been solicited frequently by the media and members of the team have given interviews on BBC Wales, HTV, Real Radio, S4C, FR3 (the French third channel) and others. Barry Jones represented the project in various media outlets during the 2001 (general) and 2003 (Assembly) elections.

We include articles published in Political Quarterly and Regional Studies as part of the evaluation. The Political Quarterly article demonstrates the use of the elite interview method. The Regional Studies piece, also a case study, is centred upon analysis of the opinion poll and interviews in Brittany. The full report provides the overarching comparative dimension that gives these articles their real meaning.

b: Please provide names and contact details of any non-academic research users with whom the research has been discussed and/or to whom results have been disseminated.

Dr John Marek, Deputy Presiding Officer, National Assembly for Wales, Cardiff Bay, Cardiff, CF99

Mr Rhodri Morgan, First Minister, Welsh Assembly Government, Cathays Park, Cardiff, CF10 3YQ

M. Josselin de Rohan, President of the Brittany Regional Council, Conseil Régional de Bretagne, BP 3166, 283 Avenue du General Patton, 35031 Rennes, CEDEX , France

M. Oliver Geffroy, Directeur adjoint du Cabinet du Président, Conseil Régional de Bretagne, BP 3166, 283 Avenue du General Patton, 35031 Rennes, CEDEX , France

3. Nominated Outputs (see Guidelines 2.4)

Please give full details of the two nominated outputs which should be assessed along with this report. With the exception of publicly available web-based resources, eight copies of any nominated outputs must be submitted with the End of Award Report.

Alistair Cole and John Loughlin, ‘Beyond the Unitary State? Public Opinion, Political Institutions and Public Policy in Brittany’, Regional Studies, vol. 37:3, pp. 265-276, 2003. ISSN:0034-3404

Alistair Cole, with J. Barry Jones and Alan Storer, ‘Inside the National Assembly for Wales: the Welsh Civil Service under Devolution’, The Political Quarterly, vol. 74:2, April – June 2003, pp. 223-232. ISSN: 0032-3179

4. Staffing

Please detail appointments and departures below for ALL staff recruited for this award. Where possible, please note each person's name, age, grade; and for departing staff, destination type on leaving. (Destination types: Academic post, Commercial, Public Sector, Personal, Other).

Title Initials Surname Date Of Grade Appointmen Departure Destination Type & Post Birth t Date Date Mr Alan Storer RA1B4/5 01/01/01 30/09/02 Public sector Ms Nia Jones RA1B4 01/01/03 31/03/03 Public sector

NB This section must not include anyone who is an awardholder or co-applicant.

5. Virements

Since 1st April 1996 investigators may vire between grant headings without reference to Council, except where major capital items are being provided for. Please detail below any changed use of resources and the benefits or problems this brought.

By and large, we have been within budget throughout the project. We have kept within our means, sometimes with difficulty. Two items of expenditure were more expensive than we had initially envisaged. The first of these was the comparative opinion poll survey in Wales and Brittany. These polls cost just under £30,000, whereas we had budgeted for £25,000. In order to pay the Welsh and French polling companies, we had to cut back on our interview transcription budget and vire monies from interview transcriptions to the opinion poll item. We have also had to dispense with computer programming (£1,000) for the same reason. We eventually transcribed most of the interviews ourselves, with a small number of exceptionally important interviews being professionally transcribed.

The French fieldwork proved more expensive than the revised Travel and Subsistence grant awarded by the ESRC. On the other hand, we were able to economise on interviews within Wales, the centrality of Cardiff proving to be beneficial in this respect. We benefited from the undoubted centralisation of political and economic power in Cardiff to meet actors from all over Wales in Cardiff itself. We vired around £1500 across to Brittany, as the French fieldwork proved to be more expensive than the ESRC anticipated.

The other remark concerns the cost of the senior social scientist abroad. In the original proposal, Dr Joseph Fontaine was to act as the key institutional contact and scientist within the C.R.A.P., at the Rennes Institute for Political Studies. In the event, Dr Fontaine was promoted to Professor and moved to St Etienne shortly after the beginning of the award. This made no difference at all to the conduct of the project. Alistair Cole was very warmly received at the C.R.A.P. in the Institute of Political Studies in Rennes, where he stayed for six months. The C.R.A.P. gave Cole an office and full access to all facilities - telephone, secretarial assistance – for the duration of his stay. Having an institutional home in the Rennes Institute of Political Studies was essential in order to organise the interviews in Brittany. After discussions with the French CNRS, we were able to employ Yann Fournis, a PhD student at Rennes University, as a Research Assistant for three months, paid by our grant, but on French rates. Yann Fournis was of great assistance, conducting around 15 of the interviews, collecting questionnaires and contributing to the overall intellectual reflection on the project. The C.R.A.P. was also able to provide secretarial assistance for the transcription of the Brittany interviews. This was very important, as Cole would have been unable to transcribe so many interviews alone. All in all, we are very satisfied with the good use of the money allocated for the ‘Senior Scientist Abroad’.

6. Major difficulties

Please detail below any major difficulties, either scientific or administrative/logistical, encountered during your research and comment on any consequent impact on the project. Further details should be included in the main report, including any advice you might have for resolving such problems in future projects.

We experienced no major difficulties, though the project was extremely demanding, especially for the principal researcher. We ran the project according to the schedule we agreed upon in the original grant proposal and we were able to keep to this.

J. Barry Jones was rather ill towards the end of the project, limiting his mobility. Fortunately, Jones recovered to represent the project in the media during the 2003 Assembly elections.

The major logistic problems were encountered with interviews. In 2001, the Principal Researcher drove over 22,000 miles directly connected with the project. Wear and tear on the Principal Researcher’s car was well beyond the budget awarded by the grant and so had to be met by the principal researcher himself.

The Research Assistants in Wales and the research assistance procured in Brittany proved absolutely indispensable. Alan Storer and Nia Jones were both excellent. Storer participated fully in the intellectual life of the project and the data collection phase. Jones helped to organise the major March 2003 conference at which Rhodri Morgan met his Breton counterpart, Josselin de Rohan. Storer has gone on to find employment in the Welsh Development Agency; while Nia Jones is being interviewed soon for a position in the Presiding Office of the National Assembly.

This project was deeply rewarding, but also very tiring. Analysis of the results will continue for some time yet.

7. Other issues and unexpected outcomes

Please describe any outcomes of your research, beneficial or otherwise, that were not expected at the outset, or other issues which were important to the research, where these are not addressed above. Further details should be included in the main report.

We decided to develop an elite-level questionnaire, in order to allow for elite-mass comparisons. This proved to be very beneficial, as it allowed structured comparisons to take place within and beyond Wales and Brittany.

