DE NOVIS LIBRIS IUDICIA 229 distinguishing Macrobius' sources and in trying to establish his 'library'. Thus the curious doctrine of four rhetoric styles is not ascribed to the author himself but to 'une tradition heterodoxe' . There is, however, no reason to criticize F. for his extensive inquiries into the sources and books which were available to Macrobius. On the contrary, the results are a wellcome contribu- tion to our knowledge of the learning and the libraries of intellec- tuals in late antiquity. One final remark. Although the bibliography covers a period up to 1975-N. Marinone's fine Italian edition of the Saturnalia (Turin 1967, 19771) is an unexpected absentee-, note 69 on page 615 seems to imply that the manuscript was in fact finished in 1969. For the reviewer this is an added reason to apologize for the delay of this review.

LEIDERDORP, Van Effendreef 15 J. DEN BOEFT

J. M. RIST, HUMAN VALUE, A Study in Ancient Philosophical Ethics (Philosophia Antiqua, vol. XL) Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1982. 173 p. Pr. fl. 48.-.

Professor Rist's monograph discusses the value of man according to ancient Greek and Roman authorities. Three of the thirteen chapters are historical and deal with Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus respectively (chapters III, IV and VIII). The author links these three chapters and elaborates on the value of man with discussions on such topics as "The Gods", "Usefulness", "Freedom", "Divine Sparks" and "Claiming One's Rights". His main thesis is that classical antiquity as a whole had no theory on the equality of men nor on his value per se. Ancient philosophers never spoke of basic human rights. Man had no more value than things, and certain things, such as the stars and planets, were placed even higher than man. The Greeks did not receive their ideas of moral value from the gods. In Homer, for instance, the gods were not (or rarely) guided by moral considera- tions in their actions. In Plato's thought the gods are paradigms of virtue, but they do not for that reason evaluate and judge anything or anyone, and for Aristotle the gods are totally unconcerned with people. It is true that the Stoics tried to establish the role of the gods as beings attaching value to human morality; people are, in a sense, divine sparks, and therefore we may be worth something for our 230 actions and habits. Nevertheless, the Greek gods have no personal concern for the products of their creations. In Plato moral qualities of individuals can be measured, to some extent, by their contributions to society, yet these contributions do not determine their value. Not the individuality, but the goodness of a good man is the source from which his actions flow. The good state, in which the same goodness is manifest, has as one of its major objectives the providing of the opportunity for all citizens to care for their souls. Virtue can be taught according to Plato. Professor Rist discusses Plato's attitude toward slaves, non- Greeks, women, children, the lower classes, and criminals in order to delineate more clearly what is "good" and "virtuous". Vir- tuous, adult males are morally superior to all others, but all men should strive to have their souls approximate god in order to reach perfection. All along, however, Plato refuses to connect what is merely "human" with "what has value". Of course every man is human, but only if we cease to be godlike can we be said to lose our value. Likewise, the more the Form of Goodness characterizes us, the more we, men, will become similar to each other. There is no individual value and if we act justly, it is because we must, not because we see other human beings in need of help. For Aristotle human value depends on the nature of the human mind, but the best man is unconcerned with his fellows: goodness seems to have shed its ethical features and 'thinking of thinking' has lost its power to motivate social action. Freedom may be considered one of the criteria by which value can be measured. This freedom is a freedom 'from', an 'unrestraint'. The unfree are slaves and slaves are worthless, at least according to many Greeks. But the idea of the "divine sparks" makes things complex. If there are divine sparks in everybody, then everybody's value is the same because of that. But most Greek philosophers argue that one has the choice to activate those divine sparks or not. Just as actors in a play can choose to play badly, we can decide to act wrongly. Society can bestow value upon a man, but society is never the most important thing in life. It only offers people the opportunity for excellence. The state has never its meaning in itself and hardly any ancient philosopher holds the view that there are political reasons to justify behaviour which should be condemned if performed privately. Plotinus believes that man is created valuable (as a part of the One) and if he does not live up to himself, it is his own fault. So man has to claim his rights; otherwise