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Nos. 18-575 and 18-581 In the Supreme Court of the United States YPF S.A., PETITIONER v. PETERSEN ENERGIA INVERSORA S.A.U., ET AL. ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, PETITIONER v. PETERSEN ENERGIA INVERSORA S.A.U., ET AL. ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE NOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General Counsel of Record JOSEPH H. HUNT Assistant Attorney General EDWIN S. KNEEDLER Deputy Solicitor General VIVEK SURI Assistant to the Solicitor General SHARON SWINGLE KATHERINE TWOMEY ALLEN Attorneys RICHARD C. VISEK Department of Justice Acting Legal Adviser Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 Department of State [email protected] Washington, D.C. 20520 (202) 514-2217 QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the court of appeals correctly held that the “commercial activity” exception to foreign sovereign immunity in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), applies to respondents’ claims. (I) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Interest of the United States....................................................... 1 Statement ...................................................................................... 1 Discussion ...................................................................................... 9 Conclusion ................................................................................... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018) .................................................. 14 de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ............................................................. 16, 17 Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2007) ......................................................................... 6 OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390 (2015) ...................................................................... 6, 9, 11, 12 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) .................................................................6, 7, 10, 11, 13 Rong v. Liaoning Province Gov’t, 452 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ....................................................... 14, 15, 16 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) ............................................................. 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993) ............................................................ 17 Statutes: Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602 et seq. .................................................. 1 28 U.S.C. 1603(a) ............................................................... 2 28 U.S.C. 1603(d) ......................................................... 2, 10 28 U.S.C. 1604 .................................................................... 2 (III) IV Statutes—Continued: Page 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2) ............................................. 2, 6, 9, 10 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3) ......................................................... 12 In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 18-575 YPF S.A., PETITIONER v. PETERSEN ENERGIA INVERSORA S.A.U., ET AL. No. 18-581 ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, PETITIONER v. PETERSEN ENERGIA INVERSORA S.A.U., ET AL. ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES This brief is submitted in response to the Court’s or- ders inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. In the view of the United States, the petitions for writs of certiorari should be denied. STATEMENT 1. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA or Act), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602 et seq., provides the sole basis for U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over civil lawsuits against foreign states and their agencies (1) 2 or instrumentalities. It provides that foreign states, agencies, and instrumentalities “shall be immune” from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, unless one of the stat- ute’s express exceptions to sovereign immunity applies. 28 U.S.C. 1604; see 28 U.S.C. 1603(a). This case involves the exception to sovereign immun- ity for commercial activity. The exception provides: (a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case— * * * (2) in which the action is based upon a com- mercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial ac- tivity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the for- eign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States. 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2). The Act defines “ ‘commercial activity’ ” to mean “ei- ther a regular course of commercial conduct or a partic- ular commercial transaction or act.” 28 U.S.C. 1603(d). It further provides that “[t]he commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the na- ture of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.” Ibid. 2. YPF S.A. is a petroleum company in Argentina. Argentina Pet. 2. Argentina owned and operated YPF 3 until 1993, when it privatized the company through an initial public offering. Pet. App. 3a.* In order to attract investors, YPF and Argentina (acting as the controlling shareholder) registered YPF’s Class D shares with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and listed them on the New York Stock Ex- change. Pet. App. 74a. YPF and Argentina also amended YPF’s bylaws to protect investors if Argentina renation- alized (or another shareholder took control of ) the com- pany. Id. at 4a. The amended bylaws provide that no person may become the holder of more than a specified percentage of YPF’s stock unless he makes a tender offer—an open invitation to all shareholders to buy their shares at a price calculated under a formula set out in the bylaws. Id. at 117a-126a. The amended bylaws fur- ther provide that this tender-offer requirement “shall apply to all acquisitions made by the National Govern- ment [of Argentina], whether directly or indirectly, by any means or instrument,” “if, as a consequence of such acquisition, the National Government becomes the owner, or exercises the control of, the shares of the Corpora- tion, which * * * represent, in the aggregate, at least 49% of the capital stock.” Id. at 159a. The bylaws spec- ify that shares acquired in violation of the tender-offer requirement “shall not grant any right to vote or collect dividends or other distributions.” Id. at 130a. They fur- ther specify that (subject to certain exceptions) these penalties apply to improper acquisitions by Argentina. Id. at 160a. Argentina and YPF advertised these protections in the prospectus for the initial public offering, stating: “Under the Company’s By-laws, in order to acquire a * Unless otherwise indicated, “Pet. App.” refers to the appendix to the petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 18-581. 4 majority of the Company’s capital stock or a majority of the Class D Shares, the Argentine Government first would be required to make a cash tender offer to all holders of Class D Shares on terms and conditions spec- ified in the By-laws.” Pet App. 85a-86a (emphasis omit- ted). Argentina and YPF also assured potential inves- tors in the prospectus that “[a]ny Control Acquisition carried out by the Argentine Government other than in accordance with th[at] procedure . will result in the suspension of the voting, dividend and other distribu- tion rights of the shares so acquired.” Id. at 86a (em- phasis omitted; brackets in original). The resulting initial public offering raised billions of dollars, including over $1.1 billion from the sale of shares on the New York Stock Exchange. Pet. App. 6a. Repsol S.A. emerged from the initial public offering as the ma- jority shareholder in YPF. Ibid. 3. In April 2012, Argentina announced that it was re- taking control of YPF. Pet. App. 10a. Argentina pro- posed legislation (the Expropriation Law) that would expropriate from Repsol 51% of the voting stock of YPF. Ibid. The National Executive Office of Argentina also issued an emergency decree under which an inter- venor was appointed to seize the company while the ex- propriation legislation made its way through the Argen- tine Congress. Ibid. Acting under the decree, officials took over YPF’s facilities, replaced YPF’s senior man- agement, and refused to make dividend payments. Ibid. In May 2012, the Argentine Congress enacted the Expropriation Law. Pet. App. 10a. The law provided: “[T]o ensure the fulfillment of the objectives of this law, the fifty-one percent (51%) equity interest in YPF So- ciedad Anónima represented by the same percentage of Class D shares of the said Company, held by Repsol 5 YPF S.A., its controlled or controlling entities, directly or indirectly, is hereby declared to be of public use and subject to expropriation.” Id. at 11a (citation omitted). Argentina expropriated shares from Repsol as provided by the law, eventually paying Repsol $4.8 billion in com- pensation. Ibid. In the meantime, Argentina refused to make a tender offer in accordance with YPF’s bylaws. Pet. App. 10a. One government minister described the tender-offer re- quirement as “unfair” and a “bear trap.” Ibid. (citation omitted). 4. In April 2015, respondents