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Tilburg University Presupposition and anaphora Krahmer, E.J. Publication date: 1998 Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Krahmer, E. J. (1998). Presupposition and anaphora. (CSLI lecture note series; No. 89). CSLI. 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Download date: 25. sep. 2021 Presupposition and Anaphora Emiel Krahmer IPO, Center for Research on User-System Interaction CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AND INFORMATION Chapter 3 is based on Negation and Disjunction in Discourse Repres- entation Theory, Emiel Krahmer and Reinhard Muskens, Journal of Semantics 12 (4), 357–376. Copyright !c Oxford University Press 1995. Used here by kind permission. voor Daan en Bas Contents Acknowledgements xi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Background 1 1.1.1 Anaphora 1 1.1.2 Presupposition 3 1.1.3 Anaphora and Presupposition 13 1.2 About this Book 19 1.2.1 Anaphora 19 1.2.2 Presupposition 20 1.2.3 Anaphora and Presupposition 22 1.3 Overview 24 2 Anaphora and Discourse Semantics 27 2.1 Introduction 27 2.2 Representational Theories of Discourse 30 2.2.1 File Change Semantics 30 2.2.2 Discourse Representation Theory 35 2.2.3 From fcs to drt 42 2.2.4 drt Interpretation Using Total Assignments 43 2.2.5 From drt to Predicate Logic 44 2.3 Non-representational Theories of Discourse 46 2.3.1 Quantificational Dynamic Logic 46 2.3.2 Dynamic Predicate Logic 49 2.3.3 A Dynamic Version of Montague Grammar 52 2.4 Discussion: The Quest for the Theory of Discourse 58 2.4.1 The Dynamic Cube 58 2.4.2 Extensions and Modifications 61 3 Negation and Disjunction in drt 65 3.1 Introduction 65 vii viii / Contents 3.2 Two Problems for drt, and a Reduction 65 3.2.1 The Double Negation Problem 65 3.2.2 The Disjunction Problem 68 3.3 Double Negation drt 74 3.4 Applications 76 3.5 The Relation with Standard drt 80 3.6 Discussion: Uniqueness, Inference 83 4 Presupposition and Partiality 87 4.1 Introduction 87 4.2 Partial Predicate Logic 94 4.2.1 Strong Kleene ppl 95 4.2.2 Middle Kleene ppl 98 4.2.3 Weak Kleene ppl 100 4.3 Presuppositions and ppl 100 4.3.1 Determining Presuppositions 101 4.3.2 Predictions 103 4.4 Flexibility: The Floating A Theory 110 4.5 Discussion 118 4.5.1 Karttunen and Peters Revisited 118 4.5.2 A Note on the Logic of Conventional Implicature 119 Appendix 122 5 Presupposition and Montague Grammar 125 5.1 Introduction 125 5.2 Partial Type Theory 127 5.3 Presuppositional Montague Grammar 130 5.4 Discussion: Extending the Fragment 137 5.4.1 Additional Presuppositions 137 5.4.2 Note 140 5.4.3 Dynamifying Presuppositional Montague Grammar 141 5.4.4 Implicatures and Dynamics 143 Appendix: The Fragment 144 6 Presupposition and Discourse Semantics 149 6.1 Introduction 149 6.2 Presuppositions-as-Anaphors 151 6.2.1 Resolving Presuppositions 152 6.2.2 What is a Presuppositional drs? 156 6.2.3 Procedural vs. Declarative 156 6.2.4 Accommodating Failing Presuppositions 157 Contents / ix 6.2.5 Disjunctions 159 6.2.6 Presupposition-Quantification Interaction 161 6.3 Presuppositional drt 162 6.4 Applications 167 6.5 Determining Semantic Presuppositions 171 6.6 Again: Presuppositions-as-Anaphors 176 6.7 Discussion: Comparing the Two Approaches 180 6.7.1 Does Binding Preserve Meaning? 181 6.7.2 Does Accommodation Preserve Meaning? 183 6.7.3 An Alternative Interpretation 184 6.7.4 Presupposition Projection as Proof Construction 187 Appendix 190 7 Presupposition and Determinedness 193 7.1 Introduction 193 7.2 Is Determinedness Uniqueness? 200 7.2.1 Restricting the Uniqueness Prediction 201 7.3 Is Determinedness Anaphoricity? 