Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics

The internet is now a mainstay of contemporary political life, and captivates researchers from across the social sciences. From debates about its impact on parties and election campaigns following momentous presidential contests in the United States, to concerns over international security, privacy, and surveillance in the post-9/11, post-7/7 environment; from the rise of blogging as a threat to the traditional model of journalism, to controversies at the international level over how and if the internet should be governed by an entity such as the United Nations; from the new repertoires of collective action open to citizens, to the massive programs of public management reform taking place in the name of e-government, internet politics, and policy are continually in the headlines. The Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics is a collection of over 30 chapters dealing with the most significant scholarly debates in this rapidly growing field of study. Organized in four broad sections: Institutions, Behavior, Identities, and Law and policy, the Hand- book summarizes and criticizes contemporary debates while pointing out new departures. A comprehensive set of resources, it provides linkages to established theories of media and politics, political communication, governance, deliberative democracy, and social movements, all within an interdisciplinary context. The contributors form a strong international cast of established and junior scholars. This is the first publication of its kind in this field; a helpful companion to students and scholars of politics, international relations, communication studies, and sociology.

Andrew Chadwick is Professor of Political Science and Founding Director of the New Political Communication Unit at Royal Holloway, University of London. He is the author of Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication Technologies (Oxford University Press), which won the American Sociological Association Communication and Information Technologies Section Outstanding Book Award.

Philip N. Howard is Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Washington, and directs the World Information Access Project (www. wiareport.org). He is the author of New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen (Cambridge University Press), which won book awards from the American Sociological Association and the International Communication Association.

Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics

Edited by Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard First published 2009 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2009 Editorial selection and matter, Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard; individual chapters the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Routledge handbook of Internet politics / edited by Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Internet– Political aspects. 2. Political participation– computer network resources. 3. Communication in politics– computer network resources. I. Chadwick, Andrew. II. Howard, Philip N. III.Handbook Title: of Internet Politics. IV. Title:Internet Politics. HM851.R6795 2008 320.0285'4678 – dc22 2008003045

ISBN 0-203-96254-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 978-0-415-42914-6 (hbk) ISBN 978-0-203-96254-1 (ebk) Contents

List of ﬁgures ix List of tables x List of contributors xii Acknowledgments xvi

1 Introduction: new directions in internet politics research 1 Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard

Part I: Institutions 11

2 The internet in U.S. election campaigns 13 Richard Davis, Jody C Baumgartner, Peter L. Francia, and Jonathan S. Morris

3 European political organizations and the internet: mobilization, participation, and change 25 Stephen Ward and Rachel Gibson

4 Electoral web production practices in cross-national perspective: the relative inﬂuence of national development, political culture, and web genre 40 Kirsten A. Foot, Michael Xenos, Steven M. Schneider, Randolph Kluver, and Nicholas W. Jankowski

5 Parties, election campaigning, and the internet: toward a comparative institutional approach 56 Nick Anstead and Andrew Chadwick

6 Technological change and the shifting nature of political organization 72 Bruce Bimber, Cynthia Stohl, and Andrew J. Flanagin

v CONTENTS

7 Making parliamentary democracy visible: speaking to, with, and for the public in the age of interactive technology 86 Stephen Coleman

8 Bureaucratic reform and e-government in the United States: an institutional perspective 99 Jane E. Fountain

9 Public management change and e-government: the emergence of digital-era governance 114 Helen Margetts

Part 2: Behavior 129

10 Wired to fact: the role of the internet in identifying deception during the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign 131 Bruce W. Hardy, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, and Kenneth Winneg

11 Political engagement online: do the information rich get richer and the like-minded more similar? 144 Jennifer Brundidge and Ronald E. Rice

12 Information, the internet and direct democracy 157 Justin Reedy and Chris Wells

13 Toward digital citizenship: addressing inequality in the information age 173 Karen Mossberger

14 Online news creation and consumption: implications for modern democracies 186 David Tewksbury and Jason Rittenberg

15 Web 2.0 and the transformation of news and journalism 201 James Stanyer

Part 3: Identities 215

16 The internet and the changing global media environment 217 Brian McNair

17 The virtual sphere 2.0: the internet, the public sphere, and beyond 230 Zizi Papacharissi

vi CONTENTS

18 Identity, technology, and narratives: transnational activism and social networks 246 W. Lance Bennett and Amoshaun Toft

19 Theorizing gender and the internet: past, present, and future 261 Niels van Doorn and Liesbet van Zoonen

20 New immigrants, the internet, and civic society 275 Yong-Chan Kim and Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach

21 One Europe, digitally divided 288 Jan A. G. M. van Dijk

22 Working around the state: internet use and political identity in the Arab world 305 Deborah L. Wheeler

Part 4: Law and policy 321

23 The geopolitics of internet control: censorship, sovereignty, and cyberspace 323 Ronald J. Deibert

24 Locational surveillance: embracing the patterns of our lives 337 David J. Phillips

25 Metaphoric reinforcement of the virtual fence: factors shaping the political economy of property in cyberspace 349 Oscar H. Gandy, Jr. and Kenneth Neil Farrall

26 Globalizing the logic of openness: open source software and the global governance of intellectual property 364 Christopher May

27 Exclusionary rules? The politics of protocols 376 Greg Elmer

28 The new politics of the internet: multi-stakeholder policy-making and the internet technocracy 384 William H. Dutton and Malcolm Peltu

29 Enabling eﬀective multi-stakeholder participation in global internet governance through accessible cyber-infrastructure 401 Derrick L. Cogburn

vii CONTENTS

30 Internet diﬀusion and the digital divide: the role of policy-making and political institutions 415 Kenneth S. Rogerson and Daniel Milton

31 Conclusion: political omnivores and wired states 424 Philip N. Howard and Andrew Chadwick

Bibliography 435 Index 487

viii Figures

1.1 Published scholarly articles on political communication, 1995–2006 2 6.1 Collective action space 82 12.1 Referendum knowledge among internet users and non-users, Washington State, 2006 164 12.2 Referendum knowledge among regular and intermittent internet users, Washington State, 2006 164 13.1 Percentage of United States citizens who read about politics online 176 20.1 Four ideal types of new immigrant internet use 278 21.1 A cumulative and recursive model of digital technologies access 290 21.2 Personal computers, internet access, and broadband speed in the European Union, by region, 2006 292–5 23.1 Content ﬁltering by major category 328

ix Tables

4.1 Political content online and development measures for 19 countries with elections in 2004 47 4.2 Explaining web production practices: development, political culture, and producer types 52 10.1 Correct assessment of campaign claims during 2004 presidential election in the United States, by respondents and internet users 139 10.2 Regression models predicting the belief that presidential candidates always lie, that respondents accessed the internet for campaign information, and the correct assessment of campaign claims 141 11.1 Descriptive statistics for the variables of a model explaining political discussion network heterogeneity 153 11.2 Hierarchical multiple regression explaining political discussion network heterogeneity 153 12.1 Linear regression models predicting referendum and political endorsement knowledge in Washington State, 2006 165 12.2 Linear regression models predicting use of the internet for information about ballot measures or initiatives, United States, 2004 166 12.3 Linear regression models predicting referendum knowledge and argument repertoire in Europe, 2004 168 15.1 Regular news consumption in the United States by outlet, 1993–2006 202 15.2 The ten most popular news websites in the United States, 2004–6 206 15.3 Ownership of the top 25 most popular news websites in the United States by size of media corporation 2003–6 208 21.1 Computer and internet non-use, and skills among selected demographics in 25 EU countries, 2005 296 21.2 Internet activities of Europeans, by age and education subgroups, 2005 298 22.1 Internet connectivity and growth in the Arab world, 2000–7 307 x TABLES

22.2 Information access, income, literacy, and freedom in the Arab world 308 22.3 Examples of attempts by authoritarian regimes to discourage cyber-dissidence 319 23.1 Percent of tested websites blocked in 21 countries, by type of local and global content, 2006 330 23.2 Centralized, decentralized, concealed, transparency and consistency of website ﬁltering in 22 countries, 2006 332 28.1 Participants at the WSIS phases in Geneva and Tunis 388 28.2 Internet governance: comparison of traditional and WSIS processes 391 28.3 Selected games shaping internet governance for development 396 30.1 Internet diﬀusion trends 417 31.1 The internet and omnivorous information habits during elections in the United States, 1996–2006 430 31.2 Wired political parties and governments around the world 433

xi Contributors

Nick Anstead is a doctoral candidate in the New Political Communication Unit in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, U.K.

Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach is a Professor of Communication and Sociology at the University of Southern California, U.S.A., and Principal Investigator of The Metamorphosis Project.

Jody C Baumgartner is an Assistant Professor of political science at East Carolina University, Greenville, U.S.A.

W. Lance Bennett is Professor of Political Science and Ruddick C. Lawrence Professor of Communication at the University of Washington, Seattle, U.S.A., where he also directs the Center for Communication and Civic Engagement.

Bruce Bimber is Professor of Political Science and Communication at the University of California, Santa Barbara, U.S.A.

Jennifer Brundidge is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Communication at the University of California, Santa Barbara, U.S.A.

Andrew Chadwick is Professor of Political Science and International Relations (2006–9) and Founding Director of the New Political Communication Unit at Royal Holloway, University of London, U.K.

Derrick L. Cogburn is an Assistant Professor of Information and Director of the Center for Research on Collaboratories and Technology Enhanced Learning Communities in the School of Information Studies, Syracuse University, U.S.A.

Stephen Coleman is Professor of Political Communication and Co-Director of the Centre for Digital Citizenship at the Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, U.K. xii CONTRIBUTORS

Richard Davis is Professor of Political Science at Brigham Young University, Salt Lake City, U.S.A.

Ronald J. Deibert is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, Canada.

William H. Dutton is Professor of Internet Studies at the University of Oxford, U.K., where he is Director of the Oxford Internet Institute and a Fellow of Balliol College.

Greg Elmer is Bell Globemedia Research Chair and Director of the Infoscape Research Lab, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada.

Kenneth Neil Farrall is a doctoral candidate at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, U.S.A.

Andrew J. Flanagin is an Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of California, Santa Barbara, U.S.A.

Kirsten A. Foot is an Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Washington, Seattle, U.S.A.

Jane E. Fountain is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Director of the National Center for Digital Government at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, U.S.A.

Peter L. Francia is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at East Carolina University, Greenville, U.S.A.

Oscar H. Gandy, Jr. is Emeritus Professor of Communication at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, U.S.A.

Rachel Gibson is Professor of Political Science at the Institute for Social Change, University of Manchester, U.K.

Kathleen Hall Jamieson is the Elizabeth Ware Packard Professor of Communication at the Annenberg School for Communication and Walter and Leonore Annenberg Director of the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, U.S.A.

Bruce W. Hardy is a doctoral candidate at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, U.S.A.

Philip N. Howard is Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Washington, Seattle, U.S.A.

Nicholas W. Jankowski is a Visiting Fellow, Virtual Knowledge Studio for the Humanities and Social Sciences, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

xiii CONTRIBUTORS

Yong-Chan Kim is an Assistant Professor of Health Communication in the Department of Community and Behavioral Health at the College of Public Health, University of Iowa, Iowa City, U.S.A.

Randolph Kluver is Director of the Institute for Paciﬁc Asia and Research Professor of Communication at Texas A&M University, College Station, U.S.A.

Brian McNair is Professor of Journalism and Communication at the University of Strathclyde, U.K.

Helen Margetts is Professor of Society and the Internet at the Oxford Internet Institute and Professorial Fellow at Mansﬁeld College, both at the University of Oxford, U.K.

Christopher May is Professor of Political Economy and Head of the Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University, U.K.

Daniel Milton is a doctoral candidate at the Florida State University in Tallahassee, U.S.A.

Jonathan S. Morris is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at East Carolina University, Greenville, U.S.A.

Karen Mossberger is an Associate Professor in the Graduate Program in Public Administration, University of Illinois, Chicago, U.S.A.

Zizi Papacharissi is an Associate Professor and Chair in the Department of Communications at the University of Illinois, Chicago, U.S.A.

Malcolm Peltu is an Editorial Consultant to the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, U.K.

David J. Phillips is an Associate Professor of Information Studies at the University of Toronto, Canada.

Justin Reedy is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Communication at the University of Washington, Seattle, U.S.A.

Ronald E. Rice is the Arthur N. Rupe Professor of Communication and Co-Director of the Carsey-Wolf Center for Film, Television and New Media at University of California-Santa Barbara, U.S.A.

Jason Rittenberg is a doctoral candidate in Speech Communication at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, U.S.A.

Kenneth S. Rogerson is Lecturer in Public Policy Studies at the Sanford Institute of Public Policy at Duke University, U.S.A.

Steven M. Schneider is Professor of Political Science and Interim Dean of the School of Arts & Sciences at the SUNY Institute of Technology, U.S.A. xiv CONTRIBUTORS

James Stanyer is Lecturer in Communication and Media Studies at Loughborough University, U.K.

Cynthia Stohl is Professor of Communication at the University of California, Santa Barbara, U.S.A.

David Tewksbury is an Associate Professor of Speech Communication at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, U.S.A.

Amoshaun Toft is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Communication at the University of Washington, Seattle, U.S.A.

Jan A. G. M. van Dijk is Professor of Communication Science at the University of Twente, The Netherlands.

Niels van Doorn is a doctoral candidate at the Amsterdam School of Communications Research and Junior Lecturer at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Liesbet van Zoonen is Professor of Media and Popular Culture at the Universities of Amsterdam and Oslo.

Stephen Ward is a Senior Lecturer in Politics, European Studies Research Institute, University of Salford, U.K.

Chris Wells is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Communication at the University of Washington, Seattle, U.S.A.

Deborah L. Wheeler is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, U.S.A.

Kenneth Winneg is Managing Director of the National Annenberg Election Survey, a project of the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

Michael Xenos is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication Arts at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, U.S.A.

xv Acknowledgments

A handbook is impossible without the generosity and cooperation of its authors. We would like to thank all of the contributors for delivering their chapters and for responding so positively to our editorial recommendations. Thanks also to Craig Fowlie, commission- ing editor at Routledge, as well as Natalja Mortensen and all of the publishing staﬀ who worked hard to make this book happen. Our home departments at Royal Holloway, University of London and the University of Washington have been generous in providing the time and space required to complete this project. The Whitely Center at the University of Washington’s Friday Harbor Labs provided a quiet intellectual home for Howard to work, while the New Political Communication Unit at Royal Holloway provided Chadwick with a stimulating scholarly context. Nick Anstead at Royal Holloway and Justin Reedy and Chris Wells at the University of Washington gave substantive feedback on over half of the contributions to this collection. Several anonymous external reviewers read chapters in draft form and gave useful commentary, often at very short notice, for which we are very grateful. Special gratitude must go to Nick Anstead, who provided crucial editorial assistance during the closing stages. Lee Rainie at the Pew Internet and American Life Project has been a generous scholar, sharing data for the varied interests of several handbook contributors. The contributors to this collection have used data sets from many research projects, including Pew, but these projects bear no responsibility for the interpretations or conclusions made by contributors. Last but by no means least, we would like to express immense gratitude to our wives, Sam Turner and Gina Neﬀ, for their invaluable support, patience and tolerance of the occasionally crazy working schedules of two editors divided by eight time zones.

xvi 1 Introduction New directions in internet politics research

Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard

The politics of the internet has entered problems or reinforces old ones. The the social science mainstream. From volume is pluralistic in content but coher- debates about its impact on parties and ent in its thematic structure. Chapters are election campaigns following momentous organized in four broad parts: Institutions, presidential contests in the United States, Behavior, Identities, and Law and Policy. to concerns over international security, This is the first publication of its kind to privacy and surveillance in the post-9/11, focus on the politics of (and on) the post-7/7 environment; from the rise of internet. blogging as a threat to the traditional A handbook provides an excellent model of journalism, to controversies at means of summarizing and criticizing the international level over how and if contemporary debates but it should also the internet should be governed by an point out new departures from the estab- entity such as the United Nations; from lished literature. First, this collection pro- the new repertoires of collective action vides a thematically organized overview open to citizens, to the massive programs of as many important areas of internet of public management reform taking politics and policy as possible. Second, it place in the name of e-government, presents readers with a survey of the state internet politics and policy are continually of the art in this field. Third, it functions in the headlines. Welcome to the Handbook as a means of punctuating the field’s of Internet Politics: a collection of 31 chapters development—a chance to take stock and dealing with the most significant scholarly reflect on developments to date and debates in this rapidly growing field of future challenges for research. Fourth, it study. provides linkages to established theories of media and politics, political communication, governance, deliberative democracy About this book and social movements, all within a context that is both interdisciplinary and This volume is concerned with the con- focused on political phenomena. Finally, temporary expression of voice and citi- the contributors form a strong interna- zenship, political institutions and practices, tional cast and a mix of established and and how the internet creates new policy junior scholars.

1 ANDREW CHADWICK AND PHILIP N. HOWARD

The process of producing the book was existing literature in their chosen area but designed to foster a blend of editorial gui- also to advance their own arguments and dance and author autonomy. As editors, analyses. An ideal handbook will push we first defined the broad contours of the ahead with distinctive, original arguments areas to be covered. We then approached and the discovery and manipulation of new authors for submissions. Once the final list data. In such a fast-moving area, it is of contributors had been established, we essential to provide readers with a scholarly proceeded through a four-stage review context but also a sense of how develop- process. Authors were invited to submit ments are unfolding and undermining abstracts, and these were the subject of received wisdom. Indeed, there is very editorial feedback and suggestions. Next, little received wisdom in this field, and first drafts were submitted. These received this is arguably what makes it so exciting. detailed editorial commentary, not only involving us as editors but also colleagues in our respective departments at Royal The growth of a field of study Holloway, University of London, and the University of Washington. Following this, Over the last decade or so, scholarly authors submitted complete drafts. A final analyses of the relationship between the editorial exercise shortly before comple- internet and politics have grown at a tion of the whole manuscript led to fur- remarkable rate. Figure 1.1 shows the ther alterations in the case of some of the results of a simple Boolean search against chapters. text contained in titles, abstracts or Our approach throughout has been to indexing keywords in the world’s most encourage authors to reflect upon the important scholarly article database—the

Figure 1.1 Published scholarly articles on political communication, 1995–2006. Source: Authors’ calculations from Boolean searches of article title, abstract and keywords: TS = (Internet OR web) AND TS = (politic* OR govern*); TS = (television OR newspaper* OR radio) AND TS = (politic* OR govern*); TS = (television) AND TS = (politic* OR govern*) in ISI Web of Science scholarly article database 1995–2006, November 8, 2007.

2 INTRODUCTION

ISI web of science index. The chart report television as the most popular shows the number of articles whose sub- political medium, but it is not the most ject matter is the internet or web and popular medium of study for scholars. politic* or govern*. For comparison, This is, of course, only a rough-and- results are also shown for the number of ready analysis. But overall, the message articles on television or newspapers or for those working in this field is clear: radio and politic* or govern*, and for you are part of a rapidly expanding area television and politic* or govern*. The of scholarly endeavor, in absolute and truncated words politic* and govern* are relative terms. used to capture the range of words that have these as their root, such as politics, political, government, governance, and so on. New directions in internet The first point here is that these are the politics research results of tightly controlled searches against a highly specialized database of Despite this huge growth in scholarship, published articles in mainstream academic when the internet first emerged as a journals. Leaving aside the fact that many popular communication medium (in the journals are not covered by the ISI, the developed world) few seemed to take it index also does not include the thousands seriously. It was often dismissed as a pas- of books, book chapters, reports, working sing fad, a minority pursuit too dependent papers, and conference presentations that upon specialist forms of technical knowl- have been produced in this area over the edge, of far less importance than television last decade. Similarly explosive growth and the press, or a simple manifestation of can be seen in searches of the press and irrational exuberance in the financial periodicals database LexisNexis, as well as markets. Many commentators were intri- open search engine results, but these are gued by the new medium’s capacity for not reported here because we cannot self-expression and its potential for dis- control for companies’ decisions to change rupting social, political, and economic their indexing coverage. relations, but there was a palpable “let’s The second point about Figure 1.1 wait and see” quality to the academic relates to the comparator of new informa- discourse of the mid-1990s. Some scholars tion and communications media: broadcast dismissed this domain of research as see- media and the press. While scholarship in mingly without effect on the traditional these fields is vibrant, the rate of overall evidence of political science such as cam- growth has been substantially slower than paign spending, voter turnout, and public for the internet. The number of articles opinion formation. on the internet and politics exceeded But over the course of a decade, this those on broadcasting, the press, and pol- context has arguably changed, as appre- itics for the first time in 2000. By 2006, ciation has grown of deeply rooted changes the overall difference was substantial and in social, economic, cultural, and political continues to grow. The middle line life in the advanced democracies. Many of represents article counts for three different these changes are now rippling out to the media (television, newspapers, and radio) less wealthy regions of the globe, albeit in combined. Focusing on television alone, highly uneven patterns. the contrast is even greater. In 2006, 113 In the developed countries, particularly articles dealt with television and politics, the Anglo-American world, important while 424 were concerned with the subterranean shifts occurred as the internet internet and politics. Opinion surveys still continued to diffuse at a remarkable rate

3 ANDREW CHADWICK AND PHILIP N. HOWARD in the early 2000s. People started to con- O’Reilly is regarded as the first to duct important aspects of their lives publicly coin the term Web 2.0 in 2003. online, as internet shopping, social sup- This primarily technology-focused approach port networks, and public services began defines it in terms of seven key principles to proliferate. All of this was underpinned or themes. Some of these are more rele- by a reduction in the costs of computers vant to internet politics than others, and and other networked devices and an some require extra theoretical work to increase in the capacity of broadband tel- render them amenable to social science ecommunications. investigation. Nevertheless, the seven prin- The first inkling that the political role ciples are: the internet as a platform for of the internet had been underestimated political discourse; the collective intelli- came in late 2002 and early 2003. This gence emergent from political web use; the awareness was not caused by but coin- importance of data over particular soft- cided with the increasing frequency of the ware and hardware applications; perpetual word blog, both online and in the tradi- experimentalism in the public domain; tional media. While the roots of the blog the creation of small-scale forms of poli- format date back to Dave Winer’s Radio tical engagement through consumerism; UserLand self-publishing platform laun- the propagation of political content over ched in 1997, it was not until 2002 that multiple applications; and rich user experi- blogging started to grow under the influences on political websites.1 How might ence of new platforms such as WordPress these principles work as a means—both and Moveable Type. literal and metaphorical—of sketching out The spectacular growth of blogging a first take on new directions in the realm and its associated offshoots soon led to the of internet politics research? invention of another term: Web 2.0. First, the internet as a platform for Looking back over the last five years it political discourse. In essence, this theme seems clear that there have been sig- relates to the idea that the web has moved nificant shifts in political uses of the from the older model of static pages internet. Some may recoil at the adoption toward a means of enabling a wide range of a term conceived by the entrepreneur- of goals to be achieved through net- ial and technology community of Silicon worked software services. The archetypal Valley, but even if they do not con- Web 2.0 web-as-platform service is of sciously use the label, there is little doubt course Google, whose value depends in the minds of the majority of con- almost entirely on its ability to create tributors to this volume that Web 2.0 wealth from the interface of its distributed does have substantive meaning and serves advertising network, its search algorithm, as a useful term for a number of sig- and its huge database of crawled pages. nificant developments. Two key features of this aspect of Web 2.0 are particularly salient: first, the power of easily scalable networks and second, Politics: Web 2.0 the “long tail.” Easily scalable networking involves an organization being able to Space limits preclude a full discussion of flexibly adapt to sudden growth surges Web 2.0 here, but this section highlights and ad hoc events that increase demand for its central features by building upon Tim its services. O’Reilly’s (2005) seminal approach. For The theory of the long tail (Anderson, good or ill, this is arguably the most 2006) is that online commerce and dis- influential discussion of the term to date. tribution is changing the economics of

4 INTRODUCTION content creation and distribution. Tradi- contributors, the majority of them ama- tionally, movie studios, publishers, and teurs, can, using simple tools, produce record companies tend to try to create information goods that may outperform small numbers of big-hit products because those produced by so-called authoritative, the sunk costs of developing a film, book, concentrated sources. Examples of this or album can be more quickly and pre- abound, but two stand out as having dictably recouped. Similarly, real-space caught the political imagination: free and retail outlets (cinemas, city-center record open source software projects and user- stores, booksellers) can only afford to sell generated content sites. The underlying “hit” products because the relatively high model of online collaboration that pro- cost of providing shelf or screen space for duces these vast collections of human low-selling niche products makes it risky. intelligence has been much debated. Online distribution significantly reduces Opinions differ, for instance, over the these costs, resulting in a sales/products extent to which hierarchy matters in these curve with a large “head” and a long environments. Some, such as Weber (2004) “tail” of niches. The internet thus con- suggest that it accounts for a great deal, tributes to a more diverse and pluralistic while others, such as Weinberger (2007), media landscape. downplay its importance. These debates These web-as-platform principles can aside, this theme points to the growth of be seen at work in a range of political a deeply voluntarist model of content arenas. Elsewhere it has been argued that creation and knowledge aggregation. the 2004 primary and presidential cam- At a basic level, many of the most paign in the United States saw the emer- interesting and significant developments gence of a model of campaigning that in online collective action have been relied upon a range of online venues enabled by free and open source software loosely meshed together through auto- creations. This provides a perfect example mated linking technologies, particularly of the elective affinity between political blogs, as well as face-to-face meetings values and technological tools. Wikipedia coordinated via the user-generated itself has become a political battleground, Meetup site (Chadwick, 2007; Hindman, as supporters of candidates, causes, groups, 2005). However, nowhere is the idea movements, even regimes, engage in more strongly embodied than in the incessant “edit wars” over entries. Beyond recent shift towards online social net- this, the principle animates politics in a working on platforms such as Facebook variety of arenas. The blogosphere has and MySpace. The symbolic moment enabled ongoing citizen vigilance on a came in January 2007, when John grand scale. Political actors and media Edwards announced his candidacy for the elites now exist in an always-on environ- Democratic presidential nomination via a ment in which it is impossible to escape brief and informal video posting on the “little brother” surveillant gaze of YouTube, but the U.S. midterms of citizen-reporters. From Flickr photo- November 2006 had already witnessed an streams of marches and demonstrations explosion of political activity on social net- ignored by the mainstream media to working sites as well as the intensification bloggers such as Connecticut Bob, who of blogging by candidates and the long took to the streets with his home movie tail of amateur pundits. camera to film Senator Joseph Lieberman’s The second theme of Web 2.0 is col- off-the-cuff remarks in the 2006 U.S. lective intelligence. The core idea here is midterms, the media environment for that a distributed network of creators and politics has shifted.

5 ANDREW CHADWICK AND PHILIP N. HOWARD

The third principle of Web 2.0 con- indicated above, the attraction of O’Reilly’s cerns the importance of data. The central model is that it captures literal, quite claim here is that the Web 2.0 era is narrow developments in technological characterized by the aggregation of huge practice but it can also be used at a amounts of information, and those who metaphorical level to capture social and can successfully mine, refine, and subse- political behavior. Web 2.0 applications quently protect it are likely to emerge as have been characterized by an unusual dominant. Most of these data have been amount of public experimentalism. This is created from the concentrated labor of most obviously illustrated by the “perpe- volunteers (Andrejevic, 2002) or they tually beta” status of many of the popular may simply be the by-products of count- services. While this is a reflection of the less, coincidental interactions. But the key requirements of building and testing scal- point is that informational value emerges able web applications on meager resour- from the confluence of distributed user- ces, it also reflects something of a value generated content and its centralized shift away from tightly managed develop- exploitation. ment environments towards those charac- When used as an analytical lens for terized by fluidity and greater collaboration internet politics, this principle points to between developers and users. the ongoing importance of longstanding This sense of democratic experimentalism controversies surrounding privacy, surveil- has of course been one of the driving lance, and the commercial and political use values of the internet since its earliest days of personal information (Howard, 2006). (Chadwick, 2006: 38–48). But Web 2.0 The irony is that the celebrated freedom has seen it proliferate across a surprising of political expression via self-publishing range of political activities. Election cam- and the ease of connection facilitated in paigns in the United States are now the social networking environments of characterized by obsessive and continuous Web 2.0 also offer a multitude of possi- recalibration in response to instant online bilities for automated gathering, sorting, polls, fund-raising drives, comments lists and targeting. In the early days of the on YouTube video pages, and blog and web political actors would often be heard forum posts. But perhaps a better example complaining that they had “no control” of the impact of the permanent beta over the online environment or that they in politics is the British prime minister’s did not know how to target particular e-petitions initiative, “launched” in groups or supporters (Stromer-Galley, November 2006. At the time of writing, 2000). The applications of Web 2.0 the site remains in beta, and will probably arguably render these tasks much more do so for some time to come, or until it manageable, as individuals willingly pro- metamorphoses into another application. duce and reveal the most elaborate infor- Adding the beta stamp to an e-government mation about their tastes and preferences initiative at the heart of the executive within enclosed, proprietary technological machinery of one of the world’s oldest frameworks. In the realm of political liberal democracies tells us just how far campaigns, social networking sites thus the penetration of internet values and offer many advantages over the open working practices has gone. web. For governments seeking to filter or The next two Web 2.0 themes—the control internet content, the advantages creation of small-scale forms of political are also plain. engagement through consumerism and The fourth theme is perpetual experi- the propagation of political content across mentalism in the public domain. As multiple applications—are more specialized

6 INTRODUCTION but still reveal important aspects of the minimal of user activities. This occurs on new politics. Many data cannot be sealed sites that encourage users to create original off from public use because it would be content but which also offer readers the politically unacceptable, or a business chance to rate it. To take just a couple of model might depend upon open access. A examples, highly rated pieces rise to the celebrated aspect of Web 2.0 is the top of the recommended diaries feature mashing together of different data in on the Daily Kos home page, while pursuit of goals that differ from those MoveOn.org’s Action Forum contains a originally intended. In political life, this similar mechanism for prioritizing issues. practice often grants increased power to Perhaps the most significant aspect of citizens. For example, British activist Web 2.0 politics as rich user experience volunteer group mySociety has launched has emerged in the form of online video. a number of sites, such as TheyWork The explosion of user-generated video ForYou.com and FixMyStreet.com, that content in 2005 took most commentators combine publicly accessible government by surprise. Past predictions of media data with user-generated input. Theyrule. convergence generally argued that an net allows users to expose the social ties abundance of bandwidth would make the among political and economic elites by internet a more televisual, large-screen mapping out the network structures of experience. There are developments in this the corporate boards of multinational area, with IPTV applications such as Joost firms. Meanwhile, mobile internet devices and the BBC’s iPlayer launching in 2007 are increasingly important, again with a on the basis of deals to stream large-screen distinct user-generated inflection through quality video across adapted peer-to-peer practices such as video and photoblogging, networks. However, the main event in as well as mainstream news organizations’ online video to date is the user-generated increasing reliance on amateur “witness site YouTube, initially an independent reporters” as Stanyer argues in this volume. company established by two individuals, The final theme is rich user experiences but acquired by Google in early 2007 for on political websites. In the narrow tech- $1.65 billion. YouTube may eventually nical sense this refers to the development metamorphose into a fully converged of applications designed to run code large-screen online “broadcasting” net- inside a web browser in ways that facil- work, but the indications so far are that it itate interactivity and the rapid retrieval, will not. This is primarily because it has alteration, and storage of data. Most of generated a huge regular user base that the successful Web 2.0 applications com- savors its small-screen, DIY format. bine such capabilities with back-end In the political sphere, YouTube has databases that store user generated content made a sizeable dent in earlier predictions that can be modified by others. While of the emergence of slick, professionalized valuable information is created by such televisual online campaigns able only to actions, these are often not the result of be resourced by wealthy candidates and their heroic individual efforts but of aggregated campaign teams (Margolis and Resnick, small-scale, low-threshold forms of beha- 2000). This is clearly wide of the mark vior: seemingly “happy accident” outcomes when both political elites and citizens of thousands of individual interactions perceive that the visual genres of an (Chadwick, 2007: 290). But these are not effective YouTube video do not depend entirely accidental: many Web 2.0 sys- upon professional media production tems are deliberately designed to capture techniques. The cynical may decry the aggregated data from even the most rise of YouTube political campaigning on

7 ANDREW CHADWICK AND PHILIP N. HOWARD the grounds that it is inauthentic “spin” internet environment. Foot et al.’s work based on manufactured folksy imagery. In on elections outlines web production the United Kingdom, the Conservative practices among political actors. Highly Party leader David Cameron was widely significant is that three of these—invol- criticized by the mainstream media for ving, connecting, and mobilizing—are this approach on his site Webcameron, explicitly interactive and feature politi- launched in 2006. And yet the impres- cians habitually integrating citizens into sionistic evidence suggests that the their campaigns in novel ways. Anstead and method attracts members of the public, Chadwick provide a comparative institu- evidenced by 28,000 postings within five tional explanation for the proliferation of months of that forum’s launch in May new styles of interactive campaigning in 2007 (Webcameron.org, 2007). And in the United States and its fitful develop- important ways, each new digital tech- ment in the United Kingdom. Bimber et nology that captures public attention al.’s communicative theory of collective quickly becomes politicized. YouTube action rests upon the huge diversity of has become one of the most popular organizing strategies now available to online applications, essentially a tool for citizens and political leaders alike, while content distribution by political campaigns. Coleman finds inspiration for e-democracy Technologies may possess inherent in the subversive data-mashing approaches properties that shape and constrain poli- of Web 2.0. Fountain considers interest- tical norms, rules, and behavior, but these ing problems with interactive computer- must be situated within political contexts mediated networks in government, while (Chadwick, 2006: 17–21). The seven Margetts identifies, among other trends, themes of Web 2.0 discussed above are by the growing assumption that the storage no means exhaustive and only begin to of information produced by citizens provide analytical purchase on the huge themselves in the consumption of public changes currently underway in internet services is of far greater value to govern- politics. Yet it would be a mistake to dis- ment than top-down “second guesses.” miss Web 2.0 as the creation of marketing Part 2 of the handbook examines poli- and public relations. All of the chapters in tical behavior. Hardy et al. focus on the this collection provide tools for making internet’seffects in enabling citizens to sense of the sometimes remarkable pace verify candidate statements via online of these recent changes, yet they do so fact checking—widely lauded as a central while also recognizing the continuities with feature of the political blogosphere. the internet’s earlier phases. It remains for Brundidge and Rice, and Reedy and us to provide a brief outline of the book. Wells tackle its other much-discussed characteristics—balkanization of opinion and citizen engagement with political issues. Outline of the book Mossberger reminds us of the persistence of the digital divide but also highlights the In Part 1, on political institutions, Davis huge changes in this area among the et al. chart the evolution of election young and connected. Tewksbury and campaigns in the United States and Rittenberg suggest how the diversity of identify Web 2.0 networks as a new means news outlets available in the contemporary of reaching out to voters. Ward and era leads to greater individual-level filter- Gibson argue that the net is amplifying ing of content, though not to the extent broader individualization and disaggrega- that had earlier been predicted. Finally in tion trends—now obvious traits of the this part, Stanyer highlights the impact of

8 INTRODUCTION citizen journalism on the production and new types of legal analysis in an environ- consumption of news. ment in which traditional understandings In Part 3, the focus shifts to political of privacy and property are increasingly identities. McNair picks up where Stanyer inadequate. May’s chapter focuses on one left off but broadens the scope to illustrate of the central driving forces of the demo- the flattening hierarchies of global poli- cratization of creativity: free and open tical communication in an era character- source software, while Elmer highlights ized by “cultural chaos.” Papacharissi how older styles of online political com- highlights the problematic but also liber- munication such as the White House ating nature of citizen participation in website, still of major importance for Web 2.0 environments that subvert the citizen information, are open to strategic solemnity of traditional political delibera- manipulation by political elites. The final tion. Bennett and Toft suggest that the three chapters, by Dutton and Peltu, presentation and organization of political Cogburn, and Rogerson and Milton deal narratives is central to collective mobili- with the extent to which decisions taken zation online, but citizens are still feeling in global forums or national policy bodies their way in exploiting the potential of shape the kinds of online environment networks to leverage such narratives. Van citizens are able to experience. The hand- Doorn and van Zoonen discuss shifts in book ends with an editorial chapter sum- gender representation and the rise of a marizing the main findings and pointing participatory ethos but they also suggest out some potential areas for future inquiry. that this is unlikely to require a wholesale reappraisal of gendered computer-mediated communication. Kim and Ball-Rokeach Conclusion offer a nuanced understanding of the multiplicity of individuals’ local and In little more than a decade, the internet transnational connections by focusing on has evolved from a collaborative tool for the case of immigrant communities. Van scientists to become a fundamental part of Dijk reminds us that persistent digital our system of political communication. divisions shape life online in terms of The production and consumption of pol- motivation, physical access, skills, and itics today differs significantly from that of usage, irrespective of the latest celebratory the 1990s, as does the scholarly vocabu- claims, while Wheeler outlines how citizen- lary used for understanding contemporary produced content may be steadily reshap- political life. The 31 chapters in this ing daily life in Arab countries. handbook together offer a panoramic The final part of the volume deals with perspective on these new domains. law and policy. Deibert’s chapter punctures the new mythology of the participatory net by outlining how states monitor and control Note content. In a similar vein, Phillips reveals the infrastructure of mobile surveillance 1O’Reilly’s original principles are: “the web as and the policy instruments and vertical platform”; “harnessing collective intelli- ” “ ‘ ’” “ controls that overlay seemingly horizontal gence ; data is the next Intel inside ; the end of the software release cycle”; “light- information networks. Gandy and Farrall weight programming models”; “software suggest how new modes of economic and above the level of a single device”; and “rich social organization increasingly require user experiences.” See O’Reilly, 2005.

Part I

Institutions

2 The internet in U.S. election campaigns Richard Davis, Jody C Baumgartner, Peter L. Francia, and Jonathan S. Morris

In recent years, candidate websites and other internet-based innovations have dramatically altered political campaigns for national oﬃce in the United States. The internet has improved the ability of campaigns to inform citizens, mobilize voters, and raise money from political donors. Websites have become only one of several weapons in a candidate’s online arsenal. Blogs, podcasts, social networking sites, and YouTube also have become additional means to reach voters, particularly those who would not visit the website or have their name appear on an e-mail list. We explore the immediate implications that these and other changes have had for national campaigns, as well as the possibilities for the future.

The advent and popularization of the of a short video titled “Let the internet has generated a great deal of hype Conversation Begin.” about its potential to invigorate electoral This chapter examines the specific ways politics. Dick Morris, former advisor to in which candidates and parties have used President Clinton, suggested that a “fifth the internet in their campaigns. The main estate” of internet politics would alter the focus is on candidates for national office balance of political power in the United in the United States. The subject is impor- States by linking people together (Morris, tant for several reasons. First, because it is 1999). The early success of Howard a considerably less expensive medium than Dean’s campaign on the internet led one television, the internet holds the potential journalist to ask in 2003, “what will to level the playing field for outsider can- happen when a national political machine didates and minor parties. Although major can fit on a laptop?” (Ehrlich, 2003). party candidates are still advantaged in Dean’s campaign manager, Joe Trippi, terms of their ability to carry their mes- claimed that the internet would do noth- sage to the public (Margolis, Resnick, and ing short of revolutionize electoral politics Levy 2003), the existence of the internet (Trippi, 2004). Indeed, by 2006, the as a campaign tool offers citizens more internet had changed the way candidates choice, thus potentially enhancing candi- conduct campaigns. Congressional candidate options. Second, as an unfiltered dates were using the internet for fund- medium, candidates and parties are able to raising, blogging, creating online com- “get their message out” through bypassing munities, making video and audio clips traditional media gatekeepers in order to available, and much more. In January of reach groups of interested voters (Graber, 2007, Hillary Clinton announced her run 2006). The internet is also a sophisticated for the presidency on her website by way and relatively inexpensive communications

13 RICHARD DAVIS, ET AL. tool that like-minded citizens, candidate, White House Communications Office and party organizations can use to interact e-mailed approximately 200 Bush spee- with each other and mobilize support. ches and position papers, and distributed To begin, we review the short history of them to several commercial bulletin internet campaigning, focusing on how the boards (Bradley, 1993). Clinton was more use of the medium has evolved. We divide aggressive in his use of the medium, dis- this discussion into three sections, each tributing speeches, position papers, and corresponding to a particular phase of the biographical information on various news- development of internet campaigning. In groups and a Clinton Listserv. He also the discovery phase, which dates from made his e-mail address for the campaign about 1992 until 1999, candidates, parties, available through commercial internet ser- and groups began experimenting with the vice providers, such as Compuserv (Sakkas internet and exploring its possible electoral 1993; Bimber and Davis 2003: 23). uses. By the presidential campaign of However, the reach of these electronic 2000, the internet campaign had reached campaign effortswaslimited,asfewcitizens a maturation phase. At that point, the vast used or relied on the internet for their majority of major-party candidates for fed- political information. eral elections, and many state-level candi- In March of 1995, the Republican dates, maintained websites throughout the National Party registered the domain name campaign. Political campaign websites no “rnc.org,” and the Democrats followed longer lagged behind their commercial with “dnc.org” the following month. counterparts in terms of interactivity, inte- During that same year, several Republican gration of server-side and database technol- candidates for president, including Lamar ogies, and aesthetic sophistication. Alexander, Phil Gramm, and Steve Forbes, Internet campaigns entered yet another built websites for the primary campaign. phase in the 2006 congressional election The eventual nominee, Bob Dole, and the cycle and this continued through the Clinton–Gore re-election campaign had 2008 presidential campaign. By this time, websites, although their internet campaign virtually all serious candidates for national operations were still under the radar in political office had fairly sophisticated most respects. This changed after the first websites that professionals maintained. In presidential debate, when during his clos- this new phase, candidates, parties, and ing statement, Dole invited viewers to interest groups have turned their attention become involved in the campaign by beyond their own websites to other giving the address of his campaign’s web- venues. Campaign organizations, in parti- site. Although technically he erred by cular, have begun to carry the campaign saying “www.dolekemp96org” rather than to blogs, social networking sites such as “www.dolekemp96.org,” the site received Facebook, and other quasi-media forums more than two million visitors in the fol- such as YouTube. lowing 24 hours (Cornfield, 2004a: 3). By 1998, more than two-thirds of all congressional candidates maintained web- Discovery: experimentation sites for their campaign, and many state and exploration party organizations had established an online presence as well. Most of these George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton early campaign websites were little more were the first presidential candidates to than “brochureware.” They offered little make use of the internet during their interaction and were not updated often 1992 campaigns. During the election, the (Bimber and Davis, 2003: 24). However,

14 THE INTERNET IN U.S. ELECTIONS they did offer a wealth of information (for General campaign operations example, platforms, issue positions, and so The internet allows the campaign to on) through a new and growing medium gather various types of information that (Francia and Herrnson, 2002). are useful to the campaign effort. This In addition to websites, campaigns began includes possibly damaging information to make greater use of e-mail commu- about the campaign’s own candidate nications. Former professional wrestler Jesse Ventura drew from existing net- (Baumgartner, 2000: 1), background works of professional wrestling fans and material on the opponent (personal and Reform Party activists to build an e-mail public life, voting, speeches), as well as developments in polling, endorsements, network of more than 3,000 supporters. fi His Minnesota gubernatorial online cam- statements by other public gures, and paign was able to facilitate registration and information about the various legal and get-out-the-vote efforts, and the coordi- technical requirements associated with ffi ff nation of campaign events and rallies. running for public o ce. Campaign sta s While this was not exactly interactive previously acquired this information by ffi web technology, it did suggest the poten- other, less e cient means. With the rise tial for using the internet to mobilize of the internet, however, the process has support. become much easier and more convenient. Campaign information sources include news services such as LexisNexis, Maturation as well as standard internet news monitoring techniques like RSS news feeds By the election of 2000, political cam- and search engines. paign websites were no longer a novelty, Another aspect of general campaign and by 2004, the overwhelming majority operations conducted via the internet of congressional, gubernatorial, and pre- is the distribution of various campaign sidential candidates maintained websites materials, such as posters, buttons, bumper (Howard, 2006: 26–8). In this maturation stickers, and clothing. In 2000, for exam- phase, campaign websites began to ple, Al Gore’s online store for these include many of the features that sophis- materials was called “Gore Stores.” In ticated commercial websites offer. For 2004, Kerry sold campaign products from example, in 2000, the Gore–Lieberman a section of his website labeled “Kerry site featured an “Instant MessageNet” for Gear.” President Bush had a section called online chatting. In 2004, George W. “Wstuff,” which in addition to traditional Bush allowed visitors to ask questions to campaign materials, included a reading his campaign staff in real time in the site’s list, computer screen-savers and wall- “State of the Race.” Many campaign papers, and a section to create and print a websites now routinely include inter- customized campaign poster. active features or games. Bush’s 2004 site “ ” included a Kerry Gas Tax Calculator Campaign communications that allowed visitors to see how much John Kerry’s proposed 50 cent per gallon Political campaigns are fundamentally exer- gas tax would cost them. Within this cises in communicating a simple message: maturation phase, the internet supple- “vote for me,” or, “don’t vote for my mented campaign efforts in four different opponent.” Candidate home pages serve functions: campaign operations, commu- multiple purposes in this regard. Most nication, mobilization, and fund-raising. home pages post the candidate’s personal

15 RICHARD DAVIS, ET AL. and professional biographies and informa- New Century,” an eight-page manifesto tion about the candidate’s family. Under a “addressed to the Citizens of America,” heading labeled “Get to Know Us,” the was one such example. It is also common front page of the 2000 Gore–Lieberman for campaign websites to have a section website (algore.com) featured small photos devoted to why voters should not vote for of each of the candidates and their wives the opposition. In 2004, for example, linked to their respective biographies. John Kerry’s “Bush–Cheney: Wrong for Front pages typically include contact America” section, which was linked to a information for the campaign, including “Rapid Response Center,” outlined his toll-free telephone numbers and e-mail case for why voters should oust the addresses. Most also have other standard incumbent president. Bush’s “Kerry website features, including, for example, a Media Center” performed a similar func- way for visitors to search the site or to tion and included rebuttals to Kerry’s send a link to the site to someone. positions. Candidate home pages further allow for Another way the internet aids in cam- more targeted advertising. Sites typically paign communication is via e-mail. One have links to related or friendly cam- reason e-mail is invaluable is because it paign organizations, such as party affiliates allows campaigns to communicate internally. or major interest or advocacy groups. Of course, there are other technologically Presidential candidate websites can pro- advanced communications (cell phones, vide state and local information about text messaging), but an e-mail from a campaign events, as well as disseminate campaign manager can reach thousands of unique information about voter registra- employees and volunteers easily, quickly, tion and early voting in all 50 states. In and cheaply. another form of targeted advertising, the E-mail also can keep supporters informed major-party presidential candidates in about the campaign, alert them to upcom- 2004 allowed users to select Spanish ver- ing events, candidate appearances, and sions of their website. Both campaigns circulate rapid rebuttals in response to had sections on their websites dedicated opposition attacks or press reports. For to demographic groups they were courting. example, in his 1998 bid for Governor of Kerry called these groups “Communities.” Minnesota, Jesse Ventura relied on e-mail Bush referred to them as “Coalitions,” to his supporters to debunk a rumor that devoting sections on the site to the concerns had been spread that he supported of women, African Americans, Catholics, legalized prostitution (Cornfield, 2004a: educators, first responders, health profes- 67–8). In early January of 2000, John sionals, Hispanics, seniors, small business McCain e-mailed supporters requesting owners, sportsmen, students, veterans, and that each make ten phone calls to regis- more. tered independents or Republicans in Campaign websites also provide infor- New Hampshire; more than nine thou- mation about the policy positions of the sand did so. McCain also used e-mail to candidate, which include statements of ask supporters to preview radio ads before issue positions, rebuttals of charges from they aired (Cornfield 2004a: 69–70). It is the opposition, speeches, and campaign now standard for campaign organizations pamphlets. Frequently these materials are (candidates, parties) to maintain lists of e- made available in printer-friendly or down- mail addresses of supporters. Visitors to the loadable formats, reminiscent of campaign campaign website can opt in or “sub- books of previous eras. Howard Dean’s scribe” to a campaign newsletter, entering December 2003 “Common Sense for a an e-mail address and other information

16 THE INTERNET IN U.S. ELECTIONS

(for example, name, mailing address, phone candidate in early 2003 to the presumed number, age). Michael Turk, Bush’s 2004 front-runner for the nomination by the e-Campaign Director, claimed that the end of 2004. By the time polling began in campaign collected more than seven mil- the Iowa caucuses, the Dean campaign lion e-mail addresses using this method estimated it had the support of approxi- (Jenkins, 2004). With the additional infor- mately 600,000 online activists (Manjoo, mation, campaigns can “narrowcast” mes- 2003; 2004). sages, personalizing them to groups of The Dean campaign ultimately did not individuals based on various characteristics. win the nomination. In fact, Dean won a primary in only one state—Vermont. The Dean campaign’s failure illustrated the Mobilization drawbacks of using online discussion as a Mobilization is a specialized form of substitute for outreach to undecided voters. political communication, an attempt to Even though Dean was able to appeal do more than just inform, but to engage strongly to his online supporters, his base supporters to act. One mobilization tool was simply too small a proportion of the that political campaigns employ is the primary electorate. blog. Blogs connect supporters with the Dean’s initiatives, however, did affect candidate, the campaign, and each other, other campaigns’ use of blogs. George providing them with an arena in which to Bush and John Kerry had official blogs voice their opinions. In addition, the linked from their campaign websites in hypertext format allows writers to link to 2004 (Trammell, 2006). Many of the other stories relevant to the campaign. candidates for president in 2008 also had The most well publicized use of blogs in a blogs up and running as early as March campaign effort was Howard Dean in 2007. 2003. The Dean campaign directly or Another way that the internet aids in indirectly supported and moderated several mobilization is by helping supporters find blogs throughout 2003 and into 2004, local campaign events, ways to volunteer including “Dean Nation” (dean2004.blog on a local basis, or other ways to become spot.com), “Change for America” (www. involved in the campaign effort. In 2000, changeforamerica.com), “Howard Dean Al Gore had a section on his website 2004 Call to Action Weblog” (deancall- called “Take Action,” which provided toaction.blogspot.com), and what was to visitors the opportunity to select their become his main blog, “Blog for America” state and their “coalition” (group), and (blogforamerica.com). Dean even parlayed returned suggestions about how they his blog into a forum for decision-making might help the campaign based on those in his campaign. selections. Gore also gave supporters the Dean’s blogs were updated daily (and opportunity to build their own Gore-for- sometimes more often) with journal president web page by joining the “Gore entries, photos, audio, and video clips I-Team.” The 2004 campaign website of (Trippi, 2004: 16–17). On a single day in John Kerry featured a section labeled late December 2003, the Dean campaign “Get Local,” in which visitors could get posted roughly 400 messages to their state-specific information on how to get “Blog for America,” which in turn involved in the campaign (Postelnicu prompted more than 4,000 comments et al., 2006). Likewise, the Bush campaign over the next 24 hours (Stromer-Galley had a “Grassroots” section on its website, and Baker, 2006). This activity helped designed to build networks of people propel Dean from a largely unknown who would canvass their neighborhoods

17 RICHARD DAVIS, ET AL.

(Ceasar and Busch, 2005: 133–4). The Dean raised an enormous amount of efforts were based on a model used in the money through internet donations. 2000 Iowa caucuses and the 2002 con- Altogether Dean raised approximately $20 gressional elections in South Dakota. million solely online, roughly 40 percent Volunteers were given the opportunity to of his entire campaign funding (Postelnicu become a “team leader” by recruiting ten et al., 2006: 105). What makes these totals additional people. Daily communications more impressive is that his campaign was from national team leaders supported and over fairly early in the primary season. informed these local leaders (Lowry, George Bush raised approximately $14 2004). Approximately 1.4 million volun- million online, only about 5 percent of teers were recruited in this manner (Lizza, his total campaign funding. John Kerry, 2002). on the other hand, raised $89 million online, a healthy one-third of his total (Postelnicu et al., 2006: 105). Fund-raising In terms of their demographic profile, The presidential primaries of 2000 online donors tend to be middle-class, demonstrated the potential of using the fairly well educated, and politically active. internet as a fund-raising tool. New Jersey Disproportionate numbers of online donors, Senator Bill Bradley, a candidate for the for example, attended a house party or Democratic Party presidential nomina- Meetup.com event. Online giving seems tion, was the first candidate to raise one to have become the preferred method of million dollars online. Even more donating to a campaign. Significantly impressive was the internet fund-raising better than half of both small and large of John McCain, who was vying for the donations were made online by all age Republican Party nomination. At the groups except seniors (those over 65). time of the New Hampshire primary, Small donors between the ages of 18 and McCain was virtually out of money. His 34 overwhelmingly gave online (87 per- surprising win, however, coupled with cent) (Graf et al., 2006). the publicity generated from it and an In terms of online fund-raising strategy, online appeal for donations, helped him some lessons can be gleaned from the pre- raise more than one-half million dollars in sidential campaign of 2004. One compre- online donations in a single day (Bimber hensive study suggests that Democrats and Davis, 2003: 38–9). were more successful at raising money Online donations have become online. Twice as many donors who gave increasingly important because the current $500 or more gave to Democratic rather campaign finance system encourages small than Republican Party candidates (64 donations from a multitude of sources. percent to 31 percent), and the disparity The small donations McCain received between the two parties was even greater from online donations after his New with respect to those who contributed Hampshire victory, in conjunction with $100 or less (54 percent to 19 percent). federal matching funds, enabled him to The study speculates that this was in part raise a large amount of money very due to the fact that many of Dean’s sup- quickly. While McCain eventually lost his porters migrated to Kerry’s candidacy bid to secure the Republican nomination, after the primaries. In addition, Kerry was he raised $6.4 million online, or about forced to be somewhat more aggressive in one-quarter of the total amount the his fund-raising efforts given the financial campaign raised (Cornfield, 2004b: 66–7; advantage of the incumbent President Howard, 2006: 13–14). In 2003, Howard Bush (Graf et al., 2006).

18 THE INTERNET IN U.S. ELECTIONS

However, online giving remains unpre- The next section describes each of them, dictable. Approximately half (46%) of all as well as their variations, and then dis- small donors and more than one-third cusses how candidates are using them to (39%) of large donors contributed with- present themselves to voters. out being asked (Graf et al., 2006). The implications of this for future fund-raising Media-controlled online strategy are unclear. It does seem safe to communication conclude that candidates who can capture the imagination of the electorate (e.g., Media-controlled online communication underdog candidates Bill Bradley and refers to websites disseminating news and John McCain) or appeal to a politically information to a relatively large number active base (e.g., Howard Dean or Ned of voters, but which a third party con- Lamont in 2006) will enjoy more success trols. One type is the traditional news raising money online. media website (for example, ABCnews. com, Foxnews.com). In terms of the news functions, candidates approach the Post-maturation: beyond the online versions much as they do the tra- candidate website ditional print or broadcast versions. A growing area of interest for candi- Since the initiation of candidate websites, dates is advertising on media-controlled campaigns have realized the limited reach sites. internet advertisements cost only a of this medium. Websites reach those fraction of what advertising on television who actively visit them, and those who costs. Because the audiences for such sites visit them are a relatively small percentage are likely voters, candidates have steadily of the electorate. Moreover, those who increased the share of their advertising visit candidate websites are existing sup- budget devoted to online advertising. In porters rather than the “undecided” 2004, both presidential candidates pro- voters who can often swing an election duced and distributed many of the (Bimber and Davis, 2003). While e-mail “banner” ads (small rectangular advertise- has the potential to expand beyond the ments that appear on a web page that lead narrow reach of a website because it does visitors to the advertiser’s website). For not rely on a site visit and “pushes” its example, by the spring of 2004, the message, it is constrained by a subset of Republican National Committee placed supporters (spam blockers prevent wide- banner ads that attacked John Kerry’s war spread distribution of e-mail messages, record on more than 1,000 diﬀerent and, if they do not, candidates face the websites (Kaid, 2006). Both the Bush and wrath of voters who punish spammers). Kerry campaigns directed most of their How, then, do candidates go beyond internet ad buys to local news organiza- the self-selection problem that limits tions (television, radio, newspaper). One exposure to their message to those who study suggests that almost 70 percent of already intend to vote for the candidate? Bush’s internet ads, and 60 percent of What are the means by which they can Kerry’s, appeared in venues like these reach voters—and even activists—who (Cornﬁeld, 2004b). Also popular were the are not site visitors or e-mail recipients? websites of national periodicals and blogs. Campaigns have reached out beyond Online campaign advertising increased their own websites to two other types of by more than 700 percent between 2002 internet-based political communication and 2006 (PQMedia, 2006). Twenty-nine tools: media controlled and user controlled. candidates or party organizations advertised

19 RICHARD DAVIS, ET AL. online in the last week of 2006, but the learn to give exclusives to blogs in order number of online ad impressions bought to gain the goodwill of bloggers who see (approximately 4 million) was small com- themselves as the underdogs in competi- pared to 2004. However, the 2006 election with the traditional news media. tion lacked a presidential race (Kaye, 2006). However, candidates do not treat poli- The 2008 presidential campaign featured tical bloggers quite like other media. early advertising, including online adver- Unlike journalists, bloggers sometimes join tising, by major contenders. campaigns as consultants. In return for a A newer relationship is between candi- consulting fee, bloggers become advocates dates and another form of media-controlled of a particular campaign. Much like the website, the blog. In addition to candi- partisan press of the late 1700s and early date-controlled blogs or blogs started by 1800s, bloggers are willing to establish a an individual, there are also more popular relationship with candidates that tradi- and well-known political blogs such as tional journalists would eschew. One Daily Kos or InstaPundit. These blogs current debate in internet campaigning constitute a new type of online informa- regards the ethical question of whether tion that is beginning to rival some exist- bloggers should reveal any financial con- ing traditional media sites in readership nection to a campaign when writing size and loyalty. Moreover, much like about that candidate and their opponents. traditional media, many of their writers— Candidates must be wary of establishing bloggers—have journalistic status, gaining relationships with bloggers, given that special entrance to political events such as blogging can be quite shrill and feature national party conventions, and candidate extreme and flagrantly abusive language. and policy-maker press briefings. These Even when a blogger tones down rheto- bloggers serve a political news dissemina- ric to accommodate the campaign, tion function, and, most importantly, another problem is the transparency of candidates court them regularly. the past history of blog posts. Many blogs Politics is not the primary topic in the include archives on their sites, allowing blogosphere, but national political blogs easy access to journalists, interest groups, have acquired a niche and an expanding or other campaigns that wish to locate readership. Some national political blogs material that a blogger has written, which reach hundreds of thousands of people, might embarrass the candidate through and political blog readership is approach- association. ing the size of the traditional news media Indeed, candidates already have faced audience. Daily Kos has approximately such a situation. For example, in 2006, one half million visits per day. InstaPundit, a Catholic group accused two bloggers, Eschaton, and CrooksAndLiars each have working for presidential candidate John more than one hundred thousand visits Edwards, of posting anti-Catholic state- daily. By comparison, the daily circulation ments on their personal blogs. At first, of the Los Angeles Times is 775,000 the Edwards campaign made a decision (Ahrens, 2006b). not to terminate the bloggers, although Political blogs offer the opportunity to it did separate itself from their state- reach well beyond the campaign’s web- ments. Eventually, however, both blog- site. By placing information with blogs or, gers resigned as the controversy continued even better, currying the support of high- to swirl around them (Broder, 2007). profile bloggers, candidate campaigns hope Relations with bloggers can be espe- to tap into the millions of Americans who cially problematic for a moderate candi- read blogs. Candidates have started to date. A candidate with rather extreme

20 THE INTERNET IN U.S. ELECTIONS political views can appeal to a larger In July 2006, an estimated 19.6 million blogging community than a candidate visitors went to the YouTube website with centrist positions. One example is (“YouTube U.S. Web Traffic Grows 75 the contrast between Joseph Lieberman Percent Week over Week”). A visit to and Ned Lamont. Lieberman aroused the YouTube usually is not a quick one; wrath of liberal Democrats, including because site visitors spend time browsing bloggers, when he supported the Iraq war videos (many of them lengthy) the aver- and continued to do so even when age visit is 28 minutes (Cornfield, 2006). Democrats (and even some Republicans) YouTube has become the one-stop had largely abandoned that position. source for popular videos about politics. Lamont, Lieberman’s primary opponent The site even created a separate section in the Connecticut Democratic Senate for political campaign videos for the 2008 primary, acquired broad support from presidential campaign (Vargas, 2007a). liberal bloggers who favored Lamont’s Videos posted there largely consisted of liberal stances. When Lamont won the candidate ads from the campaigns them- primary election, many political observers selves. The most popular candidate videos credited the activities of liberal bloggers seem to be those in which the candidate for his victory. Although Lieberman later says or does something not intended for defeated Lamont in the general election, viewing (e.g., videos of Hillary Clinton the primary election outcome suggested singing the national anthem off-key, or that bloggers may be helpful to more John McCain sleeping through the State ideologically polarizing candidates within of the Union address). Controversial adver- intraparty nomination contests. tisements, such as actor Michael J. Fox’s appeals to voters to reject candidates who were against government funding for User-controlled online stem cell research, or the racially charged communication negative advertisement against Senate can- One of the features of the internet is the didate Harold Ford in Tennessee, were potential for self-publishing. At its incep- also popular. tion, this was one of its much-heralded Of course, journalists have sought to characteristics. However, the audience for catch candidates in embarrassing posi- an individual’s website was rarely more tions for years. Examples from an earlier than family or friends. But a new medium era include a comment made by 1968 for self-publishing—the social networking Republican candidate George Romney to site—has enhanced the reach of the prac- a television journalist that he had been tice. Online forums such as YouTube, brainwashed by the U.S. military while Flickr, MySpace, and Facebook have visiting Vietnam (Sabato, 1991), Ronald centralized self-publishing efforts and Reagan’s 1984 joke caught on an open brought large audiences to such portals. mike that “we start bombing [the Soviet These types of sites have recently begun Union] in fifteen minutes” (Taylor, to have an impact on political campaigns. 1984), or news stories that emphasized Perhaps the best known online site for George H. W. Bush’s mistake in calling self-publishing is YouTube, a website that September 7 Pearl Harbor Day in 1988 allows people to upload videos for general (“Bush Trips in Speech” 1988). viewing. The growth of YouTube’s Ever-present video recording devices audience has been phenomenal. In a six- have increased candidate exposure to an month period in 2006, the number of unprecedented level, and the existence of unique site visitors grew by 300 percent. YouTube democratizes “gotcha journalism”

21 RICHARD DAVIS, ET AL. by allowing anyone who catches a candi- networking site.” These are web portals date or politician off guard to self-publish where users can create their own web the gaffe. The problem is not limited to a pages and link to the “profiles” of others. candidate doing or saying something in an Social networking sites are used to con- off moment. An old video could highlight duct conversations, express opinions, keep the candidate making a speech or speaking journals, display photos, and so on. Many in a debate and contradicting his or her such sites exist, but the two best known position on an issue. An example is a of this growing genre are MySpace and YouTube video of Mitt Romney giving a Facebook. These have acquired a large speech in an earlier campaign touting his following, particularly among young pro-choice position on abortion and his people. According to the Pew Research support for gun control (Finnegan, 2007). Center, 54 percent of young people aged By 2008, presidential candidate Romney 18–25 have used one or more of these had changed his positions, but YouTube sites. In addition, 76 percent of young has been there to remind voters of his people visit them at least once a week previous position. (Pew Research Center for the People and Campaigns can, it should be noted, use the Press, 2007), and spend an average of YouTube to their advantage. They can, about two hours per visit (Noguchi, for example, upload videos touting their 2006). own candidate (Jalonick, 2006). Placing a The growth of online social network- campaign ad on YouTube enhances ing has been dramatic. In its first 30 audience exposure at no cost to the cam- months of existence, MySpace filled to paign. Campaigns also are using the rea- 124 million profiles. Facebook (the newer lity characteristic of YouTube to trip up site) acquired nine million members in their opponents. Campaigns now hire two years and was already the target of a staffers to follow their opponent with a billion dollar buyout offer by a media video camera to record candidate gaffes conglomerate (Ahrens, 2006a). and post the video online (Jalonick, Candidates have discovered the poli- 2006). The most famous example in 2006 tical uses of these sites. In 2006, several was the Jim Webb staffer who followed candidates created profiles on MySpace Senator George Allen and became part of and Facebook including Sherrod Brown, the story himself. When Allen made Claire McCaskill, and Ned Lamont. All reference to the Webb staffer by using the the major presidential candidates for 2008 term “macaca,” the staffer was recording did so. Not only do candidates create Allen’s remarks. The staffer uploaded the their own sites, but supporters also create video to YouTube, and then the cam- sites and groups in support of their paign informed local and national jour- favored candidate. At about the time nalists on where to view it. With Barack Obama announced his candidacy journalists’ assistance, the “macaca” video for president, there were already more was able to reach millions of Virginia than 500 Obama groups on Facebook. voters, as well as tens of millions of others These groups devoted their space to dis- watching around the nation. The video cussing the Obama campaign, posting became a national story that forced the photos of Obama, and spreading news Allen campaign into defensive mode from about their favored candidate (Vargas, which it never recovered (Lizza, 2006). 2007b). While candidates may not control Ultimately, Allen lost the race. such sites, they can benefit from them. Another forum within user-controlled Chris DeWolfe, one of the founders media is one commonly called a “social of MySpace, called them “digital yard

22 THE INTERNET IN U.S. ELECTIONS signs, for lack of a better term” (Williams, television ads that reach potentially tens of 2007). million of voters in the midst of enter- Supporter networks also becomes a tainment programming, an average cam- gauge for others (such as the press and paign website attracts a relatively small other site visitors) to measure the appeal audience that chooses to go to and use of a candidate. While candidates popular that resource. However, that does not with young people, such as Barack mean the internet has no value in a cam- Obama or John Edwards, gain widespread paign. By using the internet for research, support, more traditional candidates communicating with supporters and acti- appear to lag in attractiveness to this vists, mobilizing voters, and raising funds, audience. For example, when the 2008 campaigns have carved out a critical niche presidential campaign began with a flurry for the website. The modern campaign of announcements in early 2007, Barack for president and Congress relies on the Obama already had 64,000 “friends” on website to perform tasks such as volunteer MySpace, while Hillary Clinton’s site mobilization, fund-raising, and supporter only registered 25,000 (Williams, 2007). reinforcement more efficiently and inex- One problem with online social net- pensively than other means in the past. working as a campaign tool, however, is As this chapter has shown, websites the demographic of the audience and have become only one of several weapons their potential to affect the candidate’s in a candidate’s online arsenal. Blogs, chances of victory. These sites attract the podcasts, social networking sites, and least participatory age group (18–24) in YouTube also have become additional terms of voter turnout. However, they means to reach voters, particularly those can be effective for volunteer recruitment who would not visit the website or have given that young people often become their name appear on an e-mail list. Of the foot soldiers for political campaigns. course, beyond some anecdotes, it is still The social networking concept has largely unknown whether these new migrated onto official candidate websites technologies can play a decisive role in as well. For example, on Barack Obama’s determining the success or failure of a site, visitors can create their own profile, campaign. However, what is clear is that link to friends, and join groups just as candidates and their campaigns will con- they would on a commercial site. In tinue to experiment with these new addition, user-controlled media are even technologies in order to discover if they linked from candidate websites. The Obama are capable of having a major impact on campaign linked YouTube, Facebook, election outcomes. and Flickr, while the Edwards campaign linked all of those in addition to MySpace, Gather, del.icio.us, and a dozen others. Guide to further reading The Edwards campaign’s site made a point of saying the candidate had a pre- Since the mid 1990s, there has been a sence on all of these social networks. plethora of published works that examined the effects of the internet on campaigns and political participation in general in Conclusion the United States. Some of these works have operated as instructional guides for The internet is not television. Despite how citizens can use the inherently demo- the hype, it has not changed campaigning cratic nature of the internet to circumvent in the same way. For example, unlike traditional forms of political participation

23 RICHARD DAVIS, ET AL.

(see Browning, 2001; Davis et al., 2002; The debate surrounding the broader Kush, 2000). A wide range of work then participatory influences of the internet examined whether the internet had an gave way to empirical research that spe- effect on political participation. Some argued cifically has examined the medium in the that participation had been positively context of campaigns. From the American influenced and that the prospects for the national perspective, Bimber and Davis future of internet democracy were bright (2003) offer an overview of this topic, as (Grossman, 1995; Morris, 1999). Other does Chadwick (2006) and Foot and work (often grounded more in empirical Schneider (2006). Williams and Tedesco data), found the internet to be much less (2006) also provide a comprehensive view consequential (Davis, 1999; Margolis and of the internet’s role in the 2004 pre- Resnick, 2000; Wilhelm, 2000), or even sidential election. On a wider scale, Kluver dangerous (Putnam, 2000; Sunstein, 2001) et al.’s (2007) recent edited volume takes a regarding the public’sinfluence on demo- cross-national comparative look at the cratic engagement. More recent research internet and elections, and concludes that has also examined virtual political partici- the internet has had significant electoral pation via blogs, chat rooms, and instant influences worldwide. messaging (see Davis, 2005).

24 3 European political organizations and the internet Mobilization, participation, and change

Stephen Ward and Rachel Gibson

Much has been written about the supposed decline of the traditional vehicles of political activity in European democracies, especially parties and trade unions, and the corresponding rise of new forms of political organization: single issue campaigns, new social movements, and radical direct action protest. This chapter explores the impact of the internet on such trends. In particular, it analyzes the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the intra- and interorganizational arenas. In the case of the former, it examines the use of ICTs to mobilize support and sustain activism through helping organizations reach new audiences and deepen levels of engagement. In the case of the latter it analyzes the impact of ICTs on organizational competition, to see how far it is increasing pluralism and changing the traditional parameters of representative democracy. To date, the empirical evidence outside North America has been somewhat limited, but it suggests that new technologies are facilitating changes in both arenas, though not necessarily in a uniform manner. Early evidence indicates a deepening of activism among the already engaged, but only a marginal mobilization role in relation to new audiences. Overall, ICTs appear to be accelerating some of the trends of the pre-internet era such as individualization and disaggregation. Finally, the chapter discusses the drivers of, and barriers to, organizational responses to new technologies.

This chapter discusses the role of European forms of collective participation via loose political organizations (parties, trade protest networks and direct action are unions, pressure groups and new social replacing traditional representative poli- movements) in mobilizing the public and tics. Second, it examines the potential how far the arrival of new ICTs is helping impact of the internet on political orga- to reshape such organizations, both in nizations from both an intra- and inter- terms of their internal organization and, organizational perspective. Have new more broadly, as vehicles for political ICTs provided for additional organiza- participation.1 In particular, the chapter tional pluralism by allowing fringe causes has three aims. First, it provides a context a louder voice in European political sys- for organizational development in the tems? Do new technologies streamline internet era by discussing trends in orga- organizational hierarchies and provide for nizational mobilization. It assesses how far greater internal democracy? Third, it ana- traditional collective forms of mobiliza- lyzes the factors shaping the strategies tion are in decline and whether new underlying political organizations’ ICT

25 STEPHEN WARD AND RACHEL GIBSON usage. Since ICTs can be used for a vari- of decline and point to a more complex ety of different purposes, ranging from situation. information storage to promoting interactive participation, the chapter seeks to Political participation and develop an explanatory framework from organizational change which expectations of organizational behavior can be derived: what types of Central to arguments about the perfor- political organization will use the technol- mance of representative political systems are ogy most extensively, and to what ends? the functions of collective political organizations. While we have noted that traditional participatory organizations have been Representative democracy said to be in decline, the literature on and political organizations: their participatory role in modern democ- decline and crisis? racies is somewhat contradictory. Four areas of debate are worth highlighting. Increasingly, the idea of representative First, survey evidence has revealed a democracy is being questioned from a considerable fall in party and trade union variety sources. While some talk excitedly memberships and activism across Western of a new era in politics (Mulgan, 1997), Europe over the past 30 years. This has others bemoan declining interest and also led to an increasingly ageing mem- engagement in democratic politics bership (Mair and Von Biezen, 2004; (Putnam, 2000). Critics and supporters of Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999). Among the representative democracy have noted wider public, an increasing lack of apparently declining levels of political knowledge or interest in such organiza- interest, electoral turnout, participation, tions, especially among younger genera- and trust in the system (Dalton, 2004; tions, has been noted (Klingemann, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Gray and Caul, 2000). It Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Coleman, has been suggested that increasing indivi- 2005b). However, some of these trends dualism, freedom of choice, and the rise need to be viewed with caution. Statistics of a consumer society has meant that for party and union membership have not citizens have become more demanding been particularly reliable until quite and less willing to allow others to make recently. Also as Norris (2002) has poin- decisions on their behalf. European pub- ted out, decline is not a global phenom- lics have become used to being offered enon and parties still remain a popular choices and products to match their indi- organizational form—witness the number vidual preferences, but political systems of new parties that have emerged over the have been slow to catch up in many lib- past 30 years. Moreover, there is a danger eral democracies. In short, critics of that the notion of decline is based on a representative democracy have suggested mythical golden age of collective repre- that it is failing to promote opportunities sentative organizations that never really for direct input from the public. existed (Fielding, 2001). Yet others have suggested that this Second, it has been suggested that rather pessimistic picture is overly simplistic overall levels of participation in Western (Norris, 2002). Political organizations are societies are not necessarily declining, but not necessarily in crisis but in flux; they are that the public is now more willing to evolving rather than dying. Countervailing support single-issue campaigns and engage trends in political participation can also in unconventional forms of protest activ- be identified, which challenge the logic ity, rather than join broad-based catch-all

26 EUROPEAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INTERNET parties. The proliferation of environmental, this has in turn promoted the rise of a animal-rights and social-welfare organiza- new professional class of media relations tions since the 1960s has been seen as a personnel. A further trend is the growth significant counter-trend to the decline of of “checkbook members.” In the NGO established parties and older social move- sphere, Jordan and Maloney (1998) note ments (Kriesi et al., 1995; Jordan, 1998). the rise of what they refer to as protest Social movement scholars have also pointed businesses. Here, for the most part, the to increasing cycles of protest and direct vast majority of supporters simply donate action politics since the 1960s (Dalton, funds, rather than participating actively in 1994). Initially, this was through anti- protest or internal decision-making. Such Vietnam war protests, then anti-nuclear donations support a professional class of campaigns and green protest, and latterly activists who undertake participatory action the emergence anti-capitalism/globalization on behalf of the organization. Finally, there networks. These loose coalitions or global has been erosion of the concept of formal networks of protest are difficult to categor- membership. In European parties the ize as political organizations, since they often lines between formal party members and have no formal memberships or recog- informal supporters are blurred, with par- nizable organizational structure (Pickerill, ties encouraging donations, and participa- 2000, 2003; Wall, 1999; Doherty 2002). tion, from non-party members (Margetts, Accurate figures on the growth of cause 2006). In a more radical sense, many of organizations and the number of protests the newer direct action networks have are also difficult to establish: many net- simply removed the concept of member- works are informal, ephemeral and wither ship altogether since there are no hier- away (Putnam, 2000). archies or structures, just activists (Pickerill, A third debate centers on the role of 2003). the individual member within large poli- A fourth area of debate concerns inter- tical organizations. Common patterns can nal democracy, where the impact is be detected in political parties, trade mixed. Certainly, individual members unions, and, in some cases, large non- have increased their formal rights to par- governmental organizations (NGOs). The ticipate, most often as voters in internal notion of the mass organizational model selection processes. In some instances, has been challenged by the individualiza- power has been dispersed from unrepre- tion of participation within organizations. sentative activist cliques to the wider For example, since the 1980s many trade membership. However, this does not union and party members have been necessarily make leaders more accountable given more formal rights to participate or the process more democratic. Often through direct postal ballots on policy the participative agenda and candidate issues, leadership, and candidate selection. choice is restricted or controlled by orga- Centralization and professionalization of nizational elites as part of a top-down campaigning within parties, unions, and approach. Moreover, it can be argued that some NGOs, has also occurred (Farrell atomized organizational members are and Webb, 2000; Diani and Donati, unlikely to build a stable platform to 2001). Traditional local campaigning activ- challenge elites. Indeed, organizational ities of activists and branches have been elites have often been keen to pursue an somewhat superseded by national cam- individualized model of participation as paigning particularly through the media. As means of legitimizing their own position television has become more important in by bypassing activists and appealing to the communicating the organizational message more passive and moderate members.

27 STEPHEN WARD AND RACHEL GIBSON

Overall, though, it is difficult to detect but also sustaining new political forms. At a clear picture: there is no uniform trend one level, the basis for the internet as towards citizen disengagement. While recruitment tool can be seen in terms of older forms of collective participation administrative gains and increased mar- have undoubtedly withered to some keting potential. New technologies allow extent, collective organizational participa- parties and NGOs to become more tion is still taking place, albeit in different administratively efficient in processing and sometimes more ephemeral forms recruitment. The collection of e-mail than before. In addition, we must not databases of addresses of supporters now assume the existence of a golden era of allows organizations to make streamlined, traditional representative organizations. regularized, and swifter appeals at less cost. The arrival of the internet into the Requests for donations or membership midst of these upheavals has added a fur- forms can be sent out to thousands of ther layer to debates about the role of supporters at the touch of a button. Once political organizations. The internet has members have been recruited, e-mail can been viewed as both savior and execu- enable organizations to keep track of their tioner of the current political system and supporters more effectively. its organizational infrastructure. Much of The internet and e-mail are in some the remainder of this chapter therefore senses a continuation of direct mail tar- discusses the differing scenarios that sur- geting and computer database packages round the role of new ICTs in the intra- that have been deployed by parties and and interorganizational arenas. large NGOs since the 1980s, both of which have allowed organizations to target and track sympathizers (Doherty, 2002). The internet and However, the internet and e-mail have intraorganizational change also been seen as more effective marketing devices. The combination of the tradi- The intraorganizational debate has so far tional printed media with audiovisual tools tended to focus on contested claims within and interactivity make websites, in parti- three key aspects of internal organizational cular, an attractive medium with which to life: recruitment and the use of ICTs to advertise and canvass support. Furthermore, gather additional members and supporters; the ability to gather information on web- activism and the use of the net to increase site visitors and the narrowcasting potential supporter activity and commitment; of the technology of the internet provide internal democracy and the use of the increasingly sophisticated opportunities to new technologies to avoid the so-called target sympathizers (Bowers-Brown, 2003). “iron law of oligarchy” (Michels, 1915). Similarly, viral marketing techniques can be used to extend the range of the organizational message still further, as e-mail, Extending organizational reach? web pages, and video clips can be easily The internet as a recruitment forwarded by existing supporters to their tool friends, family, and work colleagues. Information and communication tech- Beyond simple administrative efficiency, nologies have been viewed as means of one relatively straightforward way in attracting additional supporters for poli- which organizations can extend their reach tical organizations and also diversifying is geographically. It is now much easier the social base of membership, bringing than in the past for organizations to appeal new life to traditional political organizations to a broader global audience (Rodgers,

28 EUROPEAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INTERNET

2003; Clark and Themudo, 2003). The technology. It is difficult to get one’s internet has facilitated the rise of new, message across to a general and often virtual, global protest networks, such as more passive audience. Before people visit Avaaz.org, which focuses on global justice political websites they generally need pre- issues, organizes around internet tools, existing knowledge and some degree of and targets multinational companies. It is political interest. Simply because an orga- not just new networks that have used the nizational website is available, it is unli- internet for global activism; traditional kely to make those uninterested in, or party and trade unions have also extended unfavorable towards, an organization, visit their campaigns beyond national bound- it. Many visitors to political sites are aries. One good example of this is the already politically active (Norris 2001b, emergence of virtual overseas party bran- 2002; Gibson et al., 2003a, 2005). While ches where parties can gather support empirical data on audiences for political from expatriate communities. Similarly, in websites outside the United States are still the trade union movement some have limited, the balance of most general surveys suggested that the net is supporting a new across Europe to date tend to support a form of internationalism by linking reinforcement rather than a mobilization workers’ campaigns across the world (Lee, story (Norris, 2003). Nevertheless, our 1997; Hodkinson, 2004). One further own case study evidence suggests that benefit for organizations is the ability to where organizations do deploy resources attract members in areas where they have and technology creatively then they can, no or weak physical infrastructures on the at least modestly, extend their reach. For ground. Supporters can join virtually, instance, the pro-hunting Countryside even where the organization has no local Alliance in the United Kingdom success- presence, and still be a part of the orga- fully used new technologies to mobilize a nization nationally. This is a particular wider support base among young people advantage for small organizations with and in urban areas (Lusoli and Ward, geographically dispersed memberships. 2006). We found similar results among The internet has also, arguably, formed U.K. parties with online recruitment aimed a new virtual sphere in which organiza- at the young, particularly students (Lusoli tions can campaign to attract new types of and Ward, 2003, 2006). As yet, though, supporter. One of the main debates in research on the internal angle remains internet politics literature is how different limited because of the difficulties of gain- the web sphere is for recruitment: is there ing access and the cost of data collection. actually a new audience for organizations There remains considerable scope to ana- to target that might not be reached lyze how and why online recruitment through the traditional media? In parti- campaigns succeed or fail. cular, many organizations have seen the web as means of targeting younger sup- Deepening supporter porters, so-called “digital natives”, who engagement? The internet as an are hard to reach through the traditional activist tool media but who have grown up with computer technologies as part of their Beyond the simple argument about everyday lives. reinvigoration of organizations through Despite these advantages to online additional members is the idea that the recruitment, one significant problem internet could allow organizations to limits the net’s potential as a recruitment deepen their engagement with supporters tool. Essentially, the internet is a “pull” on a more regularized basis. For example,

29 STEPHEN WARD AND RACHEL GIBSON organizations now have more potential to governments and parliamentarians with create additional opportunities for partici- high-quality information. pation. Virtual discussion forums, intra- The emergence of so-called Web 2.0 nets, online surveys, e-mail links, blogs, campaigns, however, suggests even more and social network sites such as MySpace radical consequences whereby supporters or Facebook could all provide for more and activists help shape campaigns and regular and in-depth supporter input. even reconfigure them, potentially reducing While traditional participatory opportunities the control organizational headquarters might be limited to monthly meetings, has over campaigning. Greenpeace’s recent annual conferences or one-off events, “green my apple” campaign targeting the new online spaces could allow for ongoing Apple company provides an early indi- dialogue between members and between cator of such novel elements in campaigns. organizational elites and members. While Greenpeace supporters were encouraged one might dismiss this as simply an to create their own online banners and updating of traditional participatory chan- also remix video and images placed on nels, the net has also created a range of the Greenpeace site. new protest repertoires, notably electronic Again, however, these positive benefits civil disobedience and hacktivism where have been questioned not only by scholars online activists have targeted government but also by political activists themselves. and corporations through the defacing of Some within the activist community, websites, publishing of private informa- especially those engaged in direct action, tion, and through swarming and denial of have criticized online activism as a distrac- service attacks that tie up websites and tion from real-world activities or as a rela- networks (Jordan, 2001). tively shallow form of participation with One positive knock-on effect of addi- negligible impact (Pickerill, 2000, 2003). tional electronic channels is to create stron- Moreover, studies have even suggested ger links to the organization and between that far from stimulating activism, the organizational supporters. This can help internet is more likely to create passivity build levels of trust and commitment. Most (Putnam, 2000). For example, Nie and studies of participation conclude that the Ebring (2000) found that precisely because more contact that members have with an the internet removes social setting, place, organization the more they are likely to and time, it becomes a much more iso- feel efficacious and the more they parti- lating experience than television. While cipate (Jordan and Maloney, 1998). people may connect online, the more One further benefit from the perspec- they surf, the less time they spend socia- tive of organizations is the ability to use lizing with others. Diani (2001) has fur- the technology to enable their supporters ther questioned whether virtual networks to campaign more effectively against gov- can engender enough trust between par- ernments or opponents (Galusky, 2003). ticipants to support high-risk radical acti- Buxton (2002) notes that the Jubilee 2000 vism. This sort of activity, he argues, campaign, (to end developing world requires collective identification that is debt), used the web and e-mail to provide dependent on face-to-face interaction. information and campaign material for One may join organizations online but activists. Such information would pre- without the real-world connections to viously have remained within the domain other supporters or local networks the net of professional NGO staff. The result was is more likely to encourage a passive the professionalization of activists who chequebook membership with limited could then more confidently lobby long-term ties (Lusoli and Ward, 2004).

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Flattening hierarchies? The headquarters. Furthermore, organizational internet as a democratic tool elites find it harder to control internal flows of information and dissent. Potentially, Even if we accept that the internet assists therefore, it makes it easier for elites to be with increasing their recruitment and challenged from below (Greene et al., 2003). deepening membership engagement, would Often underlying such arguments are this necessarily alter the internal dynamics normative assumptions that flattening hier- of organizations? Much has been made of archies will increase the power of grass-roots the supposed democratizing influence of members and create a more participatory new technologies that weaken oligarchy form of internal democracy. Skeptics how- and institutionalization and promote more fl ever, have questioned whether technolo- exible, grass-roots, decentralized modes gies facilitate such unidirectional changes. of behavior (Washbourne, 2001; Greene Simply providing electronic tools for et al., 2003). But how far are ICTs really participation is not the same as actually likely to override pre-existing practice empowering members. The existing par- and culture? Their role in intraorganiza- ticipatory context is clearly important: who tional democracy can best be con- controls the agenda for electronic discus- ceptualized along two dimensions (Gibson sion? What are the rules for access? How and Ward, 1999). do existing organizational rules incorpo- fi The rst dimension is vertical, member- rate electronic channels? And is participa- to-elite relations. It has been argued that the tion even viewed as important? (Burt and creation of intranets, internal discussion Taylor, 2001). Several studies have indi- forums, e-mail lists, blog networks, and cated that due to their resource and power the like might make organizational elites advantages organizational headquarters are more accountable to ordinary members. more likely to dominate the e-agenda and The greater volume and speed of infor- use it to strengthen their position of power fl ff mation ows o ered via ICTs, combined (Pickerill, 2001; Ward and Gibson, 2003). with its interactivity and presence in homes At a basic level, beyond the headquarters means members/supporters can have more of many parties and pressures groups, frequent and direct access to elites. This access and use of new ICTs is often more would promote increased accountability patchy (Gibson and Ward, 1999). Similarly, of elite-level decision-making. there is little guarantee that use of new The second dimension concerns hor- technology within organizations, even if izontal, member-to-member relations. The it challenges existing hierarchies, will not independent adoption of new media simply create new divides. As Grignou technologies by either individual mem- and Patou (2004: 178–9) conclude in bers or internal groups arguably allows their study of ATTAC, a French origi- them to communicate their views to local, nated social movement, electronic tools national, and global audiences more effec- maintain and even enlarge gaps between tively. Moreover, they can communicate expert and non-experts, and active sup- with one another more easily and network porters and non-active supporters. independently without the need to go In short, therefore, it is not clear that through official channels. Washbourne any particular model of internal democracy (2001:132–3) notes the growth of “trans- may emerge. Information and commu- localism” in Friends of the Earth, where nication technologies do not automatically local branches and activists have used promote internal democratization. Much technology to facilitate decentralized action is clearly dependent on the participatory without the need for going through ethos of the organization in question.