The project was much more successful than even the Principal Researcher expected. The activities we engaged in were innovative, well above the average for an ESRC project. The response in the French and Welsh media was terrific, especially surrounding the publication of our Brittany opinion poll in November 2001 and the visit of Josselin de Rohan to Cardiff in March 2003.

Bringing together the first Minister of the Welsh Assembly Government and the President of the Brittany Regional Council (also a member of President Chirac’s kitchen cabinet) was deeply satisfying. It was only possible because of the eighteen months of intense interviewing that preceded the final conference.

We are grateful to all Assembly members, ministers and officials of the National Assembly for Wales who were open, transparent and accessible. Likewise, we thank politicians and officials from the Brittany Regional Council and all the other organisations that were involved with the project.

8. Nominated Rapporteur

Please suggest the name of one person who would be suitable to act as an independent rapporteur for your project. Please state full address and telephone number.

Patrick Le Galès, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, George Street, Oxford, OX1 (until end-July 2003). Tel: 01865

Thereafter: Patrick le Galès, CEVIPOF/Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 54 Boulevard Raspail, 75006, Paris, France.

Research Summary

Devolution and decentralisation in Wales and Brittany is a comparative project that set out with several ambitious objectives:

· to compare public opinion about political institutions and public policy in Wales and the French region of Brittany

· to compare and contrast mass and elite opinions on institutions and policy within and across Wales and Brittany

· to inform policy practice in Wales by drawing lessons from experience in the French region of Brittany. We focussed on two policy fields: regional languages and education and training.

· to contribute to our scientific knowledge about European regional governance by adopting a comparative perspective and elaborating new theoretical frameworks.

We adopted several methods to achieve these general objectives, including mass opinion poll surveys in both regions, an ‘elite’ questionnaire (distributed in English, French, Welsh and Breton) and around 200 face to face interviews with political, voluntary sector and educational actors in Wales and Brittany. We now present our main findings in the form of bullet points across the dimensions we identified in the original proposal: polity building, political process and policy learning.

Polity building and political process

· We identify an essential differentiation between processes of regional governance in Wales and Brittany. Regional governance in Wales is driven more by the force of identity politics and the dynamic of polity building, whereas regionalism in Brittany prospers because the prevalent mode of regional advocacy has proved to be very effective.

· Support for regionalisation in Brittany is more instrumental (the region is the appropriate level for good services) than identity-based (the region at the service of a distinct identity, separate/adversarial from the rest of France). In Wales, policy choices were viewed through identity tinted conceptual lenses.

· The case of Wales suggests that divided identities are less propitious to collective social ownership than harmonious ones. Multiple identities (regional and national) are more easily assumed in Brittany than in Wales. The real achievements of devolution in Wales are obscured not only by an obfuscated and unworkable settlement, but also by the persistence of crosscutting identities based on linguistic, geographic and cultural differences.

· Partisan voting is more indicative of institutional choices in Wales than in Brittany. Within the Welsh electorate, we identified three distinct positions, ranging from a residual Conservative hostility to the principle of devolution, to overwhelming support from intending Plaid Cymru voters for at least a Scottish-style parliament, with Labour and Liberal democrats occupying a median position favourable to going beyond executive devolution. In Brittany, there were no significant differences according to party.

· Political opportunity structures are vital for understanding comparative regional dynamics, notably the political space available for the development of a regionalist party, the interlocking of regional and social movements and the structure of incentives for regional players to engage in local, regional, national or European games.

· While the French region focuses primarily on the French state in pursuit of its own objectives, in Wales being ‘different from England’ has emerged as a fundamental dynamic of devolution.

· Time is needed to make devolved institutions work. The first term of devolution has provided the mobilising project necessary to embed the Welsh polity and to build Welsh civil society, in the long run potentially overcoming an important social capital deficit.

· In both countries, political elites operate within broadly same order of priorities as their respective public opinions

· Brittany builds upon a deeply rooted territorial solidarity to promote institutional interconnectivity and to enmesh institutions within civil society. In terms of linkage between institutions, territory and identity, Brittany appears more ‘joined up’ than Wales, with a more effective outreach to civil society and a less divisive identity.

· Wales needs to continue to embed institutions within civil society; to engage in positive value-added mobilisation, rather than the defensive affirmation of difference with England; to engage a longer-term investment in human capital, and to mobilise opinion around unifying cultural symbols.

Policy learning

Rejecting ‘hard’ policy transfer as inappropriate to our research focus, we preferred an approach based on reflexive learning, whereby actors reflect upon their own practices as they accumulate experience, learn how to identify weaknesses and interact with others. We now present our findings in bullet point form:

· In Wales and Brittany the policy communities are not ‘epistemic communities’. Their reference frames are primarily national, referring to practice in other regions in France or in other parts of the UK in Wales.

· A small number of strong models in third party countries do exist. In both regions, when the ‘lessons’ related to training policy, the most popular model was that of the German Dual system. When the ‘lessons’ related to language policy, the Spanish region of Catalonia was the most cited.

· In Wales and Brittany precise lessons were less important than aspirational comparisons. In Wales we observed a manifest disassociation between idealised comparisons of where Wales ought to be ( the aspirational comparisons of Wales with, in order of frequency, Ireland, Catalonia or the Scandanavian democracies) and limited knowledge of policy programmes elsewhere.

· In the area of lesser-used languages, policy actors operate within distinctive institutional and ideational contexts. For most Bretons, the Welsh model is beyond the pale in the French context. There is more support in Wales than in Brittany for interventionist public policies, which we can attribute to the relative success of active public policies in setting the agenda in Wales during the past decade. The rise in the numbers of Welsh speakers in the 2001 census is testament to the efficacy of public policy in Wales.

· In the area of human capital, we identify five lessons for Welsh policy-makers from Breton/French experience. These involve the need to adopt a more broad-based approach to pre- and post-16 educational provision; more investment in training; resisting the temptation for all-Wales centralisation; a more transparent system of skills accreditation, and the adoption of new policy instruments ( facilitating the statistical linkage of training supply and local employment markets).

Final Report on ESRC Grant L219252007: ‘Devolution and Decentralisation in Wales and Brittany’.

Alistair Cole, Principal Researcher

This final report is organised into eight parts: background, aims and objectives, methods, results, activities, outputs, impacts and future research priorities. It should be read in conjunction with the original proposal and refers to that proposal where necessary to avoid repetition and facilitate evaluation. We include several essential appendices containing an indicative bibliography, lists of interviews, statistical tables, sample surveys and evidence of esteem.

