NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS report: brazil government would not have done anything much different. The changes that Rousseff has made must be addressed It is not by chance that there is continuity between Lula’s in their own specific context. Rousseff has promised to build and Rousseff’s economic staff, now with even greater cohe­ 500 new urgent care facilities by 2014 and on March 28, sion, with the appointment of career economist Alexandre launched the Stork Network (Rede Cegonha), a new $5.7 Tombini to head the Central Bank. billion program to attend to new mothers and their babies. In the same way, Rousseff has maintained social poli­ These steps are clearly positive for public health, which is cies as central to the government’s fundamental pillar: de­ one of the country’s most serious social problems. Building velopment while combating social inequality. The Growth off of steps under the Lula government, the Rousseff admin­ Acceleration Program (PAC)—which invested over half a istration has prioritized the creation of a Truth Commission trillion dollars during Lula’s second term—is still protected (to investigate the cases of torture and disappearances under from budget adjustments, and still holds a leading role in the Brazilian dictatorship)—an important added initiative the government’s continued economic expansion and pov­ under the Department of Human Rights. The Institute for erty alleviation programs. The adjustments at the heart of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), charged with producing the Rousseff government have improved the harmony and accurate statistical data to improve public policy, has contin­ capacity to manage this key pillar, which will continue the ued its remarkable work. And the Rousseff government has achievements of the Lula government. tasked the Ministry of Communications with democratizing The Lula Government’s Foreign Policy: An Interview With Emir Sader This interview took place in Rio de Janeiro shortly after ticularly with the Portuguese- Dilma Rousseff took office on New Year’s Day. speaking countries, which were completely rejected in terms of What were the most noteworthy characteristics of the Lula foreign policy under Lula’s pre- government’s foreign policy? And how was it different from decessor, Fernando Henrique Lula’s predecessor? Cardoso (1995–2002). This allowed us to not only begin One of the first defining moments of the Lula government in to repay the historic debt our international policy was when it helped to block the offensive country has to Africa, but also Emir Sader of the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas establish tight connections of (FTAA), which would have established a hemisphere-wide economic exchange, sup- free trade zone modeled on NAFTA. Brazil and the United porting large projects in infrastructure and educational and States would have had a fundamental role in the final scientific cooperation, from a completely non-paternalistic phase of the implementation and formalization of the FTAA. perspective, and clearly in solidarity and brotherhood. Like- Nevertheless, the Lula government’s decision to prioritize the wise, in terms of international trade, China became Brazil’s regional processes of integration led Brazil to veto the FTAA, principal partner, with South America second and United opening the space for MERCOSUR to be revived from its States in third place. state of inactivity, and almost inexistence. In summary, during the Lula government there was a very In the same way, this strategic about-face of the new substantial change in foreign policy from that of his prede- Brazilian foreign policy allowed and promoted the emer- cessor. It was a very radical break that could also be seen gence of new forms of integration and regional cooperation, in the other areas of public policy carried out from 2003 to such as UNASUR, the Bank of the South, the South American 2010—changes that, without a doubt, will also underscore ITORIAL Defense Council and the South American Community of Na- the foreign policy style of the new president, Dilma Rousseff. ED tions. A strong association of diverse countries from across the Global South joined this alliance of Latin American What was the most significant change of the Lula adminis- nations, among whom, of course, the BRIC nations—Brazil, tration in terms of international geopolitics? Russia, India, and China—are an emblematic example. Under this framework also, without a doubt, the Lula gov- Brazil was always the privileged ally of the United States, ernment established a strong cooperation with Africa, par- whether it was during the Brazilian military dictatorship DIVULGAÇÃO BOITEMPO BOITEMPO DIVULGAÇÃO 32 MARCH/APRIL 2011 report: brazil Brazilian communications by prioritizing community media ment. In other words, to maintain the objectives set forth and more closely regulating television and radio waves. by the Lula government, broadening alliances and legiti­ The problems must be addressed within this context: mizing it politically and socially, extending the capacity for The Rousseff government’s continuity with the Lula gov­ dialogue and interaction with other social sectors—such as ernment. We can’t allow critics to isolate partial aspects of the middle class—as well as with the opposition. Herein the bigger picture or get carried away by simple journalis­ lies the essential art of constructing alternatives to neo­ tic motifs—which tend to use descriptive imagery to focus liberalism: to develop an alternative model, guaranteeing only on the appearances, without the capacity for profound the economic, social, political, and cultural conditions for political analysis. The problems are in the economic realm: it to be reproduced and consolidated. the difficulties of adjusting internal measures without The Rousseff government has inherited not just a coun­ jeopardizing the objectives of the central government, the try in much better shape than Lula did eight years ago, but obstacles to carrying out the PAC development projects— also a weakened, demoralized, and defeated right­wing— some of the most serious problems facing the government, both in its political sphere as well as in the media. That the nuances of international politics, and cultural policy. is the context in which the Rousseff government must be But the Rousseff government’s greatest achievement is assessed, as well as the progress it will make and the prob­ already its capacity to expand the potential of the govern­ lems it will face in the thousands of days to come. By Pablo Gentili (1964–85) or during the government of Cardoso. The Lula gov- are the clearest expression of the prominence that the ernment abandoned this inferior position, adopting a clearly emerging countries have achieved. multipolar direction in its foreign policy. The most concrete way of consolidating this new path was to try to intervene, Will there be changes in Brazilian foreign policy during in the most autonomous and active way, in the definition under the Rousseff government? of agreements or in the resolution of conflicts in which the North American government is involved and whose partici- It is my understanding that in general, there should be conti- pation has done nothing but intensify conflicts and multiply nuity. The new minister of foreign affairs, Antonio Patriota, is tensions. I think that without a doubt, the involvement of the closely connected to his predecessor, Celso Amorim, and he Brazilian government in looking to expand the parties in- will follow the fundamental policies that guided foreign policy volved in negotiations in the case of Palestine as well in Iraq under the Lula government. At the same time, another im- are eloquent signs of this significant change in foreign policy. portant person who helped to define the path that Brazil took In this same way, Brazil has proposed the real democrati- in this area, Marco Aurelio Garcia, will continue as special zation of the United Nations, particularly the increase of the adviser to Rousseff, as he was with Lula. number of permanent members on the Security Council. Brazil It is probable that the absence of Lula and Amorim, with all hasn’t only fought actively to occupy a permanent seat on of the international prominence that they had, will decrease this Council, but to make it more open and less immune to the the high profile of Brazilian foreign policy, as least in the arbitrary whims of the most powerful countries on the planet. beginning. Rousseff’s most characteristic and active themes of political involvement have been more economically and Is this a renewed version of the “third worldism” that grew socially oriented, in terms of strengthening and transforming out of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s and 1970s? the state. Perhaps foreign policy will lose a bit of the central role that it had during the Lula government, although it is still In a way, yes, but now there is a larger emphasis on the too early to know. What appears to be without a doubt is that recognition of the South, as a geopolitical reference that the general focus that guided the change and radicalization includes the emerging countries and, at the same time, of Brazilian foreign policy during the last eight years will although the references to imperialism have diminished, a continue and strengthen. counter-position to the arrogance and systematic violation of popular self-determination that orients the foreign policy Pablo Gentili is the director of the Brazilian section of the of the hegemonic nations. During the Lula government Brazil Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) at the has been a key actor in this change, and as I said, the BRICs State University of Rio de Janeiro. 33.