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The internet and (Morris, 1999), critics point to the possi- interorganizational change ble rise of electronic populism or demagoguery open to abuse and manipulation Beyond ICT-facilitated internal change, (Barber, 2004). commentators have suggested that such Nevertheless, the idea of the removal technologies may eventually alter the of organizational frameworks in politics organizational landscape of democracies seems fanciful, for several reasons. An and that certain types of organizations can unwritten assumption in these type of more readily adapt the technology and accounts is that political organizations are benefit from it. A variety of possibilities powerless to defend their positions against have been advanced, from radical dein- the tide of technological change. Yet, as stitutionalization through to a “politics as historical studies of the arrival of new usual” scenario. technologies remind us, most organizations tend to adapt and adopt the technology (Wring and Horrocks, 2001). Direct democracy: Moreover, direct democracy proponents disintermediation and erosion? perhaps underestimate the extent to One of the most radical scenarios, parti- which people wish to participate on an cularly from early accounts, is the idea individual basis. From a rational choice that the internet may hasten the demise of perspective, citizens may lack time, skills, traditional representative democracy by resources, and interest to be involved on producing a process of deinstitutionaliza- the scale required. Even if the technology tion as organizational hierarchies are flat- is available, some citizens may prefer to tened and displaced by direct input from see experts and professionals in pressure citizens (Rheingold, 1995; Leadbeater and groups participate for them. Mulgan, 1997; Morris, 1999). At its most revolutionary, a return to the classical An outsiders’ medium: model of unmediated direct democracy equalization? has been envisaged. New technologies allow for much more regular and direct A second school of thought suggests a input from the individual. Electronic more differentiated impact for the inter- forums, discussion areas, e-voting, and net and a less deterministic approach. referenda all make it easier for citizens to Notions of accelerated pluralism or have a direct say in governing themselves, equalization indicate that outsider, oppo- thus bypassing mediating institutions and sitional, or fringe organizations are likely organizations, such as parties, pressure to benefit disproportionately from the groups, and even Parliaments. The orga- rise of new ICTs and potentially pose nization and administration of direct more of a challenge to the mainstream democracy in a mass society is, therefore, political establishment. In short, new no longer untenable (Budge, 1996). While ICTs could help level the campaign practical details are somewhat limited, communication playing field. Equalizers normative debates about the benefits or point toward the apparent rise of protest drawbacks of direct democracy have flour- activity, direct action campaigns, and ished. While proponents see technology- global networks all making use of the enhanced direct democracy as heralding a technology to organize and mobilize new, more responsive system of govern- (Doherty, 2002; Bennett, 2003; Clark, ance replacing the outmoded organiza- 2003; van de Donk et al., 2004). The tions and rules of the pre-modern era media have been quick to highlight the

32 EUROPEAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INTERNET use of the internet in a range of protest supposedly rather anarchic environment campaigns, from the anti-fuel tax cam- of the net with its free flows of information paigns in the United Kingdom, anti- and a common space, relatively unregulated globalization protests at Seattle, Prague, by governments would seem to benefit Milan, and the anti-Iraq war campaign flexible, non-hierarchical types of organi- (Kahn and Kellner, 2004). zation outside the mainstream. Thus direct- The equalization case tends to rest on action protest campaigns, anarchistic and arguments about costs, disintermediation, libertarian networks are those whose values and internet culture. While newspapers are supposedly best reflected in cyberspace require journalistic and printing skills and (Scott and Street, 2001). the costs of producing one’s own televi- However, the equalization thesis is less sion or films are still relatively expensive precise over which specific organizations in equipment terms, the internet is seen a will benefit. Bimber (1998) argues that all cheap and open publishing source. It can organizations may well benefit from the significantly lower communication and use of new ICTs but that single-issues start-up costs for resource-poor organizations campaigns, new social movements, and and networks (Dalton and Wattenberg, protest networks are likely to benefit 2000). Even obscure political groups with most. Others have suggested that not all very little resources can create a website parties will be disadvantaged: some fringe that can sit alongside the mainstream outsiders, such as the far right or the political establishment. Similarly, the low greens, may in fact gain as much as non- cost and viral quality of e-mail can also party organizations (Ward et al., 2007). generate rapid connections and momen- While a number of studies have suggested tum in campaigns, promoting flash pro- that environmental organizations may be tests. Whereas television and newspapers best placed to develop a lead with the have limited space and editors can control technology because of their supposed and edit out fringe concerns, websites, participatory culture and their ability to blogs, and YouTube provide an unlimited link global issues with local campaigns platform with which to get one’s message facilitated by the net (Pickerill, 2000, across. They effectively help decentralize 2003; Doherty, 2002). Yet it could also control of the communication process. be argued that not all such single-issues Given that control and authority are groups are likely to prosper. Large pres- decentralized, it is often difficult for a web sure groups or new social movements, as surfer to gauge the size, legitimacy, or much as parties, may find themselves authenticity of organizations by simply increasingly challenged by looser ad hoc looking at a website. Hence, small and protest networks or virtual campaigns fringe organizations can create an ampli- with no identifiable leaderships or clear fication effect with a web presence. As structures (Mobbs, 2000; Lebert, 2003). Copsey (2003) notes in relation to far right parties, their professionally designed, Politics as usual: normalization? often slick sites give the impression of much larger, more representative, organi- At the other end of the spectrum, other zations than they are in reality. writers have expressed considerable skep- It has also been suggested because of ticism that the rise of the internet will the way the internet developed, its initial bring about any significant changes in the audience, (techies and academics), and nature of democratic politics. Resnick its decentralized nature has led to a parti- (1998) argues that although it was origin- cular ethos or online culture. The original, ally a playground for the alternative and

33 STEPHEN WARD AND RACHEL GIBSON anarchic increasingly the internet has been the goodwill of members or supporters normalized. In the political sphere, this who lack the time and skills to manage means that the large traditional political websites on a continuous basis. forces will come to predominate as they Finally, while the internet is often do in other media. This so-called nor- depicted as uncontrollable, it is clear that malization thesis is built on four main governments and established interests are assumptions: commercialization, fragmen- devoting increasing effort to trying to tation, new skills, and increasing regulatory regulate and control online communica- control. First, as the net has developed, tion. In authoritarian regimes, this has cyberspace has been increasingly commer- meant attempts by authorities to limit cialized and dominated by business interests online opposition through restrictions on in particular (Margolis and Resnick, 2000). access, as well as surveillance and arrests. As commercialization has occurred so the Even in European democracies attempts space for alternative politics has been have been made to restrict the online squeezed. Indeed, the space for politics as activities of far right groups (Copsey, a whole is being crowded out. The main 2003) and also monitor the activities of a uses of the internet have become the lei- range of protest campaigns (Pickerill, 2003). sure activities of sex, sport, and shopping. So far, changes in the interorganizational Second, normalizers have also ques- arena are somewhat mixed. Information tioned the idea of the increased reach of and communication technologies have the net. As we have already noted, the yet to upset the balance of power between net is a pull medium, in which it is diffi- organizations in European countries. cult to reach the politically uninterested. Nevertheless, they have undoubtedly low- More fundamentally, skeptics have argued ered the start-up costs for campaigns and that the internet has contributed to a fur- are facilitating the growth of new net- ther fragmentation of the media. While works and organizations operating in theoretically the consumer has more ways that were previously impossible. In choice, in reality this is likely to mean short, as we have argued elsewhere, the that more choose not to be exposed to internet is widening the political playing political coverage (Sunstein, 2001; Norris, field and accelerating established trends 2001b; Scott, 2005). Unlike the tradi- such as the growth of direct action and tional terrestrial broadcasting era, during single-issue politics that pre-date its arrival which the public was regularly exposed to (Ward et al., 2003; Ward and Vedel, political news, even if only as passive 2006). New technologies have not revo- consumers, in the era of web portals and lutionized or destroyed traditional collec- digital TV packages citizens can easily tive organizations, but such entities have filter out news and politics. benefited less than new social movements, Third, far from being a cost-free exer- protest campaigns, and flexible, decen- cise, normalizers argue that to produce a tralized supporter networks. sophisticated web strategy involves considerable investment (Lebert, 2003). Again, established organizations have more Explaining levels of activity resources to devote to creating websites and strategies online: and using ICTs creatively. They can developing a framework2 afford to pay professional web designers and full-time staff to maintain their sites Much of the literature on organizational and respond to voters, whereas, smaller, ICT use has focused on rather over- volunteer-run organizations are reliant on simplified two-dimensional approaches—

34 EUROPEAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INTERNET equalization versus normalization, or cen- Italy), parties and social movements tralization versus decentralization. We have traditionally owned news- reject such “one size fits all” explanations papers or television channels, which and argue that social and political shaping arguably slow the need to develop are crucial to understanding the develop- online channels (Gibson et al., ment of an organization’s approach to forthcoming). The extent of frag- new technologies. As Burt and Taylor mentation of media and the role (2001: 72) have suggested: “the extent to of public broadcasters can also which technologies are exploited and the have an influence. The fragmented, ways in which they are appropriated are highly volatile U.S. media-market shaped by the social conditions, philoso- seems to have produced an envir- phies and value systems within which the onment conducive to the creation technologies are immersed.” of partisan new media channels. The remaining section in this chapter Alternatively, where there is a explores what more specific factors could dominant and comparatively trus- shape organizational ICT strategy and choice. ted public service provider, such as Drawing on the literature, we propose that the BBC in the United Kingdom, three sets of factors (systemic opportunity it has arguably ameliorated the structures, organizational capacities, and development of a partisan web- organizational incentives) may hold the sphere. More directly, the spread of key to explaining organizational activity. internet technology and the speed of connection within countries or regions clearly provides incentives Systemic and technological for all organizations to move online opportunity structures (Norris, 2). Systemic and technological opportunity & Political environment: the basic structures provide the broad political and political system framework (feder- technological parameters within which alism, party system, electoral political organizations operate. In short, system, etc.) will also shape the use especially within national boundaries, they of new ICTs. Arguably, presidential, can alter the extent and the style to which candidate-centered, federal systems technology is used by organizations. For are more likely to be responsive to example, the idea of political opportunity interactive online technologies than structures has long been used to explain highly centralized polities because and compare protest movement strategic multilevel government with large choice (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., numbers of independent actors is 1995). The arrival of a new communica- likely to result in wider experi- tion channel adds further dimension to mentation and innovation in terms those opportunity structures. One can of campaigning (Gibson and envisage opportunity structures as falling Rommele, 2005; Zittel, 2003). broadly into two categories: Moreover, the extent to which such institutional frameworks are & Media environment: both the entrenched may also influence shape of the old media environ- technological uptake. As March ment, as well as the development (2006) suggests, newer democracies, of internet infrastructure, are (in Eastern Europe for example), important here. In a number of where political communication and European countries, (see for example political systems are less fixed,

35 STEPHEN WARD AND RACHEL GIBSON

could allow a greater role for new develop more sophisticated and multi- technologies. purpose strategies than those with limited capacity. Overall, therefore, we might expect to see greater and more innovative uses of Organizational incentives internet technology in countries with relatively fragmented and less trusted While resources are clearly important, media systems, high internet penetration organizational incentives are likely to be rates, along with decentralized, persona- the key factors not only in increasing or lized, and less fixed political systems. decreasing the willingness of organizations to use ICTs, but also the purpose for which they are used—consumerist or Organizational capacity grass-roots participatory approaches, for Organizational capacity determines the example. Organizational incentives include extent to which organizations can use the following: ICTs for a variety of purposes. Capacity can be understood in terms of three & Organizational ideology: organiza- resources: staff time, skills, and finance. tions on both the right and the left of the political spectrum have & Staff time: to run an effective claimed the web to be their “nat- website it requires time, not least to ural” medium. The participatory, keep the site fresh, innovate with communitarian politics and even the technology, and deal with the anarchic tendencies of the green information gathered through the movement provide a fit with the site. Even small political organiza- internet ethos and the possibilities tions have found that a website can of online grass-roots activism. end up generating an off-putting Equally, though, the radical liber- amount of e-mail demanding infor- tarian right see the web as their mation and answers. medium due to the possibilities for & Skills: basic web technology is not the free market and free speech it necessarily difficult to understand, offers. but it still requires a degree of & Target audience: access and use of knowledge and training to create the web, while growing rapidly in the more sophisticated and innova- Europe, is still skewed toward the tive online features. more affluent and educated sectors & Finance: websites are comparatively of society. Hence, organizations cheap to design and manage com- with a predominantly working-class pared with making TV broadcasts membership, or audience among or placing large press ads. socially excluded groups, may well Nevertheless, small organizations develop ICT strategy more slowly with limited finances may have a than those organizations with somewhat different perception of affluent web-oriented supporters. such costs. In short, generally, the Similarly, organizations that have a more sophisticated the website, the geographically dispersed audience more money is required. may also have greater incentive to develop an ICT strategy. Overall, we would expect organizations & Organizational age: the age of an with greater organizational capacity to organization may have some impact

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on the willingness to adopt the pressure groups and parties have adopted technology. Organizations founded marketing techniques and direct mail. in the 1990s are more likely to This may help widen participation at the accept the technology as main- margins, but it is unlikely to radically alter stream because they have grown up internal democracy. In terms of intraor- in the internet age. Similarly, ganizational democracy, the technology longstanding political organizations may strengthen existing trends within with well established communica- political parties and large organizations. tion and bureaucratic structures Individual members of traditional political might face more internal hurdles in organizations may be provided with more grafting new technologies onto information, more opportunities to input existing administrative frameworks. opinion direct to organizational elites, and & Organizational status: because they even more plebiscitary voting rights, but may lack sufficient exposure in the the net is unlikely to foster more collec- traditional media and access to tive participation within these types of official channels of publicity and organization. Unless organizations have websites, opposition parties, out- particular incentives for using ICTs for sider pressure groups, or challengers participatory and innovative purposes, the in a political system are likely to technology alone will not change existing have the greatest incentive to use organizational goals. Such organizations new media. are likely to use ICTs for supplementary purposes, although the emergence of In sum, incentives are likely to be greatest Web 2.0 campaigns and tools may place among young, oppositional network-style further pressure on large organizations to organizations with a dispersed, internet- allow a degree of decentralization in their literate, and participatory support base. campaigns. More innovative online activity and participatory strategies are likely to Conclusion emerge from protest networks and radical grass-roots organizations that have some One of the weaknesses of internet studies of the greatest organizational incentives to is a failure to link research to existing lit- use ICTs for these purposes. This should eratures or place it within current political not be a surprise, since in the “offline and social contexts. To understand the world” it is these types of organization political role of the internet, it should be that have tended to extend the range of clear that we need to relate it to existing protest behavior. The internet further trends within participatory politics. Hence, allows such networks the opportunity to at the start of the chapter, we referred to gain a foothold and mobilize support, at three contested trends: declining mem- least in the short term. Hence, mobilizing bership within established organizations, one-off protests or creating rapid but the changing role of the member, and the ephemeral networks is where the internet disputed rise of alternative organizations may make the biggest impact. Sustaining and protest. What impact is the internet those networks may be more problematic having in these areas? since they often lack organizational capacity. Those organizations with significant The evolution of organizations in the capacity are already using the technology internet era also raises methodological to try and broaden their support base. questions. The traditional metrics of This is not dissimilar to the way that large political participation and organizational

37 STEPHEN WARD AND RACHEL GIBSON success (voter turnout and organizational Guide to further reading membership, for example) are too narrow and require expansion. As we have seen, There is a growing general literature on the internet has already fostered the the internet, political organizations, and growth of informal supporter networks participatory politics, but it is still limited and blurred the boundaries between in a number of respects. Much of the formal membership and more ephemeral early work draws on North America and, supporters. Notably, partisan blogs and to a lesser extent, Northern Europe. It social networking supporter sites are now also tends to be limited to single country fostering participation outside formal studies. Second, methodologically, much organizational structures and impacting on of the initial focus has been on the con- formal organizational policy agendas. tent of organizational websites and small- Studies of organizations and mobilization scale case studies. There is still a dearth of arguably need to take account of new studies looking at the internal organiza- forms of online participation. For exam- tional angle and little from the user per- ple, the unofficial use of online humor spective or on internet political audiences that has become increasingly popular in (members, supporters, and the broader political campaigns through spoof web- general public). sites, blogs, and YouTube videos, could With these limitations in mind, how- be seen as a participatory activity (Shifman ever, there is a range of work that forms a et al., 2007). useful basis for study. In relation to the Moving from the changes that take broader ideas of democracy and the place within organizational types, to the internet and the role of political organi- broader systemic level, competing demo- zations, Budge’s (1996) early speculative cratic visions are emerging from con- work sets out the arguments for a more sumerist to web network models. direct democracy enabled, in part, by Nevertheless, contrary to talk of decline, technology. Although based on the U.S. we should not forget that representative experience, Bimber’s (1998) idea of organizations have actually been remark- accelerated pluralism, is a useful con- ably resilient. The deployment of new ceptualization of the potential reshaping ICTs may be used to modernize repre- role of the net. Margolis and Resnick’s sentative democracy on a consumerist (2000) “politics as usual” approach pre- model, rather than sweeping it away sents perhaps the best account of why (Bellamy and Taylor, 1998). Here citizens politics and mainstream actors are likely are viewed more as consumers of public to retain their power in the internet era. services and the focus is on value and The more conceptual and theoretical efficiency and providing individuals work of Stephen Coleman on democracy with increased choice through access to in the internet era, particularly his idea of information (Hoff et al., 2000). This in direct representation (Coleman, 2005b) itself is likely to create increasing chal- provides an interesting argument for how lenges for organizations and networks the participatory potential of ICTs could dedicated to a cyberdemocratic approach. be harnessed by representative organizations In short, while the extent of systemic and institutions. From a more empirical, but developments is shaped in different still general, approach, Zittel’s (2003) article countries by different opportunity struc- is one of the few that lays out the com- tures, we may be moving towards a more parative potential impact of the systemic fragmented and more contested demo- political environment on the influence of cratic model. the internet.

38 EUROPEAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INTERNET

Useful introductory chapters on parti- Danish and Norwegian party members. cipation, democracy and the net, as well There is also corresponding work by as case studies of organizations can be Greene et al. (2003) on trade unions, found in Webster and Lin (2002), Hoff et ICTs, and activism. Work on the internal al. (2000), Gibson et al. (2004), and Oates organizational side of mainstream pressure et al. (2006). More specific studies of groups is more difficult to locate. political organizations (especially in Europe) Pickerill’s (2000, 2003, 2006) research on have tended to skew towards parties in a range of environmental organizations the electoral context (Gibson et al., 2003c; from Friends of the Earth to radical Kluver et al. (eds), 2007; Davis et al., 2008) direct-action protest networks contains and case studies of campaign activity among some excellent insights on the way ICTs groups and new social movements. Among have been incorporated in ways reflecting the latter, see Van de Donk et al. (2004) and differing organizational cultures. McCaughey and Ayers (2003). Literature on trade unions and ICTs is sparser, although a special issue of the Journal of Notes Industrial Relations 34 (4), 2003, contains a number of good European case studies. 1 Parts of this chapter are based on Ward, S. J. For empirical studies of internal orga- and T. Vedel (2006) The potential of the nizational democracy or activity beyond internet revisited, Parliamentary Affairs,59 – the national or collective level, see, in the (2):1 16. 2 This section draws on and expands two party context, Lusoli and Ward (2003, chapters dealing with parties and internet 2004) on the United Kingdom, and strategies (Nixon et al., 2003; Ward et al., Pederson and Saglie’s (2005) study of 2008).

39 4 Electoral web production practices in cross-national perspective The relative inﬂuence of national development, political culture, and web genre

Kirsten A. Foot, Michael Xenos, Steven M. Schneider, Randolph Kluver, and Nicholas W. Jankowski

To what degree are websites produced during an election shaped by a country’s political culture, level of development, and the type of actor producing the site? Surprisingly, the websites produced during 19 elections in 2004 are more consistent across types of political actors than within political cultures. When analyzed for four communicative functions—informing, involving, connecting, and mobilizing citizens—political actors’ sites are remarkably consistent regardless of which country they are operating in. Data from the Internet and Elections Project (Kluver et al., 2007) reveals that, controlling for levels of national development, a significant amount of the variation in web production practices can be explained by differences in political culture even among democratic nations, and even more is explained by genre effects associated with five types of political actors: candidates for election, government agencies, political parties, news media, and civic groups such as labor unions and non- governmental agencies. This suggests that along with the diffusion of internet technologies comes a diffusion of genre practices, causing institutional isomorphism among political actors around the world.

The phenomenon of transnational tech- expertise, and technology-related prac- nology diffusion has received significant tices, including web production practices attention among scholars of innovation, (Howard, 2006; Kamalipour, 2006; Wilson, technology, and development (cf. Howard 2004). Patterns of transnational technology and World Information Access Project, diffusion indicate a globalizing trend among 2006; Rogers, 1995; Wilson, 2004). economic, political, and intellectual elites However, cross-national similarities and dif- in different countries toward similar tech- ferences in the adoption and adaptation of nology-related practices (Wilson, 2004). information and communication technol- One manifestation of this trend in the ogies by political actors in the context of political arena is the international circuit democratic politics remain understudied.1 traveled by American political technology Studies of technology diffusion have consultants in between U.S. elections, as demonstrated a transnational flow of notions they advise political parties and campaigns about technological affordances for political in other countries on strategic uses of and other human activities, technological internet technologies (Howard, 2006).

40 ELECTORAL WEB PRODUCTION PRACTICES

On the other hand, differences in poli- ways technology is employed. However, tical culture underlie the varying ways that the findings of this study suggest that web political practices—including those that producers are more likely to adopt trans- involve technologies—take shape in differ- national genre markers in producing their ent countries (Ho et al., 2003; Kluver, sites, than to employ culturally specificpat- 2005; Kluver and Banerjee, 2005; Ott, terns in the online structures they produce. 1998). This literature suggests that the This analysis is based on data from 19 particularities of political culture “loca- national electoral web spheres spanning lize” technology, that is, national political Europe, North America, and Australasia cultures contextualize technology adoption collected in the context of the internet and adaptation in politics within countries. and Elections Project (Kluver et al., 2007). Different assumptions within national cul- The project was designed to facilitate the tures regarding the relationship between collection of comparable data on one citizens and the state and regulations lead facet of the internet and political life: how a to variance in expectations of political wide range of political actors in democ- actors and in patterns of engagement by racies around the world engaged in the various types of actors across countries. web during national elections in 2004–5. Foot and Schneider (2006) have demon- With research teams in each country, the strated that the structure of a web sphere, overall project examined the web pro- defined as website features produced in duction practices of political parties, cam- relation to an event or topic by a range of paigns, news producers, government bodies, sociopolitical actors within a particular and non-governmental organizations, in timeframe, can either enable or constrain nations with varying levels of technology the range of actions available to internet penetration, economic power, and styles users. Web sphere structure affords users of democratic governance, and with dif- with opportunities to act and to associate. ferent political cultures. For instance, on political party sites, the Very few large-scale cross-national studies provision of features enabling e-mailing of the web in elections have been con- messages to the editors of local news- ducted to date with a common metho- papers enables site visitors to voice their dological framework that enables strong political opinions quickly and easily, comparisons across political, economic, while at the same time linking party sites and cultural contexts. Prior cross-national with the press sites. Electoral web spheres comparative studies on political uses of take shape as various types of actors digital information and communication engage in web production practices reflect- technologies (ICTs) have shown that ing their respective political roles and goals, levels of economic development and both individually and in (hyperlinked) technological development, and national relationship to each other. political structure, are significant predictors The overarching aim of this chapter is of the deployment of ICTs in politics to shed light on the relative influence of (Norris, 2000, 2001b). A collection of web genres, national development, and case studies on the online activities of localizing political culture on the web political parties in several countries shed production practices of political actors light on some of the ways parties were active in national electoral web spheres. experimenting with ICTs both in election Prior work on technology appropriation and governance contexts (Gibson et al., across countries has indicated that political 2003b), and a close comparison of online culture and several aspects of national campaigning in the United Kingdom and development play important roles in the the United States suggested interesting

41 KIRSTEN A. FOOT, ET AL. differences between candidate-centric and political actors, and political culture as party-centric elections (Gibson et al., well as political, technological, and eco- 2003a). nomic development. This analysis was These studies and others have con- guided by three overarching research tributed significantly to our understanding questions. First, to what extent do the of the issues related to particular ICTs, patterns in the production of election- political structures, and electoral, advocacy, related resources online observed in the and governance activities. However, in our present study compare with prior research view, insufficient attention has been paid to in the field (notably Norris, 2000, 2001b)? the role of political culture in the deploy- Second, how do aspects of national ment of ICTs in politics, and to political development and political culture corre- actors other than parties and campaigns in spond with the production of election- the context of elections. Political culture related resources online? Third, to what has been defined as the symbolic envir- extent do particular political actor types onment of political practice, shaped by engage in the same web production political institutions, historical experiences, practices across national contexts? Some and philosophical and religious traditions extant scholarship demonstrates that national (Kluver, 2005; Martin and Stronach, development and political culture influence 1992). This broad description includes the technology appropriation. Other scholar- assumptions, expectations, mythologies, and ship suggests that technology adoption mechanisms of political practice within a patterns have some remarkable similarities country and addresses the ways values and cross-nationally. This study compares the attitudes influence political behavior. Most explanatory power of all three on the research on the political use of the web web production practices in national has overlooked political culture, which may electoral web spheres. constrain use of the technology. Norris (2001b), for example, seems to disregard the role of cultural issues in her analysis of Electoral web practices: the internet in global politics when sug- informing, involving, gesting that electronic infrastructure may connecting, and mobilizing be the primary predictor of internet deployment in political campaigns. Four indices were constructed to analyze Addressing these gaps in the literature systematic variations in political web was one of the principal goals of the practices across a variety of web spheres, Internet and Elections Project. It was corresponding to four types of commu- hoped that by looking across national nicative functions addressed in the study. contexts during a period in which elec- The creation of the indices was primarily tions were held around the world, a guided by theoretical concerns related to greater sense of the diversity of ways in distinct differences in the types of features which various types of political actors observed on all of the various sites in the employ web technologies with regard to study. Extending and modifying con- elections in a wide variety of contexts ceptualizations of web production prac- could be gained. The aim of this chapter tices developed in earlier research (Foot is to contribute to scholarship on the web and Schneider, 2006), we thus used and electoral politics through a large- functional differences to associate features scale, cross-national comparative analysis with four practices, each representing a of the relationships between the web key dependent variable in the analyses production practices of a wide range of that follow. The first practice, informing,

42 ELECTORAL WEB PRODUCTION PRACTICES concerns the most basic function of poli- other countries near the top of the four tical communication online. Features that ranked lists that are known neither for fall into the informing category convey their economic strength, their political basic information about the central figures cultures, nor their technological infra- in each electoral web sphere, the sub- structures, e.g. Slovenia (with the second stance of their public discourse, and the highest prevalence of informing features), election process itself. The second prac- Portugal (with the second highest rate of tice, involving, is evidenced in features that connecting features), and Indonesia, (with serve as a point of entry into a more the second highest rate of mobilizing fea- interactive relationship between site visi- tures). This spread of adoption patterns tors and site producers. The third practice, for the four web practices examined sug- connecting, concerns the ways in which a gests the need for a multivariate model, site producer creates the means for site including a wide variety of potential visitors to interact with other political explanatory variables. actors and with websites produced by other political actors. Finally, mobilizing entails a set of features through which site Explaining variation in web producers enable visitors who are sup- practices: national porters of a candidate, party, or cause to development, political become advocates for that candidate, culture, and producer types party, or cause. A clearer understanding of the complex To build this multivariate model, several nature of the variations explored here, independent variables were employed. however, comes from an examination of Based on the results of prior compara- how the electoral web spheres studied tive analyses of political websites (Norris, rank in terms of the prevalence of each 2000, 2001b), indicators of economic practice. In preliminary examinations of development, on the one hand, and these rankings, a complex set of patterns technological development, on the other, suggests a number of different explana- were selected. By exploring the degree to tions for differing levels of political web which observations of political actors’ practices across the spheres. For example, web practices in electoral web spheres countries known for their economic correlate with either or both of these status, such as the United States and the variables, the notion of a global “digital United Kingdom, display some of the divide” may be tested and reconsidered highest levels of connecting and mobiliz- (van Dijk, 2005; Norris, 2001b) with ing, while Finland—whose residents also respect to political uses of internet tech- enjoy a relatively high standard of nology in the context of elections. These living—consistently ranked near the variables enable the comparison of web bottom for all four practices. Korea and observations as directly as possible to Italy both consistently rank among the prior international investigations of politics top three web spheres in the areas of online. informing, involving, and mobilizing, However, to further extend and suggesting that all three factors—techno- develop understanding of international logical development, transnational tech- patterns of diffusion of online politics, nology diffusion within particular types of two additional concepts were added to actors, and political culture—may all play the analyses. Moving beyond traditional important roles in explaining web prac- material predictors of the online actions of tices. And yet, there are also a number of political actors, this portion of the analysis

43 KIRSTEN A. FOOT, ET AL. was designed to test the notion that expectation and producer delivery of variations in national political contexts audience expectation. In the case of per- may provide substantive insight into sonal web pages, for example, common international variations in political actors’ or expected features include personal web practices. Specifically, the two dif- photos and contact information. In the ferent aspects of the political contexts in case of campaign websites, the standard the countries included in this study were list of features begins with the candidate political development, and political cul- biography, and typically includes other ture. The first of these, political develop- informational features related to political ment, relates to the variations in the or policy goals of the candidate. political institutions and political struc- Recognizable and stable sets of site features within which the elections of 2004 tures, produced by the same type of took place. Although each country inclu- actors, carry elements of genre compar- ded in the study is, in some measure, able to genre markers in other media democratic by virtue of having elections (Vedres et al., 2004; Xenos and Foot, at all, there are still a number of vitally 2005). Site genres create pressure on important variations between them in would-be site producers to conform to terms of constitutional, legal, and admin- others’ expectations by employing the istrative characteristics associated with pertinent genre markers in their web democratic governments. With the con- production practices, and at the same cept of political culture, the extent to which time, provide tracks from which to online political practices may be driven by improvise and diverge. In addition, the demand factors associated with the citi- transnational dissemination of political zenry itself is explored. Thus, the variables web production strategies and practices related to political culture are based on through networks of political actors in variations in the temperament, attitudes, different countries (cf. Howard, 2006) are and behavior of potential voters in each likely to catalyze similar web production country, as evidenced through available practices among the actors of the same secondary survey data. type, regardless of their national political A final set of variables included in the context. analyses that follow arises from previous Since the sites analyzed in each web research on web production in general, sphere studied in the Internet and and the production of campaign websites Elections Project were produced by a in particular (Crowston and Williams, variety of political actors, the producer 2000; Foot and Schneider, 2006; Yates types themselves were included as vari- and Orlikowski, 1992; Xenos and Foot, ables for two reasons. First, based on 2005). This research into the production known relationships among and between of various kinds of websites, political and various types of political actors and dif- otherwise, revealed patterns of what Foot ferent kinds of communicative activities and Schneider (2006) called genre effects. on the web, the inclusion of site producer That is, sites produced by the same type type variables was anticipated to improve of actor and/or sharing a similar purpose the explanatory power of the models. often reflect certain regularities of form More importantly, the inclusion of such and function that become associated with genre variables also enables a further test the genre of the site by both producers of competing theoretical interpretations of and visitors alike. As Burnett and Marshall the impact of the web as a communication (2003) explain, genres develop as a con- medium on political activity. Specifically, stantly cycling interplay between audience such variables enable estimation of the

44 ELECTORAL WEB PRODUCTION PRACTICES relative proportion of variation in political use the Not Clear option when technical web production that is related to domes- problems prevented them from viewing tic factors such as economic and political the archived page. Thus, coordinators development or culture, or more uni- assumed that a Not Clear response in the versal forces such as a particular style of reliability test was due to technical archi- communication and presentation using the val display difficulties and disagreements internet that transcends such geographical, between coders that involved a Not Clear economic, and political differences. response were not counted as disagree- To summarize, this comparative analy- ments in the reliability assessment. Percent sis of variations in web practices across the agreement was calculated between each international elections project centers on individual coder in the internet and an explanatory model that compares three Elections Project and a set of master codes distinct kinds of web production strategies agreed upon by the project coordinators. employed by political actors, along a Percent agreement was also calculated number of dimensions. The focal prac- between the coders within each sphere, tices are informing, involving, connecting, relative only to the coders working and mobilizing. The explanatory dimen- within each sphere, to account for differ- sions include economic, technical, poli- ences in interpretation of the measures tical development, political culture, and due to language and political cultural dif- genre effects. ferences across coding teams. Inter-rater reliability was evaluated according to percent agreement among Measurement of web coders based on two important character- production practices and istics of the data. First, the primary con- explanatory dimensions cern in the systematic coding conducted for this study was with either the presence The data from which each of the four or absence of certain types of features and dependent variables was drawn consisted information, and did not incorporate of feature coding observations from 19 continuous variables. Neuendorf (2002) national election web spheres. After notes percent agreement is particularly completing training exercises on five appropriate in such instances, “wherein English-language sites, all participants each pair of coded measures is either a hit were required to code the same set of ten or a miss.” Second, the distributions of archived English-language sites as a means the measures in this study were skewed in of measuring agreement among coders. that fewer than half the sites sampled for Four response options were provided for reliability testing offered half of the 24 each item: (1) Yes, present on a page features included in the coding schemes. produced by this site producer; (2) Yes, Such distributions force lower reliability but present on a page produced by a dif- calculations of agreement beyond chance ferent site producer; (3) No; and (4) Not even when coding is reasonably reliable clear. Since our comparative analysis is (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). based on the simple presence/absence of For these reasons, a requisite threshold of features, these response options were col- 80 percent agreement was established lapsed into three responses (Yes, No, and both between each participant’s codes and Not Clear) for the purpose of calculating the master codes and between members inter-coder agreement. Because the dis- of the research team for each electoral play of archived websites can be proble- web sphere to create the cross-national matic, participants had been instructed to data set for this comparative analysis. That

45 KIRSTEN A. FOOT, ET AL. is, there was at least 80 percent agreement the site producer or some other actor in between each of the coders and the the political system, as when the site pro- master codes, and between the coders for ducer is a press organization or political the given web sphere, for each of the web party. The third is information about sphere data sets employed in this analysis. voting, such as registration information For each web sphere, a variety of produ- and the location of polling sites. A fourth cer types were represented in the collec- feature included in the informing index is tions of websites for coding. Table 4.1 general information about the campaign contains a list of the 19 countries included process. This includes information about in this analysis, the proportion of sites the campaigning rules and possibly gov- from each producer category included, as ernmental regulations on campaigning in well as the total number of functional the country in which the elections are sites included in the sample for each web being held. Finally, the fifth feature used sphere.2 Dougherty and Foot (2007) pro- to construct the informing index is the vide a more detailed overview of the presence of speeches, either in the form of research design and data collection methods audio files, video files, or simple tran- employed in the Internet and Elections scripts. The mean value of the informing Project, within which this study was index across all 1,219 sites included the conducted. study was 0.40, with a standard deviation of 0.23. Comparing web practices Involving To operationalize each of the four practices of informing, involving, connecting, The index for involving also comprises and mobilizing as dependent variables, five features. First, the involving measure indices of features were constructed includes the presence or absence of representing these practices. As the features enabling the site visitor to join number of features associated with each the organization or group sponsoring the practice is not identical, the indices were site. Distinct from volunteering, which created by calculating the proportion of is also a part of the involving index, join- the features for any given practice that ing refers specifically to explicit member- were present on a site. ship of an organization or campaign. The second feature is the ability of the site visitor to sign up for an e-mail dis- Informing tribution list. A third involving feature is The informing index comprises five dis- the provision of forms or other materials tinct and relatively straightforward fea- that enable visitors to volunteer in the tures. The first is a biography or “About electoral process in some capacity. In Us” text. On campaign sites, biographical the case of campaigns and parties, this information typically takes the form of typically takes the form of teams of can- pages where candidates provide their per- vassers and phone bank operators, while sonal stories and backgrounds. On sites for less partisan non-governmental orga- produced by other types of organizations, nizations, volunteering can take the form a description of the organization was of more general efforts related to the treated comparably to a biography. The election process. The fourth feature in the second feature is information about issue involving index is the provision of a positions held by political actors within calendar of events, typically sponsored by the web sphere, whether that actor was the site producer. Such calendars are a

46 Table 4.1 Political content online and development measures for 19 countries with elections in 2004

Country Websites sampled, by political actor type Social, technological, and political development Candidate Government Party Press NGO/ Other Total Human New Democracy Participation Engagement (%) (%) (%) (%) Labor (%) Number Development Media Index Index Index (%) Index Index Australia 15 1 27 8 14 36 89 0.95 1.37 6 1.81 6.91 Czech Republic 27 9 33 12 7 11 70 0.87 0.55 6 1.68 7.08 Finland 51 10 15 10 7 7 72 0.94 1.32 6 1.67 5.90 France 31 15 17 10 17 10 48 0.93 0.81 6 1.90 6.03 Hungary 7 30 22 11 6 24 54 0.85 0.44 4 1.27 – India 5 36 26 14 3 16 88 0.60 0.04 2 1.53 6.30 Indonesia 11 7 15 33 7 28 77 0.69 0.07 1 1.24 6.52 Ireland 23 20 43 3 3 7 30 0.94 0.92 5 1.70 6.11 Italy 41 6 24 10 6 13 63 0.92 0.68 7 1.74 6.11 Japan 61 14 5 4 9 7 77 0.94 1.10 3 1.63 7.32 South Korea 44 8 12 7 7 21 72 0.89 1.37 4 – 6.89 Netherlands 48 8 24 5 6 10 63 0.94 1.29 6 1.80 7.32 Philippines 31 8 4 11 10 36 83 0.75 0.10 3 1.21 6.94 Portugal 3 3 41 35 7 10 29 0.90 0.76 4 1.49 5.53 Slovenia 3 45 24 10 8 10 38 0.90 0.81 4 1.64 5.79 Sri Lanka 0 14 25 49 2 10 49 0.74 0.02 3 –– Thailand 5 32 8 34 3 18 98 0.77 0.16 2 –– United Kingdom 50 8 15 10 5 12 60 0.94 1.00 5 1.76 5.78 United States 43 16 11 5 13 13 63 0.94 1.85 5 1.92 7.29

Source: Internet and Elections Project, 2006; International Telecommunications Union, 2006; United Nations, 2004; World Values Survey 2000; Vanhanen, 2003. KIRSTEN A. FOOT, ET AL. key line of communication between the Mobilizing organizers of political events, and those The mobilizing index is based on four that may be drawn to participate in them features and, as indicated earlier, reflects through political communication online. the efforts of a site producer to enable Finally, the involving index also includes supportive site visitors to become advo- the presence of features used to allow cates. The first is the potential for, and site visitors to donate money either to encouragement of, users to access materi- the site producer, or to other political als on the website for their reproduction actors within the system that may be dis- ffl tinct from the site producer. The average and distribution o ine. For example, this would include the ability to download level of involving across all sites in the fl study was 0.25, with a standard deviation images of posters or yers to copy and of 0.26. distribute at meetings or rallies. A second feature associated with mobilizing is e- paraphernalia. E-paraphernalia serves a Connecting similar function to offline distribution, but The connecting index is based on three as the name implies the communications features by which a site producer creates that are encouraged and enabled by the bridges for visitors to other political site are electronic in nature. A common actors. These bridges may be either cog- form of e-paraphernalia is the down- nitive, that is, invoking cognitive pro- loadable screen-saver, which communicates ffi ’ cesses to make the connections between an a liation or message to one s co- ’ the actors, or transversal, incorporating workers or others that share one s com- and going beyond cognitive bridges by puter space. The third feature in the facilitating movement and a shift of mobilizing index is the presence of fea- attention from the connecting actor to tures facilitating the making of public the “connected to” actor (Foot and statements in support of a candidate or Schneider, 2006). The first feature asso- other political actor by site visitors. For ciated with the practice of connecting is example, site producers may encourage the presence of an endorsement or visitors to write letters to newspaper edi- endorsements of particular candidates or tors, or attach their name to a petition or parties in the upcoming election by the endorsement in support of a policy site producer. The second is the presence agenda or political actor. In some cases, of information that facilitates a direct visitors may be able to enter their location comparison of parties or candidates on and receive the contact information for all particular issues. Typically, this takes the opinion page editors in their area. The form of an issue-grid, which provides fourth feature associated with mobilizing either a simple tabular entry or a link to is a web-to-e-mail application for a site information on the positions taken on visitor to send a link to someone else’se- various issues by a number of different mail address. The average level of mobi- candidates or parties. Finally, the third lizing among the sites included in the feature included in the connecting index study was 0.13, with a standard deviation is the presence of information or links of 0.20. that enable the site visitor to register to Together, these four indices make up vote in the upcoming election. Across all the principal dependent variables in this sites included in the study, the mean level analysis of variations in political web of connecting was 0.15, with a standard practices across the web spheres included deviation of 0.23. in this comparative analysis. As described

48 ELECTORAL WEB PRODUCTION PRACTICES earlier, the independent variables consist online within a given country, the proof a number of factors and conditions that portion of personal computers per capita, display noticeable differences across the and the proportion of hosts per capita. cases in the study, and are believed to be Data from the 2003 edition of the CIA related to variations in the ways that poli- World Factbook on the percent online in each tical actors use the internet. Specifically, country, and population sizes contempor- the primary independent variables are aneous with the electoral web spheres measures of levels of human, technical, studied, were used to calculate proportions and political development, as well as for this analysis.4 Data on the number of political culture. PCs and hosts in each country are drawn from data sets publicly available through the International Telecommunications Comparing nations Union for the same year.5 The mean value of the new media index observed in Human development these data is 0.75 (SD = 0.56, N = 1,219). The Human Development Index (HDI) produced annually by the United Nations Political development is the data source on economic or human development in this study.3 The HDI is a As mentioned earlier, in addition to metric that provides a representation of measures of human, economic, and tech- general quality of life, that is comparable nical development, the analyses are sup- across the countries whose web spheres plemented with variables designed to test were examined in this analysis and thus for the possible influence of political sensitive to variations in general condi- conditions on the patterns observed con- tions. In addition to measuring economic cerning political campaigning online. development by including an index of Several indicators were employed to gross domestic product within its general obtain measures of political development. formula, the HDI also combines eco- The first of these was the Freedom House nomic productivity data with measures of ratings, which summarize assessments of literacy and average life expectancy. In civil rights and liberties into a simple doing so, it produces a more compre- index. However, since the present project hensive picture of development across is automatically limited to countries various countries than a mere reliance on holding elections, Freedom House ratings GDP figures alone. Across the full cross- displayed almost no variability across the national data set, the average HDI score countries included in this comparative was 0.85 (SD = 0.11, N = 1,219). analysis, making them unsuitable for use as independent variables in our regression analysis. Thus, another measure was Technological development employed—the Index of Democratization A second variable in the models described developed by Tatu Van Hannen—to below is the level of technological devel- provide a slightly more detailed assessment opment present in the web spheres in of political development that captures the which sites included in the study origi- subtle variations in structural political nate. Following Norris (2000, 2001b) conditions that may be related to varia- three different proportions are combined tions in political web practices across the to measure technological development, web spheres included in the study.6 Van creating a new media index. The three Hannen’s index provides a detailed metric proportions are the percentage of persons of what he defines as the preconditions to

49 KIRSTEN A. FOOT, ET AL. healthy democratic governance that is five activities were: signing a petition, comparable across a wide variety of participating in a boycott, participating in countries. The principal ingredients in this a public demonstration, engaging in a index are the level of electoral competi- “wildcat” strike, and taking part in a “sit tion (calculated by subtracting the pro- down” strike. The sum of the activities portion of votes garnered in the last was then aggregated by country to create election by the largest party in the coun- a metric of the rate of non-voting poli- try from 100) and a measure of political tical or civic participation in each of the participation (based on the proportion of web spheres under study. the total population that voted in the last A similar approach was taken with the election). Scores were obtained for all political engagement index. The items used countries in the project that were avail- for this measure consisted of three ques- able from the latest published figures, tions from the WVS dealing with based on data collected in 2000, and then respondents’ level of objective and sub- those scores were converted to an index jective involvement with politics as a ranging from 1 to 7. Across all observa- matter of daily concern. The first is a tions, the mean Van Hannen rating was simple measure of the rate of political 4.19 (SD = 1.73, N = 1,219). discussion. (“When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally Political culture or never?”) Responses to the discussion A second dimension of overall political item ranged from 1 (never) to 3 (fre- conditions is political culture, defined as quently). The second item simply asks, the ways in which values and attitudes “How important is politics in your life?” influence political behavior, including Responses for the importance item range political participation, mobilizations, and from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very important). actions (Kluver, 2004). To capture varia- Finally, the third item is a classic measure tions in political culture across the differ- of political interest (“How interested ent web spheres, data from the World would you say you are in politics?”) with Values Survey (WVS) were employed.7 responses ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 Although these measures are certainly (very interested). As with the participation imperfect, they represent the most reli- index, responses were summed, and then able—and most importantly—the most aggregated by country to provide means, comparable set of indicators related to the by web sphere, of political engagement. general political temperaments and possi- Across all observations for which these ble demand functions that may be work- data are available, the mean value of the ing in various web spheres. In this area participation index was 1.62 (SD = 0.22, two specific facets of countrywide poli- N = 1,000) and the mean value of tical temperament are explored, political the political engagement index was 5.53 participation (beyond mere voting, which (SD = 0.56, N = 1,018). is captured in the Van Hannen index), Together, the five measures explained and another variable termed political here provide the best available indicators engagement for the purpose of this study. of the concepts implicated in the model Political participation is a simple additive introduced earlier. The indicators constitut- index based on responses to items in the ing the independent variables employed WVS querying respondents as to whether in this study are summarized by country they have engaged in five types of poli- in Table 4.1; for more detail see Foot tical or civic engagement activities. The et al. (2007).

50 ELECTORAL WEB PRODUCTION PRACTICES

Site producer types notable patterns emerged from these analyses, which took the form of hierarchical As discussed earlier, the explanatory regression models that explored the rela- model also includes variables for site pro- tionships between our dependent vari- ducer types as a way to capture the ables and a series of explanatory variables known relationship between political introduced into the model in succession. website genres and constellations of fea- The results of the fully specified models, tures. Information on producer types was which include the site producer variables, originally gathered by those who com- while controlling for the national devel- piled the original site populations for each opment and political culture variables, are web sphere. As an added precaution, the displayed in Table 4.2. categorization of each site as belonging to The first pattern was seen in the models a particular producer type (candidate, that only included the human and tech- government, party, press, NGO/labor, or nological development variables. The fi other) was also con rmed at the coding findings from those analyses did not, by stage. Before proceeding with coding on and large, neatly correspond to the find- a site, coders were provided with the ings of prior comparative research on category of site producer initially selected online political communication. Although fi by whomever identi ed the site as having the relationships between the New Media been produced by an entity with a role or Index scores and the web practices of voice in the election, and were asked to informing, involving, connecting, and fi either con rm this, or correct it. In cases mobilizing were all significant and in the fl of con ict, we deferred to the assessments expected direction, the results for human of the trained coders. For the purpose of development were somewhat puzzling. increasing comparability across spheres, That is, in nearly all cases, the observed we excluded sites that were noted as relationship between human development lacking related content at the time of and each of the web practices under study coding. appears to be negative or non-significant. The second pattern was revealed in the next group of models tested, which Results: the power of genre in probed for the influence of political cul- electoral web spheres ture, while controlling for the effects of national development. Based on these As explained above, there were three models, the addition of variables related central questions motivating our com- to political development and political parative analysis of the data. First to be culture made a distinct contribution to examined was the extent to which the the model. For example, though small, patterns in online political communica- the effect of political development on the tion observed in the present study com- practice of involving was statistically sig- pare with prior research in the field. nificant. And, as seen in the results Second, extant scholarship was extended reported in Table 4.2, remains significant further, through adding factors into the even after the site producer variables are model related to aspects of political added to the analysis. Furthermore, in this development and political culture. Third, series of regressions, the participation the extent to which particular types of index was found to be significantly related political actors engaged in the same web to the practice of informing, again production practices across national con- remaining so even after the genre effects texts was examined. Overall, a number of are taken into account. Finally, we also

51 KIRSTEN A. FOOT, ET AL.

Table 4.2 Explaining web production practices: development, political culture, and producer types

Predictor variable Informing Involving Connecting Mobilizing Human development Human development index 0.08 –0.16 –0.31* –0.06 Technological development New media index –0.04 0.05 0.12*** –0.01 Political development Democracy index 0.01 0.02* –0.03*** –0.01* Political culture Participation index 0.13* 0.02 0.13* 0.05 Engagement index 0.00 0.00 –0.01 –0.01 Genre effects Candidate site 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.06** Government site 0.14*** –0.08** 0.00 –0.07* Party site 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.14*** 0.12*** Press site 0.03 –0.03 0.04* –0.01 NGO/Labor 0.11*** 0.09** 0.07* 0.01 Adjusted R2 0.13 0.22 0.09 0.08 Unweighted N 946

Source: Internet and Elections Project, 2006; International Telecommunications Union, 2006; United Nations, 2004; World Values Survey, 2000; Vanhanen, 2003. Notes: * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001 saw a significant relationship between the within actor types. Each set of results participation index and connecting prac- suggests that these political actor/site tices. This relationship also remains sig- producer categories explain a large share nificant after the genre variables are of variations in features observed across controlled for in the fully specified model. the web spheres subjected to systematic Thus, some support was found for the comparative analysis. Indeed, once the idea that elements of political context, genre variables are entered into the ana- such as institutional characteristics and lysis, significant increases in the overall emergent demand functions, appear to be variance are explained (as indicated by the related to variations in online political adjusted R2s). Specifically, for the invol- communication across different web ving and connecting regression analyses, spheres. This suggests that at least in the over half of the variation explained can be case of democracies, models of online attributed to the site producer variables, politics that only take into account and in the analyses for informing and human and technological development mobilizing, virtually all of the explanatory may be incomplete. power lies in these variables. This suggests The third and most striking pattern that among democratic nations, the influ- within these data concerns genre effects. ence of a website’s producer type (e.g. As explained earlier, the inclusion of campaign, political party, press organiza- genre variables to the model reflects our tion) tends to outstrip the influence of interest in understanding the transnational factors specific to the geographic and poli- diffusion of web production practices tical web sphere from which it originates.

52 ELECTORAL WEB PRODUCTION PRACTICES

Discussion U.S., and Australia, the political cultures of several other countries included in the There are a number of possible inter- study have historically been shaped by pretations regarding the first pattern in Anglo-American influences, including the these findings, that is, the non-significant practice of hiring political consultants, or negative relationship between human who often bring their experiences in one development and each of the web prac- nation to another. tices under study. It could be that the Contrary to some prior studies indicat- exclusive focus in this study on countries ing that levels of national development with elections during 2004 masks or dis- determine technology appropriation, and torts the relationship between the level of other work suggesting political culture human development and the likelihood would trump transnational flows of that site producers engage in the web expertise, the findings of this study indi- practices examined. Another possible cate that political actors in various coun- factor influencing the observed relation- tries are more likely to model their sites ship is the study’s focus on electoral web on those produced by similar political spheres; other web spheres, perhaps those actors from other countries rather than produced by government agencies or for modeling them on sites produced by commercial purposes, might yield the other types of political actors within their expected relationship. Further research is own country. There are a number of required to examine these relationships possible reasons for this, including the more closely. aforementioned role of political technol- There is an interesting tension between ogy consultants working transnationally, the second and third patterns in these the desire to establish international legiti- findings. On one hand, the strong simila- macy, the particular needs of the political rities discovered between the web pro- actors as web producers, and the purposes duction practices of political actors of the for the sites they produce. same type cross-nationally support pat- Political culture and political develop- terns of international diffusion of innova- ment are difficult to define operationally tion in the realm of politics and internet and assess quantitatively (Verba et al., technologies from the U.S. and the U.K. 1987; Pye, 1985). While the measures to other countries in Europe and Asia employed in this study—Van Hannen’s found by other scholars (Howard, 2006; development index and aggregate indica- Wilson, 2004). On the other hand, the tors of political participation and political fact that political development and poli- engagement—are important indicators of tical culture factors had statistical sig- some aspects of political culture, they are nificance in predicting web production by no means comprehensive, and undoubt- practices across this sample of 19 election- edly fail to capture some of the more holding countries merits further attention. nuanced differences between the different Even though these relationships are not as countries. Furthermore, survey data rela- strong as those found for producer types, ted to political culture that could enable and indeed for one practice (connecting) comparison across all the countries inclu- the relationship is negative, on the whole ded in this study were limited. In addition this finding is remarkable considering the to displaying relatively little variation relatively narrow range of political cul- across the countries in this study, survey tures represented in the sample. Most of data were not available for a few of the the nations studied are parliamentary countries included in the analysis, as indi- democracies; in addition to the U.K., the cated by the lower Ns for the Model 2

53 KIRSTEN A. FOOT, ET AL. and Model 3 results.8 More fine-grained of democratic nations included in this studies of political culture are needed to study, differences in political participation develop additional measures, and cross- and political engagement among the citi- national surveys on political attitudes and zenry corresponded with differences in actions need to be implemented more political actors’ web production practices. broadly across regions. Aside from the findings on genre effects and political culture, the positive relationship between technological develop- Conclusion ment and each of the web practices confirms the association between overall Systematic cross-national comparative level of technical development within a research is challenging to design, fund, country and the types of web practices in and conduct on a large scale—and it holds which producers engage. As expected, much value for the pursuit of knowledge. countries with more diffusion of media Only this type of research allows for the technology, greater access to the media exploration of questions affecting great technology, and greater use of media tech- numbers of people in many countries. nology, included producers who engaged This study has focused on teasing out the in more types of web practices. Additional complicated relationships that explain the research is necessary to examine the tendencies of a wide variety of political observed negative relationship between actors to engage in different types of web level of human development and level of practices, across Europe, Asia, and the U.S. web practices. In summary, for the countries included Further research would be useful to in this analysis, the type of political actor both confirm and shed further light on producing a site was more potent than these findings. Such research efforts could human development, technological devel- include a finer grained analysis of the opment, and political culture variables in specific types of web practices found in explaining web production practices. The websites produced by specifictypesofpoli- production of a national electoral web tical actors. For example, a cross-national sphere happens in a global context: the study of political party websites, focused production practices of one type of actors on the particular functions and needs of in a national electoral web sphere are political parties, could highlight those more likely to be like those of the same aspects of party websites that were common type of actors in other electoral web across political cultures, as well as identify spheres than like those of other types of aspects of party websites that were dis- actors within the same national electoral tinctive across political cultures. In addi- web sphere. For example, websites pro- tion, a cross-national study of a particular duced by political parties in the Philippines practice across multiple types of political are more likely to be similar to websites actors—for example, the ways in which producer by political parties in the United information is solicited from site visitors— States than they are to be similar to web- could explain the relative influence of sites produced by advocacy groups in the actor type and political culture. Philippines. At the same time, political culture was determined to exert significant influence Guide to further reading on how web production practices are implemented within national contexts. An increasing array of scholars from Even within the relatively narrow range diverse fields, including political science,

54 ELECTORAL WEB PRODUCTION PRACTICES communication, sociology, psychology, Notes information science, and rhetoric, have studied the use of the web by political 1 An earlier version of this chapter was published by Foot, Schneider, Kluver, Xenos, and parties and campaigns, particularly in the “ U.S. and the U.K. The foci of scholarly Jankowski as Comparing Web Production Practices Across Electoral Web Spheres,” in analyses ranged from the integration of The Internet and National Elections: a comparative the web into campaigns’ day-to-day study of web campaigning, Kluver, Jankowski, operations (cf. Howard, 2006), to the Foot, and Schneider (eds.), Routledge, 2007, range of features provided by producers of pp. 243–60. campaign websites and campaigns’ web 2 Electoral web spheres analyzed in this chapter consist of 2004 European Parliamentary elec- strategies (cf. Williams and Tedesco, tions in the Czech Republic, Finland, France, 2006), to the ways in which citizens, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, journalists, and others have used the web Portugal, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom, to obtain political information during the 2004 congressional election in the United campaigns (cf. Bimber and Davis, 2003), States, the presidential and/or parliamentary to the impacts of web campaigning on elections held in 2004 in Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, civic engagement as well as campaign pro- Sri Lanka, and the 2005 parliamentary election cesses and electoral outcomes (cf. Valentino in Thailand. et al., 2004). A considerable literature has 3 http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/?CF developed examining online campaign ID=1548133&CFTOKEN=71996467. activities outside the U.S. and the U.K. Accessed August 16, 2007. (cf. Gibson and Rommele, 2003; Gibson 4 www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html. Accessed and Ward, 2002; Park et al., 2000; August 16, 2007. Tkach-Kawasaki, 2003). Some of this 5 www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/. Accessed research on the internet in elections has August 16, 2007. been explicitly comparative (Gibson et al., 6 Polyarchy Dataset: www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/ 2003b; Ward and Voerman, 2000). catalogue/FSD1216/ VanHannen’sCodebook: fi Chadwick’s (2006) book provides an www.fsd.uta. /english/data/catalogue/FSD12 16/FSD1216_variablelist.txt. excellent overview of the internet and Background materials: www.fsd.uta.fi/english/ politics in the U.S. and the U.K. Other data/catalogue/FSD1216/bgF1216e.pdf www. scholars have studied technology appro- prio.no/files/file42501_introduction.pdf. All priation cross-nationally, but not necessa- accessed August 16, 2007. rily in explicitly political contexts (cf. 7 http://data.library.ubc.ca/datalib/survey/icpsr – Norris, 2000, 2001b; Wilson, 2004). /3975/03975 0001-Codebook.pdf. Accessed August 16, 2007. 8 World Values Survey data on political culture were not available for Hungary, Thailand, and Sri Lanka.

55 5 Parties, election campaigning, and the internet Toward a comparative institutional approach

Nick Anstead and Andrew Chadwick

This chapter argues that a comparative approach to analyzing the relationship between technology and political institutions has the potential to offer renewed understanding of the development of the internet in election campaigning. Taking the different characteristics of political parties and the norms and rules of the electoral environment in the United States and the United Kingdom as an illustration, it suggests that the relationship between technology and political institutions is dialectical. Technologies can reshape institutions, but institutions will mediate eventual outcomes. The chapter outlines five key variables: degree of systemic institutional pluralism; organization of membership; candidate recruitment and selection; campaign finance; and the “old” campaign communication environment. This approach has the potential to generate a theoretical framework for explaining differences in the impact of the internet on election campaigning across liberal democracies.

Since the mid 1990s, it has been widely shopping, and communicate with friends predicted that the internet will have a online, it is hardly surprising that they are decisive influence on election campaign- also being citizens. ing. This prophecy has, in part at least, However, technology diffusion expla- been fulfilled in the United States, espe- nations of changes in election campaign- cially since Howard Dean’s blog-fueled ing only tell part of the story. There are campaign for the Democratic presidential other countries with high levels of inter- nomination in the 2003–4 primary net diffusion, in which it has yet to have season, the widespread impact of online such a significant impact. In the United video during the 2006 midterm elections, Kingdom, while more than 60 percent of and the proliferation of Web 2.0 social the population are now online media during the 2007–8 contest. (International Telecommunication Union, It is tempting to think that this “success 2005), there is consensus that the internet story” has been driven by the diffusion of has had only a marginal influence on the internet. By 2005, 76 percent of elections, a fact noted on numerous Americans were recorded as being online occasions during both the 2001 and 2005 (International Telecommunication Union, national polls (Coleman and Hall, 2001; 2005). And, despite ongoing divisions in Ward, 2005). It seems perverse, therefore, patterns of use, the overwhelming major- to suggest that once internet penetration ity of people have integrated information reaches some kind of critical mass (what- and communication technologies into ever that may be) a decisive political their everyday lives (Horrigan, 2007). impact somehow becomes inevitable. Since the public get their news, do their Given the unevenness of the role played

56 PARTIES, ELECTION CAMPAIGNING, AND THE INTERNET by the net in electoral contests across even with independent variables: age of legislator, the liberal democratic world, we must constituency demographics, the electoral look for additional explanations for system, and type of government. The national differences. latter was not disaggregated but defined in One element of such an explanation basic terms as “presidential” versus “par- may be found by considering how the liamentary”. Foot et al.’s highly illumi- internet interacts with the relevant poli- nating chapter in this volume, while tical institutions that pre-date its exis- focusing on a wide range of political tence: in particular, the organization of actors and featuring sophisticated depen- political parties and the norms and rules dent variables that signal the growth of the electoral environment. These vary of online campaign “web spheres”— greatly across political systems. Different nevertheless downgrades political institu- types of party organization and electoral tions in the overall analysis. The closest of environment have the potential to cata- several independent variables, termed lyze or to retard the development of “political culture” is, understandably given internet campaigning because they render the scale and ambition of the Internet and new communication technologies more Elections Project from which it is drawn, or less useful to candidates and parties defined and measured solely in terms of seeking office. When viewed in com- individual citizen attitudes and self-reported parative context, American parties are behavior. unusual political organizations, and quite Institutions proximate to election cam- dissimilar to those found in other, notably paigns can have a direct impact on the European, liberal democracies. Such dif- mobilization of resources, acting as cata- ferences may help explain the quantitative lysts and anti-catalysts. At their most and qualitative differences in internet extreme, institutional structures may act as campaigning across countries. complete barriers. Examples include the This is not to suggest that research on ban on the purchase of television adver- internet campaigning has lacked an inter- tising in the United Kingdom, or on national orientation. Rigorous individual podcasting in Singapore. Most of the time country studies are growing in number. institutions may simply make the process But, to echo the opening comments of of deploying resources unattractive, as Foot et al.’s chapter in this volume, with a would be the case if stringent regulatory few exceptions (for example, the editors’ hurdles had to be overcome to set up a conclusion in Gibson et al. (eds), 2003c; political website, for instance. Opportunity Newell, 2001; Tkach-Kawasaki, 2003), costs are also entailed in choosing to very little of the research on parties and deploy a particular resource. A large bill- internet campaigning is grounded in board purchase may cut the number of cross-national comparison of relevant poli- mailings a party can send; dedicating tical institutions. Gibson et al. (2003) campaign staff to a blogging campaign conducted a comparative survey of can- may remove them from face-to-face didate websites in the United States and roles. The internet may reconfigure or the United Kingdom, but excluded vari- reduce opportunity costs but it does not ables related to parties and the electoral destroy them. The benefits political actors environment. Zittel (2004) focused, not are able to derive are thus strongly influ- on campaign dynamics, but on individual enced by the institutional environment legislators’ adoption of the internet. (March and Olsen, 1989). Again, this involved a survey of legislator This chapter argues that a comparative websites in three countries, correlated approach to analyzing the relationship

57 NICK ANSTEAD AND ANDREW CHADWICK between technology and political institu- to the complex interaction between tions has the potential to offer renewed technology and political institutions. understanding of the development of the While institutions have often been internet in election campaigning. Taking neglected by the normalizers and the the different characteristics of political optimists, they have at least had an implied parties and the norms and rules of the significance. Normalization theory argues electoral environment in the United that the broader resources available to States and the United Kingdom as an political actors, such as money, bureau- illustration, it aims to show that the rela- cracy, supporter networks, or an interested tionship between technology and political mainstream media, will heavily condition institutions is best perceived as dialectical. their ability to make effective use of the Technologies can reshape institutions, but internet for campaigning (see, for exam- institutions will mediate eventual out- ple, Davis, 1999; Margolis and Resnick, comes. This approach has the potential to 2000). Online advantage accrues to the generate a theoretical framework for strongest offline actors. In their influential explaining differences in the impact of the book, Politics as Usual, Michael Margolis internet on election campaigning across and David Resnick (2000: 2) argue that liberal democracies. cyberspace “will be molded by the everyday struggle for wealth and power.” The relationship between normal- Normalizers, optimists, and ization and political institutions can be institutions critically understood in two ways. First, the theory is socially determinist. It The lack of comparative institutional assumes that pre-internet power brokers research on internet campaigning is per- will come to define the online world, haps best explained by the terms of refer- autonomously of technological change. It ence that have dominated discussion of therefore neglects important differences internet politics more generally. Since the between old media of political commu- net’s early days, analysis of its political nication, particularly the paper press and impact has been dominated by two dis- television, and new, low-cost, low- tinct schools of thought: the normalizers, threshold interactive and participatory who claim that current political relationships media. Second, in normalization theory, and power distributions will ultimately be existing institutions offer a framework for replicated online, and the optimists, who the explanation that political behavior claim that the internet will reform politics will remain normal. The problem is that, and radically redistribute political power. when situated in a cross-national com- These two camps are descendants of an parative context, it is best seen not as a older debate between sociological and universal truth but as a matter for investi- technological determinisms: between those gation. The question we must ask is: what who claim that the impact of technology is kinds of institutional features are more shaped by social and political institutions likely to have affinities with the particular and those who believe technology has the technological affordances of internet power to shape society and politics. While communication? A comparative approach the debate between normalizers and opti- allows us to hypothesize what may, or mists has been useful in creating much of may not, gain traction in different political the significant early analysis of the internet, systems. it has also proved limiting. Both sides The relationship between institutions have generally paid insufficient attention and the case made by internet optimists is

58 PARTIES, ELECTION CAMPAIGNING, AND THE INTERNET more difficult to disentangle, largely framework for the explanation of the because they do not form a single school development of internet campaigning. but can be divided into two broad cate- In summary, normalization and internet gories according to their attitudes to optimism approaches do not adequately representative democracy. Most applicable consider the possibility that some political to the American experience is what can institutions, as currently arranged, are be termed representative democracy optimism. likely to act as a catalyst for the integra- This approach does not argue that the tion of the internet into election cam- internet will destroy all representative paigning, while others may not. institutions, but instead claims that it has the potential to reform and rehabilitate indirect vehicles of democratic participa- America’s online success tion, most notably political parties and story elections (for example, Trippi, 2004). This approach has been accompanied by a While the chronicles of headline-grabbing second: the view that the internet will examples of internet campaigning now actually undermine representative political feature several countries, it is on the institutions (Morris, 1999). United States that most interest, both This distinction between representative popular and academic, has focused. This is democracy optimists and direct democ- unsurprising: the country can claim to be racy optimists is significant. However, the birthplace of the internet; it is the both posit a monocausal relationship only global hyperpower; its elections are between technology and politics: existing followed throughout the world; and political institutions will either be interest in its politics is strongly linked to reformed or entirely replaced under the the idea of Americanization, which sug- weight of technological change. This is gests convergence in electoral politics, grounded in how the characteristics of the especially in styles of campaign commu- internet differ from previously dominant nication (see, for example, Farrell et al., media of political communication, most 2001; Kavanagh, 1995, Negrine and notably television. The necessities of the Papathanassopoulos, 1996). television age political campaign are said The internet’s potential has long been to have made parties centralized and apparent. In the 1998 Minnesota guber- steeply hierarchical, and grass-roots acti- national contest, Independent candidate vism and civic life are said to have Jesse Ventura, running against well- become emaciated (Trippi, 2004: 37–40, established Democratic and Republican 214–15). The televisual form is one-to- candidates, used the net to organize and many; the internet offers rapid, distributed, publicize campaign rallies in the hours multidirectional, interactive, many-to-many before polls closed (Greer and LaPointe, communication. 2004: 117; Klotz, 2004: 71). In the Criticisms of technological determinism Republican presidential primary contest are of course manifold, and cannot detain in 2000, following his unexpected win in us here (see Roe Smith, 1994). But from New Hampshire, John McCain was able our perspective, devaluing the role of to raise $3 million in donations in ten non- or pre-internet organizational struc- days (Klotz, 2004: 77), an unprecedented tures, norms, and rules, in mediating feat at the time. During the presidential technological forces, and how these pro- contest that year, Al Gore organized an cesses may vary across political systems, innovative series of online “town hall” renders such an approach problematic as a style discussion forums.

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However, it was Howard Dean’s can- outspoken defender of the Iraq war, a didacy for the Democratic nomination for stance that put him at odds with many the presidency in 2004 that really seemed grass-roots Democrats, while Lamont to fulfill the early promise of the internet worked to portray himself as an anti-war as a campaigning tool. Dean was little candidate. Lamont’s attempt to defeat known nationally, though his continued Lieberman was embraced by high-profile opposition to the war in Iraq did give him Democratic bloggers, the so-called “net- a platform distinct from the other candi- roots,” who promoted his candidacy, dates in the Democratic field. During the raised money, and even starred in celebrity- early phase of the primaries, Dean strug- style campaign commercials. The internet gled to get his campaign off the ground: was important in creating momentum his opinion poll ratings were within the for Lamont: he convincingly defeated margin of error of zero and he was woe- Lieberman in the primary (Murray, 2006; fully short of cash and known supporters. Ned Lamont for Senate, 2006). At the end of 2002, Dean’s campaign The main midterm election period of team restructured its online presence, in 2006 continued to feature extensive use order to test the networking and fund- of the net. The most notorious episode raising potential of the internet. By the came during the race for the Virginia end of 2003, Dean had gone from being Senate seat. Republican incumbent George an unknown candidate with very few Allen was expected to comfortably retain financial resources to the leader in the race his position, as the precursor to a possible and the most successful primary fund- presidential run in 2008. However, some raiser in the history of the Democratic months before the election, Allen was Party (Chadwick, 2007; Hindman, 2005; filmed referring to Democratic opponent Trippi, 2004). Jim Webb’s campaign worker as a Following on from Dean’s success, the “macaca”, a racist term. The DIY video eventual winner of the Democratic nomi- of this event was immediately uploaded nation, John Kerry, while relying mainly onto media-sharing site YouTube, and on large donors to get him through the soon became a viral sensation, leading to primaries (defined by Hindman, 2005 as Allen’s views on race being questioned those who give the federal maximum of both online and, crucially, in mainstream $2,000), nevertheless used the internet to newsprint and television media. From raise a large number of small donations being 20 points ahead in the polls at the during the main campaign. This allowed end of April, Allen went on to lose Kerry, in a situation unprecedented for a (CNN, 2006; NOI, 2006; YouTube, Democrat, to achieve near financial parity 2006). By the time of the close of the with his Republican opponent, George 2006 elections, it was also clear that the W. Bush, by the close of the 2004 cam- netroots movement MoveOn, by campaign (Dwyer et al., 2004). paigning in support of several successful The 2006 midterms continued to offer Senate and House candidates, had exerted effective demonstrations of the power of influence on the Democratic takeover the internet. During the Democratic pri- of Congress. Soon after the election, mary for the Senate seat in Connecticut, MoveOn’s website displayed a table of three-term Senator and former candidate statistics for the pivotal districts, including for the vice presidency, Joe Lieberman, margin of victory, financial contributions, was defeated by journeyman candidate and number of phone calls to voters. It Ned Lamont, who had only previously mobilized volunteers to make seven mil- held local office. Lieberman was an lion calls and host 7,500 house parties

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(MoveOn, 2007). Although hard data are By the 2005 British general election, lacking, it seems fair to suggest that evidence was emerging that internet Allen’s defeat in Virginia was caused by campaigning was shaping political beha- the viral effect of the YouTube video. vior. Some British MPs were using the Certainly a Republican online campaign- net to reach out to supporters outside the ing guidebook for the 2008 elections traditional structures of party, via e-mail suggested that this was the case (National distribution lists, for example, which per- Republican Senatorial Committee, 2007). formed some of the functions performed And, as Davis et al. reveal in their chapter by blogs (Jackson, 2004). Around 50 par- in this volume, the 2006 midterms and liamentary candidates blogged during the the early stages of the 2007–8 primary 2005 campaign (Kimber, 2005). While season witnessed the growing use of the internet presence of candidates was an online social networking sites such as improvement over 2001, it was clear that MySpace and Facebook, with Hillary the internet did not play the role it did in Clinton and Barack Obama amassing the 2004 U.S. campaign. Blogging remains hundreds of thousands of members in very much a minority sport among British supporter networks. parliamentarians (Ward and Francoli, 2007). From this very brief depiction of high- In the period following the 2005 elec- profile cases it is evident that the internet tion, as social media and social networking plays a great many roles in the American trends reached Britain, politicians began campaign environment, whether it be to experiment with YouTube, MySpace, creating political networks, promoting and Facebook. A handful of prominent discussion of politics, raising funds, or politicians, including government minister storing, retrieving, and automating infor- David Miliband, began high-profile blogs. mation (Howard, 2006). In the spring of 2006, Labour Party leader Tony Blair ordered a rethink of the party’s approach to web campaigning. Britain’s online non-events? This led to the creation of the Labor Supporters Network, an e-mail list designed Observers of British elections have long to appeal to those who were not willing been wondering if the internet campaign or able to become fully paid-up party phenomena witnessed in the United members, and MpURL Membersnet, a States will make their way across the social network site that provides each Atlantic. United Kingdom campaign party member with a blog, each local managers eagerly followed the 2000 pre- constituency Labour Party organization sidential contest in an effort to “learn les- with an online discussion forum, and a sons” (Gibson et al., 2003a: 51). Overall, number of general policy-related forums. however, the net had little impact on the Meanwhile, the Conservative Party’s new 2001 general election. Only 7 percent of leader, David Cameron, pioneered the citizens claimed to have used it to look use of viral online video in mainstream for election information, compared with British politics, with his Webcameron 74 percent for newspapers and 89 percent video blog. Labour’s deputy leadership for television (MORI, 2001). It appears to contest in the spring of 2007 saw all can- have played only a marginal role in didates engage with Web 2.0 platforms influencing how individuals decided to such as Facebook and MySpace. Thus vote, and candidates’ online presences, there are some tentative signs that British though improving, were not as developed parties are integrating the net. But does as those of their American counterparts. this mean that they will converge on the

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American model? And, if so, to what States, guarantee substantial institutional extent? The next section seeks to provide pluralism. This weakens national party a framework for answering such questions integration (Epstein, 1980; Harmel and through a consideration of the differences Janda, 1982; Key, 1964). The separate between the United States and United electoral bases of the presidency and Kingdom party and electoral environments. Congress provide few incentives for party cohesion. Parties have state and local committees but their influence and level Party organization and of organization differs significantly from electoral environment: state to state. Many state committees are catalysts and anti-catalysts flimsy, and where there are traditions of for internet election strong party organization, such as in New campaigning York state or Pennsylvania, these are still only weakly integrated with the national The British and American party organi- committees in Washington. Parties are zations and electoral environments have important for government formation and much in common. When it comes to affiliation remains a very strong predictor national elections, both are historically of congressional behavior, but away from embedded two-party systems: only two the capitol, state and local party structures parties have a realistic chance of securing have few direct policy-making roles. executive power; single-party executives National party committees are institu- are the norm at the national level (not tionally separate from the party organiza- at the devolved level in the United tions inside Congress, and while there are Kingdom); and parties “take turns” in differences between the states, much the controlling the executive. Both countries same can be said of the relationship have simple plurality electoral systems between state legislatures and state-level based on geographical constituencies, and party committees. The national commit- this reinforces the two-party system. tees have grown in influence since the But there are highly significant differences 1970s, yet they are still of less importance between the two countries. For the pur- during presidential races than the staff and poses of this chapter, these may be mapped infrastructure built up by candidates along five distinct, though interrelated, themselves during both the primary dimensions: the degree of systemic institu- season and the main campaign. Even the tional pluralism; the organization of mem- most nationally-oriented electoral contest— bership; candidate recruitment and selection; for the presidency—necessarily becomes a campaign finance; and the “old” campaign matter of localized campaigning in tar- communication environment. The aim here geted key states, due to the electoral col- is to show how differences between the lege system. In the lexicon of Samuel United States and the United Kingdom in Eldersveld (1982), the American party each of these areas may be used to hypothe- system is stratarchical rather than hier- size the distinct characteristics of online elec- archical. Layers of party organization, tion campaigning in each political system. driven by factionalism along several dimensions, are only loosely joined. Contrast this with the United Kingdom, Degree of systemic institutional where the separation of powers is strictly pluralism circumscribed by the near-fusion of the Federalism and the separation of powers, legislature and the executive (Lijphart, 1984) both key constitutional values in the United and where, despite recent devolution

62 PARTIES, ELECTION CAMPAIGNING, AND THE INTERNET reforms, the state is unitary. The prime Compare this with the United Kingdom, minister and Parliament share an electoral where, as we have noted, the separation base, incentivizing party cohesion in the of powers is weak, federalism absent, and interests of policy success for the govern- parties comparatively integrated and hier- ment and re-election for MPs. British archical. There, though constituency-level parties are characterized by greater levels organizations can be rebellious, the lines of national coordination and integration, of communication are more vertically and while there are different political tra- oriented, more firmly drawn, and are ditions associated with party activism in based in long-established formal structures localities, the party structures are intern- with accompanying bureaucracies. The ally uniform. Local constituency organi- internet’s technological affordances for zations enjoy policy-making influence but creating loose horizontal networks have despite recent trends toward internal fewer affinities with this set of arrange- democratization, national headquarters ments. We can hypothesize that it is more exert close control over the whole party. likely that British parties will deploy the While some local associations can and do internet in ways that jell with internal deviate from the leadership’s script, routinized institutional traits. This is evi- national party organizations nevertheless denced, for example, by the MpURL have a major influence on the election Membersnet, which is a members-only campaign by channeling resources, coor- layer of web applications that map onto dinating activity, and applying sanctions longstanding internal party structures. (Ware, 1996). British parties are comparatively integrated and hierarchical rather Organization of membership than stratarchical. How do these characteristics interact In his classic work on party systems, with the technological affordances of the Duverger (1954) suggested that British internet? The pluralistic environment in (and other European) parties were orga- the United States necessitates building nizationally “superior” because they campaign networks composed of hor- developed durable mass membership and izontal and vertical connections that mesh participation infrastructures. Revisionists with the fundamentally stratarchical basis such as Epstein (1980) have suggested that of the system. Integration can be achieved the weaker American party model is in a way that leaves intact the operative better suited to the age of leader-focused, norms of federalism and the separation of televisual politics. Either way, American powers, but which provides lines of parties do not have a system of individual communication between levels of party membership, though there is a chance for organization and activists. The internet ordinary party supporters to play a role in provides for granular communication that the selection of candidates through the allows party staff to quickly switch from primary system (see below). Nor do they local to state to national focus and vice have a leader embedded in their structure, versa. It also reinforces the trend, since but instead rely on a successful presidential the 1970s, towards a more active coor- candidate to lead the party once elected. dinating role for the national party Parties in Congress are often described as committees. Yet, in a system where state “headless”: there is no concept of permanent party organizations often jealously guard opposition (Janda, 1993: 164). The once their autonomy, the open, looser net- decisive role of the party convention in works afforded by internet communication policy discussion and nomination has, fit well. since the 1970s, been hollowed out. And,

63 NICK ANSTEAD AND ANDREW CHADWICK as we have seen, the difficulty of coordi- campaign are attempts to construct an nating solidary resources in American online network of supporters and activists parties is affected by federalism and the at the lowest possible cost and often well separation of powers. in advance of organization on the ground. The lack of a permanent membership We may also consider this from the per- necessarily makes American parties heav- spective of activists themselves, who seek ily campaign focused. Candidates seeking policy influence and expressive benefits office are required to develop their own from political participation. For such campaign infrastructure, based around individuals, the internet provides these personal support for their platform. This is earlier and, for some it seems, with greater reinforced by the primary system, which intensity than in the “old” campaign features a large-scale campaign from which environment. elements of the party’s organization, such In the United Kingdom, while volun- as national and state committees, are some- teer activists are hardly in abundant times marginalized. United States politics supply, the party membership is at least a is candidate centered. pre-existing resource that can be tapped In the United Kingdom, parties have in more routinized and predictable ways an organic existence outside of election by party elites, candidates, and members campaigns; they are organs of policy and alike. Party elites often engage in admin- participation and have (currently declin- istrative reform of internal structures to ing) memberships. National party con- realize political or bureaucratic goals ferences differ in terms of policy influence (Webb, 2000), but the sense of fast- from party to party, but conferences do moving organizational fluidity, even chaos, retain a residual policy-making role. that often characterizes American candi- Local, regional, and national policy forums dates’ attempts to mobilize support is not provide opportunities for rank-and-file evident. activists to participate. While campaign Recent developments in Britain do, machinery does tend to deteriorate during however, suggest that the internet may be the periods between elections, greater insti- catalyzing some aspects of party member- tutional presence and continuous membership organization. The permanent mem- ship do not create pressures to continually bership base of British parties has been rebuild from scratch. There is a strong eroding for several decades. This incenti- tradition of organized opposition in British vizes parties to seek alternative models. As politics, spearheaded by the permanent mentioned in our brief description of party leader of the second largest party in election campaigning, the Labour Party’s Parliament and his or her shadow cabinet. new “supporters’ network” and its inter- In Britain, parties have pre-formed struc- nal social networking model, MpURL tures containing activists inherited by Membersnet, deliberately seek to attract successive leaders. United Kingdom poli- those who do not commit to old-style tics is party centered. party membership, or those who do not The often temporary and short-lived engage with traditional face-to-face parti- associations that constitute the American cipatory structures. This is not to suggest campaign offer strong incentives for using that British parties are converging on the the internet. The most successful and U.S. model. Significant differences will publicized examples, for example Howard persist, as British parties mold the tech- Dean’s use of Meetup or Barack Obama’s nology in their own ways. Hence, creation of Facebook groups (Goldfarb, Labour’s Chair Hazel Blears’ view that 2007) in the earliest possible stages of the “We don’t want a U.S.-style party with a

64 PARTIES, ELECTION CAMPAIGNING, AND THE INTERNET loose coalition of supporters, rather than contests, parliamentary candidates are heav- an active membership” (Blears, 2007). ily vetted by central party elites, and the Our assumption is that technology can committees of local constituency activists shape institutions but institutions will are usually small and exclusive. The envir- mediate eventual outcomes. onment for candidate selection is much less open and fluid, much more tightly managed, and more nationally-oriented Candidate recruitment and than is the case in the United States. selection It is notable that in the United States, In the United States, mechanisms for the most of the internet campaigning inno- recruitment and selection of candidates vations (McCain during 1999–2000; offer an institutional framework for sanc- Dean during 2003–4; Lamont during tioned dissent (Bogdanor, 1984: x). Distrust 2006; Obama during 2007–8) have of the corruption and patronage of urban occurred during primaries. Primary elec- party machines led to the early twentieth tions may be influenced but cannot be century reforms specifically designed to controlled by the parties themselves. weaken party bosses and increase citizen Resources permitting, any individual may influence via devices such as the initiative, run for the nomination and those without the referendum, and the recall, but most “establishment” party backing have found significantly, primary elections. While the internet particularly attractive for gar- practices have differed across the states, nering support. In Dean’s case, an out- since the 1970s, primaries have become sider candidate found that he could use fundamental to U.S. politics. Uncertainty the net to quickly ratchet up a campaign and risk are much greater for both party in the early primary stages in an attempt elites and candidates than their equivalents to reduce the costs of overcoming sheer in Britain. Participation in primaries is geographical scale and the complexity of restricted, but the thresholds are low. One the different state-level contests. The must simply register as a Democrat or uncertainty of the primary environment Republican, in some cases only a few forces candidates to cast around for weeks before the ballot. While caucus opportunities to build what are often fra- selection has not entirely disappeared, gile and fleeting coalitions of support. In many caucus votes are in any case char- some respects, candidates can use the acterized by the same degree of fluidity internet to try to reduce this uncertainty and openness as witnessed during pri- and risk. When the risks are high but the maries (McKay, 2005: 93). costs of organizational innovation are low, Primaries are absent from the British candidates are more likely to experiment, party system. Internal competition between for example by trying to tap into multiple contenders takes place in arenas sealed off online networks. During the 2007–8 pri- from direct participation by the general mary campaign, John Edwards’ campaign public. United Kingdom parties do have was notorious for spreading its bets across internal procedures, which, to varying practically all of the important Web 2.0 extents, involve mass memberships in the sites and applications, including 43Things, selection of national leadership positions, and Del.icio.us, Essembly, Facebook, Flickr, permanent local constituency associations Gather, MySpace, Partybuilder, YouTube, select their local party candidates, subject Ning, Metacafe, Revver, Yahoo! 360°, to the final approval of central staff. But Blip.tv, CHBN, vSocial, Tagworld, electoral rules guarantee party elites a sig- Collectivex, Bebo, Care2, Hi5, Xanga, nificant power bloc in national leadership and LiveJournal (Edwards, 2007).