1). Background

We set out to investigate the politics, policies and polity-building potential of devolution in Wales and decentralisation in the French region of Brittany. Building upon the expertise and the dense network of contacts gathered in a previous ESRC project (L311253047), the principal researcher sought to extend and deepen the analysis (centred around the comparative governance of institutions, policies, functions and places) to the meso-level, broadly consistent with debates on the new regionalism in Europe (Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer, 2003). The project design responded to a dual intellectual and political challenge. The intellectual questions posed and the criteria for comparison are outlined in the original proposal. There was also a political rationale for the Wales-Brittany comparison. Our project focuses upon the operation of new meso-level institutions and upon policy dynamics in two policy issue-areas (training and regional languages) which have specific ramifications for regional governance in both territories and where Wales and Brittany can learn from each other.

2). Aims and Objectives

The original research proposal set out five precise aims and objectives, which have been each been addressed throughout the project. Theory building has involved developing a framework for analysing comparative regional governance (Loughlin, 2000, Cole, 2003b). We understand governance as a meso-level concept, not as an overarching transforming theory (‘policy convergence’), as a normative prescription (‘good governance’) or as a global alternative to government. We do understand governance as wider than government, however, encompassing institutions, actors, authoritative processes and policy outputs. In contemporary European societies, the classic institutions of government have had to adapt to new types of endogenous and exogenous demand, to the emergence of new stakeholders and changing political agendas. We are primarily interested in regional governance, defined as the interaction of institutions and actors engaged in policy-making in distinct sectors, territories and nation-states. We believe that governance is contextual, mediated by national, functional and place specific variables. The real value of governance is that it facilitates the formulation of precise research questions that can be investigated comparatively.

We have collected a new body of inherently important information. We conducted aoround 200 face to face interviews in Wales and Brittany, convened a Welsh language focus group, carried out a path-breaking comparative opinion survey and developed and distributed an elite questionnaire in four languages (English, Welsh, French and Breton). Together, these sources provide an incomparable richness of empirical data and represent excellent value for money for the ESRC, allowing us to develop four datasets in SPSS format for the ESRC data archive. Our research methodology in turn allowed us to highlight lessons from policy practice, a theme we develop under ‘results’. International academic collaboration has been greatly enhanced. Alistair Cole spent a fruitful six months in 2001 at the CRAPE, Institute of Political Studies in Rennes. Alistair Cole also spent three months from April to June 2002 at the prestigious Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP), part of the Institute of Political Studies in Paris. John Loughlin was invited Professor at the EUI in Florence during the academic year 2001-2002. Colin Williams combined fieldwork in Wales with an international presence in Canada and Slovenia and a visiting fellowship in Oxford.

3). Methods

We applied a mix of qualitative and quantitative methodologies designed to elucidate different aspects of the study.

Qualitative approaches were the most suited to the in-depth comparative research that best characterises this project. Focused comparisons, using semi-structured interview techniques, are the most convincing method for examining similar political and policy challenges in contextually specific policy contexts. In total, we undertook 99 interviews in Wales (as well as convening a formal focus group of 33 actors) and 101 interviews in Brittany. We transcribed or summarised each interview. We are still engaged in the lengthy process of thematically coding our transcribed interview data. We identified three types of actor; isolated three priority themes emerging from the interview; specified the level of contacts (local, regional, national or European); investigated the existence or otherwise of foreign models, and summarised the three main policy challenges for the future. Through the creation of three sub-groups within our samples (generic, education and training and language advocacy) we sought explicitly to establish comparative equivalence between the two regions. We did not use a statistical package for this exercise, though we would do in the future.

The interview method allowed us to penetrate to the heart of the policy communities, identify real lessons and develop genuine contacts between policy stakeholders on a cross-national basis. There is a value-added quotient that is lacking from purely statistical studies; bringing together policy stakeholders across national boundaries requires permanent and personal interaction. This type of user engagement is only feasible on the basis of long periods of fieldwork of the type undertaken in ESRC L217252009.

We accompanied our interviews with a detailed questionnaire, containing many of the same questions as those asked in our public opinion poll surveys ( see ‘results’).

Quantitative approaches Quantitative methods elucidate a different dimension of reality to those uncovered by qualitative approaches. Where it is possible to identify a clear outcome variable, corresponding to a precise research question and a range of possible predictors, the quantitative approach can work well. Simple frequencies, cross-tabulations, correlations and more complex methods such as logistic regression allowed us to compare varied facets of public opinion in our two regions and, to some extent, to draw contrasts between political and policy communities therein (Cole and Baudewyns, 2003; Cole, Jones, Loughlin, Williams and Storer, 2003).

4). Results

The Wales-Brittany comparison played itself out at various levels, each of which had a rather different intellectual rationale. We were primarily interested in the analytically separate dimensions of national context, national and regional identities, public policy and public opinion. We now present our findings across the three dimensions we identified in the original proposal: polity building, policy learning and political process.

4.1) Polity Building

How best can we comprehend differential attitudes towards regional political institutions and identities in Wales and Brittany? This question was the focus of a comparative opinion poll carried out by two professional polling companies - Market Research Wales and Efficience 3 - in July 2001. The survey schedules are appended to this report. We interviewed a representative sample of 1008 in Wales (1007 in Brittany), selected by quotas of age, gender, socio-economic group and locality.

We developed a formal model (‘Identity and instrumentalism’) of logistic regression to distinguish between devolution and decentralisation in Wales and Brittany (Cole and Baudewyns, 2003). In our logistic regression analysis, we treated support for regional political institutions (Q.7) as our principal dependent variable. We identified a series of independent variables, selected on the basis of the existing literature and in accordance with our theoretical framework. These included classic independent variables such as age, gender, education and place of birth. We also integrated attitudinal and opinion variables such as identity, language aptitude, attitude towards devolution in Wales,

preferred level of decision for policies and voting behaviour. The logistic regression is presented in tables 12-15.

We observed a number of similarities between Wales and Brittany. There is a relationship between politicised identities and institutional choices in both regions, especially relating to support for independence. Multiple identities (regional and national) are more easily assumed in Brittany than in Wales: a far higher proportion of the Welsh survey – over one-third - considered itself to be exclusively or primarily Welsh than was the case in Brittany (table 7). There are some other interesting contrasts between Wales and Brittany, notably concerning the role of language and voting choice. In Wales, there was a clear linkage between language competency and institutional choices. Those who speak or understand Welsh well or fairly well are more inclined to support enhanced devolution. In Brittany, there is a slight negative relationship between language competency and support for independence or for enhanced forms of devolution. There is a lingering sense of shame amongst native Breton speakers (concentrated in the oldest age categories) and an over-compensation of loyalty to France and the French state. With regards to voting choice, we observed a strong relationship between intended vote in a regional election and institutional preference in Wales, but no significant relationship in Brittany.

