Strategic Survey for Israel 2012-2013 Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, Editors
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Strategic Survey for Israel 2012-2013 Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, Editors Strategic Survey for Israel 2012-2013 Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, Editors Institute for National Security Studies The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), incorporating the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, was founded in 2006. The purpose of the Institute for National Security Studies is, first, to conduct basic research that meets the highest academic standards on matters related to Israel’s national security as well as Middle East regional and international security affairs. Second, the Institute aims to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of issues that are – or should be – at the top of Israel’s national security agenda. INSS seeks to address Israeli decision makers and policymakers, the defense establishment, public opinion makers, the academic community in Israel and abroad, and the general public. INSS publishes research that it deems worthy of public attention, while it maintains a strict policy of non-partisanship. The opinions expressed in this publication are the authors’ alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, boards, research staff, or the organizations and individuals that support its research. Strategic Survey for Israel 2013-2012 Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom, Editors המכון למחקרי ביטחון לאומי THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURcITY STUDIES INCORPORATING THE JAFFEE bd CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES Graphic design: Michal Semo-Kovetz and Yael Bieber Cover design: Michal Semo-Kovetz Printing: Elinir Cover Photo: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the United Nations, September 27, 2012 Courtesy: Avi Ohayon, Government Press Office Institute for National Security Studies (a public benefit company) 40 Haim Levanon Street POB 39950 Ramat Aviv Tel Aviv 61398 Israel Tel. +972-3-640-0400 Fax. +972-3-744-7590 E-mail: [email protected] http:// www.inss.org.il © 2013 All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-965-7425-43-5 Contents Introduction 7 Part I: Regional Developments, Global Implications The United States in the Middle East: The Year in Review Oded Eran 19 Iran and the International Community, 2012: New Nuclear Game or More of the Same? Emily B. Landau and Shimon Stein 33 Toward a Nuclear Middle East? Yoel Guzansky and Gallia Lindenstrauss 53 Domestic Upheavals and Changes in the Regional Strategic Balance Mark A. Heller 69 The “Arab Spring” and External Military Intervention Shlomo Brom 87 Part II: Israel and the Middle East Israel and the Political Dead End: The Need for New Paradigms Anat Kurz and Udi Dekel 107 Jordanian Spring, Hashemite Winter: The Weakening of the Regime and the Implications for Israel Assaf David 131 The Future of the Peace between Israel and Egypt Ephraim Kam 151 The Crisis in Syria: Threats and Opportunities for Israel Eyal Zisser 167 The Arab Awakening and the Rise of Political Islam Benedetta Berti 187 Al-Qaeda and Global Jihad in Search of Direction Yoram Schweitzer 209 Part III: Israel: The Domestic Arena The Israeli Public Debate on Preventing a Nuclear Iran Yehuda Ben Meir 231 Defense Expenditure and Israel’s Social Challenges Shmuel Even 245 Conclusion Israel’s National Security Challenges 2012-2013: The Need for Proactive Policy Amos Yadlin 263 Contributors 283 Introduction Introduction Strategic Survey for Israel 2012-2013 is the latest volume in the series published annually by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). The articles compiled here examine various aspects of the leading security and policy issues on Israel’s national agenda, providing a comprehensive picture of the country’s strategic situation and the challenges the nation currently faces and may be expected to face in the foreseeable future. From Israel’s perspective, a net assessment of developments in the Middle East and on the international scene in 2012 presents a mixed balance. While some negative trends intensified, threatening forecasts did not materialize, and regional changes afford some opportunities for Israel to improve its strategic position. The most urgent challenge facing Israel is Iran’s standing at the forefront of the anti-Israel bloc in the Middle East while progressing toward military nuclear capability. Nuclear capability will endow Iran with greater influence in the Gulf, including over the energy resources in the region and perhaps also over regimes in the region. For now, Tehran is showing much resilience in the face of current international pressure, manifested by economic sanctions that are much harsher than those leveled in prior years. At the same time, its steady march toward military nuclear capability incurs the danger of a regional response with its own set of shockwaves, such as a decision by other nations to embark on the nuclear route. In the broader picture, the international helplessness vis-à- vis Iran attests to the international community’s limited ability to contain the dangers of escalation in the Middle East, and particularly to the United States’ declining ability to influence regional developments. The wave of sociopolitical tremors in the Middle East that began two years ago reflects the growing involvement by the civilian populations in 7 Introduction their respective national political theaters. The upheavals caused the fall of old dictatorships while threatening to undermine others, and brought radical Islamic powers to prominence. None of these factors created fundamentally new threats, but they have nevertheless sharpened the military challenges Israel faces in its immediate vicinity and therefore also the political challenges it tackles on the international arena, particularly an accelerated process of delegitimization. Direct pressure on Israel to launch concrete negotiations with the Palestinians has waned, but the relative diplomatic calm is only evidence of skepticism that such negotiations can lead to a negotiated settlement. This sense, as well as international criticism of Israel because of the role attributed to it for the political deadlock, facilitated the Palestinian Authority’s diplomatic accomplishment in the UN, which granted Palestine the status of non-member observer state. This implied the possibility that a Palestinian state could be established without Israeli agreement (and therefore on terms not compatible with Israel’s security guidelines); at the same time, Hamas continued to consolidate its rule in the Gaza Strip. This process solidified Hamas’ ability to generate a military confrontation with Israel and gain center stage on the Palestinian arena. The military and political challenges that Hamas poses to Israel are interwoven with Israel’s increasingly problematic relations with Egypt. While Egypt has not threatened to abrogate the peace treaty with Israel and is, like Israel, keenly interested in reining in Hamas’ power and influence in the Gaza Strip and reinstituting law and order in the Sinai Peninsula, Hamas has the ability to set off a round of fighting that could force Egypt to side with it and thereby chill relations between Cairo and Jerusalem even further. Concurrently, in Lebanon, Hizbollah’s military strength continues to grow. This trend, combined with the threat to Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria posed by a destructive civil war and the entrenchment of radical Islamic elements there, signals the potential formation of an active front on Israel’s northern border. Iraq too is a regional stronghold of radical Islamic forces. These circumstances, along with the potential continued weakening of the central government in Jordan due to expanding popular protests against the Hashemite royal household, present Israel with a significant 8 Introduction military and political challenge. While the overall evolving military threat is not conventional, the various sub-state factions involved, lacking inhibiting political restraints, could – separately or together – resort to use of the long range missiles at their disposal. Israel’s experience in asymmetrical conflicts and its efforts to establish deterrence vis-à-vis sub-state entities and push the fighting far from Israel’s population centers have at times cost the state on the international diplomatic arena because of the inevitable casualties to civilians on enemy territory during the fighting. The link between extreme Islamic factions and Iran, whether Sunni (such as Hamas) or Shiite (such as Hizbollah), only compounds the related challenges that Israel may have to face in the coming years. This mix of immediate and long term threats weakens the willingness of Israel’s public and its leadership to take security risks: easing the limitations on movement in and out of the Gaza Strip in order to mitigate international criticism, and territorial redeployment in the West Bank (i.e., a military withdrawal and evacuation of settlements) in order to demonstrate commitment to the two-state solution as the means to resolve the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. At the same time, the political deadlock reduces the chances – few to begin with – of including Israel in a regional front alongside Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt to support the efforts of the United States and the European Union to delay the nuclearization of Iran. Against the background of the challenges emerging from the regional turmoil and associated international developments, the critical political and military decisions Israel will have to take in the coming year assume greater weight given the implications for the country’s internal political arena. Thus – and as implied