65 NICK ANSTEAD AND ANDREW CHADWICK

This conjuncture of institutions and of the internet for lowering costs and technological affordances may be espe- reducing uncertainty and risk by spread- cially applicable to the Democratic Party, ing a campaign across a wide range of for whom the institution of the primary networks. was created, in its modern form, with the goal of empowering activists. The dis- Campaign finance agreement between much of the party elite and its base over the Iraq war has The campaign finance environment dif- fueled the most prominent web cam- fers significantly across the two political paigns, most notably those of Dean, Paul systems. We focus here on three factors, Hackett, and Lamont. Institutions (the all of which mediate the internet as an aid primary) and technology came together to fund-raising. to form a mutually reinforcing environ- First, there is the matter of scale and ment for grass-roots dissent. At the same significance. American politics, by the time, however, it still needs to be recog- standards of anywhere else in the world, is nized that factors such as the lack of a expensive. Indeed, there is much talk of fully “national” campaign domain, the 2008 being the first $1 billion election complexities of different state-level con- (Malbin and Cain, 2007: 4). In contrast, texts, and the command of territorial scale in the 12 months preceding the 2005 required of a successful U.S. primary British general election, the combined candidacy are important institutional con- spending of the Labour and Conservative straints. These may be softened but cannot Parties was just £90 million ($185 mil- totally be overcome by the internet. Dean lion) (Phillips, 2007: 13). Furthermore, found this to his cost when it actually the acquisition of money is central to came to the ballots. success in American politics. Electoral Lacking primaries and having much primaries, for example, are preceded by greater control over candidate recruit- what is termed “the money primary”, ment and selection, British parties operate where candidates’ electoral viability is within a radically different environment. assessed by their ability to raise funds from Factionalism, dissent, and risk are important donors (Adkins and Dowdle, 2002). This factors in British party selection processes process received a great deal of coverage (Webb, 2000), but they are deliberately in anticipation of the 2008 presidential managed, or are not permitted such bla- primary season, with much comment tant institutional expression (Ware, 1996). being made on Barack Obama’s success as The “selectorate” is a combination of a fund-raiser and the relative failure of party elites and members, but those John McCain to gather the funds con- members are fully paid up. It would be sidered necessary for a successful nomina- unusual to see large numbers of citizens tion bid (Heileman, 2007; MacAskill, join a British party just to participate in an 2007). There is no comparable institution internal election campaign: the threshold in British politics. The importance of is too high. And while candidates must be financial resources to American politics seen to be impressive in the face of ensures that political actors are quick to broader public opinion, they nevertheless exploit the potential of new revenue know that the internal electoral rules and streams. This has certainly been the case timetable are fixed and nationally uni- online, where candidates, most notably form, and that there will (literally) be no Democrats, have proved to be adept at outsider candidates. In this environment, raising vast sums of money (Dwyer et al., there are fewer incentives to take advantage 2004). Through the institution of the

66 PARTIES, ELECTION CAMPAIGNING, AND THE INTERNET money primary, it is possible for American scandal, imposed a donation cap of $1,000. citizens to have quite a direct impact on This law was upheld by the Supreme political outcomes. For this reason, it is a Court in Buckley v. Valeo (1976). far more rational course of action for However, the same hearing also ruled Americans to make political donations. two significant provisos, both of which The internet has made this more appar- were to have huge implications for cam- ent, by lowering the barrier to participa- paign finance in the United States. While tion and making it easier for citizens to caps on donations were deemed legal, any contribute to their preferred candidate. caps on spending were deemed uncon- Second, the American political system stitutional, on the grounds they would exhibits a diverse range of donation breach the first amendment right to free opportunities. This is a direct consequence speech. The Supreme Court also ruled of the pluralistic nature of American par- that only donations made directly for the ties. Even the national parties each con- purpose of election campaigning would tain three committees to which donations fall under the auspices of donation limits. can be sent: the national committee, the In reality the distinction between electoral house party, and the senate party. Then campaigning and issue advertising proved there are party organizations at state and to be very fine, and it was this element of regional level. Money can also be given the ruling that led to the distinction directly to candidates for office, both between hard and soft money in during the primary season (when givers American politics. Hard money donations will have a choice between many candi- to candidates fell under the remit of the dates), and then in the main electoral Federal Election Commission and were contest. In contrast, the centralized nature limited by the Federal Election Campaign of British parties offers far fewer oppor- Act. In contrast, soft money existed out- tunities for individuals to donate. The vast side this regulatory framework and, pro- majority of political donations in Britain vided it was not used to directly endorse a are given to the national headquarters of a candidate, could be gathered in unlimited party. In 2005, nearly 85 percent of the quantities, either by issue advocacy groups £38 million of cash contributions given or by central committees within political to the Conservative and Labor Parties and parties (Sorauf, 1992). itemized by the U.K. Electoral Commission The most recent attempt to close this went straight to the central party organi- loophole in the law was the 2002 zation, with only the remaining 15 per- Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act cent going to sub-national bodies (U.K. (often referred to by the names of its Electoral Commission, 2005). Senate sponsors, McCain and Feingold). Third, the two countries employ vastly At the same time as raising the hard different regulatory systems, based on money donation limit to $2,000 per can- diametrically opposed principles. This has didate, this legislation also prohibited historically been the case, but has been political parties or committees within further reinforced by recent legal deci- parties from gathering soft money dona- sions and legislation. In America, attempts tions. However, in-keeping with the to regulate political finance have focused Buckley v. Valeo ruling, the act allowed on declaring and capping donations. The organizations campaigning on issues to 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act receive unlimited donations. Many of the required disclosure of donations to candi- 527 groups (so-called because their status dates, while a 1974 amendment to the act, was defined under clause 527 of the U.S. passed in the aftermath of the Watergate tax code) that were created after the

67 NICK ANSTEAD AND ANDREW CHADWICK passing of McCain–Feingold are highly on fewer, large contributions to fund partisan and only quasi-autonomous from their electioneering (as well as still receiv- electoral campaigns, although barred from ing significant sums from party members). having direct contact with candidates They have fewer incentives to develop seeking office. The internet lends itself to support from large numbers of small this type of loose political association. donors. In contrast, in the U.S., candi- For example, Moveon.org is a 527 group, dates necessarily need to solicit contribu- and thus legally defined as non-partisan. tions from a large number of supporters. However, through its base of internet The internet has proved to be the perfect supporters, it is able to organize large- environment for this element of electoral scale campaigns to aid Democratic causes campaigning. Indeed, there is some evi- and candidates. Through the network dence that the internet is changing the structures of online organizations, it types of donations being received by becomes possible for “separate” organiza- candidates. In particular, the 2004 pre- tions to coordinate their actions more sidential election saw an increase in the effectively, to become virtually if not number of small donations (usually defined actually interlocking, and, in some cases, as less than $200, the level at which they to have a significant impact on elections must be reported individually to the (MoveOn, 2007). Federal Election Commission), a change In contrast, in Britain, there are no for which the internet was seen as par- caps on donations to political parties. tially responsible (Graf et al., 2006). In Individuals and organizations are legally total, 61 percent of Dean’s funds came able to give any sums they wish. As a from donations of less than $200 result, a significant proportion of dona- (Hindman, 2005: 124). Some have even tions to British political parties come from gone as far as to argue that the internet, as a small number of large donors. It has a mechanism for giving, is creating a new been estimated that a donations cap of era of “small dollar democracy” (Schmitt, £5,000 (approximately five times the cap 2007). imposed by McCain–Feingold in the U.S.) would deny British parties nearly 90 per- “Old” campaign communication cent of their current income (Grant, 2005: environment 390). Instead, British legislation on campaign finance has sought to curb spend- Our final dimension concerns how the ing. The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act older campaign communication environ- 1883 imposed constituency spending caps ment, particularly the roles of television on candidates, in an effort to prevent the and targeted marketing, shapes incentives purchase of office. The advent of orga- for political actors when it comes to the nized and wealthy political parties with internet. mass memberships during the twentieth Internet campaigning does not exist in century led to calls for a similar national a media vacuum. Since the 1970s in the spending cap. Such a cap was only intro- United States, paid-for television adver- duced by The Political Parties, Elections tising has been one of the most important and Referendum Act 2000 (PPERA), and most expensive aspects of the cam- which limited a party’s national spending paign. Advertising is largely unregulated. based on the number of constituencies it Candidates may buy as many slots as they was contesting (Kelly, 2005). are able to afford or calculate the public In the U.K. then, unhindered by will bear. In addition, quasi-independent donation caps, politicians are able to rely organizations affiliated with a candidate

68 PARTIES, ELECTION CAMPAIGNING, AND THE INTERNET may also purchase airtime. As is well sets of voters. internet phenomenon known, the United States was in the MoveOn used TV advertisements and vanguard of the so-called professionalization phone canvassing to great effect in the of political campaigning. The campaign 2006 midterms, as its website proudly industry, with its pollsters, consultants, proclaims (MoveOn, 2007). speechwriters, and direct marketers was, A further disincentive to devoting pro- long before the arrival of the internet, fessional campaign resources to the inter- strongly attuned to the role played by net is its unpredictability and risk when television in shaping electoral opinion and compared with older methods, as the has ruthlessly packaged political campaigns Virginia “macaca” incident revealed. for indirect dissemination via mainstream Equally, though, these things are not news media. It has equally ruthlessly down to pure chance. Jessica Vanden developed strategies for direct marketing Berg, the campaign manager of Jim via old technologies (phone and mail) Webb, George Allen’s Democratic oppo- especially in key swing states during pre- nent, revealed a detailed account of the sidential campaigns. carefully managed campaign that laun- Party-controlled television content is a ched the video, involving leaks to the mere sideshow in the United Kingdom, mainstream media and to favored bloggers where such political advertising is out- (NOI, 2006). Such events require dedi- lawed. British parties are allotted a handful cated, skilled, and well-connected cam- of regulated “party election broadcasts” paign teams. The internet campaign also during a campaign and while the audi- produces opportunity costs that must be ences for these are reasonably large, they paid for by comparative neglect of other are of short duration. However, the rise aspects of campaign communication. A of the professional campaign in Britain characteristic response in the United during the 1980s and 1990s has led to the States has in part been to try to mold the U.S.-style “packaging” of candidates for use of information and communication the mainstream news media, which is of technologies to reflect the norms of the greater importance for citizens’ political old communication environment. Political information in the United Kingdom actors have looked for ways to have the (Farrell et al., 2001; Franklin, 2004). internet do the old jobs, only smarter. Similarly, direct marketing strategies have Howard (2006) has demonstrated the grown in importance. centrality to the online campaign of the Theorizing differences across our two storage, retrieval, and automation of vast countries in this area is more complex. In quantities of information, the targeting of general, the internet seems to be less individual voters, and geodemographic effective than television in reaching data mining. undecided voters (Klotz, 2004: 64). Such Similar factors are shaping British voters are less likely to be motivated to developments. The Labour Supporters seek out political information using a Network and MpURL Membersnet are purposive medium (Bimber and Davis, unobtrusive means of gathering data on 2003). Winning elections is about raising party members. Targeted e-mail and candidate visibility among undecided mobile text messaging are now familiar voters in key marginal constituencies. features of the campaign landscape. Television and direct marketing have However, the British experience also obvious benefits when compared with reveals a growing exuberance among online campaigning in this regard, politicians who see the potential of the because they can be targeted to specific internet to bypass the constraints of

69 NICK ANSTEAD AND ANDREW CHADWICK mainstream media and the heavily regu- is emerging as a powerful tool for under- lated television environment. This was taking these tasks. These tendencies are precisely the reasoning behind the creation even more acutely demonstrated in the of the Conservative Party leader David primary system, which, with its low Cameron’s video blog, Webcameron, thresholds for entry and potential for mass according to campaign staff. Thus we see participation, allows for internal party a mix of potentialities in this field. The debate and dispute. The primary and the predominance of television and old-style internet are mutually reinforcing. Indeed, direct marketing, and its benefits for tar- it could be argued that the reforms insti- geting undecided voters in key marginals, gated within the Democratic Party in the are shaping the adoption of internet cam- 1970s have now taken on a whole new paigning in both countries. Interestingly, significance. however, the weaker role of candidate- Campaign finance is another area controlled television exposure in the where pre-existing institutions have an United Kingdom may act as more of a impact on internet-based campaign stra- catalyst there. tegies. In the United States, the primary system, particularly the money primary, give donations a greater influence on Conclusion political outcomes. The internet has made this process easier, and may, if the claims This article aimed to suggest how we of the advocates of small-dollar democ- might move beyond some of the racy are accepted, be democratizing the assumptions that have hitherto dominated process. discussions of online campaigning. The This article is only the starting point of optimists’ belief that the internet would a discussion of the relationship between remodel every existing institution has institutions and the internet. There is clearly not occurred as predicted. The more work to be done in examining normalizers’ prediction that power differences within political systems. Why, arrangements within existing institutions for example, do the Democrats seem to would simply be exported to the online be “better” at using the net than the environment is only partially accurate. Republicans? There are also questions Both focus on power and resources, but about institutional development and both do not take into account those ele- design. In the U.K., for example, there is ments of the institutional environment currently some unease about the way that influence the utility of new technol- political parties are funded and a discus- ogy. Existing institutions can act as cata- sion of a range of options, including lysts or anti-catalysts. donation caps and state funding. Likewise, High levels of systemic institutional the Conservative Party is experimenting pluralism in the U.S., created by the with primary contests for the London separation of powers and federalism, Mayoral elections in 2008. Clearly these ensure that American political parties and other relevant institutional changes remain much looser affiliations than their would have ramifications for online poli- British counterparts. The lack of a per- tics that will need to be considered and manent membership in American parties understood. makes them more heavily election focused The approach suggested here has the than those in Britain, and candidates do potential to help us better understand the not find a ready-made campaign organiza- complex interaction between institutions tion when they seek office. The internet and new technology. The differences

70 PARTIES, ELECTION CAMPAIGNING, AND THE INTERNET between British and American campaign- Good representatives of the normal- ing provide a compelling crucible, though ization approach include Davis (1999) and the approach could be used to frame the Margolis and Resnick (2000). The dis- comparison of other political systems. The tilled essence of internet optimism can be five dimensions outlined—the level of found in Morris (1999) and Trippi (2004). systemic institutional pluralism, the organi- Janda’s (1993) is an excellent overview zation of membership and supporters, the of the literature on comparative party processes through which candidates are systems, while Eldersveld (1982) is the recruited and selected, the financial demands classic statement of stratarchy in the and regulations surrounding campaigns, United States. Ware (1996) is strong on and existing campaign communication comparing party organization across structures—will play a role in explaining countries, from a British perspective. differences in internet campaigning across For an overview of online campaigning a wide variety of political systems. in the United States and the United Kingdom see chapter seven in Chadwick (2006). Bimber and Davis (2003), Foot Guide to further reading and Schneider (2006), and Howard (2006) provide excellent detail and inter- The growing importance of comparative estingly divergent perspectives on the U.S. approaches to online election campaign- case. Chadwick (2007) attempts to theo- ing can be gleaned from Foot et al.’s rize the significance of the Dean campaign chapter in this volume, as well as the and put it in a wider context. For the U.K., larger Internet and Elections Project which awaits a comparable book-length (Kluver et al. (eds.), 2007). study, see Ward (2005).

71 6 Technological change and the shifting nature of political organization

Bruce Bimber, Cynthia Stohl, and Andrew J. Flanagin

Underpinning the study of politics is an understanding of organizational dynamics and their relation to collective action. This chapter addresses ways in which new communication technologies enable the development of a diverse array of organizational forms in the pursuit of collective interests. Taking advantage of the internet’s ability to reduce transaction costs, blur private and public boundaries, and enable accessibility to information and new types of knowledge management systems, actors have available new strategic possibilities for organizing. These options are no longer dependent upon the complex array of material resources and formal coordinating mechanisms needed in the past. We propose an integrative theoretical approach to this rich variety of collective action and forms of organizing. Toward this end, we advance a conception of collective action as communicative in nature, and oﬀer a two-dimensional model of collective action space, comprising dimensions for (a) the mode of interpersonal interaction, and (b) the mode of engagement that shapes interaction. Conclusions address the implications of this new theoretical framework for contemporary organizations, organizing, and organizational membership.

It should come as little surprise that so political organization and its relationship many aspects of politics have been tou- to collective action. Because so many ched in some way by the internet and political dynamics involve collective related technologies. Much of politics, action, from voting for city council to from the highly democratic to the rigidly adopting a global warming treaty, and authoritarian, is fundamentally commu- because so much political action is nicative and informational in nature, and achieved through some form of organiza- the internet is central to changes in the tion, the nexus of organization and col- environment of communication and infor- lective action is one of the underpinnings mation that are of historic proportions. In of the study of politics. the disciplines where politics is studied, Indeed, over the past 35 years, the questions of change and stasis associated organizational nature of collective action with the internet appear across many topics: has been a recurrent subject of research public opinion and behavior, campaigns (Davis et al., 2005; Oberschall, 1973; and elections, political institutions, social Tilly, 1978). Formal organizations provide movements, global political economy, the mechanisms through which political security studies, and democratization, to issues are articulated, participants are name only a few. recruited, targets, locations, and timing of Among the most compelling topics collective actions are determined, com- associated with the internet and politics is plex tasks and strategies are coordinated,

72 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION and methods and tactics are selected. To changes in society at that time. The varying degrees, these elements of collec- recent literature on organizing and col- tive action appear in research on topics lective action employing the internet from social movements (Nagel, 1981) to suggests that the current period, close to a political parties (Aldrich, 1995). Across century from the height of that wave, political systems, organizational affiliations may well surpass it with regard to the and identification provide underlying proliferation of organizations and groups. motivations for individuals to respond The fecundity of contemporary political positively to incentives and sanctions that organization is addressed in several litera- help ameliorate the ubiquitous free-rider tures that have heretofore remained rela- problem found in collective action efforts tively distinct. For example, organizational (Olson, 1965). and management scholars have explored In the decade following the mid 1990s, the technological, social, and economic research on organization and collective contingencies associated with the devel- action associated with the internet focused opment of organic, self-organizing, post- on several topics, for example, demon- bureaucratic, and networked organizations strating the efficacy of “online” collective (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Heckscher action, documenting the appearance of and Donnellon, eds., 1994; Monge and novel forms of organizing not associated Fulk, 1999). Globalization theorists have with traditional interest groups (Gurak, identified underlying dynamics of time/ 1996, 1997), and describing changes in the space compression, disembeddedness of strategy or structure of traditional interest events, and increased global consciousness groups, non-governmental organizations that are associated with a plethora of (NGOs), and social movements (Bennett, contemporary organizational forms (Castells, 2003; Bimber, 2003). Because the internet 1996; Giddens, 1999; Stohl, 2005). and related technologies reduce transaction Theories of social capital, particularly the costs of all kinds, blur boundaries between work of Putnam (2000), acknowledge the public and private realms (Bimber et al., emergence of new forms of social inter- 2005), and make information-intensive action and association and lament the tasks and communicative processes and decline of traditional organizations, which products readily accessible, those actors by virtue of providing regularized face-to- pursuing the organization of collective face interaction among known others have action have available to them many alter- a politically beneficial effect that other native forms and strategies. These alter- classes of organization do not. natives are less dependent than in the past There are two chief contributors to the on constraints associated with material proliferation and productive nature of resources, expertise, location, and target new organizing forms, as described in the of the organizing. literature on the internet. The first is the A dominant theme to emerge from the growth of uncountable instances of civic first decade or so of this research might association and organization online, through be described as “organizational fecund- e-mail lists, discussion groups, common- ity.” In their examination of the history interest groups at social networking sites of civic association in the U.S., Crowley such as MySpace, MeetUp, and the like. and Skocpol (2001, 819) describe the The focus of many of these groups is Progressive Era as the most “organiza- political and oriented toward problems of tionally fecund” period in American his- public goods. The second contributor is tory, because of the profusion of various the expanding portfolio of strategies, lin- civic groups in response to the structural kages, and ways of engaging citizens on

73 BRUCE BIMBER, CYNTHIA STOHL, AND ANDREW J. FLANAGIN the part of traditional interest groups and Organizational fecundity in political organizations, many of which the contemporary media date to the period described by Crowley environment and Skocpol (2001). Long-established groups are attracting online “members,” The issue of increased organizational and some of those rooted in historically fecundity emerges in several literatures, anonymous forms of membership now including work on collective action, facilitate citizens engaging with one another organizational structure and form, social personally in discussion boards, or face- capital, and interest groups. Developments to-face. Clusters of smaller face-to-face since the internet’s emergence have groups can now sometimes readily band drawn some theories in sharper relief than together to engage in larger scale action, ever, but have also in some cases pre- creating new types of alliances across time sented some empirical exceptions. In and space. In these and other ways, the others the internet highlights tantalizing landscape of political organization and connections among theories. Synthesizing collective action shows change: many observations and findings across these lit- new types of organizations are doing new eratures yields a new perspective on the things in new ways, old organizations are nature of interaction and engagement doing old things in old ways, and old among organizations and their members. organizations are doing new things in new ways. These developments raise a Collective action number of theoretical questions about how organizations are conceptualized and Theories of collective action are central to categorized, how variation in structures is politics of all kinds, appearing in explana- explained, and about what underlying tions of social movements (Tarrow, processes may be giving rise to these 1998), voting behavior (Acevedo and developments. Krueger, 2004; Downs, 1957), member- Across theoretical frameworks, organi- ship in interest groups (Berry, 1984; zational fecundity presents a central Olson, 1965), and the operation of the problem of explaining organizational NATO alliance (Olson and Zeckhauser, heterogeneity and efficacy. Researchers 1966). These and many other phenomena lack a vision of organizing that sufficiently share the problem of the free rider: accounts for the variety of contemporary namely, that under certain common con- membership groups in existence, and that ditions, individual actors with an interest also accommodates the multiple perspec- in an outcome can enjoy its benefits tives addressing collective engagement regardless of whether or how much they and interaction. In this chapter, we pro- contribute to it. Actors in such situations pose a model that reformulates and syn- may be an individual citizen favoring one thesizes a variety of relevant theoretical candidate over another in an election, or perspectives, while also taking into a nation favoring a treaty reducing global account the diversity of organizational carbon emissions. The body of theoretical forms used to achieve collective action work defining conditions under which efforts today. We then situate existing free-riding occurs is enormous, as is empiri- work on various forms of collective action cal work debating its extent in real politics. within this integrative model, and draw One of the original elements of collec- conclusions about contemporary orga- tive action theory as formulated by Olson nizations, organizing, and organizational (1965) is the proposition that organiza- membership. tions are central to the achievement of

74 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION collective goals. Organizations serve to internet in politics suggests that, at the locate and contact potential participants in very least, the scope of collective action collective action efforts, motivate them to addressed by theory should be expanded make private resources publicly available, sufficiently to incorporate these efforts persuade them to remain involved despite alongside the more traditional actions that short-term setbacks and long-term risks, are typically the focus of the literature, and coordinate their efforts appropriately. such as writing to public officials, dis- That is, the chief way that free-riding is playing yard signs or bumper stickers, overcome and collective action achieved volunteering, and joining interest groups. is through the action of organizations. Of particular interest is self-organized Indeed, Olson argued that “most (though political action in the absence of a pre- by no means all) of the action taken by or viously defined interest group or other on behalf of groups of individuals is taken central coordinators, and participation in through organization” (p. 5). online organizations in the absence of Over the decades, a great deal of work well-defined “membership” boundaries. on collective action theory has come to No less important is the voluntary con- take its organizational character for gran- tribution of informational goods, which ted, or has focused on more controversial includes posting of civically useful infor- aspects of the theory, such as the assump- mation on websites, contributions to tion that human behavior is dominated by wikis, sharing of music, imagery, or other self-interest. Yet the role of organization cultural goods, and the creating of meta- in collective action is in many ways a data through tagging and social network- resurgent problem in light of new tech- building. In many such cases, organizing nologies of communication and informa- for collective action is not associated with tion. Researchers have increasingly been formal organizations dedicated to the reporting instances of collective action specific collective goal at hand (Bimber that appear not to rely on formal organi- et al., 2005). zation. A plethora of communication and One prominent example was the 1999 information tools, including electronic “Battle in Seattle,” in which a far-flung mail, the web, chat rooms, weblogs, bul- network of groups from several nations letin board systems, databases, portable interested in everything from human rights computing devices, and mobile devices, to the environment to women’s issues are increasingly being invoked to create used e-mail, the web, and chat rooms to and sustain collective efforts among a engage in a largely self-organizing protest diversity of interest groups, formal and against the policies of the World Trade informal, enduring and ephemeral. Organization (Bimber, 2003; Kahn and Uses of technology in novel collective Kellner, 2004). This case involved a actions have been reported in many con- loosely coupled network without central texts around the world, from Indonesia to financing or a fixed structure for leader- the Middle East (Kalathil and Boas, 2003; ship, decision-making, and recruitment. McCaughey and Ayers, 2003) to Iraq Instead, the network employed low-cost (Arieanna, 2005) to Mexico (Ferdinand, communication and information systems 2000). These cases appear to challenge the to focus attention on the objective of old tenet of a fundamental nexus between protesting the WTO meeting and to sus- formal organization and the solving of tain practices of self-joining and hor- free-riding problems, a tenet that at this izontal coordination. As the literature point has become part of the background describing events such as these has grown of much social science theory. Use of the over the last ten years or so, it has become

75 BRUCE BIMBER, CYNTHIA STOHL, AND ANDREW J. FLANAGIN clear that many cases exist that strain the Traditionally, organizational theories of explanatory capacity of traditional collec- convergence posit mechanisms that explain tive action theory, if not violating one or how and why organizations are becoming another tenet outright (Lupia and Sin, similar worldwide (e.g., DiMaggio and 2003). Powell, 1983; Hickson et al., 1974; Scott, One key theoretical issue that arises in 1995; Scott and Meyer, 1994). Depending these cases of internet politics is that the upon the theory, convergence mechan- classic binary free-riding decision metric is isms are rooted in the increased competi- not obvious, such as in the posting of tiveness and interconnectedness of the publicly useful information online and global market, the dynamics of globaliza- participation in various groups and public tion, and/or the institutional mechanisms forums where people’s useful contribu- related to legitimacy (coercive mechanisms), tions emerge from an interactive process modeling behavior (mimetic mechanisms), rather than the explicit pursuit of a goal. and the increasing professionalism and In these cases it is difficult for an observer standardization of professional norms to identify a discrete choice to contribute (normative mechanisms). or to free-ride, which confounds collec- However, the contemporary media tive action theory. Another key issue is environment provides many opportunities the pursuit of collective action either for emergent forms that combine the completely or largely in the absence of characteristics of traditional organization formal organization, such as the WTO forms with non-hierarchical networks protest, and the global anti-Iraqi war resulting in new forms of relations among marches in February, 2003 (Bimber et al., members, leaders, and other stakeholders. 2005; Flanagin et al., 2006). The theoretical A theory of collective action organizing challenges go beyond the longstanding must simultaneously account for the effi- debate over the extent of rationality of cacy of bureaucratic as well as network people’s action (Green and Shapiro, 1994). forms of organizing and the possibility that organizations exhibit several types of structures across time and constituencies. Organizational structures Indeed, in the case of the internet and The theoretical issues raised by the internet politics, there is mounting evidence for for organization theory are somewhat dif- the coexistence of a myriad of organiza- ferent from those in the collective action tional structures. For example, new orga- literature, and they help point the way nizations are emerging that have few toward a synthesis. The last several dec- organizational levels, simple management ades have drawn increasedattention to the and coordination structures, and yet have interaction of technologies and organiza- large memberships that exert considerable tional structure. Understanding contem- political power. Other organizations have porary forms of mobilization and collective retained their formal structures, hierarchical action requires understanding the ways in management techniques, and traditional which organizing processes and structures emphases. In yet other cases, hybrid forms are being transformed in response to rapidly of organizing have emerged: large bureau- changing social, task, and technological cratic organizations are reconstituted as environments. Nonetheless, for the most networked forms where coalitions and part the organization literature has not alliances cross organizational sectors, types, explicitly considered collective action despite and domains (Chadwick, 2007). The the centrality of the proposition that col- fluidity, blurring of boundaries, and diverse lective action requires organization. membership inherent in these dynamic

76 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION networks are evidenced in the rapid capital, and twice returned equivocal but appearance, transformation, and dissolu- skeptical answers (Putnam, 2000; Putnam, tion of organizations and organizational Feldstein and Cohen, 2003). Yet a number relationships across the political spectrum. of studies relying on individual-level Contingency theories of organizing measurement of attitudes have shown that help address the variability in organizational internet use can generate social capital forms associated with social mobilization, (Jennings and Zeitner, 2003; Kim et al., by focusing on strategies organizations 2004; Lin, 2001; Mossberger et al., 2008; develop to best fit the environmental Shah, Kwak and Holbert, 2001). conditions they face. In brief, contingency Of particular concern for problems of theory posits information as the critical political organization are two propositions organizational problem (Stinchcombe, in this literature. The first is that greater 1990) and asserts that the way to cope stocks of social capital help people over- with diverse and uncertain information is come free-riding challenges and achieve to create appropriate variety in organiza- collective action; the second is that social tional structures. By means of sufficient capital is built in organizations and forms “requisite variety” (Ashby, 1956) in orga- of association of a particular kind nizational structure, organizations are able (Putnam, 2000). The classic argument by to accommodate a variety of perturbations Putnam that generated so much discus- within the environment. This leads to sion can be restated only slightly as fol- the expectation that as the environment lows: American society has undergone a becomes more complex, organizational shift in dominance from one class of par- structures and growth strategies will ticipatory organization to others. The class become more diversified. This proposition, in decline provides regularized face-to- which like collective action theory dates to face interaction among known others, a time well before the current revolution and thereby exerts a remarkable and in media technology, offers a potentially obvious variety of socially and politically helpful theoretical grasp on the internet in beneficial effects, including fostering col- politics. Addressed to a class of organiza- lective action and the achievement of tion not typically within its purview, political goals. At the same time, classes of namely the membership organization or organization in ascendance, especially the interest group, it suggests a way to account anonymous membership groups that for some of the problems in collective came to dominance in the U.S. in the action theory with respect to organiza- mid and later twentieth century, con- tional form by offering an explanation for tribute to collective action in other ways why the kinds of organizations involved but do not build the rich, community- in collective action should be diversifying. based stocks of social capital formed in face-to-face associations. Social capital theory therefore returns us to the con- Social capital nection between organization and politics The literature on social capital constitutes via a different route, raising the question a kind of conceptual crossroads where a of how the internet shapes forms of poli- number of theoretical traditions intersect. tical organization. Early work on social capital took a dubious stance toward questions of the internet Interest group mobilization and politics. Robert Putnam explored the hypothesis that people’s use of the internet A fourth body of literature relevant to might contribute positively toward social these questions is that dealing with

77 BRUCE BIMBER, CYNTHIA STOHL, AND ANDREW J. FLANAGIN interest groups. It is a commonplace the conditions in which a traditional observation that interest groups and rela- interest group is more effective or suc- ted associations grew extremely rapidly in cessful than other organizational forms. the U.S. during the last three to four Another problem is that people’s use of decades of the twentieth century, prior to the internet in collectivities sometimes the rise of the internet. Baumgartner and confounds the distinction between “inter- Leech (1998) reported that the number of est group” and “civic association” that has groups grew from about 5800 in 1950 been so crucial in the literature on social to over 23,000 in 1995. Some of the capital, interest groups, and collective important foci in this literature, in addition action. Large, anonymous interest groups to the longstanding problem of inequality, sometimes now offer their members ways are the presence of interest niches and to interact in personal ways with others networks, the extent of competition and online, or even to find and meet other response of groups to variations in com- members located nearby. And discussion petitive pressure, various tactical and groups online, which can attain a sub- strategic choices among groups, and the stantial level of personal familiarity, read- distribution of activity across policy areas ily convert to advocacy groups when (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998, 2001; relevant issues arise. Goldstein, 1999; Gray and Lowery, 1996; Heinz, 1993; Walker, 1991). While this literature has a great deal to Theoretical integration say about how groups represent publics, across perspectives respond to their environment, compete, occupy niches, and engage the policy- We believe that common underlying making institutions they seek to influ- dynamics connect these various problems, ence, it has given only perfunctory notice and that the use of the internet in politics to technology. The development of brings these dynamics into greater relief computerized direct mail in the 1970s is for researchers. Understanding better how well recognized as a boon to interest these phenomena may reflect common group activity, since it facilitated medium- processes is likely to provide a promising to large-scale communication with mem- terrain for theoretical development in the berships and potential recruits. Yet this social sciences for years—at least as much literature has treated communication as further elaboration of each intellectual technology as simply one of an organiza- domain in relative isolation. We advocate tion’s tools, rather than conceptualizing several steps in that direction. information and communication as central features of politics that might be funda- Organizing and organization mental to the reasons for the existence— or transformation—of groups in the first We begin by drawing a distinction that is place. Perhaps for this reason, the litera- simple but that provides immediate pur- ture on interest groups has had little of chase on several theoretical issues at once: theoretical note to say about the internet, the distinction between organizing and viewing it as simply a less expensive organization. The central challenge of means for accomplishing an old task, and organizational fecundity for researchers is indeed a means whose efficacy is not yet the proliferation of categories by social demonstrated. Not the least of the ques- scientists for describing types of organizations posed by the internet for interest tion. A list of only a few types described group theory is the problem of specifying in the various literatures would include

78 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION the following: membership organization, one another, and targets for organizing civic organization, civic association, bureau- that involve large, slow-moving, policy- cratic organization, post-bureaucratic orga- making institutions. But all these condi- nization, collective action organization, tions can vary: costs of information and interest group, secondary and tertiary asso- communication can be low, for example, ciations, and online organization. The and the targets of organizing may not be multiplication of categories in an attempt cumbersome institutional processes. In to contain the profusion of online and such case, and in others, we would expect traditional organizations creates a need for organizing to take on other organizational greater theoretical clarity. By distinguish- characteristics. ing between the fundamentals of organiz- One important feature of the distinc- ing, which are common to most classes of tion between organizing and organization organization in politics and the specific is that it focuses attention on the indivi- forms of organization that manifest them- dual’s experience of organizing or of being selves in specific cases, it is possible to see organized, rather than on the particular linkages across theoretical domains. For attributes of the organization that might many problems connected to the internet happen to be at hand. Regardless of orga- and politics, organizing human action and nizational form, all people engaged in interaction is the fundamental process. instances of collective organizing must Organizing involves a set of informational encounter at least two dimensions of and communication functions: identifying experience, which we call mode of inter- interested people and their concerns, con- action and mode of engagement (Flanagin tacting them for purposes of developing et al., 2006). These are important to map- common identity or trust or for purposes ping the main concerns of the literature of sending appeals and requests, establish- described above. ing agendas, and coordinating action or engagement. Interaction It should be clear that organizing can occur through a number of organizational Mode of interaction can be thought of as forms, and even in some cases without an a dimension describing the extent to organization. Given the variety of orga- which people’s interaction with others is nizational forms now possible, it becomes personal. Personal interaction involves facile to claim, as Olson (1965), Walker repeated, organized interaction with known (1991), and others have, that collective others over time. Its chief characteristic is action requires “organization.” As we have the development of interpersonal rela- argued elsewhere (Bimber et al., 2005), tions where the identities of others matter, the classic argument that collective action and where relational development and requires “organization” is in fact a special relationship-sustaining activities are impor- case of the more general claim that col- tant to participation. Personal interaction lective action requires organizing. Various may itself be the collective action of conditions give rise to different organiza- interest, or it may entail skills and norms tional forms. The type of interest group important to other actions. typically envisioned in the literature on Interaction lacking entirely these attri- that topic represents the manifestation of butes is impersonal. In such cases, interac- organizing suited to conditions of high tion entails communication and exchange costs of information and communication, of information about goals, concerns, few avenues for horizontal interaction interests, strategies, or logistics of partici- among citizens who are not proximate to pation. Entirely impersonal interaction

79 BRUCE BIMBER, CYNTHIA STOHL, AND ANDREW J. FLANAGIN involves no personal, direct interaction dimension rather than a pair of categories with known others, who therefore is helpful for modeling change and inno- remain unknown despite shared affilia- vation in groups, and it is especially useful tion. In cases of impersonal interaction, for considering organizing practices asso- occasional face-to-face contact might ciated with the internet. Doing so allows occur at events, or online interaction may consideration of collective action orga- occur among people who know one nizing at any point along the continuum, another, but this is incidental to the goals and facilitates analysis of continuous of the group and its members. change over time, as organizations adapt Traditionally, theories have maintained and shift. relatively sharp distinctions between personal and impersonal interaction. The social Engagement capital literature, for example, emphasizes personal interaction as generative of trust Similar features of continuous variation and norms of reciprocity that constitute are associated with the second dimension social capital. It is, indeed, a literature of organizing: mode of engagement. This about personal interaction. The interest dimension represents the degree to which group literature, on the other hand, participants’ individual agendas may be describes interaction that is impersonal: enacted within the group context. We citizens join groups, and the relevant use the terms entrepreneurial and institu- relationships are between each member as tional to describe the extremes of this an individual and the central group. dimension. Typically, analysis of interest Especially within the collective action groups and collective action assumes that literature, a distinction between groups mobilizing organizations are centralized, brokering one or the other mode of leadership-driven structures that accumu- interaction is typical. Yet many collective late resources and make decisions hier- action efforts feature elements of both archically (Johnson, 1998; Walker, 1991). interaction modes. This is especially true This we label institutional, in order to of federated organizations, such as Amnesty highlight what it means for the experi- International, the Sierra Club, and the ence of participation enjoyed by mem- American Legion. In such cases, members bers, namely the paucity of opportunities may be organized by the group to become for individual members to shape the agenda involved in large-scale activities that are of the organization, and institutional struc- anonymous to other group members, tures that are generally hierarchical and such as letter-writing campaigns and bureaucratic (Bimber, 2003). making individual financial contributions. In groups with institutional engage- At the same time, local chapters often ment, central leadership makes decisions have volunteer events, social get-togethers, and rules for the group, and typically is in fund-raising activities, and chapter meet- control of resource accumulation and ings characterized by substantial personal expenditure, mobilization, and other interaction. The existence of hybrid per- classic aspects of organization. Institutional sonal–impersonal groups suggests the pre- engagement is also typically well bounded, sence of a continuum rather than discrete in that membership is clearly defined, and categories. In practice groups may be distinctions between staff and members more or less personal in the kinds of are sharp. The interest group is a classic interaction they offer members, and indeed example. It presents members with oppor- may offer a range of modes of engage- tunities for engagement, through donating, ment. Conceptualizing interaction as a contacting public officials, or participating

80 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION in events; members decide whether to combining the agendas of institutionalized participate, and how much, but the oppor- actors, such as fair trade organizations, tunities are created by the institution rather with the self-organizing aspects of both than organizational members. Members of community groups and international the NRA, for instance, traditionally respond online networks. to, rather than create, the organizational It is theoretically useful to align mode calls for action intended to further the of engagement and mode of interaction as collective interests of members. orthogonal dimensions. The resulting Many forms of organization deviating two-dimensional area we call “collective from the bureaucratic type are well action space” (Flanagin et al., 2006), known (Davidow and Malone, 1992; which is illustrated in Figure 6.1. In this Drucker, 1988; Galbraith and Kazanjiam, space, we designate mode of interaction 1988; Heckscher and Donnellon, eds., the horizontal dimension, with increasing 1994; Nohria and Berkley, 1994; Powell, values representing more personal inter- 1990). Key features of these are a diversity action. On the vertical axis, increasing of organizational roles that may change values represent more entrepreneurial over time and space, flexible leadership, a engagement. We use the standard con- high degree of horizontal communication vention for numbering quadrants in a (Monge and Contractor, 2003), bound- Cartesian system, starting with I in the aries arising from communication patterns upper-right and proceeding counter- rather than institutionalization, and in some clockwise to IV. cases network-based forms predominating A number of theoretical traditions and entirely over bureaucractic forms (Fulk, claims can be placed in relation to one 2001). In instances of collective organiz- another in the collective action space. ing with many such features, participants The observation in the interest group lit- have greater opportunities to shape the erature about the rapid growth of mem- agenda of action, by defining and creating bership groups in the American political opportunities for action rather than scene constitutes an observation that responding passively to agendas created quadrant IV was largely populated in the centrally. They may even produce col- U.S. during the second half of the twen- lective action not sanctioned by a central tieth century. The diversification of poli- authority. tical interests in the U.S., the structure of We refer to this as entrepreneurial parties and policy-making institutions, engagement. It is illustrated by students and the legacy of industrialization and the who mobilize “friend” networks on growth of the state, created conditions MySpace or Facebook to accomplish a whereby a great deal of organizing and collective action, such as protesting a pro- collective action occurred in the institu- posed change to U.S. immigration policy. tional–impersonal modes. This makes the It is also illustrated by participants in increasing population of quadrant IV in MeetUps, who use the informational the twentieth century an important char- power of the internet to propose and acteristic of American political development. organize face-to-face meetings of people Similarly, the development of quad- interested in some local or national public rants II and III, which entail more perso- good. Organizing occurs with both insti- nal forms of interaction, can be placed tutional and entrepreneurial features as historically. Quadrant II represents the well. Protests and demonstrations against Tocquevillian ideal of small-scale civic social injustices connected with globalization associations of the early nation, where provide a number of examples, typically personal, community-level bonds were

81 BRUCE BIMBER, CYNTHIA STOHL, AND ANDREW J. FLANAGIN

Figure 6.1 Collective action space. formed and reinforced through local shifts downward along the vertical axis, as association. Tocqueville’s discovery of the organizations succumb to pressures of rich array of civic associations embedded institutionalization over time (Scott, 1995; in American public life in the early nine- Scott and Christensen, 1995; Scott and teenth century constitutes a comparative Meyer, 1994). observation between the U.S. and Europe with respect to quadrant II. Habermas The internet, interaction, and (1962/1991) similarly recognized the engagement importance of the citizenry articulating their goals and desires, through direct Because it depicts variation in the individual- dialog guided by collective interests, level experience of organizing, rather than toward inﬂuencing acts of the state. Later in speciﬁc organizational categories, the sociological and historical literature collective action space suggests that a wide describing the dislocations and alienation range of literatures that have been intellec- associated with the industrial revolution, tually adjacent to one another in the social urbanization, and modernization of the sciences are in fact describing a common late nineteenth century and early twen- set of phenomena: two-dimensional var- tieth century (e.g., Toennies, 1887/1980) iation over time and issue space in people’s entails an argument about drift toward interaction with others and with agendas more impersonal, institutionalized social of collective action. This variation drives relations. In collective action space, mod- the highly variable forms of organization ernization appears as drift away from that researchers observe at the group and quadrant II, both downward toward aggregate level of observation. institutionalization and rightward toward With this in mind, the dynamics of more impersonal forms of civic associa- the internet in politics can be placed in tion. Putnam’s argument about the decay context. In collective action space, the of social capital groups in the twentieth internet does not lead to wholly novel century extends that observation. Finally, forms of organizing or organization. Like organizational theories have also articulated other sociotechnical developments before

82 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION it, the internet would appear to alter the collective action space, and to compare distribution of collective action in this this to historical baselines from, say, a space. The hallmark of the internet as a decade ago or a half-century ago. However, medium relevant to politics is its lack of the thesis that the internet facilitates specialization with respect to interaction organizing across all of collective action and engagement. It facilitates personal and space is consistent with the observation of impersonal interaction, from small, intense organizational fecundity. Increasing vari- discussion groups to “viral” e-mail that ety of organizations and heterogeneity of expands among unknown lists of citizens. forms of organizing within individual It facilitates hierarchical control by per- organizations would be precisely the ten- mitting the gathering and sense-making of dency one would expect to be produced by vast amounts of information by the central the widespread, rapid adoption through- leadership of globe-spanning organiza- out society of a set of technologies with tions, just as it permits decentralized, self- the properties of the internet with respect organizing coordination among loose net- to interaction and engagement. works of people. Where political organizing If this thesis is correct, then the internet is concerned, this flexibility is what dis- can be understood in relationship to pre- tinguishes the internet from previous media. vious historical trends in forms of orga- It is why we see the internet aiding large, nizing. Whereas previous trends have anonymous membership groups in find- tended to be associated with shifts across ing members and mobilizing them toward quadrants and to involve growth that is centrally directed goals, while also helping comparatively localized in collective small groups of citizens with common action space, the tendency of the con- interests to find one another and act temporary media environment involves together in a personal way. greater diffusion and spreading across all The flexibility of this medium makes it quadrants. New organizations with entre- theoretically distinct in politics from earlier preneurial styles and informal structures, technologies: broadcasting, databases and such as FreeRepublic, represent growth in direct mail, telephony, and the news- the upper quadrants. Meta-organizations paper. To take one example, databases such as MeetUp, which facilitate the for- and direct mail are often described as mation of informal groups by citizens, crucial to the rise of interest-group poli- also contribute to quadrants I and II, as do tics. In our terms, these technologies are social networking sites, such as MySpace, particularly well suited to institutional which provide a means for people to engagement and impersonal interaction. interact with friends and known others Operating a direct-mail operation requires and also to form large networks of thin, centralized resources and expertise, and it impersonal ties, in the absence of a cen- permits “downward” or outward commu- tralized agenda. Efforts to recruit and nication from a center to a membership, mobilize members via e-mail by advocacy but not the reverse. These technologies groups such as Environmental Defense provide essentially no opportunity for constitute classic quadrant IV activity. citizens to interact with one another, and To observe that the affordances of the only limited opportunity to contribute to internet can contribute to forms of orga- collective agenda-building and decision- nizing located across all of collective making in the group. These are technol- action space is useful, but insufficient. Of ogies specialized in quadrant IV. course, many factors bear on the strate- It would be impossible to conduct a gies, boundaries, success, and shape of census of forms of organizing across organizations. Forces for organizational

83 BRUCE BIMBER, CYNTHIA STOHL, AND ANDREW J. FLANAGIN homophily tend to cause similarity among Conclusion groups facing similar local circumstances, and therefore might lead to clustering of In just over a decade of its meaningful groups facing similar organizational presence in politics, the internet has “fields” or environments (DiMaggio and shown that questions about the form Powell, 1983). Competition among groups organizations take, and why, are key not may provide returns from innovation and only to organizational theory, but also to experimentation, leading some groups theories of collective action, social capital, successfully to differentiate themselves in and interest groups. In those literatures, collective action space, as well as along the topic “organization” has been to a other dimensions. Some organizations surprising degree a settled issue for years, face institutionalized constraints on their yet in each case settled in isolation from form and boundaries, as in the case of the others. The ways people are using the political parties, which are tied by a rich internet in politics now is unsettling to web of electoral laws to the structure of those theories, and that is theoretically states. To the extent that collective action useful. We have argued that the best way goals involve common targets, such as a to view organizational form in politics is national legislature, the organizational as a reflection of the environment for forms that groups adopt are likely to communication and information, rather cluster in ways that have proven histori- than seeing formal organization as funda- cally successful. mental or as a given. In other words, The affordances of the internet there- processes of communication and infor- fore interact with such factors in affecting mation give rise to organizations, just as the overall distribution of collective organizations give rise to communication action, just as such forces have shaped and information. The underlying com- previous eras of organizing. On the municative and informational features of whole, the kind of conditions generally many organizational forms can be under- that should contribute toward organiza- stood in terms of engagement and inter- tional variety would include low levels of action: the personal character of people’s constraints on organizational innovation experience with one another as indivi- generally; the absence of strong selection duals, and the nature of their experience mechanisms weeding out less successful with the process of organizing. From organizational innovations; conditions these two ingredients arise the familiar whereby it is difficult for groups to learn organizational forms of civic associations from one another, as in cases where success and interest groups, hybrid forms of is distinguished from failure by non-linear, organization, and cases that are better chaotic, or path-dependent mechanisms; understood as processes of organizing than and perhaps most importantly, by the as organizations. complexity of operating environments. It The research road ahead is therefore is quite possible that the internet pro- not simply about technology, or media, motes organizational fecundity and variety or organizations. The crucial questions via mechanisms both internal and external are: when many of forms of organizing to organizations. Within them, it permits a are open to many kinds of actors, who broader range of interaction and engage- chooses which ones, and how do their ment, with the result being a tendency for choices affect who wins and loses in greater organizational variety. Externally, democracy? Which factors tell us the most it contributes toward greater complexity about how politics is organized: idiosyn- in the organizational environment. cratic and path-dependent features of

84 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION organizations, the environment of institu- These foundational works helped to tions, culture, or characteristics of partici- articulate the core concepts and dynamics pants in collective action themselves? of collective action efforts. Technology itself can not constitute the In the last decade or so, the work of a answer to these questions, but under- number of scholars has expanded the lit- standing the relationship between tech- erature on collective action to accom- nology and organizing can focus questions modate changes in the new media in new ways. environment. Fulk et al. (1996) are parti- In some ways, the historically abrupt cularly helpful in moving the study of emergence of the internet in politics public goods into the context of the new represents what economists might call an media environment. More recently, Lupia “exogenous shock.” The internet has and Sin (2003) explicate several ways in perturbed many parts of political systems, which evolving technologies may affect and responses illuminate aspects of systems the logic of collective action, and Bimber that were more hidden in times of greater et al. (2005) and Flanagin et al. (2006) stability. The research agenda presented articulate a number of theoretical and by the internet is not so much filled with practical modifications suggested by the novel problems as with new opportunities contemporary media environment. In to resolve old theoretical problems, by addition, the theoretical, organizational, taking advantage of the near ubiquity of and political implications of changes in the technology to see how common core technologies can be found in Bimber processes connected with communication (2003) and the work of Bennett (2003) is and organizing may lie beneath a wide not only useful for identifying the prac- range of research topics. tical implications of organizing within the This material is based on work supported contemporary media environment but by the National Science Foundation also brings a global perspective to the under Grant No. 0352517. The authors issues of politics and new media. Finally, are equal contributors to this chapter. Melucci (1994) engages globalization dynamics and moves beyond the traditional concerns of organization and leader- Guide to further reading ship to examine the roles of technology, identity, language, and meaning in col- This chapter integrates three distinct areas lective action. of research relevant for understanding More generally, the potential con- contemporary political organization: col- tribution of organizational theory to the lective action, new media, and organiza- study of collective action in the global tional studies. Within the collective action system can be found in Davis et al. (2005). literature, our work builds upon the In addition, Monge et al. (1998) examine pioneering treatise of Olson (1965), multiform, alliance-based interorganizational which functionally introduced the topic communication and information public of collective action to social scientific goods, and Fulk et al. (2004) and Yuan et exploration, and on Marwell and Oliver’s al. (2005) test the individual action com- classic text (1993), which served to syn- ponent of the collective action model as thesize work across various disciplines applied to individual contributions to toward a coherent micro-social theory. organizational information commons.

85 7 Making parliamentary democracy visible Speaking to, with, and for the public in the age of interactive technology

Stephen Coleman

It has become increasingly difficult for elite institutions to preserve an aura of impenetrable secrecy. The hypermediated twenty-first century is an age of ubiquitous visibility, leaving few institutions unexposed. This chapter explores the ways in which the new visibility has been negotiated and contested in the context of British parliamentary democracy. The chapter discusses the representation of Parliament to the public and the representation of the public voice to Parliament. Parliament has attempted to manage the terms of its own visibility, but that is a losing battle, as the data-mashers of Web 2.0 are demonstrating. In seeking to become present to their representatives, citizens have colluded with managed consultations, but these are no substitute for a trusted civic space in which the public can deliberate under its own auspices. Finally, the chapter considers the implications of digital communications for representative democracy. It outlines an argument for “direct representation”:a democratic system in which citizens are spoken for. This assumes that citizens do not want to examine and vote upon every area of policy and every piece of new legislation, but they do want to be consulted and involved in the decisions that affect their own lives. Citizens are entitled to feel that their contributions will make a difference to legislators’ behavior.

In a moment of political madness during three main parties actively opposed the the spring of 2007, the British House of passage of the bill. Norman Baker, a Commons voted for a bill, which, had it Liberal Democrat MP, declared that: not been subsequently blocked by the House of Lords, would have exempted The argument has been won that Members of Parliament (MPs) from the secrecy tends to beneﬁt only those scope of the Freedom of Information Act. who are corrupt, those who are In eﬀect, the bill would have prevented incompetent or those who are requests for details of MPs’ expenditure careless with public money. We from being disclosed and would have should not protect the people in kept secret any correspondence between any of those categories. The free- MPs and public authorities regarding dom of information regime that matters of general policy. Symbolically, now applies to public authorities, the bill reinforced public distrust for an and to this House in particular, and institution that has come to be popularly which we are discussing in respect regarded as remote, recondite, and self- of this group of amendments, has serving. A small group of MPs from all led to the beginning of a change in

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culture in this country and in this present media, driven by a 24/7 demand House as to how we deal with for revelation, making it harder than ever information. The role of the House before for politicians to manage their own of Commons in how we approach images or maintain secrets. As Thompson these matters is central. (2005: 42) has argued:

This minor, but highly significant battle Whether they like it or not, poli- between institutional secrecy and demo- tical leaders today are more visible cratic visibility was but the latest in a long to more people and more closely history of parliamentary resistance to the scrutinized than they ever were in probing gaze of the public. Until 1803, the past; and at the same time, they scribes were prosecuted for writing are more exposed to the risk that reports of parliamentary proceedings; MPs their actions and utterances, and the regarded print as a dangerous means of actions and utterances of others, stirring public excitement about issues may be disclosed in ways that con- best left to the political elite. When flict with the images they wish to reporters were finally admitted into project. Hence the visibility created Parliament they were allowed entry on by the media can become the strict terms, as members of an officially source of a new and distinctive kind regulated press lobby. of fragility. However much political The emergence of broadcasting in the leaders may seek to manage their twentieth century met with similar resis- visibility, they cannot completely tance. In 1923, John Reith, the Director control it. Mediated visibility can General of the BBC, sought permission to slip out of their grasp and can, on broadcast the King’s Speech at the State occasion, work against them. Opening of Parliament, but this was refused. It was not until 1975 that the For politicians, uncontrolled visibility House of Commons finally agreed to an constitutes a threat to their traditional experiment in public sound broadcasting. backstage operations in which in times Initial assessments of the effect of letting past policies could be negotiated, suppor- the public hear the proceedings of their ters appeased, and personal lives con- elected representatives were negative. ducted away from public scrutiny. From This was made permanent in 1978, fol- the citizens’ perspective, ubiquitous visi- lowed by television coverage of the Lords bility provides a potential democratic in 1985 and the Commons in 1989. As opportunity, allowing anyone capable of with the press lobby before it, broad- setting up a website, operating a digital casters were allowed into Parliament as camera, constructing a database, or send- long as they were prepared to accept strict ing out a mass e-mail to engage with and rules of coverage—limitations that broad- represent political institutions from their casters would refuse to accept in any own perspective. Digital information and other institutional context. communication technologies (ICT) have In recent times, it has become increas- played a particularly important role here, ingly difficult for elite institutions to pre- lowering the barriers to abundant infor- serve an aura of impenetrable secrecy. mation, many-to-many communication, The hypermediated twenty-first century and media production. In pre-digital is an age of ubiquitous visibility, leaving times, political institutions, ranging from few institutions unexposed. Political life is parliaments to political parties to govern- conducted under the gaze of an ever- ment departments, were well placed to

87 STEPHEN COLEMAN manage the flow of public information. detail to other political cultures. The next This is no longer the case. As political two sections of this chapter consider par- institutions have discovered to their cost, liamentary visibility from two perspec- digital communication is dangerously tives: the representation of Parliament to porous. the public and the representation of the This chapter aims to explore the ways public voice to Parliament. These are in which the new visibility has been followed by a more theoretical discussion negotiated and contested in the context of the implications of digital communica- of British parliamentary democracy. It tions for representative democracy. builds upon an emerging academic literature on the relationship between digital media and the legislative process (Chen, Making Parliament visible to 2002; Coleman, 2006; Coleman et al., the public 1999; Dai and Norton, 2007; Ferber et al., 2005; Filzmaier, 2004; Frissen, 2002; The British Parliament was not entirely Hoff, 2004; Leston-Bandeira, 2007; unprepared for the digital “information Macintosh et al., 2002; Norton, 2007; revolution.” It had been through at least Setala and Gronlund, 2006; Shahin and two information revolutions in its earlier Neuhold, 2007; Ward and Lusoli, 2005; history: the printing press and broad- Zittel, 2003). Most of this literature has casting. Faced with the emergence of the had an empirical focus, examining the internet, in 1995 Parliament established extent to which legislatures have adapted an Electronic Publishing Group (EPG), to the conditions of a more transparent chaired by the editor of Hansard. The and interactive communications environ- group had three key decisions to make. ment. Important though it is for analysis First, what sort of information should the to be rooted in empirical observation, public have a right to access online? there is also a need for theory to be Second, should online information be developed about the normative require- provided freely or at a cost? Third, how ments of representative democracy and should information be stored and retrieved? the changes that parliaments will need to The first decision seemed to be an undergo if they are to escape from the obvious one: citizens should have elec- currently widespread perception that tronic access to daily reports of the pro- British parliamentary politics are irrelevant ceedings of both Houses of Parliament. In to everyday life. A key aim of this chapter fact, this constituted a specific policy is to link empirical observations about the intended to control what might and changing nature of parliamentary commu- might not be accessed. For example, the nications to questions that are traditionally EPG might have decided that citizens considered by democratic theorists. were entitled to a record rather than a The British Parliament is discussed in this report of proceedings. Technically, there chapter as an example of the Westminster is no reason why the transcription of legislative model, as well as an indicative speech on the floor of both chambers account of what is facing representative should not appear online almost immedi- democracies in many countries, even ately; but the convention that allows par- where the Westminster model does not liamentarians to “correct” what they have prevail. Of course, nationally-specific refer- said creates an artificial filter between ences do not automatically translate across utterance and dissemination. More impor- political borders and conclusions drawn tantly, the decision to make available the from this account may not apply in every report of proceedings, as well as written

88 PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND INTERACTIVE TECHNOLOGY and oral questions and answers to minis- process, and the group believes that ters and committee reports (research there is a clear public right to unfettered papers were added in 1998), assumed that access to this material.” It recommended the public would only ever need to know that “the full text of parliamentary pub- about parliamentary events after they had lications be published free of charge on happened. One could also envisage other the internet.” However, the EPG quali- areas of parliamentary life that could be fied its recommendation in two sig- made visible online, but have not been nificant ways: first, by insisting that for political reasons. For example, the parliamentary papers should be made working of the party whips’ offices, in available internally to members before which policy deals are struck and MPs are they were made freely available to citizens pressurized to vote in certain ways; the via the internet (thereby preventing Speakers’ office, in which the mysterious immediate online publication), and second, “usual channels” decide upon questions of by stating that any external body wishing constitutional propriety and inter-party to use material published under parlia- compromises; the voting lobbies, where mentary copyright for the purpose of backbench MPs mingle with government added-value processing or selling on ministers and endeavor to promote parti- could only do so by applying and paying cular causes. One can think of many for a license agreement. political reasons for parliamentarians to The third task facing the ECG was to want to keep these areas of political life create an online space for the storage and secretive, but the fact that they have dissemination of parliamentary infor- never even been considered as candidates mation. A domain name was acquired for online visibility suggests that such (www.parliament.uk) and this, since decisions have been based upon institu- 1996, has been the representational site of tional rather than democratic norms. the British Parliament: its virtual manifes- The EPG’s second decision concerned tation. Establishing a single parliamentary whether online information should be site implies an indexical relationship provided freely or at a cost to users. The between the virtual space and physical cost of a paper copy of Hansard in 1995 place of Parliament as an institution. The was £12 ($24) a day and electronic access metaphorical depiction of “parliament was only available commercially at prohi- online” conjures into being an image of bitive prices in the order of £2500 a year. Parliament as an integrated, bounded The Campaign for Freedom of Information space with an inside and outside, mem- (CFOI) complained that “The public is bers and visitors, and official knowledge being denied access to Hansard and to possessing an elevated status in relation to Britain’s laws on the internet because of everyday experience. By designing its HMSO’s policy of commercially exploit- own virtual representation, Parliament ing Crown and Parliamentary copy- remains free to impose rules about what right … the Campaign wants HMSO to constitutes parliamentary politics. The waive this unacceptable restriction and absence of links to political parties, social permit free on-line access to these essen- movements, or sites of counter-information tial materials.” (Campaign for Freedom of gives rise to a non-agonistic conception of Information, 1995.) The EPG agreed democracy in which the political is insti- with the CFOI, arguing that “As a law- tutionally insulated from wider flows of making body, Parliament needs to ensure power. Visitors to Parliament via its that those subject to its laws have easy website, like visitors to the parliamentary access to them and the law-making estate in Westminster, enter as outsiders

89 STEPHEN COLEMAN who may not challenge the information internet users: people who create online that is presented or enter into the debates information and those who “take infor- that are conducted. Parliament online is a mation from various sources, including political spectacle rather than a site of government, and mix it together to make public deliberation. new tools and services.” The latter group, That this was not the only model for referred to as “data mashers” are people Parliament’s web presence is indicated by “who want to mix and combine infor- the remarkable growth of e-commerce. mation to generate valuable new forms of During the same period that Parliament information and new services.” An exam- was beginning to represent itself online, ple of data-mashing from e-commerce is online commerce witnessed a radical the American retail website, Zillow, change from supplier to demand-based which combines information on local online operations. Taking the travel land value and house price sales with industry as an illustration, in the mid mapping data to create a service that esti- 1990s most major companies launched mates the value of properties at any given sites intended to sell package holidays to address. online consumers. But consumers wanted If data can be customized to meet to use the internet in other ways: to consumer demand in the context of e- compare deals between competing com- commerce, can parliamentary data be panies; learn about consumer experiences remixed in ways that liberate it from of traveling to particular places; and ask institutional control in order to provide the kind of questions that one would citizens with a needs-based account of the prefer to have answered by an impartial day-to-day workings of democracy? expert than by a corporate agent. By This was the question addressed by the using publicly accessible websites that collate founders of TheyWorkForYou, a site disparate reserves of consumer knowl- launched in 2004 by independent social edge, travelers have become increasingly hacktivists with the aim of aggregating liberated from dependence upon single content from the official Hansard reports corporate or institutional information so that they could be more accessible to stores. Instead of going online to buy the lay public. The site (www.they- holidays, people are increasingly using the workforyou.com) allows users to track a internet to construct their own travel particular issue or MP, comment on par- plans by mixing and matching data from a liamentary proceedings, and register for variety of sources. The travel industry has regular updates on selected themes. Since been transformed by these trends, with up 1996, TheyWorkForYou has been part of to a quarter of all U.K. holidays now the mySociety project, which, according being booked via the internet. This has to its website, aims to “give people simple, weakened corporate power and at the tangible benefits in the civic and com- same time expanded consumer choice. munity aspects of their lives” (MySociety, Could the same sort of opportunities be 2007). By acting as an independent inter- offered to online citizens, as distinct from mediary, mySociety can ignore the silos, consumers? Might it be to citizens’ routines, and hierarchical sensitivities of advantage to move away from institu- institutionally-bound information provi- tionally controlled websites and towards sion. Rather than Parliament sending a knowledge-sharing networks? message that “We are your representatives; In their report on social networking you may observe us from a distance,” technologies, Mayo and Steinberg (2007: they are saying “We are the citizens and 12–13) refer to “two new groups” of want to hear from you, our elected

90 PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND INTERACTIVE TECHNOLOGY representatives.” The mySociety model & The House is committed to the use changes the terms of democratic visibility, of ICT to increase public partici- using digital technologies to establish a pation in its work, enabling it to citizen-centric, needs-based approach to draw on the widest possible pool of parliamentary transparency. This marks a experience, including particularly break with institutionally managed approa- those who have traditionally been ches to political communication that have excluded from the political and hitherto dominated parliamentary infor- parliamentary process. mation systems and could, if allowed to & The House recognizes the value of develop, lead to a greater degree of public openness and will use ICT to understanding and ownership of the leg- enable, as far as possible, the public islative process. to have access to its proceedings and papers.

Making the public visible to In its 2004 report entitled Connecting Parliament Parliament with the Public, the Modernization Committee endorsed these principles and For Parliament to be democratic it must concluded that “There have now been both connect with and represent the several experiments with on-line con- values and interests of the citizens who sultation on an ad hoc basis, both by voted it into being. Relations between select committees and by all-party groups British citizens and their Parliament leave (House of Commons Select Committee much to be desired. Most British citizens on Modernization, 2004). They have (88 percent) have had no face-to-face generally been successful and have proved contact with their MP within the past effective as a way of engaging members of year. Three-quarters claim that within the the public in the work that we do and of past year they have never seen their MP giving a voice to those who would on television, 80 percent that they have otherwise be excluded. We urge select not written to their MP, and 84 percent committees and joint committees con- not to have visited their MP’s website sidering draft legislation to make on-line (Coleman, 2006). consultation a more regular aspect of their Not surprisingly, parliamentarians have work.” In its 2006 report, the Puttnam looked towards the internet as a way of Commission on the Communication of reinvigorating their weak relationship with Parliamentary Democracy, recommended the public. In 2002, a report of the House that the “parliamentary website should be of Commons Information Committee set radically improved. At a minimum, it out five principles that should guide should be consultative, interactive and Parliament’s use of the internet, three of easily navigable.” (Puttnam Commission which relate specifically to its relationship on the Communication of Parliamentary with members of the public: Democracy, 2006). Parliament’s commitment to e-democracy & The House is committed to the use was not confined to these modest declara- of ICT to increase its accessibility tions of intent. Since 1998, a number of and to enable the public, exercising parliamentary select, pre-legislative, and its right to use whatever medium is all-party committees have collaborated convenient, to communicate with with the Hansard Society, an independent Members and with Committees of body, to organize a series of online con- the House. sultations designed to involve members of

91 STEPHEN COLEMAN the public in various parliamentary inqui- When asked in the pre-consultation ries on subjects as diverse as domestic survey, 44 percent of participants felt that violence, tax credits, stem-cell research, parliament was “out of touch” with hate crime in Northern Ireland, and dia- people like them and only 20 percent betes care. These entailed establishing a thought that MPs were “interested in lis- forum in which members of the public tening” to them. In the post-consultation could recount their own experiences, surveys, 73 percent of participants report- advise MPs to adopt particular policy ing that they had “learned from other positions, and interact in online dialogue. posters” and almost one in ten participants These consultations were intended to be (8 percent) reported that they made new deliberative in nature. Generally speaking, contacts with other people as a result of participants contributed only one opi- participating. Seventy-two percent of nion, but a minority of them entered into respondents said that they found the discussion with one another and with consultation in which they participated those MPs who chose to participate “worthwhile,” of whom 79 percent said (Coleman, 2006). An outstanding ques- that they had learned something new tion for research concerns the extent to from reading other messages that were which the presence of the public, as an posted. Interestingly, 43 percent of those entity comprising diverse values, interests, who found the consultation “worth- and preferences, expressed in a range of while” posted no messages at all, suggest- cultural modes, is really being made visi- ing that the value of these exercises is not ble by these consultations. To what purely expressive. extent do online parliamentary consulta- Over half (52 percent) of respondents tions allow citizens to become visible on who regarded the consultation as “worth- their own terms? while” had indicated in the pre-consultation To answer these questions, I worked survey that “Parliament was out of touch” with the Hansard Society to construct with them. And over half (60 percent) of pre- and post-consultation surveys, which those who had regarded Parliament as out were sent to registered participants in the of touch in the pre-consultation survey five online consultations that took place disagreed in the post-consultation survey in 2004–5, run on behalf of the House of with the statements that “There is not Commons Science and Technology much I can do to change the way the Committee, Modernisation Committee, country is run.” A small but noteworthy Northern Ireland Select Committee, and group of respondents (17 percent) not the House of Lords’ Select Committee on only stated that they had learned from the Constitutional Reform Bill. A key others, but that participating in the con- aim of these surveys was to find out sultation had “changed their mind or whether participants believed that they opinion” in some way. Half of these were being acknowledged, heard, and people had previously expressed (in the respected in this consultation process. A total pre-consultation survey) that Parliament of 650 people completed pre-consultation was “out of touch,” which was reversed surveys and 212 (33 percent) also com- after participation, with 75 percent of pleted the post-consultation survey. Since them taking the view that MPs were the analysis sought to explore participants’ “listening to them”, and 40 percent experience of the entire consultation believing that the consultation process process, only the responses from the 212 would “make a difference.” The attitude people who completed both pre- and changes of this group suggest that post-consultation surveys were analyzed. meaningful deliberative exchanges can

92 PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND INTERACTIVE TECHNOLOGY occur in the setting of a well-run online nature and experiences mediated consultation. through the contributions were quite But not all participants in these con- often of a different nature from the, sultations were convinced that by posting sort of, institutional contributions their views on a website they would we would normally expect to get. become visible to their elected repre- (clerk) sentatives. In response to an open-ended I think with the online consulta- question about the value of participating, tion you lower the threshold of one respondent stated that: effort that’s required to participate in the inquiry, so the people that I think it is important at the start to you bring are the people who declare openly how exactly the wouldn’t go to the trouble of online consultation will feed into drafting a memorandum and editing the final conclusions of those who it and printing it out and posting it have asked for it to be conducted. in and so on, but might just post a At no time was it clear whether the few sentences on a message board. participants’ contribution would (clerk) have any real significance in the I think it was a useful exercise, final outcome … primarily, in giving myself, managing the inquiry, and to a lesser Another respondent suggested that: extent, I think, the members, a good grounding in the issues and some of There should be a clear response the sensitivities that were involved. from parliamentarians to those who (specialist advisor) took part in the consultation, otherwise after spending hours on Despite this recognition by officials that an online consultation there is a online consultations were broadening the feeling that it has been a waste of range of people giving evidence to time. Parliament, several were of the view that these particular online consultations had a Clerks and specialist advisors to the com- very limited impact upon MPs’ delibera- mittees involved in the online consultations. In one case a committee was unsure tions were asked whether they thought about how to regard the status of this that the internet had given them access to kind of evidence: a greater range of experience and expertise than they would have received from … it turned out that one of the the usual pool of witnesses. Responses members objected quite strongly to were generally quite positive: what were essentially anonymous comments … And, therefore, it We undoubtedly got some views became difficult to actually directly that we wouldn’t otherwise have draw upon that evidence, so in a heard, some of which were worth sense its contribution to the report hearing and some of which missed was indirect rather than direct … the point … (clerk) (specialist advisor) … It did prove to be an avenue in which people could contribute Some interviewees took the view that the who otherwise might not have consultations were limited by the absence done so … All I can say is that the of interaction between consultees and MPs:

93 STEPHEN COLEMAN

I think for it to have more effect, around two apparently opposed versions for it to impact on them and on the of democracy: ancient and modern, direct way they [MPs] conduct the and indirect, participatory and representa- inquiry, and the conclusions they tive, Burkean and Rousseauan. On the come up with, I think they need to one hand, democracy is seen as empow- be exposed to it directly. And it’sa ering people directly, and on the other, it difficult thing. Engaging members at is seen as investing power in professional all is difficult. You are actually governors or politicians who represent the asking them to do something that’s people. The history that goes with this beyond what they would normally dichotomy is as familiar as the contrast be prepared to do. So I think you itself. Ancient democracy offered direct would have to … maybe identify a rule by the people. But the emergence of small number of individuals who large, pluralistic nation states, along with a would be prepared to take on a liberal, negative conception of freedom, more active role. (specialist advisor) resulted in a transition to representative forms of democracy. Direct rule was The evidence here is mixed. Clearly, both replaced by indirect governance. This participants and officials who experienced transition ushered in an enduring quarrel the parliamentary consultations recog- between those who sought to recover nized that a process of mutual visibility direct democracy by giving power back was occurring, but there was little con- to the people, or by at least closely cir- fidence in the prospect of this having a cumscribing the initiative of representatives, tangible political impact. Virtual partici- and those who argued that representatives pators are still outsiders whose political should be left to govern as their judgment presence can be overlooked precisely dictates. because they are physically absent. The partisans of direct democracy see the representative as the ventriloquist’s dummy: an aggregate channel for all the Speaking for … collective voices being represented. As democratically represented citizens, say The reality is that the citizens of a repre- direct democrats, our task is to control the sentative democracy cannot be truly pre- representative dummy and slap it when it sent at the point of policy formation and assumes to speak on its own. We are legislative decision-making. That is why represented because our representative they need to be represented. Political speaks as if we were speaking ourselves. representation becomes necessary when The advocates of “representative democ- citizens are removed—physically, cogni- racy” see the representative as the ven- tively, or otherwise—from the locus of triloquist and the people as the dummy. public decision-making and their interests, The representative speaks, but in the preferences, and values have to be expressed people’s name. We are represented via an aggregating medium. If all could be because our representatives speak on our fully present and attentive within the behalf. They are the trustees of our col- political sphere at all times representation lective interests. We do not elect them to would be theoretically unnecessary. do what we might do ourselves; we elect Speaking for the public entails mediating them because we do not have the time— between the absent and the present. or maybe the competence—constantly to Democratic theorists’ thinking about make policy decisions for ourselves. For representation has tended to revolve indirect democrats, the notion that it is

94 PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND INTERACTIVE TECHNOLOGY the people who speak is something of a retains a degree of authority over repre- pretence, just as the notion that the sentatives, even between elections. dummy speaks is a pretence. It is the In fact, the Rousseauan characterization representative, like the ventriloquist, who of modern representative government as is really in charge. no more than the chance to elect a master A striking feature of this enduring every four years was always something of quarrel is that the two sides have tended a caricature. A range of channels have to share an understanding of representa- given representatives and the represented tive democracy itself, disagreeing about its opportunities to connect with each other. value, but not about its empirical attri- Demonstrations, petitions, letters, and butes. Both positions in democratic pamphlets have allowed the public to theory tend to understand representative express their view to representatives. Press democracy as being an etiolated version conferences, TV and newspaper interviews, of normative democracy, according citi- phone-ins, speeches, and parliamentary zens the right to depose or re-elect a debates have allowed representatives to leader every few years, but not much become more democratically visible to more. As Joseph Schumpeter (1976: 284), the public. Public meetings, political par- a famous defender of indirect democracy, ties, and MPs’ surgeries have allowed put it: “Democracy does not mean and citizens and representatives to exchange cannot mean that the people actually rule views with each other. But this relation- in any obvious sense of the terms ‘people’ ship has never been anything like an easy, and ‘rule’. Democracy means only that equal one. The public has generally been the people have the opportunity of spoken at, rather than with. Though not accepting or refusing the men who are to ignored as such, citizens were not invited rule them.” to join the club. The public has been Direct democrats, quoting Rousseau, traditionally patronized, feared, or seduced. contend that contemporary representative As citizens have become less defer- democracy is but a parody of self-rule. ential, society more diverse, and technol- Democracy, they argue, must directly ogies of communication more interactive, involve citizens in all decision-making or citizens are coming to demand a less dis- it is nothing. The Burkeans and the tant, more direct, conversational form of Schumpeterians reply that representative representation. Techniques based on the democracy might not be wholly demo- broadcast-megaphone model simply do cratic, but it is the closest approximation not provide the requisite depth and rich- we can get in the modern world to the ness of political interaction between real thing—and has some crucial advan- representatives and represented in the age tages insofar as it ensures that well-educated of the internet. While acknowledging specialists, rather than the mob, are really that representation must entail being in charge. spoken for, there are clear signs that the For all its pedigree, the theoretical contemporary public demands from its debate between direct, inclusive democracy democracy something closer to a full- and indirect, constitutionally balanced blooded, two-way relationship. For this representation is hardly compelling, for it relationship to be satisﬁed, democratic totally ignores the possibility of the options theorists and practitioners might need to in between: systems of democratic rule turn their attention to a hybrid between that, while preserving the representative direct and indirect models of democracy, framework, ensure that, through ongoing which I would refer to as direct repre- dialogue, debate, and argument, the public sentation: a democratic system in which

95 STEPHEN COLEMAN citizens are spoken for. Citizens do not avoided as a result of clear “explanation” want to go through the time-consuming being given. Although politicians are process of examining and voting upon more visible to citizens than they have every area of policy and piece of new ever been before, and vice versa, the legislation, but they do want to be con- impressions of one another received via sulted and involved as individuals in the the mass media create and reinforce crude decisions that affect their own lives, and caricatures rather than anything resem- they are entitled to feel that their con- bling a communicatively rich relationship. tribution will be valued and might at least Digital ICT could play a vital role in make a difference. changing the terms of that relationship, Hanna Pitkin, in her magisterial survey, transcending the distances that have tra- The Concept of Representation—one of the ditionally made it impossible to think of few notable works on representation to representation in conversational terms. have been written in modern times— But this role is unlikely to be played out understood well the necessity for demo- within the institutionally managed space cratic representation to be rooted in two- of the official parliamentary website. way communication (Pitkin, 1967: 209–10): As with e-commerce, the most empowering developments are likely to representing … means acting in the occur in spaces opened up by opportu- interest of the represented, in a nities to remix information and shift the manner responsive to them. The balance of communication in the direc- representative must act indepen- tion of citizens. The nature of these dently; his action must involve dis- putative democratic spaces must remain cretion and judgment; he must be largely speculative at the moment, for, the one who acts. The represented with the limited exception of the mySociety must also be conceived as capable of sites, such as TheyWorkForYou discussed independent action and judgment, earlier, there are few working examples to not merely being taken care of. which we can point. And, despite the resulting potential But what form might digitally enabled for conflict between representative parliamentary communication take, if and represented about what is to be citizens are to become more visible and done, the conflict must not nor- audible in the democratic process? First, it mally take place. The representative could take a more joined-up form. Most must act in such a way that there is citizens are not particularly interested in no conflict, or if it occurs, an Parliament, as such, but in policies that explanation is called for. He must affect their lives. As political scientists not be found persistently at odds have been suggesting for some years, with the wishes of the represented governance has become increasingly without good reason in terms of decentered: it does not take place within their interest, without a good bounded institutions, but among and explanation of why their wishes are between them. Professional lobbyists, not in accord with their interest. working on behalf of well-resourced elites, do not track policy formation and The kind of democratic representation decision-making on an institution-by- that Pitkin describes is clearly different institution basis, first looking at govern- from what exists at present. Politicians are ment departments, then Parliament, then not generally seen as being “responsive” specific agencies. Policy is best understood to citizens and conflict is not usually as a process in which power flows in

96 PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND INTERACTIVE TECHNOLOGY several directions at once, often ignoring and represented citizens can exchange or circumnavigating constitutional bound- views and seek clarification from one aries and cycles. For citizens to be politi- another. Jay Blumler and I have argued cally informed, they need information the case for the establishment of an online that tracks issues rather than reports on civic commons in which public delibera- specific institutions. In the U.K., some tion on local, national, and global issues people are represented by local councils, can take a visible form (Coleman and the Westminster Parliament, a devolved Blumler, 2001; 2008). Unlike the present parliament or assembly, and the European U.K. parliamentary website—and that of Parliament, not to mention the many almost all other national legislatures—to other intermediary agencies rooted in which citizens are invited as a passive bureaucracies and civil society. Effectively audience, contemporary democracy, if it informed citizens need tracking systems is to meet the challenge of direct repre- that can map the political process for them, sentation, needs to find imaginative ways showing them where issues have reached of realizing active and interactive citizen- and how and when they can intervene ship. For, as Hannah Arendt argued, the with a view to affecting decisions. “political realm rises directly out of acting As well as information tracking, citizens together, the ‘sharing of words and need to be able to track the flow of deeds’” (Arendt, 1958: 198). public communication. At the moment, most people have to rely upon media reports of what the public thinks (usually Conclusion derived from crude opinion polling) or casually produced vox pops, phone-ins, or It would be glibly deterministic to posit a television-studio discussions (Coleman democratizing relationship between the and Ross, 2008). Attempting to monitor internet as a communication technology public opinion by going to most political and Parliament as an institution. One chat rooms or blogs is rather like going might just as reasonably regard the internet into a pub before closing time to get a as a social institution and Parliament as a sense of public discourse. Fortunately, political technology. The relationship new digital tools, such as Issue Crawler, between one and the other is shaped by which searches the web to establish where political culture, which is in turn shaped issues are being discussed and how those by the varied and unpredictable interplay discussions are linked, are able to map the of institutional needs and technological communicative landscape, which makes it capacities. easier to sense where a debate has come Contemporary representative democ- from and where it is leading before racy is played out within the dialectics of entering into it (Bruns, 2007). Few poli- visibility. How can power make itself tical researchers, lobbyists, or politicians seen, felt, and understood by the public? would expect to be able to contribute to How can the public, as the legitimizing serious debate without having a sense of basis of parliamentary power, make sure how issues have emerged and which actors that its presence is acknowledged and are most engaged in pursuing them. Why respected by its representatives? And how should we expect lay citizens to do so? can representation come to perform the Linked to these tools of political infor- subtle trick of appearing to embody as mation-gathering and communication- well as act in trust for the public? As I mapping is a need for legitimate online have tried to show in this chapter, digital spaces in which political representatives technologies are implicated in each of

97 STEPHEN COLEMAN these dialectical strategies. In seeking to Guide to further reading be visible to the public, Parliament has attempted to manage the terms of its own To follow up ideas raised in this chapter, visibility, but that is a losing battle, as the there are two areas of literature to be Web 2.0 data-mashers are demonstrating. consulted. First, there are relevant collec- In seeking to become present to their tions of research on the changing role of representatives, citizens have colluded legislative institutions, including Giddings with managed consultations, but these are (2005); the special issue of Parliamentary no substitute for a trusted civic space in Aﬀairs on “Parliament in the Age of the which the public can deliberate under its Internet” 52(3) (1999); the special issue of own auspices. The challenge of repre- Information Polity on “the use of ICT senting the public, long argued over in by members of parliament” 9(2) (2004); sterile debates between indirect trustee- and the special issue of the Journal of ship and direct plebiscites, is met by the Legislative Studies 13(3) on “legislatures feasibility of direct representation. Of and e-democracy” (2007). On the repre- course, there is nothing inevitable about sentation of Parliament to the public, see these outcomes; the path between demo- Setala and Gronlund (2006); Shahin and cratic potential and realization is rarely a Neuhold (2007); Coleman (2006). On smooth one. The rather sad tale of the the representation of the public voice to attempt to exempt British MPs from Parliament, see Coleman (2004) and freedom of information legislation does Albrecht (2006). not augur well for e-democratic anticipa- A second area of research that might be tions. But the technologies are there, pursued in relation to this chapter con- becoming more ubiquitous all the time. siders the changing nature of political Representative democracies must either representation. The classic text is Pitkin engage with them or face the risk of (1967). See also Norton (2007); Coleman being sidelined. and Blumler (2001); and Coleman (2005).

98 8 Bureaucratic reform and e-government in the United States An institutional perspective

Jane E. Fountain

Technology enactment, an analytical framework that focuses on the processes by which new information and communication technologies come to be used by organizational actors, is distinctly institutional in orientation. An institutional perspective provides a challenge to researchers to integrate attention to structure, politics, and policy into studies of e-government. It also invites attention to the roles and relationships of formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions—laws, regulations, budget processes, and other governmental procedures—are central to legitimation and shaping incentives for the use of ICT as an integral and inseparable set of elements in the administrative state. Informal institutions—networks, norms, and trust—are equally inﬂuential. Challenges in the development of e-government stem from core issues of liberty, freedom, participation, and other central elements of democracy. Structurally, however, such challenges may be viewed through an institutional lens in terms of the adequacy of formal and informal institutions to support e-government. An institutional perspective, drawing primarily from economic sociology as well as from the institutional turn in economics, provides a path to deepening studies of information and communication technologies in government in ways that can illuminate state development and capacity. In addition, this chapter describes key institutional developments in e-government during two presidential administrations in the United States as well as key developments in state and local U.S. government.

The study of institutions is central to institutional perspective on e-government politics and governance, hence to internet can provide important insights into bureau- politics and e-government. E-government cratic reform, political development, the research has focused predominantly on policy-making process, and the role of government information provision online, civil servants in information societies. on public service delivery online, and on This chapter summarizes key elements the attitudes and use patterns of citizens. of an institutional perspective and then An essential complement to these streams brieﬂy describes institutional develop- of research is one that examines the ments associated with bureaucratic reform internal structures and processes of what using e-government across two pre- theorists of the state term “state capacity” sidential administrations in the United and “state structure,” and what others States. Throughout, I sketch develop- have called the administrative or bureau- ments in budgeting, governance, man- cratic state. I argue in this chapter that an agement, oversight, and legislation that

99 JANE E. FOUNTAIN have been central to e-government. Informal, micro-level institutions include Similarly, I highlight several informal those social processes that have been stu- institutional arrangements such as man- died as “social capital”: trust, norms, and agement processes, culture, the structure networks of individuals (Putnam, 1994; of working groups, and informal norms. Fountain, 1998; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, In addition, the chapter briefly sum- 1998; Burt, 2005). Mediating between marizes key developments in state and formal and informal institutional elements local e-government in the United States. are organizational and interorganizational It concludes with a challenge to researchers level structures and processes including to probe more deeply the emergent insti- management practices, task structures, and tutional correlates of increased internet and operating routines. The connection to e- web use in government. government, in which ICTs are used to regularize and rationalize a host of information and communication flows, should Institutions: formal, informal, be obvious. and middleware Government information flows can be conceptualized across these three levels of The term “institution” refers to regular- institutionalized processes. First, micro- ized patterns and processes that simplify level interactions at the individual and and order cognition and behavior at the small-group level structure and con- individual, group, organizational, and tinually restructure ongoing social relations societal levels of analysis. I focus here on and comprise the locus of shared infor- institutional perspectives on organizations mation and sense-making. For example, (for key conceptual formulations and cri- civil servants regularly contact trusted tical overviews see Meyer and Rowan, colleagues to interpret new information, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, to compare notes on accepted and pro- 1987). By definition, institutions are mising practices, and to ask or give advice, widely shared and socially agreed upon, support, and referrals. In the process of regularized, and, in many cases, taken for these interactions, individuals reflexively granted. Institutionalists (including neo- monitor and update their assessments of institutionalists) have sought to account those they can trust, those with whom to for strategic behavior and entrepreneur- communicate, and to share knowledge. ship in institutionalized contexts (see, for At a middle level, functioning like example, DiMaggio, 1988; Beckert, 1999; “middleware,” organizations and inter- Garud et al., 2002; Maguire et al., 2004); organizational arrangements, including institutionalization in interorganizational networks, also codify and routinize infor- networks and fields (DiMaggio and mation through systems, routines, and Powell, 1983; Baum and Oliver, 1992; processes. Routinized information is, in Brint and Karabel, 1991; Leblebici et al., part, what is meant by organization. 1991; Starr, 1982); and institutional change Innovation often comprises a rethinking (Greenwood et al., 2002; Dacin et al., 2002; and restructuring of organizational and Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; Hoffman, interorganizational processes (Nahapiet 1999; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). and Ghoshal, 1998). At a highly for- Formal governmental institutions include malized and macro-level, the rules of the legislation, regulation, budgetary processes, state—institutions such as legislation and and the structures and regularized prac- regulation—constrain the behavior of tices of the U.S. executive, legislative, government department and agencies, as and judiciary branches of government. well as economic and societal actors.