There were significant contrasts between the regions according to our socio-demographic criteria. In Wales, there were no clear patterns for most of the socio-demographic variables (age, education, gender or place of birth), suggesting regional governance preferences are derived from polarised attitudes rather than demographic attributes. In the case of Brittany, support for independence was strongly correlated with age, gender, education and, to a lesser extent, place of birth. The youngest Bretons, especially those born in Brittany, the most educated people and women are the most inclined to support regional autonomy. These findings suggest a firm bedrock of support for enhanced regional governance amongst the most dynamic social groups.

Our regression findings confirm our differentiation of processes of regional governance in Wales and Brittany. In the Welsh case, cleavages are deeply embedded and there is a real debate between independentists, devolutionists and unionists. Support for enhanced devolution (and even more so independence) is party political, with a powerful regionalist party mobilising support for more enhanced devolutionary solutions and maintaining pressure on the other parties. Voting choice clearly influences attitudes towards independence, as does competency in the Welsh language. Unlike in Wales, Breton identity is not a diacritical political marker of difference (Table 8). There is a latent Breton consciousness, but this is not a political resource that can be mobilised by regionalist political parties and we observe no significant relationships between regional voting choice and attitude to autonomy. On balance, regional governance in Wales is driven more by the force of identity politics and the dynamic of polity building, whereas regional capacity in Brittany prospers because the prevalent mode of regional advocacy has proved to be very effective and because the political opportunity structure has pre-empted the development of a regionalist party (Cole and Loughlin, 2003). Identity foci, institutional demands, instrumental incentives and political opportunity structures thus all produce substantive differences between Wales and Brittany.

We also endeavoured to uncover the dynamics of devolution in Wales (especially) and devolution in Brittany through extensive face to face interviews. These interviews were semi-structured, combining a small number of routine questions with a range of institutional and policy specific questions aimed at attaining a maximum of information in areas of great technical complexity and institutional uncertainty. This method was especially pertinent in Wales, due to the new institutional framework put into place by devolution. We reported these findings in several publications and we refer the reader to these (Cole and Storer, 2002; Cole, Jones, Loughlin, Williams and Storer, 2003; Cole, Jones and Storer, 2003). We concluded from our extensive survey that a consensus is emerging within Wales for a Scottish-style Parliament and tax-varying powers. In Brittany, there was also widespread support from all parties for enhanced regional powers, a position confirmed in our public opinion survey (Cole and Loughlin,

2003). In both regions, we discovered a remarkable consistency of viewpoints between informed and popular opinions. We compared responses to our public opinion question on regional expenditure priorities with the same question asked in our elite surveys. In both cases, the elite sample gave the same order of priorities as public opinion (health in Wales; environment in Brittany). On the specifics of the Wales-Brittany comparison, finally, we observed a certain asymmetry, following logically from the more enhanced form of regional governance in Wales. Regional actors in Brittany were more likely to refer to Wales as a model of devolution than were those in Wales to advocate adopting lessons from Brittany.

4.2) Policy learning

The second dimension we identified in our original proposal was that of policy learning. Comparative public policy analysis is increasingly focussed upon how public policies can be improved by observing practice elsewhere (Rose, 1993; Evans and Davies, 1999; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; James and Lodge, 2003). Rejecting ‘hard’ policy transfer as inappropriate to our research focus, we preferred an approach based on reflexive learning, whereby actors reflect upon their own practices as they accumulate experience, learn how to identify weaknesses and interact with others. We pursued the theme of lesson drawing both in interviews and in our elite questionnaire, where we asked our respondents in an open-ended question to identify lessons from practice elsewhere. The main conclusion we draw for Wales and Brittany is that the policy communities are not epistemic communities. The reference frames are primarily national (referring to practice in other regions in France or in other parts of the UK in Wales). A small number of strong models in third party countries do exist. In both regions, when the ‘lessons’ related to training policy, the most popular model was that of the German Dual system. In both regions also, when the ‘lessons’ related to language policy, the Spanish region of Catalonia was the most cited. In Wales and Brittany, however, precise lessons were much less important than aspirational comparisons. In Wales in particular, we observed a manifest disassociation between idealised comparisons of where Wales ought to be ( the aspirational comparisons of Wales with, in order of frequency, Ireland, Catalonia or the Scandanavian democracies) and limited knowledge of policy programmes elsewhere.

The comparative survey and elite interviews revealed the limitations of the policy learning approach amongst meso-level policy communities. In the light of the weakness of actual knowledge and contacts within the policy communities, the role of the investigator is to highlight lessons from in-depth knowledge from both regions and policy sectors.

From Wales to Brittany: the Limits of Linguistic Mainstreaming Our initial hypothesis was that, in the issue-area of language policy, any lesson-drawing would run from Wales to Brittany, on account of the greater Welsh experience in managing language policy. We evoked the possibility of a narrowing of the very distinctive ideational and institutional frames in the two countries. This convergence has not occurred. If anything, the regulatory framework has become less propitious for lesser-used languages in France since 2001. We observe many differences (and some similarities) at the level of policy communities and public opinion. In Wales, as language issues have become mainstreamed, it is difficult to identify a specific language policy community. In the case of Brittany, the embattled status of the Breton language

gave the language ‘policy community’ an extraordinary cohesion in adversity, but there is no comparable mainstreaming of the Breton language. Policy actors operate within distinctive institutional and ideational contexts. For most Bretons, the Welsh model is beyond the pale in the French context. Even fervent Breton supporters of bilingualism in Wales or Catalonia were much less sanguine when it came to France itself. Differences amongst policy stakeholders are reinforced in public opinion. There is more support in Wales than in Brittany for interventionist public policies, which we can attribute to the relative success of active public policies in setting the agenda in Wales during the past decade (Tables 16 and 17). The rise in the numbers of Welsh speakers in the 2001 census is testament to the efficacy of public policy in Wales (Williams, 2003). In Brittany, the parameters for public policy action are more narrowly prescribed. These important findings suggest the limits of lesson drawing in the sphere of lesser-used languages, where the regulatory environments are so different.

From Brittany to Wales: building human capital

Our initial hypothesis was that in matters of human capital, lesson drawing was likely to run from Brittany to Wales. What post-devolution Wales aspires to is well captured by aspects of the French model, namely a long-term approach to educational provision, a broad-based school curriculum, synergy between higher education, research and industry, opportunities for lifelong learning, partnership between strategic regional authorities and further education providers vested with real autonomy, and the implementation of new vocational paths. In terms of specific policies and policy instruments, we would suggest four main lessons.