202 7.3.1 Accommodating Missing Antecedents 204 7.4 Determinedness is Familiarity 205 7.5 Determinedness is Salience 210 7.6 Discussion: Extending the Analysis 216 7.6.1 Dependencies and Non-identity Anaphora 217 7.6.2 Definites and Salience 220 7.6.3 Surroundings: The Dynamics of Pointing 221 8 Concluding Remarks 225 8.1 Summary 226 8.1.1 Anaphora 226 8.1.2 Presupposition 227 8.1.3 Anaphora and Presupposition 230 8.2 Discussion: Rounding Off233 Bibliography 235 Subject Index 249 Name Index 253 Acknowledgements This book was written in two phases. The first phase started in the summer of 1994 and ended in the summer of 1995 when I submitted the fruits of my labour as a doctoral dissertation entitled Discourse and Presupposition. The second phase started in the summer of 1997 and ended in the early spring of 1998 with the book you are now holding. The foundation was laid during the time (1991–1995) I was a Ph.D. student at the Computational Linguistics Department of the University of Tilburg, with Harry Bunt and Reinhard Muskens as supervisors. As my daily supervisor in this period, Reinhard made innumerable valuable suggestions which greatly have helped shape the contents of this book. The second phase took place at ipo, Center for Research on User-System Interaction at the Eindhoven University of Technology. It was initiated by Kees van Deemter, who suggested I should write an updated version of the aforementioned doctoral dissertation. The stimulating discussions we had actually made me feel like doing just that, and I have greatly benefitted from Kees’ accurate criticism. One of the things I have learned in the past years is that doing research is even more fun if you do it together. Therefore I consider myself lucky for having had the opportunity of collaborating with, in more or less chronological order, Reinhard Muskens, David Beaver, Jan Jaspars, Kees van Deemter and Paul Piwek, and I thank each of my confr`eres for the highly pleasurable and educational experience. The reader will encounter some of the results of some of the cooperations in the pages to follow. In particular, sections 4.4 and 4.5.2 are based on joined work with David Beaver, while chapter 3 is an updated version of an article written in tandem with Reinhard Muskens. I should add that none of my collaborators necessarily agrees with my view of things in this book. Furthermore, I am grateful to those who made useful comments on xi xii / Presupposition and Anaphora drafts of various chapters: David Beaver, Paul Dekker, Bart Geurts, Hans Kamp, Jan Landsbergen, Leo Noordman, Paul Piwek, Gerrit Ren- tier, Elias Thijsse, Rob van der Sandt, Jan van Eijck, Robert van Rooij and Kees Vermeulen. Special thanks to David for setting me on the track for chapter 5. Over the past years a great number of colleagues and friends have made comments and suggestions which somehow found their way into these pages. To all those —mentioned and unmentioned— I want to say, paraphrasing Sam & Dave just a little bit: You didn’t have to help me like you did but you did but you did and I thank you! Let me end on a more personal note. Without the support and trust of Annemarie it would have been a lot more difficult to finish the two versions of this work. By a fortunate coincidence, the inceptions of the two phases of writing this book were marked by the respective births of our first and second son. This made the years of writing very pleasant and it is only fitting then, that this book is dedicated to the two of them. March 1998 Eindhoven 1 Introduction 1.1 Background 1.1.1 Anaphora For a long time the study of meaning has been concerned with single sentences. However, sentences seldom come in isolation. For one thing, they tend to be sandwiched in between other sentences, thus forming a text, or discourse. In the early eighties the question arose how to determine the meaning of a discourse and, somewhat surprisingly, it turned out that this is not an easy question to answer. By and large, one could say that the main problem is not so much that sentences never come in isolation, but that sequences of sentences are sequences of sentences for an interesting reason: they are ‘connected’, as it were, for instance, by cross-sentential anaphors. Consider the following sentence. (1) She kissed it. We could say that the meaning of (1) is that some female person happened to kiss something, but then we would be missing the point. Sentence (1) may be preceded by (2) or (3) —to give but two possibilities— and the meaning is rather different in each case. (2) Louis XIV solemnly offered his hand to a new chambermaid. (3) Yesterday, a beautiful princess saw a regal green frog near the creek. Sentences like (1) cannot be interpreted correctly without taking the context into account. Problems such as these led Karttunen to the introduction of discourse referents.