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Formal institutions also include broad merit for political loyalty as the societal agreements on such matters as key measure of fitness for employment property rights and appropriate account- in the professional public service. The ability, oversight, and resource allocation American bureaucratic state was built structures and practices. Thus, a multi- from a young nation of parties and courts. level integrated information system (MIIS) Although temporal delimiters over- influences behavior directly and indirectly simplify complex political development in government (Fountain, 2007; Nee and patterns, the American administrative (or Ingram, 1998). Organizational change bureaucratic) state was born during the occasioned by information and commu- final decades of the nineteenth century nication technologies often perturbs—and and the first two decades of the twentieth is influenced by—all three layers pro- century. Innovations in state structure and ducing unanticipated effects. I have processes, although deeply contested, called this combination of institutional, were meant to align the government organizational, and new technological ele- more closely with the results of enormous ments “technology enactment” (Fountain, changes in the structure of the economy, 2001). rapid shifts in transportation and com- In sum, an institutional perspective on munication, and ensuing crises in e-government focuses attention on the banking, finance, and, not least, condi- internal workings—the structure and tions and prospects for labor (Skowronek, capacity—of the state. It draws out the 1982). role of the widely shared, regularized By analogy, one would expect to see patterns of professional behavior of civil changes in the structure and capacity of servants and other government officials the state over a 50-year period as actors working within institutionalized roles and seek to re-align government with key settings. The study of e-government, dimensions of the information economy using an institutional perspective, provides and network society. The institutional an opportunity to observe the collision of context in which long-term change stable practices and traditions with tech- efforts are embedded, however, is struc- nological innovations. tured for stability. Thus, an institutional perspective draws attention to structure and process as well as the play of bureau- Weberian bureaucracy and cratic inertia, habits of mind, and the the American state relative stability and durability of institutionalized forms and arrangements in the The modern American bureaucratic state context of new capabilities occasioned by is a child of the industrial revolution. technology. Although the term “bureaucracy” has The development of information and been used by neo-liberals to connote communications technology (ICT) use by inefficiency and ineffectiveness relative to governments in the United States has by no market-based mechanisms, bureaucracy as means followed a predictable technologi- an organizational form in government cally determinist path. Nor could rational largely replaced patrimonial systems actor accounts predict the shape of (including widespread use of patronage bureaucratic reform through e-govern- appointments) with a professional civil ment. The technology enactment frame- service. Through a protracted series of work has been used to explain the successes political negotiations over decades, bureau- and failures of ICT-based bureaucratic cratic government came to substitute reform in the federal government during

101 JANE E. FOUNTAIN the Clinton administration (Fountain, “Reinventing government” 2001). Yet many other frameworks and during the Clinton models used in e-government research administration draw from institutional perspectives as The Clinton administration (1993–2001) well (Gasco, 2003; Danziger, 2004; coincided technologically with early soci- Wiklund, 2005; Heeks and Bailur, etal and economic euphoria that attended 2007). the beginning of open access to the internet through the web. Politically, ’ fi Where are we now? President Clinton swasthe rst Democratic administration since the Franklin Roosevelt Since 1993, two presidential administra- administration during the 1930s to win a tions in the United States have focused second term. Economically, national unemployment rates and inflation were low, bureaucratic reform initiatives in part on fl e-government. This section draws from and the federal budget was brie y in sur- empirical and archival research conducted plus. Although Democratic, neo-liberalism by the author and summarizes those was a hallmark of the administration. initiatives and the institutional develop- Clinton (1996) declared in an address to “ ments associated with them (Fountain, Congress that the era of big government ” 2001, 2006). More briefly, the section is over. that follows sketches some of the major The beginnings of e-commerce and bureaucratic reform developments at societal uses of the internet and web in the state and local government levels. the U.S. focused on development of web Throughout, I highlight key institutional portals to simplify citizen and business developments. search for information by integrating The emergence of the internet and the access to several websites. Before the World Wide Web (the web) during the internet was publicly accessible, bureau- early 1990s led U.S. governments to cratic reforms had been undertaken that begin to develop web-based government focused on simplification of forms and information and public services in order procedures and service integration, nota- to align governments with societal and bly, “one-stop shopping,” to make gov- economic systems and expectations. ernment information and organizations Government agencies increasingly have easier to navigate. These efforts mirrored made information available online including standard business practice in the service laws, rules, and regulations as well as sector. In one sense, digital tools merely policy and practical information for citi- enhanced the power of a set of reforms zens concerning retirement, disability, already underway and accepted as legit- health, education, housing, agriculture, imate and appropriate by civil servants. transportation, and the environment. In Yet the extraordinary power of the inter- addition, interactive public services increas- net to allow citizens to access government ingly are available including tax filing “anytime, anywhere,” greatly increased for individuals and businesses, licensing, accessibility and made abstruse govern- registration, and permitting. Beyond the ment documents and procedures, now provision of information and services, online, more glaringly unresponsive to bureaucratic reform also entails agency citizens. and inter-agency reorganization meant to In the mid 1990s, some large govern- leverage new capabilities made possible by ment agencies began to develop what the ICTs. administration called “virtual agencies,”

102 BUREAUCRATIC REFORM AND E-GOVERNMENT or cross-agency web portals, in an effort strengthen leadership in IT; implement to re-organize information and services by nationwide, electronic benefits transfer; client type rather than agency jurisdiction. develop integrated digital access to gov- The U.S. federal government first orga- ernment information and services; pro- nized students.gov, seniors.gov, and busi- vide government wide e-mail; improve ness.gov portals oriented toward three key government’s information infrastructure; voter groups, to provide these citizen ensure privacy and safety; improve IT subpopulations with a “single point of acquisition; provide incentives for innova- contact” with government. The term “vir- tion; provide training and technical assistance tual state” has been used by the author as in IT to federal employees; create a a metaphor meant to capture the organi- national environmental data index; establish zation of government information increas- an international trade data system; provide ingly in terms of virtual organizations such an intergovernmental tax system; establish as these. a national law enforcement and public Launched on March 3, 1993, during the safety network (National Performance first phase of the National Performance Review, 1993). In 1998, the reform Review (NPR), the bureaucratic reform initiative was renamed the National effort begun during the Clinton adminis- Partnership for Reinventing Government. tration was led energetically and visibly by Approximately 30 virtual agencies were Vice President Al Gore. The Gore Report developed throughout the U.S. federal on Reinventing Government was presented government during the Clinton adminis- to the president on September 7, 1993, tration. Moreover, a single government- followed by a national tour to promote wide portal, FirstGov.gov, was designed the reform effort (National Performance to connect to all federal agency web Review, 1993; Office of the Vice pages. At this writing, it remains one of President, 1993). Information technology the largest repositories of web pages in use was only one element of the larger existence. bureaucratic reform initiative. The strat- The strategic direction of this early egy for its use was underpinned by radical bureaucratic reform effort was encapsu- re-engineering methods and heroic lated in the subtitle of the Gore report: assumptions regarding the potential disin- “building a government that works termediation effects of the internet better and costs less.” The phrase echoes (Hammer and Champy, 1993). Initial American public administration themes steps of the NPR included cutting the and objectives dating from the late nine- federal workforce, primarily middle man- teenth century. Early efforts, during a agement positions, by 252,000 employees; period in the 1990s when the federal passage of the Government Performance budget actually was in surplus, focused and Results Act (GPRA), which requires publicly on government service enhance- agencies to develop strategic and perfor- ment, then referred to baldly as “custo- mance plans; dramatic reduction of internal mer service,” rather than cost cutting. Yet regulations (or red tape); and a require- during the same period, the federal gov- ment for agencies to develop “customer ernment, following the example of U.S. service” standards and strategies. businesses, cut the federal workforce by The NPR staff published a report, 250,000 jobs, primarily in middle man- “Reengineering through Information agement positions. This dramatic reduc- Technology,” in September 1993 that tion indelibly connected use of ICTs with included 13 recommendations combining downsizing in the psyche of the federal general directions with specific projects: workforce.

103 JANE E. FOUNTAIN

Early federal government websites in political timing so that events could the United States allowed taxpayers to become showcases for new technological interact with government in ways similar innovations. These temporal pressures to interactions using e-commerce follow- were both catalytic in terms of speeding ing a historical pattern of alignment of up new developments and problematic in state and economy that characterizes the terms of contorting the actual time required marketized culture of the American state. to manage such complexity. Structurally, By 1999, for example, 20,000 citizens used the formal institutions required to govern credit cards to pay their federal taxes online. digital projects lay in the future. The The Environmental Protection Agency White House-based bureaucratic reform provided environmental and regulatory data team had strong support at the highest to the public over the web and estimated levels of the administration. But they that it saved approximately $5 million lacked funding, management and over- annually by digital provision of information. sight methods, and procedures adequate Public health agencies at the community, for governance and operations of funda- state, and federal levels began to provide mental technological innovation and change access to previously centrally held infor- throughout the government. The naïve mation through centralized sites such as beliefs that the internet is self-organizing, the Information Network for Public Health self-correcting, and infinitely flexible Officials (INPHO) housed within the reflected the euphoria of the time and Centers for Disease Control and Protection substituted for hard analysis and planning. in the U.S. Public Health Service. Severe cuts in the federal workforce shif- Proliferation of government websites ted resources to the private sector, with and interactive information systems during increasing use of contracting and IT assis- this time period mirrors the highly frag- tance from outside the government. mented and relatively autonomous nature On the positive side, the experiments of central departments and agencies in the and flexibility allowed to public servants U.S. federal government and the highly broke through old, well-worn routines and federated structure of the American state. mental frameworks for how governance Beyond the White House team of political should work. Civil servants were told to be appointees, staff, and consultants leading “grass-roots activists,” and gained impor- the National Performance Review and tant experience with IT management, the Reinventing Government programs, with envisioning the possibilities for gov- there was no adequate oversight body for ernance and operations using web-based the reform effort because institutional operations, and, not least, with inter- arrangements and formal institutions simply agency working groups and projects. At did not exist at that time. The strategy the same time, other formal institutions explicitly called for a decentralized approach required for legitimation developed, includ- to innovation, to allow federal employees ing legislation, oversight bodies and pro- to use and develop their ideas without cedures, regulation, and emergent changes overarching coordination and control. in congressional committees and oversight. The e-government program of the Clinton administration followed closely the zeit- The “Presidential Management geist in the U.S. of the early days of the Agenda” of the Bush internet and web. administration On the negative side, the highly political nature of the Vice President’s reform Beginning in January 2001, the Bush admin- efforts linked development timetables to istration continued to use e-government

104 BUREAUCRATIC REFORM AND E-GOVERNMENT as a tool of bureaucratic reform following its potential to improve productivity. It many, but not all, of the broad outlines notes that: developed during the Clinton administration. The strong role of professional civil The federal government is the servants in the detailed design and imple- world’s largest single consumer of mentation of reforms has much to do information technology (IT). IT has with this continuity of effort. Yet major contributed 40 percent of the discontinuities between the two adminis- increase in private-sector productiv- trations reflected, first, the need to reduce ity growth, but the $45 billion the ICT costs during a much more constrained U.S. government will spend on IT budgetary environment; second, a desire in 2002 has not produced measur- to evaluate and consolidate a plethora of able gains in public-sector worker disconnected, grass-roots reinvention efforts, productivity. which had produced a fragmented e- (U.S. Executive Office of the government landscape; third, heightened President, 2001: 22) awareness of security and privacy challenges, post-9/11; and, finally, the Republican Bush administration staff attributed lack of administration’s desire to manage by productivity gains to lack of strategic IT strengthening business methods, and spe- development; that is, to a failure to align cifically by instituting strong control, IT systems development with agency accountability, and performance objectives. performance goals. They cited a tendency The central strategy for bureaucratic toward automation of “pre-existing pro- reform through e-government was articu- cesses” rather than strategic use of IT for lated in the “The President’s Management innovation, a central finding of institu- Agenda” (http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ tional perspectives on e-government. budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf). The reform Moreover, they noted lack of consolida- blueprint consists of five “government-wide tion across IT systems developed for gen- initiatives” including e-government. This eric functional areas such as finance, enterprise, or government-wide, approach procurement, and human resources. To to bureaucratic reform is isomorphic with remedy these problems, the administra- enterprise strategies in business. tion focused on performance strategies The Government Performance and and performance gains at the enterprise Results Act of 1993 became law during level, “across agency boundaries” using the Clinton administration and mandated the budget process as a key tool for agency strategic planning including annual project management. Put simply: those performance plans and reports. The Clinger– projects that do not produce results do Cohen Act (the Information Technology not receive funding, have management Management Reform Act of 1996) requires replaced, and are noted in high-visibility agencies to treat IT acquisition, planning, reports. In spite of consolidation efforts, and management as a “capital investment” both the Clinton and Bush administra- in order to focus IT investments strategi- tions have remained dedicated to provid- cally. These and other legislative mandates ing government information and services began to institutionalize e-government through multiple channels: face-to-face, systems management. The Bush adminis- telephone, and web based. Managing tration continues the trend toward rationa- across multiple channels, however respon- lization and control of ICT management. sive to the public, increases the cost and The President’s Management Agenda is complexity of e-government bureaucratic premised upon the economics of ICT and reform.

105 JANE E. FOUNTAIN

The President’s budget for 2002 pro- projects include: electronic rule-making, posed $20 million for e-government in tax products for businesses, streamlining 2002 and $100 million for the period international trade processes, a business between 2002 and 2004 to develop “col- gateway, and consolidated health informa- laborative E-government activities across tics. Government-to-government projects agency lines” (U.S. Executive Office of include: interoperability and standardiza- the President, 2001: 23). Yet congres- tion of geospatial information, interoper- sional appropriations during this period ability for disaster management, wireless were markedly less generous. Thus, most communication standards between emer- e-government projects have been funded gency managers, standardized and shared largely through existing agency program vital records information, and consolidated budgets. Among the projects specifically access to federal grants. Government-to- singled out in the “President’s Management citizen projects consist of: standardized Agenda” were further development of access to information concerning govern- Firstgov.gov; development and implement benefits, standardized and shared mentation of digital signatures, which are public recreation information, electronic tax needed for online transactions; a single e- filing, standardized access and processes procurement portal, with the ungainly for administration of federal loans, and name www.FedBizOpps.gov to allow citizen customer service. Projects focused businesses to access notices of solicitations on internal efficiency and effectiveness over $25,000; government-wide federal within the central government include: grants application and management (grants. training, recruitment, human resources gov); and greater transparency and access integration, security clearance, payroll, to administrative rule-making in regulatory travel, acquisitions and records manage- agencies (regulations.gov). ment. (For further information concerning each project see www.e-gov.gov.) The 25 projects were selected from Cross-agency initiatives and more than three hundred initial possibilities shared services by a task force working with IT specialists The Bush administration’s e-government from the Office of Management and plan, initially called “Quicksilver” and based Budget (OMB). The plethora of possibi- upon a set of projects developed during the lities was developed during the Clinton Clinton administration, evolved to focus administration and they continue as e- on the infrastructure and management of 25 government projects although they lie cross-agency initiatives. The e-government outside the rubric of the “President’s plan also includes a Line of Business Management Agenda”. In all cases, such strategy, discussed below, and calls for a projects focus attention on the development Federal Enterprise Architecture, an effort of horizontal relationships across govern- to align information architecture within ment agencies. In this sense, they advance agencies with respect to strategic planning beyond what some have called the first and to align architectural components for stage of e-government typically entailing similar functional areas across agencies. information provision online to citizens. The 25 projects are grouped into four They also progress further than so-called categories: government to business, gov- stage-two e-government, or putting trans- ernment to government, government to actions online such as payments to gov- citizen, internal efficiency and effective- ernment. In a sense, the evolutionary stage ness, and a project that affects all others, three of e-government might be cross- e-authentication. Government-to-business agency initiatives built on shared systems.

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Ironically, such efforts reinvigorate Office of E-government and Information management developments from the 1970s Technology, a statutory office established by using proprietary intranets to develop as part of the E-Government Act of 2002 shared databases and information systems (Public Law 107–347). The Administrator using electronic data interchange. The for E-government and IT, at the apex of public accessibility of the internet, flex- the organization, is an associate director of ibility of open standards, and web-based OMB reporting to the Deputy Director for programming mean that the technological Management, who reports to the OMB and systems development challenges differ Director. The position initially was held by significantly from the previous efforts, but Mark Forman, a political appointee, and many of the organizational and institu- is currently held by Karen Evans, a former tional challenges are similar. These insti- career civil servant and now a political tutional developments mirror supply- appointee. The Associate Administrator for chain integration in vertically integrated E-government and Information Technology, firms and industry networks. They are not who reports to the Administrator, is being invented whole cloth by govern- responsible for the 25 cross-agency pro- ments; they exemplify structural iso- jects. Five portfolio managers have specific morphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). responsibility to oversee the cross-agency As processes and systems are incorporated initiatives. A management consulting group into government from business, however, (private contractors) has been responsible they become embedded in a distinctly for most of the day-to-day communica- different environment from their original tions and reporting for the programs. In setting in business. effect, they serve as staff and liaisons The point of the Quicksilver effort was between OMB and the cross-agency to find “quick wins,” functional manage- projects that are based in government ment areas in which an IT system had agencies. been developed that could be used as the The new organization within OMB basis for a government-wide system and signals a major institutional development for which the benefits would be sig- in the U.S. federal government. Before nificant. But the opportunities to develop passage of the E-Government Act of government-wide IT systems to con- 2002, which established the federal CIO solidate management functions obscured and OMB structure, there was no formal the challenges of institutional change. The capacity within OMB to oversee and effort was—and continues to be—led lar- guide cross-agency initiatives. This struc- gely by IT professionals. It has suffered in tural gap formed a major impediment to many cases from lack of program man- the development of networked govern- agement and the involvement of seasoned ance during the Clinton administration. civil servants with program management In terms of political development and experience. Experienced program managers, fundamental changes in the nature of the for example, understand subtle differences bureaucratic state, we see here the emer- in seemingly generic management func- gent institutionalization of a structure for tions based on program and policy char- the direction and oversight of cross- acteristics, history, and legislation. agency, or networked, governance. The projects themselves are not part of the OMB hierarchy. Oversight and gui- Governance and oversight dance of the projects is exercised by The current e-government projects are portfolio managers, but the lead agency— overseen and supported by the OMB or managing partner—for each project is

107 JANE E. FOUNTAIN a federal agency. Each managing partner that the fund [requested to support cross- agency appointed a program manager to agency initiatives] doesn’t duplicate what lead its project. Program managers are already exists in other agencies or per- typically senior career federal civil ser- forms unique functions … It has never vants. They have been responsible for been well-justified, and we don’t have a developing a consultative process among lot of spare cash lying around” (Scofield agencies involved in each project and, quoted in Miller, 2004). in consultation with OMB, they are responsible for developing project goals Lines of business: building a and objectives. In most cases, program shared services environment managers were also required to devise staffing and funding plans to support their In 2004, the Bush administration laun- project. Neither funds nor staff was allo- ched the Lines of Business initiative to cated as part of the president’s agenda. further consolidate and streamline func- The E-Government Act provided for tional management across the federal federal funding for the projects of government. The original five lines of approximately $345 million over four business, identified by virtue of shared years. But an average of only $4 million enterprise architecture, include human to $5 million per annum actually has been resource management, financial manage- appropriated by Congress. Strategies ment, grants management, federal health developed by each project for funding, architecture, case management and infor- staffing, and internal governance vary mation systems security. In 2005 the widely and have been largely contingent Information Technology Security task on the skills and experience of the pro- force was added as a sixth line of business. gram manager. So far, the legislature has The initiative also now includes a seventh, not adapted organizationally to networked the budget formulation and execution government. This lag in institutional line of business. development makes it difficult to build Consolidated systems, or “centers of networked systems because appropriations excellence,” in President’s Management of funds continue to flow to individual Agenda parlance, may be operated either by agencies and programs within them. As agencies or private vendors. Competition John Spotila, former director of the is to be fostered by maintaining approxi- Office of Information and Regulatory mately four IT systems for each line of Affairs in OMB, remarked: “Even with- business. Agencies then choose the system out homeland security absorbing most of that best meets their needs and budget. the IT dollars, cross-agency projects have For example, the grants management never been a favorite of Congress, where centers of excellence, selected by compe- appropriations are awarded through a tition, include the Department of Health ‘stovepipe system’ of committees that and Human Services, the National Science makes a multi-agency approach difficult” Foundation (primarily for research grants), (quotation in Frank, 2002). Appropriations and the Department of Education, which for the cross-agency initiatives were $5 has yet to build its system. The centers are million in financial years (FY) 2002 and to compete for agency business and to 2003 and only $3 million in FY 2004. develop competitive pricing for shared John Scofield, a spokesman for the House services. Appropriations Committee was quoted Yet funding shared services is difficult during the 2004 budget negotiations as at times to align with congressional saying: “We have never been convinced appropriations and oversight, which remain

108 BUREAUCRATIC REFORM AND E-GOVERNMENT agency based. Congressional committees website is designed for efficiency and ease increasingly have demanded that approval of use, and, because most pages can be for budget transfers across agencies be translated into multiple languages, the approved by Congress. The authority of information is also widely accessible “lead agencies” over agencies within lines (West, 2007). By contrast, state websites of business networks is collaborative and for Arkansas, Mississippi, New Mexico, negotiated, and, even when negotiated West Virginia, and Wyoming were through Memoranda of Understanding, ranked as the bottom five. remains highly contingent and informal In addition to the number of services relative to statutory authorities. The available, West (2006, 2007) examines the coordination costs of such arrangements types of services available online. For remain “off the books” in the sense that example, in 2006, Iowa and Massachusetts they fail to show up on budgets and in allowed citizens to pay traffic tickets performance documents. online; Alaska installed webcams at the field offices of the Department of Motor Vehicle to allow citizens to gauge wait Developments in state and times at offices. In 2007, Virginia and local e-government Vermont allowed online donations to military troops and charities; Georgia A substantial gap in U.S. e-government provided a searchable list of gas prices; collaboration exists between levels of and South Carolina provided closed cap- government in the highly federated tioned legislative broadcasts. Common American system. For example, local and problems among state websites include federal initiatives seldom collaborate with outdated information; inconsistent web each other. This does not mean, however, page structures or URLs; and inconsistent that government leaders are unaware of color schemes and layouts that make it initiatives outside their immediate level of difficult for users to know whether they government. In fact, “[due] to their have left the “official” state web page variation in geography, demographics, when they click into a page that contrasts and infrastructure, [the 50] states serve as visually with others (West, 2006). laboratories of experimentation for e- While the importance of an online government. Federal policy-makers may presence is critical, e-government is much find aspects of state e-government plan- more than the existence of a website. E- ning and implementation useful examples government programs must have strong for future decisions regarding the integra- management and leadership and clear tion of federal information and services” strategies in place in order to be effective. (Seifert and McLoughlin, 2007, p. 1). The majority of state government chief Currently all 50 states in the U.S. have information officers (CIOs) surveyed by e-government or IT departments or divi- the National Association of State Chief sions. However, the degree and types of Information Officers (NASCIO) have activity in each department and the level adopted an enterprise architecture as a of support for each initiative vary widely way to structure e-government initiatives from state to state. West ranks the web- across an entire state government. Most sites of states of Delaware, Michigan, states have designated a chief enterprise Maine, Kentucky, and Tennessee as the architect to lead their programming, top five with respect to access, privacy, although the official title varies from state and the availability of services and other to state (NASCIO, 2005). All 50 states resources. He notes that the Delaware have CIOs, but the management of

109 JANE E. FOUNTAIN e-government initiatives extends beyond practices in cross-boundary collaboration. the CIO to include finance and account- Led by the California Department of ing offices, IT departments, and informa- Health Services (CDHS), the system tion resources departments (Seifert and allows physicians statewide to test new- McLoughlin, 2007). borns for 36 more genetic diseases than As with federal e-government pro- without the SIS. The program brings grams, state-level e-government strategies together labs, case coordinators, counse- seek to exploit the value of cross-agency lors, physicians, and staff of the CDHS for collaboration for integration of existing better control of testing, reporting, and services. Similarly, all such projects affect follow-ups so that diagnosis and treatment organizational structures and agency cul- is better administered and more successful. tures. The challenge of building sustain- A second example is Washington D.C.’s able collaboration was ranked a high Safe Passages information system. Safe priority for state CIOs in a 2005 survey Passages allows caseworkers to look by NASCIO (NASCIO, 2006b). State through the district’s information systems CIOs sought to consolidate and share to see if their clients have case histories models in several arenas—from procure- with other caseworkers or agencies. The ment to security and disaster recovery. program saves time and produces higher Communication services and online pay- quality client services because caseworkers ment engines are reported to be the most do not have to duplicate client histories commonly completed initiatives; standar- and may quickly access previous case dized log-ins and identity authentication decisions. were the most commonly proposed new Bureaucratic reform using e-government initiatives (NASCIO, 2006b). Those CIOs at the local level in the United States is who responded to the survey cited cost highly varied, somewhat slower to have savings and increased information sharing developed, and less often studied than at as the most common reasons to begin a the state and federal levels. At the county consolidation program. Seventy-seven level, a survey of 3099 county governments percent of CIOs also cited a pervasive in the U.S. indicated that 56.3 percent of stovepiped, agency-based culture as the counties have adopted e-government greatest human resources barrier to portals. Portal development is positively implementing any consolidation effort. correlated with population size, popula- Moreover, 80 percent view resistance to tion growth, racial diversity, income, change in their workforces to be the major employment opportunities, and education obstacle to successful implementation of levels (Huang, 2006). A 2004 analysis of consolidation projects (NASCIO, 2006b). 1873 city government websites in the 70 Some of the “best practices” in bureau- largest metropolitan areas found 60 per- cratic reform through e-government at the cent of the cities did not offer any online state level reported by NASCIO are not services (West, 2004a). This shows little necessarily transferable to other states change from a previous study in which due to geographic, political, social, and researchers observed that a “striking” fiscal disparities. Yet they signify innova- number of cities studied did not offer e- tion and change, act as benchmarks, and government services (Kaylor et al., 2001) point to institutional developments. For and from Edmiston’s (2003) finding that instance, in 2006, NASCIO recognized although most local governments have the California Statewide Information developed websites, there has been little System (SIS) for Prenatal and Newborn change in local government operations or Screening Program as one of two best practice. However, using surveys from

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2002, Norris and Moon (2005) reported importation of several streams of institu- “enthusiasm” for e-government at the tionalist inquiry and methods. Institutional local level and claim that plans for e- studies, building on a rich base of theo- government developments were being retical and empirical research, should be made. They also noted the increasing rate able to go further than stating that “cul- of growth in the number of local gov- ture matters,” or that the organizational and ernment websites. political issues in e-government are more Bureaucratic reform through e-govern- difficult than the technical issues. Such ment at the local level has lagged for sev- research is not meant to supplant studies eral reasons. Local governments find it of information and service provision or difficult or impossible to finance new IT studies of citizen attitudes and uses of e- systems given fiscal constraints and local government, but to complement them by budget processes. Small local governments examining institutional and organizational tend to lack IT expertise and leadership of structures and processes and their role in staff. Vendors already have packaged sev- structuring the context within which eral e-government service delivery vehi- bureaucratic reform is envisioned, designed, cles for local governments, including vital and implemented. records processes (Edmiston, 2003; Kaylor The list of institutional research dimen- et al., 2001; Norris and Moon, 2005). sions is rife with possibilities for e-gov- Forward-looking state and local government research. Among the key topics ernments typically innovate before larger is the role of formal institutions. What central governments whose systems are type of legislation seems to be most more difficult to change. However, local important for bureaucratic reform to and state governments vary dramatically move forward, assuming that the goals of in the extent of electronic information the bureaucratic reform are agreed upon and services available primarily because by major stakeholders? Is there a dis- such governments range from small, poor, cernible sequence, roughly speaking, to rural communities with little access to the the legislation enacted to support e-gov- internet to large metropolitan areas with ernment across countries? Might there be extensive infrastructure and a range of some predictive or practical value in conditions in between. The American answers to such questions? What institu- federated system and the size and scale of tional arrangements provide the necessary the United States make e-government in oversight and overall guidance for e-gov- the U.S. more heterogenous, fragmented, ernment reforms? and variable than perhaps in any other At the root of this work are normative country. Local governments tend to be questions. The number of services avail- less highly institutionalized in the sense able online or the cultural shifts in civil that staff are not always professionalized, service attitudes toward cross-agency routines and procedures are less closely arrangements are important and interest- codified, turnover may be greater in ing. Yet, our principal motivation in the employees and officials, and smaller scale study of government typically is to ask allows for greater informality. whether the government being created is more democratic, along some dimension, than the government being left behind. Conclusion Hence, normative inquiry, informed by strong scholarly foundations in political The future of e-government research can philosophy and theory and in the be greatly strengthened and enhanced by canonical writing of political science and

111 JANE E. FOUNTAIN political sociology, is greatly needed in restructuring government agencies, opera- the subfield of e-government. tions, and relationships across agencies and Of great importance also are changes in with non-governmental organizations. relationships among government agencies But do they? And what are the principal across local, state, federal, and national goals of such reforms? Perhaps the most jurisdictions and between public, private, elusive, and certainly the area of highest and non-profit organizations. Currently, speculation, is the degree to which the institutional arrangements such as the internet is likely to prove “transforma- budget process, oversight functions, and tive” for governance in the twenty-first the committee structure within legis- century. latures reinforce agency autonomy and operations at the level of a single agency or an agency working in partnership with Acknowledgments private sector or non-profit sector organizations. Such institutional arrangements fi The author acknowledges the research are likely to be modi ed as policy-makers assistance of Michelle Sagan Goncalves. respond to communities of interest, This material is based upon work supported strengthened by the internet, that cross by the National Science Foundation under agency boundaries. Grant Numbers 0131923 and 0630239. Potential near-term technological chan- Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or ges include greater use of wireless com- recommendations expressed in this mate- munication, personal digital devices, instant rial are those of the author and do not messaging, ubiquitous computing, and necessarily reflect the views of the National increased reliance on visual communica- Science Foundation. tions media. As these next-generation technologies become more dominant compared with personal computers, bulletin boards and chat rooms, and compu- Guide to further reading ter-mediated text communication, they are likely to exert as yet unknown effects The author developed the technology on e-government. Similarly, Web 2.0 enactment framework and presents tools are likely to have an effect on detailed case studies of bureaucratic bureaucratic policy-making processes. reform using e-government in the United Finally, among the important and as yet States during the Clinton administration unanswered research questions for the (Fountain, 2001a). A research agenda for future are the following puzzles. What the study of ICT and governance was are the effects, if any, of e-government generated through dialog at a workshop on the quality of policy-making and of approximately 30 researchers resulting policy implementation? What are the in a monograph (Fountain, 2002). Darrell effects of increased transparency and West (2005) has compared information power to manipulate and analyze infor- and services available on government mation on the ability of governments to websites in state and local U.S. govern- serve society and economy? What are the ments as well as in and among federal unanticipated consequences of govern- agencies. Patrick Dunleavy, Helen mental cyber-infrastructure? Government Margetts, Simon Bastow, and Jane officials and policy-makers may use Tinkler (Dunleavy et al., 2007) compare information and communication technol- e-government developments in the ogies for government reform, in part by United States, with specific attention to

112 BUREAUCRATIC REFORM AND E-GOVERNMENT the role of the IT industry and the costs (2001). Finally, David Lazer’s and Viktor of projects, to those in several other Mayer-Schönberger’s (2007) edited countries including Canada, the United volume features several chapters on the Kingdom, and Australia. An assessment of role and importance of information in cost savings in e-government is to be e-government. found in Fountain and Osorio-Urzua

113 9 Public management change and e-government The emergence of digital-era governance

Helen Margetts

Contemporary government is reliant on the complex networks of information systems and websites that make up “e-government.” Such systems are critical to government operations and open up new policy options. This chapter first discusses how they have been downplayed by mainstream public management research. With widespread use of the internet, a field of e-government research has emerged that focuses on digital technologies. But many authors argue that they are not an instrument for administrative reform, nor do they bring fundamental change to governmental operations and institutional development. The chapter goes on to explore an alternative perspective: that it now makes sense to view public management change with reference to digital modes of operating. Governments in developed countries have varied in the extent to which they implemented New Public Management (NPM) reforms in the 1990s and have prioritized e-government initiatives in the 2000s. The chapter examines the relationship between e-government and public management reform more generally, suggesting that “digital-era governance” (DEG), which reverses or cuts across NPM styles of management, is a useful way to view contemporary administrative reform. It outlines the three main themes of DEG: reintegration, needs-based holism, and digitization, and shows how the pervasive use of digital technologies by governments, firms, and society more generally provoke organizational responses in government organizations. The study of contemporary public administration, therefore, requires a “mainstreaming” of e-government research.

E-government may be defined as the use in government from the 1960s and com- by government of digital technologies bined with the development of networks internally and externally, to interact with and PCs with processing power opened citizens, firms, other governments, and the way for computers to begin to pene- organizations of all kinds. Defined so, the trate a wider range of “front” offices or phenomenon of e-government can be mainstream administrative settings, instead traced back to the 1950s, when com- of being concentrated only in self- puters were brought into government contained “back-office” enclaves. But the departments in the United Kingdom and real changes for government—and indeed United States, first in defense and science- the emergence of the term “e-government” intensive areas and later in the largest came with the internet in the second half administrative transaction processing depart- of the 1990s. Earlier government infor- ments such as tax and social security. mation technologies were largely internally The widespread use of computers for facing, with a clear potential for trans- holding financial information developed forming administrative tasks and reducing

114 DIGITAL-ERA GOVERNANCE costs but few possibilities for changing the With widespread use of the internet, IT way that government communicated with policy rose much higher up the political citizens. As citizens began to witness the agenda in those countries and regions transformation of their relationship with where internet penetration was high (such many private sector agencies (banks, as Canada, the United States, Singapore, shops, and travel agents in particular) they Japan, Scandinavia, and Australia) and also began to expect to interact with reached the attention of policy-makers as government electronically. it never had before. By the start of the Governments too began to perceive the twenty-first century, governments in potential for new forms of government– most of these countries had some kind of citizen interactions. The development of e-government initiative. For example, the internet and the web presented a key Singapore was an early leader and the opportunity for government to provide United States, Australia, and Canada were higher quality services directly to citizens particularly quick off the mark, while in in innovative ways at lower cost. It facili- the United Kingdom a low-key initiative tated improvements in the provision of in 1996 was transformed into a major information to the public, especially allied government commitment by the new with “open government” and “freedom Labour administration in autumn 1997. In of information” policies. Information can the Netherlands, an effective government be made available via the web 24 hours a portal was operating by 2001. Japan day, from whatever location people access picked up the need for some e-government it. Customers who know their own per- activity in 1999 as part of any effective sonal circumstances in detail can search “e-society” push, but progress was slow. for exactly the information they require. There is scope for many citizens to conduct most of their business with government E-government research electronically. Web-based technologies can also be used to facilitate “joined-up” The field of e-government research has government. Websites can provide virtual grown up at very different rates in differ- front-ends or entry points to otherwise ent sectors and at different times. Before fragmented organizational arrangements, the internet, the academic community allowing citizens to transact with several showed little sustained interest in the departments and agencies and across dif- phenomenon, particularly the relationship ferent tiers of government simultaneously. between information technology and public Someone newly out of work, for exam- administration reform. Until the 2000s, ple, can use government websites to look academic visions of e-government tended for and apply for a job, but also claim and to range from the highly utopian to the receive benefits, obtain information about severely dystopian, with a lack of empiri- starting up a small business, or find out cal research filling the middle of the about retraining and apply for educational spectrum. Most of these visions revolved courses. In general, governments have around the modernist notion that tech- been slower than commercial firms to nology will somehow lead government to realize the potential of the internet and become more rational and efficient, with associated technologies, but from 2000 strong parallels to Weber’s predictions for onwards the potential of e-government bureaucracy and his analogy of bureau- has been evident too, particularly given cratic organization as a “machine.” So- the phenomenal rise of e-commerce over called “hyper-modernists” (Margetts, 1999) the period 2000 to 2005. argued that as the internet and associated

115 HELEN MARGETTS technologies become ubiquitous, govern- successor, the i2010 initiative, both geared ment will become more and more efficient at creating “an information society for and therefore smaller, until eventually all.” There sprung up a plethora of intergovernmental organizations themselves national rankings of e-government, pro- will become increasingly irrelevant. While duced by private sector consultancies also believing in transformation for vying for government business and inter- government through technology, “anti- national organizations providing informa- modernists” concentrated on the negative tion across a wider range of countries effects, believing that e-government (see for example Accenture, 2001–5; would be more powerful, and more UNPAN, 2004). But most of these stu- intrusive in the lives of citizens than tra- dies are based on questionable methodol- ditional bureaucracy. Writers such as ogies and suffer from a number of Burnham (1983) argued that the increased weaknesses. The dominant way of pic- possibility for surveillance and control turing the development of e-government offered by information and communica- in IT-industry thinking in the United tion technologies would lead electronic Kingdom and internationally that under- governments to “the Computer State” pins all these rankings is the so-called or the “Control State,” whereby gov- “stages model” (for an example, see ernments use CCTV cameras, “smart” UNPAN, 2001; for a full explanation see identity cards, satellite navigation systems, Dunleavy and Margetts, 2002: 11). This electronic tracking devices, and cen- model delineates a number of stages, tralized databases with sophisticated search which each government is said to go capabilities to maintain an ever-closer eye through over time. The first stage is basic on the activities of their citizens. electronic publishing where most gov- Outside the modernist tradition, there ernment agencies have websites but there were a few localized examples of rigor- are few linkages with internal legacy sys- ous, empirical e-government research in tems or interactions with citizens, while the United Kingdom (such as Margetts, in the second stage agencies develop more 1999; Bellamy and Taylor, 1998), the interactive and transactional websites, Netherlands (van de Donk et al., eds., where users can undertake more sophisti- 1995) and the United States (Laudon, cated dealings with the agency online. 1974; Kraemer and Kling, 1985; Kraemer Eventually, the government achieves and King, 1986). But in general, main- some kind of “joined-up e-governance,” stream public administration research where the website facilitates one-stop remained remarkably oblivious to and services for citizens across a whole range untouched by the potential implications of services across central government of information technologies for govern- agencies and tiers of government. Different ment (see Margetts, 1999: Chapter 1 for a rankings ascribe different titles to the discussion). stages. Accenture, for example, appears to With rising societal use of the internet, choose the names carefully so as not to there was far more widespread interest in offend potential customers placed in the the possible implications of digital tech- lower categories: “online presence,” nologies for government. Many organi- “basic capability,”“service availability,” zations directed substantive sums of “mature delivery,” and “service transfor- research funding towards e-government, mation.” But across the rankings there is particularly the European Commission, strong similarity between the definitions which defined e-government as a priority of each stage. As with the work outlined in the eEurope 2005 Action Plan and its above, this stages model of development

116 DIGITAL-ERA GOVERNANCE is inherently modernist, with an inbuilt In contrast to the earlier modernist assumption that a government (or an orga- agenda, the key theme that links much of nization, or an individual) will only proceed this post-internet e-government research forward through the “stages” before reach- (for example, Fountain, 2001; Moon, ing some kind of “e-government nirvana.” 2002; Norris and Moon, 2005; West, Academic research and theoretical devel- 2005) is that digital technologies are used opment, however, has not kept pace with to reinforce existing organizational arrange- these huge volumes of practitioner activ- ments and power distributions rather than ity, which remain unintegrated into the to change them; that information tech- mainstream of public management research. nology cannot be an instrument of Even by 2007, many leading texts on administrative reform (see Kraemer and public management reform contain only a King, 2006 for a full discussion, refer- few isolated references to the internet or ences, and argument). Such authors argue e-government; for example, the 2004 edi- that, at best, IT has been an enabler of tion of Pollitt and Bouckaert’s central reforms; that IT has had little effect on cross-national study of Public Management organizational structure; and that the pri- Reform has no references to the internet or mary beneficiaries of e-government have information technology. been the dominant political–administrative However, as in the pre-internet era coalitions in public administration. Although there have emerged a few key works on they make some acknowledgment of the e-government that do investigate the empiri- potential influence of the internet in the cal reality of e-government while aiming future, there is no argument that digital to incorporate mainstream theoretical and technologies will set the agenda for methodological perspectives for further administrative reform. study in the field. Leading journals in public In contrast, Dunleavy et al. (2006a) administration such as Public Administration outline the potential for e-government or, Review, Governance, and the Journal of more broadly, digital-era governance (DEG) Public Administration Research and Theory to emerge as a new paradigm for public contain a smattering of articles discussing administration. It is not argued that e-government issues (for example, Norris reform will necessarily be technologically and Moon, 2005; Bretschneider, 2003; driven in this direction; rather that the Chadwick and May, 2003). Fountain changing technological environment both (2001) applies an institutional approach to inside and outside government creates the study of U.S. e-government, arguing demands and choices to which govern- that the real challenge for the “virtual ment agencies must respond. In so doing, state” will be to overcome entrenched the approach explores a range of scenarios organizational and political divisions within for the internet and digital technologies to government. West (2005) uses multiple impact upon government and public methods to identify some of the factors management reform and for this reason, is determining the breadth of e-government discussed below. adoption across a wide range of countries. Dunleavy et al. (2006a) use fuzzy set methods to make a detailed comparison of seven Before e-government: the countries in terms of their e-government new public management performance and a range of potential factors contributing to performance, with the power So what might we be able to predict for of the IT industry in relation to the gov- government in the age of digital tech- ernment emerging as the most important. nologies—and what is the relationship

117 HELEN MARGETTS between e-government and administrative The enthusiasm with which these stra- reform more generally? tegies were pursued in the 1980s and The dominant theme of public man- 1990s in some countries (such as the agement reform across many developed United Kingdom and New Zealand) has nations throughout the 1980s and 1990s, left important organizational legacies. to strongly varying degrees, was the move- Most importantly for the development of ment known as New Public Management e-government is organizational fragmen- (NPM). In its early days NPM was often tation, typified by New Zealand where represented as introducing modern busi- NPM change left a government consist- ness management methods into public ing of over 300 separate central agencies administration, which was often taken to and 40 tiny ministries, in addition to local include more use of IT instead of paper- and health service authorities, for a coun- based channels. But this pro-IT theme try of only four million people. was never really a distinctive feature of NPM, partly because all public sector Competition changes organizations increased their use of IT and changed the character of the IT they were These involved introducing purchaser/ using around that time (Dunleavy et al., provider separation into public structures 2006a). So from the mid 1980s onwards, so as to allow multiple forms of provision the NPM movement can be characterized to be developed and to create (more) as a cohort of organizational restructuring competition among potential providers. changes based on importing concepts Increasing internal use was made of com- from business practices and public choice- petition processes to allocate resources, in influenced theory into the public sector. place of hierarchical decision-making. The Within this macro-level change, there “core” areas of state administration and were three chief themes of NPM, as public provision were shrunk and suppliers below. were diversified. Specific competition components included the introduction of quasi- markets into public agencies, particularly Disaggregation health and social services; voucher schemes; This involved splitting up large public outsourcing and compulsory market test- sector hierarchies, together with strong ing of previously governmental activities; flexibilization of previous government- intra-government contracting; deregula- wide practices in personnel, IT, procure- tion; and consumer-tagged financing. ment. and other functions (Barzelay, Much of the competition agenda has 2000). Examples of changes that brought stalled in recent years, but again leaves disaggregation included the separation of problematic legacies with particular rele- public sector agencies into “purchasers” vance for government IT strategies. The and “providers”; the breaking down of most important is the almost complete large departments into small core depart- outsourcing of government IT functions to ments and multiple agencies; the creation private sector systems integrator firms in of quasi-government agencies; the separa- Australia, the United Kingdom, and New tion out of micro-local agencies; and the Zealand (see Dunleavy and Margetts, 2006a). dividing up of privatized industries. New forms of performance measurement and Incentivization league tables and rankings of agency performance further emphasized organizational This involved shifting away from invol- boundaries. ving managers and staffs and rewarding

118 DIGITAL-ERA GOVERNANCE performance in terms of diffuse public IT projects tended to be small and piece- service or professional ethoses, and meal, although large corporations were moving instead towards a greater empha- still involved. Other countries were more sis on pecuniary-based, specific perfor- ambivalent to NPM. Australia was an mance incentives. This shift was achieved early NPM leader, pioneering some dis- via capital market involvement in projects tinctive NPM reforms, but under Labour such as the United Kingdom’s Private governments the initially radical impetus Finance Initiative (PFI); privatizing asset faded into a more humanist style by the ownership; the de-privileging of profes- mid 1990s, with less of the “private sector sions, such as teachers; performance- good, public sector bad” ethos and the related pay; public–private partnerships; negative image of public sector staff that unified rate of return and discounting; the was built into the NPM reforming cul- development of charging technologies; ture elsewhere. Likewise, both the United the valuing of public sector equity, in States and Canada implemented parts of ways analogous to the private sector; and the NPM agenda but resisted other parts. imposing mandatory efficiency dividends The United States made some concerted on public managers. NPM-style changes during the 1990s, as Incentivization is the most resilient of part of the Clinton–Gore National the NPM themes, including some rela- Performance Review reforms, but the tively detailed rationalization changes style was more akin to Australia than the with relevance for e-government. Of United Kingdom (Margetts, 1997). And it particular relevance was capital market never embraced the whole agenda proac- involvement, which proceeded furthest in tively, partly because many NPM ideas the United Kingdom with the PFI, under were already long in play across U.S. which contract providers were supposed federal, state, and highly fragmented local to undertake a share of the risk in large- governments. Other countries, such as scale projects. Yet PFI also created new Japan and the Netherlands, were pre- risks of catastrophic failure. In late 2003, dominantly resistant to NPM. In Japan, after more than a decade of experimenta- core central government administration tion, the U.K. Treasury banned PFI for remained organized on orthodox public government IT specifically, reflecting a administration lines up until 2003 and so far, checkered history of ineffective risk- changes are small scale. The Netherlands transfer to contractors and high scrap rates implemented some detailed NPM ideas at for IT projects. local levels, but these changes were made From a comparative perspective, gov- without a strong or concerted political ernments can be assessed in terms of their push for NPM as such, and by the early openness to NPM ideas and changes 2000s NPM was largely viewed by offi- along these three dimensions. The United cials as something that “has been tried,” Kingdom and New Zealand emerge as but was now “over.” core NPM countries, although with different emphases. In the United Kingdom, NPM was strongly orientated towards The emergence of digital-era developing major projects and systems governance involving private finance and large corporations in public service delivery. In the New Public Management change pro- far smaller New Zealand, a more con- ceeded, or didn’t proceed, more or less servative and risk-averse approach combined independently of technological change. with the fragmentation effect meant that But as noted above, by the early 2000s

119 HELEN MARGETTS most countries were implementing or at for organizational change—the impact of least discussing some kind of e-government large-scale contractor involvement in initiative which formed a central part of delivering IT-related administration pro- the administrative reform agenda, although cesses on the organizational arrangements with considerable variation across coun- and cultures of the agencies they supply. tries in terms of the type of changes The impact of DEG practices can be envisaged. Dunleavy et al. (2006a, 2006b) considered under three main themes, sum- have summarized the possible menu of marized from the book of the same title changes as “digital-era governance” (DEG), (Dunleavy et al., 2006a) as below (and which have IT and information handling also see Dunleavy et al., 2006b). All three changes at their center but which spread of these themes can be considered in terms much more widely than was the case of how they contrast with the dominant with previous IT influences. For the first approaches (and emerging problems) of time the authors argue, it now makes NPM. sense to characterize the broad sweep of current public management regime change Reintegration in terms that refer to digital modes of operating. The advent of the digital era New Public Management-driven fragmen- is now the most general, pervasive, and tation is a key barrier to governments structurally distinctive influence on how wishing to maximize the potential benefits governance arrangements are changing in of digital-era technology. Reintegration advanced industrial states. This is not to components stress gathering back together argue that all these changes have or the disparate functions and clusters of necessarily will occur in any given country, expertise that under NPM were frag- any more than did NPM, but they remain mented into single-function agencies and on the menu of administrative reform for spread across complex interorganizational contemporary government agencies. networks. However, the forms of reinte- Digital-era governance involves a range gration are different from pre-NPM struc- of organizational changes resulting from the tures and some new patterns (such as shared need to accommodate important shifts in services) are emerging. modes of operation, including the use of In the United Kingdom, the rollback e-mail in internal and external commu- of agencification and fragmentation was nications; the rising salience of the internet achieved in part via departmental mer- and intranets in organizational informa- gers, reformation of cohesive departmental tion networks; the development of elec- groups of agencies, and culls of quasi- tronic web-based services for different client governmental agencies, all of which were groups; and a fundamental transition from prominent features of Labour government paper-based to electronic record-keeping. policies from 1997 onwards. Joined-up Societal changes in communications and governance was also a central element of information seeking also push govern- reintegration in the United Kingdom ments towards further digitalization. As under the Blair government (see 6 et al., consumers’ and corporations’ behaviors in 2002; Pollitt, 2003; 6, 2004). Major the private sector change, so there are departmental amalgamations at central or direct demands for government informa- federal levels occurred in both the United tion and transaction practices to shift in States and the United Kingdom, such as parallel ways (although there may be time the creation of the Department of lags). In countries where NPM influences Homeland Security in the United States, have been high, there is an additional driver responding to the previous deficiencies of

120 DIGITAL-ERA GOVERNANCE agency fragmentation highlighted by the problematic IT systems tended to be out- 9/11 terrorist massacre (Wise, 2002) and sourced “wholesale” rather than being the merging of employment service and modernized or redesigned, there is con- welfare benefits operations in the U.K.’s siderable potential for re-engineering in Department of Work and Pensions. this way. Reaping the benefits of re- These changes rely on massive IT con- engineering acquired political prominence vergences; the merger of two previously in the United Kingdom in 2004 when separate U.K. tax agencies into one (HM both the Labour government and the Revenue and Customs) in 2005, for main opposition parties outlined plans for example, was completely reliant on an quantum reductions of at least 80,000 extensive integration program of two civil servants (out of a total of 530,000) huge systems networks managed by dif- over a five-year period (see Gershon, 2004). ferent suppliers under separate contracts. The big reductions were concentrated in Reintegration also comes from re- high IT-use departments, with 30,000 staff establishing central processes. New Public targeted in the Department of Work and Management’s focus on creating new or Pensions and 15,000 from the merging of enhanced corporate management pro- two national tax agencies. cesses across dozens of agencies meant A government-wide focus on pro- duplicating on a smaller scale some similar curement is also a move towards the generic functions, such as non-standard re-integration of outsourced elements, procurement, recruitment and human particularly IT. Procurement concentra- relations, or e-government operations. tion and specialization has long developed Varied initiatives have begun to rein the United States, especially with the impose a degree of order on this NPM growth of Government-Wide Acquisition legacy, especially in the IT area with the Contracts (GWACs), contracts established Canadian and U.S. Federal Enterprise by one agency with one or more suppliers Architecture Programs (FEAP). In the under which other agencies can purchase United Kingdom, centralized e-change products and services without tendering programs have been extensively funded anew. Government-Wide Acquisition and from 2005, the e-government unit Contracts accounted for 39 percent of began trying to reduce duplication in American public sector civil IT procure- areas like the over-provision of websites. ment by 2003. But in the NPM core However, these large-country initiatives countries these ideas were neglected and a lag years behind effective government- huge increase in the number and range of wide programs launched by small coun- contracts was not accompanied by a con- tries like Singapore and Finland that were current professionalization of procurement. more resistant to NPM influences in the In New Zealand, government outsourced past, and hence have had stronger central its key competencies in contracts-drafting processes from the outset. to private sector lawyers and consultants, Re-engineering back-office functions is as chief executives on short-term con- another form of re-integration which tracts themselves covered their positions realizes the productivity improvements against risks, more concerned with ensur- offered by newer IT, consolidating “legacy” ing process-proofing and a clear audit trail labyrinths of discrete mainframe facilities than with contracting innovatively. In the and associated administrative units, which United Kingdom, the NPM era produced grew up piecemeal in the 1970s and a considerable duplication of procurement 1980s and were never simplified in the functions across departments and agencies. 1990s. In the NPM countries, where A 2004 efficiency review conducted for

121 HELEN MARGETTS the Treasury concluded that £20 billion multiple management teams in highly of cost savings could be made within four balkanized policy areas like this, each years from a range of measures, including partly making more work for others to a shift to smarter procurement carried out handle. The “small worlds” literature on by a few major procurement centers, network connectivity suggests that net- instead of independently by 270 depart- work simplification can be achieved when ments and agencies at national level a regular lattice of local links between (Gershon, 2004). close neighbor organizations is supple- Shared services initiatives also contribute mented by a relatively small number of to re-integration, encouraging smaller random or cross-cutting, long-range links departments and agencies to use com- joining up further apart or even remote monly provided back-office or more policy policy sectors (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). relevant services, like human relations, IT services, or financial services. Agencies Needs-based holism with a proven capability in one area are encouraged to provide the same service In contrast to the narrow joined-upon a contract basis to other agencies with governance changes included in the rein- similar needs, with multiple providers tegration theme, holistic reforms seek to ensuring that a customer agency experi- re-engineer the entire relationship between encing poor levels of service can always agencies and their clients. Needs-based switch to an alternative supplier. In the holism involves moving away from the United States, the GWACs for procuring NPM stress on business process manage- simple IT were an early version of shared ment and towards a citizen-based, services- services. In the United Kingdom, a based, or needs-based foundation of “mixed economy” model may develop organization (see 6 et al., 2002). Interactive under the Gershon review process, with a information-seeking and giving is funda- few central government “hubs” for pro- mental for the emergence of all the other curement and other services competing needs-based holism elements. This dis- with a limited number of major out- covery was a long time coming in the sourcing operations run by consultancies public sector. Governments have tended or big IT providers who can sell more to accept uncritically the five-phase wholesale “business process outsourcing” “stages model” of e-government’s devel- solutions. opment described in the first section, in Network simplification is another way which passive information-giving was to resolve another problematic by-product dismissed as an elementary first phase, a of fragmentation; complex top tiers of “billboards” phase that should be bypassed regulatory or guidance agencies for net- as swiftly as possible en route to the works of public agencies and quasi- or non- “golden” applications of e-government in governmental bodies (see Hood et al., transactional uses (Dunleavy and Margetts, 2000). The multi-way fragmentation of 2002). It took more than a decade for the the U.K. rail industry provides one of the government sector to follow the private most exaggerated NPM outcomes, with sector in different countries in realizing that at one time in the late 1990s three sepa- information-seeking is a crucial part of rate regulators covering rail infrastructure service delivery just as it is of most com- investment, rail safety, and the licensing mercial transactions and that search appli- of train companies. Streamlining reg- cations and sophisticated information ulatory overview and simplifying under- arbitrage would be every bit as critical lying networks can stop the creation of in public sector applications. A further

122 DIGITAL-ERA GOVERNANCE realization—that citizens and enterprises complete redrawing of service-provision themselves have far more information models. Under previous public manage- about their own situations than government regimes, agencies often had perverse ment could ever acquire (just as patients incentives to differentiate their services know most about their condition, and and processes. Despite moving the admin- consumers about their needs and istrative furniture around a great deal, desires)—is vital to the design of effective NPM reformers were actually reluctant to e-government services. The job of gov- undertake more fundamental questioning ernment information systems then is to of administrative processes, because of the maximize the potential for using this focus on short-term managerialist savings. information, by recording users’ actual Indeed, in the fragmented New Zealand behavior for example, in the provision of system, re-engineering would pose impos- public services, rather than taking a top– sible demands, for instance requiring down approach, which tries to “second- agency chiefs to envisage their own orga- guess” what people want or need. nization’s amalgamation or to contemplate One-stop provision is another form of a change program extending far beyond needs-based holism. It takes various their own short term of office. In conforms, including one-stop shops (where trast, the migration of key government multiple administrative services are pro- information systems to the web can vided by the same co-located staff), one- emphasize the interconnectedness of pro- stop windows (where only the customer vision and the potential for re-engineering. interface is integrated), and web-integrated An end-to-end approach ensures that pro- services (where the customer transparency ject teams focus through the whole pro- and cross-services integration is primarily cess without artificially demarcating their electronic). The impulse in all one-stop analysis at existing agency boundaries. provision is for government agencies to proactively mesh together provision across Digitization changes erstwhile separate fiefdoms, so as to resolve “lead agency” and duplication To realize contemporary productivity gains problems and to reduce the previously from IT and related organizational changes high cognitive burdens and compliance requires a far more fundamental take-up costs placed on citizens or businesses in of the opportunities opened up by a transi- the NPM heyday. Key examples have tion to fully digital operations. Instead of been the pulling together of previously electronic channels being seen as supple- separated employment and benefits ser- mentary to conventional administrative and vices for working-age people in the business processes, they become genuinely United Kingdom, again in a new kind of transformative, moving towards a situation client-focused agency, Job Centre Plus, where the agency “becomes its website,” following a pattern initiated much earlier as a senior official in the Australian Tax by the pioneering Australian Centrelink Office described this process (Dunleavy agency. “Ask once” methods involve a and Margetts, 1999). Organization and cul- commitment by government to reusing tural changes are triggered by the impacts already collected information, rather than of web, internet, and e-mail on public recursively gathering the same information agencies as well as behavioral shifts by many times, as happened under NPM’s civil society actors outside. fragmented administrative systems. The most obvious digitization change Another holistic approach is end-to- comes from electronic services delivery end service re-engineering, involving a (ESD), as most paper-based administrative

123 HELEN MARGETTS processes are converted to e-government monitor water levels and replace manually processes. As noted above, many post- inspected gauges and instrumentation. NPM governments have adopted rela- Such technologies also facilitate disin- tively ambitious programs and targets, as termediation; that is, the potential for with the U.K.’s pledge to put 100 percent web-based processes to allow citizens, of central and local government services businesses, and other civil society actors to online by the end of 2005, backed by a connect directly to state systems, without £1 billion investment (Dunleavy and passing through gatekeepers in the form Margetts, 1999, 2002). In fact, citizens’ take- of civil service or agency personnel as was up of e-services in the United Kingdom previously always the case. Of course, has lagged considerably behind growth in such systems in practice need substantial e-commerce, but once initiated has gen- back-up and help-desk systems. But dis- erally shown rapid growth as with online intermediation changes can allow civil applications for the paying of income tax society actors who know their own and road tax, for example. Rising internet situations very well to autonomously sift penetration acts to strengthen the business and select what they may receive from rationale and customer impetus for further government. Disintermediation works ESD. only when government agencies facilitate Other digitization changes include changes in behavior by citizens or using “zero touch technology” (ZTT), consumers of public services. A good pioneered in the private sector by com- example is the public transport system in panies like CISCO, where the ideal is that London, where transport authorities no human intervention is needed in a introduced charging technology in under- sale or administrative operation. There are ground rail stations and buses for using a huge areas of potential application in smart card (called Oystercard), which public agency operations. For instance, allowed users to put credit on their card the surveillance and control system for the and then pay for any form of mass-transit London congestion charge is an almost journeys by swiping it past an automatic ZTT process. Once the entry of a parti- reader. Card users grew in four years from cular car has been paid for, its number 350,000 (the original holders of paper plate is automatically counted as valid in season tickets) to more than 2.2 million, the monitoring machinery, or turned up with large cost savings in ticketing staff, as an apparent exception if not paid for, big reductions in peak-hour queuing with the vast majority of cases not times, and increased use of mass transit by requiring staff attention. Likewise, speed- passengers, who no longer had to buy ing fines or traffic violations in many tickets when traveling. Adding a web- countries that are photographed in real- based card-issuing service and the ability time and sent to the owner of the vehicle to “top-up” card credit online completed with address details obtained from a the disintermediation picture for customers. vehicle licensing database have the Digitization changes also involve gov- potential to be dealt with automatically in ernments developing customer segmenta- this way. In other sectors there are also tion processes as strongly in the public many applications for auto-monitoring, sector as in the private business sector, like immigration, where borders are where the internet is used to differentiate electronically monitored by automatic firmly between customers (in contrast to sensors, and environmental management, the NPM focus on discrete business pro- where cheap mobile phone-based auto cesses). For example, for those citizens sensors (costing as little as $15 each) can that interact with government online the

124 DIGITAL-ERA GOVERNANCE internet provides unprecedented oppor- compliance or tax payments for enter- tunities for government agencies to prises, as many tax and customs depart- understand their behavior (from sophisti- ments have already done (see Margetts cated usage statistics for example) and re- and Yared, 2003). design electronic services accordingly. For All these digitization changes have the those citizens that do not use the internet, potential to bring a shift towards self- research suggests that a significant pro- government, from agency-centered to portion (more than 70 percent) could find citizen-centered (or business-centered or an intermediary to do so for them, and stakeholder-centered) processes, where formalizing online channels with inter- citizens or businesses play more of a role mediaries could be a key way for gov- in running their own interactions with ernment agencies to interact with this government. Re-orientation around the major sub-section of the population. citizen implies a move away from “closed Government agencies have to employ files” government to a more “open book” quite different online strategies to reach model, where citizens can look at their these distinct groups. own medical files and monitor their own Customer segmentation is also an treatment, or actively manage their own essential step in active channel-streaming, tax account. Such a shift involves bringing namely incentivizing people to switch by citizens “into the front office,” so that providing e-services with lower costs or they are “co-producing” or even “co- greatly improved functionality. Multi- creating” public services. In some areas of channel access is often just too expensive government the principles of citizens co- to provide, so rather than adding electro- producing services are already well nic service channels to existing capacity, appreciated; for instance, in public health many agencies move to a strategy of where active cooperation is the key actively managing displacement of service for any communicable diseases control users to electronic channels. For example, and in “e-health,” where citizens use the in 2006, the mayor of London heavily internet to become far more informed promoted the use of pre-pay versions of about their own condition than was ever the Oystercard (see above) by dramatically possible in the pre-digital era. And in increasing prices on conventional ticket environmental services, essential innova- sales but keeping those on electronic tions like differentiated waste disposal are transactions at the previous year’s prices. co-produced throughout—citizens actu- The logic here is that strong incentives ally do all the sorting of different types of are needed to overcome the “transaction” household waste prior to its being simply costs to consumers of moving from a collected by agencies or contractors. Such familiar but expensive to operate payment a shift might be greatly accelerated if system to a new but much cheaper alter- governments were to move towards using native. Once this step transition has been so-called “Web 2.0” applications, char- encouraged the incentives for electronic acterized by user-generated content (such customers can be reduced, and none are as testimonials), the mixing of information likely to switch back once they have sources (“mash-ups”), and social net- actually experienced the convenience of working technologies, a growing societal the new methods. Mandated channel trend discussed elsewhere in this volume. reductions or legally compelling people or At the time of writing government use of businesses to change how they transact such applications was relatively rare across with government agencies remains an option even leading e-government countries, but in other areas, especially for regulatory the potential was already clear.

125 HELEN MARGETTS

The future of digital-era with e-commerce, and to return to an era governance and where general improvement and “good e-government research government” are the mantra of public management reform. This chapter has discussed the potential There is certainly nothing inevitable for “digital-era governance” to emerge as about the “digital-era” changes outlined a new paradigm for public administration, above. Indeed, many of them, particularly and has suggested some key themes of those under the “re-integration” theme such a movement that might be used to but also elements of need-based holism, chart e-government change in the future. work against the dominant thrust of The evidence presented in this chapter NPM reform in countries where it has suggests that there will be substantial var- been implemented. Furthermore, for any iation across countries, just as was the case governmental organizations to make the after 20 years of a public management most of the internet and related technol- reform agenda dominated by NPM. ogies, they may have to shift towards Countries vary in the extent to which networked (rather than hierarchical) ways they are responding to digital-era changes of working, involving a wider range of in public management, ranging from non-governmental and private organiza- radical, transformative change or more tions (the “para-state”) in previously gov- modest changes lagging behind other ernmental tasks. One-stop shops, for sectors. And they also vary according to example, long promoted as a benefitof the level of NPM influences and the IT in both the United States and the extent to which DEG processes are being United Kingdom, have in the past proved used to reverse NPM change in public to necessitate a degree of collaborative organizations. working that many government agencies By the mid 2000s, there were signs that found it difficult to attain (Margetts, 1999). the wave of enthusiasm for e-government Web-based technologies make collabora- from the practitioner community dis- tion easier, but some degree of back-end cussed in the first half of this chapter had cooperation is still required. Policy-makers died away, analogous perhaps to the also have to recognize that making use of “dotcom bust” of the earlier years of advanced search capabilities (often wiel- the decade. Hefty expenditure and e- ded by citizens themselves) combined government programs remain, but public with chaotic forms of information storage officials were reluctant to label them as can be the most efficient way to provide such, with both practitioners and aca- information. And capitalizing on newer demics arguing that we should “drop applications (such as those using “user- the ‘e-’.” In 2006, Accenture’s annual e- generated content” or “Web 2.0” tech- government ranking did not even refer nologies) involves drawing citizens into to e-government in its title (although the front office of public services produc- most of the indicators of performance tion. All these developments tend to work remained the same) and the U.K. gov- against the culture of traditional public ernment’s e-government strategy was administration (see Dunleavy and Margetts, renamed “Transformational Government,” 2002 for an early discussion), so can be while the e-government unit in the challenging even for “low-NPM” coun- Cabinet Office was also renamed. To tries. So, public organizations wishing to some extent, policy-makers seemed keen be at the forefront of innovation may well to move on even while e-government have to overcome considerable internal was still in its infancy, particularly compared cultural resistance.

126 DIGITAL-ERA GOVERNANCE

This chapter has also pointed to many will drive bureaucratic reform in the future. gaps in e-government research. While “E-government” or “digital-era govern- pre-internet research tended to be domi- ance” (or whatever it is labeled) should nated by a modernist agenda, oscillating become a critical area of public manage- between strongly determinist utopian ment research. “hyper-modernist” or dystopian “anti- modernist” accounts, post-internet work in the institutionalist tradition has tended Guide to further reading to downplay the implications of digital technologies for government and par- A cross-national comparative analysis of ticularly public management reform. e-government and an argument for a Meanwhile, the issue has still failed to new framework for understanding public penetrate the mainstream of public bureaucracies can be found in Dunleavy administration research and has not et al. (2006a, 2006b). West (2005) also takes received sustained attention from a variety a comparative approach. Fountain (2001) of theoretical frameworks. From the evi- provides a detailed account of e-govern- dence presented here, it should be clear, ment’s emergence in the United States however, that the centrality of digital during the 1990s. Kraemer and King technologies to public management, their (2006), and Norris and Moon (2005) pervasive impact on society at large, and provide useful statements of the reinfor- the necessity for organizational responses cement perspective. Hood and Margetts on the part of government, will ensure that (2007) update the classic “tools of gov- to some extent, technological innovation ernment” perspective for the digital age.

127

Part 2

Behavior

10 Wired to fact The role of the internet in identifying deception during the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign

Bruce W. Hardy, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, and Kenneth Winneg

This chapter asks whether during the 2004 presidential general election the internet enabled citizens to diﬀerentiate fact from deception. Like past elections, the one in 2004 included deceptive claims and misleading rhetoric by both the Republican and Democratic camps. Past research has suggested that traditional news sources such as newspapers and television news are not living up to their role as custodian of fact. Some forms of journalistic practice may in fact foster cynicism and depress learning among citizens. Using data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey that asked respondents about 41 campaign statements—claims that were vetted by FackCheck.org of the Annenberg Public Policy Center—we found that accessing campaign information online promoted a command of facts contested in the election campaign, above and beyond the inﬂuence of traditional news media. The chapter also discusses failings of the traditional press and ways in which accessing information on the internet may overcome them.

The amount of political information sense of contesting political claims? Can available to voters in today’s media these new information technologies pro- environment is seemingly endless. The vide information to enable users to pro- internet provides data on demand from tect themselves from misleading campaign news sites, both mainstream and not rhetoric? This chapter examines the mainstream, ideologically driven websites, eﬀectiveness of the internet in providing blogs of all political stripes, candidate, the tools to enable citizens to distinguish campaign, and party websites, and video- fact from deception in the 2004 pre- sharing sites such as YouTube.com, where sidential general elections, above and anonymous individuals or groups can post beyond the tools aﬀorded to them by the videos related to candidates and cam- traditional news media. paigns. Some of this information is vetted In the 2004 U.S. presidential election, by gatekeepers, some not. And when a citizens turned to the internet for cam- gatekeeper is supervising, the norms under paign information at unprecedented levels which that function is performed are not (Rainie et al., 2005). By one estimate necessarily either clear or disclosed. (that of the Pew Research Center for the Does this cascade of potential informa- People and the Press), 75 million tion confuse users or help them make Americans looked to the web during the

131 BRUCE W. HARDY, ET. AL election, “to get political news and infor- those seeking office offer discordant facts, mation, discuss candidates and debate the public should expect the press to issues in e-mails, or participate directly in weigh in to make sense of the dis- the political process by volunteering or crepancies” (Jackson and Jamieson, 2004, giving contributions to candidates” (Rainie p. 229). The press, however, seems to be et al., 2005, p. i). The number of citizens failing in its role as the “custodian of fact” going online for political news increased (Jamieson and Waldman, 2003; Jamieson from 18 percent of the general public and Hardy, 2007). Nor is the public during the 2000 election to 29 percent in holding up its end of the bargain. 2004 (Rainie et al., 2005, p. i). Similar Relatively low consumption of traditional percentages were found in the National news combines with a reluctance on the Annenberg Election Study (NAES). Over part of the press to adjudicate fact to all the course of the campaign, from October but ensure that the presumed protection 2003 through November 2, 2004 we against campaign distortions expected of found that 26 percent of registered voters the press is less effective than democratic accessed the internet for political infor- theorists would like. mation during the 2004 election. As elec- Confounding such an ill-fated combi- tion day neared (September 7 through nation is the press’s reliance on “horse- November 1, 2004), the proportion of race” campaign coverage that focuses on registered voters with internet access who strategy and politicking and, as some have reported going online for political infor- argued, leaves citizens cynically sitting on mation averaged 34 percent (Winneg and the sidelines (Cappella and Jamieson, Stroud, 2005). 1996, 1997; Jamieson, 1992; Patterson, Like past elections, the one in 2004 1993). Studying the race for mayor in included deceptive claims and misleading Philadelphia in 1991 and the 1993–4 rhetoric by both the Republican and health-care reform debate, Cappella and Democratic camps (Jackson and Jamison, Jamieson (1996) found that such coverage 2004; Milbank and VandeHei, 2004; significantly increased cynicism and sup- Winneg et al., 2005). Misleading attacks pressed the likelihood that participants in on opponents’ vote records, military ser- their study could accurately report the vice, and proposed policies found their information present in strategically framed way into Democratic and Republican news stories. Those experiments, how- advertisements and stump speeches. ever, took place in the old media envir- None of this would make much dif- onment. In the early 1990s citizens did ference if the public were immune to its not have any other functional alternative effects. However, Winneg et al. (2005) for accessing political information besides found at the end of the 2004 primary the traditional news outlets. Back then, season that a majority of the American citizens who were exposed to information public living in battleground states in about the gaming of self-interested politi- which political advertisements aired, mis- cians through traditional news, and as a takenly believed that “George W. Bush result became more cynical and learned favors sending American jobs overseas” less than they otherwise might have, and “John Kerry voted for higher taxes had little recourse. Today, however, the 350 times.” These were, of course, central internet presents a viable alternative. claims in attack ads. Here we examine the following ques- The press is supposed to sort fact from tions. Do failures of the press lead indivi- fiction. If it does, an attentive public duals to turn to the internet in search of would not be deceived. Put simply, “when political information? Does the internet

132 INTERNET AND POLITICAL DECEPTION enable them to discern fact from decep- This research focused on widely dis- tion in presidential elections, above and seminated claims—those found in poli- beyond the tools afforded to the citizens tical ads and discussed in news. They by the traditional news media? Does the included such central questions in the use of the internet affect citizen’s overall campaign as the extent of job loss or gain knowledge of facts? during the first Bush term, whether Bush These questions require that we explain proposed cutting current Social Security what we mean by fact. Campaigns are benefits for seniors and the level, timing, contests over completing claims. Some are and extent of support for intelligence simple matters of opinion. “John Kerry operations by Senator Kerry. betrayed his country by testifying against The scholarly literature raises doubts the Vietnam War before the Senate about the likelihood that internet use Foreign Relations Committee upon his would positively correlate with command return home,” is a statement of opinion. of political fact. After all, scholars have One might believe that any critique of an found that “[although] the possession of ongoing war is an act of disloyalty, while ‘facts’ is related to citizens’ media expo- another might believe that it is a citizen’s sure, the correlation is weak, particularly duty. However, as Senator Daniel Patrick in the case of television news. And once Moynihan was fond of noting, “Everyone one controls for education level, the cor- is entitled to his own opinion; no one is relation nearly disappears” (Patterson and entitled to his own facts.” Seib, 2005, p. 191; see also Becker and ThefactthatJohnKerryisaDemocratic Whitney, 1980). Exposure to local news Senator from Massachusetts who served in actually predicts a drop in political Vietnam and testified before the Senate knowledge (Jamieson and Hardy, 2007; Foreign Relations Committee upon Prior, 2003). Newspaper readership, how- returning home is not a matter of opi- ever, is a reliable positive predictor (Becker nion. If one holds that Kerry is a Senator and Dunwoody, 1982; Chaffee and from Iowa, for example, there are widely Frank, 1996; Chaffee, Zhao, and Leshner, accepted sources to which one can appeal 1994). to demonstrate to a reasonable observer that the person is incorrect. For practical purposes what we mean by fact is what The press, information, and Jamieson (1992), in Dirty Politics: deception, democratic society distraction and democracy, called “consensual fact.” Whether a person voted for or The press is constitutionally protected against a specific piece of legislation and because it has important functions in a how many votes a person cast for a cer- democratic society. “[To] the press alone, tain position are matters of fact as well. chequered as it is with abuses,” wrote To draw up the battery of factual and Thomas Jefferson, “the world is indebted false claims from the 2004 presidential for all the triumphs which have been campaign, this study relied on the reports gained by reason and humanity over of the Annenberg Public Policy Center’s errors and oppression.” FactCheck.org.1 That source was cited The importance of the press is magni- approvingly by both Democratic and fied by the fact that most citizens experi- Republican campaigns in 2004, most ence politics second-hand. Very few notoriously by Vice President Dick Cheney directly observe political actors and policy during his debate with Democratic Vice decisions. A functioning democracy is Presidential contender John Edwards. dependent on the press to inform. As

133 BRUCE W. HARDY, ET. AL

Herbert Gans wrote, “The country’s campaigns. Being incorrect on many of democracy may belong directly or indirectly these questions would have led a voter to to its citizens, but the democratic process inaccurately predict how the elected can- can only be truly meaningful if these didate would govern. citizens are informed” (Gans, 2003: p. 1). As a practical matter, political scientist Samuel L. Popkin (1994) notes the “voter as an investor and the vote as a reasoned The role of information in investment in collective good, made with democratic society costly and imperfect information under In modern democracies, citizens elect or conditions of uncertainty” (p.10). The appoint others to represent their interests. solution, according to Popkin, is citizens’ One peril in such a system is that unin- use of heuristics or cognitive shortcuts. Of formed citizens may delegate to those course, cognitive shortcuts can compen- who could “transform democracy into a sate but only when they prompt accurate tyranny of experts” (Dahl, 1967; Lupia and inferences. The notion that citizens are McCubbins, 1998). Low levels of citizen capable of making rational choices with knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, limited information assumes that the lim- 1996) raise the question: has such a tyr- ited information on which they rely is anny of experts become a reality? accurate. Political scientist Phillip Converse The research shows ample evidence (1990) outlined two simple “truths” that both campaigns relied on heuristics to about the distribution of political infor- mislead the public in 2004. Sixty-two mation in the U.S. electorate: “the mean percent of those surveyed after the elec- is low and the variance is high.” However, tion found very or somewhat truthful the Converse points out that these truths are false Bush claim that Kerry’s tax increase relative to “naïve expectations” of the level would have hurt 900,000 small-business of political information the average citi- owners. The reason is simple: the public is zen holds and that the naïve observer is inclined to see Democrats as tax raisers the one alarmed and shocked by low scores and anti-business. That “business bias” of the “political knowledge” tests found heuristic was also at play, perhaps, in the in many studies. “It is important,” he ﬁnding that 66 percent believed the false argued, “not to leap from these low scores, Kerry claim that “the new jobs created as is often done, to an assumption that the since George W. Bush became president substantial portions of the electorate know pay, on average, $9,000 a year or less than virtually nothing about current national the jobs they replaced.” Republicans are politics … even those who fall in the expected, or so the heuristic says, to favor bottom deciles of political information tests business over labor. More jobs at lower still may have a substantial set of apper- pay would advantage employers at the ceptions about the national political world, cost to employees. Misuse of the heuristic such that with proper interviewer probing that says that Republicans are more likely could talk non-repetitively about it for to cut social programs led the public to signiﬁcant spans of time” (p. 372). To accept as credible the notion that Bush address the concerns raised by Converse’s would actually cut Social Security for conclusions, researchers developed ques- those now receiving it while the heuristic tions to ensure that they captured issues of that suggests that Democrats are weak on importance to voters (e.g., Iraq, guns, defense led it to accept the false statement Social Security, jobs) and also central to that “John Kerry voted for cuts in intelli- the Democratic and Republican presidential gence after September 11th.”

134 INTERNET AND POLITICAL DECEPTION

As presidential campaigns progress, voters and Scheufele, 2005; Margolis and Resnick, do become more informed (Johnston, 2000). Some researchers have even sug- Hagen, and Jamieson, 2004). Gelman and gested that the internet may negatively King (1993; see also Holbrook, 1996; affect community involvement by repla- Campbell, 2000) for example argued the cing social interactions with solitary main purpose of presidential campaigns is activities (Nie, 2001; Nie and Erbring, to illuminate the differences between 2000). Alternatively, insulating uses of the candidates so that voters can figure out internet may limit exposure to diverse which of the candidates are more in line opinions thus undercutting the rational— with their predispositions. Additionally, critical decision-making resulting from overall levels of political knowledge the integration of opposing viewpoints found in the electorate seem to have (Sunstein, 2001). increased as well. By the end of the 2004 Much of this work has been troubled election issue knowledge was higher than by an over-generalized conceptualization it had been at the same point in 2000 of internet use. Specifically, much of the (Winneg and Stroud, 2005). Yet that research focusing on the internet’sinflu- increase did not signal the demise of ser- ence on the electorate has looked only at ious forms of misinformation (Kenski and an online/offline distinction instead of Jamieson, 2006). The bottom line remains: patterns of internet use. A study by Moy it is difficult to sort through misleading et al. (2005) found that the online/offline claims by the two political parties and distinction has little explanatory power in their nominees. Can new information examining the civic consequences of the technologies, such as the internet, provide internet when controlling for specific information to help citizens sort through dimensions of internet use. Moy and her the confusing political world of contested colleagues demonstrated that a “time claims? spent” measure did not have any significant effects on levels of civic engagement when more specific uses of the Past research on the civic internet are included in an explanatory consequences of internet use statistical model. Similarly, Shah et al. A growing body of scholarly literature (2001) concluded “Studies on the psy- addresses the effects of the internet on chological and sociological consequences democratic society. However, researchers of internet use have tended to view the of political communication have yet to internet as an amorphous whole, neglect- agree on the extent to which access to, ing the fact that individuals make very and use of, the internet promote active different uses of this emerging medium” citizenship. Some—often labeled “cyber- (p. 142). Thus, “trying to assess the poli- optimists”—suggest that the internet can tical impact of the internet … involves turn around waning levels of political shooting at a moving target” (Jennings knowledge and political participation. In and Zeitner, 2003, p. 311). this view, citizens will access information The lack of research focusing on the and coordinate political activism via the versatility of the internet and the variety of web (e.g., Bimber, 1998; Davis, 1999; different uses invited by this new medium Kaid, 2002; Rheingold, 1993). leave political communication researchers Others suggest that the internet’s pro- with only a partially painted picture of spect for civic renewal is limited; at best, the civic consequences of internet use. it complements traditional media channels Only a few studies (e.g., Moy et al., 2005; (e.g., Althaus and Tewksbury, 2000; Hardy Shah et al., 2005) have looked at the civic

135 BRUCE W. HARDY, ET. AL effects of the different types of informa- central political fact in the old media is a tion available online while controlling for somewhat futile exercise. other communication variables such as traditional media use. In sum, a review of The traditional news is failing as the scholarly literature on the informa- the custodian of fact tional effects of the internet suggests the need for a more nuanced understanding Some have argued that the press is not of likely patterns of use. fulfilling its democratic functions (e.g., The notion that the public might learn Bennett, 2001; Bennett and Serrin, 2005; information online that it has not been Patterson, 1980, 1993). When politicians able to learn from traditional media pre- succeed in deceiving the public, journal- supposes that there are forms of informa- ists fail, for example, in acting as a “cus- tion on the web not found in the old todian of fact” (Jamieson and Waldman, media or that the modes of presentation 2003). But how does the press fail in its or types of access permitted online are coverage of politics? Two interrelated more effective in communicating political explanations account for the press’s failure fact. Unfortunately, there are not many as the custodian of fact. First, news about systematic content analyses of political campaigns is dominated by tactical and information available online partly because strategic coverage (Cappella and Jamieson content analyses of web content present 1996, 1997; Patterson, 1993) and, second, unique challenges for the researchers (Weare there is an over-reliance on “he-said-she- and Lin, 2000). Specifically, a main chal- said reporting” (Jamieson and Hardy, 2007). lenge is the construction of a sampling Patterson (1993) noted that “election frame to study this massive, decentralized news, rather than serving to bring candi- network of hyperlinked multimedia that dates and voters together, drives a wedge contains over 4 billion web pages on 400 between them” because of the news focus million hosts (Internet Systems Consortium, on the horse-race and politicking of the 2004). Most analyses looking at online campaign. Cappella and Jamieson (1997) content compare traditional print news- found that strategic news coverage—cov- papers to their online counterpart (e.g., erage focused on the political moves and Harper, 1996; Hoffman, 2006; Peng et al., the electoral game rather than issues— 1999). Many of these studies suggest that depressed learning and activated cynicism the online counterpart simply mirrors the toward politics and the political actors offline version. covered. By “reporting about politicians Does the internet produce different and their policies repeatedly framed as effects? An experiment conducted by self-interest and seldom in terms of the Kaid (2003) found that, unlike traditional common good—whether such character- news media, the internet “was very suc- izations are correct or incorrect,” they cessful in encouraging voters to seek out note, “the public’s experience of their additional types of sources of informa- leaders is biased toward attributions that tion.” (p. 688). Additionally, other direct induce mistrust” (Cappella and Jamieson, comparisons between traditional media and 1997, p. 142). Similarly, Neustadt (1997) their internet counterpart have shown that argued that the press is an “actor in online sources are deemed more credible today’s political drama, conveying a than traditional news media (Johnson and steady stream of unambiguously negative Kaye, 1998a) cues about government and politics” The next section presents a telegraphic (p.97). Lost in strategic news coverage is a defense of the notion that trying to learn focus on adjudicating fact.

136 INTERNET AND POLITICAL DECEPTION

Nor is “fact” central to “he-said-she- between the two campaigns. Instead of said” reporting. When reporters adopt a being able to make comparative judg- horse-race frame, they rarely draw any ments on the accuracy of individual can- conclusions about the existence or extent didate claims, the citizens can only surmise of deception in a campaign. In most cases, that both sides are lying. if deceptive tactics are being used more As past studies have shown, such failure by one camp than the other, reporters of the traditional news media fosters poli- will make broad general claims such as in tical cynicism and stunts learning about a New York Times article by Jim politics. If the over-reliance on strategic Rutenberg (2004), titled “Campaign ads coverage and he-said-she-said reporting are under fire for inaccuracy.” Writing in are making it difficult for citizens to find his blog, Press Think, on June 4, 2004, politically useful information, are they media critic and New York University shunning tradition news media and turn- Professor of Journalism Jay Rosen coming to the internet during elections for mented that this type of “he-said-she- campaign information? Such a hypothesis said” reporting “makes Rutenberg a is consistent with studies that have shown chronicler of the will to deceive in politics, that those who hold low levels of political presented as part of the reality of politics.” trust use the internet to access political In 2004, an Annenberg Public Policy information (Johnson and Kaye, 1998b, Center poll asked professional mainstream 2003). Does the use of the internet lead journalists a question that presupposed a to a better command of facts and assess- hypothetical campaign in which reporters ment of the accuracy of campaign claims? knew that one side was more deceptive than the other (see Jamieson and Hardy, 2007; Jamieson et al., 2007 for more 2004 National Annenberg information on this poll). The poll found Election Survey that even when reporters believe that one candidate’s campaign is more deceptive Data from the 2004 NAES will help than their opponent’s, the reporters are determine whether this is the case. reluctant to report it. When asked “In a Following the 2004 general election, the political campaign, if one side is using Annenberg Public Policy Center con- deceptive tactics more often than the ducted a survey of a random sample of opponents, do most journalists usually 3400 citizens to assess the extent to which report the greater use of deception by one they believed the many claims made by, side, just report that both sides are using or on behalf of, the Bush and Kerry deception or avoid the matter com- campaigns. Respondents rated the accu- pletely?” a majority, 58 percent, of the racy of the claims on a four-point scale journalists surveyed stated that they ranging from “very truthful” to “not believe journalists usually report both truthful at all,” in order to test the sides are using deception. Seventy-nine knowledge of 41 claims made by the percent of those journalists acknowledged major party campaigns in 2004. All were that this creates the impression to the offered in the course of the campaign. All public that each side of the campaign is were checked for accuracy by FactCheck. engaging in similar amounts of deception. org. The claims that are analyzed here The avoidance of comparative judgment, were aired in advertisements, made in which is part of the he-said-she-said stump speeches, or brought up in the approach rooted in norms of objectivity, debates. The importance of these claims creates a sense of moral equivalence lay not only in their centrality to the

137 BRUCE W. HARDY, ET. AL campaign but in the significant assertion half of the questions. Those who received they made about the character and com- form A were asked about 21 claims with petence of the candidates. For example, a mean of 8.86 correct and a standard the claim that John Kerry voted for cuts deviation of 2.91. Those who received in intelligence after September 11 was form B were asked about 20 claims with a promoted in the Bush campaign ad titled mean of 8.38 and a standard deviation of “Wolves”; the claim that George W. 2.57. As can be seen from these means Bush’s Social Security plan would cut the overall level of knowledge of the benefits 30 to 45 percent was suggested truthfulness of the campaign claims is both when Kerry told seniors in Florida moderate. On average, respondents cor- on October 18th that Bush plans to cut rectly identified a little less than half of their benefits by as much as 45 percent the claims. This is probably a reflection of and in the Kerry ad called “January political orientation. Citizens are more Surprise.” A person who would cut likely to believe their candidate than the intelligence after September 11, in many opponent and more likely to hear about voters’ eyes, would be deemed unquali- and believe the inaccuracies flagged by a fied to serve as commander-in-chief. And favored candidate. one who would cut the benefits of those Respondents’ use of the internet to currently receiving them would be pre- access campaign information was tapped pared to break a central social compact. by a single question that asked respon- Important for our purposes, both claims dents how many days in the past week are false. If a belief in either false claim did they access information about the shaped a voting decision, the voter was presidential campaign online. The mean misled. If a person believed either and for this variable is 1.26 days with a stan- nonetheless voted for the candidate then dard deviation of 2.26. For those 788 that belief sundered the relationship respondents (23.2 percent of the sample) between campaigning and governance. that reported access campaign information The questions on the survey that asked at least once in the past week the mean is respondents about central, significant facts 3.98 days with a standard deviation of from the 2004 campaign were cumulated 2.29. to construct an overall index of respon- Table 10.1 provides some examples of dents’ knowledge of the claims. The the campaign claims that were on the higher a respondent scored on this scale survey as well as percentages of correct the more claims he or she correctly iden- identification of the truthfulness of these tified as true or false. The volunteered claims by all respondents and those who “don’t know” responses were coded as accessed the internet for campaign infor- incorrect. This may seem problematic mation at least one day in the past week because such a response could refer to not of being surveyed. Consistent with our knowing the truthfulness of the claim or a hypothesis, internet users show higher fact that the respondent never heard such percentages of correct identification of the a claim. As a check on the coding proce- truthfulness of claims compared to all dure, the statistical analyses reported in respondents (which include the internet the chapter were also conducted with the users) and lower percentages of respon- “don’t knows” coded as “missing values.” dents reporting “don’t know.” This, however, did not affect the estimates To answer the specific questions asked of model. above, multivariate statistical analyses Due to a split-ballot design of the survey, were conducted. These models included a each individual respondent was asked about variety of controls and traditional media

138 INTERNET AND POLITICAL DECEPTION use measures.2 Political cynicism, for these candidates never told the truth received a analyses, was not measured in a general score of one (30.1 percent) and respon- lack of confidence in institutions as is dents that believed that both candidates usually done in political communication always or sometimes told the truth received research. Instead a more focused set of a score of zero. questions was used to tap respondents’ beliefs that the presidential candidates are Statistical analyses and results deceitful. A measure of respondents’ belief that candidates always lie was com- The first statistical model is a logistic bined from two rotated questions on the regression model predicting the belief that survey that were reverse coded: “How candidates always lie. As Table 10.2 shows, often do you think John Kerry told the reading the newspaper and watching 24- truth about George W. Bush’s record?” hour cable news are both positively and and “How often do you think George significantly related to the belief that W. Bush told the truth about John during the 2004 campaign George W. Kerry’s record?”—(1) none of the time, Bush and Democratic challenger Senator (2) some of the time, and (3) all of the John Kerry never told the truth, while time. This combined variable was then controlling for demographic and political dichotomized where respondents who identification variables. What these odd reported a belief that at least one of the ratios suggest is that for every additional

Table 10.1 Correct assessment of campaign claims during 2004 presidential election in the United States, by respondents and internet users

Campaign claims Correct Percent of respondents Percent of respondents answer answering “don’t know” answering correctly All Internet users All Internet users George W. Bush’s plan to cut Social False 8.1 6.7 46.2 52.6 Security would cut benefits for those currently [2004] receiving them The unemployment rate is now True 12.4 8.1 42.3 45.5 [2004] about where it was in 1996 when Bill Clinton ran for a second term Senator Kerry voted to ban pump False 23.7 20.8 39.1 45.5 action shotguns and deer hunting ammunition When George W. Bush took office True 4.9 1.3 80.6 87.0 as President there was a budget surplus, and now [2004] there is a deficit Dick Cheney has profited from the False 13.5 5.7 27.1 34.8 contracts Halliburton has in Iraq Saddam Hussein played a role in False 5.6 2.0 46.9 62.5 Sept 11 George W. Bush has promised to False 15.8 8.3 35.1 38.5 nominate Supreme Court Justices who will overturn Roe versus Wade

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the National Annenberg Election Survey (2004).