Adopting a more broad-based approach to pre- and post-16 educational provision is fundamental. The Welsh Baccalaureat should be justified in terms of raising the level of generic skills for everybody, rather than by the ‘parity of esteem’ argument. No system manages a genuine ‘parity of esteem’, but the French (and German) systems are very good at inculcating generic skills within vocational streams, ensuring adaptability to changing employment environments while instilling valuable employment skills.

Taking Training seriously. The Brittany region has benefited from decades of public and private investment in human capital and can boast one of the best-trained and educated workforces in France, though it started the post-war period from a similar GDP base to Wales. The French model strongly suggests that investment in training can improve productivity. There needs to be a more balanced policy mix between viewing training as a public and a private good. Skills development plans, obligatory workplace training, greater workplace consultation and a higher degree of investment in training are all responses that might help Wales to escape the low-skills trap, to embed a learning culture and to encouraging lifelong learning.

Appropriate Scalar responses Wales and Brittany are both ‘regions’ of around 3,000,000 inhabitants. There are many scalar similarities between the two. We would argue that the natural clientele of meso-level authorities lies between obligatory schooling and higher education: apprenticeships, further education colleges, lifelong learning, work-based training. In Brittany, the 20 ‘training and employment areas’ that exist at a sub-regional level are rather equivalent in size to a Welsh local authority area, the level at which it is the easiest to predict micro-linkage between training courses and future employment needs. The Wales-Brittany comparison pleads in favour of maintaining the CCET level in some shape or form.

New policy instruments? The Brittany region undertakes an annual evidence-based, strategic and statistical overview of training needs (ARGOS). New policy instruments similar to the ARGOS programme in Brittany would allow a closer match between training supply and the requirements of local labour markets for vocational training.

4.3) Political Process

Our project also set out to deepen our understanding of processes of comparative regional governance. We offer a framework for analysis that combines criteria drawn from institutions, relationships, political opportunity structures, identities and regulation (Cole, 2003b). In sum, if Welsh devolution is above all shaped by the institutional avenues opened in the Government of Wales Act of 1998, regional capacity in Brittany is built upon a dense network of relationships and tested forms of horizontal and vertical linkage. Political opportunity structures are vital for understanding comparative regional dynamics, notably the political space available for the development of a regionalist party, the interlocking of regional and social movements and the structure of incentives for regional players to engage in local, regional, national or European games. The linkage between identity, territory and institutions is primordial for comparing regions, the Wales-Brittany comparison suggesting that politicised identities do not necessarily add value to regional political institutions. Understanding regional governance, finally, requires cognisance of the character of regulation: the importance of constitutional rules, mechanisms of financial transfer, inter-institutional linkages, the capacity of central government to intervene in devolved areas, the Europeanisation of specific policy sectors and so on.

Devolution and decentralisation in Wales and Brittany are best understood as two alternative forms of territorial institution building. Devolution in Wales appears focussed on territorial identity and polity building, decentralisation in Brittany on proximity as a response to policy solutions and upon a specific mode of regional advocacy in higher level arenas.

The case of Wales suggests that divided identities are less propitious to collective social ownership than harmonious ones. The real achievements of devolution in Wales are obscured not only by an obfuscated and unworkable settlement, but also by the persistence of crosscutting identities based on linguistic, geographic and cultural differences. There is some evidence that the first term of devolution has provided the mobilising project necessary to embed the Welsh polity and to build Welsh civil society, in the long run potentially overcoming an important social capital deficit. There is a more cohesive party system, the equilibrium of which is favourable to making the devolved institutions work. There is the ‘team Wales’ approach, signifying the building of new institutions as part of the devolved family (ELWa) and the diffusion of emerging referential frames. There are much closer contacts between Welsh Assembly government officials and Assembly sponsored public bodies than in the pre-devolution era (Cole, Jones and Storer, 2003). There is the appearance, finally, of all-Wales organisations within civil society and the gradual recognition by professional organisations (the CBI and TUC notably) of the need to take devolution into account in their own organisation. Here, the emphasis on the temporal dimension is vital; relationships need to be developed over time, a scarce resource for new institutions such as the National Assembly for Wales.

What, if anything, can Wales learn from observing Brittany? Even though Brittany is in the forefront of French regions, calling for enhanced regulatory powers (‘pouvoir normatif régional’ ) in its September 2002 Manifesto, it is not a model in narrow institutional terms. The institutions of devolution in Wales are weightier than those of decentralisation in Brittany, whether measured in terms of budgets, personnel or legal powers. Close observation of the Brittany region does suggest some positive lessons

beyond those identified above in relation to education and training. In important respects, Brittany has a denser governance capacity than Wales, on account of the absence of major divisions, the tightly knit nature of Breton networks within and beyond Brittany, the cross-partisan tradition and even the weakness of an autonomist movement, though its regional institutions are undoubtedly weaker. Brittany builds upon a deeply rooted territorial solidarity to promote institutional interconnectivity and to enmesh institutions within civil society. Brittany scores highly in terms of institutional inter-connectivity, embodied by traditions of inter-communal co-operation, normally harmonious relationships between regional politicians and representatives of the state field services, and high levels of social capital, measured by an active associative life, high electoral participation and strong social networks acting as a barrier to the extreme right (Le Coadic, 1998). In terms of linkage between institutions, territory and identity, Brittany appears more ‘joined up’ than Wales, with a more effective outreach to civil society and a less divisive identity. Wales needs to continue to embed institutions within civil society; to engage in positive value-added mobilisation, rather than the defensive affirmation of difference with England; to engage a longer-term investment in human capital, and to mobilise opinion around unifying cultural symbols.

5). Activities

ESRC L219252007 has been an extremely active project that has placed engagement with non-academic research users at the core of its philosophy. We have involved users at the various stages of the project, from research design to implementation. The Welsh language board helped with the design of the language policy part of our survey. The Office of the Presiding Officer (the DPO) offered valuable advice on our Welsh interview schedule. In the case of Brittany, our mass and elite surveys were usefully improved upon the advice of the Brittany Cultural Institute and the Breton Language Office. We benefited in Wales and Brittany from the sound academic advice of leading experts in the field (Ben Seyd, Daffyd Trystan, Elizabeth Dupoirier, Joseph Fontaine, Eve Fouilleux, John Walter Jones, Jeremy Evas, David Egan, Peter John, Jonathon Bradbury, Philippe Leroy, Ronan Le Coadic, and Christian Demeure-Vallée). The National Assembly for Wales and the Brittany Regional Council both followed the project with interest and became directly involved in conferences at the later stages. Many other individuals and organisations have been involved in one way or another, not least all of those which agreed to an interview (see appendix 3).

Two major back-to-back conferences were organised by the project and supported by the ESRC Devolution and Constitutional Change programme. In November -December 2001, the ESRC project team was involved with the Forum of Federations and the National Assembly ‘Roundtable on Language Governance’, 29-30 November 2001 and then organised a follow-on conference on ‘Lesser-Used Languages: Lessons from Comparative Experience’, on 1st December 2001. Speakers included language policy officials from the Canadian and Quebec governments, as well as from Scotland, Ireland, Wales and Brittany. The three speakers from Brittany represented the three most important organisations involved in the Breton linguistic revival (DIWAN, Ofis ar Brezhoneg, TV Breizh). A second back-to-back conference was organised by Alistair Cole in March 2003. On 14th March 2003, we held a one-day conference on ‘Regional Governance in Wales, Brittany and Beyond’, at which findings from the project were presented to a mixed audience of academics and policy- makers. The conference brought together for the first time leading politicians from the Brittany Region and the Welsh Assembly Government. Josselin de Rohan, President of the Brittany Region, spent all day with First Minister Rhodri Morgan. The two leaders concluded their day by jointly addressing the conference. The Regional Governance conference was followed-up on March 15 by a one-day Devolution programme event on the ‘Dynamics of Devolution in Wales’, which brought together most of the Welsh projects for an intensive meeting.

6). Outputs

The project has been very thoroughly disseminated. By the end of the project (June 2003) the team had over 40 separate entries in the REGARD database, excluding an important number of forthcoming and planned publications. We aim to complete an overarching project book by end-December 2003. In addition, Colin Williams is editing a volume on Language Governance (University of Wales Press) that stems from the November-December 2001 conferences. We have presented the project in many varied arenas and professional fora, details of which are contained in the REGARD database. These have included: the PSA (2002, 2003), the IBG (2002), the ECPR (2003), the ECPR Standing Group on Regionalism (2002), the French Political Science Association (2002) and ASMCF (2001, 2002). In addition, the project has been presented to non-academic users in conferences in Pau, Lorient, Lille, Reims, Marly-le-Roi in France, as well as to the National Assembly for Wales and at one-day conferences in Glamorgan and Aberystwyth. The project has organised two major conferences, in December 2001 and March 2003. Barry Jones organised a series of seminars in 2002 that brought together academics, Assembly members and Welsh Assembly Government officials. The project has been extensively covered in the Welsh and French Press, with references in the Independent, the Economist, the Western Mail, the South Wales Echo, Ouest-France, the Télégramme de Brest, the Gazette des Communes, and Réforme. We have also been solicited frequently by the media and members of the team have given interviews on BBC Wales, HTV, Real Radio, S4C, FR3 (the French third channel) and others. Barry Jones represented the project in various media outlets during the 2001 (general) and 2003 (Assembly) elections.

7). Impacts

The project has made a major impact, well above the average for an ESRC project. We have brought policy-makers in Wales and Brittany together in innovative ways that would not have occurred without the project. We have influenced public policy formation in Wales and Brittany. We have contributed in an expert capacity to debates about the future of devolution in Wales and decentralisation in France (especially Brittany) and promoted cross-national learning.

A few examples, amongst many, demonstrate our impact.

· Williams acted as an advisor to ELWa on Welsh language issues and, in November 2001, organised a focus group that collectively debated ELWa’s Welsh Language Scheme.

· Williams gave evidence to the National Assembly Culture Committee in its review of the Welsh Language

· Jones gave evidence to the House of Lords committee on constitutional reform.

· In August 2001, we published our Welsh poll findings in the Western Mail, making the front page and lead editorial.

· In November 2001, we published our Breton poll findings in Ouest-France, making the front page and lead editorial. The poll was widely commented upon by the key actors in Brittany.

· In December 2001, Cole and Williams organised the path-breaking Lesser-Used Languages conference

· In March 2002, Cole presented interim findings from the project to the National Assembly

· In July 2002, Cole advised the Brittany Regional Council on language policy in Wales.

· From September to October 2002, Cole advised the French government on aspects of the UK Devolution programme, in advance of the Raffarin government’s decentralisation reforms. Cole wrote a detailed 8,000 word consultancy report on Devolution in Wales for the French Interior Ministry.

· In March 2003, Cole (and the ESRC) hosted a conference at which First Minister Morgan and President de Rohan met for the first time, presaging future meetings (the first in June 2003)

· In March 2003, Cole was awarded the Brittany Regional Council’s gold medal for services to Brittany.

8). Future Research Priorities

L215292007 has attracted very considerable interest from academic teams within and beyond the UK. Alistair Cole is now the chief UK contact point for the framework programme six project bid on ‘governance, territory and public policy’, headed by the French CNRS. This project bid has been formally submitted to the Commission, and, if successful, will run from 2004-2008. This bid, and others, will pursue the themes investigated in this project, namely the comparative governance of institutions, policies, functions and places. Our comparators are principally France and the United Kingdom, but we propose to extend our general analysis to include Spain, Germany and the accession countries (especially Slovenia). The contacts made during this project will facilitate the task.

(4960 words)

Appendix One

Bibliography

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Appendix Two

A List of Tables

1). Comparing Political and Policy Contexts 2). Institutional Preferences in Wales and Brittany 3). Attitudes to Devolution in Wales 4). Policies and processes in Wales 5). Trust in the Brittany Regional Council 6). Decision-making arenas for training and language 7). The Moreno Identity Scale for Brittany and Wales 8). Identity and institutional preferences in Brittany 9). Regional Voting Intentions and Institutional Preferences in Brittany 10). Identity and Institutional Preference in Wales 11). Regional Voting intentions and institutional intentions in Wales 12). Logistic regression estimates (s.e.) for Wales 13). Logistic regression estimates (s.e.) for Brittany 14). Multinomial logistic regression – parameter (s.e.) for Wales 15). Multinomial logistic regression – parameter (s.e.) Brittany 16). Attitudes to the Welsh Language 17). Attitudes to the Breton Language 18). Attitudes to Training in Wales and Brittany

Table One Comparing Political and Policy Contexts

Wales Brittany Commentary

Population · 3M · 3M ( 4M including Loire Good fit Atlantique) History · Tudor Act, 1536, Wales · Independent Duchy until Breton ‘state’, attached to English Crown 1532, then part of France. 878-1532.