139 BRUCE W. HARDY, ET. AL day of reading the newspaper or watching significant and positive relationships with 24-hour cables news a person becomes correct identification of truthfulness of 1.04 times more likely to believe that the campaign claims during the 2004 election. candidates never told the truth. Similarly, However, the relationship between acces- accessing campaign information online sing campaign information online and sort- also produced a positive and significant ing fact from fiction produced the largest relationship. Although these effects are regression coefficient of all of the media not uniform across all news media, there variables in the model. Therefore, acces- are no significant competing results in our sing campaign information had an overall model that suggest that any news media larger net impact on citizens’ ability to use, including using the internet, pro- identify deception than any other news motes the belief that candidates were media. truthful during the 2004 campaign. These In the model, local television news are not strong relationships, yet they are appears to have a detrimental impact as it detectable relationships that support the produces a negative relationship in the hypothesis that some news media cover- model.3 This finding is consistent with a age of presidential campaigns promotes recent study by Prior (2003) who noted cynicism in the electorate. “local news … is the real villain in our Does the internet present a new avenue story … the effect of liking local news is for the cynical voter to find information? actually negative for most of the hard The second model presents the results news items” (Prior, 2003: 164). This from an OLS regression model predicting could be, in part, a result of differences in accessing the internet for campaign infor- content driven by local news’ role as a mation. Consistent with the above theo- “good neighbor” and not as a watchdog rizing, the more respondents believe that (see Poindexter et al., 2006). the candidates never told the truth in the Overall, these findings suggest that the 2004 election the more likely they were internet, in comparison with traditional to turn to the internet to access campaign press campaign coverage, has an informing information. As found in many studies effect similar to that of such major cam- on internet use, education, age, and paign events as conventions and debates gender all produced significant relationships. (Chaffee and Frank, 1996; Kenski and Specifically, educated younger males were Jamieson, 2005). A citizen learns about more likely to access campaign informa- issues from watching these events. On the tion online. The only news media variable other hand, media coverage of these events to be positively and significantly related to is dominated by strategic coverage. For relying on the internet to access campaign example, Sears and Chaffee (1979) observed information is 24-hour cable news use. that television coverage of the 1976 pre- Local television news use, however, was sidential debate focused much more on negatively related to going online for candidates’ characters, leaving little room campaign information. for coverage on the content of policy The final statistical model details the debate. impact of accessing campaign information One plausible counter-explanation of and the correct identification of the truth- results presented here would be that fulness of campaign claims. Accessing such internet users are accessing mainstream information online significantly increases news organization’s websites. If so, the citizens’ command of fact. Watching traditional press is actually not failing. Its national broadcast television news, 24- venue of influence has simply changed. In hour cable news, and newspapers all had 2004, over six in ten respondents cited a

140 INTERNET AND POLITICAL DECEPTION

Table 10.2 Regression models predicting the belief that presidential candidates always lie, that respondents accessed the internet for campaign information, and the correct assessment of campaign claims

Predictor variable Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Binary logistic regression OLS regression model OLS regression model model predicting the predicting accessing the predicting correct belief that presidential internet for campaign assessment of campaign candidates always lie information claims Odds Standard Standardized Standard Standardized Standard ratio error B error B error Female 1.070 0.101 –0.055* 0.100 –0.149*** 0.135 Age 1.013*** 0.004 –0.078*** 0.004 0.043* 0.005 Education 0.965 0.024 0.110*** 0.024 0.128*** 0.032 Income 0.987 0.028 0.056* 0.028 0.098*** 0.037 Republican 1.062 0.128 0.015 0.125 –0.093*** 0.168 Democrat 1.478** 0.123 0.049* 0.124 0.056* 0.167 Ideology (Conservative coded high) 0.969 0.059 –0.071** 0.058 –0.123*** 0.079 National broadcast TV news 0.983 0.022 –0.025 0.022 0.075*** 0.030 Newspaper 1.036* 0.018 0.029 0.018 0.042* 0.025 24 hour cable news 1.038* 0.018 0.135*** 0.018 0.073*** 0.024 Local TV news 0.991 0.020 –0.053* 0.020 –0.045* 0.027 Access campaign info online 1.071*** 0.021 ––0.131*** 0.030 Belief that candidates always lie –– 0.071*** 0.108 0.019 0.146 Nagelkerke R2 3.8 –– R2 – 6.5 16.6 Unweighted N 3,400

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the National Annenberg Election Survey (2004). Notes: *=p 0.1; ** = p 0.01; *** = p 0.001 news organization as the source for online at low or no-cost web searchers can read political information (Winneg and Stroud, multiple newspapers and check multiple 2005). This argument relies on the news sites in very short order. If factual assumption that websites of mainstream information is available in any of these media and their offline counterparts pre- sites the searcher now has an access to it sent similar information, an assumption unlike, for example, if the cost were sub- that has been supported by past research scriptions to a handful of newspapers. (Hoffman, 2006). However, this alter- Importantly, while the content of the native explanation is unlikely because if traditional media can be found online, it had explanatory power, the analytic the websites run by traditional media model in this chapter would not feature contain richer, more interactive, and differential gains in knowledge of fact more timely additional material. A visit to from different news media channels. any mainstream news media website reveals Additionally, the new informational that visitors are presented with a variety environment of the internet transforms of links and other interactive tools that the nature of access to the mainstream in allow them to explore informationally ways that may increase the likelihood that rich resources. With access to this infor- use of these sites will produce an effect mation comes the possibility of additional unlikely in the offline world. Specifically, learning.

141 BRUCE W. HARDY, ET. AL

At the same time, there are sources of Distinguishing accurate from false factual information available only online. claims about key issues is important if a Outside the traditional media online, the voter is to make a decision based upon his “blogosphere” presents an interlinked net or her own preferences. Knowing which of political information with “track-back” campaign claims are misleading can safe- capacity for reciprocating links and RSS guard voters from drawing false conclu- feeds that breeds cross-fertilization of sions from mistaken evidence. If a voter political messages and an organic vetting cannot sort fact from fiction during cam- process of such information. Sites such as paigns then misleading claims may lead to FackCheck.org and others, whose mission misguided voting. Political actors, their it is to keep campaigns in check, further respective camps, and supporters deceive provide internet users with tools that are because they benefit from it (Kenski and all but missing in traditional news. Jamieson, 2005) and by so doing max- Another plausible competing interpreta- imize votes. This is problematic as mean- tion for the results presented here is that ingful participation in democratic life those who are politically knowledgeable are requires that there be some consistency more likely to access the internet for poli- between citizens’ own issue stances and tical information; is the causal direction their votes. The ability to pick up on correct? The knowledge questions that we dishonesty can also permit the citizen to use for this study, deceptive claims, are penalize the deceptive candidate and particular to the 2004 presidential election. campaign. Knowledge of the relative level Such reverse causation would be more of deception can also factor in voting plausible if we were examining general decisions by increasing the likelihood that political knowledge. Due to the specifi- the voter will penalize the offending city of our dependent measure, modeling campaign. the internet as an antecedent variable is The traditional press does have the more plausible than positing that identifi- ability to provide the information that cation of the truthfulness of claims leads citizens need to separate truthful campaign to accessing political information online. claims from false one. Unfortunately, journalistic norms and trends in campaign coverage have undercut the watchdog Conclusion role of the press, which in turn has fostered cynicism and depressed learning This chapter examined the relationship among citizens. As many scholars (e.g., between accessing the internet for poli- Cappella and Jamieson, 1996; Jamieson tical information and citizens’ ability to and Hardy, 2007; Patterson, 1993, 2000) distinguish deception from fact during have illustrated, the traditional press, in its the 2004 U.S. presidential election. The ordinary distribution channels, is not suf- statistical models presented here support ficiently protecting citizens. Scholars and the suppositions that the failings of the press critics have called on the traditional traditional news to adjudicate fact in news media to devote less time to discus- presidential campaigns increased cynicism sions of strategy and he-said-she-said toward politicians and this, in turn, may reporting and spend more time providing have resulted in a reliance on the internet. substantive news and pointing out dis- Such reliance led to better command of crepancies and discordant facts offered fact. The more one accessed political by political candidates. As this research information online the better one was at shows, the internet does provide the voter distinguishing fact from deception. with a functional alternative.

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Guide to further reading goal is to apply the best practices of both journalism and scholarship, and to increase public knowledge and understanding.” From For those interested in the general per- www.FactCheck.org. formance of the press, Geneva Overholser 2 Gender (54 percent female), age (M = 48.35, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s edited SD = 16.58; measured in years), education volume, Institutions of American Democracy: (M=14.26, SD = 2.50; measured in number the press (Overholser and Jamieson, 2006) of years of completed school), and income and the Annenberg Democracy Project’s (Mode = $50,000 to $75,000) are included in the models as sociodemographic control Institutions of American Democracy: a republic variables. Political orientation variables such divided (Jamieson et al., 2007) offer detailed as party identification (31 percent Republican reports on the functions and performance and 33 percent Democrat) and political of the press and tensions between the ideology (M=3.18, SD = 0.99; measured fi “ press and other institutions of democracy. on a ve-point scale where 1 represents very liberal” and 5 means “very conservative”) are For those interested in deception, the also included in the models as control vari- press, and political strategy in U.S. cam- ables. Traditional news media use was tapped paigns, Jamieson and Paul Waldman’s by asking respondents how many days in the (2003) book The Press Effect illustrates last week did they: “watch the national net- instances in which reporters simply ana- work news on TV” (M=2.59, SD = 2.67), “ ” lyzed the strategies employed by opposing watch a 24-hour cable news channel (M= 2.97, SD = 2.85), “watch local TV news” sides rather than sorting out the facts (M=3.85, SD = 2.81), and “read a daily behind the issues. Jamieson and Brooks newspaper” (M=3.70, SD = 2.96). Jackson’s (2007) book Un-Spun: finding 3 Interestingly, a recent initiative, the Engaging fact in a world of disinformation provides a the Electronic Electorate (E4) project, helped crash course in identifying misleading and local broadcasters use the internet to engage their audiences in civic issues. The objective deceptive campaign claims. was to help increase citizens’ knowledge about politics and participation in civic life. The Annenberg Public Policy Center devel- Notes oped and refined a number of online election templates that local news broadcasters 1 FactCheck.org “is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, could use to inform the public and meet the ‘consumer advocate’ for voters that aims to objectives of the project. As part of the pro- reduce the level of deception and confusion ject stations were required to integrate their in U.S. politics. We monitor the factual on-air and online election coverage. Examples accuracy of what is said by major U.S. poli- were ad watches and debate watches (Meltzer tical players in the form of TV ads, debates, et al., 2004). speeches, interviews, and news releases. Our

143 11 Political engagement online Do the information rich get richer and the like-minded more similar?

Jennifer Brundidge and Ronald E. Rice

A new area for research is the extent to which the internet contributes to one particular form of political engagement: political discussion among heterogeneous networks of citizens. While it may be that the information rich continue to get richer, it is far less clear that the politically similar continue to become more similar. This chapter thus discusses research on the extent to which internet use affects individual-level political engagement and examines the possible role of the internet in exposing people to politically dissimilar others. A sample analysis follows, which finds that online political discussion is significantly and positively associated with politically heterogeneous individual discussion networks. Finally, the discussion considers normative implications and future research concerning political landscapes with varying interactions between knowledge gaps and heterogeneous political discussion.

An established tenet of U.S. political cul- In particular, the internet has instigated ture is that the democratic process should wide speculation about its potential to be “ﬁrmly anchored in the judgments of reinvigorate political community and the demos” (Dahl, 1989: 338). By this democratic life (Harrison and Falvey, standard, there is reason to suspect that 2001). internet enthusiasts have pointed Americans are living in democratically to the possibility that the medium could troubled times—a period of history char- lead to increased political engagement and acterized by a persistently under-informed to direct democracy, with an unprece- citizenry, substantial declines in traditional dented potential to reach young, isolated, indicators of civic and political engagement and minority citizens; to weakened (Althaus, 1999; Bartels, 1996; Converse, boundaries between the public and pri- 1990; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 2003), vate sphere; and to an increase in direct and reduced political self-eﬃcacy (Brody, links to policy-makers (Etzioni, 1997; 1978; Miller and Shanks, 1996). While Norris, 2001b; Porter, 1997; Rheingold, connections between the state of democ- 1993). racy and technology have always existed, Other observers have been more skep- advances in information and communica- tical, arguing that at the individual level, tion technology just prior to the onset of the internet is more likely to reinforce the new millennium have made these established patterns of political commu- connections all the more salient. nication, widening the knowledge gap

144 POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT ONLINE and digital divide between elites and non- learning (Price, Cappella, and Nir, 2002), elites. They note that opportunity is a and the ability to differentiate among necessary but not sufficient criterion for ideologically distinct attitudes (Gastil et al., political engagement, and that informa- forthcoming). Recent research has even tion abundance does not mean that all, or indicated a stimulus effect on political even most, individuals will take advantage participation when discussion among het- of it in ways that advance their roles as erogeneous networks is combined with citizens (Bimber, 2003; Norris, 2001b). In hard news media use (Scheufele et al., other words, the information rich will get 2003; Scheufele et al., 2004). richer while the information poor will Yet in spite of a good deal of theore- remain relatively poorer. Indeed, the vast tical speculation on this issue (e.g., majority of empirical evidence suggests Galston, 2003; Sunstein, 2001), the that internet use has stimulated relatively impact of the internet on exposure to few, if any, participation effects at the political difference remains unclear. On individual level (Bimber, 2001, 2003; one hand, the personal control provided Bimber and Davis, 2003; Katz and Rice, by the internet creates the possibility that 2002; Scheufele and Nisbit, 2002). people will exercise an increasing ten- However, in recent years, researchers dency for selectivity in discussion partners, have become more circumspect, acknowl- reinforcing their perceptions and attitudes. edging that, as with older media, the effects On the other hand, the internet may of the internet on political engagement weaken traditional social, informational, may be more subtle and indirect than pre- and political boundaries, which could viously assumed (e.g., Hardy and Scheufele, potentially lead to increased exposure to 2005; Howard, 2003: 216–19). Further, disagreement. traditional indicators of political engagement (e.g., factual political knowledge, voting) are not the only normatively com- Do the information rich get pelling issues presented by an increasingly richer? Hard news media use, connected citizenry. political discussion, and One particularly compelling issue is the political participation extent to which internet use promotes exposure to political disagreement and News media use deliberation among citizens—a phenomenon long considered essential to a In retrospect, the hope that the internet vibrant and pluralistic public sphere, pro- would stimulate mass political engage- ducing a “high scale of mental activity” ment at the individual level seems a bit (Mill, 1859/1998), an “enlarged mentality” historically naïve. With the exception of or more sophisticated opinions (Arendt, the newspaper, which for the first time 1968), and prompting greater inter- allowed for the mass distribution of poli- personal deliberation and personal reflec- tical information, historical advances in tion (Habermas, 1989). Empirical research information technology have done little has furthermore demonstrated that it has to advance political engagement (Bimber, several tangible benefits, such as increased 2003; Scheufele and Nisbet, 2002). Yet accuracy about the distribution of public from an intuitive perspective, the current opinion (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995)— information environment would seem to be which is likely to promote a sense of the perfect antidote to the more infor- legitimacy for democratic outcomes (Price, mationally and geographically challenged Cappella, and Nir, 2002)—increased political mass media audience (Sey and Castells,

145 JENNIFER BRUNDIDGE AND RONALD E. RICE

2004)—an environment that is able to arguing that pre-existing educational, transcend time, space, and possibly ideol- income, and other social resources allow ogies. Indeed, classic explanations of some to not only gain access to, but also political behavior at the individual level, to internalize and apply, new knowledge rooted in rational choice theory, would faster and better. seem to point in this direction (Downs, Indeed, a long line of media-effects 1957; Verba et al., 1995). A rational research reveals that mere exposure to choice involves a form of cost–benefit news does not account for the influence analysis, which may be applied to strate- of news content on individuals (McLeod gies involved in choices to engage in and McDonald, 1985). Eveland and col- political participation, information seek- leagues (Eveland, 2001, 2002; Eveland et ing, and the acquisition of political al., 2003), for example, found that atten- knowledge, or decisions to participate in tion, cognitive involvement, and news political deliberation. If technological elaboration serve as important contributors developments, such as the internet, reduce to political learning. Attending to news the cost of both providing and accessing involves the selection of a subset of infor- information, provide more convenient mation for processing, while elaboration and less demanding forums for political involves a more intensive and integrative deliberation, and on many occasions process of making cognitive associations reduce the cost of political participation between new information and informa- to the click of a mouse, individuals with tion already held in memory. Thus, more access to the internet, who might not knowledgeable individuals learn more otherwise find the time, will be more from broadcast and print news and subse- likely to participate. quently have more differentiated con- Yet human beings are not always structs and higher quality arguments in rational creatures—the internet is not essays about policy issues (Rhee and somehow a utopia where psychological Cappella, 1997). A media-uses and grati- predispositions do not apply (Katz and fications approach further supports the Rice, 2002; Neuman, 1991). Any tech- knowledge gap hypothesis. People with nology, and especially the internet, is more knowledge about political and civic shaped not only by its potentially rational life should seek out more political infor- uses, but also by the ways in which mation because they are able to process it people actually use it. As it applies to with greater ease and find it more grati- news and other elite discourse, human fying. For example, newspapers are more psychology suggests that as the cost of gratifying to more sophisticated and information falls and as sources increase, knowledgeable citizens to the extent that the already information rich will get they facilitate purposive control (Chaffee richer, while the information poor will and Kanihan, 1997). remain relatively poorer (Bimber, 2003). In recent years, the internet has become This is the fundamental proposition of the an increasingly important news resource. knowledge gap hypothesis (Donohue et By the end of 2005, nearly 50 million al., 1975). The psychological basis of this people in the U.S. obtained some of their proposition draws on schema theory and news through the internet on an average related research, arguing that individuals day (Horrigan, 2006). Yet it appears that with more complex cognitive schema are the information rich have been most able better able to process and incorporate to harness the abundance of information new information. The knowledge gap provided online. In general, those people hypothesis is somewhat more sociological, who were politically engaged before the

146 POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT ONLINE internet are the very same people who are the most requisite political knowledge politically engaged on the internet—those tend to be the most attentive during high in socioeconomic status, political effi- political deliberation and are therefore cacy, and political knowledge (Bimber, likely to get more out of it (Kwak et al., 2001, 2003; Scheufele and Nisbet, 2002), 2005). Thus deliberation can just as easily have an interest in politics and are more become a lesson in unidirectional political likely to be skeptical of information (Bimber, persuasion and opinion reinforcement as 2003: 219; also see Shah et al., 2005). it can become a mutual uplifting of minds. Those engaged in political participation The internet offers a novel forum for online tend to be disproportionately young, political deliberation, enabling anyone educated, and affluent (Cornfield and with internet access to communicate via Rainie, 2006; Rainie et al., 2005). The chat rooms, website bulletin boards, e- more people read about campaigns in mail, wikis, videos posts, or weblogs (or newspapers or learn about them through blogs). Nevertheless, engagement in online news broadcasts, the more likely it is that forums of deliberation is greater under they will also attend to such information conditions of high political motivation, online (Bimber and Davis, 2003). high socioeconomic status, opportunity (Price et al., 2002), and strong connections to local communities through poli- Political discussion tical activities (McLeod et al., 1999). In a Yet news media and other elite discourse field experiment using a nationally repre- are not the only way to garner knowl- sentative panel, Price et al. (2002) found edge and form public opinion. Through that individuals who participated in sched- political discussion, citizens may elevate uled online discussions conformed to a their thinking, reveal private information, hierarchical model of participation—they learn to justify their claims, and thereby were older, highly educated, predominantly achieve more sophisticated opinions (Fearon, white, more politically knowledgeable, 1998; Price and Cappella, 2002). Political more politically interested and active, and discussion and news use may work in had higher levels of social trust. They also tandem, one solidifying the other. Tarde found that while political deliberation (1899/1989), for example, argued that online significantly improved opinion newspaper reading triggers political dis- quality, those participants who benefited cussion, political discussion influences the most were higher in social capital, public opinion, and opinion in turn sti- more educated, and had higher incomes. mulates political action (Katz, 1981; Kim et al., 1999). Political participation The trouble with political discussion, however, is that the processes involved Political learning and the subsequent tend to be biased toward those with desire and means to participate are highly extensive civic skills, including a good contingent upon the setting of political vocabulary, the ability to communicate agendas and on the framing of political in English, a sense of personal efficacy, events and issues by elites (Bimber, 2003). the ability to write or speak well, and Agenda-setting and framing research has the cognitive wherewithal to draw on demonstrated that the media influence previously existing political knowledge. which political issues are treated as impor- The most educated members of society tant by focusing the public’s attention on disproportionately tend to have these skills certain events and by framing those events (Verba et al., 1995). Those people with in particular ways (McCombs et al., 1997;

147 JENNIFER BRUNDIDGE AND RONALD E. RICE

Wanta, 1997). They are able to serve this of news blogs and online newspapers has function by making certain news topics created novel opportunities for non- more salient than others, while putting mainstream political actors to contribute a particular perspective or spin on these to the setting and framing of the public topics (Entman, 1991, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; agenda. No longer do two elite groups, Iyengar, 1990; Shoemaker and Reese, the press and government institutions, 1996; Tuchman, 1978). According to hold virtually sole domain over the fram- framing theory, the spin and the salience ing of news stories and the setting of of particular news items are then trans- agendas. Yet all of this simply suggests a ferred to (and through) the audience. more chaotic information environment Some observers have speculated that the for individuals to make sense of, not the ways in which news media tend to frame end of framing and agenda-setting itself. political topics, in particular though their Howard (2003, 2005, 2006) argues that emphasis on sensationalized political con- beyond the typical effects at the indivi- flict as opposed to political consensus, may dual political participation level, and at alienate certain segments of the citizenry the campaign media and funding level, an and lead to a spiral of cynicism (Cappella entirely new and generally unknown and Jamieson, 1997). By influencing the influence has emerged—that of hyper- kinds of issues that citizens think about media political campaigns, run by non- and the way that they think about them, traditional entities using a wide range of the media may additionally influence technology and data. Digital technologies, whether or not people choose to partici- databases, and networks have fostered the pate politically and which activities they rise of hypermedia political campaign orga- choose to participate in. Furthermore, nizations, outside the control of major those people with the least well-developed media and major political parties. From cognitive schema are the least likely to grass-roots activism to elite political cam- attend to information at all, but the most paigns, these organizations—often a small likely to be influenced by the ways that group of consultants and firms—collect a the news media and other elites frame the wide variety of information on personal information (Bimber, 2003). demographics and consumption, polling However, as Delli Carpini and Williams and voting data, online and other media (2001) point out, the internet complicates use. They use this information along with and disperses the framing and agenda set- a wide array of techniques, such as very ting processes. During the “mass audi- quick, targeted online polls, and data ence” era, the political agenda had been mining of combined and integrated data- largely shaped by a mutual relationship bases, to shape what potential citizens are between dominant political actors and exposed to, aware of, and think about. As mainstream news outlets—the gatekeepers. a result, Howard (2005: 153) argues, The current information environment has while democracy is becoming deeper— changed this two-way system into a that is, a wider “diffusion of rich data “multiaxial” one for at least two central about political actors, policy options, and reasons. First, the multiplication of poli- the diversity of actors and opinion in the tical news media and the blurring of the public sphere”—citizenship is thinning— boundaries between entertainment and that is, increased political expression with news have lead to competition within the less substantive engagement, and less media for the role of the gatekeeper. shared text in the public sphere. Second, the internet with its attendant Taken together, individual biases influ- destruction of normal news cycles and rise encing news use and political discussion,

148 POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT ONLINE media agenda setting and framing effects, theoretical explanation is that tendencies and new forms of media and political toward selective exposure to politically consulting, all suggest that while political similar individuals may be especially strong knowledge is a consistent predictor of for those who consider politics central to political participation, political learning and their lives and identity (i.e., partisans, participation are highly contingent pro- politically knowledgeable people). Certain cesses, both online and offline. For exam- political attitudes, on the other hand, such ple, political discussion via e-mail has as low partisanship, ideological liberalism, been found to be a positive predictor of as well as structural-level factors, such as political participation (Brundidge, 2006) the forum of discussion (e.g., the work- and of civic participation (Shah et al., place), seem to be better overall predictors 2005) while political discussion via chat (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague, 2004; rooms is a negative predictor of political Mutz, 2006). Exposure to disagreement participation (Brundidge, 2006). Others online then should not then conform to have found that, as with face-to-face the knowledge-gap or rich-get-richer deliberation, it is the interaction between hypothesis. media consumption and online political Yet the contribution of online forums discussion that predicts political participa- of discussion (e.g., chat rooms and e-mail) tion (Hardy and Scheufele, 2005). in facilitating the creation of hetero- Overall, research findings have been geneous political discussion networks has consistent with a psychological as opposed been relatively neglected by research. to a rational model of political behavior. Those studies that do examine the role of While information is easier to come by the internet tend to examine the online and while political participation requires world as essentially separate from the off- less effort than ever before, the new line world (e.g., Wojcieszak and Mutz, information resources provided by the 2007). This research helps to specify the internet are more likely to be used by mechanisms by which people are exposed people who are politically knowledgeable to political disagreement online, which is and high in socioeconomic status. At least an essential piece of the puzzle, but does for the time being, the information rich not suggest the extent to which these continue to get richer. mechanisms contribute to the collective heterogeneity of people’s political discussion networks. Because online political Do the like-minded become discussion has either been overlooked or more similar? The studied in isolation from people’s whole contribution of the internet to experience of the public sphere, a number the heterogeneity of political of fundamental theoretical arguments discussion networks about the impact of the internet are unresolved. Perhaps the most important While the information rich may indeed of these is whether internet use is adding get richer, do the like-minded become to the overall diversity of people’s entire more similar? Research on traditional political discussion networks, having no face-to-face forums of political discussion impact, or somehow even leading to suggests that exposure to political dis- increased selective exposure and political agreement is not well predicted by tradi- fragmentation. Other internet related stu- tional individual-level antecedents of dies employ experimentally controlled political engagement, including political settings (e.g., Price et al., 2002) or tend to knowledge and socioeconomic status. One focus on the heterogeneity of news and

149 JENNIFER BRUNDIDGE AND RONALD E. RICE information rather than heterogeneity of individuals to actively search for and click interpersonal discussion (e.g., Bimber and on links to information sources, which Davis, 2003; Garrett, 2005; Tewksbury could lead to them to exclusively expose and Althaus, 2000). themselves to information they have been Broadly speaking, scholars have suggested searching for or information that seems two seemingly contradictory mechanisms particularly personally relevant. that could potentially influence online This line of thought is supported by exposure to political disagreement: selec- some recent research. Mutz and Martin tive exposure, which leads to narrowed (2001) found that as individuals are given domains of political discourse, and weak- increasing control over the selection of ening social boundaries, which broaden news media sources, they become more opportunity for exposure to political likely to expose themselves to information disagreement. more compatible with their own viewpoints. Bimber and Davis (2003) report that audiences for campaign websites Selective exposure during the 2000 U.S. presidential election There are several processes by which use were likely to consist of knowledgeable, of new media may lead to narrowed interested, and partisan supporters of the domains of political discourse. In one way candidate, as opposed to non-supporters or another, most of these processes con- of the candidate. Tewksbury and Althaus stitute variations on a general claim that as (2000) contrast the effects of the print people gain increasing control over com- edition of the New York Times with the munication and the flow of information, effects of the online edition. Rather than they will exercise an increasing tendency attending to the most prominent or for selectivity in discussion partners and important news stories, the users of the exposure to information. This view invokes online edition were more likely to attend the longstanding theory of selective expo- to personally relevant news. Two studies sure from the political communication of political blogs furthermore support the literature (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986; selective exposure/homogeneity of poli- Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Katz, 1981) tical discussion networks thesis. Tremayne and simply maps it onto the internet, et al. (2006) found that the network of hypothesizing an amplification in selec- links among a small number of blogs tivity due to the increased control derived reporting on the Iraq war consisted of two from the purposive way that the internet distinct clusters—liberal and conservative is used. blogs—although there were some central Bimber and Davis (2003), for example, blogs linking the two clusters. Adamic and rank-order various media environments as Glance (2005) provide quite similar results to their tendency to promote selectivity from studying relations among the posts of on the basis of the volume of information 40 A-list blogs over the period of two they provide, the diversity of viewpoints, months preceding the 2004 U.S. pre- and the extent of control given to the sidential election. Liberal blogs linked pri- individual. They conclude that when marily to other liberal blogs, and compared with television news, news- conservative blogs linked primarily to papers, and talk shows, the internet actu- other conservative blogs (more frequently ally offers the conditions most conducive and more densely than among liberal to selective exposure. Another factor blogs), with only a few cross-listings. leading to increased selectivity are struc- The macro-level consequences of such tural aspects of the internet that require selectivity and subsequent “personalized

150 POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT ONLINE realities” fostered through the internet suggests: “Most people … are simply not may be substantial (Bennett, 1998: 741). so rigid in their information-seeking These personalized realities represent a behavior that they will expose themselves dynamic and pervasive social adjunct to only to ideas that they find congenial. To Putnam’s (2000) concern with the ill effects the extent selective exposure occurs at all, of bonding (brings homogeneous people it appears to do so under special condi- together) as opposed to bridging (brings tions that do not typically arise in situa- heterogeneous people together) social tions of mass persuasion.” capital (see Norris, 2004 for an application In line with amendments to the origi- to online communities). The most promi- nal theory of selective exposure, there is nent advocate of this position is Sunstein some evidence to suggest that despite (2001), who writes that the internet will the increased control provided by the foster enclave communication among internet, people are not using it to weed politically homogenous citizens, yielding out certain partisan perspectives. Garrett polarization of opinions, widening political (2005), for example, finds from a combi- divides between extreme sides on public nation of survey research and laboratory issues, and encouraging cyber-cascades experiments that the online environment of unsubstantiated and sometimes false facilitates people’s seeking of viewpoints information. that reinforce existing positions, but does Yet whatever its online implications, not comparably promote avoidance of the theory of selective exposure has itself challenging viewpoints. He argues that received only mixed support. Rooted in the internet is imperfect in its ability to cognitive dissonance theories, selective weed out certain partisan perspectives. exposure suggests that when individuals Typing in the phrase pro-choice as a are exposed to information that conflicts search term, for example, yields results with their political belief system, they both for and against this position. Rainie become cognitively uncomfortable, which et al. (2005) furthermore find that 36 causes them to look for conforming percent of internet users report encoun- messages and avoid conflicting messages tering campaign news and information on (e.g., Festinger, 1957). However, despite the internet not as the result of a directed some evidence that people seek supportive search but by accident, while online for messages, research has generally been unable an altogether different purpose. to consistently demonstrate that people avoid contradictory messages (Festinger, Weakened social boundaries 1957; Rhine, 1967; Sears and Freedman, 1967; see also Chaffee et al., 2001). A Further facilitating potential exposure to further amendment to the original theory political disagreement and possibly coun- of selective exposure suggests that selec- tering the influence of online selective tivity is not a common activity among all exposure is the potential of internet use to or most individuals. Rather, it is the most weaken social, political, and ideological politically sophisticated individuals who boundaries through interactive commu- are most likely to selectively attend to nication technologies, such as website information, reinforcing previously exist- bulletin boards, chat rooms, e-mail, and ing beliefs and knowledge (e.g., Graber, feedback loops to news organizations and 1984). Some observers have concluded politicians (Price and Cappella, 2002; Shah that selective exposure is not nearly as et al., 2005). New media may reduce or pervasive as once suggested (e.g., Kinder, overcome the costs and environmental or 2003). Zaller (1992: 139), for example, structural constraints traditionally associated

151 JENNIFER BRUNDIDGE AND RONALD E. RICE with political discussion and other forms websites that provided information about of civic engagement by blurring and making specific issues or policies that interested more porous the boundaries between the them; while 8 percent said they visited private and the public sphere, and between sites that share their point of view, 13 different ideological groups. percent said they visited websites that have First, perhaps most obviously, geographic different views (Howard, 2005: 159). borders that mark and support the homo- Overall then, tendencies toward selective geneity of a particular population do not exposure may constrain people’s exposure bind the internet. Whether or not people to political disagreement online. While an take advantage of it, there is ample oppor- overwhelming amount of political diver- tunity for people to expose themselves to sity may exist online, people may not be political difference that they might not overly enthusiastic about exposing them- otherwise encounter offline within their selves to it. Conversely, limits on selective usual physical boundaries. People may be exposure processes and weakened social exposed to different political perspectives boundaries seem to facilitate inadvertent, online simply by chance (Garrett, 2005). if not intended, exposure to political dis- This possibility is well illustrated by agreement online, potentially leading to Wojcieszak and Mutz (2007), who find an overall increase in the heterogeneity of that exposure to political disagreement is people’s political discussion networks. most likely to take place in non-political, as opposed to explicitly political, chat rooms, suggesting that it happens some- Analysis of individual-level what unexpectedly, while people are influences on heterogeneous meeting to discuss topics other than poli- political discussion tics. Second, the internet allows people to develop broader and lower density net- As a preliminary exploration of the rela- works or weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) tionship of internet use and exposure to that potentially allow for increased expo- political difference, this section provides sure to novel information and political just an example, overall summary test of disagreement. Boase and colleagues, for several of the influences discussed above, example, found that the internet may using a national survey sample.1 actually be transforming the shape of communities from small tightly knit asso- Measures ciations to far-reaching social networks (Boase et al., 2006: 55). Rather than relying Table 11.1 provides the descriptive statis- on one or two communities for socializ- tics and operationalizations of the items ing, help, and information, internet users and scales appearing in the final regres- are tending to use a variety of appropriate sion model—the explanatory variables of people and web resources. age, offline political discussion, online Clearly, politically heterogeneous com- political discussion, ideological polarity, munities can and do exist online (e.g., ideology, political knowledge, and the Barber, Mattson, and Peterson, 1997; Dahl, dependent variable of politically hetero- 1989; Downing, 1989; London, 1993). geneous discussion.2 Moreover, some online political discussants actually appreciate and enjoy engagement Results in heterogeneous spaces of deliberation (Stromer-Galley, 2002). In 2002, about a In order to provide context to the parti- quarter of the U.S. adult population visited cular role of the internet, a combination of

152 POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT ONLINE sociodemographic controls, traditional pre- they are usually conceptualized, are not dictors of exposure to disagreement, and necessarily getting richer. Consistent discussion variables were entered into a with the results of prior research, political hierarchical multiple regression analysis discussion network heterogeneity was (first block: education, race, age, sex, dis- not significantly predicted by socio- cussion at work, discussion with family, economic status, an important predictor social ideology, political knowledge, and of most forms of political engagement. ideological polarity; second block: online Interestingly, age was an inverse predictor, discussion). suggesting that this particular form of As Table 11.2 shows, age, political engagement is actually more common knowledge, ideological polarity, social among younger individuals. In contrast ideology, discussion at work, discussion with prior findings, political knowledge with family, and importantly, online dis- was a very small, yet significant positive cussion, were significant influences on predictor (however, previous research heterogeneous political discussion, explain- examined the ratio of like-minded to non- ing 34 percent of the variance. Concerning like-minded voices, whereas this analysis heterogeneous political discussion, the examined overall political discussion net- information rich, at least in terms of how work heterogeneity).

Table 11.1 Descriptive statistics for the variables of a model explaining political discussion network heterogeneity

Variable Mean Standard Deviation Frequency of political discussion at work 3.6 2.9 Frequency of political discussion with family 5.8 3.0 Frequency of online discussion (mean of two items) 1.3 1.6 Age 50.1 17.2 Social ideology 4.0 1.7 Ideological polarity 1.3 1.0 Political knowledge (a = .89, sum of four items) 2.6 1.2 Heterogeneous political discussion (mean of four items) 2.5 1.6 Unweighted N 440

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Scheufele (2003).

Table 11.2 Hierarchical multiple regression explaining political discussion network heterogeneity

Predictor variable B coefﬁcient Age –0.11** Ideological polarity –0.21*** Social ideology (conservatism) –0.14*** Political knowledge 0.09* Political discussion at work 0.31*** Political discussion with family 0.27*** Political discussion online 0.10* Adjusted R2 0.34 Unweighted N 440

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Scheufele (2003). Notes: * = p < 0.1; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001; online discussion was entered as a separate, second block.

153 JENNIFER BRUNDIDGE AND RONALD E. RICE

While traditional forums of political knowledge gaps in environments where discussion (i.e., at work and with family) exposure to disagreement decreases may emerged as the most powerful predictors result in polarized enclaves, each knowl- of network heterogeneity, the internet edgeable and politically active but at best does appear to play an important role in unaware and at worst hostile to any dif- exposing people to political diversity. In ference. When political knowledge gaps particular, online discussion may facilitate increase but exposure to disagreement discussion with politically dissimilar indivi- decreases, ideological domination may duals. In line with prior research findings, arise, whereby minority and less edu- social ideology (conservatism) and ideolo- cated groups are not even aware of alter- gical polarity were furthermore inversely native perspectives. Finally, when political related to heterogeneous political discussion. knowledge gaps continue to increase, but exposure to disagreement also increases, elite demagoguery may arise, whereby Conclusion knowledgeable political elites can manipulate meanings and salience of alternative For the most part, research findings on perspectives. the internet and political participation This final possibility of elite demago- have conformed to the rich get richer guery receives the most support from the hypothesis. New information resources research findings and analyses presented in provided by the internet are more likely this chapter. As reflected in the observa- to be used by people high with socio- tions of Bennett and Manheim (2001), economic status and political knowl- this possibility suggests that as the bound- edge—those individuals who are less aries between the public and the private subject to the framing and agenda setting sphere become increasingly porous, and as functions of the media and who are more and more political mobilists trans- already likely to participate politically. cend them, citizens may become exposed These tendencies help to explain why the to more numerous and more varied internet has exerted little effect on indi- competitive bids for their attention. In vidual level political participation—this, such an environment, the formation of in spite of the vast array of democratic coherent and stable public opinion is opportunities that the internet provides likely a greater challenge, as opposed to a (Bimber, 2003). The results from the lesser one. Moreover, the current mobili- sample analysis do, however, suggest that zation tactics used by the majority of unlike many traditional predictors of elites exacerbate this challenge—tactics political engagement, online discussion that seem to suppress the identities and does contribute slightly to the hetero- motives of mobilizers, as well as the geneity of political discussion networks. complete implications of their objectives, One general potential implication of as a means to achieving instrumental increased or decreased knowledge gaps, political goals (Howard, 2006). Howard et and increased or decreased heterogeneity al. (2005: 61) further argue that knowl- of political discussion, are four different edge gaps make it very difficult for the kinds of political environments. An envir- lower educated and information poor to onment where political knowledge gaps assess online claims and information are decreasing, and exposure to political during campaigns, leading to increased disagreement is increasing, may be the manipulation by political messages. sought-after political environment of delib- According to Dahl (1989: 338), if democ- erative democracy. However, decreasing racy is to move beyond a state of capture

154 POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT ONLINE by policy elites, or quasi-guardianship, consequences of media use. In terms of and become more “firmly anchored in the specific issue of political discussion the judgments of the demos,” there needs network heterogeneity, Mill (1859) and to be a free flow of information in the Habermas (1989) are required reading for policy process. To do this, Dahl contends normative perspectives, whereas Mutz that independent reliable knowledge must (2006) and Huckfeldt, Johnson, and be transmitted to citizens in clear and Sprague (2004) take more empirical transparent ways that facilitate inclusive approaches, investigating the particular deliberation on policy issues. mechanisms that govern exposure to Future research should continue to political disagreement. Finally, for a more explore how the internet and related new thorough discussion of the macro-level forms of discourse and sources of infor- consequences of selectivity, Sunstein mation, such as blogging, affect political (2001) is an essential source. Prior to engagement, especially political discussion examining the impact of information and among heterogeneous networks of citi- communication technology on civic zens. Future research should also consider engagement, however, it seems essential the differential likelihood and strength of to understand just what civic engagement each of the four political environments is, how it might be conceptualized, the associated with the combinations of processes governing it, and why it might knowledge gaps and exposure to political be desirable. Toward this end, Verba et al. disagreement. (1995) specify the particular variables and mechanisms involved with different types of civic engagement, and Dahl (1989) Guide to further reading provides a contemporary interpretation of democratic theory, which includes a Much has been written about the multi- defense of the normative value of political layered potential of advances in informa- engagement. tion and communication technology to improve, reinforce, or perhaps exacerbate the supposed state of society and the Notes public sphere—there are a few texts that stand out as particularly seminal. A good 1 The Cornell University Survey Research starting point, for a broad look at the Institute collected national level survey data social consequences of internet use, such used in this analysis in October and November of 2003, using CATI methods (N = 781). as its impact on community and the digi- Dietram A. Scheufele was the principal tal divide, is Katz and Rice (2002). For investigator for the original study and gener- books relating specifically to the impact of ously shared the data. The response rate was the internet and related information 55 percent based upon AAPOR definitions. technology on political and civic engage- The survey was based on a carefully con- ment, the authors recommend Neumann structed probability sample that reduces sampling errors. The analyses use these data and (1991) and Bimber (2003), both of which some of the scales created by Dr. Scheufele, theoretically and historically situate these and other scales based on the current authors’ processes; Bimber and Davis (2003) is also conceptualizations and analyses. For the current relevant here, which looks at the impact chapter, only internet users were included in of the internet on political campaigns. the analyses (N = 440). 2Offline political discussion was assessed Iyengar (1990), Putnam (2000) and Zaller through the use of two separate items mea- (1992), are suggested for broader discus- suring the frequency of political discussion at sions about the civic and political work and with family (from 0 = never to 1

155 JENNIFER BRUNDIDGE AND RONALD E. RICE

= very rarely, up to 10 = all the time). partners in terms of ideology and political Online political discussion was assessed by party identification. Prior to the creation of computing the mean of two separate ten- this scale, however, some changes were made point items that asked about frequency of to the original items. Ideology and political political discussion via chat rooms, and e- party preference were recoded, with discus- mail. Social ideology was measured with a sion with partners of the same ideological seven-point scale, with 1 being “very liberal” preferences recoded as 0. Ideological hetero- and 7 being “very conservative.” The mea- geneity was assessed using respondents’ self- sure for ideological polarity also used this placement on two seven-point ideological item. The farther along the scale in either scales (economic and social) ranging from direction indicated higher polarity. Factual “very liberal” to “very conservative.” Likewise, political knowledge was an additive index of political heterogeneity was evaluated through four items tapping correct identification of the use of an item assessing political party public figures and knowledge of current membership that asked respondents if they events (wrong answers were coded as 0, were registered Democrats, Republicans, or correct answers were coded as 1)—correctly Independent/Other Party. Democrats who naming the Vice President, describing the discussed politics with other Democrats were role of the Supreme Court, identifying how coded “0” for that discussion item, as were many votes are necessary to override a pre- Republicans who discussed political issues or sidential veto, and naming the majority candidates with other Republicans. The party. Heterogeneous political discussion was ideological and political (party) items were computed based on a ten-point scale, asses- then totaled into a combined index of overall sing how frequently respondents discuss pol- heterogeneity of political discussion, based itics with (1) people with extreme right on the respondents’ standardized differences views, (2) people with extreme left views, (3) between their own characteristics and those people who are Democrats, and (4) people of their discussion partners. The following who are Republicans. Collectively these variables were not significant influences in items create a total discussion heterogeneity preliminary analyses so are not described scale, with higher scores on this scale indicating here: race, sex, education, income. greater heterogeneity in political discussion

156 12 Information, the internet, and direct democracy Justin Reedy and Chris Wells

Over the past several decades, the global use of ballot initiatives and referendums at both federal and provincial levels across a range of political systems has increased dramatically. Today, decisions made by direct democracy regularly impact issues of critical importance to governments and societies, from taxes, public spending, and environmental regulations to immigration, minority rights, and foreign policy and international relations. Considerable research on direct democracy has attempted to understand how voters cope with the unique demands of direct democratic situations, which differ significantly from electoral campaigns. Surprisingly, very little research to date has investigated the impact of internet use on this important and growing political arena. This chapter explores the potential for research in this area by reviewing research on the unique information environments of direct democracy and the political impact of the internet in candidate elections, suggesting new theoretical directions. We also offer original data from case studies of three direct democratic contests: ballot initiatives in a state-wide election in a typical American state, a nation-wide American survey on internet use and ballot measures, and data on referendum voting from Europe. Comparing data from these three sources, we find that internet use predicts knowledge of both facts relevant to direct democracy and the positions of opinion leaders. Internet use also predicts improved opinion quality, and there are signs of its potential as an organizing tool in ballot initiative and referendum campaigns.

In a referendum on May 29, 2005, voters European integration, but voters’ sound in France soundly rejected the European rejections of a treaty generally supported Constitution, dealing a severe blow to the by their elected oﬃcials demonstrated progress of European integration and clearly the powerful role that ordinary to President Jacques Chirac (Sciolino, Europeans will play in determining the 2005). Three days later, Dutch voters future of their continent (Hobolt, 2007). rejected the constitution with even more Voters’ direct power over policy in the gusto, and although the referendum in modern world is not limited to momen- the Netherlands was technically a non- tous occasions of international integration. binding consultation with voters, with In 1978, voters in California enacted turnout at 62.8 percent and a “no” vote Proposition 13, a citizen-initiated amend- of 61.6 percent, Prime Minister Jan Peter ment to the state constitution, which Balkenende said he would respect the permanently capped property taxes at a preference of the overwhelming majority maximum of 1 percent of the property’s (BBC News Online, 2005). The French value. The impact Proposition 13 has and Dutch referendums were only the had on politics and governance in latest in the decades-old progression of California—and, later, in many other

157 JUSTIN REEDY AND CHRIS WELLS states—would be difficult to overstate. It campaigns are significantly different from has deeply reshaped California’s tax struc- those of candidate elections (Hobolt, ture, and severely constrained local offi- 2007; de Vreese and Semetko, 2004b), cials’ options for raising money for public which have so far received the attention projects, especially in education (Staples, of internet research on political campaigns 2003). It also has centralized political (e.g., Bimber and Davis, 2003). They are power in the state as the proposition tar- thus unique environments in which to geted the property taxes relied on by local observe political internet use, and in governments (Qvortrup, 2002). Further, which our assumptions about how voters Proposition 13 demonstrates that American use information may not apply. This direct democracy is not a backwater or chapter will thus offer two arguments for localized political process: after its passage the study of the internet in direct in California, the “tax revolt” spread to democracy. First, studying internet use in other states (Gerber, 1999), and taxes direct democracy may shed light generally remain one of the most popular targets of on how people use the internet to gather, American initiative campaigns. use, and distribute political information. These examples illustrate the major Studies of voter decision-making in direct impact decisions made by direct democ- democracy have already contributed to racy—processes in which questions of our more general understanding of how policy are decided directly by voters— voters process information (e.g., Lupia, have had and continue to have in con- 1994). Second, as the examples above temporary politics. Ballot initiatives and illustrate, the increasing importance of referendums are used to decide policies direct democracy for policy-making controlling billions of dollars and affecting combined with the increasing prevalence millions of citizens, and are being used by of internet use make direct democracy in more and more states and countries itself an important area for internet around the world (Matsusaka, 2004). research. For the foreseeable future, direct Surprisingly, despite several solid research democracy will be an increasingly integral programs investigating the practices and part of democratic government. Likewise, characteristics of direct democracy (for a the internet’s role as a source of informa- review of the literature on American tion, discussion, and citizen mobilization ballot initiatives, see Lupia and Matsusaka, is only likely to grow. 2004; for a review on the European con- In this chapter, we explore ways of text, see Hobolt, 2006), and the wealth of thinking about the internet’s possible interest on the political and social con- impacts on voters in direct democratic sequences of internet use to which this contests. Does it increase access to infor- volume attests, the use of the internet in mation and thus voter knowledge? Is it direct democratic situations has remained used as a forum for deliberation and can it unexplored. This gap is unfortunate, and therefore improve voter opinion quality? this chapter will make the case that Does it take the place of other political research on internet use in direct demo- news sources, which may or may not cratic situations is an important and provide substantial coverage of ballot potentially fruitful area for research. initiatives and referendums? In addition to the growing importance There is good reason to think that the of direct democracy on the world stage, answers to these questions in ballot another argument for studying the internet initiative and referendum campaigns may in this context is that the information be different from their answers in candi- flows of ballot initiative and referendum date elections, because of the ways in

158 THE INTERNET AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY which the two types of campaigns differ. a starting point for research in this area. Voters in direct democracy do not have The chapter begins with general observa- the luxury of easily voting by party pre- tions about direct democracy—its origins, ference (Hobolt, 2007; Lupia, 1994), spread, and place in the world’s con- since, unlike candidates, ballot measures temporary democracies. After considering rarely appear with built-in party labels. the informational uniqueness of direct Direct democracy also poses extremely democracy, we present three recent case complex questions of policy to voters, studies of internet use in direct demo- rather than simply offering a choice of cratic situations. We then contemplate the candidates. Further, direct democratic results of those case studies in the context contests may vary widely from candidate of what is already known about related elections in terms of the amount of media uses of the internet. We develop a coverage they receive and in their research agenda in three domains: perceived importance to citizens. These differences suggest that internet & the informational impact of the use in direct democracy might be differ- internet—how it impacts the way ent from internet use in candidate elec- voters seek and find information; tions. The lack of explicit partisan cues & the internet’s deliberative impact— attached to ballot measures may encou- the opportunities it offers citizens rage voters to use the internet to learn to deliberate in preparation for how favored elites stand on the measures, plebiscites; or they may take the opportunity to assess & and the internet’s organizational the views of non-partisan interest groups, impact—how it creates new oppor- such as environmental, labor, or religious tunities for supporters and oppo- organizations. The complexity of proponents of ballot measures to identify, sitions may push voters away from candi- contact, and organize supporters. dates’ sites and conventional news sites and toward issue-specific sites, or govern- We conclude the chapter with calls for ment sites that present factual informa- further research in a number of areas. tion. The low level of media coverage that some ballot measures receive may encourage voters to turn to the internet Mechanisms of direct for information. Use of the internet may democracy in contemporary consequently boost knowledge of ballot politics measures more than knowledge of candidate races because some measure-related Direct democracy in the United information is only available online. The States perceived importance of a ballot measure may be more influential than voters’ The United States Constitution contains impressions of candidate races, since those no provision for direct democracy at the are so fully defined by level of govern- federal level, and neither did any of the ment. More generally, citizens online may state constitutions before the late nine- have much more opportunity to define the teenth century. In a time of rapidly shift- meaning and terms of a direct democratic ing economic conditions, progressives campaign, especially a citizen initiative. responded by challenging political struc- The aim of this chapter is not to develop tures and demanding reforms such as a detailed theory of the internet and the direct election of senators, women’s direct democracy. It is intended instead as suffrage, and the power of the public to

159 JUSTIN REEDY AND CHRIS WELLS enact legislation without the approval of referendum in 1972, and the use of direct state legislatures. Interestingly, the con- democracy in Europe grew steadily cerns of the early American supporters of through the end of the twentieth century, direct democracy are familiar to modern with 40 more referendums being held ears. Reformers argued that representative concerning the issue (Hobolt, 2007). A democratic bodies were beholden to common explanation for the growing use powerful, moneyed interests, and that the of the referendum in Europe is the need concerns of the common people were too for political elites to legitimize international often forgotten when decisions were agreements by putting them to a vote. made. As a result, the public had lost faith Particularly because economic globaliza- in the political system (Piott, 2003). tion and the growth of the European Borrowing from the Swiss experience Union have left many Europeans feeling with direct democracy, advocates of the powerless to shape their nations’ futures, initiative and referendum organized at the many leaders fear undertaking interna- state and federal level, coordinated with tional projects without popular consent, the Populist party, and won the first state even when they may be constitutionally constitutional amendment providing for empowered to do so (LeDuc, 2003). the initiative and referendum in South Thus, referendums in most European Dakota in 1898 (Piott, 2003). Other states countries are national, and concern major soon followed suit (Matsusaka, 2004). national or international issues. However, The turn of the twenty-first century is a few use them regularly for policy- also a time of high demand for public making. Switzerland stands out as the influence in government and skepticism world’s pre-eminent nation for direct about the ability of representative gov- democracy; while elected representatives ernment to govern in the public interest, still make a majority of public decisions, and we have seen a new rise in the use of voters have easy recourse in repealing direct democracy. Today, 70 percent of unpopular legislation, and can pass legis- Americans live in a city or state that has lation independent of legislative action. provisions for referendum or initiative, Thus, public policy is regularly put before and no state that has adopted direct voters, who vote in plebiscites three or democracy has later repealed it (Lupia and four times a year (LeDuc, 2003; Treschel Matsusaka, 2004). In addition to the and Kriesi, 1996). Besides Switzerland, growth in the availability of direct demo- Ireland and Italy are the only other cratic mechanisms, the use of those European countries to hold referendums mechanisms has increased substantially in on general public policy with any fre- the last two decades. After declining use quency (LeDuc, 2003). from peaks in the 1910s, the 1990s were a record-setting decade for direct democracy in the United States, with 378 total The problems and prospects measures voted on in that decade for direct democracy (Matsusaka, 2004). While it remains solidly popular with voters (Matsusaka, 2004), direct democ- Direct democracy in Europe racy is not without its critics. Detractors Europe’s recent explosion of direct have argued that the ballot initiative pro- democracy has been largely in the form of cess imprudently delegates the power of national referendums concerning European complex policy-making to citizens who integration. France held the first such know little about the details of the issues

160 THE INTERNET AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY and are unable to devote sufficient time (Lupia, 1994). Findings of this type have or attention to making an informed led to optimism about the ability of low- choice. Consequently, say critics, voters information voters to cast “appropriate” are as open to manipulation through votes (e.g., Bowler and Donovan, 2002; direct democracy as the representatives Lupia, 2001). But voters’ abilities to gather the process is meant to circumvent the basic information needed to make (Broder, 2000). Whatever their empirical these inferences may vary widely with merit (they are contested by, e.g., media exposure, attentiveness, the per- Matsusaka, 2004), these criticisms are ceived importance of the issue, and other intriguing because they highlight direct factors. And referendums in which parties democracy’s political uniqueness. More have been divided or formed unusual than anything else, it is questions about alliances—often the case, especially in the the amount, availability, and flow of referendums over European integration— information—what de Vreese and Semetko may confuse voters attempting to express (2004b) have termed the “information partisan preferences (de Vreese and environment”—that sets direct democ- Semetko, 2004a). As Hobolt (2007) shows racy apart from candidate elections and with data from a Norwegian referendum, that have enflamed its critics. In this sec- voters with knowledge of partisan cues tion, we describe four features of direct but little other information may be able democratic information environments to vote “competently,” but mere recep- that make them unique. The first two, tion of those cues is insufficient; she lack of partisan cues and complexity, set emphasizes the importance of having a nearly all direct democratic choices apart particular type—rather than a particular from candidate elections. The latter two, amount—of information (Hobolt, 2007). the degree of media coverage and citizen This is an intriguing point for the study of appraisal, vary widely among different internet use in direct democracy. Relative direct democratic situations, but deserve to consumers of one-directional mass mention because of the peculiarly influen- media, are internet users better able to tial roles they may play in ballot initiative control the type of information they and referendum campaigns. receive, perhaps via internet searches, in order to shore-up their limited information store for competent voting? Setting direct democracy apart The second characteristic that distin- from candidate elections guishes direct democracy from the process It has been noted that ballot initiatives of electing representatives is the com- and referendums lack a tool heavily used plexity of the choices faced by voters. In by voters in candidate elections: explicit contrast to the relative simplicity of partisan affiliations (Lupia, 1994). The choosing between candidates—however absence of this decision-making resource complex their platforms—citizens voting might suggest that citizens vote hapha- on ballot initiatives or referendums are zardly, unable to connect any of the faced with an intricate policy question choices on the ballot to a preferred with dense text, often written in legal ideology. But Lupia (1994) demonstrated language that is inaccessible to even edu- that even voters with little knowledge of cated citizens (Leib, 2006). Some ballot a set of California initiatives were able to measures have been created to intention- cast their ballots much like better ally mislead and confuse (Leib, 2006). informed voters by knowing the position Further, ballot initiatives and referendums of a key political actor or organization may allow for surprisingly confusing

161 JUSTIN REEDY AND CHRIS WELLS situations—a “Yea” vote may actually be dedicated to the issue (de Vreese and a vote to repeal a policy, leading some Semetko, 2004b). In contrast, as LeDuc citizens in favor of a program to unin- notes, in the U.S. elections in 2000 there tentionally vote to end it (Gastil et al., were more than 200 direct democratic 2007). Here again the internet may play measures on ballots in 41 states; in an important role. If citizens find con- Oregon, voters faced 26 direct democratic ventional news coverage of complex decisions (LeDuc, 2003). ballot measures insufficient, the internet On the American side, it has been taken likely offers voters the opportunity to visit as an article of faith that ballot initiative information-rich sites. campaigns offer voters little information on which to base their decisions (Branton, 2003). Voters consequently display little Variation within direct factual knowledge of ballot measures. For democratic contexts example, in the case of the major, state- Two further characteristics of direct demo- wide ballot initiative in Washington State cratic information environments tend to in 2003, only a quarter of respondents differ from those of candidate elections, could correctly estimate the number of though they also may vary widely among Washingtonians impacted by the initia- different direct democratic contexts. These tive. In Europe, Qvortrup suggests that include the media attention directed to Swiss voters may be comparably poorly ballot measures and citizens’ assessment of informed (Qvortrup, 2002). What is more the importance of ballot measures. Here, revealing is his comparison of Swiss voter a generalization can be made between knowledge of referendums on general those polities that use direct democracy issues with Danish voter knowledge of frequently and for general public policy— the major Maastricht treaty referendums a majority of the American states and in 1992 and 1993. Only 9.2 percent of Switzerland—and those in which direct Danish voters then had “poor” knowl- democracy is rare and usually of major edge of the political issues at stake, while significance—most of the European coun- 19.4 percent of their Swiss counterparts tries. In the former, ballot initiatives and did (Qvortrup, 2002). The Danes’ better referendums are often the victims of knowledge of a high-profile and important habituation or voter fatigue. They often referendum than the Swiss’ knowledge of share media attention and ballot space with mundane public policy referendums illus- higher profile candidate races (Bowler and trates one of the consequences of the dif- Donovan, 2002), and usually receive turn- ferent information environments at play out lower than candidate elections (LeDuc, in different direct democratic contexts. 2003). In contrast, referendums in the This again begs questions about the pos- latter frequently concern major questions sible role of the internet in these different of national identity and sovereignty, attract contexts. In low-profile, low-importance exclusive media attention, and receive turn- campaigns, will internet use provide infor- out comparable to elections (LeDuc, 2003). mation not provided elsewhere? Might As an illustration of this difference, de low-profile direct democracy offer blog- Vreese and Semetko (2004b) describe the gers and users of online bulletins unique campaign over the Danish vote to intro- opportunities to define public issues usually duce the Euro, in 2000, as “very visible,” usurped by bigger media? And what will with extensive campaign coverage on be the role of the internet in high-profile television, airtime allotted to the political referendum campaigns that receive plentiful parties for campaigning, and debates attention from other media?

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The conclusion to be drawn here is and national politics, and were asked a that although direct democratic contexts battery of questions about the initiatives. are far from uniform, their informational The questionnaire included items that characteristics make them distinct from asked respondents if they had ever used candidate campaigns (Bowler and Donovan, the internet and if they had used it the 2002; Hobolt, 2007; de Vreese and day before (Washington Poll, 2006). We Semetko, 2004a). This reveals direct analyzed the data for patterns of internet democracy as a particularly interesting use and initiative-specific knowledge. political context in which to explore the For each of the three initiatives, respon- effects of a new and revolutionary medium dents who had used the internet were better of information flow: the internet. It is to able to give correct answers to initiative- the internet’simpactonvotersfacingdirect specific knowledge questions than those democratic votes in three case studies—a who had never used the internet. As single American state, a cross-section of shown in Figure 12.1, when plotted by the Americans, and a sample of Europeans— number of total correct answers to knowl- that we now turn. edge items, the distribution of internet users was shifted toward a higher number of correct answers relative to the distribu- Three case studies tion of non-users. Regular internet users also fared better than occasional users: Figure 12.2 shows that the distribution of Washington State: online intermittent internet users was centered political communication and around five correct answers out of fourteen three state-wide initiatives total initiative questions, while the dis- Our first case study examines internet use tribution of regular users was centered and voter knowledge of three state-wide around a mean of eight correct answers. ballot initiatives in Washington State in Similar distributions were seen when the 2006. Initiative 920 would have repealed sample was split into college graduates and Washington’s state estate tax; Initiative non-graduates, indicating that the effect of 933 would have required the state to internet use on voter knowledge was more compensate landowners for the expense than a proxy measure of formal education. of complying with land-use regulations; To control for confounding demo- and Initiative 937, the only of the three graphic variables, the data were also ana- to pass, mandated that particular percen- lyzed through a linear regression. As shown tages of the state’s energy come from in Table 12.1, general political knowledge renewable sources. The 2006 election had the largest effect on referendum offered Washington voters a typical mid- knowledge, followed by income, regular term ballot, with a single high-profile U. internet use, and intermittent internet use, S. Senate race, House races, and state which approached statistical significance. legislative and local races. The three ballot Education level had a negligible, non- measures concerned issues typical for significant effect. state-wide initiatives, and all three received Finally, the data were analyzed to at least some coverage from news outlets determine how internet use might help and were discussed on the editorial pages voters access electoral cues, such as of newspapers. endorsements from major parties or com- A few days before the election, the munity groups. A linear regression tested Washington Poll surveyed several hundred the effects of internet use, political voters around the state about issues in state knowledge, and demographic variables on

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Figure 12.1 Referendum knowledge among internet users and non-users, Washington State, 2006. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Washington Poll (2006).

Figure 12.2 Referendum knowledge among regular and intermittent internet users, Washington State, 2006. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Washington Poll (2006).

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Table 12.1 Linear regression models predicting referendum and political endorsement knowledge in Washington State, 2006

Predictor variable Model 1: Linear regression model Model 2: Linear regression model predicting referendum knowledge predicting endorsement knowledge B Standard error B Standard error Constant 3.192 0.297 0.673 0.264 Education 0.015 0.220 0.314 0.195 Income 0.161* 0.066 0.108* 0.058 Political knowledge 0.489*** 0.079 0.502*** 0.070 Internet use 0.538* 0.310 0.518* 0.275 Regular internet use 0.348 0.247 –0.074 0.219 Adjusted R2 0.137 0.150 Unweighted N 616

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Washington Poll (2006). Public Policy Attitudes – Oct.–Nov. 2006. Seattle, Washington. Notes: * = p < 0.1; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001; variable is education scale collapsed into two categories: college graduate and non-graduate. avoters’ knowledge of political endorse- including whether they had used the ments on the initiatives. As seen in Table internet to learn about “ballot measures 12.1, political knowledge was again the or initiatives,” (Pew, 2004). In order to strongest predictor, this time followed by compare respondents with roughly equal internet use, then income; education had likelihoods of learning about ballot initia- a predictive effect and approached statis- tives online, we restricted our analysis to tical significance. In this case, the effect of respondents who lived in the 34 states regular internet use was negligible com- that had measures on the ballot in 2004 pared to overall internet use. (Initiative and Referendum Institute, 2004), and those who used the internet for campaign news. Of that group, nearly a American direct democracy and third, 28.5 percent (weighted value), internet use: election 2004 reported using the internet to gather infor- In the 2004 American election, President mation about initiatives or ballot measures. George W. Bush was challenged, unsuc- We explored five types of possible pre- cessfully, and won re-election. All seats dictors of using the internet to find infor- in the House of Representatives were up mation about ballot measures. They included for vote, as were a number of Senate seats, eight demographic variables; three poli- and many local offices. Most Americans tical internet use variables; seven online thus faced a fairly typical ballot for a news use variables; four variables describ- Presidential election year, with races from ing reasons for internet use; and seven the President down to local candidates, fol- variables describing interactive uses of the lowed by state and local ballot measures. internet relevant to the campaign. Those The second case study presents data 29 variables were included in a regression from the Pew Internet and American Life predicting use of the internet to learn Project’s 2004 Post-election Survey, about ballot measures. All eight demo- which took place shortly after the election. graphic variables, and the significant pre- The survey asked respondents numerous dictors from the other groups are listed in questions about political internet use, Table 12.2.

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Most of the general demographic vari- went online, using the internet because ables were predictive in the typical ways— desired information is not available from being younger, being white, being male, other sources was significantly—and being richer, and being more educated. negatively—predictive of going online to Years of internet use and regularity of use learn about ballot measures. Using the net were not significant predictors, however. to obtain additional information was also All three variables concerning political uses marginally and negatively predictive. of the internet were also significant: learn- From the set of variables describing actions ing about the campaign online and learn- respondents had taken online, having one’s ing about state-wide races online were own blog was negatively predictive, while slightly predictive, while learning about having sent or received online invitations House or local candidate races online was to a party or event, and undertaking one of the most significant predictors of “other” campaign-related activities online learning about ballot measures online. were both predictive, albeit weakly. In terms of online news habits, going to candidate sites to learn about the cam- European referendums and paign was marginally predictive, while online politics going to issue-oriented sites was strongly predictive. From the set of variables At the time of the 2004 U.S. election, the describing the reasons that respondents nations of the European Union were

Table 12.2 Linear regression models predicting use of the internet for information about ballot measures or initiatives, United States, 2004

Predictor variable B Standard error Constant –0.032 0.094 Demographics Age –0.035* 0.017 Ethnicity (white) 0.071* 0.033 Sex (female) –0.055* 0.027 Income 0.020** 0.008 Education 0.046* 0.018 Conservative –0.016 0.014 Internet use Years of access to the internet –0.002 0.006 Regular internet user 0.037 0.031 Internet Activities Getting campaign news online 0.027** 0.010 Learning about state-wide or Pres. race online 0.084* 0.034 Learning about House or local race online 0.303*** 0.031 Going to issue-oriented sites for campaign news 0.254*** 0.063 Uses internet for news not available elsewhere –0.128** 0.048 Uses internet for additional information –0.068* 0.036 Has started own blog –0.112* 0.052 Has sent or received invitation to event/party 0.099** 0.036 Involved with “other” online campaign activities 0.109** 0.039 Adjusted R2 0.257 Unweighted N 1,897

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Pew Internet and American Life Project (2004) Post Election Tracking Survey – November, 2004. Washington, DC. Notes: * = p < 0.1; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001 166 THE INTERNET AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY debating a draft European Constitution. whether they listed the internet as one of The document would have installed a the three most important technologies in permanent president of the EU council, their personal lives. Linear regressions replacing the six-month rotating post were used to determine the predictive already in place; created a position of effects of the internet use score and demo- foreign affairs minister for overseeing for- graphic variables, such as age, education, eign policy and representing the EU and political ideology, on referendum internationally; made changes to how the knowledge. Table 12.3 shows the results EU council made legislative and policy of that regression. Education level had the decisions; codified a method for member strongest effect on a respondent’s knowl- nations to leave the union; and insti- edge of the referendum, followed closely tuted a charter of fundamental rights for by personal use of the internet. Political EU citizens and nationals (Economist, ideology had a very small effect on refer- 2007). endum knowledge, and age had a non- The constitution was controversial and significant effect. widely debated in the public sphere, but The data was further analyzed to deter- it was also a topic of confusion for voters, mine the effects of internet use on respon- who were being asked to weigh in on dents’ ability to recall arguments in support what amounted to many major policy of their view on the EU referendum. To decisions in one vote (Rennie, 2005). test this, we employed the concept of Even politicians and leading commenta- argument repertoire, designed to measure tors found the 300-plus-page document a person’s engagement with an issue; difficult to decipher and fraught with being able to recall more arguments for or potential policy pitfalls (Bush, 2005). against a policy suggests that the respon- In October and November of 2004, dent has received and digested informa- the Eurobarometer poll asked citizens for tion from the debate on that policy their opinions on the draft constitution (Cappella et al., 2002). As indicated in and quizzed them on their knowledge Table 12.3, age, education, and personal of the policy changes it would bring internet use all had modest predictive about. Respondents were asked, for effects for argument repertoire on the EU instance, whether they knew that the referendum, but only for arguments in constitution would create a foreign min- favor of the constitution. ister position with oversight of EU foreign policy—which it would—and if the document would allow for the direct The internet and direct election of the EU council president— democracy which it would not. They were also asked about their use of telecommunica- The results of these analyses paint a portion technology, including the internet, trait of internet use in direct democracy and the importance of those technologies as sharing several features with general to their personal and work lives political use of the internet, while also (Eurobarometer, 2004). distinguishing itself as unique. In this sec- In the analysis, each respondent received tion, we explore the findings from three a referendum knowledge score reflecting perspectives on the possible impact of the number of correct answers they pro- the internet in direct democracy: the vided on the EU constitution questions. internet’s informational impact, its inter- Each person also received an internet use active impact, and its organizational score that measured their personal use and impact.

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Table 12.3 Linear regression models predicting referendum knowledge and argument repertoire in Europe, 2004

Predictor variable Model 1: Linear regression model Model 2: Linear regression model predicting referendum knowledge predicting pro-EU argument repertoire B Standard error B Standard error Constant 1.716 0.057 1.721 0.078 Age 0.036** 0.012 0.053** 0.053 Education 0.397*** 0.018 0.133*** 0.024 Conservative 0.013* 0.013 –0.012 0.008 Internet use index 0.311*** 0.311 0.076** 0.024 Adjusted R2 0.051 0.005 Unweighted N 24,787

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Eurobarometer survey (2004). Notes: * = p < 0.1; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001; education variable is index based on respondent’s age level when formal education stopped; internet use index based on respondent’s reports of personal internet use and perceived importance of the Internet to their personal life.

Informational impact information online; this echoes Bonfadelli’s finding that information-seeking web The political ideal for the internet is of tasks are associated with people who tend a technology that improves the social to already have greater information resour- knowledge base and leads to a more ces (Bonfadelli, 2002). In this case, those informed citizenry (Polat, 2005). Empirical users tend slightly to be wealthier and studies tend to be cautious about viewing better educated. At the same time, the fact the internet as a panacea, showing, for that internet use was significantly edifying example, that the political knowledge fi for both the high- and low-education bene ts of using the internet tend to be groups from the Washington Poll—as well focused on those already enjoying greater as in regressions from both the Washington knowledge resources (Bonfadelli, 2002). Poll and EU case study—suggest that In this section, we explore the implica- people with less formal education will ’ tions of the case studies results for inter- benefit from using the internet in direct ’ net users pursuit and acquisition of democracy situations. information in ballot initiative and refer- Another explanation for the indepen- endum campaigns. dent effects of both formal education and internet use on referendum knowledge is Knowledge of ballot measures that direct democratic elections, which have been shown to encourage civic and The data from the case studies show political engagement (Smith, 2002), provide both that income and education predict a context for normally unengaged citizens knowledge of ballot measures—as in the to connect with politics and gain infor- Washington State and EU case studies— mation about ballot measures. While and that income and education predict hopelessly complex, many ballot measures using the internet to learn about ballot are also relatively discrete political events. measures—as seen in the U.S. national They may provide opportunities for study. The regression used in the U.S. people mostly unaware of the political case study controlled for frequent internet context of referendums to still cast mean- users and users who learned about campaign ingful votes. Together with the internet—

168 THE INTERNET AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY which allows for the easy retrieval of quickly log on to the website of a pre- information on any particular ballot ferred group to find an endorsement? measure—direct democratic elections may Does such a group tend to be a party, an sometimes bridge the information and interest group, or an online community? engagement gap between privileged voters and those who are traditionally dis- Ballot measures and online news advantaged. What role the internet may consumption play in engaging those citizens through ballot measures should be further explored. In addition to understanding who uses the Ultimately, the answer to the question internet to learn about ballot measures, of whether people are better informed what they learn, and how much, the data about ballot initiatives and referendums as allow us to explore how people go about a result of their internet use, according to that learning. Here, the unique char- the Washington Poll and EU case studies, acteristics of direct democracy manifest is a fairly clear “yes.” In both cases, themselves. The Pew data show that internet users were better able to answer people who use the internet to access sites factual questions about the direct demo- with issue-specific news are particularly cratic decisions they were facing, a finding likely to use the internet to learn about with parallels in the literature on the ballot measures, suggesting a very strong internet and candidate elections (e.g., connection between ballot measures, Drew and Weaver, 2006). using the internet, and seeking information specific (we might assume) to the measures on the ballot. Mysteriously, the Knowledge of endorsements variables for seeking online for informa- As noted above, one of direct democracy’s tion not available elsewhere and seeking most unique characteristics is that voters online for additional information were make their decisions in direct democratic both negatively predictive of learning about contests without the aid of explicit parti- ballot measures, suggesting that users were san cues. A major question is whether the not visiting issue-specific sites because internet aids voters in connecting their they felt the conventional media were votes to preferred parties’ positions. The covering ballot measures inadequately. findings of the Washington State case Future research investigating this seeming study suggest that it does. There, internet incongruity could tell us much about online use trailed only general political knowl- information seeking in direct democracy. edge in its power to predict knowing the endorsers of the three initiatives. This Deliberative impact finding implies that the spread of internet use could improve voters’ abilities to The internet is much more than just a one- connect their votes to those of favored way medium of transferring information parties or political actors, by making spe- from media outlets and political elites to cific types of information more plentiful media consumers. On the web, con- and easier to retrieve (Hobolt, 2007). sumers of information may also be pro- Future research should explore this in ducers (Polat, 2005). It is thus an arena of more detail. It might ask how citizens use diverse opinions and perspectives, but it the internet in deciding their votes. Do remains to be seen whether the internet they attempt to learn everything they can can improve the character of public dis- about ballot measures and in the process cussion on political issues in general or learn about endorsements? Or do they initiatives in particular (see Sunstein,

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2001, for a pessimistic view, and Horrigan discussions of policy options with each et al., 2004, for a refutation). other and with political leaders, though One model for evaluating the quality only a small portion of the citizenry par- of political discussion is deliberative demo- ticipated (Jensen, 2003). A review of the cratic theory, which calls for respectful online deliberation literature indicates and open deliberation of issues (see, for similar mixed results: some studies have example, Barber, 1984; Cohen, 1997). found strong evidence of deliberation True deliberative democracy is discussion- (Kim, 2006), while others have found few centered, promotes an equality of view- or no benefits to online political discus- points, a free discussion, and inclusion of sion (Janssen and Kies, 2005). Do citizens both fact- and emotion-based arguments discuss ballot measures online? What role (Burkhalter et al., 2002). Through delib- does online deliberation play in the pro- eration, citizens make better and more cess of voter decision-making? informed policy decisions, promote com- One indicator of deliberation, explored promise among people with differing by Cappella et al. (2002), is argument views, and stimulate engagement in civic repertoire (AR), which refers to the life (Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Gastil, number of issue-relevant reasons a person 2000; Luskin et al., 2005). has for holding their own opinion, as well At first glance, the internet may seem as the number of reasons they know for ill-suited to deliberation, since users are holding the opposite. Argument reper- not engaging with one another face-to- toire has been found to be indicative of face as in other deliberative settings. But online deliberation and has been sug- scholars have proposed alternatives to in- gested as a measure of “opinion quality” person deliberation, such as situations in (Cappella et al., 2002). The data from the which a deliberating group offers a policy Eurobarometer offered the opportunity to or candidate recommendation for the assess respondents’ AR on the refer- wider public (Gastil and Crosby, 2003), endums they were facing, and internet or those in which media and political use was found to be slightly predictive of elites debate the pros and cons of policy AR—but only slightly, and only for rea- alternatives (Page, 1996). The internet sons in favor of the European constitu- may be a special case of mediated delib- tion. Nonetheless, this finding suggests eration in which users interact in a virtual the deliberative potential of the internet world, but are exposed to a wide range of in direct democratic contexts, and deserves viewpoints and consider many different further attention. arguments and opinions. A study of internet It also bears asking whether the existing users in Chile, for example, described the concept of democratic deliberation is use of an online forum to debate a highly insufficient to describe the fledgling contentious issue: the detention of Augusto online public sphere. Dahlgren (2005), for Pinochet, the country’s former dictator example, argues that the internet is con- (Tanner, 2001). The forum discussions tinuing a process of destabilization and featured many elements of a deliberative dispersion of power that began with the discussion, such as the use of informa- advent of modern telecommunication tional and emotional arguments, and the technology. Analyzing the mechanisms discussion of larger issues surrounding and effectiveness of the online public Pinochet’s regime. Another study of a sphere may require an adaptation of government-instituted online information deliberative democratic theory to under- center and forum in Denmark found that stand this destabilized setting (e.g., users engaged in respectful, well intentioned Edwards, 2002; Bekkers, 2004).

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Organizational impact local races online, and learning about ballot measures online have already been A final potential impact of the internet on noted. But people who gave or received direct democratic campaigns is its potential invitations to events or parties, and people to increase opportunities for citizen groups who engaged in “other” campaign activ- to support initiatives. Several scholars ities online were also more likely to learn have argued that the internet provides about ballot measures online. Future stu- unprecedented low-cost opportunities to dies should explore the uses of the inter- organize many people toward a goal net in direct democracy. Is it used as an (Bimber et al., 2005; Rheingold, 2002). alternative to scarce television coverage? Is Though their history and formal structure it used to organize quick and temporary suggest unique opportunities for average coalitions, as Bimber (2003) suggests? citizens to influence policy-making, critics note the heavy use of direct democracy by special interests (Broder, 2000; Gerber, Conclusion 1999) and the modern cost of direct democracy. How might the internet Our findings show that while several of ff reduce the costs of e ective campaigning the general trends described in the litera- on ballot initiatives and referendums? ture on internet use in elections apply to ff Bimber (2003) o ers several observa- direct democratic contexts, several also ’ tions about the internet s role in politics appear to be unique to direct democracy. and collective action that suggest new These include the tendency of people forms of organization and opportunities using the web to learn about ballot mea- for low-resource groups to mobilize. He sures to visit issue-specific websites, the notes that because the primary medium association between learning about ballot for political messages is still television, the measures and learning about local, as internet may be most influential in lower opposed to state-wide or national races, profile races, because a greater portion of and the relative likelihood that people the effort in high-profile races is dedicated who use the internet to organize their to communicating through television social and political activities will also use it (Bimber, 2003). In the American and to learn about ballot measures. Our more Swiss contexts, ballot measure campaigns general findings—from very different may be just the sort of low-profile events contexts—that internet use is associated in which savvy internet communicating with greater knowledge of ballot mea- has a great effect. Another of Bimber’s sures and the endorsements of political observations is that the internet reduces actors also deserve more study. the need for organizations to maintain Both the internet and direct democracy members and replace leaving members; are unique products of our era. The participation might be less “interest- internet was developed over the last two based” as it becomes more “event-based.” decades, just as direct democracy’s resur- And as costs of communication decrease, gence has boomed. Both have been organizations become more free to “form heralded as new forums for expressing and disband at will” (Bimber, 2003). political will and potential salves for Several findings from the Pew data set modern democracy’s problems, especially suggest ways these ideas might be applied the estrangement of the public from in the direct democratic context. The political processes. The study of the strong associations between consuming internet in the unique context of direct issue-specific news online, learning about democracy is thus an important endeavor.

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It offers insights on the political possibi- of the initiative process against charges lities of internet use for a political envir- that it has been corrupted by special onment with features and characteristics interests. The Initiative and Referendum that set it apart from candidate elections. Institute, which Matsusaka directs, at the Perhaps more important than con- University of Southern California, also tributing to our general understanding of has plentiful information about direct political internet use, however, studying democracy in the U.S. It is online at: the internet in direct democracy reveals www.iandrinstitute.org/. (The Intitute’s the impact of a tremendously important European page is: www.iri-europe.org/). communication medium on a political The Referendum Experience in Europe, process that will continue to shape the edited by Michael Gallagher and Pier world in which we live. Direct democ- Vincenzo Uleri (1996), offers a good racy is not going anywhere any time selection of articles about experiences soon—on the contrary, publics around with direct democracy around Europe. the world are likely to increase their For a study of referendums in the course demands for opportunities to influence of European integration, see Simon Hug’s policy and check the power of wayward Voices of Europe: citizens, referendums and elites. As rates of internet use become European integration (Hug, 2002). A solid strong majorities in the developed world, literature review on the topic of EU and as they approach sizeable numbers in referendums is Hobolt (2006). Claes de other parts of the globe, this is a research Vreese and Holli Semetko (2004b) program that will benefit our under- emphasize the importance of information standing of politics and the changing roles in Political Campaigning in Referendums: of citizens in modern democracy. framing the referendum issue. De Vreese’s (upcoming) edited volume, The Dynamics of Referendum Campaigns: an international Guide to further reading perspective, also promises new research by top scholars. Online, C2D, the Research Because the subfield of the use of the Center on Direct Democracy at the internet in direct democracy has not been University of Geneva, is a clearing house explored, the more general fields of direct for information on European and world- democracy and the internet’s impact on wide direct democracy. It is at: http:// voter information would be the most help- c2d.unige.ch/. ful for readings looking for other works. For books considering direct democ- In the field of American direct democracy globally, Lawrence LeDuc’s (2003) racy, the work of Shaun Bowler and Todd The Politics of Direct Democracy: referendums Donovan stands out. Their Demanding in global perspective is very helpful. David Choices: opinion, voting and direct democracy Butler and Austin Ranney’s (1994) edited (Bowler and Donovan, 1998) and their collection Referendums Around the World: edited volume Citizens as Legislators: direct the growing use of direct democracy, provides democracy in the United States (Bowler, a good historical overview of direct Donovan, and Tolbert, 1998) are excel- democracy in Europe, the Americas, and lent sources on voting in direct democ- much of the rest of the world. Also see racy. John G. Matsusaka’s (2004) For the Matt Qvortrup’s (2002) A Comparative Many or the Few: the initiative, public policy Study of Referendums: government by the and American democracy is a spirited defense people.

172 13 Toward digital citizenship Addressing inequality in the information age

Karen Mossberger

Despite the growth of the online population in the United States, substantial inequities in the capacity to use the internet remain. Some scholars claim time and market forces will effectively resolve the issue, and official policy has declared the problem essentially solved. This misrepresents the underlying issues in technology inequality. The concept of digital citizenship—the ability to participate in society online—highlights the continued need for policy that promotes effective use of the internet, including literacy, skills, and regular access. Educational competencies are crucial for digital citizenship, just as they are for political participation both online and offline. Race and ethnicity continue to matter for digital inequality, despite evidence that African-Americans, and in some cases Latinos, have even more positive attitudes toward technology than similarly-situated whites. Research suggests that structural disadvantages, including unequal educational opportunities, link technology disparities to other inequalities in society. Politics online exhibits substantial benefits for participation and greater access to government, especially in its ability to mobilize younger people. Indeed, the internet may enable participation in new ways both online and offline for some, while raising greater barriers for others. Without greater attention to fostering widespread digital citizenship, society risks creating even greater political inequality.