Geography · West Atlantic Seaboard. · West Atlantic Seaboard. Good fit Atlantic Arc Atlantic Arc

Political · Devolved Assembly in · Limited administrative, This asymmetrical Governanc ‘Union State’. Model of then political comparison e Executive devolution. decentralisation since makes sense in an Devolution a process of 1960s. Brittany birthplace overarching uncertain dimensions of regional political Franco-British institutions. Bretons comparative · Wide-ranging regulatory regarding Wales with context. and secondary legislative interest powers; no tax-varying British Union powers. · Some tax-varying powers, State more but no equivalent flexible than the legislative/ regulatory French unitary powers. one. · 2003 constitutional reform to allow regions to bid to exercise new functions of an experimental basis. Possibility of transferring certain regulatory powers. · Regions are major actors in economic development, training, culture, transport. Influence over education

Economy · Tourism, Aerospace, · Food Processing, Brittany more Automotive, Electronics, Shipbuilding, Defence, joined-up than Steel, low-skilled service Telecommunications, Wales, with more sector (call centres) Automotive, Farming, value-added · Mostly SMEs, but a strong Fishing,Tourism. industries. Both old manufacturing base. · Some large firms – regions share FDI important. Citroen, France-Telecom, many similar · Poor infrastructure hinders DCN - mostly SMEs. FDI features: farm trade. Political Networks more important than crisis, industrial run from North to South; elsewhere. restructuring, Economic networks from · Good infrastructure physical distance East to West facilitates trade from markets · GDP c.80% of national · Brittany poorest French average region in 1945, now 14th out of 22. GDP just below average Language · 17% fluent/fairly fluent · 12% fluent/fairly fluent Welsh (MRW poll, July Breton (Efficience 3 poll, 2001). July 2001).

Table Two Institutional Preferences in Wales and Brittany

Q. There is a debate today in France/Wales on the future of Brittany Wales decentralisation/Devolution. % %

Which one of the following options do you prefer ?

‘Abolish the Regional Council / National Assembly for Wales’ 2 24

‘Retain a Regional Council / National Assembly with limited powers’ 44 24

‘Create an elected parliament with tax-raising and legislative 33 38 powers’

An independent Brittany / 12 11 Wales

Don’t know 9 3

Table Three Attitudes to Devolution in Wales

% Strongly in favour 11 In favour 40 Against 19 Strongly against 13 Don’t know 18

Table Four Policies and processes in Wales

Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Don’t strongly strongly know

‘ The quality of public 2 22 48 12 16 services has improved under the Assembly’

‘The say of people in 3 33 38 9 17 decision-making has improved under the Assembly’

‘The existence of the 5 41 33 9 13 Assembly has given Wales more lobbying power within the UK government’

Table Table Five Trust in the Brittany Regional Council

Strongly Fairly Not very Not at all Don’t trusting trusting trusting trusting Know ‘Do you trust 30 53 8 2 7 the Regional council to undertake the development of Brittany?’

Table Table Six Decision-making arenas for training and language: i). Brittany

‘Which of the following institutions should Breton language Training take the main decisions concerning the Breton language/training’

Brittany Regional council 53 43 French Government 22 20 Local government 9 24 European Union 6 3 Others 1 1 Don’t Know 9 7

‘Which of the following institutions should Welsh language Training take the main decisions concerning the Welsh language/training’

National Assembly 50 42 UK Government 18 25 Local government 19 23 European Union 5 3 Don’t Know 8 7

Table Seven The Moreno Identity Scale for Brittany and Wales

Brittany % Wales % Breton, not French (2) Welsh, not British (17)

More Breton than French (15) 17 More Welsh than British (20) 37

Equally Breton and French Equally Welsh and British 56 35

More French than Breton (17) More British than Welsh (22) 26 22 French, not Breton (8) British, not Welsh (0) Don’t know 1 Other 6

Table Eight Identity and institutional preferences in Brittany

Total More Breton Equally Breton More French than than French and French Breton ‘Retain 44 28 45 56 existing arrangements’

‘Elected 33 35 34 24 parliament with tax- raising and legislative powers’

‘Autonomy for 12 27 10 3 Brittany’

Table Nine Voting Intentions and Institutional Preferences in Brittany*

Total PS Green UDF RPR (n.1007) (n. (n.71) (n.28) (n.55) 187)

‘Retain existing arrangements’ 44 53 52 41 53

‘Elected parliament with tax-raising and 33 35 35 46 36 legislative powers’

‘Autonomy for Brittany’ 12 8 12 4 7

(*Vote in a regional election. Figures - rounded up or down –to be treated with caution on account of the large number of undecided voters, refusals to answer the question or votes for minor parties. But the contrast with Wales is interesting).

Table Ten Identity and Institutional Preference in Wales

Institutional Independent Elected Elected No elected Don't know Total preference Wales parliament assembly assembly Identity Welsh not 25,7 41,1 15,8 13,4 4,0 100,0 British

More Welsh 17,9 44,5 23,7 11,6 2,3 100,0 than British

Equally 3,7 39,3 26,4 26,9 3,7 100,0 Welsh and British

More British 3,6 30,4 25,4 36,2 4,5 100,0 than Welsh

Other 11,7 25,0 26,7 26,7 10,0 100,0

N. Total 112 380 238 238 41 1009

% 11,1 37,7 23,6 23,6 4,1 100,0

Table Eleven Voting intentions and institutional intentions in Wales

Con Lab Lib Dem Plaid Cymru

(11.0) (32.7) (7.3) (17.1)

Wales should become independent 4.5 7.3 1.4 27.9 Remain part of the UK, with elected parliament 24.3 43.8 43.2 51.2 Remain part of the UK, with elected assembly 17.1 30.1 27.0 12.2 Remain part of the UK without an elected assembly 54.1 15.2 27.0 6.4 Don’t know - 3.6 1.2 2.3

Table Twelve Logistic regression estimates (s.e.) for Wales

Variables Independence Assembly with extended Assembly with limited No elected assembly competences competences

Age -0.019 (0.206) 0.169 (0.125) -0.037 (0.140) * -0.338 (0.201) Gender -0.046 (0.295) 0.069 (0.182) 0.264 (0.203) ** -0.594 (0.281) Education -0.099 (0.101) 0.096 (0.062) -0.089 (0.070) -0.011 (0.099) Place of birth 0.225 (0.467) 0.086 (0.236) 0.229 (0.256) -0.340 (0.346) National identity *** 0.685 (0.170) 0.135 (0.102) ** -0.325 (0.119) ** -0.406 (0.174) Language 0.067 (0.328) * 0.448 (0.230) ** -0.663 (0.294) -0.502 (0.424) Attitude to 0.588 (0.412) *** 1.159 (0.220) *** 0.933 (0.255) *** -2.912 (0.320) devolution process Level of decision 0.317 (0.358) 0.169 (0.211) * 0.438 (0.243) *** -1.127 (0.313) (language) Level of decision -0.164 (0.333) ** 0.479 (0.207) 0.061 (0.235) ** -1.051 (0.340) (training) Voting ** 0.344 (0.137) 0.034 (0.082) -0.153 (0.094) *** -0.138 (0.129) Constant * -6.057 (0.822) *** -2.753 (0.635) -0.557 (0.459) 3.711 (0.673) Log-likelihood 325.166 709.057 597.431 343.365 Predicted (%) 90.00 66.00 76.40 87.10 R2 Cox & Snell 0.094 0.149 0.068 0.404 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001

Table Thirteen Logistic regression estimates (s.e.) for Brittany

Variables Independence Regional Council with Regional Council with No Regional Council extended competences limited competences

Age *** 0.668 (0.182) ** -0.421 (0.124) 0.168 (0.115) -0.138 (0.391) Gender 0.375 (0.264) ** -0.368 (0.169) * 0.329 (0.163) * -1.095 (0.605) Education *** 0.712 (0.130) *** -0.247 (0.057) 0.025 (0.056) 0.128 (0.207) Place of birth * 0.511 (0.310) - 0.016 (0.200) -0.267 (0.194) 0.353 (0.622) National identity *** 0.863 (0.179) ** 0.255 (0.113) *** -0.587 (0.113) 0.107 (0.321) Language -0.135 (0.447) 0.434 (0.267) -0.314 (0.272) -0.689 (0.990) Attitude to -0.481 (0.350) 0.391 (0.278) 0.243 (0.263) ** -1.700 (0.566) devolution process Level of decision -0.293 (0.266) 0.141 (0.174) 0.040 (0.168) -0.507 (0.595) (language) Level of decision -0.186 (0.278) -0.018 (0.175) 0.151 (0.169) * -1.282 (0.715) (training) Voting -0.200 (0.165) 0.015 (0.094) 0.049 (0.091) 0.135 (0.294) Constant *** -9.225 (1.301) ** 0.227 (0.703) 1.084 (0.677) -2.592 (2.090) Log-likelihood 409.327 841.489 886.650 121.605 Predicted (%) 88.20 65.00 61.10 97.80 R2 Cox & Snell 0.118 0.072 0.063 0.030 · p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001

Table 14 Multinomial logistic regression – parameter (s.e.) Wales

Variables No elected assembly versus Assembly with limited powers Assembly with extended Independence versus Independence powers versus Independence

Age -0.302 (0.278) -0.038 (0.233) 0.093 (0.211) Gender -0.474 (0.393) 0.199 (0.336) 0.064 (0.304) Education 0.048 (0.136) 0.004 (0.115) 0.122 (0.103) Place of birth -0.501 (0.564) -0.078 (0.508) -0.188 (0.479) National identity *** -1.010 (0.234) *** -0.877 (0.193) ** -0.538 (0.175) Language -0.646 (0.518) -0.626 (0.404) 0.108 (0.332) Attitude to devolution *** -2.931 (0.494) -0.109 (0.450) 0.054 (0.423) process Level of decision ** -1.256 (0.453) -0.060 (0.398) -0.208 (0.364) (language) Level of decision * -0.850 (0.457) 0.084 (0.371) 0.328 (0.337) (training) Voting ** -0.457 (0.181) ** -0.436 (0.154) ** -0.287 (0.139) Constant *** 8.757 (1.091) *** 5.434 (0.965) 3.786 (0.895) R2 Cox & Snell 0.472 · p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001

Table 15 Multinomial logistic regression – parameter (s.e.) Brittany

Variables No Regional Council versus Regional Council with Regional Council with Independence limited competences versus extended competences versus Independence Independence

Age * -0.717 (0.426) ** -0.522 (0.189) *** -0.881 (0.200) Gender ** -1.381 (0.644) -0.165 (0.276) * -0.556 (0.284) Education ** -0.515 (0.246) *** -0.650 (0.134) *** -0.808 (0.135) Place of birth -0.049 (0.674) * -0.594 (0.325) -0.453 (0.334) National identity * -0.607 (0.365) *** -1.067 (0.190) ** -0.605 (0.194) Language -0.577 (1.064) -0.049 (0.475) 0.366 (0.467) Attitude to devolution * -1.239 (0.632) 0.555 (0.377) * 0.658 (0.394) process Level of decision -0.242 (0.637) 0.274 (0.278) 0.343 (0.287) (language) Level of decision -1.058 (0.756) 0.273 (0.289) 0.177 (0.298) (training) Voting 0.303 (0.327) 0.203 (0.171) 0.187 (0.175) Constant ** 5.729 (2.448) *** 8.593 (1.344) *** 8.178 (1.376) R2 Cox & Snell 0.199 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001

Table 16 Attitudes to the Welsh Language Attitudes to the Welsh and Breton Languages

Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Don’t Agree Disagree Know

The Welsh Language is an 37 47 13 2 1 important part of Welsh identity

We need to train more people 16 51 22 6 5 who speak Welsh to take up posts in the public sector

Certain jobs in Wales should be 7 39 39 12 3 reserved to bilingual speakers

8 16 48 21 7 There should be restrictions on in-migrants buying property in mainly Welsh-speaking areas

Table 17 Attitudes to the Breton Language

Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly Don’t Agree Disagree Know

The Breton Language is an 61 23 8 7 1 important part of Breton identity

We need to train more people 17 20 22 36 5 who speak Breton to take up posts in the public sector

Certain jobs in Brittany should 20 22 19 36 3 be reserved to bilingual speakers, that is, people able to speak French and Breton 30 37 12 16 5 Public grants should be given to Breton-language media 37 36 12 11 4 Public grants should be given to Breton associations

Table 18 Training Preferences in Brittany and Wales

Q. Subject Brittany (n.1008) Wales (n. 1007)

Q.13 Attended a Training No: 84 No: 73 course? Yes: 16 Yes: 27

Q.14a ‘Should firms directly No: 48 No: 46 manage their training Yes: 46 Yes:44 funds?

Q. 14b ‘Public funds to Yes: 60 Yes: 70 unemployed’ No: 36 No: 25

Q. 14c ‘ Public funds to Yes: 73 Yes: 60 poorest areas’ No: 23 No: 38

Q. 14d ‘ Public funds for Yes: 90 Yes: 93 everybody’ No: 8 No: 5

Q.15a Who should decide Firms: 39 Social partners: 46 training priorities Social partners: 25 Public Authorities: 33 Public Authorities: 25 Firms: 21 (don’t know:11)

Q.16 a Most effective · Apprenticeships · Apprenticeships measures for · More vocational · Higher education improving the training education · Individual of young people (in · Better careers services learning accounts order)? · Individual learning · More vocational accounts education · Higher education · Better careers services

q.17 A good training Lasts to a leading Lasts to a leading scheme is one which: qualification 62 qualification: 48. Secures employment: 31 Secures employment: Don’t know: 7 33 Don’t know: 19 q.18 Support for a training N/a Yes: 44 levy No: 45 q.19 Should firms be N/a Yes: 72 obliged to have No: 19 training plans?