Systematic inequalities in the capacity to This chapter argues for a reframing of the use information technology persist. internet issue from the narrow concept of the use has increased exponentially over the digital divide as a problem of simply past decade, but is certainly not universal, having some access to technology, to the for approximately 30 percent of Americans concept of digital citizenship, or the do not use the internet. Still fewer—less capacity to participate in society online than half—use the internet on a daily (Mossberger et al., 2007). basis. Many of those who are counted by What does it mean to be a digital citizen? surveys as internet users do not have the Participation in society online requires skills to find or use information online regular access to information technology effectively, or may use the internet infre- and the effective use of technology. Digital quently. More than a decade into the citizens can be defined as those who use information age, many Americans remain the internet every day, because frequent disconnected or are only tenuously con- use requires some regular means of access nected, and variations in the ability to use (usually at home), some technical skill, technology are based on education, and the educational competencies to per- income, race and ethnicity, as well as age. form tasks such as finding and using

173 KAREN MOSSBERGER information on the web, and commu- of internet users relied on the internet as nicating with others on the internet their most important source of news, and (Mossberger et al., 2007). Because of the 8 percent posted a blog or online com- explosion of political information and ments (Rainie and Horrigan, 2007). A opportunities on the web, digital citizen- larger percentage—54 percent of internet ship is an enabling factor for political citi- users—reported ever having looked at zenship, whether practiced online by news or information about politics or responding to Listserv solicitations for campaigns on the web (Pew Internet and campaign contributions or offline at the American Life Project, 2007). voting booth. In much the same way that All U.S. federal and state agencies (West, public education has long been linked to 2005) and most local governments currently civic republicanism and democratic host a website (Norris and Moon, 2005). values, the internet has the potential to The development of “e-government”— facilitate the membership and participa- the delivery of government information tion of individuals within society. and services through the internet—(West, This chapter reviews research on who 2000) has implications for social inclusion is involved in politics and government and political participation. Information online in the United States, comparing it posted online may include e-mail addresses to evidence on internet use more gen- for contacting officials, policies, research, erally. A brief history of public policy and agendas and minutes of meetings, issues research on the issue reveals that many of advocated by elected officials, and publicly the causes of digital inequality have not available databases as well as information been adequately addressed. The latter part about services. Online transactions are of the chapter considers possible policy another common use of websites, for activ- solutions and examines the implications ities such as filing taxes, applying for per- that online disparities have for democratic mits, paying tickets or fines, requesting birth participation and governance in the future. and death records, renewing driver’slicen- ses, registering to vote online, or submitting complaints. Although information and ser- The growth and impact of vice delivery predominate on government politics and government websites (Chadwick and May, 2003; West, online 2003a, 2003b) there are also examples of more participatory uses of the internet. How does the internet influence the exer- The city of Berkeley, California has solicited cise of democratic citizenship, both in terms online comments on the comprehensive of political participation and also access plan (Mossberger et al., 2003), for exam- to government information and services? ple, and Seattle lists ways to get involved Opportunities for politics and government in neighborhood groups and links to online are burgeoning and emerging neighborhood websites. As of August evidence demonstrates that they have 2006, two-thirds of internet users reported important impacts. visiting a government website (Pew Internet During the 2006 U.S. mid-term elec- and American Life Project, 2007). tions, 31 percent of all internet users engaged in some campaign-related activ- Evidence on the democratic ity online. This included viewing online benefits of internet use news, sending or receiving e-mails about the election, or posting content online The prevalence of politics and govern- regarding the campaign. Fifteen percent ment online is insufficient, however, to

174 INEQUALITY AND DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP make the case that digital citizenship is attention to politics or government on central to citizenship in the traditional the internet tend to be the young and the sense—for political participation and for educated, holding other factors constant inclusion in the polis. There is evidence, (Bimber, 2003: 218; Wilhelm, 2003; however, that access to politics and gov- Alvarez and Hall, 2004). Some studies ernment online has important social ben- have concluded that men are more likely efits. Research has established a positive to be e-government users (West, 2005: association between internet use and par- 125) and are more interested in internet ticipation, including voter turnout (Bimber, politics, including online voter registra- 2003; Tolbert and McNeal, 2003; Graf tion and participation in an electronic and Darr, 2004), campaign contributions town meeting (Mossberger et al., 2003: (Bimber, 2001, 2003; Graf and Darr, 100). Fuller (2004) has found that gender 2004), and citizen-initiated contact with tends to influence the types of politically government (Thomas and Streib, 2003; oriented websites that respondents visit Bimber, 1999). Research using two-stage rather than political interest per se. Yet, models suggests that these results can be socioeconomic influences are more pow- partly explained by the influence of erful than gender for predicting political online news on civic engagement, stimu- engagement online. lating greater political interest, knowledge, and discussion (Mossberger et al., 2007). The internet holds promise for Like print media, the internet offers in- engaging the young depth coverage and facilitates recall of information, encouraging the acquisition of Politics online differs from voting and political knowledge (Healy and McNamara, many other forms of political participation 1996; Kyllonen and Christal, 1990). Its insofar as young people are more likely to diverse content and convenience are participate. It is well-known that political valued by citizens and interactivity facil- participation increases with age, under itates political discussion and mobilization. most circumstances (Campbell et al., Two-stage models show that political uses 1960; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980), of e-mail, chat rooms, and online news all and in fact political interest and activity increase the probability of voting. Those are traditionally most visible after the age who have visited government websites of 45 (Alvarez and Hall, 2004). The have more positive attitudes toward gov- greater presence of young people in ernment (Welch et al., 2005; Tolbert and internet politics increases political partici- Mossberger, 2006; West, 2005). These pation among the young, and if these outcomes are evident even controlling for trends are sustained, they may result in other factors, including the positive rela- greater overall levels of political interest tionship that education has with both and activity in the future. Krueger (2002, internet use and political participation or 2006) demonstrates that the internet has e-government use. the ability to engage some individuals who otherwise would not be involved in politics, and that this pattern is most evi- Who is involved in politics dent among younger individuals. Reading and government online? online news has a greater effect on political knowledge among young people, The internet has truly become a new controlling for the use of traditional civic arena, but not all citizens are equally media and other factors (Mossberger et al., present in this venue. Those who pay 2007).

175 KAREN MOSSBERGER

The internet magnifies existing rooted in education (and income) if those political disparities who are mobilized are predominantly more advantaged citizens (Alvarez and In other ways, however, those who pay Nagler, 2002). The potential effects on attention to politics online are the same civic participation among racial and ethnic individuals who are involved in politics minorities pose particular concern. Among more generally. Education emerges repeat- internet users, there are no significant dif- edly across these studies as a key conferences in most political activities online sideration for political involvement on the based on race or ethnicity, once we con- internet as well as political participation trol for income and education. Yet race offline (Campbell et al., 1960; Verba et al., and ethnicity do have statistically sig- 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). nificant influences on the population of As can be expected, political interest and internet users. political efficacy play a role in online politics Descriptive statistics (simple percentages) as well (Bimber, 2003: 218; Mossberger et show this pattern as well. As Figure 13.1 al., 2007: chapter 4). Online politics largely indicates, the percentage of African- replicates existing patterns of participa- Americans in the population who read tion, with the exception of its attractions about politics online is consistently lower for young people. than the percentage of whites for the Moreover, prior disparities may be exa- years 2000–6. This is primarily because of cerbated online. Research that demonstrates lower rates of internet access rather than heightened political interest and activity great differences in political engagement based on internet use would also suggest by race for internet users. Trends for an intensification of existing disparities Latinos are difficult to interpret from

Figure 13.1 Percentage of United States’ citizens who read about politics online. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Pew Internet and American Life Project Trends in Internet Adoption and Rainie and Horrigan (2007).

176 INEQUALITY AND DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP these figures, however. They include only is analogous to the social construction of English-speaking Latinos, and the Pew the issue of universal telephone service, surveys from which these data are derived where subsidies have reduced the cost of have consistently depicted this group as telephone connections for rural residents. having similar internet access to white In contrast with universal telephone ser- respondents. Research that includes both vice policy, however, the federal E-Rate English and Spanish-speaking Latinos program has assisted public institutions clearly demonstrates that this group over- rather than reducing the cost of the ser- all is significantly less likely to use the vice for individuals. During the Clinton internet (Fox and Livingston, 2007). At administration, some smaller programs the same time that the internet promises funded training and innovation using to increase political participation for some, technology, but the Bush administration minorities and less-educated individuals eliminated federal grants for the are trailing behind. Is it probable that this Community Technology Centers and the will change in the near future, simply Technology Opportunities Program. Some because of further diffusion of the internet? limited funding is available for technology use in schools as part of the No Child Left Behind Act, but the Bush adminis- Evolution of an issue: defining tration cuts have further narrowed the the digital divide scope of federal policy. The federal E- Rate program has endured because it is Understanding these trends and the pro- embedded in legislation. spects for change necessitates a closer look at how the issue has been defined. Evolution of research on digital Complex, multi-dimensional issues are inequality often simplified on the public agenda (Cobb and Elder, 1983) and issue defini- The federal government has been an tions may pay attention to certain aspects important source of data on information of policy problems while neglecting others technology use, although this role has (Jones, 1994; Jones and Baumgartner, declined as well in recent years. Federal 2005). Technical solutions such as internet influence on the terms of the debate has connections and hardware have tended to been exercised through its research reports, dominate policy debates since the issue of issued by the National Telecommunications the “digital divide” first emerged on the and Information Administration (NTIA), agenda in the early 1990s. Federal policy which is the same agency that administers has emphasized internet connections in the E-Rate program. During the Clinton schools and libraries rather than affordable administration, the first “Falling Through home access. Relatively little money has the Net” report described disparities in home been available for training and support computer ownership (U.S. Department of services, even in schools and libraries. Commerce/NTIA, 1995), and later edi- The largest federal program is the tions included home internet access as E-Rate program, which provides wiring well (U.S. Department of Commerce/ and internet connections for schools and NTIA, 1998). The reports regularly pro- public libraries in low-income commu- vided valuable information and kept the nities. This has defined the predominant issue on the national agenda for a number role of government as a matter of low- of years, but shifting political priorities ering the cost of access for institutions in influenced the way in which the federal areas with high-poverty populations, and government defined the issue in later

177 KAREN MOSSBERGER research. The 2002 NTIA report written Using the large-sample 2000 Current during the Bush administration included Population Survey, Fairlie (2004) found use anywhere rather than home access. It that occupation, income, and education emphasized the growing internet popula- explained a good deal, but not all of the tion, declaring that the problem was inequalities in home access for African- receding. A subsequent study was issued Americans and Latinos. The gender gap in 2004 regarding broadband use, but the in access has closed over time, but other U.S. Department of Commerce no longer inequities have remained even as internet tracks the issue. The non-profit Pew use has grown in the U.S. internet and American Life Project has since Mossberger et al. (2008) describe “digi- become a central source of current data on tal citizenship” as daily use, assuming that information technology use in the U.S. those who use the internet on a daily basis have required skills as well as regular access. Reviewing Pew data from 2000– What factors drive digital 5, they find that only about 60 percent of inequality? internet users go online on a daily basis. For several years there was a dearth of Holding all other factors constant, whites studies capable of showing what factors have a 15 percent higher probability of were really driving these inequalities— being daily internet users than Latinos, whether, for example, race and ethnicity and a 13 percent higher probability than matter when controlling for income and African-Americans, according to data education. Some research using bivariate from the 2003 Current Population Survey analysis produced contradictory results. of the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2003). Hoffman et al. (2001) showed that In contrast, there is a 28 percent differ- African-Americans who were poor and ence between 63-year-olds and 29-year- less educated were technologically dis- olds in their probability of daily use, and a advantaged in comparison with whites in 22 percent difference for high school the same income or education categories. graduates compared to those holding On the other hand, Nie and Erbring associate’s degrees, or for those who make (2000) asserted that differences were based $20,000–$25,000 per year compared to on age and education alone. Neither those earning between $75,000–$100,000 study used multivariate controls. annually (Mossberger et al., 2007). Daily As more researchers began to use mul- use mirrors the disparities in access, but it tivariate regression analysis to examine the serves as a proxy for skill as well as regular issue, a consensus emerged among studies access. using different sources of data, and across Studies examining broadband use have years. Age and education generally account found similar patterns of disparity, with for the most variation, but income, race, the exception that rural residents are also and ethnicity also exercise independent disadvantaged because of a lack of broad- effects (Neu et al., 1999; Fairlie, 2004; band availability in less-populated areas Mossberger et al., 2003). Katz and Rice (Ayres and Williams, 2003; U.S. Department (2002) examined data between 1995 and of Commerce/NTIA, 2004; Horrigan, 2000 and found some diminishing effects 2004). Broadband use is important for full of race by the turn of the millennium, but connectivity, as campaign websites and other research with more representative news sites (among many others) use samples of minorities has revealed continued complex and interactive graphics, video disadvantage among African-Americans streaming, and other features that require and Latinos, controlling for other factors. higher speeds to download. Slower speeds

178 INEQUALITY AND DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP can be frustrating, especially for novices. Americans and Latinos cited costs as the High-speed connections are associated major reason for not having home access with more frequent use and more diverse in the 2003 Current Population Survey, uses online (Horrigan, 2004; Mossberger in comparison with only 9 percent of the et al., 2007). general population. There are also reasons to believe that certain disparities will not simply be erased by time or even cheaper Will time close all gaps? technology, because they involve funda- As public access and occasional use have mental educational gaps rather than increased over the years, some observers affordability, and these are entwined with have assumed that the problem is fading race, ethnicity, and class. away. The most common assumption among academics who take this position is that internet adoption will merely The role of race and ethnicity: follow the “s-curve” typical for the diffu- apathy or disadvantage? sion of many innovations (Rogers, 1995), and that later adopters will be more The causes for racial and ethnic disparities representative of the population as a in technology in the United States have been whole (Compaine, 2001). There has indeed the topic of some debate. One possible been real growth in occasional use, from explanation is that African-Americans and 46 percent of Americans in 2000 to 70 Latinos are particularly unaware of or percent in 2006 (Pew Internet and American disinterested in the potential benefits of Life Project, 2007). Yet, as the preceding the internet. Kretchmer and Carveth (2001) section showed, disparities still remain. have hypothesized that minorities perceive Furthermore, one analysis of respondents that content on the internet has little aged 16–32 shows that race, ethnicity, relevance to their needs and interests. Van and education account for statistically sig- Dijk (2005: 40) asserts that the difference nificant divisions among young people as must be cultural and cites a case study of well. Current gaps are therefore not likely poor African-American men in one city to close of their own accord in the near who associate the internet with women’s future (Mossberger et al., 2007). work rather than the manual labor they Some analysts have contended that the view as appropriate for men (Stanley, problem of digital inequality will diminish 2001). African-American women do indeed with the rapidly decreasing prices for use the internet somewhat more frequently information technology brought about by than their male peers (Fallows, 2005; the market (Thierer, 2000; Compaine, Mossberger et al., 2007), but this hardly 2001). But, the affordability of home accounts for the differences between access is still a hurdle for some individuals. minorities and whites. The United States ranks 15th in broadband adoption in part because it is Minorities have more positive relatively expensive in comparison with beliefs about technology countries where government has subsidized its costs as part of the national infrastructure In contrast to the common narrative (Organization for Economic Cooperation about apathy, survey research demonstrates and Development, 2006). Income is still a that attitudes toward internet use are even significant barrier for acquiring home more positive among African-Americans access for many of those who remain off- (and to a lesser extent, Latinos) when they line, as more than 20 percent of African- are compared to similarly situated whites.

179 KAREN MOSSBERGER

This is particularly true for African- argues that inner-city residents do not American attitudes toward information possess the skills or networks to obtain technology across a range of issues such as knowledge-intensive jobs that could pro- the importance of the internet for eco- vide exposure to technology (Kain, 1968; nomic opportunity, and reported will- Kasarda, 1990). Mossberger et al. (2006) ingness to use public access or to learn discovered that living in poor commu- new technology skills in a variety of ways nities significantly decreases technology (Mossberger et al., 2003). There is evi- access and use for individuals of all back- dence that race and ethnicity influence grounds in a study that used multilevel online behavior as well as attitudes. models and data from a national survey African-Americans and Latinos are con- merged with 2000 census data. Differences siderably more likely to search for jobs between African-Americans and whites at online than whites, despite lower rates of the individual level are no longer statisti- access, and African-Americans are more cally significant after introducing envir- likely than whites to take online classes onmental factors such as zip code median for credit (Pew Internet and American income and the percentage of high school Life Project, 2007; Mossberger et al., graduates. In other words, the persistence 2003; U.S. Department of Commerce/ of segregation and concentrated poverty NTIA, 2002). Just as African-Americans account for the lower rates of access and were more likely to take advantage of the use among African-Americans. African- GI Bill after World War II (Hacker et al., Americans residing in more affluent areas 2005), the internet has been attractive for are marginally more likely than whites to its potential to overcome discrimination have a home computer, and just as likely in the labor market. This poses a contra- to be frequent internet users. Place effects diction, however: why is it that these do not entirely explain technology dis- positive attitudes fail to lead to higher parities for Latinos. rates of internet access and use? Language and limited education Segregation and concentrated contribute to lower use for poverty Latinos Research indicates that community-level Some studies have indicated that Spanish- factors influence the opportunities that language dominance among Latinos decrea- individuals have to learn about and to use ses internet use, controlling for other fac- technology. African-Americans are most tors (Fairlie, 2004; Fox and Livingston, at risk for living in areas of concentrated 2007). However, lower levels of education poverty. The percentage of Latinos who among Latinos have a high impact on live in segregated, high-poverty commu- internet use as well (Fox and Livingston, nities is also high in comparison with 2007). Individuals from Mexico or of whites (Massey and Denton, 1993: 12). Mexican descent have the lowest rates of Structural barriers for technology use in computer access and internet use among poor communities may include public Latinos (Fairlie, 2004; Fox and Livingston, institutions, social networks, and labor 2007). Second-generation, better-educated, markets. Poor communities often lack the English-speaking Latinos are more likely resources to support technology use in to resemble the population as a whole schools and libraries, and social networks (Fox and Livingston, 2007). may not include many who are technol- Both Latinos and African-Americans ogy-savvy. The “spatial mismatch” thesis have a higher probability of reliance on

180 INEQUALITY AND DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP access outside the home in order to use Frequency of use and activities the internet (Fox and Livingston, 2007; online Mossberger et al., 2007). One study of Some studies have shown a link between three communities in Northeast Ohio frequency of use and internet activities and found that about 20 percent of internet skills. Jung et al. (2001) create an internet users in a very poor, nearly all African- “connectedness index,” which includes American community had no access at years of experience, number of places home or at work. Primary access at the where an individual connects to the internet, homes of friends and relatives was most goals for internet use, activities online, and common, followed by public libraries as self-reported dependency on the internet. the most frequent place of use. Poor Length of experience online and frequency African-American neighborhoods stood of home use are the most important out in comparison with other low-income determinants for predicting different types communities because of the effort that of internet users, according to Howard et al. residents showed in going online in the (2001a). They create a four-part typology absence of home access. Social networks in ranging from newcomers to “netizens,” poor communities may be a positive force with newcomers being more absorbed with for resource sharing. The problem, how- games and social activities. As experience ever, is that individuals who lacked home and frequency of use increase, internet or work access used the internet much less users are more likely to engage in politics frequently, often only a few times a month. online or visit a government website, This does not provide a firm foundation among other activities. Similarly, DiMaggio for participation online, and such infrequent and Celeste (2004) find using other survey users are less likely to acquire the skills data that frequent use, experience, and they need to use the medium effectively education contribute to the deepening of (Mossberger et al., 2006). activities online, including a higher likelihood of political engagement. A varied picture of access and ability Technical skills and information literacy For these reasons, it is important to recognize differences in access and capa- In recent years, a number of scholars have city among internet users. Katz and Rice drawn attention to skill requirements for (2002: 75) discovered that about 10 per- internet use (Van Dijk, 2005; Warschauer, cent of internet users lose their computer 2003; Mossberger et al., 2003). The ability or internet connection or stop going to use hardware and software is often the online because of frustration or lack of focus of technical support and computer interest. Internet dropouts are likely to be training, but for some of these technical skills younger, lower-income and less-educated at least, practice may be more important than those who continue to use the internet. than formal education (Van Dijk, 2005: 90). Although Pew regularly reports figures on Internet use demands other skills as occasional internet use, more detailed well, which blend educational competencies studies issued by Pew have also acknowl- with internet-specific knowledge. These edged that there is a wide continuum of include information literacy (Mossberger use ranging from those who are highly et al., 2003; Warschauer, 2003) or the wired, tenuously connected, or truly disability to search for, locate, evaluate, and connected (Lenhart, 2003; Fox, 2005). use information online. Information literacy

181 KAREN MOSSBERGER applied to the online context requires the National surveys from the early 1990s ability to ask good questions, to underestimated that nearly a fifth of the U.S. stand search engines and search strategies, population operated at the lowest level of to think critically about the validity of literacy (able to do little more than to information, and to apply the information locate the appropriate line for a signature to solve problems (American Library or to locate an item in a short passage). At Association, 1989). One study of a hundred least another quarter of the population has randomly recruited participants observed limited comprehension of longer and more their ability to search online for informa- complex text (Kaestle et al., 2001; Kirsch tion on political candidates, tax forms, et al., 2002). Half of the American popu- and jobs, among other topics. Fully 15 lation reads at eighth-grade level or less, percent failed to complete three or more although content on government websites of the tasks, despite being given all the requires an average eleventh-grade read- time they needed to find the information ing-comprehension level (West, 2005: (Hargittai and Shafer, 2006). In national 54). As Warschauer (2003) has argued, surveys, 37 percent of respondents have information technology disparities are said that they need help finding informa- interwoven with other inequalities in tion on the internet. Respondents who society, including educational disparities. reported needing help to use computers or locate information online were the same groups that were least likely to have Policy solutions beyond home access (and therefore, frequent limited access access)—the poor, less-educated, older individuals, African-Americans, and Latinos The predominant frame for public policy (Mossberger et al., 2003). has failed to address these questions of skill as well as the regular use needed for digital citizenship. To date there have been real Reading skills are critical achievements in terms of extending internet Even more fundamental for following or connections and public access computing participating in politics on the internet is to 99 percent of the public libraries in the basic literacy or the ability to read and United States and to 92 percent of the write. The internet is a reading-intensive schools (Gates Foundation, 2005; Kleiner medium similar to print media. This par- and Lewis, 2003). Public access sites may tially accounts for its potential richness offer resources for technical assistance and and depth as a source of political infor- training, and have increased the ranks of mation, but it also makes information use those who have had some experience challenging for those with limited reading online. But, frequent internet use occurs comprehension. Despite the multimedia most often at home, and use in places environment online, Warschauer (2003) other than home or work is often inter- has pointed out that writing dominates mittent (U.S. Department of Commerce/ content on the internet, and that the NTIA, 2002). ability to use technology effectively also requires the management of online com- The potential of municipal munications (including writing skills). broadband Variation in literacy could be expected to affect politics online even more than some The movement toward free or very low- other activities on the internet that require cost municipal broadband in the United less reading and background knowledge. States holds out the possibility of extending

182 INEQUALITY AND DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP regular access to both rural and urban government has announced that local low-income communities, as well as the authorities will provide universal local access opportunity to study the effects of increased to the internet by 2008, that public sector access in these communities as natural service delivery will be transformed through experiments. Bills for monthly internet e-government, and that the internet will be services are often a greater obstacle for connectivity for low-income households used to address social exclusion more gen- than the one-time purchase of a compu- erally. The British government has identi- ter (Schement and Scott, 2000), and so fied persistent disparities, including the lack municipal broadband should help to of necessary skills, as a barrier to eco- expand the percentage of those who have nomic development and realizing the full internet access at home, as well as to benefits of moving government services upgrade connections for many others. online. Plans include the expansion of U.K. Online Centres throughout the Comprehensive approaches to country, low-cost laptop leasing for stu- broadband opportunities dents, and a Digital Challenge prize for The provision of municipal broadband local authorities (eGovernment News, alone, however, may be insufficient to 2005; U.K. Prime Minister’s Strategy promote digital citizenship. Philadelphia, Unit and Department of Trade and Chicago, and other major cities are also Industry, 2005). considering additional initiatives in low- income communities that will provide used computers, training, and support services Tackling educational inequality for computer novices, and these are pre- is complex but necessary cisely the steps that are needed to make the most of increased connectivity (Mayor’s Education is important for participating in Advisory Council, 2007). Currently, non- the information-rich environment of pol- profit organizations such as One Economy itics both offline and online. The con- have taken advantage of high-speed internet tinued significance of race and ethnicity provision in some subsidized housing sites to and the role of place also suggest the ff o er a comprehensive array of technology- entanglement of technology inequalities focused services. They provide training, with segregation, concentrated poverty, support, a website with online content that is created by residents, and other information and unequal opportunities in education in for low-income families, including informa- the United States. While there are some tion on job search, and the earned income who remain offline or sporadically con- tax credit (see www.thebeehive.org). nected because of a lack of interest in the Federal funding has been cut for technology, it is the poor and less edu- Community Technology Centers and cated who have limited choices in this other programs that once provided tech- regard. Inequities in poor schools must be ff nology support and training. The di u- addressed if all are to have a chance to sion of municipal broadband may bring in participate equally in the information age. a new wave of internet users who could use such services, and there is reason to Adult education, literacy programs, and justify a government role in terms of post-secondary programs in community access to e-government services as well as colleges are also part of what will be enabling political participation. The British needed to promote digital citizenship.

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Conclusion other media in their richness and diversity. They are barred from electronic net- More Americans are online and are works that can encourage mobilization, increasingly using information technology discussion, and information exchange in to engage in politics and to interact with ways that are demonstrably significant for government. Yet, there is wide variation in civic engagement, voting, and other par- the ability to participate online, structured ticipation. Low-income individuals have by age, education, income, race, and eth- greater need for public services, and their nicity. Age differences may diminish over isolation from the benefits of e-government time as have those based on gender, but may mean that they are less aware of other digital disparities are embedded in available resources or are less able to take larger patterns of social inequality. advantage of services. Access to politics Without addressing this unequal capacity and government on the internet offers a for digital citizenship, the internet por- compelling rationale for attention to tends greater political inequality, mobiliz- internet use as a policy issue in a demo- ing and engaging some while further cratic society. Research on the con- marginalizing others. This may redouble sequences of online politics and e- the disadvantages of lower income and government also must pay attention to less educated individuals, who are already the effects of unequal capacity to utilize less likely to participate, and who have less this important medium of communication, influence on public policy than other citi- mobilization, and information. zens (Norris, 2001b; Jacobs and Skocpol, 2005). At the same time, however, the engagement of young people online indi- Guide to further reading cates the exciting potential of the internet to reinvigorate politics after decades of Information on digital inequality in the declining participation and trust and con- United States is rapidly changing because fidence in government. of new surveys that are frequently avail- Contributions to this book and pre- able showing increases in the exact per- vious research demonstrate why wide- centages of the population online; still, as spread digital citizenship is crucial for the this chapter has showed, many patterns of democratic process and for equality of disparities have remained over time. Some voice and representation. Information is a older scholarly work is still worth exam- critical resource for participation both ining for the concepts or theoretical online and offline, and as Bimber (2003) arguments presented, although the survey has argued, the growing abundance of data are now dated. Norris’ (2001b) book political information online raises the on the Digital Divide is interesting for its costs of exclusion from the medium. cross-national, comparative approach and Networks facilitate political participation for linking technology disparities to civic (Verba et al., 1995), and the internet participation. Katz and Rice (2002) pre- offers these in new forms, with the possi- sent a good overview of the early diffu- bility of transcending geographic location sion of the internet from the mid 1990s and forming new communities of interest and employ multivariate statistics to exam- (McFarland, 2007). ine these trends. Their discovery of internet Those who cannot effectively use the dropouts is also a contribution to the lit- internet are politically disadvantaged. erature. Using more recent data from a They are cut off from sources of infor- variety of sources and multivariate meth- mation about politics that differ from ods, Mossberger et al. (2003) examine the

184 INEQUALITY AND DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP idea of digital citizenship and evidence of India as well as Los Angeles to argue that its impact on civic engagement, political internet use must be placed in a meaningful participation, and economic opportunity. social context for individuals if they are to The chapter on technology inequalities adopt the technology. Van Dijk’s (2005) includes a detailed analysis of patterns book lacks the original quantitative or within subgroups of the population. This qualitative data of the other studies cited shows variation in factors that inﬂuence here, but his discussion of a deepening technology use among African-Americans divide based on unequal capacities online or Latinos, for example, as well as among is worthwhile. The Pew Internet and low-income, less educated, older, and American Life Project (www.pewinter- younger Americans. Warschauer (2003) net.org) has continually updated survey discusses internet use as social inclusion, research on online activities and attitudes and has an excellent chapter examining toward information technology in the U.S. multiple literacies needed for internet use. Many of the reports do not include mul- He employs qualitative case studies from a tivariate analysis, but they have a gold mine number of places, including Egypt and of relevant reports and trend data.

185 14 Online news creation and consumption Implications for modern democracies

David Tewksbury and Jason Rittenberg

This chapter examines how citizens acquire political information using the internet. For some time, researchers have been looking at the form of news online and how news audiences find (or at least encounter), consume, and retain political content there. The available literature suggests that major news outlets rarely create content exclusively for the online audience. In fact, news online is often similar to what one finds in print newspapers. Internet audiences are increasingly likely to seek news online, but there is little evidence thus far that this has resulted in replacement of print newspapers and television news. Online audiences tend to limit their reading to topics of special interest to them, though not to the extent that some observers expected. There is some evidence that learning from the news is different online than off. The reviewed research on learning from online news suggests that the national news audiences may become fragmented if they rely on the internet for their news consumption. This finding has implications for understanding the distribution of political knowledge and issue agendas within nations today and in the future.

Contemporary versions of democratic recognizes that their selection of public theory tend to hold citizens to a relatively affairs news is a partial function of what is high standard. As the keystone of democ- available and how it is presented. racies, citizens are expected to pay atten- Recent normative and research treat- tion to local, regional, national, and ments of news audiences have focused on international public affairs and to acquire how people respond to expanding con- information they can use to formulate tent options, particularly those options opinion (Berelson, 1952; cf., Schudson, that have multiplied with the introduc- 1998). The strongest version of this tion of high-bandwidth media. If audi- requirement suggests that citizens should ences were to choose content at random, be ever-vigilant; responsibility for acquir- heedless of cues and enticements offered ing information primarily rests with them. by media producers, the large number of A more moderate expectation acknowl- content options online would decrease edges that news is selectively presented by the probability of any one option being media sources and that public affairs selected. Of course, few audience mem- information vies with other information bers choose entirely at random; content for public attention (Lippmann, 1922). producers (e.g., news editors) exercise This contest is most visible in newscasts, substantial influence over what people front pages, and other news venues. A choose to read in print and online reasonable set of expectations of citizens (Graber, 1988; Eveland and Dunwoody,

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1998). Basic processes of media develop- 2000). The wealth of news content ment suggest that online content provi- online available on traditional and inter- ders will develop focused sites containing net-only outlets and the high levels of content of interest to a small segment of the selectivity and interactivity these sites news audience (Merrill and Lowenstein, provide are often thought to free citizens, 1979). This segmentation strategy could at least partially, from the hierarchical result in audience members consuming power of news editors and to increase only a fraction of the range of possible citizen’s involvement with political infor- current affairs information. The internet mation and the public sphere. provides opportunities for users to pre- This chapter provides a review of both select their news preferences such that the recent literature on news on the they are able to avoid entire categories of internet and the concepts researchers use news online. The ultimate version of this to define the potential effects of the process is what Negroponte (1995: 153) medium. Our goal is to identify a set of dubbed “The Daily Me.” Some researchers findings and ideas that researchers, critics, have suggested that specialized news sites and policy-makers can use to think about and delivery options will fracture the certain effects of the internet. The review national news audience into internally begins with some background on how homogeneous groups (Sunstein, 2001). media effects researchers have thought The result will be a polarized nation, with about comparing the effects of exposure divisions in knowledge and opinions to news in different media. We turn from becoming increasingly prevalent. there to the growing literature on the Writing about the segmentation of presentation of news online. Our goal audiences through cable television and here is to identify whether and how news other high-bandwidth media, Katz (1996) on the internet is different from what put a decidedly normative spin on chan- audiences may find in the traditional ges in audience knowledge. He suggested media (for a discussion of the structure that segmentation of the audience in medium comparisons, see Eveland, 2003). modern democracies was part of larger The focus then turns to how people are patterns of increasing social segmentation using the internet for news consumption in these countries. He decried this devel- and whether that consumption has an opment, suggesting that common public effect on what and how people learn spaces where ideas and issues are discussed about public affairs. Finally, we will draw for a general audience can be highly on the literature dealing with online news functional for democratic nations. As a reading to discuss a set of concepts that result of audience fragmentation, common we hope will help readers of this hand- public perceptions and agendas are less book consider and study how online news likely to emerge (Chaffee and Metzger, consumption operates in contemporary 2001). Thus, any development toward society. segmentation (and, therefore, fragmentation) could ultimately weaken modern democracies (Katz, 1996). The content and form of At the same time, some observers have online news suggested that online news media may give audiences more independence in The internet is clearly technologically choosing what news to view and more distinct from the traditional news media power over processes of news production (Eveland, 2003). Even online news sites and presentation (Corrado, 1996; Havick, differ significantly from each other (Deuze,

187 DAVID TEWKSBURY AND JASON RITTENBERG

2003). Our review focuses on the main- research is evaluating whether online stream news sites, which have the most papers are leading traditional media, or traffic of news content providers (Alexa simply beating them to the punch. For Web Service, 2007). Research differentiat- example, a study of South Korean news ing online news from traditional news has agendas found an online paper influen- emphasized three facets: creation, content, cing a wire service (Lim, 2006). and design; we adopt that approach. Agenda building can also occur through opportunities people have for requesting and generating content (Deuze, 1999). In Creation a review of public journalism research, Editors play a crucial role in the produc- Witt (2004) notes that the public appears tion of news for any medium (White, to exert some influence over news con- 1964). Research shows that web editors tent, and Zhou and Moy (2007) demon- mostly reproduce stories from the print strate the ability of online public discussions version of their papers (Singer, 2003), to shape issue frames in the news. with additional content coming from wire Weblogs (blogs) are perhaps the most services or interactive features (Boczkowski, discussed channels for this ground-up 2004b). Comparatively small staffs (Singer, communication (Pavlik, 2001). Some 2006) and the success of reproducing researchers (for example, Shah et al., stories (Houston, 1999) contribute to this 2005) suggest that user discussions should practice. However, surveys of editorial produce comparatively strong mobilizing staffs suggest an ongoing interest among effects, and American Presidential cam- editors in providing additional perspective paigns have used blogs to generate excite- pieces online (Cassidy, 2005), which may ment among supporters (Lawson-Borders encourage users to view the online ver- and Kirk, 2005). Lynch (2005) has repor- sion as a supplement to print. Research ted a similar community forming around suggests web editors make content choices blogs and chat rooms in the Middle East, with such a goal in mind (Garrison, 2005). with the former being particularly used by A study of Colorado newspapers found violent political minorities. editors recognizing a disproportionately Perhaps the image of the audience is local audience by including proportion- different for mainstream and alternative ally more local news than the print ver- sites, which has led to the mainstream’s sion (Singer, 2001). Again, research thus limited acceptance of new formats (for a far has identified few attempts to generate discussion of alternative sources, see original content, even for local stories. Davis, 2005). Some mainstream news sites Theoretically, news sites should publish encourage editorialists and reporters to more stories and run them with more maintain blogs and utilize discussion updates than would be the case in the (Imfeld and Scott, 2005). However, offline media (Dessauer, 2004), and some research by Boczkowski (2002) suggests studies have found evidence that audi- they have a limited impact on the creation ences specifically go online for news of the news. Another reason for hesitancy when big events occur (Salaverria, 2005; is posited by Lowrey and Anderson Tewksbury, 2006). Cohen (2002) suggests (2005), who suggest that the increase in that the haste to publish breaking news public journalism may undermine per- online may warrant a re-thinking of the ceptions of mainstream news and even concept of newsworthiness. Faster pub- change what counts as news. However, lication times appear to give websites an successful community-building around agenda-setting advantage, and ongoing news topics most likely has positive

188 ONLINE NEWS CREATION AND CONSUMPTION implications for society, and the implica- interface development (Manovich, 2001) tions of public journalism and alternative predict visual convergence for all news news formats should be a subject of further media. In fact, a study of news presenta- research. tion by Cooke (2005) found print papers increasingly using thumbnail-sized pic- tures during the 1990s, and both TV and Content online news adopting modular layouts. Predictably, content analyses of online The strongest diverging point for online newspapers have found few differences news is the use of interactivity. This term from print versions (Barnhurst, 2002). has been applied loosely, despite attempts However, even subtle differences in to explicate the concept (Kiousis, 2002). content are worth noting; research by Interactivity is typically divided between Eveland and Dunwoody (2001a) suggests categories such as control over content, learning occurs differently for online customization, and participation (Dessauer, news. Early observers expected internet 2004). Alternatively, Deuze (2003) advocates sources would eagerly provide mobilizing discussing news in terms of connectivity, information (i.e., information that allows encompassing hypertext, multimedia, and or encourages audiences to act on issues interactivity as distinct components. and events in the news), at least as a Hypertext plays a significant role in the means of attracting an audience (Hume, interpretation of political information (see 1996). Instead, studies have found few Sundar et al., 2003). Tremayne (2004) differences between the offerings of print finds that linked stories become both more and online papers (Hoffman, 2006), with episodic as related information is removed the main variation coming in the form of from the stories, but also more contextual additional community information (Singer, as relevant materials are embedded as links 2001). Print and web editors alike report within the text. The result is better valuing mobilizing information online information only if the user follows the (Cassidy, 2005), potentially explaining the links. Research has also identified increased limited variation. A more encouraging presentation of other interactive elements. study suggests that online news fosters Photograph slide shows and user polls more discussion than print news (Shah became more common with coverage of et al., 2005), which indicates increased the 2000 presidential campaign (Singer and public participation with the news. Gonzalez-Valez, 2003), while personalized information such as interactive maps or itemized candidate comparisons were pop- Design ular during coverage in 2004 (Singer, 2006). The availability of space and opportunity Such additional content may make up for for interactivity online suggests that the the lack of original news stories online design of news sites should provide the (Palser, 2004). Massey and Luo (2005) biggest differences between traditional find that sites use as much interactivity as media and online news. The aesthetic their resources allow, but other research design of news sites has received little finds editorial perceptions of the target attention from research. Li (1998) found audience a strong predictor (Boczkowski, major news sites emphasizing text and 2004b). Anticipating audience desires may leaving most of the graphic space to be a rather complex determinant; how- advertisers, creating a product little differ- ever, as research suggests personality types ent from a newspaper. Remediation predict enjoyment of interactive features theory (see Bolter and Gruisin, 1999) and (Chan and Leung, 2005).

189 DAVID TEWKSBURY AND JASON RITTENBERG

Research results are mixed about the web for news requires answering several potential benefits of interactive news for- questions. First, why do people use the mats. Eveland and his coauthors have internet for obtaining political informa- found mixed results for online learning. tion? Second, how do people read the Similarly mixed results have been found news online, including both site and for interactivity, which is capable of content choices? Technological char- increasing return rates but also of decreasing acteristics and individual factors play a role recall (Sundar, 2000). Perloff (2003) does in each level of choice. note that video games, which are highly interactive can increase message effective- Getting news online ness, but this is not necessarily a benefitin the context of the news. A realistic, but The likelihood of using the internet for optimistic, viewpoint suggests two impli- political information gain has increased cations of multimedia and interactive ele- over time. The internet audience was on ments on news sites. First, there is a the rise before 2000 (Norris, 2001a), but significant chance that these elements will the events of September 11, 2001 seem to provide better educated audiences with have been a catalyst for online news use. more information, potentially worsening September 12 was a record day of inter- knowledge gaps (Prior, 2005). Second, net news access, but other events during online news is perhaps akin to soft news the following months drove trafficto as it is not especially informative but may news sites in similar patterns (Rappoport do well in attracting otherwise disinterested and Alleman, 2003). Horrigan and Rainie audiences. More research is certainly (2002) show that internet users turn to required to assess the changing nature and the medium first for most types of infor- subsequent implications of online news mation. Although the news environment features. has changed drastically over the last Online news, at least as it is presented decade, the internet is only part of the in the mainstream sites, is not yet sig- story. Cable news and talk radio have also nificantly different from traditional news. risen, while print and broadcast news use This lack of distinction is particularly dis- have dropped (Norris, 2001a). These pat- appointing in the area of mobilizing terns suggest replacement of traditional information. On the positive side, inter- sources (Dimmick et al., 2004). Other activity has improved over time, and there research indicates that users follow com- are more (potentially) useful features now plementary patterns (Dutta-Bergman, included with stories. The onus lies with 2004), using online papers only to get the reader to make use of the available updates or to use interactive features benefits of online news, because the addi- (Rathman, 2002). tional content is not in a readily scannable Part of the decision to use online news format. It appears that in the near future is the belief that the internet is a credible the important question regarding online source of information. Relatively early news is not “what?” but “how?” studies by Sundar (1999) suggest the complexity of online credibility, based on more considerations than merely evalua- Audience use of online news tions of traditional media. A series of studies by Johnson and Kaye (see 2002) Recognizing the importance of user con- found that online news was viewed as trol as a primary characteristic of the more credible than the traditional media, internet, understanding public use of the although both were rated no better than

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“somewhat” credible. Other studies have The importance of selection suggests looked at credibility ratings of online that uses and gratifications theories of news by particular groups of users. Choi media are appropriate for internet effects et al. (2006) found opponents of the war research (Chaffee, 2001), but the current in Iraq rating online news as more cred- glut of definitions is problematic. ible than traditional media. Johnson and Tewksbury and Althaus (2000) found Kaye (2004) found blog readers rating support for applying traditional news these sites as most credible, with other gratifications: entertainment, surveillance, online news performing no better than and passing time. Kaye and Johnson (2004) the traditional media. The findings high- studied entertainment and information- light the significance of site selection once seeking, as well as guidance-seeking and the user is online. convenience. Information-seeking, but not entertainment, was supported by Flavian and Gurrea (2006). LaRose and Reading the news online Eastin (2004) found status-seeking a As a medium that allows a high level of strong motivator of web use. Until con- user control, the internet requires many sistent results are established, the best more decisions from the user, including lesson from these studies is that people what source to select. Factors that play a select websites at least partially based on role in source selection include browsing personal motivations (Tewksbury, 2005a). skill (Hargattai, 2002), site popularity Specialization is another promising line (Webster and Lin, 2002), structure and of research for understanding of how information (Richard, 2004), in addition people select news, particularly by explor- to personal choice. For example, Best et ing the choice to limit oneself to a few al. (2005) found that about 25 percent of sources and topics. An analysis of naturally all news users access foreign sites, with occurring online news reading patterns those most opposed to the Bush adminis- found that audiences of different news sites tration most likely to look abroad for tend to be relatively distinct from one information. another (Tewksbury, 2005a). A parallel Once on a site, selection can again analysis of reader behavior at popular online determine news exposure (Eveland and news sites suggests the presence of reader Dunwoody, 1998). Part of the determi- clusters who limit their exposure to a nation is the user’s goals for the browsing small number of topics (Tewksbury, 2005b). session (Sanchez-Franco and Roldan, Not all people specialize their reading, 2005). For example, New York Times however. Some clusters sample broadly online traffic patterns suggest an audience from the available news (Tewksbury, with an atypical interest in international 2005b). Thus, the evidence gathered thus affairs (Wu and Bechtel, 2002). Structurally, far suggests some element of site and sites can influence story selection by audience specialization. incorporating recommendation systems, The research on internet use suggests which are most effective when “other the choice to get news online has been a users” choose stories (Sundar and Nass, function of time. The more exposure 2001), and the “others” ratings are linearly people have to the web, the more likely related to selection (Knobloch-Westerwick they are to get news there. There is et al., 2005). In this way, features of con- debate over the nature of cross-media use temporary new sites give users the ability in the public, but complementary uses to bypass or supplement the traditional seem well-supported by research. Once gatekeeping power of editors. online, the user has the freedom to select

191 DAVID TEWKSBURY AND JASON RITTENBERG sites and stories based on personal goals America Online, presumably) when going and design cues, but the nature of these online for other purposes. Tewksbury motivations remains unclear. Ultimately, et al. (2001) report that these people, with it is the impact of these choices that most other news exposure controlled, know a interests media effects scholars. bit more about current affairs in the news than do other internet users. Incidental contact with the political The effects of reading news news at internet hubs cannot compen- online sate for users’ focused attention on content that fits their particular non-political A number of effects of citizen use of information or entertainment pre- online news services have been studied ferences. Looking at diversification of empirically. Much of the research has content on cable television and on the examined what people learn online and internet, Prior (2005: 580) reports that offline and how that learning influences surveyed people with a “relative enter- issue agendas. This research typically exam- tainment preference”—the extent to ines the impact of users’ online behavior which people will choose entertainment and how the relationship between news over news—take advantage of the diver- content and citizens’ normative roles may sity of content on newer media to focus be changing over time. on entertainment and, by extension, avoid news (however, the pattern was not consistent across a number of tests). Prior Survey-based studies of learning observes that because people with poli- effects tical knowledge are less likely to prefer Survey studies have produced mixed entertainment to news, the diversity of assessments of the potential for learning content online may exacerbate existing from online news. Measures of general knowledge gaps. internet use (Johnson et al., 1999) and online news seeking (Scheufele and Nisbet, Experiment-based studies of 2002) have failed to correlate with domes- learning effects tic U.S. political knowledge. However, online news seeking has been shown to Two experiment-based studies examined predict international affairs knowledge the connection between what news people (Kwak et al., 2006). More developed choose online and their knowledge of measures of news content sought online current affairs. Tewksbury and Althaus may improve future research. After all, the (2000) found that online news readers most prominent attribute of the internet select public affairs topics less frequently is that it can be all things to all people. than their print newspaper counterparts. While much research has focused on Looking at current affairs in terms of both intentional learning from news, some national and international news (Althaus studies have suggested that people can and Tewksbury, 2002) and the promi- accidentally receive information from tra- nence of the news (Tewksbury and ditional media (Zukin and Snyder, 1984) Althaus, 2000), the online readers acquired and the internet (Tewksbury et al., 2001). less of the political content in The New The Pew Research Center for the People York Times than did the print readers of and the Press (2004) reports that as many the paper. as half of internet users report coming A replication of this study failed to across news (at hub sites like Yahoo! and observe differences between readers of

192 ONLINE NEWS CREATION AND CONSUMPTION print and online versions of two promi- Eveland and Dunwoody’s work on nent Dutch newspapers (D’Haenens et al., news processing online provides some 2004; see also Eveland et al., 2002). The explanations for studies showing lower striking feature of the outlets examined in recall of online news. Eveland and the Dutch study is that the print versions Dunwoody (2002) suggest that separating of the papers contained more stories than the extent to which people cognitively did the online versions and some cate- elaborate on the news they read online gories of news (international news) were from the amount of selective scanning better represented online than offline. of online content they do (“picking Thus, it does not appear that online ver- and choosing among information” 2002: sions offered the diversity of content 38) should isolate the factors that can that researchers have identified as a key encourage and discourage learning from component of audience distraction from online news. They find that people read- political information online. This result ing news on a website engage in both highlights the difficulties inherent in pre- more elaboration of the news and selec- dicting the effects of internet use when tive scanning of the presented informa- the medium does not have the constraints tion. The former process leads to greater and traditions that define and limit the learning of information and the latter structure of news on television and in tends to suppress it. These tendencies print newspapers. One online news partially counteract each other, leading to source can be very different in its inclu- a net effect of reduced learning online sion and presentation of public affairs (see also, Tremayne and Dunwoody, news from another. As a result, it can be 2001). difficult for one to know, on average, Eveland and colleagues have subse- how the stories will be presented when quently suggested that exposure to online people look at news online. news may have benefits beyond the recall of factual news information. Eveland et al. (2004) suggest that news sites’ use of The psychology of learning hyperlinks in stories may encourage read- online ers to consider the connections between From a theoretical perspective, there is bits of information. The result is that some reason to expect people will learn online readers may develop structures of more from web-based news presentation knowledge more dense than their linear than from traditional print news. Web- (i.e., non-hyperlinked) news reading based news gives users more control over counterparts. Indeed, Eveland et al. (2004) the flow and presentation of news, and find that linear online news readers learn the hyperlinked nature of news online more from a story than readers of may mimic the associative network struc- hyperlinked stories, but the latter exhibit ture of human memory (Eveland and more dense knowledge structures regard- Dunwoody, 2001a). Perhaps surprisingly, ing the news topics. Thus, there are sug- empirical research has not supported these gestions that researchers looking at citizen expectations. Indeed, research in this area acquisition of information from online suggests that the online environment may news sources should be conscious of the not be particularly conducive to acquiring way they conceptualize information. The information. For example, Sundar (2000) density of knowledge structures may carry observed that the addition of audio and very different normative weight in terms video downloads to print stories online of what and how people learn about lowered news recall and recognition. public affairs.

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Agenda building and agenda version of the effect in their experiment setting with New York Times readers. They found that online readers care less about the If mainstream news sites are largely repli- sorts of topics that show up in the public cating their traditional media versions, affairs sections of the paper. then clearly these sites are not uniquely The overall normative tone of this involved in setting the public agenda, at research is mixed. Some studies of the least not in a meaningful way. One area learning effects of news media are decid- of note is the influence of alternative sites, edly pessimistic. Online news readers may particularly blogs, on public and media ff ff learn less about public a airs than do their agendas. Anecdotal evidence o ers several offline counterparts, and a similarly dys- notable examples, particularly blog activ- ’ topian view is advanced in the research ity regarding U.S. Senator Trent Lott s on audience agenda acquisition. However, comments about Strom Thurmond in an expanded view of online learning 2002 (Lawson-Borders and Kirk, 2005). suggests that, to the extent that online Blogs are relatively good at maintaining news readers choose public affairs news, and developing interest in under-served they may acquire more densely structured stories (Pew Research Center, 2005), knowledge than if they had read a print particularly when those stories are partisan, newspaper. At the same time, a number previously discussed, or from non-elite of studies have shown that frequent use of sources (Lowrey, 2006). The practice of the internet (e.g., news reading, e-mail, posting snippets and linking leaves many etc.) is positively associated with online ff stories fragmented but still able to o er and offline political participation (Hardy worthwhile material (Wall, 2005). In fact, andScheufele,2005;TolbertandMcNeal, an analysis of external linking practices 2003). What is more, there is mounting suggest that blogs are well suited to com- evidence that citizen online political plement mainstream media, by both activity (e.g., blogging) may influence building stories and by channeling readers mainstream and online news agendas back to mainstream sites (Reese et al., and so indirectly influence the political 2007). process. Related to the impact of the new This seeming normative paradox is media on the traditional media agenda is illustrative of a basic feature of advanced the question of whether readers of online media, of which the internet is perhaps news may develop issue agendas that the most extreme case. The internet, differ from those of audiences of the broadcast radio, magazines, and cable tel- traditional media. One expectation evision, to varying degrees, allow their researchers have suggested is that readers users to focus their exposure on topics of online news outlets may be exposed to and activities that interest them. For the a smaller variety of issues by virtue of bulk of Americans, the internet offers the their ability to focus their news selection opportunity to choose their own news, as (Schoenbach et al., 2005). Using a survey it were, to the exclusion of political approach, Schoenbach et al. find that information (Tewksbury, 2003). Thus, online newspaper use increases the number these advanced media at the end of their of social topics readers consider important, natural evolution as media forms (Merrill but only for the most educated members and Lowenstein, 1979) give perhaps too of the sample. Thus, an overall agenda much freedom, some researchers seem to shrinking effect was not observed. Althaus assert. At the same time, the politically and Tewksbury (2002) tested a weaker interested can take the reins of the

194 ONLINE NEWS CREATION AND CONSUMPTION abundance of political information online one finds on television or in a newspaper, to build their engagement with politics news online represents a substantially and become more efficacious than may smaller portion of the total content the have been possible some 20 years ago. medium offers. It may be easier than ever before for citizens to omit news reading and not be reminded of that fact (this Online news audiences: assumes low levels of the incidental online united, divided, and news learning online described above). empowered Even when users seek the news, their site choices can be based on selecting sources Our review of the literature suggests that known for specific categories of news. developing an understanding of how Thus, selection at the level of websites online news distribution may influence could result in an overall reduction in individuals and society can be profitably political knowledge in specialized audiences. undertaken by looking separately at how Specialization can also take the form of news is organized online (on its own and audiences selecting specific news topics in contrast to how it is organized offline), when they go online, a phenomenon for how people use the internet, select sites, which researchers have found some evi- and choose individual news stories, and dence (Tewksbury, 2005b). Specialization what they learn from the news they con- of news selection may be conceptualized sume. This multi-part analysis nicely par- on three dimensions. The first is the allels what researchers and other observers consistency of topic selection. For exam- have said about the potential effects of the ple, someone who occasionally selects internet on American society. There is a international news is less specialized than fair number of terms used in the literature someone who selects international news to describe how the internet today and in each time he or she gets news online. The the future may be affecting political second dimension is the depth of expo- knowledge, agendas, and, possibly, opi- sure. This is essentially the quantity of nion. What follows is a review and reading a person does on a selected topic. integration of these normatively based The amount of focused learning that concerns. The resolution and integration comes from specialization should be dif- of the terms should provide researchers ferent for a reader who selects one story with some tools to apply to ongoing on a favored topic than for one who reads research regarding the political effects of all available stories on a topic. This dif- internet news consumption. ference is all the more relevant in the happy chance (from a normative view) that the selected topic concerns public Specialization affairs. The final dimension of specializa- Content selection and specialization figured tion is the exclusivity of exposure. The prominently in this review. Specialization issue here is whether specialized internet is what people do. It is their tendency to users are focused on one, two, or more focus their reading on specific topics. It topics when they choose news stories. It is can take many forms relevant for the easy to think of the one- or two-topic development of segmentation, fragmen- reader as specialized, as most readers do tation, and polarization. Specialization in not specialize on a large number of topics online selection can take the most direct (Krosnick, 1990). One could still consider form of audiences failing to read news a citizen who focuses on a half-dozen content at all. Indeed, relative to what topics or more as specialized, but the

195 DAVID TEWKSBURY AND JASON RITTENBERG meaning of the term begins to collapse. likelihood that any one person knows any Specialization at that point does not carry one piece of information. By definition, the same implications for the distribution fragmentation is assessed relative to some of political knowledge as it does were we past, desired, or optimal level of uni- to imagine that all news readers focused formity of political information holding. exclusively on one topic. Thus, it may be necessary to set some a priori standard for Polarization when specialization by news readers becomes normatively relevant. When fragmentation takes hold, polarization is one potential consequence. The possible segmentation of the news audi- Segmentation ence suggests that political knowledge in If specialization is what users do, segmen- the population will not be reduced or tation is what content producers do—inas- fragmented in a random fashion. Rather, much as these are separate roles online. “to the extent that one subset of the Segmentation is the tendency for sites to audience comes to use [a] class of content tailor their content to specific groups whereas others tend not to use it, the (typically defined by demographic char- mass audience can be said to have polar- acteristics) of interest to advertisers or ized” (Webster and Phalen, 1997: 111). others willing to provide sites with rev- The polarization of the news audience enue (cf., Katz, 1996). Theories of media may come as the result of specialization in history argue that systems progress from a news reading. People may spend quite a stage in which most media outlets serve bit of time online reading news, but they large, heterogeneous audiences to one in may focus entirely on sports, business, or which most outlets serve smaller, intern- some other content (Tewksbury, 2005b). ally homogenous audiences (Merrill and If so, they may rarely seek public affairs Lowenstein, 1979). To the extent that content. As a result, they will not know specific demographic groups are drawn to as much about public affairs as the news separate sites, one can talk about the readers who choose current events con- range of online content being segmented tent. An even more focused type of (of course, a website can segment users polarization may result from people within subdivisions of the site, as well). choosing content from within the public affairs domain. In this case, a yet unstu- died possible tendency for people to spe- Fragmentation cialize their news selection within political Fragmentation is the outcome of people topics means that people may come to specializing their news exposure and/or know quite a bit about one area (for site producers segmenting the audience. example, international affairs or environ- Fragmentation is the lack of widespread mental policy) but little about some other public exposure to some content of interest. domain (for example, education policy or When fragmentation in a group or society health care policy). is advanced, information is distributed The presence of issue publics in America over the population but is not widely is one bit of evidence to suggest that shared by its members. It is what occurs some people come to specialize their when fewer people than before or desired political information exposure (Converse, receive a given piece of information. Thus, 1964; Krosnick, 1990). A recent study fragmentation may be best considered a supports this suggestion. A combined social-level term that refers to the observation of online information seeking

196 ONLINE NEWS CREATION AND CONSUMPTION and survey data collection showed that the centralized gatekeeping role of main- people concerned about a political issue stream news editors. are more likely to seek online information These elements of the internet suggest about the issue than are others (Kim, there is evolving a democratization of the 2007). Similarly, a study of the personali- creation, dissemination, and consumption of zation of internet portal sites found that news and information. This information when given a chance to select their own democratization comes from some of the information pages, the selection of con- forces that may also lead to fragmentation tent and its placement on a page were and polarization, but it suggests a very determined, in part, by predispositions to different normative perspective on internet seek certain kinds of content (Tewksbury news. As people seek and encounter a and Maddex, 2001). In particular, that study greater range and depth of information showed that some people are quite will- online, they are less likely to rely on ing to set up personalized news pages that centralized content producers. In effect, omit such core public affairs content as the marketplace of ideas, as an ideal and international and political news. tool, is found more easily online than off. In that way the availability and structure of news online may be serving democratic Information democratization ideals more effectively than are the features At the same time that the internet proof the traditional media. vides opportunities for fragmentation and The bulk of the data suggests that polarization—normative concerns based, online news readers have the ability to perhaps, on the desirability of the mass specialize their news reading to the point public—it makes possible new avenues of both fragmenting and polarizing the for citizen independence from mainstream news audience. There is less evidence to news media and larger social forces. The suggest that popular news sites are being depth of information that can be found designed to segment the audience, a pat- on online news sites and the variety of tern that appears to limit the likelihood of content in blogs and other interactive polarization occurring. Instead, polariza- sources gives users access to substantially tion seems most likely to come from more information than is available in audiences taking advantage of personali- other media. Once online, any user has zation options on existing news services access to essentially the same range of (e.g., internet hubs such as Yahoo! and content as any other (subscription sites AOL) and from actively focusing their aside). Few would argue that knowledge reading on a select set of news topics. gaps are impossible online. However, in Sunstein (2001) has suggested that this many ways, the information-access advan- pattern of use can result in a polarization tage of economic status common offline is of opinion. Were that to happen, divi- practically erased once someone obtains sions and conflicts over political parties, internet access. In addition, many online figures, and policies may become increas- news sites give users the ability to post ingly common. Accompanying processes of content online and interact with journal- fragmentation and polarization is infor- ists through blogs and other forums, mation democratization, a broadening of encouraging involvement with the news citizen control of, and access to, news and and, ultimately, politics. Finally, there is information. Thus, as people know less some evidence that citizen activity online about what mainstream news editors may affect the agenda of news in the off- think is important, they may know more line and online media, thus weakening about what other citizens think is

197 DAVID TEWKSBURY AND JASON RITTENBERG important. The effect of a marketplace of here. Researchers can conceptualize spe- ideas that is both large and diverse may be cialization as what audiences do in citizens more engaged with current events response to (or as the ultimate origin of, and politics but perhaps not as uniformly to some extent) the structure and content informed. of news online. Segmentation is what websites do. Some news producers may fashion their sites to serve specific news Conclusion audiences rather than follow the mass public model of traditional newspapers Almost all of the topics examined in this and television news. If so, they are essen- review require more investigation. The tially choosing to serve only segments of comments here are focused on areas with the citizenry. If people specialize and/or if substantial normative weight and the news producers segment audiences, the greatest likelihood of future importance. results may be fragmentation and polar- More research is needed on the potential ization. Fragmentation is the distribution effects of online news presentation and of information over smaller segments of selection on media and public issue agen- the public than is normatively desirable. das. The bulk of the findings on news Once that information is fragmented, content suggest few differences between polarization—the separation of informa- online and offline outlets of the same tion and opinion in relatively homogenous, organizations. Future research in this area isolated groups—is a likely outcome. might focus more attention on features of Filling in some of the gaps created by news presentation (for example, page fragmentation is a trend toward informa- placement, daily cycle and the movement tion democratization. By permitting the of news on a site, or headline size) that decentralization of information control might distinguish online news from off- online, relative to the traditional media, line and which might have some effect on and by increasing the opportunities for audience agendas. The research reviewed citizens to access a range of political con- here suggests the presence of some differ- tent, the internet may be enhancing poli- ences in the type of current affairs infor- tical involvement and debate. mation people select online and off Future research might profitably exam- (Schoenbach et al., 2005; cf., Dutta- ine more dimensions of the mobilizing Bergman, 2004), but there is much more potential of online news. The main find- we can do in this area. If future audiences ings reviewed here (Shah et al., 2005; devote more time to reading news online Hoffman, 2006) suggest that there are not than they do today, what the field knows many differences in the amount of mobi- about news availability and organization lizing information provided online and in online suggests that basic agenda setting print. Shah et al. (2005), however, suggest processes are in for some changes. One that interpersonal interaction options area of developing interest is the extent to available online at news and other sites which online discussion (for example, may have a larger impact on citizens chat or blogs) may influence news con- than the presence of similar mobilizing tent and agendas (Hopkins and Matheson, information in print. Future research 2005). Thus, processes of agenda building looking at online news might examine as well as setting are potentially under- how news sites are continuing to integrate going change. blogs and other means for citizens to Future research may profit from the interact among themselves and with news application of the five concepts defined producers. It may be that the combination

198 ONLINE NEWS CREATION AND CONSUMPTION of the presence of mobilizing information online news sites will increasingly be and these interpersonal interactions may willing to engage in audience segmentation. be particularly likely to activate citizen Reviews of the history of media suggest participation in politics. that maturing media and outlets almost Finally, there appears to be a need for inevitably follow a path of increased seg- investigation of whether online news mentation. On the basis of these two reading patterns have implications for the considerations, there is reason to expect a presence or development of opinion substantial amount of fragmentation and— polarization. Sunstein’s (2001) discussion perhaps inevitably—polarization in the of polarization focuses on the segmenta- public. These trends are unlikely to be tion of opinion groups online. The ques- universal, of course, but they may notice- tion for researchers is whether news ably affect the operation of democratic reading online may play a role in such a nations in the future. Fortunately, infor- process. It is certainly possible that spe- mation democratization is also likely to cialized news reading may result from expand in the near future. It is always pre-existing audience polarization. Kim threatened by seemingly inexorable forces (2007) shows that when members of an of centralization and homogenization, but issue public (not identified by partisan- if any medium seems suited to the reduc- ship, to be sure) go online for campaign tion of those threats, it is the internet. In information, they go to sites that focus on sum, information democratization may be their pet issues. If citizens limit their the more important long-term develop- exposure to opinions and information ment facilitated by the internet. supporting their side of the issue, the widespread availability of that information online may foster greater opinion polar- Guide to further reading ization. The field could use more research that examines whether people engage in This review focused, in part, on how the that sort of selective exposure online. particular attributes of online news pre- Research suggests that people are very sentations affect which stories people selective on some occasions for some select. Researchers looking at what people topics (Knobloch et al., 2003). The pivo- learn once they select the news could tal question is whether the online envir- profit from the research on learning from onment encourages and facilitates greater hypermedia text. Eveland and Dunwoody selectivity of this sort. (2001b) provide an excellent review of The evidence reviewed here suggests that literature. Webster and Phalen’s dis- that audiences are willing to engage in cussion of the fragmentation and polariza- some specialization of their news use tion potential of online new consumption online. Most internet news receivers proved a significant resource for this chap- appear to be using the medium to sup- ter. For background on those topics, and plement their exposure to other news for a detailed discussion of conceptions of media, and this may leave them free to the mass audience in twentieth century seek out their focused interests online. media research, see Webster and Phalen However, there is also evidence that many (1997). Opinion polarization has received people use the internet as they use other less attention in the recent research look- media. If that is the case, there is little ing at online news media than have spe- reason to expect that people will be par- cialization and fragmentation. For a good ticularly willing to specialize. At the same discussion of the normative implications time, there is ample reason to suspect that of opinion polarization, see Sunstein

199 DAVID TEWKSBURY AND JASON RITTENBERG

(2001). In order to remain succinct, this discussion of technological characteristics review has focused on studies of online of the internet (and the computer) lim- mainstream news since 2000. For a ited. Please see Bolter and Grusin (1999) review of research on the production, use for a theoretical development of remedia- of, and interactivity in earlier online tion and the strategies of immediacy and newspapers, see Boczkowski (2002). Davis hypermediacy and Dessauer (2004) for a (2005) provides insight on the social and discussion of technology’s implications for political uses of chat rooms and blogs. the development of online news. Finally, readers may have found the

200 15 Web 2.0 and the transformation of news and journalism James Stanyer

The news environment in advanced industrial democracies is undergoing a tremendous series of changes driven by the emergence, spread, and evolution of the internet. The once ubiquitous scenario of a string of national, regional, and local news outlets with largely captive audiences and secure revenue streams is being reshaped. In a period of 15 years, the net has helped to further de- territorialize news markets, reconﬁgure media competition, fragment audiences, transform news reception and content production, and it has forced a reassessment of journalistic roles. At the same time, the big traditional news players have adapted to life online. It is this rapid period of evolution and its consequences for news and the wider democratic public sphere that forms the main focus of this chapter. Concentrating mainly on the United States, it considers: the degree to which the new digital news environment provides a greater diversity of information for citizens; the extent to which it enhances the expression of public opinion; and, ﬁnally, whether it democratizes the news-making process.

In just over a decade the news website has Li, 2006), and all of the main news orga- become a familiar feature of the news nizations had a website displaying news environment. There is no consensus about content by 1995 (Scott, 2005; Sparks, exactly when the first news outlet went 2000). By 2002 the number of news- online. Some suggest it was as early as papers online had grown to 3,400 in the 1990 in the United States, when seven United States and 2,000 outside the United newspapers could be accessed over the States (Gunter, 2003), although some put internet (Gunter, 2003). Others put for- the figure higher. Li (2006), for instance, ward the slightly later date of 1992 (Li, suggests that there are as many as 4,000 2006). Much of the initial expansion, newspapers online in the United States, though, took place after the emergence of not counting other news outlets. the World Wide Web and the dotcom At the same time as the number of boom of the late 1990s, which saw internet news sites expanded so has the established news organizations invest mil- audience for online news (see Deuze, 2003). lions of dollars in their web operations. Table 15.1 shows that the proportion of An indication of the rapid expansion can people who regularly consume news be given through a quick survey of some online grew by 29 percent from 1996 to figures. In 1994, 60 newspapers in the 2006, while those using traditional offline United States had websites. By 1998, outlets declined, though it should be depending on the source, there were noted that for many the internet comple- between 1,600 and 2,000 newspapers with ments offline news consumption and is their own sites (Greer and Mensing, 2006; not a substitute for it (see Ahlers, 2006).

201 JAMES STANYER

Table 15.1 Regular news consumption in the United States by outlet, 1993–2006 (percent who regularly consume)

Medium/Year 1993 1996 2000 2004 2006 Evening network news 60 42 30 34 28 Local television news 77 65 57 59 54 Newspapers 581 50 47 42 40 Cable television news ––332 38 34 Online news – 2232931

Source: Compiled from Pew Research Center data, cited in Stanyer, 2007. Notes: 1 = 1994 Figure; 2 = 2002 Figure.

Such developments are not limited to web. User-generated content sites such as the United States. In the United Kingdom, Facebook, YouTube, and MySpace have for instance, during the first part of 2002, become one of the most visible character- an average of 10.6 million people per istics of Web 2.0 (Project for Excellence in month were accessing news websites, up by Journalism, 2007). 3.5 million on November 2000 (Hargreaves and Thomas, 2002). In 2005, other research showed that 61 percent of British net News and Web 2.0 users relied on it for news (Dutton et al., 2005). It is important to explore what these Over this time period the internet has developments mean for the news. The also evolved. Currently, news outlets are most visible impact of Web 2.0 has been adapting to what has been called Web in the appearance of online news. News 2.0. There is no agreed definition of this websites are no longer solely text and term, first popularized by O’Reilly Media. photograph based and video streaming has However, in the context of this chapter, become a widespread feature. For exam- it is taken as short-hand for a variety of ple, a survey of over 80 newspaper web- changes relating to the look of content, sites in the United States in 1997 found speed of access, mobility, and content that only 7 percent of websites had video reception and production. Web content has content and 16 percent had audio con- evolved from largely text and graphics to tent, but by 2003 44 percent of sites had include video and audio streaming. This is both (Greer and Mensing, 2006). By 2005, a result of a boost in network capacity due online video had become a common fea- to the emergence and spread of broad- ture on U.S. news websites (Project for band, meaning larger amounts of data can Excellence in Journalism, 2006). Visitors now be transferred at ever faster speeds. to most of the leading news sites can view Further, wireless technology (wi-fi) has a whole bulletin or particular extracts. For resulted in an increase in mobility. While instance, those browsing the main net- Web 1.0 was mainly computer based and works’ websites can watch breaking news static, the public can now browse the web and segments from the evening news through mobile devices. Finally, not only bulletins. In 2007, 37 percent of internet can content be viewed on a variety of users said they watched news videos online platforms, internet users can now more (Madden, 2007). easily upload and disseminate text, audio, The way news is accessed is also chan- video, and digital photographs over the ging. News can be downloaded as a

202 WEB 2.0 AND JOURNALISM podcast from news websites and watched While most of the major news sites now at the user’s convenience. A survey in the have well established interactive facilities United States found that 12 percent of such as message boards and e-mail the ability internet users had downloaded podcasts of audiences to contribute to news content from various news websites in 2006, com- has generally been more limited. However, pared with 7 percent in 2005 (Project for Web 2.0 is transforming this situation. Excellence in Journalism, 2007). Although User-generated content has become a the numbers regularly downloading news common feature of mainstream news out- output are small, these surge during impor- lets. Audiences are encouraged, and some- tant news events. In the United States, in times paid, to submit video footage and the wake of Hurricane Katrina, in 2005, other material to news sites. Inspired by the there were more than 10 million video success of user-generated news sites, like clip downloads from the MSNBC web- ohmynewsinternational, wikinews, and digg, site and 9 million from CNN (Project for some news outlets allow readers to write Excellence in Journalism, 2006). Wireless their own stories, particularly on local issues technology is transforming news viewing, (Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2007). news bulletins can be sent to personal The professional staff reporter has been digital assistants or cell phones. In 2007, a joined by the freelancers, compilers, ama- survey found that 30 million internet users teur enthusiasts, and members of the public: in the United States accessed the web the so-called “witness reporters” or “citizen from a mobile device (ComScore, 2007), journalists.” Increasingly, as Dahlgren and with phone users regularly upgrading their Gurevitch (2005) observe, a large amount cell phones these figures are certain to rise. of the information in the online news These changes mean that the time-linear environment does not originate from appointment-to-view news bulletin is professional journalists but from amateurs. being replaced by a more bespoke service In sum, online news has evolved from where the audience has the ultimate say “shovelware” into increasingly sophisti- about when and how information is con- cated interactive output. In the world of sumed. Audience members can assemble Web 2.0, news can be accessed by a their own mix of stories to suit their variety of portable devices. Through these interest. This has empowered audiences different platforms audiences can not only to filter what they see/read to an unpre- view the stories they want at their con- cedented extent, facilitating the emer- venience but also post content, even gence of what Nicholas Negroponte has break news. These changes in news con- termed the Daily Me: “a communications sumption and production, however, need package that is personally designed with to be seen as part of a wider series of each component fully chosen in advance” developments in the news industry, as the (Sunstein, 2001: 7). While new providers, next section will elucidate. like online news aggregators, might have pioneered personal newscasts, it is not just these new players that provide such facil- The reconfiguring of news ities. A survey of over 80 newspaper markets websites in the United States found that the number of sites that allow audiences The geographical isolation, technological to customize their news consumption rose difference, and national regulation that for from 10 percent in 1997 to 24 percent in decades characterized the offline news 2003 (Greer and Mensing, 2006)—a environment are fast disappearing and this figure that is likely to have grown further. is altering radically the nature of competition

203 JAMES STANYER between news organizations. This section traditionally a key entry barrier to the explores the changing competitive dynam- news and information market—the number ics of the online news environment. of small news providers has increased (Anderson, 2006; Sparks, 2000). After what some observe as a “shake-out” of Converging media sectors news providers in 2000—when new start- Increasingly the old distinctions between up news ventures went bust—there has media sectors no longer hold. Newspapers been a growth of niche outlets that offer and news broadcasters now compete for specialist news and information (see Scott, the same audiences online (Sparks, 2000). 2005). Some of these are low-budget For example, the television news net- independent news organizations run by works ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC and amateurs, while others are commercial their affiliates vie not only with each operations managed by professionals. other and cable providers, such as CNN, In local news markets, there has been a but also with a variety of regional and local growth of so-called hyperlocal citizen newspapers. Those news providers with media outlets, which make use of neigh- monopoly positions offline, like the city borhood user-generated content. One newspapers, have found themselves with survey put their number at between 700 new competitors online (Sparks, 2000). and 800—60 percent having started in While the regional newspapers’ monopoly 2005 (Project for Excellence in Journalism, is under threat, the news broadcasters 2007). Local websites or place blogs such have lost their competitive advantage in as Backfence, H20town, wadeonbirmingham. breaking news. During the aftermath of com, and Village Soup provide what has the Oklahoma City bombings in 1996, been described as a fusion of “news and the importance of the net for breaking schmooze” (Project for Excellence in news became apparent. Local newspaper Journalism, 2007). In some cases it is not websites were able to relay the latest devel- specific locales that internet-only news opments (Allan, 2006). Online, newspapers providers service, but linguistic minorities. now break news live on a regular basis, California, Florida, and New Mexico and newspapers and broadcasters compete have seen a flourishing of Spanish-language to be the first destination for audiences news websites that provide for a growing seeking news. These changes are not con- Hispanic immigrant audience. There are fined to the United States. In the United some 18 Spanish-language newspapers Kingdom, the television news networks online in Florida alone. BBC and ITN compete with the national There has been a growth of sites that press. British newspapers have invested in cater for specific audience interests on video streaming technology. For example, business, sport, politics, and many lifestyle the Guardian now runs its own daily trends. For example, a recent survey of video news bulletin as well as producing a the top 100 blogs in the United States weekly show. The Guardian was also the found that 34 percent were devoted to first newspaper in Britain to run a “web technology, 26 percent to culture, 25 first” policy, and now breaks foreign and percent to politics, and 3 percent to other business news on its site. issues (Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2007). There has also been an expansion of outlets serving audiences who want New niche news providers their news and information with a liberal As technology has reduced the cost of or conservative flavor. There are news publicizing and distributing information— magazines such as Salon, Slate, and CNet

204 WEB 2.0 AND JOURNALISM to name a few, many bank-rolled by wide variety of news content produced venture capital or owned by other media elsewhere. The most high-profile names (Scott, 2005). In addition, there are one- include Google, AOL, and Yahoo! (Project person operations. Individual blogs such as for Excellence in Journalism, 2006). the Daily Kos, MyDD, Wonkette, Andrew While most allow visitors to access the sullivan.com, Littlegreenfootballs, Instapundit, latest breaking news from a range of edi- and Powerline offer comment and infor- torially selected sources, Google News, mation for liberal and conservative audi- launched in 2001, provides its audience ences, including journalists and politicians. with access to the most popular news For example, the left-leaning Daily Kos, stories as determined by algorithmic soft- started in 2002, has steadily built an ware and not a team of editors. The site audience. According to Compete.com, searches over 10,000 news sources from between May 2006 and May 2007 it around the world before compiling attracted a monthly average of around information for its users (Allan, 2006). 300,000 unique visitors (see also Project In sum, the news markets of the pre- for Excellence in Journalism, 2007). internet era are being reconfigured. The Another particularly well documented old geographical and technological divides group of internet-only providers, on the are disappearing and the once dominant left of the political spectrum, are the so- position of the main national news provi- called “independent” news organizations ders is coming to an end. The emergence (Deuze, 2003). Outlets such as the Guerilla of news aggregators, niche providers, and News Network, the Alternative Press Center, non-U.S. outlets means competition to and Indymedia are among the most well be the first news destination is intensifying known of the alternative web-based opera- and internationalizing. tions, which seek to cover issues neglected by mainstream news (see Deuze, 2003; Scott, 2005). For example, Indymedia or the Market leaders Independent Media Center was formed in 1999, to provide an alternative perspective While the numbers of news and infor- on the anti-World Trade Organization mation providers online has increased (WTO) protests in Seattle. It is a network dramatically, precisely how citizens use of around 150 media centers in roughly these sources is far from clear. While it is 45 countries (Allan, 2006). Its coverage of difficult to gain a definitive picture of the WTO protests in Seattle, in 1999, the habits of American news audiences, attracted some 1.5 million unique hits Nielsen data provide some insight into (Allan, 2006). their behavior. Table 15.2 shows the most popular news websites in the United States, as judged by average monthly Online news aggregators visitor numbers. Another type of internet-only outlet is It reveals that eight out of the top ten the news aggregator. These sites do not most popular news websites, between produce their own unique content but 2004 and 2006, belonged to, or were instead allow audiences to access material associated with, traditional news organi- from news agencies and other news out- zations. The table also shows that news lets. Non-news producing internet service aggregators, Yahoo!, AOL, and Google, providers and search engines have taken have become popular sources for the advantage of their first destination status public to glean news, Yahoo! being the to provide their visitors with access to most widely used over the three-year

205 JAMES STANYER

Table 15.2 The ten most popular news websites in the United States, 2004–6

News website Monthly average visitors in millions 2004 2005 2006 Yahoo! News 21.4 24.1 28.4 MSNBC 20.9 23.4 25.6 CNN 23.1 22.0 24.3 AOL News 14.6 16.2 16.8 Gannett1 11.3 11.8 12.9 IBS 10.2 11.4 12.2 New York Times.com 9.3 11.0 12.4 Knight Ridder 9.9 9.9 – Tribune 8.8 9.9 11.3 USAToday.com 8.2 9.4 10.0 Google News –– 9.4

Source: Compiled from Nielsen/NetRatings cited in Project for Excellence in Journalism (2006, 2007). Notes: 1 = the figures for Gannet, IBS, Knight Ridder, and Tribune represent aggregates for all their titles; – represents a position outside the top ten. period. Google News just registered out- the latest news quickly, in between surf- side the top ten in 2005, with a unique ing the web for other reasons (see Ahlers, monthly audience of 7.8 million, making 2006). In a recent survey by the Pew tenth place in 2006. The popularity of Center, 71 percent cited convenience as aggregators is not just confined to the the main reason for getting news and United States. In the United Kingdom— information online during 2006 (Rainie based on a share of total visits to news and Horrigan, 2007). The big brand sites in 2005—Google News ranked the aggregators’ popularity is in no small way sixth most popular site and Yahoo! the due to the fact that they allow audiences ninth (Hopkins, 2006).The small inde- to access a wide range of news stories pendent news websites, mentioned in the easily and reduce the cost to the con- previous section, not only did not feature sumer in terms of time spent browsing. in the top ten, but neither did they The second reason has to do with brand appear in the top twenty most popular strength (see Sparks, 2000). With a vast sites for news according to Nielsen/ amount of information online, audiences NetRatings (Project for Excellence in often turn first to the sites they know— Journalism, 2006, 2007). The majority of namely the big online and offline news those online in the United States, and brand names. other democracies, routinely seem to A third reason has to do with the cred- access the websites of the main news ibility of information. Audiences may not organizations and news aggregators, a only turn to brands they recognize but point confirmed by other research (see also to ones they trust (Gunter, 2003). For Freedman, 2006; Sparks, 2000). But why example, in the United States, 56 percent might this be the case? of those surveyed in 2006 considered the The first reason relates to audience information provided by newspapers and desires for convenience. The most popu- television news organizations to be lar sites seem to be those that allow their “believable” most of the time, compared visitors to check the headlines or catch with only 12 percent that considered blogs

206 WEB 2.0 AND JOURNALISM believable most of the time (Project for 2005, according to Nielsen/NetRatings, a Excellence in Journalism, 2006). monthly average of 5.6 million American internet users visited the BBC News website, compared with 5.5 million for Using alternative sources Fox News, 3.8 million for USA Today, 3.3 However, while the smaller independent million for the LA Times, and 2.5 million news websites do not feature in the top for the Wall Street Journal. There were twenty, this is not to say they were not particular surges around the London ter- visited or accessed indirectly via an rorist bombings in July of that year aggregator. For example, the news blog, (Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2006; the Huffingtonpost.com, is regularly in Thurman, 2007). It is said that the British the top ten most visited blogs, between newspaper the Guardian has more online May 2006 and May 2007, according to readers in New York than Birmingham, Compete.com, it attracted a monthly England (The Guardian, 2006), a point average of around half-a-million unique supported in part by a recent study which visitors. These sites also seem to be parti- found that the Guardian’s website had an cularly attractive at particular times or average monthly audience of 3 million during specific events. A recent survey by U.S. visitors (Thurman, 2007; see also the Pew Center found that 53 percent of ComScore, 2007a). The London Times internet users went to web sources other attracted an average monthly audience of than those fed by the traditional news 1.6 million, more than the Star Tribune, media to get information about the 2006 the Miami Herald, and the Seattle Post U.S. mid-term election campaign (Rainie Intelligencer (Thurman, 2007). The New and Horrigan, 2007). For example, 19 York Times and Washington Post also have percent, in the same Pew survey, said a growing number of readers from outside they got campaign news and information the United States, estimated at between specifically from satire sites such as The 20 and 30 percent (Project for Excellence Onion and the Daily Show (Rainie and in Journalism, 2006; Thurman, 2007). Horrigan, 2007). There is little research to date on why The main U.S. news providers are also British news sites prove popular with U.S. not necessarily the first destination for audiences, though in addition to brand American internet users, especially in the strength and credibility, it seems obvious area of international news. For example, to suggest that it might be related to cul- U.S. audiences seeking latest develop- tural or linguistic affinities. Such links can ments on a story in Europe are not reliant also be seen in other examples. Arabic on their traditional U.S. channels. They news channel Al-Jazeera claimed to have may be taken indirectly to a British news gained an audience of four million among site by a news aggregator such as Yahoo! Europe’s Arabic speaking population or Google News. Research has shown during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 that U.S. internet users are regularly (Stanyer, 2004). The organization recently referred to U.K. sites via aggregators launched an online English language news (Thurman, 2007). American internet users service online aimed at the Muslim can also go directly to non-U.S. news diaspora in Europe and North America. outlets. Some high-profile British outlets Similarly, Hispanic audiences in the have established a large American follow- United States are not reliant on English- ing. The BBC News website, for exam- language news sources but may access the ple, attracts more monthly visitors than a Spanish-language websites of central and host of U.S. outlets (Thurman, 2007). In Latin American news organizations.

207 JAMES STANYER

In summary, therefore, while there is fourth most popular sites, CNN.com and now greater choice, the majority of net AOL News, while the second most fre- users regularly consume news packaged quently visited site is a joint venture by the traditional outlets directly or via news between computer giant Microsoft and aggregators, with smaller numbers visiting NBC (Project for Excellence in Journalism, the sites of niche providers. Interestingly, 2006). While this picture reveals the a significant number of American web dominance of media conglomerates such users choose to visit non-U.S. websites as Time Warner, it also suggests that for news on a regular basis. change may be occurring. If one looks at the largest media corporations (1–10), then the table shows their ownership of Website ownership and the most popular news websites has fallen diversity in online news by 17 percent between 2003 and 2006. Similarly, the popular sites owned by the The previous sections have revealed that top 100 media corporations have also although there are more news providers fallen by 11 percent over the same period. the most popular sites tend to belong to Whether these trends will continue in the the traditional news organizations and long term remains to be seen. news aggregators. Research also shows Some have observed that there is little that many of these outlets also belong to diversity in the sources of news used by large media chains, in some cases transna- corporate-owned sites (see Paterson, tional conglomerates (see McChesney, 2006). Take the example of international 2004; Sparks, 2000). There has been a news. While there is a wide variety of spate of high-profile acquisitions and alternatives most of the American public mergers between online and offline busi- gain their international news through the nesses, perhaps the most visible being the most popular big-brand news sites (as multi-billion dollar merger between AOL shown in Table 15.2) and these sites and Time Warner in 2000. Offline media rely on a few key information sources. companies have also been quick to pur- Paterson (2006) argues that when it chase high-profile internet-only news sites. comes to international news the diversity Table 15.3 shows that the most popular of views is largely illusory, as most of the news websites are owned by the largest news on leading sites comes from just two U.S. media corporations. Time Warner is agencies—Associated Press and Reuters. the parent company of the third and His study measured the “average verbatim

Table 15.3 Ownership of the top 25 most popular news websites in the United States, by size of media corporation 2003–6 (percent)

Media corporations1 / Year 20032 2005 2006 Media corporations ranked 1–10 42 25 21 Media corporations ranked 11–20 27 35 26 Media corporations ranked 21–100 15 20 26 Media corporations not on the list 15 20 26

Source: Nielsen/NetRatings cited in Project for Excellence in Journalism (2004, 2006, 2007). Notes: 1 = as determined by domestic media revenues; 2 = 2003 ﬁgures show ownership of the top 20 news websites.

208 WEB 2.0 AND JOURNALISM news agency use” in a small sample of classifieds. Many also provide free bespoke international news stories in 12 of the services, such as e-mail alerts and breaking leading news websites in the United news alerts, services that outlets hope States and the United Kingdom. The consumers will be prepared to pay for in results reveal that of the stories examined the future (Scott, 2005). on the most popular sites many were At the same time, with the lack of simple copies of the news agency mate- agreed standard measures for audience rial. For example, in 2006, 97 percent of numbers, and therefore no way of knowing the content of Yahoo’s international news whether adverts have been seen and by was lifted from news agencies, 94 percent whom, news sites have often struggled to of AOL’s international news, 91 percent generate significant advertising revenues. of ABC’s news, 81 percent of MSNBC’s Early metrics such as page views and hit news, and 59 percent of CNN’s news. rates proved unreliable measures of who Paterson suggests that despite the growth had seen adverts and advertisers have been in the volume of information on news generally skeptical about the returns of websites, when it comes to international large ad spends. Not surprisingly, news news, the transnational news agencies, as sites still command a small share of the before, remain the dominant voice. total ad spend in the United States (4 However, he does note that the New York percent in 2005, and projected to be 9 Times, and the BBC, both popular outlets percent of total advertising dollars in 2008) too, exhibited the least reliance on news (Ahlers, 2006). This figure is higher though agency copy, with their average verbatim in the United Kingdom, where the internet news agency use being 32 percent and 9 accounted for 11.4 percent of the national percent respectively (Paterson, 2006). ad spend in 2006, topping for the first time the proportion spent on newspaper ads (Allen, 2007). The switch away from Financial uncertainty and paid subscription access at the New York cross-subsidy Times in the autumn of 2007 indicates that that online advertising revenues are The online news environment is finan- beginning to take off in the United States. cially precarious and news websites have With audiences less captive, advertisers so far been largely unprofitable (Freedman, are increasingly interested not just in hit 2006). Audiences have been unwilling to rates but also in the type of audience that pay for news online and so few outlets visit a news site. There is pressure on news have been able to charge as a traditional outlets to gain more information about newspaper or cable station would. Indeed, customer habits and tastes (MacGregor, in the United States in 2006, of 1456 2007). Software increasingly allows news newspapers online, only 1 national, and providers to track the audience’s online 40 small regionals, charged their readers behavior, including interactions with ads, (Project for Excellence in Journalism, or how many times ads are viewed and for 2006). Many of the news providers have how long—information that can be fed adopted a strategy of “modulated experi- back to the advertisers themselves (Project mentation,” separating off certain content for Excellence in Journalism, 2006). and charging for it (Scott, 2005). For The reality of online journalism is that example, breaking news is provided free, the main news providers have cross- but visitors are sometimes asked to pay for subsidized their online operations. While additional services, such as access to the financial subsidies have been a major archives, and specialist material, like drain on resources they have allowed the

209 JAMES STANYER development of web presence. The tradi- Audience input and its tional news providers have invested limitations heavily in the latest technology to enable them to supply news direct to variety of A key criticism of offline newspapers and platforms (see Scott, 2005). Corporations news bulletins is that audience input has like CBS in the United States, and the been too tightly restricted (Richardson and BBC in the United Kingdom, have sunk Franklin, 2004). The emergence of news millions of dollars in their online news websites and the development of Web operations (Project for Excellence in 2.0, it is argued, has changed this situation Journalism, 2006). Smaller less wealthy (Twist, 2006). The space for audience news providers are unable to match these debate is no longer limited and the voice levels of investment, with the result that of the audience is less reliant on the editor they often cannot offer the quality of and journalist for exposure. However, output or the services of their larger rivals. while there clearly are greater opportu- The big players also have the funds to nities for audiences to communicate their purchase exclusive rights to user-generated views and contribute to the news, some content. For example, user-generated foot- argue that the reality is somewhat differ- age of the 2004 East Asian tsunami, the ent from the hype (see Deuze, 2003; aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the London Singer, 2005). News outlets still exercise bombings in 2005, and the campus control of messages posted on their sites shootings at Virginia Tech in 2007, was and remove comments deemed inappropri- purchased by news outlets in the United ate from message boards and blogs. A study States and around the world. Bidding of the extent to which online audiences wars are not uncommon, with the main engaged with news websites found that outlets competing for the rights to video only 15 percent used chat rooms and 13 footage with specialist rights resellers such percent e-mailed journalists (Lowery and as Scoopt, Splash, Cash4yourpics, and Anderson, 2005; see also van der Wurff, news wholesaler Reuters. In the United 2005). Similarly, a survey by Nielsen/ Kingdom, in 2006, there was fierce com- NetRatings found that only a minority of petition between news organizations for visitors to leading newspaper websites in the amateur footage of a police raid on ter- United States looked at journalists’ blogs. In rorist suspects in north London, with ITN December 2006, of a unique audience of and the Daily Express allegedly paying 30 million, 13 percent visited the blog $120,000 for the film. pages of an online newspaper (Nielsen/ The picture emerging is of a gap NetRatings, 2007). between the online operations of tradi- It is not just the public that shy away tional news organizations and those of from interaction, Lowery and Anderson internet-only news providers. The tradi- (2005) found that only a minority of tional news operators are part of a chain, journalists pursued contact through news able to cross-subsidize their online opera- blogs. Another survey discovered that most tions, pay for and provide exclusive access journalists in the United States saw to content that attracts large numbers of responding to e-mail as part of their job visitors, while the smaller news sites of but just over half did so—and did so only internet-only niche providers often have occasionally (Pavlik, 2004). Indeed, in a less capital to invest and less to spend. The study of interactivity Chung (2007: 48) financial clout of the leading players often found that although most site producers reproduces the existing asymmetry of the recognized the “importance of incorpor- offline news environment. ating … interactivity” they were cautious

210 WEB 2.0 AND JOURNALISM about it, especially those inside the estab- through a centralized multimedia assignment lished news organizations. These respon- desk (Scott, 2005). In the United Kingdom, dents often pointed to the increase in the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Telegraph workload in maintaining interactive fea- merged their online and offline news tures (Chung, 2007). operations. In addition, content-sharing Others have observed that the more partnerships between different companies radical potential of the technology, for and between the websites of different example, in allowing for open-source outlets have emerged (Scott, 2005). journalism, has remained just that— This process of convergence has had a potential. While there is greater feedback, number of consequences. Deadline pres- some argue that most news organizations sures have increased. Journalists who had encourage little more than comment—the deadlines once or twice a day offline now attitude is still very much “we write, you find they have rolling deadlines through- read” (Deuze, 2003). Lowery and Anderson out the day: 78 percent of journalists (2005) found there was a limited support working in U.S. online news outlets in among journalists for participatory news. 2003 reported that their deadline pres- The traditional news outlets largely encou- sures had grown (Pew Research Center, rage audience input, not out of a sense of 2003). There is more pressure to refresh civic obligation, but as another way to and repackage material during the day. gather information that they can then The same survey of journalists found that repackage. Many outlets have introduced a great deal of time was devoted to audience-editors, to read and respond to repackaging news stories; in fact, 71 per- reader e-mails and to follow up story leads cent of those sampled said they were (Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2006). doing more repackaging of news com- For example, in the United Kingdom, the pared to 48 percent of those working national daily newspaper, the Sun, recently offline (Pew Research Center, 2003). The launched its message board MySun. The need to repackage may well increase as reason, the assistant editor of the Sun the volume of user-generated content rises. online noted, was to gain information The precarious position of the news and tips on the issues that concerned professional has been exacerbated by cost their audience most, to boost circulation cutting across the industry. As Alhers (Gibson, 2006). (2006) observes, with news sites attracting relatively small revenues when compared with offline news media, reducing costs The impact on the profession has become key for news organizations. Indeed, 62 percent of online journalists in While some observe that the internet the Pew survey of 2003 reported that the brings new opportunities for the profes- number of people working in their online sional journalist (see Pavlik, 2004), others news operation had decreased over time argue that it has an adverse impact (Lowery (Pew Research Center, 2003). This points and Anderson, 2005). One negative effect to a future in which journalism may is news room convergence (see Scott, 2005). become increasingly casualized. Over the last five years or so many of the traditional news players have begun to merge their online and offline news Conclusion operations. An early example is the tie-up between the Tampa Tribune, WFLA-TV, The developments outlined in this chap- and Tampa Bay Online, who process news ter provide new opportunities and pose

211 JAMES STANYER new challenges for mature democracies shown that the diversity of views on these such as the United States. The emergence branded sites may be largely illusory with of the internet has meant that there are most of the news coming from Associated now more news outlets available for citi- Press and Reuters (Paterson, 2006). These zens to choose from than ever before. profit-hungry corporations are also inter- While most American internet users still ested in charging citizens for additional visit the websites of the main news out- news services at the same time as enga- lets, a substantial proportion regularly visit ging in cost cutting that may well under- non-U.S. news sites or niche sites such as mine the quality of output on which news blogs, and news aggregators often citizens depend. And citizens’ online take them to such sites (Thurman, 2007). behavior is increasingly subject to surveil- The growth of such outlets has been lance by news corporations interested in beneficial for minorities of various kinds building up information on their tastes who have felt that the main offline U.S. and habits (MacGregor, 2007). news providers cater for majority tastes or New opportunities to interact and use the majority language and fail to produce content may also be exaggerated. accommodate them. For example, dia- Some interactive developments have been sporas are able to access news outlets with given a lukewarm response by the public which they have a cultural or linguistic and journalists (Lowery and Anderson, affinity (see Chapter 20). A similar point 2005). News editors have continued to could be made for those with particular exercise control over much of what is ideological views. The radical media have contributed. In addition, the issue of always been part of society (Downing, unequal access to the internet has 2001), but they have never been more remained. Internet users tend to be weal- accessible as they are today via the net. thier, educated, and young, and this is This chapter has also shown that inter- also true in relation to the adoption of net news sites provide more opportunities new communication technologies such as for citizens to exercise their voice and cell phones (Chadwick, 2006; ComScore, contribute to the news. Citizens are able 2007). These groups are more likely to to supply material and shape news con- post content. According to a recent Pew tent with greater ease than before. Open- survey of bloggers in the United States, source news, for example, means readers 54 percent were under the age of 30, 37 can direct content, or post their own percent had a college degree, and 38 stories. Citizens are no longer confined to percent were knowledge-based profes- being spectators, monitoring news from sional workers (Lenhart and Fox, 2006). the sidelines, but are able to contribute to These groups are also more likely to use its focus and production, and become the internet to access news and informa- citizen journalists. tion. For example, another Pew survey But despite the potential for new conducted during the 2006 mid-term developments to enable a more informed elections, found that 44 percent of those and active citizenry, it is important to whowentonlinetogaincampaigninfor- remain critically aware of the challenges mation earned over $75,000, 49 percent still faced. There may be more choice but had a college degree, and 71 percent were large media chains still exercise power in under the age of 49 (Rainie and Horrigan, the online news environment. They still 2007). own the bulk of the established brand The current transformation of the news outlets on which a large proportion of environment provides new opportunities internet users tend to rely. Research has and new challenges for democratic

212 WEB 2.0 AND JOURNALISM communication. In the long term, whe- on the online news environment is pro- ther these changes enable a more informed vided by Project for Excellence in and active citizenry or facilitate increas- Journalism’s annual state of the news ingly interest-driven news consumption media survey, produced by the Columbia remains to be seen, but what is certain is School of Journalism (see www.stateofthe that news will never be the same again. newsmedia.com). These annual reports, together with occasional reports produced by the Pew Internet and American Life Guide to further reading Project (see www.pewinternet.org), are an excellent resource for those looking There is a rapidly growing body of lit- for more empirical detail about the latest erature on the online news environment. developments. Broad overviews can be found in books In addition to the general overviews, by Allan (2006) and Gunter (2003), in there are studies with a more specific edited collections by Li (2006), and in focus. Bruns (2005) and Pavlik (2004) shorter length journal articles by Scott provide a detailed account of how jour- (2005) and Deuze (2003). All of these nalistic roles are being redefined by the works are easily accessible to the non- net. These studies are complemented by specialist reader. More critical accounts detailed research conducted by Lowery can be found in Freedman (2006) or and Anderson (2005) and Singer (2005); McChesney (2004). These interventions together these show that journalists often show that there is little consensus on the resist change brought about by the internet. impact of the internet, and serve as a There are also numerous studies of how reminder of the power of large multi- the internet is shaping news consumption national corporations and media chains to patterns. These range from descriptive influence the online news environment. data in the Pew Internet surveys to the With books dating quickly, a useful, more detailed studies of consumption by regularly updated source of information Ahlers (2006) and Thurman (2007).

213

Part 3

Identities

16 The internet and the changing global media environment Brian McNair

This chapter describes current trends in the global media environment, with a focus on their implications for the management of public agendas and political processes. It assesses the extent to which trends such as the growth of the blogosphere, “citizen journalism,” and other forms of user-generated content, have complicated and problematized news and agenda management as engaged in by both media and political elites. It argues that, in large part due to the rise of the internet and the proliferation of online producers of information and commentary, alongside 24-hour news channels such as CNN and Al Jazeera, political and social actors today face a much more complex, chaotic communication environment than ever before, an environment characterized as one of cultural chaos. Having outlined the roots of this trend in the emergence of an expanded, globalized public sphere, the chapter goes on to ask if elite control over the political agenda has been eroded, and if it has, what the consequences for government and the exercise of power might be. Can authoritarian regimes in China, the Middle East, and elsewhere survive the onset of internet-fueled global journalism, for example? In a political environment where public opinion is driven and buffeted by news coverage of unprecedented speed and volume, can democratic governments retain sufficient control over decision- and policy-making processes to enable competent social administration and political management? Can the citizens of contemporary democracies use the emerging media environment to enhance elite accountability and strengthen the democratic process? The chapter concludes that the changing global media environment has the potential to strengthen democratic processes, though there is no single template for the impact of the internet and other new media on specific countries.

The media environment within which before elites. They did so in contexts such political actors must operate has been in a as providing a platform for the publication state of constant evolution ever since the of readers’ letters, phone-in contributions invention of the printing press and the to a radio talk show, or a TV studio ﬁrst newspapers. As democratic polities debate. Whether one examines the origins developed in early modern Europe, poli- and outcomes of the English Civil War, tical media played a key role in the the French Revolution, or the American articulation of public opinion and debate. War of Independence, the media emerge They emerged not just as reporters of as important actors in the evolution of information, but as watchdogs and scruti- democratic politics (Hartley, 1996; Conboy, neers over power, partisan advocates of 2004; Starr, 2004). These aspects of the competing political positions and ideolo- media’s democratic role remain valued gies, and representatives of the citizen today, cited as guiding principles by the

217 BRIAN MCNAIR journalists and editors of Al Jazeera as England in 1702, the print media were much as those of the BBC or the Wall joined in an expanding public sphere by Street Journal. As Vladimir Putin, George radio in the early twentieth century, and W. Bush, Tony Blair, and his successor television broadcasting in the late twen- Gordon Brown have all discovered, poli- tieth. By then, democracy had also ticians in societies that aspire to be demo- expanded, with universal suffrage having cratic must pursue their activities against been achieved in most advanced capitalist the backdrop of media, which, in theory, societies by the outbreak of World War should be free from and independent of II. Universal education had encouraged state authority and commercial pressure the growth of literate mass publics, served (private media pursue private interests, of by popular “tabloid” media (Engel, 1996). course, but it is generally acknowledged By the end of the twentieth century, and that in a pluralist democracy there should the end of the cold war, which brought be ideological diversity of news outlets, with it the end of authoritarian power in and no overwhelming “bias” towards one the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, the view or another). Democratic politicians world was by most objective standards a must seek legitimacy at the ballot box, by more democratic place than it had ever communicating with their potential been. Where in 1900 there were on the voters through the media. Not only do planet precisely no fully democratic the media provide channels of commu- countries (meaning those in which every nication from aspiring governors to those adult had a vote, and was free to choose in whose name they will govern, they which, if any party, they wished to sup- should hold governors to account by port), by the end of the century nearly critical scrutiny of their performance, two thirds of the world’s population, including the representation and cham- living in 121 out of 190 recognized pioning of citizens before elite power. nation states, enjoyed “free” or “partly The media that performed these free” democratic politics. “Partly free,” as democratic functions and that formed the the U.S.-based thinktank Freedom House first public spheres were, from the seven- puts it, recognizes that many of these teenth century, newspapers and period- democracies were imperfect, characterized icals. In the 1600s coffee house cultures by “some restrictions on political rights emerged in the capital cities of Europe, and civil liberties, often in a context of where men of property and education corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic strife, would debate the issues of the day. As or civil war” (Freedom House, 2007). democratic institutions developed in the Putin’s Russia, one might observe, is a course of the seventeenth century and “partly free” democracy, in sometimes into the next, the importance of the painful transition from the authoritarian- existence of a common communicative ism of the Soviet era, and not yet free of space, within which citizens could be that regime’s censorial and intimidatory informed, advised, and exhorted to think habits (not least in respect of political and act politically, came to be a key journalism). Iran is a democracy, but element of what we would today call again only partly free, in so far as religious deliberative democracy—a democracy of theocracy continually clashes with com- informed citizens, acting rationally on the peting demands for liberalism and plural- basis of information received from poli- ism. Democracy has expanded globally, tical media, then tested in debate. then, in recent decades, but is not yet a More than two hundred years after the completed project. On the contrary, launch of the first daily newspaper in democratization at the global level, and

218 THE CHANGING GLOBAL MEDIA ENVIRONMENT within nation states, is an ongoing process relevant to the issues under debate at any subject to blockages and reversals. given time, and sufficiently well-for- One can also say that the process of mulated to engage the rest of the audi- democratization has been paralleled by ence. Opportunities for access to, and the expansion of the media and the public participation in, the public spheres of the sphere. That there is a precise, measureable nation state were, for the three-and-a-half causal relationship between the rise of centuries or so that separated the English mass media and the spread of universal Civil War from the outbreak of the “war suffrage is difficult to prove in the con- on terror,” strictly limited, and awarded ventional sense (as are all media-effects by the media, reasonably perhaps, only to hypotheses), but there is clearly a correla- those deemed to have something worth- tion between the two trends. And why while to say. Members of the public were should there not be? The media have in this respect structurally subordinate to fueled political debate and democratic the professionals of the media, dependent participation since the seventeenth cen- on them for access to the public sphere. tury, expanding their audiences and Access was also restricted by the fact enabling their engagement with expanded that media have traditionally been democratic structures. The two sets of expensive to set up and maintain; highly institutions are inherently linked. Without capital-intensive, and thus almost entirely a free and independent media, accessible restricted to big business. There have to the people who rely upon it as their been independent, radical media in exis- main source of political information, there tence throughout the history of most can be no democracy worthy of the name. democracies, but usually existing on the But mass media, like political institu- margins, financed by political donations tions, are imperfect vehicles for democ- or other non-commercial means. racy. Print and broadcast media of the Otherwise, and with the exception of traditional type have been and remain publicly funded organizations such as the centralized, vertically hierarchical, top- BBC, the vast majority of the media of down channels of communication, capitalist societies have taken the form of allowing only limited opportunities for business enterprises, owned by corpora- public feedback, and then in circum- tions and wealthy entrepreneurs. stances closely controlled by media pro- This top–down, centralized, industrially fessionals. Readers’ letters and callers to organized media apparatus was relatively phone-in shows are screened, with only a easy for political elites and other actors small minority of contributions making it to manage, manipulate, and control. through, according to the criteria of the What Walter Lippmann called in his medium in question (political viewpoint, 1922 book Public Opinion “the art of level of articulacy of the contributor, creating consent among the governed” willingness or ability to adopt the com- (quoted in McNair, 2007), and the “con- municative etiquette required, such as no trol of affairs” by “persuasion” was rela- racist abuse on the BBC). This was a tively easy in a media environment of few necessary and inevitable gatekeeping outlets where the possibilities of feedback exercise, given the limited availability of and rapid public response were limited. column inches and airtime, designed to No politician could ever guarantee a ensure that those voices that made it good press, of course, and rulers from though the various filtering processes in Charles II employed what we would operation were at one and the same time today call spin doctors to try to ensure the representative of the public as a whole, best possible coverage in the media of

219 BRIAN MCNAIR their times (Charles II had the diarist This deference began to erode after Samuel Pepys to look after his image). As World War II, in the U.K. perhaps soon as there were democratic elections most rapidly, as journalists such as Robin in place, and public opinions that mat- Day on the commercial channel ITV tered, political elites were obliged to pioneered more aggressive, interrogatory pursue persuasive communication strategies. interviewing styles, and as journalism in The lavishly resourced public relations general became more intrusive. Between apparatuses of today’s political parties, gov- the 1950s and the turn of the millen- ernments, and campaigning groups have nium the barriers that had traditionally their roots in the early twentieth century existed between private lives and public recognition that in mass-mediated democ- affairs, between the personal politics of racies the management of public opinion politicians and their political personas, and, dare one say it, the manufacture of were steadily eroded. Thus, while in the consent, could not be left to chance, but 1960s the White House press corps should henceforth be the province of a knew about and even participated in recognized category of communication John F. Kennedy’s swimming pool dal- professional (McNair, 2007). liances with starlets and models, but In the days where the political media never reported them (Hersh, 1997), three comprised only print and analog broad- decades later Bill Clinton’s sex and family casting, however, there were fewer chan- life became a central theme in reportage nels to manage, and information flowed of his presidency. Where Winston more slowly, determined by the level Churchill could dismiss the value of of communication technology deployed. appearing in the media to address the Politicians had days, weeks, months, and British people, and expect no objection even years to react to stories that might be from a compliant journalistic profession, damaging. They could preserve con- Tony Blair and his contemporaries fidentiality, censor, cover up bad news, entered office in the certain knowledge not only because there were fewer media that everything they did or had done, outlets to control, but because they be it smoking a joint at university, inhabited a culture of public deference having affairs and getting divorced, or towards elites in general, based on the buying a second home for the use of a authoritarian traditions of absolute mon- child going to university, would be under archy and church, further elaborated intense and constant scrutiny by a media by the class and status distinctions that hungry for stories and increasingly fearless emerged in bourgeois society as a means in its determination to uncover every- of maintaining social hierarchy. Thus, if a thing. prime minister or a president refused to As deference declined in the post-war give an interview to a journalist—the first era, however, it did so in the context such interviews took place in the late of a top–down media system, which nineteenth century (Silvester, ed., 1993)— remained relatively easy to control. Press this was accepted as a reasonable exercise officers and media advisers helped politi- of executive detachment, necessary to cians such as Harold Wilson to lobby preserve the dignity and authority of editors and cultivate media loyalties, but power. Journalists, like citizens in general, these efforts were small scale by compar- routinely deferred to the presumed author- ison with the political public relations ity of political elites, and rarely challenged operations of modern politics. A handful their prerogative to dictate the style and of radio and TV stations, a dozen or so content of political communication. newspapers and periodicals of influence—

220 THE CHANGING GLOBAL MEDIA ENVIRONMENT these were the political media faced by The internet any political actor. In the twenty-first From the late 1990s, following the launch century, by contrast, political elites face a of Netscape’s Mosaic browser and the transformed media environment, and an beginning of the development of the immeasurably more complex agenda and internet as a mass medium (by which I opinion management challenge. To put it mean a communication channel accessible another way, political actors now face an to and used by the general population, as environment characterized by the loss of control, and the onset of communication opposed to specialist or elite segments of chaos (McNair, 2006). it) real-time news channels were joined The rest of this chapter explores the by a rapidly growing number of online roots and causes of this trend, which I will news and information outlets: websites set group into four categories. up by newspapers and TV companies such as Guardian Unlimited and BBC Online; online publications such as Slate; sites Expanded information flow dedicated to commentary and comment, run by individual journalists such as Andrew There are now many more media outlets, Sullivan, and also by amateurs such as the producing much more information than Drudge Report. Personal weblogs (blogs), at any previous time in human history. many of them devoted to news and The expansion has been gradual over a commentary on the news, emerged as a period of centuries since the invention of visible feature of the internet at the turn print, accelerating in the twentieth cen- of the millennium, proliferating after the tury with the invention of broadcasting, events of September 11, 2001. By 2005, and exploding in the 1980s and 1990s there were millions of blogs operating all with the appearance of the first 24-hour over the world, the number increasing all news channels. CNN in 1980, Sky in the time (McNair, 2006). In 2005–6 1989, BBC News 24 in 1997—each new online social networking services such as entrant to the real-time news market YouTube, MySpace, Bebo, and Facebook added more hours to the total of journal- emerged, allowing individuals to spread istic discourse in the public sphere than and share information in the form of had previously been provided by all video, text, and audio files. terrestrial channels put together. In the All of this amounted to an information U.K., when this writer was commencing environment of practically infinite size, his Ph.D. in 1981, the quantity of broad- from the point of view of the individual. cast news approximated five hours per Where in the pre-internet era there had day across four TV and one radio chan- been a large, but finite, public sphere com- nel. By September 11, 2001 there were prising print and broadcast media, by the three U.K.-based 24-hour news channels time of this writing there was a vast universe available to the British viewer, as well as of publicly available data within easily CNN and several other overseas-based searchable reach of anyone on the planet services (McNair, 2006). As this essay with a computer and an internet connec- went to press these included Al Jazeera, tion (of whom there were more than a which launched an English-language ser- billion, with internet access and usage vice in 2006, and a growing number of figures rising all the time). Those who non-English speaking services in the sought to track the expansion of this data Middle East, Asia, and Latin America flow talked not of gigabytes but terabytes (Chalaby, ed., 2005). and petabytes—quantities unimaginable

221 BRIAN MCNAIR to the human mind, just as we find it before in human history, it has accelerated hard to visualize just how many stars there the rate of flow of that information, and are in the known universe. the speed at which all kinds of knowledge These data included everything from are disseminated. If, during the English individual e-mails to huge, multi-layered Civil War for example, it took days and websites devoted to government infor- perhaps weeks for news about a battle to mation and official business, such as the be widely disseminated, in the era of the reports of the U.S. 9/11 Commission and internet, information travels around the the Hutton inquiry, which explored the world at the speed of light, spread along circumstances behind the death of a U.K. horizontal vectors and decentralized hubs. government scientist and the U.K. gov- The networked structure of the internet ernment’s decision to participate in the (Watts, 2003) enables rapid dissemination invasion of Iraq. It included professional of information to any and every point on journalism, amateur punditry in the form the network. Real-time news, mean- of blogs, academic research, online edi- while, reports newsworthy events as they tions of books and papers, most of it are actually happening, and often before downloadable at the touch of a mouse the journalists, or anybody else, under- button. Much more data, in short, than stand their meaning or significance. Those any individual could ever hope to master. who witnessed the Twin Tower attacks Information had gone from being a scarce unfold on CNN, no matter where in the resource to one freely available in unlim- world they were at the time (I tuned in ited quantities. The child of the early from a remote part of tropical Australia, twenty-first century had access not just to just in time to see the second plane hit his or her local library, or to the learning the towers) will recall the confusion of of a teacher or parent, or to doc- journalists as they struggled to make sense umentaries on TV and radio, but to the of events. Was it an accident caused by a whole universe of accumulated human fire or a light aircraft; a cruise missile fired knowledge (that proportion of it, at least, by a hostile power; a terrorist attack? No- that was digitized), for the price of a PC one knew for sure, and for quite some and a broadband connection (by 2007, in time, even though the whole world was a country such as the U.K., barely more watching. than the annual cost of a mobile phone And as real-time news transmitted pic- contract). The expansion of internet tures and commentaries to the world, the access was a marked trend, moreover, not internet came alive with bloggers and merely in the relatively affluent advanced e-mailers spreading the news, sometimes capitalist world, but in the developing from the heart of Manhattan. There was, countries of China, India, and Africa, in short, practically no gap between the where its educational and economic ben- event happening and its being reported, efits were among the factors revolutio- then commented on and debated by nizing rates of growth and enabling millions of people all over the world. In countries such as India to aspire to super- the case of 9/11 this collapse of the gap power status. between happening and reportage, which had previously been a structural constraint on journalism, was facilitated by the fact Accelerated information flow that CNN and other organizations’ cameras were on the scene from the outset, Not only has the internet made more perched on roof tops only a short distance information publicly available than ever from the towers. Even if those conditions

222 THE CHANGING GLOBAL MEDIA ENVIRONMENT have not always been present, however, already noted), they can produce as well a similarly accelerated cycle of event– as consume the information that flows on reportage–commentary has accompanied the internet. Blogs, e-mails, personalized subsequent events such as the invasion of websites on MySpace and YouTube—all Iraq in 2003, the July 7 bombings in involve an unprecedented degree of inter- London, and the Beslan siege of September activity and participation. The sharing of 2004. The whole world watched the information and debating of its sig- tragic end of the Beslan siege, though no- nificance with anyone, anywhere on the one knew with any certainty what was planet, has in a few short years become a going on amidst the chaos of a rescue commonplace of cultural life. We upload operation gone wrong. information, many of us, as readily as we The speed of flow of information on download it. the internet, coupled with its relative Media organizations have sought to uncensorability, alongside the advent of reflect the growth of interactivity and real-time news, has encouraged the col- participatory media by establishing plat- lapse of what Anthony Giddens (1990) forms for the posting of videos, text, and describes as time–space distantiation. After other contributions from members of the many centuries of gradual erosion of the global public. “Citizen journalism,” gap between the places where events though a misleading term in so far as most happen and the places where we read such contributions are submitted by ama- about or watch them in our news media, teurs unversed in professional journalistic we are suddenly in the era of reportorial skills and practices, and user-generated instantaneity, or something very close to content have become prominent elements it. Whether an event happens in Darfur in the global media environment. The or Caracas, New York or Bali, we have quality of these contributions varies hugely, the potential to access live coverage of it as one would expect, but that they exist in our front rooms, on TV, and then to at all is a significant causal factor in the follow the story on the internet, sharing increasingly chaotic information environ- information, alerting others, accessing the ment confronted by political actors. The online sites of print and broadcast news images of torture and abuse taking place outlets. The boundaries of time and in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, for exam- space are dissolved through technology, ple, were made available to the main- which allows information to be packaged stream media by U.S. soldiers at the digitally and then to travel anywhere in scene, from where they generated a major the world. political crisis for the Bush administration.

The rise of interactivity and From control to chaos mass participation All of this—expanded, accelerated infor- Adding to the qualitative shift that this mation flow, which crosses borders of emerging environment represents is the time and space and is relatively difficult to fact that it is uniquely accessible to the police, and which is easily accessed by the people who wish to use it. Assuming that individual constituted as a participant– the members of a society can afford to producer and not merely a consumer— buy the necessary hardware (and the pro- amounts to a globalized public sphere of a portion of the world’s population with new type; a diffuse network of informa- internet access is rising all the time, as tion sources, horizontally organized rather

223 BRIAN MCNAIR than vertically hierarchical like the top– community, focused on how best to down media of old. The internet was control the medium while preserving its originally designed to be robust in the unique communicative properties, and face of military attack, with a high degree addressing the problems of racist or sec- of redundancy built into its components tarian hate speech, terrorism, pedophilia, (Naughton, 1999). As a consequence of copyright theft, and others. this feature of the internet, and when The difference, however, between con- combined with the velocity and geo- temporary attempts at control, for what- graphical reach of the information that ever reason they are pursued, and those of flows down its myriad pathways, it is the pre-internet era, is that the former relatively difficult to control and censor. rapidly become part of the global public Newspapers could easily be closed down debate. The Chinese, fearful of the effect by an authoritarian regime, and still are in of freely flowing information on their countries such as Zimbabwe and Iran. authoritarian control regime, may seek to Terrestrial TV stations can be closed censor internet companies such as Google, down too, as occurred in Venezuela in but as bloggers and others in the media 2007, or their transmissions blocked, with hear the news and begin to share it with relative ease. Real-time news channels on their online networks, from where it satellite are harder to control within the breaks into the mainstream news agenda, boundaries of a nation state, but can be the act rapidly becomes common knowl- policed by banning satellite dishes or edge, inside and out of the country, and otherwise criminalizing the consumption impacts on China’s other goals, such as of undesirable material. States such as holding a successful Olympics, or obtain- Saudi Arabia and China have compelled ing most favored nation status with the broadcasters such as the BBC and CNN U.S. Control of the internet is possible, to curtail their activities within their and in relation to some content desirable national boundaries, leading directly, in (child pornography, racist hate speech, the former example, to the establishment and so on), but the costs of political cen- of Al Jazeera by disgruntled Arab jour- sorship, in terms of global reputation, nalists seeking an outlet for their journal- trade, and influence, not to mention the ism (Zayani, ed., 2005). impact on internal pressures for reform, Such tactics can also be used against the are much higher than they were in the internet, as Google discovered when trying past. Some countries—some of those in to break into the Chinese market in 2006. south east Asia, for example—have com- To widespread protest from its global user bined strict control of the internet with base the online search company accepted political stability and economic success restrictive Chinese government terms in (Atkins, 2002). Others, such as Iran under return for permission to operate in the the fundamentalists, struggle to persuade country. Google subsequently reversed its their young people in particular, and what decision, in order to repair its damaged is to a considerable extent a liberal, cos- reputation, but the incident was a cau- mopolitan population in general, that tionary reminder to those of a more banning their access to the internet and utopian view that the internet can be satellite TV is good for their morality or controlled, whether by means of commer- the security and stability of the country. cial, technological, or political instruments. The leaders of the U.S.S.R. could get Debate on the means and justifications away with this kind of logic during the for future regulation of the internet cold war, and were able to quarantine continues to occupy the international their population from the outside world

224 THE CHANGING GLOBAL MEDIA ENVIRONMENT quite effectively for the best part of which news provision can be truly seventy years. As early as the 1980s, democratized. Despite his enormous however, as fax and video were becoming power and influence within the commonplace communicative tools in the print and broadcast media, for exam- U.S.S.R., and CNN was becoming ple, Rupert Murdoch’s newspapers available to Soviet TV viewers, the com- and television stations can find their munists under Mikhail Gorbachev recog- view of the news world challenged nized that the game was up in terms of and contradicted by anti-capitalist authoritarian information control, and news sites on the web that people introduced the policy of glasnost (open- all over the world are able to view ness). This did not prevent the collapse of whenever they want and without the Soviet state in 1991, and may have charge. accelerated that process, but it was a sign (Anderson and Ward, 2007: p. 15) of the increasing degree of difficulty involved in any state seeking to police the Murdoch himself, in a 2006 speech to a media-consumption habits of its people, London audience made less than a year once those people had even a limited after his company had paid $580 million knowledge of what they were missing. for the social networking site MySpace, Two decades later, in an online world, no reflected on the transformed media envir- matter how reluctantly it is conceded by onment, and what it meant to global the Chinese, the Cubans, the Iranians, or media barons such as him. “Power is any other regime, the difficulty is immea- moving away from those who own and surably greater. Censorship is far from manage the media to a new and demand- impossible to repeat, but it is much more ing generation of consumers—consumers problematic as a governing strategy unless, who are better educated, unwilling to be as appears to be the case in North Korea, led and who know that in a competitive people are so completely isolated from world they can get what they want, when the outside world that they have little or they want it” (McNair, 2006). And who no understanding of the globalized media can, as already noted, contribute through environment that is emerging, and thus blogs and other means to the globalized no substantial basis on which to compare public sphere, participating to an unpre- their internal situation. cedented degree in the emergence and evolution of news stories, and the impact they have on public opinion at both local The internet and politics and global level.

Does this loss of control matter to the exercise of political power? Does it Evaluating the globalized strengthen democracy where it already public sphere exists, and increase the potential for it to emerge in the authoritarian societies that On the face of it, with other things remain? Anderson and Ward’s (2007) remaining equal, these trends should recent edited volume points to the loss of enable a strengthening of the democratic elite communicative control that the process, in so far as they widen and internet has produced. deepen access to the means of communication, from the perspectives of both Potentially it could be argued that the consumption and production. On the other internet provides a channel through side, it is argued that, notwithstanding the

225 BRIAN MCNAIR explosion of the blogosphere and the development of a public sphere that is emergence of millions of people world- raucous and noisy, aggressive and con- wide who through access to the internet frontational, but lacking in the quantity actively contribute to the globalized public and quality of information required by a sphere, the quality of debate is low. truly informed citizenry. If the blogger Oliver Kamm, himself a blogger of some functions in a globalized, digitized media influence in the United States, concedes environment, and if there are many mil- that blogging is “a democratic medium, lions of them competing for attention, allowing anyone to participate in political their articulations on the issues are no debate without an intermediary, at little different, in essence, from those of the or no cost.” There is a downside, how- tabloid columnist or the radio shock jock. ever. “It is a direct and not deliberative On the other hand, the sheer size and form of democracy. You need no com- complexity of the online environment petence to join in” (Kamm, 2007). Blogs presents a challenge to the normative are frequently inaccurate, opinionated public sphere. How does the reader sift without being authoritative, and add little and sort the wheat from the chaff, the to the stock of knowledge in the public unsubstantiated rant from the insightful sphere. For Kamm, the democratic con- analysis? There are several answers to that tribution of the blogosphere is undermined question. First, the “old,” established by the fact that: media brands take on an enhanced role as gatekeepers, identifying and highlighting Blogs are providers not of news but online voices that are, for one reason or of comment. This would be a good another, worthy of attention. Bloggers thing if blogs extended the range of such as Salam Pax, the “Baghdad blogger” available opinion in the public sphere. who emerged during the build-up to and But they do not; paradoxically, they execution of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, narrow it. This happens because broke through into the mainstream, with blogs typically do not add to the a column for the Guardian and a book available stock of commentary: they collecting his blog entries, not merely are purely parasitic on the stories because he was a rare independent source and opinions that traditional media on the ground in Baghdad as the war provide. In its paucity of coverage began, but because he was a good writer and predictability of conclusions, and a courageous reporter in the best tra- the blogosphere provides a parody dition of foreign correspondents. Norman of democratic deliberation. Geras, the former Marxist intellectual, (Kamm, 2007) found his Normblog picked up by the mainstream print media in 2005 because This somewhat pessimistic conclusion has of the eloquence and passion with which substance, but then, haven’t much of the he, as a Marxist, defended the coalition old media been accused of precisely the intervention to remove Saddam Hussein same flaws—that they add little that is from power. There is, in short, a compe- new to political debate, and trade instead titive environment for bloggers and other on opinions, polemic and bias? In recent online contributors, in which success, times the established political media in meaning influence and reach beyond the both Britain and the U.S. have been still relatively narrow networks of blog- accused of “corrosive cynicism” and gers, extending to the mainstream media “hyperadversarialism” respectively (Lloyd, and their audiences, depends on a variety 2004; Fallows, 1996a), implicated in the of criteria, from the quality of writing to

226 THE CHANGING GLOBAL MEDIA ENVIRONMENT the originality of perspective. The digi- and beliefs” (Huntington, 1996: p. 59). A tized media environment is noisy, to be globalized public sphere does not imply a sure, and may well be conceived as a rational, deliberative debate on global communicative tower of Babel, but it is political issues, in short. It may indeed an environment in which quality rises to inflame and intensify conflicts that might the top of the pile, while the mediocre otherwise have remained marginal and and the rubbish sink to the bottom, never localized. The media image of Al Qaida’s to be heard of again. Millions talk, but jihad, and the widespread perception that only a few are listened to. the small group of disaffected Muslim men who actively participate in it represent a serious global threat to countries Cultural globalization and that defeated the industrial might of fas- its critics cism in World War II, is the product of skillful media management by the Aside from the question of the quality of Islamists on the one hand, and structural the contributions that an expanding, features of the global news media on the active global citizenry (and many who are other. Audacious attacks such as 9/11 and not citizens) make to the globalized the July 7 London bombings are designed public sphere, the concept of globaliza- and executed precisely to command the tion itself continues to be contentious, news agenda, to spread fear and panic, particularly in the sub-field of critical and to amplify the salience of the issues media studies. Angus Stewart observed in that drive their perpetrators. Beheading a 2001 that the dominant usage of “globa- hostage on camera and sending the foot- lization” in scholarly writing was “to age to Al Jazeera for broadcast to the invoke chaotic or irresistible social forces world is more than an act of religious and convey a powerful sense of uncontest- sadism—it is political communication, able … political fatalism” (Stewart, 2001: designed to terrorize and intimidate a p. 124). For this writer “the historical variety of constituencies. reality of the current phase of capitalist Adam Curtis’ documentary The Power modernity is one of extreme fragmenta- of Nightmares, broadcast by the BBC in tion” (Stewart, 2001: p. 93). These themes 2005 and in many other countries since, persist in the writings of sociologists such argues persuasively that the perception of as Paul Virilio (1997) and Zygmunt Al Qaida as a global threat is exaggerated, Bauman (2002), who has described a not merely by the neo-conservative ideo- world under siege from the relentless flow logues who have wielded, some would of information. Virilio has written of “the say, disproportionate and pernicious influ- sudden bewildering Babel clamor of the ence on the Bush administration and have world-city, the untimely mix of the an interest in threat inflation, but by the global and the local” (Virilio, 1997, p. 57). unintended consequences of pervasive, Samuel Huntington’sinfluential Clash global media coverage of the Islamists’ of Civilisations, published in 1996 and activities. The “war on terror” is in this anticipating the resurgence of global reli- context a media construction, fueled by gious conflict long before 9/11 opened the panicked responses of political elites full-scale holy war on the west, observed and then global publics as they watched that “little or no evidence exists to sup- the twin towers fall, or the people of port the assumption that the emergence Madrid emerge from their blasted train of pervasive global communications is pro- carriages, or the Australian clubbers in Bali viding significant convergence in attitudes mourning their dead friends. Compared

227 BRIAN MCNAIR with the millions who died in the 1939– sphere of information and media man- 45 war against fascism, or the half million agement. Bill Clinton’s presidency was massacred in Rwanda in 1994, or the almost (if not quite) destroyed by the atrocities committed by the Serbs in the media storm that engulfed his administra- former Yugoslavia, the crimes of Al Qaida tion in the wake of the Monica Lewinsky are small in scale (if no less offensive to scandal. The story was broken by the humanity than those of the Nazis or the online Drudge Report, when traditional ethnic cleansers of Serbia). They loom “old” media such as Newsweek decided large in the global public imagination, that they could not take the risk. When however—inhabiting our nightmares, the news broke, and in the months fol- indeed—because of the speed and spread lowing, CNN’s feeds of the president’s of their dissemination across the planet. testimony to the Starr commission and The consequences of this threat inflation other twists demonstrated in sharp relief for national and global politics have been the uncontrollable, chaotic nature of clear—not merely the war in Iraq, which contemporary political media, and the would probably have happened anyway, speed at which stories that would once at some point in the future, but also the have been kept secret, often with the vast expense and other costs for civil lib- complicity of journalists, become part of erties of airline security and other measures the globalized public sphere. designed to protect us from a handful of George W. Bush faced comparable fanatical young men and women on sui- information management challenges with cide missions. The perception of a global the emergence from Iraq of atrocity stor- terror threat, built not by conspiracy but ies, such as the human rights abuses and by the mere fact of terrorist incidents torture occurring in Abu Ghraib prison. being reported intensively, has generated As is well known, digital photographs of a global response that may in time come the torture of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. ser- to be seen as overdone, indeed damaging vicemen and women made their way into to democracy in other respects. The U.S. the investigative journalism of Seymour Patriot Act, the introduction of ID cards Hersch, and thence on to Al Jazeera and in the U.K., the treatment experienced in other international media outlets. The many countries by innocent Muslim citi- widespread outrage that resulted, both in zens because of the perceived threat the United States and overseas, compelled caused by the Islamists—all these can be the president to make a public apology to related, at least in part, to the perceptions the Iraqi people, live on Arab-speaking of risk and threat encouraged by a globa- television. The success of this attempt to lized, digitized media culture. limit the damage caused by Abu Ghraib, and to restore some order to the chaos of the global media environment, was lim- Conclusion ited, in so far as the war in Iraq subsequently intensified and the American The changed global media environment occupation grew ever less popular with described above is making a difference to both the Iraqis and the American people, the conduct and management of politics but it would not have occurred, nor on every level, and in every arena. would it have been necessary, thirty or Accelerated, expanded, increasingly inter- forty years ago. active and uncensorable information flows In conclusion, then, it is possible to present political elites in democratic argue that the globalized public sphere societies with new challenges in the that has been brought into being by the

228 THE CHANGING GLOBAL MEDIA ENVIRONMENT combination of 24-hour news channels with the performance of public duty. On and the internet, has generated a political balance, though, democracy is stronger environment that is harder for elites and when power and its exercise is transpar- other social actors to control than may ent, even insecure, before the court of have been the case in the past. News global public opinion. Better out than in, stories rise and fall unpredictably, rapidly one might say. The democratic predis- cascading into damaging media storms position should be to more rather than because of images taken on mobile phones, less openness and transparency, a stance or off-the-record speeches recorded and that the emergence of the internet makes then posted on a blog. In March 2007, U. difficult to resist. S. Republican presidential candidate John In the declining number of authoritar- McCain was recorded at a dinner singing, ian societies, on the other hand, the to the tune of the Beach Boys’ Barbara trends appear to be in favor of movement Ann, “bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb towards democratization, and if there is Iran.” A joke, he insisted, and not in no obvious or simple cause-and-effect particularly good taste, but transferred by relationship between the pressure for the communicative power of the blogo- democratic reform in for example Cuba sphere into a global controversy requiring and China, or Singapore, or Saudi Arabia, public contrition. CNN news editor control of the media environment within Eason Jordan was “exposed” on a blog the boundaries of the nation-state becomes when he asserted at an off-the-record as a general rule ever more problematic. news conference that U.S. forces deliber- How long these societies can hold out ately targeted journalists in Iraq. He was against the demands of young, internet- required to resign as a result. U.S. senator literate populations eager to participate in Trent Lott was recorded making racist globalized media culture will depend on remarks. In the digitized media environ- the sociocultural specifics of each case, ment, nothing is secret for long, and there and the extent to which economic success is no such thing as “off the record.” can be combined with the control of Political actors must adapt to this new information. There is no single template reality, or perish under the weight of for how the internet will react with and hostile public opinion, fanned and fueled impact on the conduct of politics in dif- by bloggers, online pundits, net-savvy ferent countries. But that there has been campaigners, and the rest. and will be reactions and impacts, every- Uncomfortable as it may be for those where the hardware is available to people, who are the targets of such scrutiny, from is inevitable. a normative perspective it enhances the potential for the media to exercise accountability over power. The internet, Guide to further reading and its gradual convergence with the established print and broadcast media, has For further reading on the impact of new produced greater elite visibility and trans- communication technologies on author- parency. In democratic societies where itarian regimes see Kalathil and Boas the media are free to say more or less (2003). Maltby and Keeble’s (2007) edited whatever they like, this has led to some collection explores the impact of digital excesses, in which politicians may be media on war and conflict reporting, and thought to have been unfairly traduced on military decision-making. McNair for “crimes,” which though they may (2007) provides an overview of the chan- fascinate the blogosphere, have little to do ging media environments.

229 17 The virtual sphere 2.0 The internet, the public sphere, and beyond

Zizi Papacharissi

This chapter ﬁrst traces dominant narratives on private and public opinion, beginning with an overview of the public sphere, examining models that oppose or supplement the public sphere, and leading into work that examines the internet as a public sphere. As a second step, distinct conditions that moderate the democratizing impact of the internet are identiﬁed and explicated. First, the self- centered nature of online expression lends a narcissistic element to political deliberation online, which is distinct from the objectives of the public sphere. Second, patterns of civic engagement online suggest selective uses of online media to supplement the representative model of democracy and mobilize subversive movements. Finally, the proliferation of online public spaces that are part commercial and part private suggests a new hybrid model of public spaces, where consumerist and civic rhetoric co- exist. These three recent developments are used to question whether the public sphere is the most meaningful lens from which to evaluate the democratizing potential of online technologies.

“Technology is neither good nor bad, nor is it neutral.” (Melvin Kranzberg, 1985: p. 50)

“Technology is a mirror of society, not a ‘neutral’ force that can be used for good or evil.” (Lasch, 1987: p. 295)

The potential of online media generates a effects, and gratification. While it is multitude of responses and reactions. Most important to avoid the deterministic are centered around the ability of digital viewpoint that online technologies are and online media to simultaneously restrict able to, on their own, “make or break” a and empower individuals as they interact public sphere, it is also necessary to with each other in public life. Thus, the understand that technologies frequently use of the internet, the operative medium embed assumptions about their potential here, as it converges and sustains multiple uses, which can be traced back to the technologies, becomes an asset or a detri- political, cultural, social, and economic ment, depending on how it is put to use. environment that brings them to life. The internet, from this point of view Therefore, it is not the nature of tech- serves as a tool, and does not contain the nologies themselves, but rather, the dis- agency to effect social change. Individuals, course that surrounds them, that guides on the other hand, possess differing levels how these technologies are appropriated of agency, based on which they can by a society. Both Kranzberg’s (1985) and employ the internet to varying ends, Lasch’s (1987) descriptions of technology

230 THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND BEYOND as “non-neutral” or a “mirror of society,” and/or the economy (Garnham, 1990; acquire meaning as they position technol- Habermas, 1974). The modern public ogy within a particular discourse. Kranzberg sphere, according to Habermas, plagued (1985) recognizes technology as a histori- by forces of commercialization and com- cally relative construct that possess neither promised by corporate conglomerates, evil nor good inherent characteristics, but produces discourse dominated by the at the same time is not neutral; it is objectives of advertising and public rela- actualized by and within the historical tions. Thus, the public sphere becomes a context that delivered it. Lasch (1987) vehicle for capitalist hegemony and ideo- frames technology as the mirror that logical reproduction. Naturally, a digital exposes the inadequacies, the merits, and medium such as the internet, with an the hopes of a society. Thus, individuals infrastructure that promises unlimited and are likely to respond to technologies, but unregulated discourse that operates beyond even more so, to the discourse that sur- geographic boundaries, would suggest a rounds them. The future of technology virtual reincarnation of the public sphere. rests on the metaphors and language we Utopian rhetoric habitually extols the employ to describe it (Gunkel and Gunkel, democratizing potential of media that are 1997; Marvin, 1988). new (e.g., Bell, 1981; Davis et al., 2002; The discourse surrounding the political Johnson and Kaye, 1998; Kling, 1996; potential of online news media could be Negroponte, 1998). Dystopian rhetoric located in the tension between the “pri- conversely cautions against enthusiasm vate” and the “public,” as articulated in regarding the democratizing potential of contemporary democracies. Online media medium that currently operates on a 17 lend themselves to several uses, but they percent global penetration rate (World acquire agency as they enable the re- Internet Usage and Population Statistics, negotiation of what is considered private www.internetworldstats .com/stats. htm, and what is considered public in public accessed April 2007). Others characterize life. Thus, a political opinion posted on a the democratizing potential of the internet blog or a video parody posted on as simply vulnerable (e.g., Blumler and YouTube present an attempt to populate Gurevitch, 2001). This chapter examines the public agenda, and a potential, pri- the democratizing potential of online vately articulated challenge, to a public media, as articulated through relevant agenda determined by others. In the theory, research, and online practices. truest form of democracy, negotiation of This essay first traces dominant narra- that which is considered public and that tives on private and public opinion, which is considered private takes places beginning with an overview of the public within the public sphere. As defined by sphere, examining models that oppose or the architect of the concept, Jurgen supplement the public sphere, and leading Habermas, the public sphere presents “a into work that examines the internet as a realm of our social life, in which some- public sphere. As a second step, distinct thing approaching public opinion can be conditions that moderate the democratiz- formed” (Habermas, 1974: 49). ing impact of the internet are identified Quite distinct from, but reliant on, the and explicated. First, the self-centered constructs of the public, public space, and nature of online expression lends a nar- public opinion, the public sphere facil- cissistic element to political deliberation itates rational discourse of public affairs online, which is distinct from the objec- directed toward the common good, and it tives of the public sphere. Second, pat- operates autonomously from the state terns of civic engagement online suggest

231 ZIZI PAPACHARISSI selective uses of online media to supple- simple proceedings that are made public, ment the representative model of democ- or a public consisting of individuals who racy and mobilize subversive movements. assemble. Because, according to Habermas, Finally, the proliferation of online public the public sphere has been compromised spaces that are part commercial and part to the point where its actual existence is private suggests a new hybrid model of in doubt, it is best understood as a meta- public spaces, where consumerist and phor for “a sphere which mediates between civic rhetoric co-exist. These three recent society and state, in which the public developments are used to question whether organizes itself as the bearer of public the public sphere is the most meaningful opinion, accords with the principle of the lens from which to evaluate the demo- public sphere—that principle of public cratizing potential of online technologies. information which once had to be fought for against the arcane politics of mon- archies and which since that time has The premise of the public made possible the democratic control of sphere state activities” (Habermas, 1973: p. 351). The historical context evoked by this Academic discussions of civic engagement definition places the public sphere at odds typically pay tribute to the concept of the with feudal authorities, and in the public sphere, as conceptualized by Jurgen modern era, with the state. Within the Habermas (1967/74) in his seminal work. liberal model of the public sphere, mass The public sphere presents a domain of media play a critical part in informing social life in which public opinion is and directing public opinion, especially expressed by means of rational public since mass society simultaneously abridges discourse and debate. The ultimate goal gender/class/race borders and renders of the public sphere is public accord and direct communication among varying decision-making, although these goals public constituencies more difficult. It is may not necessarily routinely be achieved. Habermas’ argument that the commer- Agreement and rational deliberation are cialized mass media have turned the desirable outcomes; however, the value of public sphere into a space where the the public sphere lies in its ability to rhetoric and objectives of public relations facilitate uninhibited and diverse discus- and advertising are prioritized. Commercial sion of public affairs, thus typifying interests, a capitalist economy, and main- democratic traditions. stream media content have colonized the The public sphere must not be con- public sphere and compromised rational fused with public space. While public and democratic public discourse extinct, space provides the expanse that allows the with television frequently playing a van- public sphere to convene, it does not guard role (Habermas, 2004). guarantee a healthy public sphere. The This point of view resonates with leading public sphere also serves as forum for, but communication scholars. Carey (1995), is conceptually distinct from, the public, for instance, articulated how a capitalist public affairs, or public opinion. According economy and the private sector may fur- to Habermas (1974), “public opinion can ther amass commercial culture that only come into existence when a reasoning crowds out the democratic objectives of a public is presupposed,” and that is what public sphere. Specifically relating to the distinguishes it from individuals expressing mass media, Putnam (1996) examined a mere opinions, or mere opinions about variety of institutional “suspects” respon- public affairs, opinions expressed within sible for the decline of civic engagement

232 THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND BEYOND in the U.S., to conclude that television is argument suggests that the prospect of responsible for displacing time previously civic participation is de-emphasized and devoted to civic affairs and promoting skepticism is reinforced through negative passive involvement with politics. Similarly, or cynical coverage in the mass media, Hart (1994) argued that some media, such growing cynicism spreads in a spiraling as television, “supersaturate viewers with manner (Cappella and Jamieson, 1996, political information,” and that as a result, 1997), producing a public that is further “this tumult creates in viewers a sense of detached from the public sphere. activity rather than genuine civic invol- Several scholars find that the malaise vement” (Hart, 1994: p. 109). over the public sphere overestimates civic Additional conditions associated with engagement in past societies and civiliza- the transition to industrial and post- tions, or the value of public agreement for industrial modern and postmodern society a healthy democracy. For instance, contribute to a deteriorating public sphere Lyotard (1984) argued that Habermas and declining interest in politics. For overemphasized rational accord as a con- instance, in contemporary representative dition for a democratic public sphere, and models of democracy, politicians, opinion argues that it is anarchy, individuality, and leaders, and the media frequently rely on disagreement that have and can lead to aggregations of public opinion obtained genuine democratic emancipation. Lyotard’s through polls, as opposed to the rational dissent was founded in Derrida’s (1997) exchange of opinions fostered by the deconstructivist approach, who empha- public sphere. Herbst (1993) refers to sized undecidability as the necessary con- such aggregations of public opinion as stant in any form of public deliberation. “numbered voices,” thus pointing to the Mouffe (2000, 2005) explicitly connected substitution of individual and detailed these ideas to contemporary, pluralist, personal opinion on public affairs with a democracy and posed the concept of ago- concentration of viewpoints usually expres- nistic pluralism as a more realistic alter- sed in the bipolarity of the yes/no polling native to the public sphere. Mouffe’s response format. Thus, deliberation of (2000) critique is based on the impossi- public affairs within the public sphere is bility of true plurality within a modern or postponed as citizens are called upon to postmodern deliberative democracy. Thus, express agreement or disagreement with she proposed agonistic pluralism, as a prescribed options. “vibrant clash of democratic political Such re-appropriation of the public positions,” guided by undecidability, and sphere, combined with mainstream media more receptive to the plurality of voices narratives that commodify or simplify com- that develop within contemporary plural- plex political issues, conjure up public ist societies than the deliberative model skepticism among citizens who already (Mouffe, 2000: p. 104). Specifically, the have narrowly defined ways of becoming “agonistic” approach acknowledges the involved in public affairs within a repre- real nature of its frontiers and the forms of sentative democracy model. So, it is not exclusion that they entail, instead of simply that the media crowd the public trying to disguise them under the “veil sphere with commercial rhetoric, it is also of rationality or morality” (Mouffe, 2000: that when they do choose to focus on p. 105). Mouffe’s (2000, 2005) emphasis public affairs they do so using frames that on the agonistic foreshadows modes of prioritize politicizing an issue rather than political expression that have been popu- encouraging rational deliberation of it larized through the internet, including (Fallows, 1996b; Patterson, 1993). One blogging, YouTube privately produced

233 ZIZI PAPACHARISSI content, and discussion on online political online deliberation, or do both. In these boards. scholarly examinations, researchers tend The notion of exclusion from the to be concerned with the following three public sphere is also present in Fraser’s aspects of online communication, as they (1992) work, who suggested that directly affect the social and political Habermas’ examples of past, romanticized capital generated by online media: access public spheres excluded women and non- to information, reciprocity of communica- propertied classes and proposed a post- tion, and commercialization of online space industrial model of co-existing public (e.g., Malina, 1999; Papacharissi, 2002; spheres or counterpublics, which form in Sassi, 2000). response to their exclusion from the dominant sphere of debate. These multi- Access to information ple public spheres, though not equally powerful, articulate, or privileged, exist to While the internet and surrounding digi- give voice to collective identities and tal technologies provide a public space, interests. Schudson’s (1998) historical they do not necessarily provide a public review of past political activity further sphere. Greater access to information, questioned the actual existence of a public enabled by online media, does not directly sphere, and argued that public discourse is lead to increases in political participation, not the main ingredient, or “the soul of or greater civic engagement, or trust in democracy,” for it is seldom egalitarian, political process (Bimber, 2001; Kaid, 2002). may be too large and amorphous, is rarely The advantages of the internet as a public civil, and ultimately offers no magical space can be enjoyed only by the select solution to problems of democracy few who have access to it, thus harboring (Schudson, 1997). an illusion of an open public sphere Perhaps it is more meaningful to view (Pavlik, 1994; Sassi, 2005; Williams and the public sphere as a metaphor that Pavlik, 1994; Williams, 1994). With the suggests a mode and ideal for civic parti- global digital diffusion presently at 17 cipation and interaction, as Habermas percent (North America: 70 percent, originally intended. Within this context, Oceania: 54 percent, Europe: 39 percent, online media, including the internet, Asia: 11 percent, Africa: 4 percent, Latin could host a virtual sphere or revitalize America: 17 percent, Middle East: 10 the public sphere. Several scholars have percent) it might be more appropriate to looked into this question and examined discuss local, regional, or national public how online media serve as political dis- spheres over a global public sphere. cussion forums, encourage deliberative or Moreover, while digitally enabling citi- direct models of democracy, and ulti- zens (Abramson et al., 1988; Grossman, mately revive civic participation in public 1995; Jones, 1997; Rash, 1997), online affairs. media simultaneously reproduce class, gender, and race inequalities of the offline public sphere (Hill and Hughes, 1988). The virtual sphere 1.0 Finally, the information access the internet provides also typically results in enter- Scholarship examining the public sphere tainment uses of the medium (Althaus potential of the internet has been typically and Tewksbury, 2000; Shah et al., 2001), divided into utopian and dystopian the public sphere relevance of which is visions, which praise civic participation arguable (Moy et al., 2005; Dahlgren, online or question the actual impact of 2005).

234 THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND BEYOND

Access can also be understood as greater elements afford online conversations a access to political elites that shape the degree of reciprocity, which can truly help public agenda, and the ability for these connect citizens of democracies, rather elites to communicate directly with the than reproduce fragmented spheres of electorate. Thus, in addition to enabling conversation. access to information, online media make Specifically, online discussion of public it possible for privately motivated indivi- affairs can connect citizens sharing similar duals and groups to challenge the public motivations but may also reproduce and agenda (e.g., Grossman, 1995; Rash, magnify cultural disparities (e.g., Mitra, 1997), connect the government to citi- 1997a, 1997b; Schmitz, 1997). Scholars zens, and allow for two-way commu- routinely point to online political discus- nication, through interactive features sions that are too amorphous, fragmented, (e.g., Abramson et al., 1988). Still, greater dominated by few, and too specific to live access to information and communication up to the Habermasian ideal of rational channels does not ensure increases in civic accord. While relative anonymity enables engagement, and could simply generate political expression online (Akdeniz, the illusion of “a sense of activity rather 2002), that expression does not always than genuine civic involvement” (Hart, result in discussion of greater substance or 1994: p. 109). Online political conversa- political impact (Jones, 1997; Poster, 1995; tions can be as easily dominated by elites Schement and Curtis, 1997). Online as offline ones. Access to information does communication typically takes place not guarantee that information will be among people who already know each accessed. Similarly, access to information other offline (Uslaner, 2004). Research does not render an electorate more active conducted by Jankowski and van Selm or efficacious. (2000) indicated that online discussions seemed to be dominated by elites and seldom extended to the offline sphere of Reciprocity interaction. Other analysis of online poli- Online media enable conversations that tical deliberation revealed that collective can transcend geographic boundaries. use of the internet can lead to greater They also allow for relative anonymity in political participation, but only when it is personal expression, which could lead to characterized by trust and reciprocity (e. empowered and uninhibited public opi- g., Kobayashi et al., 2006). Studies exam- nion. Still, the technological potential for ining the connection between online global communication does not ensure political talk and social capital found that that people from different cultural back- the social connections people make grounds will also be more understanding online do not necessarily promote trust; of each other (e.g., Hill and Hughes, on the contrary, evidence suggests that 1998). The deliberative model may either online forums frequently bring together be globalized or tribalized, based on the mistrusting people (Uslaner, 2004). motivations of the political actors that put it to use. Several scholars argue that in Commercialization order for online discussion to be democratizing, meaning that it must involve Finally, commercialization presents a primary two-directional communication, cover concern for researchers who examine the topics of shared interest, and be motivated potential of the virtual sphere. The inter- by a mutually shared commitment in net has gradually transitioned into an rational and focused discoursed. These online multi-shopping mall and less of a

235 ZIZI PAPACHARISSI deliberative space, which influences the inevitably enable a public sphere. Research orientation of digital political discussion. so far has shown that access to information, As a medium constructed within a capi- reciprocity of communication, and commer- talist context, the internet is susceptible cialization are the three primary conditions to the profit-making impulses of the that prohibit the transition from public market, which do not traditionally prior- space to public sphere. A new public itize civic participation or democratization space is not synonymous with a new (O’Loughlin, 2001; Schiller, 1999, 2006). public sphere, in that a virtual space simply While equipped with an open architecture enhances discussion; a virtual sphere should that resists commercialization (Lessig, enhance democracy. Similarly, given the 2006) it is not immune to commercial nature of online deliberations, it would objectives (McChesney, 1995; Newhagen not be appropriate to even use the term and Rafaeli, 1996). For instance, in a virtual commons; the technologies at hand study of how an online democracy pro- generate common space, but do not con- ject measured up to the public sphere stitute “commons.” However, this should ideal, Dahlberg (2001) demonstrated how not be interpreted as a predicament or a such projects, while partially successful, failure. It is not online technologies that ultimately are unable to attract a sizeable fail the public sphere test; rather it could portion of the population and are fre- be the other around. This does not neces- quently “marginalized by commercial sites, sarily suggest a failure of the online poli- virtual communities of common interest, tical apparatus; it could merely suggest that and liberal individualist political practices” the language we use to describe online (Dahlberg, 2001: p. 615). Employing the technologies routinely underestimates their Habermasian concepts of colonization and potential. juridification, Salter (2005) showed how mainstream legal tendencies may restrict the democratizing potential of the inter- The virtual sphere 2.0 net. More importantly, the internet is unable to single-handedly “produce poli- As individuals become more comfortable tical culture when it does not exist in with online media, newer appropriations society at large” (McChesney, 1995: p. of the internet suggest interesting trends 13). Scholars also argue that the content that pull us farther away from the public featured online has yet to become distinct sphere ideal to a direction that is mean- from that provided by traditional mass ingful, but not what we may have media or to draw in the average citizen in expected. The remainder of this chapter the manner traditional media do (Bimber examines these trends and how they and Davis, 2003; Margolis et al., 1997; articulate the democratizing potential of Scheufele and Nisbet, 2002). Finally, the internet in a way that has little in through collaboration and mergers with common with the Habermasian public media conglomerates, creative factions of sphere but more in common with con- the internet are colonized by the com- temporary public impulses and desires. mercial concerns that standardize the content of traditional media (Davis, 1999; On the benefits of civic Margolis and Resnick, 2000). narcissism Therefore, scholarly examinations of the internet as a public sphere all point to Personalization, that is, the ability to the conclusion that online digital tech- organize information based on a subjective nologies create a public space, but do not order of importance determined by the

236 THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND BEYOND self, presents an operative feature of online pathological sense, which would imply a media such as the internet. Popular fea- personality disorder. Narcissism here is tures of the internet, such as blogs or employed to understand the introspection MySpace personal/private spaces thrive on and self-absorption that takes place in personalization. In The Culture of Narcissism, blogs and similar spaces, and to place Christopher Lasch (1979) described a self- these tendencies in historical context. centered culture that emerged following Lasch’s work, over psychological research the political turmoil of the sixties, focused on narcissism as a personality disorder, on self-improvement, “wrapped in rheto- serves an apt starting point. Narcissism is ric of authenticity and awareness,” and defined as a preoccupation with the self signifying “a retreat from politics and a that is self-directed, but not selfishly repudiation of the recent past” (p. 4–5). motivated. Narcissism is referenced as the Lasch was not describing historical trends cultural context within which blogs are that have escaped other historians. Media situated, and not as a unilateral label scholars have also picked up on and ana- characterizing all blogs. lyzed how the consequences and failures Blogs are defined as web pages that of sixties alternative politics have impac- consist of regular or daily posts, arranged ted the current relationship individuals in reverse chronological order and archived have with media or the tendency of con- (Herring et al., 2004). Initially heralded as temporary media to abandon historical a groundbreaking development in the perspective (e.g., Hart, 1994; Gitlin, world of reporting and media, blogs bear 1980, 1983; Patterson, 1993; Putnam, considerable democratizing potential as 1996; Schudson, 1998). Moreover, social they provide media consumers with the and political scientists have visited the opportunity to become media producers lasting impact social, economic, cultural, (Coleman, 2005a, 2005c). However, despite and economic changes brought on by the audience and public pulpit that blogs modernity have had on value and belief provide, they typically regress to self- systems. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have confessional posts that resemble diaries, taken a comparative look at modernity, with few exceptions that engage in jour- cultural changes, and democracy across nalistically informed punditry (Papacharissi, developed and developing societies, to 2007). Research has shown that blogs can conclude that post-industrialization has broadly be divided into A-list blogs ratified a transition from existential to self- (popular publicized blogs); blogs that are expression values. Self-expression values somewhat interconnected; and the major- are connected to the desire to control ity of sparsely socially connected and less one’s environment, a stronger desire for conversational blogs (Herring et al., 2005). autonomy, and the need to question At the same time, there are many instan- authority. Self-expression values are not ces in which bloggers exerted sizeable uncivic, and have frequently lead to sub- influence over mainstream media, usually versive or collective action movements on by creating noise over issues or political environmental protection, fair trade, and candidates initially marginalized by main- gender equality. stream media (Kerbel and Bloom, 2005; It is within a postmodern culture that Tremayne, 2006). Several major news emphasizes self-expression values that this outlets, including CNN, use blogs as “a particular breed of civically motivated finger on the pulse of the people” sub- narcissism emerges. It should be clarified stitute and routinely feature stories or at this point that the term narcissism is not content on what “the blogs” are reporting employed in a pejorative manner or in its on a given day. Other mainstream outlets,

237 ZIZI PAPACHARISSI like the New York Times, have incorpo- contemporary Americans find themselves rated blogging into their traditional overcome with (p. 11). According to reporting, and use it to provide in-depth Lasch, the self-preoccupation associated reporting and/or indulge specific journal- with the culture of narcissism “arises not ist story interests. Varied and diverse as from complacency but from desperation” they may be, news blogs frequently func- with a society that does not provide a tion as gateways for mainstream media clear distinction between public and pri- coverage. vate life (p. 26). In moments of variable Blogs, video blogs (vlogs), and similar insight bloggers engage in typical sec- expressions present an articulation of what ondary strategies of the narcissist: “pseudo Scammell (2000) terms “consumer-style self-insight, calculating seductiveness, ner- critique” (p. 354). Within this context, vous, self-deprecatory humor” (Lasch, 1979, they are symptomatic of a hedonistic and p. 33). The new Narcissus, according to materialistic culture, which, in Althusserian Lasch (1979), gazes at his/her own reflec- sense, “interpellates” its citizens as con- tion “not so much in admiration as in sumers. Political thoughts expressed on unremitting search of flaws, signs of fati- blogs are narcissistically motivated in that gue, decay,” structuring a performance of they are not created with the explicit pur- the self that is reminiscent of the thea- pose of contributing to a public sphere, the trical, as explicated by Erving Goffman commons, or heightening civic engage- (1959) in the seminal The Presentation of ment. While it is true that occasionally Self in Everyday Life. On blogs, the they impact mainstream media and public expression of public opinion on private opinion in a sizeable manner, blog con- forums (or the expression of private opinion tent is determined by subjective inclina- on a public forum—the blogger constantly tions and tendencies based on a personal plays with this distinction) becomes a evaluation of content. Quantitative analysis carefully orchestrated performance with the of blogs finds them to be largely self- other in mind. referential (Papacharissi, 2007) and moti- This particular breed of narcissism has a vated by personal fulfillment. Even news democratizing effect. The subjective focus oriented, A-list blogs present a mélange of of blogs and similar forums encourages public and private information that is plurality of voices and expands the public subjectively arrived to and removed from agenda. While narcissistically motivated, western standards of the journalistic pro- blogs are democratizing in a unique fession (objective or partisan). Bloggers manner. As Bimber (2000) argues, while blog because they simply want to. online technologies “contribute toward This particular breed of political expres- greater fragmentation and pluralism in the sion is self-serving and occasionally self- structure of civic engagement,” their ten- directed, but should not be mis-characterized dency “to deinstitutionalize politics, frag- as selfish. Similarly, Lasch understands ment communication, and accelerate the narcissistic behavior as structured around pace of the public agenda and decision the self, but not motivated by selfish making may undermine the coherence of desire. Ironically, narcissistic behavior is the public sphere” (pp. 332–3). With motivated by the desire to connect the their focus making a private agenda self to society. Lasch acknowledges the public, blogs challenge the established insecurity embedded in narcissism, but public agenda in an anarchic manner. proceeds to place that narcissism within This lack of coordination or concentrated the “sense of endless possibility” pitted civic objective limits the contribution to against “the banality of the social order” the public sphere, and exemplifies how

238 THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND BEYOND online technologies enhance democracy that, while political use of new media is in ways tangential to, but not directly vast, it does not fit the mold of the connected with, the public sphere. While Habermasian public sphere and promotes blogs and similar vehicles (e.g., YouTube. direct democracy selectively. Specifically, com) dilute the agenda-setting function of while citizens are increasingly drawn to traditional news sources, they still present digital media, they are attracted mostly to personalized media environments (Swanson, interest group and non-partisan websites 2000), and as such, have a limited con- (Cornfield et al., 2003). Digitally contribution to the greater good objectives of nected citizens still prefer websites of the public sphere. major media outlets or TV for informa- Atomized uses of online media by tion on public affairs over internet based individuals in their homes do not con- news organizations (Kohut, 2003). stitute a public or a public sphere Additional research indicates that poli- (Dahlgren, 2005), but they do successfully tical party websites are successful in make the political environment more reaching out to young voters, but are “porous” (Blumler and Gurevitch, 2000). unable to connect with people who have Blogging should not be mistaken for so far remained aloof toward politics journalism, nor should it be mistaken for (Jensen, 2003; Boogers and Voerman, a public sphere. Its value lies in demon- 2003). Availability of information alone is strating the conflict between what is pri- unable to sustain and encourage civic vate and public; a venerable and timeless engagement (Marcella et al., 2002). Those conflict that is stressed by online technol- connected enjoy participating in online ogies. The type of self-absorption we see polls and circulating political jokes and on blogs is a play, a constant game with cartoons, but are not drawn to conven- what others define as public or private tional formats of political content online and what the blogger believes should be (such as news releases and endorsements) defined as public or private. This online (Cornfield et al., 2003). user and citizen is interested in challen- On the opposite end, politicians ging what is defined as private and what is employ digital media mostly to conduct defined as public. Priorities here lie in political research, enhance two-step flow broadening and overlapping private and communication with other media and public agendas; not reviving the public opinion leaders, invite donations to political sphere. causes, and publicize news releases and endorsement (Cornfield, 2004a). Online political discussions that feature politicians Direct representation and do enjoy greater participation, but are subversion: pluralistic agonism frequently dominated by politicians who Initial reaction to the democratizing employ them to advocate for their agen- potential of online media was filled with das (Jensen, 2003). Uses of digital media the hope that citizens would employ the by politicians and the media tend to be media for the deliberative discourse of one-directional and do not sustain feed- public affairs that is emblematic of the back channels for the digital public or public sphere. The inherent assumption enable substantive citizen involvement. was that digital media would inject our Additional research points out the representative model of democracy with a capacity of digital media to connect and healthy dose of direct democracy. Recent sustain subversive movements. Subversion research on how citizens make use of of mainstream political objectives by online media worldwide, however, indicates alternative movements, while not built

239 ZIZI PAPACHARISSI in to the traditional Habermasian model, and Perlmutter (2007) found that samiz- presents an operative aptitude of digital dat (unofficial) blogs provided informa- media. The role of the internet in shaping tion not available through mainstream the anti-globalization movement specifi- media, but essential in articulating vocal cally highlights this aptitude, and better opposition to the republic’s leadership and fits within Fraser’s model of counter- supporting the “tulip revolution.” publics that compete to articulate a voice Through this exemplary review of within the public sphere. The Zapatistas’ recent studies, it becomes obvious that use of the internet for political subver- citizens go online to complement or sub- sion presents a renowned example (e.g., stitute their uses of traditional commu- Langman, 2005). Anti-globalization web- nication and directly represent their sites are instrumental to (a) establishing opinions, when possible and necessary. movement formation, (b) shaping move- Politicians and media institutions, on the ment collective identity, and (c) mobilizing other hand, make use of digital media to movement participants and organizations supplement their own agendas and in a fluid manner (Van Aelst and Walgrave, objectives, as they see fit. This model of 2002). Simone (2006) found similar con- use may ultimately have a democratizing sensus and mobilization use of the internet effect, but does not bear a direct resem- by CODEPINK, a self-identified women’s blance to the public sphere. Moreover, movement for peace. Pickard (2006) digital media prove adept at furthering explicated the centrality of the internet in mobilization and subversive action. These Seattle’s Indymedia activist efforts. To this types of uses evoke Schudson’s (1998) point, Davis (1999) found that the internet model of monitorial citizens, who “scan reinforces existing patterns of political (rather than read) the informational participation, which primarily serve tra- environment … so that they may be ditional activists and/or citizens active alerted on a variety of issues … and may beyond the norm. Similarly, the internet be mobilized around those issues in a is essential to non-profits and community large variety of ways” (p. 310). Not to be associations seeking access to the main- mistaken as inactive or uninformed, stream media agenda (Jensen et al., 2007; monitorial citizens are “defensive,” rather Kenix, 2007). Average voters and politi- than “proactive,” surveying the political cally disinterested citizens employ the scene, looking “inactive, but [poised] for internet in a less goal-directed manner. action if action is required” (p. 311). In Typically, online media succeed in mobi- the same vein, and adapted to the context lizing political expression and serving as of the internet, Bimber’s (1998) model of complements or alternatives to traditional “accelerated pluralism” presents a more media (Shah et al., 2005). accurate portrayal of the democratic role In societies that are undergoing political of the internet as contributing “to the on- transition, access to alternative media going fragmentation of the present system online becomes important. For instance, of interest-based group politics and a shift for users in Russia and the Ukraine, sites toward a more fluid, issue-based group of online-only newspapers are of primary politics with less institutional coherence” importance and online versions of offline (p. 135). news outlets, along with politician web- Contemporary uses of the internet sites, only minimally used (Semetko and suggest citizen confusion in directly enga- Krasnoboka, 2003). Similarly, in a study ging the public sphere. Some of the con- of advocacy blogs in Kyrgystan, a former fusion is associated between the paradox Soviet republic of Central Asia, Kulikova of civic engagement in representative

240 THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND BEYOND democracy, labeled by Mouffe (2000), To this point, several argue that models among others, as the “democratic paradox.” of politics structured around collective Mouffe (2000) argues that “Democracy identities present an inadequate way of requires the existence of homogenous understanding political activity in a more public sphere, and this precludes any “reflexive,” or “liquid” society (e.g., possibility of pluralism” (p. 51). Most Bauman, 2005; Beck et al., 1994; Giddens, political scientists subscribed to the more 1990). Diminished participation in the tempered viewpoint that, while civic public sphere, online or offline, reflects a engagement in representative democracy move to newer modes of civic engage- is not an impossibility, it is, nonetheless, a ment, which might be understood better compromise (e.g., Coleman, 2005c). For through Mouffe’s (2005) proposal of ago- instance, Coleman’s (2005c) conceptualiza- nistic pluralism and agonistic confrontation of the “directly-represented” citizen tion. Agonistic pluralism is formulated in presents a compromise between direct and contrast to the dialogic pluralism of the representative democracy. Direct repre- public sphere, and is aimed at radically sentation, enabled through online media, transforming existing power relations. Coleman argues, “offers many of the Mouffe (2005) employed the concept in a same benefits as direct democracy, but different context, to specifically call for fewer of the burdens,” thus allowing “citi- the reinsertion of right and left into zens the prospect of representative close- everyday politics, yet the concept is useful ness, mutuality, coherence, and empathy in understanding the effect of online sub- without expecting them to become full- versive movements on democracy. While time participating citizens.” With the incor- not all instances of subversion described poration of subversive activities enabled here have successfully destabilized the by the internet to this model, we are left existing power structure, they originated with a set of online digital media that do as adversarial, possess elements of what not revive the public sphere, but inject a Mouffe (2005) terms a “conflictual con- healthy dose of plurality to a maturing sensus,” and attempt a real confrontation model of representative democracy. based on a shared set of rules and despite In the same vein, the examples of disparate individual positions (p. 52). online activity reviewed here reflect a Mouffe (2005) defined agonism as a “we/ challenge to authority and the need for they relation” where the conflicting the expression of individual political parties, although acknowledging that they identity. Acts of online mobilization and are adversaries, operate on common subversion are aligned with Inglehart and symbolic ground and see themselves as Welzel’s (2005) model of human devel- belonging to the same association. In opment, which suggests that as societies this context, “the task of democracy is are able to cater to the existential needs to transform antagonism into agonism” of individuals, citizens then progress to (p. 20). While agonists do not function individual autonomy, thus emphasizing outside the spectrum of the public self-expression values more. Rising self- sphere, they are less concerned with public expression values do not lead to decline accord and more with self-expression in all civic activities, but they do promote and voicing disagreement. Thus, the new political habits, “linked with higher direct representation and subversive cap- levels of political action, focused on abilities of online media enable agonistic making elites more responsive to popular expressions of dissent that do not neces- demands” (p. 194). Contemporary political sary empower the public sphere, but uses of the internet reflect these tensions. enhance democracy.

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Commercially public spaces: a marginal and mainstream, while not inac- model of hybrid influence curate, frequently detracts from observing important trends. Early speculation on the democratizing For instance, the recent examples of impact of the internet addressed the online music vendors running Tower possibility of online forums being sub- Records offline stores out of business, or sumed by corporate entities and interests Blockbuster being forced to adopt a half (McChesney, 1995; Schiller, 1999, 2006). offline, half online model so as to com- From a political economy perspective, it pete with NetFlix, indicate that the is inevitable that as information technol- influence of online ventures on traditional ogies enter the capitalist market, they fi media has a more far-reaching and long- become commodi ed so as to enter the term effect than expected. Viacom’s mainstream or perish to the margins. current ongoing suit of YouTube on Within this context, several online forums digital copyright reveals not only out- emerge as alternatives to mainstream dated regulatory and market mentalities media, but easily forfeit their singularity as about copyright law, but also how deeply they merge with larger corporate entities threatened media giant conglomerates are and become corporate brands themselves. by smaller, but more flexible, online Numerous companies have gone through entities. The recent marketing decision of such cycles, including AOL being bought all major networks to make primetime by Time Warner and gradually losing its shows available through their own web- unique place on the market, Excite being sites, shortly after they air on TV presents merged into AT&T and failing to retain a formal recognition of changes to the its competitive share of the market, and market and audience structure effected by fi Napster rst being sued by music con- entities offering on demand content, for glomerates, then eventually partnering free (peer-to-peer file exchange) or nom- with entertainment and telecommunica- inal charges (iTunes, Tivo). tions companies to launch a semi-successful Thus, the rigid model of mainstream online music venture. conglomerates subsuming the smaller More recently, Google, the on-again- marginal firms is being gradually replaced off-again auctioning of Facebook, the by a model of hybrid influence. This YouTube/Google partnership, and the should not suggest that marginal online incorporation of MySpace.com into News ventures and the alternative interests they Corporation present some of the latest represent are no longer commodified, or ventures currently being valuated in the that the larger conglomerates are being present market cycle (and will likely have subverted. However, through a gradual undergone significant transformations by process, which unfolds over the long the time this chapter goes to print). Like term, the dynamics of the market are their predecessors, these companies gain actively challenged and conglomerates are stature by challenging conventional media being forced to adopt a more flexible business and attracting new audiences. structure that can more easily adapt and Media scholars ascertain that as new ven- serve an audience that has become more tures become commodified, they transition selective, elusive, and whimsical. This from public spaces to commercial spaces, development produces conglomerates and thus compromise their democratizing with a more fluid and transient structure; potential. However, this cycle is not that firms that must not only include, but simple or predictable, and conceptualizing adopt, the practices of the marginal firms market dynamics through the dualities of they buy out so as to survive. What does

242 THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND BEYOND this imply for the democratizing potential may present a more accurate reflection of of online media? Online public spaces do contemporary and postmodern public needs not become immune to commercialization. and wants. However, they become adept at promoting a hybrid of commercially public interaction that caters to audience demands and Conclusion is simultaneously more viable within a capitalist market. The public sphere, in its many forms and The case of YouTube presents such an conceptualizations by a variety of scholars, example of a commercially public space. presents a concept that allows us to YouTube contains vast amounts of audio- understand civic engagement in historical visual content, presented in an amorphous context. As a construct, the public sphere format that makes the site virtually also helps explicate the influence of the impossible to monitor or regulate. Some mass media on public discourse, in mass of this content violates copyright, in that societies that employ varying models of it blatantly reproduces content already capitalist markets and representative copyrighted by other entities. Other types democracy. Research on the political of content present creative re-workings of potential of the internet is frequently rapt media content in ways that endorse the in the dualities of determinism, utopian audience member as media producer, and and dystopian. In reviewing literature on promote political satire and dialog. Finally, the role of the internet in political life, YouTube also features original content Howard (2001) characteristically con- that serves a variety of purposes, ranging cluded that the first set of scholarship was from catching a politician in a lie to “too favorable,” the latest “too somber” impromptu karaoke. This blend or hybrid (p. 949). Scholarly research does not lend of commercial and public interest is support to a virtual sphere, modeled after interesting enough to sustain audiences the public sphere. Moreover, uses that the and viable enough to scare off conglom- public spontaneously invents for the erates (YouTube was recently bought out internet are removed from the ideal of by the more fluid-structured, medium- the public sphere, counter-publics, or sized, Google and consequently sued by similar conceptualizations. As Noam Viacom, who saw versions of its copy- (2005), among others, argued, the internet righted content featured on YouTube web is not “Athens, nor Appenzell, nor space). These commercially public spaces Lincoln-Douglas. It is, if anything, less of may not render a public sphere, but they democracy than those low-tech places. provide spaces where individuals can But of course, none of these places really engage in healthy democratic practices, existed either, except as an ideal, a goal, including keeping a check on politicians, or an inspiration” (p. 58). engaging in political satire, and expres- Models that emphasize the plurality sing/circulating political opinions. These enabled by digital media (Bimber, 1998), spaces are essential in maintaining a poli- contemporary citizen needs and wants tically active consciousness that may, when (Schudson, 1997), and the ability of the necessary, articulate a sizeable oppositional internet to amplify political processes (Agre, voice, in response to concentrated owner- 2002) present more realistic assessments of ship regulation (as described in McChesney, online media potential. Romanticized 2004) or U.S. foreign policy (as described retrospectives of past and future civic in Hands, 2006). While distinct from the engagement often impose language and public sphere of the past, these tendencies expectations that curtail the true potential

243 ZIZI PAPACHARISSI of technologies of the present. The public this private sphere, the citizen is alone, sphere can be helpful in critiquing and but not lonely or isolated. Connected, contextualizing the political role of online the citizen operates in a mode and with media, but not in prescribing that role. political language determined by him or Public sphere rhetoric set aside, the her. Primarily still monitorial in orienta- question of the democratic relevance of tion, the citizen is able to become an online media remains. The trends identi- agonist of democracy, if needed, but in an fied in this essay capture more recent atomized mode. tendencies in online deliberative spaces. The private sphere is empowering, These tendencies are situated in narcissis- liquid, and reflexive. But, what happens tically derived, civically beneficial expres- to the public sphere, when all political sions of political opinion present in blogs; action retreats to the private sphere? This subversive actions articulated in discourse transition from the prominent public realm that emphasizes plurality and agonism; to private spaces could equal alienation, in and, finally, privately generated narratives which “the specific and usually irreplace- published in commercially public spaces. able in-between which should have been These tendencies form as an extension of formed between the individual and his previous dimensions of the virtual sphere, fellow men” is lost (Arendt, 1968: p. 4). It identified as access, reciprocity, and com- is precisely this “in-between,” which, as mercialization. But, in both recent and individuals act civically from the locus of earlier appropriations of online media, the the private sphere, is filled in by online tension between the “public” and the digital media. Unlike offline digital media, “private” is prevalent. The common online technologies possess “reflexive” thread among all these tendencies can be architecture, responsive to the needs of located in the individual, who operates multiple private spheres, which would be civically in a political sphere that is foun- isolated were it not for the connectivity ded about the tension between that capabilities of online media. which is considered public and that which is considered private. Participating in a moveon.org online protest, expressing Guide to further reading political opinion on blogs, viewing or posting content on YouTube, or posting As we look for contemporary metaphors a comment in an online discussion group and new language with which to describe represents an expression of dissent with a and understand the political potential of public agenda, determined by mainstream online media, it is necessary to con- media and political actors. textualize our assessments within human Strikingly, these potentially powerful development. For those interested in the acts of dissent emanate from a private internet as a public sphere (or not, as I sphere of interaction, meaning that the argued here), readings beyond the obli- citizen engages and is enabled politically gatory public sphere literature, should through a private media environment include a balanced combination of ponti- located within the individual’s personal fication and data reflecting social, political, and private space. Whereas in the truest economic, and cultural trends. Habermas iterations of democracy, the citizen was (2004), in his recent writings (e.g., The enabled through the public sphere, in Divided West), refers less to the public contemporary democracy, the citizen acts sphere, and more to concepts like cos- politically from a private sphere of reflec- mopolitanism, which could inform how a tion, expression, and behavior. Within “global” citizen functions in an online

244 THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND BEYOND digital environment. Toby Miller’s (2007) and the complex interaction of socio- Cultural Citizenship traces the transition cultural factors to be considered as we of citizenship from the political to the interpret the meaning of contemporary cultural realm, presenting an argument technology. Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) that could explain several behaviors we more recent set of data and accompanying observe on online public environments. analysis trace a progression of human Zygmunt Bauman, in any of his books values that we all notice in our everyday on liquid modernity (he typically pub- lives, but lack the vocabulary with which lishes two every year), synthesizes con- to discuss. Finally, for a proper under- temporary social and political theory to standing of how social, political, eco- provide a lively and accurate depiction of nomic, and cultural trends converge, I public life in the age of modernity and like to read the work of architects, and beyond. Any work by Manuel Castells anything by Rem Koolhaas presents a sets the standard for interdisciplinarity, good starting point.

245 18 Identity, technology, and narratives Transnational activism and social networks

W. Lance Bennett and Amoshaun Toft

Social movement research often regards collective identity and collective action frames as central for movement development or decline. Yet the social fragmentation experienced by younger generations in late-modern societies suggests a decline in formal memberships and collective identities, and rising participation in loose-tie networks. Narratives play important roles in structuring these networks, but they may or may not operate as collective action frames brokered by leading organizations. Many action stories are open to highly personalized and diverse interpretations, enabling flexible relationships between individuals and organizations. In other cases, narratives flow through gatekeeping nodes in networks such as planning committees or network support organizations. Such narrative gatekeeping by leading network organizations can affect the diffusion of identity cues across networks, resulting in structural coherence or tensions. We examine three cases that suggest different contributions of communication technologies and narrative flow to the relationships among organizations and individual activists in mobilization networks: the global anti-war protests against the Iraq war; the planning and cancellation of a regional social forum; and a comparison of fair trade networks in the U.S. and the U.K.

The changing organization of social activism large-scale activist networks, such as those in post-industrial societies has received associated with the recent surge of trans- considerable attention, from the study of national activism, occur effortlessly online. “new” social movements (Buechler, 1995; Our interest is to determine where infor- Melucci, 1994), to exploring information mation technologies fit into the conven- networks in transnational advocacy (Keck tional gamut of protests, campaigns, and and Sikkink, 1998), to the examination of endless meetings that bring people into self-organizing properties in technology- direct contact. At the same time, many enabled permanent campaigns (Bennett, forms of activism—particularly those that 2003). We are interested in how net- cross national and cultural boundaries— working technologies operate in different blur easy distinctions between on- and social activism contexts. Social technolo- offline behavior. The difficult question is gies do not offer magic solutions in the to locate the connective elements that formation of activist networks, nor do enable people to travel across inter- they often replace organizations, meet- personal and digital pathways, and in the ings, or rallies as means of building soli- process, cross individual, organizational, darity. We begin with this point as a and network levels of action. We suggest caution against thinking that persistent, that the uses and flows of narratives in the

246 TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM, IDENTITY, AND TECHNOLOGY organization of political action illuminate technologies—including their reasons for, the interplay between technology and and their ways of using them. human interaction, while providing links We propose to explore how technol- among different levels of analysis required ogy and narrative organization play out in for understanding protest organization. three different contexts in which activist The junctures and disjunctions in the relationships form and become expressed: composition of networks can be thought protests, campaigns, and social forums. Each of as choices at different levels (e.g., indi- type of activity represents a different slice vidual, organization, and network-wide) of activist life, and each arguably requires about what to identify with and how the others in order to create sustainable strongly. Stories often embody and cali- and effective movements. Protest events brate those identifications at different such as marches, vigils, and demonstra- levels of analysis. For example, if we focus tions draw dramatic attention to causes, on the organizational level in protest net- and give activists opportunities to vent works, identifying the uses of narrative and publicly express emotional concerns. quickly takes us to the nexus between Campaigns target larger audiences with individuals and organizations: what orga- more detailed information about why nizational stories enable which individuals they might want to join in protest against to identify with them, leading them to offending campaign targets. And forums form what kinds of relationships (e.g., provide opportunities for the activist from formal membership to loose affinity) community to reflect, learn, plan, and with which organizations? The ways in celebrate their causes. This analysis exam- which stories join or separate individuals ines a case of each type of activity with an and organizations may affect how net- eye to how narratives travel over network ties are established and how easy works and either enable or inhibit the they are to sustain. loose-tied relationships that social tech- Stories also may become elemental in nologies can help establish. the flow or blockage of information Our first case explores the “World Says across internet connections among indivi- No to War” protests on February 15th, duals and organizations. Some degree of 2003, when 15–20 million people took to the linking in most contemporary protest the streets in opposition to the impending networks is electronic—machines com- U.S. invasion of Iraq. In what many regard municating with people and with other as the largest coordinated mobilization in machines. Not only are costs of organiza- human history, activists and organizations tion potentially reduced by digital linking, working on a wide range of issues showed but various technology links may well their support for a common political become part of organizational structure demand—“No War on Iraq,” a frame of themselves. Stories are relatively easy to such breadth that millions of individuals embed, whether in whole or in part, in and organizations could raise their own digital media, from action alerts in e-mail narrative versions of the issue within it. lists, to the mission statements and “get That broad narrative freedom enabled involved” pages of websites, to electronic many individuals to develop flexible rela- forums that enable members to tell and tionships with sponsoring organizations, share stories about their concerns. resulting in the broad use of digital media to Pentland and Feldman (2007) suggest that activate diverse personal political networks technologies, alone, do not organize (Bennett, Breunig, and Givens, 2008). social networks apart from the stories that Our second case, which may be generally people share through and about those described as centered on a long-running

247 W. LANCE BENNETT AND AMOSHAUN TOFT campaign (surrounded by various protest narrative harmony in the U.K. and the events and forums), compares fair trade tensions in the U.S. are clearly reflected networks in the U.S. and the U.K. Those in the distances and clusters in the struc- networks consist of individuals and var- ture of web linkages in the two networks ious types of organizations seeking fair (Bennett et al., 2007). compensation for the producers of com- Our third case looks at the organization modities such as coffee, tea, and cocoa in and cancellation of the Northwest Social the global south. While both the U.S. Forum (NWSF) in the northwestern and the U.K. campaign networks are United States and southwestern Canada. transnational in character and dedicated to Social forums have emerged as valuable a common cause, the lead national “gate- tools in building cross-issue and trans- keeping” organizations differ substantially national collaboration and solidarity by in the stories they promote about how providing spaces for speakers, workshops, individuals, companies, and, ultimately, films, and social networking to explore nations can best engage with fair trade. issues, strategies, and social divisions. The The national certification and labeling organizers of the NWSF set explicit organization in the U.K. (the Fairtrade narrative goals to empower traditionally Foundation) emphasizes a layered narra- disempowered groups such as people of tive that encompasses both individual color and indigenous groups. However, conscientious consumption and collective the broadly shared narrative of an open (including national and transnational participatory organizing process ultimately policy) commitments to principles of clashed (in the view of many participants) social and economic justice in trading with an adopted planning committee relationships. The relatively radical col- process aimed at building personal rela- lective action story of global economic tionships with disempowered groups. exploitation has been widely publicized This process was accompanied by deci- through a national trade justice campaign in sions to reject more technology-based, which the Fairtrade Foundation joins loose tie networking strategies for orga- most other major fair trade groups to nizing and communicating with partici- mobilize public action for fairer national pants in the forum. The inability to create and international trade policies. Thus, strong tie relationships in a short time led narratives about exploitation and justice to the last minute cancellation of the sit comfortably alongside more persona- event, followed by critical and often per- lized, less explicitly political narratives sonally hostile narratives expressed on the about reasons for responsible consump- list serve, and the collapse of the Forum tion, all of which are given room for process (Toft et al., 2007). expression in web forums, e-mail lists, and other media affordances such as events calendars. By contrast, the U.S. Narratives and frames as certification and labeling organization distinct analytical constructs (Transfair USA) emphasized the individual “conscientious consumer” version of Our cases indicate that the framing of the fair trade narrative to the near exclu- action (Entman, 1993; Benford and Snow, sion of the trade justice story, creating 2000) still matters, but often in surprising tensions with many other actors in the U.S. ways that do not always fit easily along- network who would prefer elevating the side the conventional social movement justice story, which they see as part of a notions of collective identity frames being larger narrative whole. The relative the sine qua non of movement building

248 TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM, IDENTITY, AND TECHNOLOGY and stability. In fact, our research indicates products. The narrative split in the U.S. is that there may be advantages to looking reflected in tensions in the larger network at narrative processes as distinct from the that affect the capacity of the movement to ever-popular communication concepts of undertake various kinds of collective action. frames and framing. Several distinct advan- Third, even when frames are com- tages may be revealed in separating narra- monly accepted across a broad spectrum tives from frames as analytical constructs. of a network, communication practices First, some frames may be shorthand may inhibit the kinds of narrative co- references for clear and commonly shared production (through actions and story underlying narratives, while others may sharing) that people need to verify and not. Consider the Iraq war protest frame affirm the underlying meanings of frames. of “No War in Iraq,” which is a frame As a result, frames that may be passio- that traveled around the globe and drew nately embraced as general principles may millions of protesters. Yet, within that end up being experienced in particular frame, were gathered untold numbers of networks as empty slogans, or contested stories that differed as to why the war was on grounds of betrayal by one faction wrong (another case of U.S. imperialism, against others. For example, the frames of ill considered policy, attacking the wrong openness and inclusiveness were unassail- country, lack of diplomatic initiatives, able bywords for most who planned to etc.) and what should be done in its stead attend the Northwest Social Forum. Yet (sanctions, diplomacy, more limited military the thick-tie (low tech) strategy pursued action, nothing, etc.). Thus, identifying an by the planning committee to draw in organizing frame may not lead to much disempowered groups ultimately failed, understanding of the underlying narratives leaving many outside the planning com- that give it meaning, much less help us mittee to doubt the credibility of the understand how those underlying narratives process, asking how an open and inclusive affect the organization of protest networks. process could be canceled by a commit- Second, in some networks multiple tee; to which many on the inside argued frames can be embedded comfortably that those who later expressed criticism within the same commonly accepted could have joined the process. story, while in other comparable net- These examples of how narratives and works the same frames may be viewed as frames can be usefully separated as analy- constituting competing or incompatible tical concepts are not exhaustive of the narratives about the rationale for action. reasons for keeping the concepts distinct. Thus the lead organizations in the U.K. However, they suggest important ways in fair trade coffee network appear generally which narratives operate in relation to to agree that personal consumer choices frames via various social mechanisms and are one part of a larger fight for national communication technologies that help and international trade justice, making the them travel across networks. It is to these two frames of responsible consumer technological features of narrative net- choice and trade justice easy elements of working that we now turn. the same grand narrative. In the U.S., by contrast, some leading organizations are careful to emphasize consumer choice Activist networks and while avoiding trade justice in the context technology of a larger market-oriented, business- friendly narrative about fair trade being Accounting for the presence or absence of good for businesses that sell certified different types of social technologies in

249 W. LANCE BENNETT AND AMOSHAUN TOFT activist networks involves thinking about opposite problem of low capacity to choices available to individuals and orga- coordinate strategies, or even to turn nizations. Both organizations and indivi- protest actions on and off (Bennett, 2003). duals make choices as they join, organize, Allowing an integral role for technol- and leave networks, producing different ogy choices in the analysis of social acti- sorts of collective action. Some of those vism means that social software and the choices are enabled or limited by tech- devices that run them can be understood nology access, resources, and skills. For as non-human actants in complex social instance, large portions of the world’s networks, to borrow a term from actor population still have little or no real access network theory (Latour, 2005). Instead of to the internet. Sometimes the network- thinking of networks only as extensions ing choices are more strategic, reflecting of human actions, this approach enables fundamental conceptions about the kinds us to see how elements of the physical of relationships organizations want with environment (from fair trade labels on their members and affiliates, or that indi- coffee bags, to social networking software viduals seek with organizations and each and the platforms that run it) contribute other. For example, election campaigns in independently to the scale, speed, or many nations today could turn over sub- durability of networks. The presence or stantial levels of content production and absence of basic technology features such decision-making to large numbers of as calendars, open forums, or links can supporters by joining them through inter- inhibit or facilitate the sharing of stories active networking technologies (Chadwick, along networks, and affect the identifica- 2006). However, few parties, candidates tions and action choices among potential or, more importantly, their political con- participants. sultants are willing to abandon the so- called war room, centrally organized model of campaigns (Center for Communication Identity, narratives, and and Civic Engagement, 2004). In contrast network dynamics to elections, other kinds of campaigns are much more decentralized, and more Affiliation with an online activist organi- driven by technologically facilitated rela- zation such as MoveOn in the U.S. entails tionships among actors. For example, many receiving e-mail or text message alerts and so-called logo campaigns pressing companies calls to action, which often include for greater social responsibility in envir- requests to send them along to friends. onment, labor, or trade practices have This social networking often involves been relatively self-organizing, even (and sharing a personal story or message. These perhaps especially) when disparate players personal accounts may then be fed back possess only the barest of organizational to the network as examples of how resources (Bennett and Lagos, 2007). others, who remain complete strangers, Some of these predominantly internet- have framed their participation. At any based campaigns have proved remarkably level of analysis, from the individual, to sustainable, while offering players—both the organization, to the network, stories organizations and individuals—a great locate actors in relationship to action: deal of autonomy in how and when to Who am I? What do I think about this participate. While highly managed cam- protest? What do I do? Who am I with? paigns like elections restrict bottom–up Do I belong to their group? Who are interactivity in order to act strategically, they? What do they do? How do they do decentralized campaigns can have the it? Why?

250 TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM, IDENTITY, AND TECHNOLOGY

Just as narrative elements help us move party is seen as being too small a player in analytically from individuals, to organiza- an organization’s scheme to warrant tions, to personal networks, we can also attention; alternatively, the relationship start at other points in network forma- may be close, but too controversial to tions and travel along other paths. For acknowledge publicly. As elements of example, we can look at how organiza- narratives join individuals and organizations signal to individuals and to other tions in dynamic networks, the relatively organizations: Who are we? What do we open or closed nature of the stories—that is, do? Who do we do it with? How do we the willingness of individuals and organi- act? What do we ask from you? Such zations to share ownership and control identifying story elements can be found in over them—helps determine the size and websites under familiar tabs such as About degree of distributed or centralized struc- Us, Get Involved, What You Can Do, ture of the network. For example, as Mission Statement, and so on. noted earlier, the main fair trade labeling By moving among individuals and (narrative gatekeeping) organization in organizations, narratives thus play a cen- the U.S. promotes a business-friendly tral role in the formation of the ties that consumer story while downplaying a constitute networks. Polletta (1998, 2006) more radical trade justice narrative, con- argues that the development of narratives tributing to a network with relatively about the reasons for action contributes large path distances among organizations. significantly to participants’ self-conceptions One result is that a few social justice non- and ultimately the ways that they institu- governmental organizations (NGOs) must tionalize those experiences. Once organi- take on a disproportionate share of the zations generate mission inspiring narratives, influence work, as reflected in a high they may develop into strategic “collec- volume of out-linking to other organiza- tive action frames” that “assign meaning tions to help keep the network together. to and interpret, relevant events and con- Organizations not only negotiate with ditions in ways that are intended to mobi- each other to find suitable action frames lize potential adherents and constituents, that accommodate their respective stories, to garner bystander support, and to demo- but those stories are also in play with bilize antagonists” (Snow and Benford, individuals who can form various kinds of 1988: 198). relationships with organizations in the Whether collective action frames mobilization process. Where individual emerge, or whether more open framing level identity properties may have been permits action based on diverse individual relatively less important in the era of mass and organizational narratives, under- media and mass social membership, digital standing the properties of resulting net- media both reflect and enhance the works may be enhanced by examining capacity of individuals to communicate in the technologies through which frames personalized ways. Far from being a and underlying narratives flow. Consider, technologically deterministic process, we for example, what may be revealed about prefer to think about them as an interac- a network in the weblinks among orga- tion between the development of com- nizations. In- and out-linking in techno- munication technologies and patterns of logically enabled networks may reflect social change. perceptions on the part of organizations The capacity for collective action in that others share concerns about issues or fragmenting (Beck, 1999, 2000; Putnam, problems (Rogers, 2002). Failure to 2000) and increasingly personalized societies return links may signal that an in-linking (Giddens, 1991; Bennett, 1998) increasingly

251 W. LANCE BENNETT AND AMOSHAUN TOFT hinges on the formation of networks for more inclusive organizations around lifestyles and the personal political fueled by co-production of narra- values of individuals who often do not tives via networking technologies wish to cede authority to, or otherwise favors (indeed, defines) weak tie conform to, the membership require- networks. Weak ties empower indi- ments of conventional political organiza- viduals to mobilize their own tions. As a result of the shifting nature of diverse political networks. social identification and organization, many conventional political interest orga- These propositions help explain a good nizations are replacing formal membership deal about network dynamics. For exam- requirements with more entrepreneurial ple, it is not surprising that the lack of a relationships that reduce various costs and binding narrative definition for the inclu- conditions of collective action (Flanagin, sive “No War in Iraq” frame of the global Stohl, and Bimber, 2006). Social move- protests enabled considerable grass-roots ments attempting to span geographical technology deployment and a high level (particularly national political) spaces and of personal-level network activation (per- social differences may reflect these chan- haps accounting for the speed and scale of ges most clearly. For example, della Porta the mobilization). By contrast, the strain (2005) talks about the flexible identities that between the inclusiveness and diversity are drawn to global justice networks frames and the relatively centralized, low- where much of the bridging and bonding tech planning of the social forum may is done at the individual level. account for both the shock expressed at All of this suggests that the nature of its cancellation and the fact that list traffic network relationships and their technolo- actually increased in terms of the number gical management play out along two and diversity of posts after the event was dimensions of identity-related tensions: canceled. The following sections explore these two dimensions of networks in & At the organization level: organi- more detail. zational pressures for collective identification lead to more centralized Collective identification versus strategic management of inter- inclusiveness and diversity organizational relationships and individual membership requirements, As we enter an era marked by public generally resulting in less deploy- reaction to evolved global economic and ment of interactive technology and state-level political arrangements, many participation in the production of new forms of political and cultural asso- narrative content. By contrast, an ciations are forming across borders and emphasis on inclusiveness and diver- issues (Clark, 2003; Cohen and Rai, 2000; sity is likely to lead to a greater della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; Garrido use of interactive technology that and Halavais, 2003; Kaldor, 2003). invites bottom–up action initiatives Movements are organizing in the trans- and accompanying narration. national arena, connecting geographically & At the network level: collective disconnected groups with common issues identification pressures typically and targets of protest. As a result, many result in preferences for strong tie single-issue movements are developing coalitions, with the attendant pro- capacities to organize across issues, as evi- blems of high maintenance and dent in the connections among envir- limits on growth. The preference onmentalism, shade-grown coffee, organic

252 TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM, IDENTITY, AND TECHNOLOGY production, and some branches of the fair Weak ties versus strong trade movement. In the process, collective coalitions in networks identity requirements for membership and As a result of the distribution of oppor- belonging are relaxed, personal narratives tunities and demands for collective or are easier to publicize, and technology more inclusive identification with organi- applications are coded to facilitate net- zations and causes, networks take on dif- works in more diverse and creative ways. ferent organizational forms, with varying Information and communication tech- mixes of strong-tie relationships between nologies (ICTs) have created a capacity to ffi aggregate audiences by linking dense net- individuals and groups, to weaker a nity works of personal, “micro media” such as ties that enable greater individual choice over the terms of engagement. Granovetter e-mail, personal blogs, and text messa- ff ging, to “middle media” channels such as (1973) measured these di erences in the issue blogs, NGO sites, or Indymedia, strength of relationship ties in terms of ff “the amount of time, the emotional o ering activists unprecedented channels fi of communication (Peretti, 2001, 2003). intensity, the intimacy (mutual con ding), The growth of large and less centrally and the reciprocal services which char- ” organized networks populated with large acterize the tie (1361). By creating a numbers of upstart organizations and triad categorization scheme consisting of “direct activists” may repel old line social strong ties, weak ties, and absent ties, movement organizations working on Granovetter (1973) outlined a theoretical particular issues, making them reluctant to basis for understanding the social organi- give up or share control of political nar- zation of strong cohesive groups and — ratives and strategies. Research on social broader loose networks something that movements has begun to reflect this shift, is particularly relevant to social movement supplementing the traditional focus on research. The persistent issue campaigns collective identity as a defining quality of that surround companies like Starbucks, movement organizations and networking McDonald’s, Shell, Monsanto, Microsoft, dynamics (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tilly, and Nike exemplify weak-ties networks 1978), with greater attention to “meaning of individuals and organizations sharing creation” (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991: 55) resources but often engaging in autono- and the contestation of “codes” in modern mous activity. The explosion of “parallel informational societies (Melucci, 1996). summits” (Pianta, 2003) like social fora While it is clear that organizations still have provided spaces for disseminating play an important role in building and public information, proposing alternative networking modern social movements policies, and networking among civil (Fisher et al., 2005), the role of informa- society organizations through loose ties tion technologies has had a significant operating under common umbrella impact on the form and function of poli- themes such as globalization (Pianta and tical mobilization. In some cases ICT Silva, 2003; della Porta, 2005; Diani, applications allow large and diverse 2003; Galaskiewics and Wasserman, 1993; populations to find common cause in Garrido and Halavais, 2003; Scott, 2000; networks that challenge conventional Whitaker, 2004). organizational structures and capacities. A What distributed networks lack in terms variety of networking technologies, have of traditional organizational resources they enabled these so-called “weak tie” networks often gain in networking capacities through to shape participation in a wide range of the use of social technologies to facilitate cross-issue movements (Bennett, 2003). the maintenance and activation of weak

253 W. LANCE BENNETT AND AMOSHAUN TOFT ties (Bennett, 2003). Bimber (1998) expan- engagement (i.e., create collective frames ded Granovetter’s (1973) strong and weak and master stories), the role of technol- ties analysis to the impact of communica- ogy, beyond simply reducing commu- tion technologies on social organization, nication costs, is often more limited. hypothesizing that “the Net is accelerating the process of issue group formation and action”—something he calls “accel- Narratives, identities, and erated pluralism” (Bimber, 1998: 136). technology networks: three This trend exhibits “a shift toward a cases system of more rapidly changing issue groups, with less stability and less depen- We illustrate these intersections of iden- dence on private and public institutional tity, narrative, and technology with brief structures” (Bimber, 1998: 155). Such a elaborations of the three cases introduced move towards fluid parallel information earlier: the global anti-war protests against structures (Kidd, 2003), alongside existing the Iraq war in 2003; a comparison of fair institutions, facilitates the development of trade networks in the U.S. and the U.K., myriad weak ties between individuals, and the organization and cancellation of and loose collectivities of specialized issue a regional social forum in the northwest groups. U.S. and southwest Canada. These developments suggest that technologies can do more than reduce orga- No war in Iraq nizational costs: they can greatly enhance the capacity of individuals to organize The planning of the February 15, 2003 weak-tie networks, enabling the contribu- global anti-war protests can be traced to tion of information by single actors to a the European Social Forum meetings in “collective good” (Marwell and Oliver, the summer of 2002. The Forum dis- 1993; Rogers, 2004; Bimber, Flanagin, played its rapid networking capacity with and Stohl, 2005: 372). In other words, at the mobilization of a half million demon- some point on this spectrum of organiza- strators in the streets of Florence. While tional types, the communication process some observers worried that the shift in becomes the organizational structure, making focus from global justice to anti-war technology inseparable from the social might sidetrack and deplete the energy of network itself. However, we also caution the globalization movement, it turned out against sweeping generalizations regarding that the existing emphasis on weak ties the role of technology in political mobi- and flexible identities enabled focus-shifting lization. Clearly not all situations tap the with relative ease. Subsequent regional interactivity and networking potential of meetings leading to the World Social digital media. We find that when iden- Forum gathering in January of 2003 tity requirements (formal membership, resulted in remarkable consensus around ideological commitment, collective fram- sharing the broadest possible action frame: ing) are relaxed so that individuals can “No War in Iraq”—a frame within which find social ties and narrative connections many other narratives could fit, includ- that are personally comfortable, technol- ing imperialism, peace, anti-racism, and ogy networks have the potential to do global justice, among others. Subsequent considerable organizational work. When protest cycles after the war was launched organizations, or powerful factions within continued to invite diversity of personal them, fight for control over the collective and organizational narratives, a fact that agenda and try to set the terms of political often confounded mass media journalists

254 TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM, IDENTITY, AND TECHNOLOGY looking for “the story” about the protests. Even more interesting is that activists Resulting news coverage often focused on with more diverse network identifications the chaos or incoherence of the move- also tended to be more likely to have ment itself, themes that have also char- some affiliation with organizations involved acterized news framing of globalization in helping to coordinate the demonstra- protests (Bennett et al., 2004). Looked at tions. Both association with sponsoring differently, the case of the Iraq protests organizations and holding diverse personal suggests that the openness of the framing political networks turn out, after statistical shared by the sponsoring organizations analysis, to be strong predictors of domi- (including some strongly ideological groups) nant e-media use even when entered in was key to the broad activation of weak-tie the same regression equation and con- networks. trolling for various demographic variables. A survey of 6753 demonstrators in 8 This suggests that organizations continue nations (Germany, the U.K., Spain, to play a role in rapid, large-scale mobili- Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, zation such as demonstrations, but the key and the U.S.) showed that many different to the scale and speed of mobilization is kinds of organizations were involved, and whether lead organizations are open to that there was considerable diversity in action stories that allow individuals to activist profiles, from first-time demon- activate their own networks to magnify strators, to single-issue advocates, to acti- the turnout. While we cannot definitively vists with diverse issue commitments and connect all the links in this complex chain protest histories (Walgrave and Rucht, of inference, we tentatively propose that 2008). While there were national differ- chains of weak ties from organizations, to ences in the demographic composition of individuals, to their personal social and the demonstrators, one notable feature issue networks were managed by digital characterized all the national samples: information technologies in ways that activists who had the most diverse perso- contributed to the scale of the protests nal political network identifications also (both numbers of participants and geo- tended to manage their information and graphic dispersion of sites) and the speed communication activities with digital (a matter of months) with which they media. Diversity of network identification were organized. While the flow of narra- was measured in several distinct ways: tives in such a complex mobilization is individual-level sympathy and strength of difficult to document, the continuing identification with the global justice openness among lead organizations to an movement (which tends to favor inclu- inclusive story surely helped activate the siveness and diversity among its narrative broadest reach of those weak-tie networks frames), the number of different organi- (Bennett, Givens, and Breunig, 2008). zational memberships logged for each demonstrator, and the number of different Buyer be fair: a tale of two issues for or against which each respon- nations dent had demonstrated in the past. Each of these measures was associated with Our second case involves comparing two dominant e-media use (high reliance on large-scale fair trade networks in the U.S., e-mail, lists, websites, and low reliance on and the U.K. This case illustrates the mass media) for obtaining and sharing effects of different narrative flows on information about the demonstrations, for organization and technology deployment promoting social change, and for obtain- in those networks. Recall that the fair ing general political information. trade story most evident in the U.S.

255 W. LANCE BENNETT AND AMOSHAUN TOFT emphasizes individual consumer choice to national labeling organizations Transfair create market demand to persuade large USA and the Fairtrade Foundation in the companies such as Starbucks to be more U.K., which exert gatekeeping influence socially responsible in their buying and over the network due to control of the marketing of products. In the U.K., con- certification process and dispensing the sumer choice stories also exist, but they trademarks that populate the physical are generally embedded in broader narra- environment with clear signals about pro- tives that include more radical social jus- ducts and the stores and brands selling tice scripts about inequality, injustice, and them. Due to the greater agreement on sustainable development policies. These the combined consumer and justice nar- social and economic justice narratives rative, the U.K. network displayed more often invite individuals to go beyond closeness, less brokerage or path distance, buying fair trade coffee or chocolate, and and more coherence in the mobilization to organize their towns, schools, and of individual actions beyond buying fair offices, or contact their member of par- trade products. In addition, the U.K. net- liament, the U.K. trade minister, or the work organization websites offered indivi- president of the European Union to duals more opportunities to contribute advocate trade justice policies. By con- their own content, along with encour- trast, there are few invitations to contact agement to contact different levels of gov- government about policy issues in the U.S. ernment to pressure for change in trade The heavily consumer framing more policies. The U.S. network organizations often encourages individuals to ask for fair (including many of the NGOs in the trade products and avoid radical political network) offered fewer opportunities to messages that might offend businesses. contribute content, fewer points of contact Organizations that promote more radical with government, and far greater oppor- stories in the U.S. often sit at the margins tunities to buy products (Bennett et al., of the main network, sometimes even 2007). promoting different schemes for certifying products and the companies that sell Canceling a forum: building on them. success, learning from failure The distributions of narratives across these networks are reflected in the linking pat- The World Social Forum (WSF) has terns among organizations. For example, established itself as a global justice icon organizations in the U.S. network that gathered under a simple frame: “Another favored a trade justice narrative tended to World is Possible” (Schönleitner, 2003). have greater path distances from the more The presentation of such an open frame, consumer/market oriented sites, requiring has functioned as an umbrella, allowing a considerably greater out-linking efforts by diverse array of narratives to develop a small number of centralized organiza- (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003). This flex- tions (such as Global Exchange) to keep ibility has also impacted the spread of the the network together. By contrast, the WSF model, and dozens of local social U.K. network contained considerably smal- forums have taken root across the globe, ler path distances among organizations, often borrowing and adapting its 14-point with more organizations sharing the Charter of Principles (Olivers, 2004; out-linking load in network influence. Pleyers, 2004). The Northwest Social An important source of these different Forum (NWSF) would have been the network structures are the pronounced second social forum in the U.S., following narrative differences on the sites of the the Boston Social Forum.

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The NWSF was developed as an With only a few months to organize ambitious project, spanning a broad range the event after an opening planning retreat, of issues across a significant geographical meetings became more constrained and it area. While the initial event was sched- became difficult to achieve meaningful, uled for October of 2004, many of the consensus-based participation. As one parti- individuals and organizations involved cipant put it, “[people] signed on for a saw the Social Forum as a ten-year pro- consensus process and for being at the cess of building strong-tie relationships center of the process, and then the whole across cultures and geography, and creat- end-focused process, driven by the dead- ing communication spaces where ideas line, happened. And that was all lost.” and issues could be worked out for a Despite the narrative of openness and common cause. However, in the last two diversity, some participants felt that the months of planning, a narrative of discord exclusionary tendencies of the dominant between the inclusive social justice fram- culture were inscribed invisibly into the ing of the Forum and key participant tight time frame and the imperative to experiences in the organizing process forge fast, strong-tie coalitions: “[all] that began to emerge, with several groups is a very western, very white, very male, pulling out. Less than two weeks before it and a very traditional normal non-profit was scheduled to occur, the Planning approach—we are very end-driven in this Committee (the main organizing body) country: the ends justify the means.” The cancelled the event, and the organizing tension between an open, consensus- infrastructure dissolved. In order to based process and the realities of planning understand how the network structure an event on a short timeline became too proved so fragile, we conducted an great and one of the core constituencies analysis based on archived copies of the began calling for postponing the con- organizing website, 243 discussion list e- ference—a request that was denied, and the mail messages, 42 responses to an online group pulled out. Once the Indigenous survey, and 21 in-depth interviews. Planning Committee pulled out, others Organizing narratives were modeled followed suite and organizers decided to after the WSF and informed by local cancel the forum in the hopes of recon- indigenous protocol around respect and ciling differences and moving forward consensus. Early organizers conceived of a later on with a more open process. diverse planning committee that put the The narrative emphasis on racial justice most disadvantaged at the center of the in the organizing vision led to an organizing process. Efforts were made to emphasis on strong-tie networking and a invite participation from marginalized decision early on not to introduce more populations and establish strong relation- sophisticated social networking technolo- ships before making an open call for gies beyond e-mail and the website into participation in the Social Forum. One the organizing process. Instead, organizers participant noted the great excitement focused their energies on building face- about “the commitment to indigenous to-face relationships with those commu- wisdom and worldview and to youth and nities most severely affected by economic people of color in leadership.” However, and social inequalities. Among organizers it soon became clear that organizers of the forum, there was a sense that there lacked the staffing, time, and resources is often too heavy a reliance on technol- to effectively carry out the agreed ogy for outreach, and they wanted to upon strong-tie process in such a short counter this trend. One member of the timeline. Planning Committee commented that, “if

257 W. LANCE BENNETT AND AMOSHAUN TOFT you are especially talking about electronic Conclusion networks there are a whole bunch of people that you cannot reach at all and I One conclusion from these studies is that think that the people who are most likely large-scale rapid networking is facilitated to be left out are older poor people of by relatively open stories that enable both color. It is going to be a much narrower organizations and individuals to rely on group.” social networking technologies to activate Of the digital tools that were made dense interorganization and individual- available, the discussion list was the most level networks. Yet even when stories used, but mostly for posting announce- seem open and inclusive, their capacity to ments of offline activities. As noted ear- travel across particular technological and lier, the uses of the list changed drastically social divides may be limited by a com- once the event was cancelled. Almost bination of organizational form, network overnight, the list went from a low-traffic boundaries, and trust across social (e.g., announcement platform with very few racial) or cultural (e.g., tribal custom) dif- authors (only four authors posted 47 ferences. The organizers of the NWSF percent of all e-mails) to a popular dis- may have been right in thinking that cussion platform (accounting for 47.3 thick-tie networks were more appropriate percent of all sent messages) with 24 par- to their goals by building trust between ticipants posting their comments or ideas individuals across social divides, but the for the first time. The number of posts implementation of a time-intensive thick- per thread shifted from a pre-cancellation ties approach based around a pre-figurative mean of 1.4 to 2.5 afterward. Many posts anti-racist organizational narrative did not questioned the decision to cancel and work well with the short timeline con- wanted to know what had happened; straints imposed by an impending event. others provided their assessment of the Perhaps employing a combination of thin- situation or helped organize an emer- and thick-tie organizing approaches with gency meeting. However, this flurry of sensitive applications of networking and activity was short lived, and subsequent online discussion technologies could bridge spaces for open dialog had not emerged the gap between building long-range per- by the time of this writing nearly three sonal relationships and short-term affinity- years later. based mobilization. The NWSF was an ambitious attempt Beyond the strategic applications of to organize thick-tie networks based on technology, the role of organizations in collective identity formation around an networks remains important to study. For anti-racist social justice narrative. As a example, the fair trade networks suggest result, despite the short time frame, strate- the importance of gatekeeping organiza- gic decisions were made to de-emphasize tions in exercising power across a net- the kind of social networking technolo- work. Gatekeeper stories may introduce gies that often facilitate weak-tie net- structure into networks as various organi- works based on more open narrative zations choose to strategically link to each formation. While adopting more open other or not. Moreover, as individuals narrative and technology-assisted net- and organizations begin to plant elements working strategies may have strengthened of their narratives in the physical and parts of the network, the capacity to social environments in which people bridge race, class, and locality in the work, shop, live, and protest, those ele- global justice movement may still have ments further constrain or echo the var- remained an elusive goal. ious dominant narratives that may flow

258 TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM, IDENTITY, AND TECHNOLOGY through networks. For example, the rela- plot and action populate the commu- tively uniform adoption of the national nication context, they provide resources fair trade trademark in the U.K. on goods to help individuals move among—or set certified by the Fairtrade Foundation limits on—personal, organizational, and provides substantial environmental affir- network levels of affiliation. mation of the common story about trade justice. By contrast, a number of small companies and NGOs have broken with Guide to further reading the primary fair trade network in the U.S. over conflicts about whether to elevate There is a vast literature on identity and trade justice to a more dominant story. social change, with implications for chan- The result is that the social environment ging forms of political association. Good contains a proliferation of small com- places to start are Giddens (1991), Bennett peting trademarks and labels that may (1998) and Beck (1999, 2000). della Porta confuse consumers about what sort of (2005) suggests that these changes encou- certification a product has, which, in turn, rage “flexible identities” in recent global may lead to a reluctance by some com- justice organizing. panies to add contested trademarks to The focus on symbolic linkages in their branded packages (Bennett et al., much of the social movement literature 2007). The various breaks and path dis- has been on framing. Snow and Benford tances in the U.S. web network reflect (1988) and Snow et al. (1986) are two these disputes over the narrative. Those seminal works that outline the field of digital breaks and distances are coded in collective action framing research. A more the lived environment in the jumble of recent assessment of the field by Benford different trademarks and certification and Snow (2000) makes an interesting schemes that define what fair trade means companion. to different activists. Work on narratives in social move- As these cases suggest, the idea of nar- ments is fairly new to the field. Polletta’s ratives as networking devices offers a (1998, 2006) work on activist narratives useful mechanism for understanding and storytelling provides valuable insight how individuals and organizations actually into the ways that stories shape activists’ construct social ties: they tell and exchange conceptions of themselves and others. stories, and play with physical elements of For more general work on meaning them in their social environments. In our and social movements we recommend view, the more popular academic concept Eyerman and Jamison (1991) and Melucci of framing continues to be useful for (1996). Both works present a compelling describing broad organizational alliances, account of the way that social movements calls to action, and media representations. are adapting to larger changes in the role Beyond this, it becomes important to of information in industrialized countries grasp how narratives weave together and the role of meaning contestation in social relationships by providing the social change. Similarly, Keck and Sikkink’s interpretive contexts for frames. In the (1998; Sikkink, 2002) work on transna- process of negotiating meaning, stories tional advocacy brings an analysis of “soft travel across various communication chan- power” in global governance activism nels, both digital and personal, leaving around human rights and development to their traces in technology affordances, in discussions of meaning and movements. personal consciousness, and in the built A crucial starting point for thinking human environment. As these pieces of about networks and collective action is

259 W. LANCE BENNETT AND AMOSHAUN TOFT

Granovetter’s (1973) analysis of thick- and their account of narratives in technology- thin-tie networks. assisted networks. The role of technology in activist net- The authors would like to acknowl- works is a burgeoning ﬁeld. We recom- edge the support of the Belgian Science mend reading Rogers (2002) for his Policy Foundation in funding the studies account of issue networks on the web, described in this chapter. The input and Bennett (2003) for an assessment of support of Stefaan Walgrave has been decentralized digital activist campaigns, particularly valuable. and Pentland and Feldman (2007) for

260 19 Theorizing gender and the internet Past, present, and future

Niels van Doorn and Liesbet van Zoonen

The growth of the internet has been accompanied by a profound academic interest in its gendered features and contexts. This chapter ﬁrst discusses how studies of the relationship between gender and the internet have been articulated through the use of two conceptions of gender common within a feminist theoretical framework: “gender as identity” and “gender as social structure.” Yet, as we will demonstrate, studies in these domains often have gender-essentialist and technological-determinist tendencies and ignore the positioned and embodied everyday interactions with internet technologies. We therefore continue with an assessment of approaches that counter essentialism and determinism by focusing on the mutual shaping of gender and technology in situated practices and spaces. We conclude by discussing whether the current prevalence of user-generated content referred to as Web 2.0 raises new questions for research about gender and the internet.

As early as 1993, well before the pro- cultural studies scholars have a recurring liferation of the web, Sandra Herring interest in the virtual performance of investigated differences between men and gendered identities in, for instance, online women in their use of language in asyn- games; and sociolinguists mostly discuss chronous computer-mediated commu- gendered language patterns in various nication (CMC) such as bulletin boards, online contexts. Given this plethora of newsgroups, and discussion lists. Barely 15 approaches, any attempt to write about years later, research on gender and the this subject is bound to be incomplete internet has burgeoned. The online and partial. Nevertheless, we organize our sphere, with its mixture of information, account around what we see as the key entertainment, and communication mod- conceptual contours of the social science alities and its convergence of audiovisual literature in this area. technologies requires multidisciplinary theoretical and methodological lines of inquiry. Psychologists, for instance, often Gender as identity examine gender differences in the online behavior of women and men; anthro- Differences pologists and sociologists regularly investigate how women build communities on Gender differences online have been a the internet; feminist political scientists central area of concern in studies of tend to look at the way women use it to gender as identity. In her pioneering study, mobilize for social and political causes; Herring (1993) identified two separate

261 NIELS VAN DOORN AND LIESBET VAN ZOONEN discourses online: a feminine discourse constitutive and how, for heterosexual encompassing a more “personal” style of men, the position of the former is communication, characterized by apolo- strengthened by the oppressive explica- getic language use and the prevention tion of the latter through the use of of tension; and a masculine discourse, sexually demeaning language targeted at typified as being more “authoritative” and women. oriented towards action, and character- On the other hand, a detailed analysis ized by challenging and argumentative by Nancy Baym (2000) of the participants language use. When these two disin the online fan community of the U.S. courses met in a “mixed gender” online daytime soap All My Children reveals that environment, the masculine discourse it is not only the gender of participants dominated: men tended to introduce that explains particular feminine commu- more subjects and ignored or ridiculed nicative styles, but also the topic of con- the input of female participants (Herring, versation (in this case a soap) and the 1993). These results led Herring to offline contexts of the participants. Baym’s conclude that the internet perpetuates study suggests that gender cannot be everyday linguistic inequalities between considered the sole explanatory factor for men and women (Herring, 1995, 1996a, “gender differences” online—a result 1996b, 1999; Herring et al., 1995). supported by a small number of others Similar research, such as a study of that have found reversed gender patterns. newsgroups by Savicki et al. (1996), For example, in an experimental study by concluded that newsgroups with pre- Jaffe et al. (1999) men abandoned domi- dominantly male participants could be nant behavior and approached others in a characterized as containing a large amount socially aware and helpful way, while of fact-related exchange and impersonal Witmer and Katzman (1997) found that speech, while female-dominated news- women actually uttered more conflictual groups featured conflict-avoiding speech speech than men. Similarly, Can’s (1999) and high levels of “self-disclosure.” Jaffe investigation of the language styles in two et al. (1995) found that women tend to feminist Usenet newsgroups, alt.feminism display textual patterns of social inter- and soc.feminism, showed that exclu- dependence more than men do in both sionary rhetorical techniques can also be real-name and pseudonymous online con- found in online environments dominated ferences, while Kendall (1998) demon- by women. strated that the interactions between Whether these “difference” studies “male” and “female” characters in MUDs emphasize the reiteration or the reversal (Multi User Dungeons—an early type of of stereotypical gender relations in CMC, online fantasy game) were largely pre- they leave the “male/female” dichotomy dicated on stereotypical gender relations, unchallenged because they focus on gen- even though these provided what eralized types of “male” and “female” appeared on the surface to be an anon- communicative behavior. They find evi- ymous and disembodied environment. dence for the claim that the internet Some research has shown how male reconfirms and exaggerates traditional dominance is violently reinforced online gender relations. through the sexual harassment of women Yet, just as in feminist theory more in different online contexts (Herring, generally, gender differences are not only 2002, 2001, 1999, for an overview see Li, a source of women’s oppression, but are 2005). These studies make clear how also seen by some scholars as a source of gender and sexual identities are mutually power. Influenced by Donna Haraway’s

262 GENDER AND THE INTERNET

“cyborg theory,” the radical French fem- early research about “gender bending” inism of Luce Irigaray, and Freudian psy- the absence of the body in text-based choanalysis, British author Sadie Plant CMC plays a central role. Due to the fact (1995, 1996, 1997) argues that the “digi- that cyberspace offers an environment in tal revolution” marks the decline of mas- which gender can be disconnected from culine hegemonic power structures, as the one’s physical body, the possibilities for internet constitutes a non-linear world that creating different gender identities become cannot be ordered or controlled. Plant’s abundant. Studies by Reid (1993) and “cyberfeminist” vision conceptualizes the Danet (1996) examined the construction web as a fractured and diffuse structure— of gender at the moment in which parti- one that is uniquely aligned with women’s cipants enter “virtual space.” For exam- fluid identities and that deconstructs the ple, Reid (1993) argued that internet traditionally patriarchal character of tech- relay chat (IRC) users construct their nology. According to Plant, women have gender identities through the choice of a “natural” affinity with new digital tech- their nickname. “Nicks” may express nologies because they allow them to masculinity, femininity, or even gender explore a multitude of gender identities in ambiguity. “MUDders” are able to choose a virtual environment where the relation gendered, gender-neutral, or gender-plural between gender and the body is a con- characters when they join. This provides tingent construction. them with an opportunity to actively Although Plant’s utopian view certainly create their gender (or lack thereof) in serves as an encouraging theoretical source virtual space. for young women who are increasingly Perhaps the most influential examina- immersing themselves in new technolo- tion of gender bending online is Sherry gies, it also has a rather peculiar way of Turkle’s Life on the Screen. Turkle con- combining conceptions of femininity as tends that the internet has become “a universally different from masculinity with significant social laboratory for experi- a view of female identity as fragmented menting with the constructions and and diffuse. In an awkward effort to reconstructions of self” (Turkle, 1995: 180). merge the two notions, Plant reconciles In contrast with other studies, Turkle her version of biological essentialism with approaches this from a socio-psychological the technologically determinist claim that perspective, by investigating the partici- the internet constitutes the key to women’s pants’ personal reasons for engaging in liberation because it allows female multi- experimentation with gender and sexual plicity to flourish. This tension leads identity, as well as the social context in Wajcman (2004) to oppose this position, which these performances take place. This by suggesting that the claim that internet approach places strong emphasis on the technology is essentially feminine Plant relation between online and offline selves. pre-empts the need for feminist political In Turkle’s view, online experiments with action. gender and sexuality are useful tools for the rethinking not only of one’s “virtual” gender identity, but also of one’s “real- Experimentation life” gendered and sexualized self (Turkle, In an effort to break out of this traditional 1995). This last point is made especially gender binary and further investigate the clear in the book’s chapter on “cybersex”, liberating potential of cyberspace, another in which it is argued that cyberspace offers strand of research shifts the focus from gender a risk-free environment where people can differences to gender experimentation. In engage in the intimate relationships they

263 NIELS VAN DOORN AND LIESBET VAN ZOONEN desire but are afraid to initiate in the real reference that structures our disembodied world. The possibilities of online gender communication and gives it meaning bending fit well with poststructuralist (O’Brien, 1999). From this perspective, theories about identities as non-essential the internet could hardly be considered a discursive performances that open up site that facilitates the creation of totally space for negotiation (Butler, 1990). In fluid gender identities. addition, these notions have helped the Despite their different perspectives, political struggles of feminists trying to both the “difference” and the “experi- escape the “prison-house of gender.” mentation” approaches focus on gender as Yet, notwithstanding its theoretical and identity: a discourse in which individuals political popularity, several empirical stu- engage and through which they assume dies have suggested that gender bending is agency while being simultaneously shaped uncommon, or is most often conducted and disciplined by it. The “difference” for fun or specific game-related advan- studies distinguish between feminine and tages rather than to break out of the masculine language patterns and behaviors gender dichotomy (e.g., Wright et al., and conclude that the internet does not 2000; Van Doorn et al., 2007). A further change traditional relations of dominance problem with these theories is that their between women and men, femininity and focus on escaping the offline confines of masculinity. In these works gender is gender causes them to ignore the impact perceived as a foundational property, with of embodied everyday experience on its internal truth or logic located in the online performances. Turkle herself believes sexed body. It is what makes women and that ultimately the gendered self is rooted men who they are and it determines in the physical, offline world, even human interactions, even in an online though cyberspace provides us with pro- context. In contrast, the “experimenta- found experiences that can lead to “per- tion” works implicitly perceive the inter- sonal transformation” and a reconfiguration net as the determining force, since its of how we perceive ourselves (Turkle, facilitation of disembodied communica- 1995). tion is said to enable individuals to break This concern about the offline self is out of the traditional confines of socially shared, for example, by Jodi O’Brien constructed gender relations. Not only are (1999), who also stresses the importance both perspectives thus rather determinist of embodied experience. O’Brien argues (favoring either gender or technology as that “gender categories evoke a deeply the deciding factor) they also tend to entrenched cognitive-emotive script for ignore social contexts and structures. One who we can be and how we should relate reason for this is that empirical studies on to others,” and these make it doubtful “gender as identity” have mainly focused whether “cyberspace will be a realm in on the interpersonal online practices of which physical markers such as sex, race, CMC (chat, bulletin boards, online age, body type and size will eventually gaming, and so on) while mostly discarding lose salience as a basis for the evaluative the socio-economic framework in which categorization of self/others” (O’Brien, these practices take place. Although these 1999: 77). Through a reliance on “classi- studies have at times incorporated a fication schemes,” which cause one to notion of embodiment, with the notable make continual references to the body as exception of Turkle’s this is rarely related connected to the self even though this to a focus on the actual lives of users in body is not physically present, the body everyday social contexts—in other words, provides us with a common point of gender as a social structure that locates

264 GENDER AND THE INTERNET women and men in particular roles in community-seekers and as consumers— society is usually ignored. We now turn traditionally feminine roles” (Gustafson, to another field of research that has 2002: 169). Consalvo (2002) also suggests examined how the internet is engaged in that community and consumption have the negotiation of socio-political positions been coded as “feminine” traits in meta- by women and men. phors used in popular discourse about women and the internet. And while women are now equal to men in their Gender as social structure online consumption, they remain far behind when it comes to the production and design of the web and other infor- Marketing “the feminine” online mation technologies (Whitehouse, 2006; A number of feminist researchers have Wajcman, 2007). interrogated the internet’s commercial spaces. Women online are now routinely Internet pornography: from the addressed in their traditional role as con- abject to the everyday? sumers (Van Zoonen, 2002). Market research has produced ever more studies While women are increasingly targeted as about the online differences between consumers in many of the web’s com- women and men in order to find ways to mercial spaces, the single largest commer- promote women’s online consumption cial enterprise on the internet is still (for example, Parasuraman and Zinkhan, mainly directed at a male audience. The 2002; Rodgers and Harris, 2003; Van porn industry was one of the first to take Slyke et al., 2002). its business online and since then has Feminist scholars have looked upon expanded exponentially in size and profit, these developments with suspicion. Leslie simultaneously figuring as a further cata- Regan Shade (2002), for instance, warns lyst for the technological innovation that against the increasing tension “between e- facilitated its growth and pervasiveness commerce applications directed towards (Lane, 2000; Cronin and Davenport, women as consumers and the usage of the 2001; Lillie, 2004). According to Lillie, internet as a locus for citizen-oriented there are four general perspectives from activities” (Shade, 2002: 10). According which “cyberporn” has been studied. to Shade, digital capitalism’s rising interest First, behavioral-psychological studies have in women as a viable consumer market examined uses and addictions, and have has decreased the number of online spaces established an agenda for research that where women can engage in non-profit describes a range of “healthy” and cultural or political practices, while cor- “unhealthy” online behaviors, while pro- porate websites that aim to profit from viding possible remedies for “compulsive” women’s supposed needs and interests uses of online porn. Second, the “effects” have proliferated (Shade, 2002). Similarly, tradition of empirical media research has Gustafson (2002) explores the concept of mainly concerned itself with the exposure the “feminization” of community online of children to cyberporn. This has usually through the interrogation of three popu- recommended policies on increased par- lar commercial women’s sites (iVillage, ental guidance and surveillance or filtering Oxygen, and Women.com). Gustafson software. The third perspective adopts a suggests that “while women are a grow- political economy approach, studying the ing internet population, they are being many facets of the online porn industry discursively constructed on the internet as and its development in a broader social

265 NIELS VAN DOORN AND LIESBET VAN ZOONEN context, while the fourth focuses on how This last area of feminist scholarship has different social groups use cyberporn in been gaining currency over the past few their everyday lives and is mainly years, with studies extending the scope of indebted to the traditions of cultural stu- analysis by paying specific attention to the dies and CMC research. situated and everyday contexts of internet Feminist analyses of online pornography porn consumption. For instance, Lillie has were initially structured around the polariz- argued for a need for “porn reception” ing debates between radical “anti-porn” studies that investigate “the truths of the feminists and liberal “free speech” or “pro architecture of knowledge and technolo- sex” feminists, which took place during gies of sexuality, which pornography as a the 80s and 90s, mainly in the United participant in the construction of the States. The most well-known anti-porn subject’s desire and sexual identity works feminists of this time, Andrea Dworkin within.” An important location for these and Catherine MacKinnon, have argued kinds of studies would be what Lillie that pornography functions as a system for terms “the moral economy of the net- male domination, where male power is worked home” (Lillie, 2004: 53, 58). established through the violent degrada- New communication technologies have tion of women. Thus, the goal for fem- played a crucial role in the production, inist activists is to dismantle this system of distribution, and consumption of porno- domination. In contrast, next to the rather graphy, both as visually explicit material obvious free speech arguments that have and in terms of the accompanying dis- been raised, “pro sex” feminists have courses of gender, sex, and sexuality applauded pornography for undermining (Paasonen, 2006; Paasonen et al., 2007; and subverting our culture’s repressive Attwood, 2002; Cronin and Davenport, attitude to sexuality in general, and female 2001; O’Toole, 1999). To a large extent, sexuality in particular. What these debates the internet can be credited for spreading make clear is how discourse about por- a “diversity of pornographies” in today’s nography is inextricably linked to con- media environment, contributing to the ceptions of gender, sexuality, and power omnipotence, normalization, and increased (Allen, 2001). acceptance of sexualized imagery in Yet for all the theoretical and ideolo- mainstream cultural products. In fact, this gical discussions concerning pornography trend is slowly positioning women as in general, there is remarkably little another viable consumer market for por- feminist scholarship on online sex. The nographic content, however unlikely this few studies that do exist generally align might seem (Cronin and Davenport, themselves with the “established” areas of 2001; McNair, 2002; Schauer, 2005). It is media research. Feminists working within in such environments, on- and offline, the “media effects” and “political econ- that sexuality and gender are performed omy” traditions have tended to center on and negotiated, and this makes them a the hazards of internet pornography for primary target for further feminist research. women and children (e.g., Adam, 2002; Burke et al., 2002; Hughes, 1999, 2004), Web of empowerment while those with a cultural studies background have focused their attention on Despite the previously mentioned efforts online cultures and how they may be to commercialize the concept of “com- redefining the standard gendered codes of munity,” it has also played an instrumental porn and sexual practices (Kibby, 2001; role in a variety of feminist activities to Kibby and Costello, 2001; Waskul, 2004). empower women in their everyday on-

266 GENDER AND THE INTERNET and offline lives. Many women’s groups to women’s and girls’ online strategies for and feminist activists have approached the cultural criticism and self-expression. The internet as an international platform for so-called “cybergrrls” movement has been such diverse goals as creating support the subject of extensive academic enquiry. networks, challenging sexual harassment, Of particular interest is how techno-savvy discussing feminist politics, creating spaces young women negotiate and deconstruct for sexual self-expression, and rallying the consumerist messages encoded in against social injustices. In this sense, their everyday pop cultural environment community is strongly attached to a (Driscoll, 1999; Kroløkke, 2003; Yervasi, commitment to social change, and resists 1996). However, according to some crit- commercial appropriation by market actors. ics, a focus on this kind of “postfeminist” Feminist scholars have devoted con- cultural renegotiation neglects basic gender siderable attention to these social move- inequalities concerning internet access and ments, documenting the everyday efforts work-related issues (Wilding, 1998). of women to exercise their rights as As some scholars have pointed out, an citizens in an online environment. Aside important area where women have been from offering a critical look at the efforts working to empower themselves is in the by multimedia conglomerates to “femin- internet sex industry, where they have ize” the internet in order to exploit become increasingly visible as active con- women’s consumer potential, Shade sumers and producers of pornographic (2002) also provides an overview of how content (Podlas, 2000; Cronin and women have used the same internet for Davenport, 2001; Attwood, 2002; Smith, feminist communication and activism. 2007). Through this process of emanci- She describes, for instance, how mailing pation, women are gradually redefining lists were one of the earliest and most the idea of pornography as an exclusively successful tools for building international masculine domain in which women are women’s networks, creating hundreds of treated as passive sex objects, in favour of online discussion groups covering a mul- a realm in which they enjoy porn on titude of topics related to feminism and their own terms and in which they are in women’s everyday lives. More specifi- control of their sexual practices. This is cally, Shade illustrates how the internet not only taking place on a symbolic level, was used to organize and coordinate the for instance through the resignification of Fourth World Conference on Women, “female sexuality” in live webcam shows held in Beijing in 1995, and how it or in pornographic stories produced and enabled Zapatista women to wage a social published by women, but also on a “net war” against the Mexican govern- material level, with more female entre- ment and inform and educate the preneurs starting their own online business Western world about their cause. In a and making profits from pornographic similar vein, Kensinger (2003) presents a productions (Podlas, 2000; Ray, 2007). critical perspective on how the internet Thus, while the porn industry has so far was used for promoting social activism remained a predominantly masculine and solidarity with women in Afghanistan environment, and sexist representations of during the Taliban regime and the sub- women are unlikely to decrease in the sequent war in the region. future, the internet is for some a tool for Aside from investigating how the women’s sexual and economic freedom. internet can be used for organizing fem- These studies all share a concern with inist social activism in various “offline” women’s agency in relation to the internet, contexts, scholars have also paid attention whether it is through the creation of

267 NIELS VAN DOORN AND LIESBET VAN ZOONEN networks for political activism, producing without taking into account its intricate female-friendly pornography, or the fem- relationship with technology (Akrich, inist reappropriation of digital capitalism’s 1995). Influenced by this notion, feminist consumer culture. While some see this scholars have approached gender as agency as eroding due to the increasing something that is both shaping and shaped dominance of male corporate presence by technology. This “mutual shaping” online, others emphasize women taking approach generally looks at the intersec- matters into their own hands, effectively tions of gender and technology on three using the net to engage in various forms different, yet interrelated, levels: struc- of socio-political action. More generally, tural, symbolic, and identity related internet research that approaches gender (Harding, 1986; Cockburn and Ormrod, as a social structure is effectively con- 1993). Mutual shaping research investi- cerned with the material-semiotic relation gates how these three dimensions of between gender and power at a macro gender are articulated within the web’s level. Meanwhile, the internet itself func- techno-social spaces, which are them- tions as an unbiased, ahistorical, and selves gendered in the process. According gender-neutral technological instrument to this approach, techno-social spaces are that can be used by and against women in not only shaped by their use, but also the struggle for material and symbolic through the design and production of power. At the same time, gender also their technological infrastructure (Wajcman, appears to be a stable entity in the 2004, 2007). These practices are depen- majority of these studies, principally aligned dent on many different socio-technical along the man–woman binary and see- factors, such as the interplay of commercial mingly untouched by the technology that and institutional interests. Technological facilitates these feminist practices. Thus, change, then, is never the linear result of the biological essentialism and technolo- “techno-logical” decision-making, but the gical determinism witnessed in the “gender outcome of a contingent process. as identity” approach tends to resurface Research that follows this approach here once again in the context of the ideally takes into account the whole “gender as social structure” debate techno-cultural circuit including the design, (Wacjman, 2004). development, marketing, consumption, and domestication of specific technologies (e.g., Cockburn, 1992). However, in Situated practices and spaces practice STS scholars mostly conduct In response to these shortcomings, some detailed case studies that focus on specific feminist research on gender and the elements of this circuit. We will now internet has started to shift its emphasis briefly discuss three such studies, two from the “identity vs. social structure” from a Dutch perspective and one situ- dichotomy to the manifold interactions ated in the Norwegian context. between gender and internet technology, Els Rommes (2002) examines how paying special attention to their situated implicit presumptions about gender roles offline/online articulations. Some authors among the design team worked to in the field of science and technology exclude and alienate women as users and studies (STS) have argued that because designers of Amsterdam’s Digital City— the experience of ourselves is so thor- one of the first Dutch experiments with oughly mediated through our everyday the internet in 1994. Adopting a “gender interactions with technological artifacts, script” approach, she demonstrates how we cannot meaningfully study gender the desire of the predominantly male

268 GENDER AND THE INTERNET design team to experiment with state-of- or feminine environment, gendered mean- the-art technology made it hard for less ings of the internet arise, especially at the tech-savvy users to participate in the moment of domestication. Through in- Digital City. Rommes calls this a typical depth interviews with young couples she example of the “I-methodology” found demonstrates how the “social,”“sym- among ICT developers, or taking one’s bolic,” and “individual” dimensions of own preferences and capacities as the gender interact with the everyday nego- starting point for designing technology. tiations of technology use among hetero- Since most ICT workers are male, user sexual partners living together. Four types scenarios implicit in ICT production are of negotiations among the partners severely gendered. The masculine gender emerged from the interviews, constituting scripts that informed the design and “traditional,”“deliberative,”“reversed,” development of the Amsterdam Digital and “individualized” use cultures. While City produced a pioneering online space male usage primarily determines these that received international acclaim but it types, the interviews show that this does did not attract a diverse group of users. not automatically result in the construc- Ultimately, Rommes suggests, the mas- tion of a masculine domain in the house- culine gender scripts implemented in the hold, but instead opens up space for Digital City’s techno-social fabric con- shared and feminine appropriations. For tained a set of normative assumptions that instance, a “deliberative” use culture favored high-tech male users, while alie- involves explaining the negotiation of nating other, especially female, users. domestic computer use in collective terms Only those who already owned a com- and is instrumental in constructing a sense puter with an internet connection, or of togetherness among the partners: a who had sufficient financial and social shared techno-social domain (Van Zoonen, capital to purchase one, could get access 2002). Technology is effectively gendered to the Digital City. Since ownership of a through the process of domestication as computer and internet access were, and masculine- and feminine-coded practices still are, unequally distributed along mutually add meaning to the artifact. At gender lines in Dutch society, this favored the same time, the computer and the male users (Rommes, 2002). Further, internet present the members of a house- Rommes shows that while women did hold with a techno-social environment have access to a computer in their home, in which their gender roles can be they often did not use it because they renegotiated. This can occur when the viewed the device as something that computer is identified with work-related belonged to their male partner. tasks, as is shown in some of the study’s While Rommes’ study centers its interviews. In these cases, work or studies attention on the design/development side are more valued than surfing or gaming of the mutual shaping process, other and thus get prioritized. In effect, this mutual shaping studies focus on how the priority turns out to be male-biased in the gendered meanings of the internet arise in context of Dutch households, where men the context of usage, and how usage are still the main “provider.” As a con- interacts with everyday constructions of sequence the domestication of the com- gender. Van Zoonen (2002) examines how puter in the household leads, in these internet technology is domesticated within cases, to a reiteration of traditional gender everyday practices in Dutch households. roles. Contrary to common claims that the While Van Zoonen’s study focuses on internet constitutes an essentially masculine the gendered domestication of technology

269 NIELS VAN DOORN AND LIESBET VAN ZOONEN in the home, Lægran (2004) examines practices can be studied in detail. The internet cafés as “gendered techno-social phenomenon of I-methodology (Akrich, spaces.” Influenced by the actor-network 1995) in the design phase has been taken theory of Bruno Latour (2005), she con- up as a useful concept in diverse case stu- siders technologies, spaces, and gender as dies, such as the gendered design of digital mutually constructed in situated processes games (Kerr, 2002), smart-building pro- that involve material and symbolic jects (Aune et al., 2002), or gendered ICT articulations, as well as both human and use in the workplace (Sefyrin, 2005). non-human actors. Following Latour, Also, the concept of gendered domestica- technological artifacts are seen as “actants,” tion has been well developed in theore- which are able to acquire agency in the tical terms (e.g., Cockburn and Dilic´, 1994) production of space by means of how and has been applied in several studies they are integrated in actor networks. By of old and new media use (Haddon, extending the concept of agency from 2006). human to non-human actors, Lægran opens up new possibilities for the analysis of gendered spaces and technologies. New web, new questions, Through the inspection of the relation new outcomes? between the two, and by considering both as agents producing meaning along- Having discussed the main areas of side human actors, she is able to analyse research on gender and the internet, the the material-semiotic processes in which question for the future is how far the technology and spaces are reciprocally existing approaches can function as ade- gendered in a physical realm. Instead of quate theoretical tools for the investiga- creating a space where the masculine tion of new developments—the emerging connotation of ICT can be deconstructed era of Web 2.0 typified by an increasing through the material and symbolic pre- number of users producing and sharing sence of feminine use cultures, internet their own content. cafés favor one culture over the other According to many, Web 2.0, with its (usually the masculine culture). This leads non-hierarchical modes of content pro- Lægran to conclude that the internet café, duction and dissemination, has replaced with its female visitors largely invisible, the top–down structure of the so-called remains “just another boys’ room.” While Web 1.0. As part of this Web 2.0 buzz, mutual shaping research usually takes into Time magazine named “You” their Person account the multiple dimensions in which of the Year in 2006: a tribute to the gender interacts with technology, this “common people who transformed the study draws our attention to the inter- way we socialize, gather information, and relations of gender, space, and internet do business on the internet” via rapidly culture on a symbolic level. This is effec- growing web applications and platforms tive in showing how offline spaces acquire such as MySpace, Facebook, and YouTube. meaning as a gendered realm, an area that While we should not lose sight of the fact is generally overlooked in traditional that user-generated content of all kinds research on gender and the internet. has long been a feature of online life, it is As the three examples above show, worth exploring the implications of Web mutual shaping theory necessitates a case 2.0 for gender politics. study approach to examining gender and Given the fact that these new web the internet, in which the manifold dimen- applications have only recently become sions that make up particular gendered the focus of gender-informed research,

270 GENDER AND THE INTERNET any attempt to predict outcomes is (Barcan, 2002; Ray, 2007). In response to necessarily precarious. Nevertheless, we YouTube’s policy of not allowing nudity, can theorize how the previously discussed websites such PornoTube and RedTube approaches might be able to provide new are now providing a platform where users and interesting insights in the field of can upload pornographic video material gender and internet research. How are (either actually home made or purporting the existing approaches able to come to to be) to which other users can respond terms with the present internet landscape, by leaving comments. Most of these dominated by applications that facilitate videos focus on the everyday reality of novel forms of user-generated content? people engaged in sexual practices. Dealing first with the “gender as iden- Consequently, this dynamic has strongly tity” approach, it is most likely that reaffirmed the “real body” on the screen, studies investigating gender differences in which can now be visually tracked to its internet use will continue to find these physicality. It thus seems unlikely that differences in the way that men and Web 2.0 will cater to much gender women design their weblogs, provide bending, with continuous visual scrutiny information on their MySpace profiles, or causing users to be extremely aware of contribute to a discussion about a video their bodies and those of their peers. posted on YouTube. These gender dif- Away from the mainstream, however, ferences find their origins in the embo- the general increase in internet access in died everyday experiences of internet the Western world, coupled with con- users and are thus unlikely to be easily siderably lower thresholds for creating altered by any specific ICT application. personalized content online, do certainly For this reason, we contend that this kind open up possibilities for marginalized of “difference” research is continuously gender and sexual identities to be exposed reinventing the wheel. to a larger audience. The visualization Turning to “experimentation” research, technologies that may reaffirm gender and it does not seem plausible that future stu- body norms in a mainstream context dies will find much evidence of gender could also be used by queer and trans- experimentation that transcends or disrupts gender people to deconstruct traditional binary gender discourse. Contemporary images of gender, embodiment, and internet applications incorporate new and sexuality, in addition to simply increasing improved visualization technologies, which their visibility. This could cause a grass- constitute both a response to and a per- roots disruption of what counts as “the petuation of our preoccupation with the real body.” Thus, contemporary research exhibition of everyday “reality.” Whereas on gender as identity should further the “virtual” was once believed to form examine how gender, sexuality, and an alternative to the “real,” a space where embodiment are experienced and per- users could engage in disembodied com- formed through visualization technologies munication Web 2.0 has definitively col- such as the webcam and internet video lapsed this dichotomy because people software. A relevant question would be upload an increasing number of photo- how this “body-technology” constellation graphs and home-made videos onto the is affecting our conceptions of embodied web, transporting the “real” and “authen- gender and the ways it can be mediated tic” into cyberspace. One of the realms in online. which this phenomenon is evident is When considering the “gender as social the “reality porn” niche, which has expan- structure” approach it is clear that this will ded significantly over the past few years remain valuable. As previously noted,

271 NIELS VAN DOORN AND LIESBET VAN ZOONEN multinational corporations have collectively are by no means new questions, but it is jumped on the Web 2.0 bandwagon and vital to reformulate them in the different have bought into the current hype contexts of a constantly transforming land- around user-generated content. Surely scape in which economic, cultural, and this will have repercussions for how pre- political interests will continue to shape sent and future Web 2.0 applications can the way that people use the internet. be experienced and used, with designs Mutual shaping research on the relation now under increasing corporate control, between gender and the various techno- and marketing divisions eager to benefit social spaces of Web 2.0 will prove to be from the possibilities of new personalized an important tool for showing how situated advertisement techniques. This raises the practices of gendered content producers issue of the increased prevalence of per- are related to their everyday lives and vasive marketing schemes directed at spe- concerns, with the internet constituting cific groups of female users, in addition to an extension of everyday practices rather a more general concern about privacy than a disruptive alternative to it. Future issues. On the other hand, the previously studies should continue to focus on the mentioned low thresholds for participa- occurrence of the I-methodology in the tion and production that characterize design of current websites featuring user- Web 2.0 could have positive effects on generated content, as well as examining the level of women’s participation in whether and how traditional gender pat- political activism and opinion formation terns are reinstated in the domestication online. As research in this novel area is of popular Web 2.0 applications. In our still in its infancy, future studies need to own research on the gendered constitu- investigate the dimensions of women’s tion of blogs, for instance, we found that political efficacy in these new social they are on the one hand extensions of spaces. However, even if the number of the traditionally feminine act of diary politically active women grows over the writing, and imbue the blogosphere with next few years, it seems unlikely that the feminine codes and rituals, while on the gendered inequalities identified by Herring other they redefine the act of diary writ- and others will dissolve solely through an ing as a “technological” practice, enabling increase in women online. men to share in it as “bloggers.” This as Further questions in this area revolve a clear case of gender and technology around the extent to which users actually shaping each other mutually, with reper- have control over the content they are cussions both for the traditional relations encouraged to produce and how this may of women with technology, and of be delimited by corporate design teams. men with self-expression. Nevertheless, To what extent do these new user com- we also observed male and female blog- munities allow for women to engage in gers making gender stereotypical choices politically radical activities, when the of blogging content, mode of address, lay -cultural environment of websites like out, and hyperlinks in order to create clear MySpace and YouTube seems to be pre- masculine and feminine spaces (Van Doorn dominantly concerned with the con- et al., forthcoming). The mutual shaping sumption of entertainment and lifestyles? of gender and Web 2.0 is, and will con- How “political” can a book discussion on tinue to be, a fragmented process con- Amazon.com be? Does the type of inter- tingent upon a multitude of situated action taking place on the main Web 2.0 practices featuring a constant interpellation sites require a reinterpretation of what it between particular groups of users and the means to be “politically active?” These technologies with which they interact.

272 GENDER AND THE INTERNET

Conclusion current social spaces of Web 2.0, and argued that the “gender as identity” stu- We started this chapter by acknowledging dies should focus on the experience of that the different academic disciplines embodied identity as the nexus of gen- each have their own perspectives on the dered techno-social practices; that the articulation of gender in relation to the “gender as social structure” studies will internet. We identified two initial approa- find an increasingly interesting research ches: “gender as identity” and “gender as a field, which demands an emphasis on the social structure.” The internet has been tension between user agency and com- shown to both confirm existing differ- mercial interest; and that the mutual ences between women and men and to shaping studies will be able to illustrate enable transgressions of the stereotypical the situated and diverse articulations of codes of femininity and masculinity. gender and technology in the context of Research has also demonstrated how those Web 2.0 applications that facilitate internet marketing exploits women’s user-generated content. Rather than social positions by addressing them merely causing a schism in the established research as consumers, while other studies have tradition on gender and the internet, the shown how many women use the net to social and technological features of Web engage in activism and feminist network- 2.0 are more likely to evoke questions ing. Whichever of these contradictory similar to those asked before. Yet these possibilities occur depends very much on will require a reformulation commensur- particular articulations of design, devel- able with the current socio-technical opment, use, and users that take place environment and its foundation in today’s around internet applications. We therefore political economy. discussed the mutual shaping approach, which assumes that gender and technology mutually influence each other, with Guide to further reading neither gender nor technology as the determining force. Gender and technol- While this chapter has presented the ogy are considered “actants” in a network reader with an overview of the past, pre- of users and producers whose continuous sent, and possible future of research on negotiations and contestations propose gender and the internet, it is by no means specific articulations of gender and tech- an exhaustive account. Shade’s (2002) nological artifacts. Studies of gender and feminist analysis of the opportunities and the internet conducted from such a per- threats that women face when engaging spective have identified influential pro- with the internet serves as a solid intro- cesses such as the I-methodology in the duction to the socio-political aspects of development of internet applications, in women’s internet use. Consalvo and which designers and developers (mostly Paasonen (2002) also focus on the politics men) adopt their own preferences and of women’s everyday interactions with capacities as the standard for creating new the web, but broaden the scope of their technological applications, and the domes- book through the additional investigation tication process, which refers to the way of more “cultural” issues such as identity the internet is integrated in the everyday construction, embodiment, and discourse. gendered lives of domestic users. More generally, Poster (2001), Bell (2001), We concluded by anticipating some and Trend (2001) all provide insightful research questions that the three approa- analyses on gender identity and the internet ches could produce when applied to the from a critical cultural studies perspective,

273 NIELS VAN DOORN AND LIESBET VAN ZOONEN while Schaap (2002) and Campbell (2004) technology. Turning to technology’s con- oﬀer two of the most interesting and nection to sex and sexuality, O’Toole’s detailed case studies in this area of research. (1999) Pornocopia oﬀers a vivid account of For those looking for an elaborate dis- how porn is consumed and the technolo- cussion of the relationship between gical innovations that foster its consump- science and technology studies and fem- tion. Likewise, Waskul (2004) presents a inist analysis, Judy Wajcman’s (2004) collection of essays, which will prove to TechnoFeminism is an indispensable work, be of great use to those with an interest in as is the collection of Norwegian case the political and cultural dimensions of studies edited by Lie (Lægran 2004). sexual practices in the online environ- Though it might now be considered ment. These are just a few suggestions for somewhat dated, Cockburn and Ormrod’s further reading, which will help the (1993) seminal book is sure to remain of reader navigate a path through the growing interest to anyone curious about the landscape of gender and internet research. multidimensional relations of gender and

274 20 New immigrants, the internet, and civic society Yong-Chan Kim and Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach

This chapter discusses the role of the internet in the new immigrant identity negotiation process and its implications for civic engagement. New immigrants have options that were difficult at best to create in earlier eras. For example, communication technologies and especially the internet, can offer ways for the new immigrant to negotiate pressures toward assimilation. The ease and con- temporaneous nature of communication with the home country is a feature that makes immigration today a different experience from immigration in the pre-internet era. We suggest that there are four possibilities open to new immigrants in terms of the primary way(s) the internet is incorporated into their everyday political lives: the internet can be used for (1) connecting to there (home society), (2) connecting to here (host country), (3) connecting to neither here nor there, and (4) connecting to both here and there. We label each of these internet use types as assimilation, transnational, virtual, and hybrid. We discuss various cases illustrating each of these types. We also discuss research issues related to individual and contextual factors that are likely to shape and modify the internet use type/ civic engagement relationship.

In this chapter, we explore the intriguing negotiate pressures toward assimilation case of the internet and new immigrants. (Appadurai, 1996). The ease and con- Most studies of the social implications of temporaneous nature of communication the internet concern settled populations with the home country is a feature that within the borders of a community, city, makes immigration a different experience region, or nation state. New immigrants from what it was in earlier eras. in contemporary contexts may be regarded In contrast to settled populations whose as part of a grounded notion of globali- immigrant memories, if any, afford stories zation where migration and immigration in family or community history, internet- are part of the process. Movements of connected first- and second-generation populations within and between nation immigrants may engage in storytelling states are flows over spaces that have dif- practices that speak to the present and ferent implications from the migrations future. These stories are constructed and and immigrations of earlier eras, such as communicated in a dynamic milieu of that studied by the Chicago School in the options for situating identity. Whereas 1920s and 30s. New immigrants have settled populations deploy internet con- options that were difficult at best to create nections for identity exploration and in earlier eras. For example, communication confirmation (Morley and Robins, 1995; technologies, and especially the internet, Holmes, 1997), even more fundamental can offer ways for the new immigrant to considerations of identity are likely in the

275 YONG-CHAN KIM AND SANDRA J. BALL-ROKEACH new immigrant case. While there is con- interpersonal communication (Ball-Rokeach sensus in scholarly circles that linear assim- et al., 2001; Kim and Ball-Rokeach, 2006). ilation models no longer apply (Zhou and Typologies often serve as early building Cai, 2002), scholars have not yet fully blocks of theory. In that spirit, we will understood the ways in which new immi- present a typology of internet uses as one grants are appropriating internet technolo- way of capturing the literature and what gies to manage the negotiation of identity it has to say about the range of identity prompted by the immigrant experience negotiations that new immigrants are (Hall, 1994). creating in their everyday lives. Following While identity negotiations are impor- a discussion of the internet uses typology tant in and of themselves, they also have with reference to civic engagement con- important implications for how new cerns, we will extend the discussion to the immigrants engage the host country. This individual and contextual factors researchers connection has been a major theme in the have identified as being implicated in the worlds of research and policy. In many new immigrant identity negotiation process. host countries, there were serious concerns about societal integration extant at the time of heightened immigration. It Internet use and civic is, thus, not surprising that the coin- engagement cidental occurrences of new communication technologies (especially the internet) As a backdrop for comparison with new and heightened immigration have pro- immigrants, we can first summarize the duced anxiety about how new immi- literature on the civic engagement out- grants will relate to the communities of comes of internet connections on settled their host country. populations. This literature runs the gamut In this chapter, we review threads of of outcomes, ranging from positive, nega- evidence that researchers have created in tive, or minimal effects of internet use on their attempts to understand the role of civic engagement. The most common the internet in the new immigrant iden- finding is that internet use has positive tity negotiation process and its implica- outcomes. These include civic or com- tions for civic engagement. As in most munity engagement (Wellman and Gulia, attempts to catch a process in mid air, we 1999; Preece, 2000; Uslaner, 2000; Lin, quickly gain an appreciation of complex- 2001), participation in community activity. For example, we cannot assume that ities (Gibson et al., 2000; Kraut et al., the experience of new immigrants to the 2002), political participation (Gibson et al., United States is the same as those of 2000), neighborhood belonging (Hampton immigrants to France due to their differ- and Wellman, 2000; Matei and Ball- ent immigration histories and policies. Rokeach, 2001), contact with families Similarly, we cannot assume that all and friends (Katz and Aspden, 1997; immigrants from a country will have the Franzen, 2000; Rainie and Kohut, 2000; same experience, as there are individual Howard et al., 2001b; Katz et al., 2001), and group differences they bring with political interest (Johnson and Kaye, them that also affect the nature of the 1998; Bucy et al., 1999), political beha- experience in the host country (Myers, vior, such as voting (Hill and Hughes, 1999). Also, our focus on internet con- 1998), and trust in government (Kim et nections leaves us open to myopia as these al., 2001; Shah, Kwak, and Holbert, connections are part of a larger commu- 2001). Other researchers observe negative nication ecology of traditional media and effects of internet use on civic engagement.

276 NEW IMMIGRANTS, THE INTERNET, AND CIVIC SOCIETY

These include lower levels of involve- A contingent model of new ment with family members and social immigrants’ use of the circles (Kraut et al., 1998; Nie and internet for civic engagement Erbring, 2000), loneliness and depression (Kraut et al., 1998), political distrust It used to be that research on human (Johnson and Kaye, 1998), and less neigh- migration, especially immigration, was borhood belonging (Katz et al., 2001). based on what we may call a “dis- Finally, some studies find no direct effect connect–reconnect” paradigm. In this of internet use on civic engagement, linear assimilation way of thinking, neighborhood belonging, or participation immigrants who migrated from one place in public affairs (Katz and Aspden, 1997; (the sending country) to the other (the Kohut, 2000; Putnam, 2000). receiving country) disconnected from Scholars working from a social shaping their social relationships in their home- of technology perspective have sought to lands and reconnected by building new resolve these seemingly contradictory find- social relationships in the host country. ings by examining how the internet is More recently, scholars have argued that incorporated into specific contexts of indi- there is a loosening link between locality vidual, household, and community life. and sociability due to new communica- These studies find that the relationship tion and transportation technologies. As between internet use and civic engage- Anthony Giddens suggested with the ment is conditional on other variables concepts of “disembeddedness” and such as degree of access to social, political, “reembeddedness” (Giddens, 1991) and or technological resources (Howes, 2002), Manuel Castells illustrated in his notion of motivations for internet use (Norris, the “network society” (Castells, 2000), 1998; Bimber, 2000; Kavanaugh and where we live, where we communicate, Patterson, 2001; Shah, McLeod, and Yoon, and where we belong do not necessarily 2001), and the geo-ethnic environment correspond. Barry Wellman and collea- of community life (Matei and Ball- gues’ concept of “network individualism” Rokeach, 2001; Kim et al., 2002). is particularly relevant for the discussion Building upon the social construction of the disjuncture of physical locality and of technology approach and its emphasis social networks. They suggest that the upon social context, we examine how internet is incorporated by individuals as a internet use is incorporated into specific tool to strengthen locally-based social social, political, and cultural contexts of connectedness, but also to develop and new immigrants’ lives. New immigrants’ maintain global connectedness. Thus, lives can be characterized as a “confused individuals may use the internet to form positioning between the host country, the their own social networks across local and originating country and any other iden- global geographical boundaries. Even tities felt unaddressed by these two” (Hirji, those who live in the same geographical 2006). The implications of the internet in place can live in very different, specialized their everyday lives are largely shaped by communities constructed around shared how they manage and negotiate such interests, identity, and history. While tensions. Unlike internet and civic engage- most of this genre of research focuses ment studies dealing with settled popula- upon settled populations, there is no tions, researchers studying immigrant reason why new immigrants could not also groups will be faced with the challenge of become both global and local e-citizens in answering one fundamental question: civic a highly individualized “pseudo commu- engagement in which place? nity” (Howard et al., 2001b).

277 YONG-CHAN KIM AND SANDRA J. BALL-ROKEACH

In applying this way of thinking, we country and to build and expand con- suggest that there are four possibilities nections to the host community. open to new immigrants in terms of the As with any typology, these are “ideal primary way(s) the internet is incorpo- types” or analytical categories useful in rated into their everyday political lives: making theoretically relevant distinctions. the internet can be used for (1) connect- In reality, connecting and disconnecting ing to there (home society), (2) connecting to a place is a matter of degree. It is to here (host country), (3) connecting to important to note that we are not classi- neither here nor there, and (4) connecting fying individuals per se, but their internet to both here and there (Figure 20.1). uses. Individuals’ internet use patterns When the primary use of the internet is should be viewed as dynamic and fluid as a tool to settle in and establish associa- rather than static. Critical turning points tions in the host society, we call it an such as changes in immigration policies in “assimilation” use. When the internet is the host society, socio-political disasters used primarily as a connection to the (e.g., the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the wars home country (there), then it is not likely in Iraq and Afghanistan), or changes in that internet use will contribute to civic the diplomatic relation between the host engagement at home (host country). We society and the home country could call this case “transnational” internet use transform one type of internet use into because the internet is a vehicle for con- another. Another point is that the division necting to there from here. In the case of host society and home country where the internet is primarily a tool for becomes more problematic as we move the construction of an imagined commu- from new immigrants to settled popula- nity that belongs neither to here or there, tions. Generally, first and second genera- then we call it a “virtual” internet use. tions are considered new immigrants and Finally, the most challenging and inter- settled populations include the third gen- esting case from the point of view of eration and beyond (Myers, 1999). These identity and civic engagement is “hybrid” qualifiers aside, we suggest that the ana- internet use. In this case, new immigrants lytical distinctions between these four use the internet to simultaneously main- categories have implications for new tain significant connections to the home immigrants’ civic engagement.

Figure 20.1 Four ideal types of new immigrant internet use.

278 NEW IMMIGRANTS, THE INTERNET, AND CIVIC SOCIETY

Assimilation internet uses, needs, education, employment, and cultural connecting to “here” events. Siapera suggests that such websites play “pre-political” functions constructing In the early days, it was expected, with “a community of care and support and both trepidation and excitement, that the creating a common world among or internet would free individuals from the within a refugee public which then can tyranny of geography, and enable them be summoned or enacted as a public.” to build space-free relations in technolo- MissyUSA.com for Korean immigrants in gically simulated “social” spaces called the United States and websites for refu- cyberspace. However, many empirical gees and exiles in the U.K. offer an studies have found that local residents use “entrance to the public sphere” in the the internet to bond with, rather than host society. escape, their immediate environments. ’ Another assimilation-oriented internet The University of Toronto s Netlab study use concerns having a space to articulate a of digital neighborhood Netville demon- group identity as immigrants, an identity strates that internet users are more that is en route to participation in identity strongly connected to their neighborhood politics in the host society. For example, than non-users (Hampton and Wellman, in a case study of websites for non-resident 2001). Likewise, the internet has the Indians in the United States, Mitra (2005) potential to be incorporated into new observed that they offer a “discursive ’ ff immigrants lives by o ering short-cuts in safety zone” where new immigrants ff their e orts to establish new social rela- “negotiate the identity tension and dis- tions, engage in civic activities in their sonance” that they experience in their new neighborhoods, and get civically or new lives in the United States. It is a politically assimilated to the host society. political process in which new immigrants New immigrants can use the internet talk about who they are and who they to familiarize themselves with the new should be in their host society. For Mitra social, political, and cultural environments. (2005), this is a “cybernetic space which is One case is MissyUSA.com, an online produced by the combined voices of community. Korean female immigrants or many people who occupy different phy- short-term visitors including foreign stu- sical spaces” (p. 380). In this space, dents or family members visit this website immigrants’ identities, deconstructed in and share a variety of topics related to the move to their host society, are living in American society. Topics include reconstructed to adapt to their new social children’s education, real estate, immigra- environment. tion issues, and entertainment. In many In addition to talking with fellow respects, this website functions as a bridge immigrants about who they are, the between old and new worlds for new internet also provides a forum where new immigrants from South Korea, smoothing immigrants can actively resist host society the transition from their homeland to stereotypes of them. For example, their new “home” in the United States. Brouwer (2006) found that Dutch Siapera (2005: 516) calls such online Moroccan youth use websites to correct spaces “communities of care.” She ana- negative public images of Moroccans in lyzed 18 U.K. websites constructed to the Dutch mainstream media, providing provide refugees and exiles—such as them with a chance to be heard despite Armenians, Cameroonians, Sudanese, and lack of access to mainstream institutions. Rwandans—with practical information Mitra (2001) observed that in cyberspace, regarding immigration, welfare, emotional indistinct individual voices can converge

279 YONG-CHAN KIM AND SANDRA J. BALL-ROKEACH into a specific discourse for a specific group. CTC has positioned itself as an important Such acts of resistance may serve as anti- part of the community communication dotes to the tendency towards downward infrastructure, immigrants may learn to assimilation for new immigrants (Portes use the internet to learn about their new and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Ostergaard- environment (Hayden and Ball-Rokeach, Nielsen, 2003). 2007). They can develop neighborhood Talking to the host society through the storytelling skills that motivate participa- internet does not necessarily take the form tion in civic activities that bridge them of resistance. Sometimes, new immigrants (Putnam, 2000) to the larger community try to enlighten the host society about (Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001; Kim and Ball- their unique situations. Siapera’s (2005) Rokeach, 2006). case study of African refugees in the United Kingdom shows that new immi- Transnational internet uses, grants try to get the host society’s support connecting to “there” and understanding by “providing complex socio-historical explanations for the Benedict Anderson (1991) observed that current exile,” and building “an alliance newspapers and other national language with the general public, resting on the print media symbolically construct national common understanding sought through boundaries and nationalism. These days, these websites” (p. 515). the internet and other ICT technologies Finally, there are instances of new immi- (e.g., satellite TV, mobile phones, fax, grants using the internet to gain political and so on) afford a new boundary for empowerment by participating in civic nationalism, by allowing for transnational and political activities in the host country. networking that can be mobilized to col- Siddiquee and Kagan’s (2006) study of the lectively (re) imagine the homeland. Such Community Internet Project in the United collective imagining is a political process Kingdom found that refugee women who that begets a terrain of struggle among the are more technologically competent are participants in transnational communities. more motivated to participate in their This collective imagining does not neces- local community. In a University of sarily reflect the reality of the homeland, Southern California Metamorphosis Project as it can take on an idealistic, fundamen- study of community technology centers talist, or essentialist form. As Appadurai (CTCs) in Los Angeles, Hayden and Ball- (1996) notes, “the homeland is partly Rokeach (2007) found that the majority invented, existing only in the imagination of the CTCs are serving new immigrant of the deterritorialized groups, and it populations, most of whom do not have sometimes becomes so fantastic and one- internet access at home. In other sided that it provides the fuel for new Metamorphosis Project studies of Los ethnic conflicts.” Participation in such Angeles’ new immigrant communities, collective transnational imagining of the researchers found that new immi- homelands may discourage or slow the grants from East Asia, Mexico, and process of new immigrant assimilation Central America have low levels of civic into a host society. engagement in their host communities Chan provides an illustrative case of (Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001) and that their Chinese students studying in Singapore internet use does not operate as a facil- Universities and their collective imaging of itating factor in community engagement the homeland. They constructed websites (Matei and Ball-Rokeach, 2001). However, that imagine their homeland as a super- such studies also found that when the power (Chan, 2005). These transnational

280 NEW IMMIGRANTS, THE INTERNET, AND CIVIC SOCIETY migrants acted as representatives of their Virtual internet uses, connecting “imagined” country of origin, using to neither “here” nor “there” online imagery of China as a tool of In the preceding sections, we discussed resistance against the United States in the two ideal types of new immigrant internet global context and against the discipline use, assimilation into the host society and of the host community. reinforcement of transnational connec- New immigrants may also use the tions to the homeland. In this section, we internet to maintain access to social, eco- discuss a third possibility; namely, an nomic, human, and cultural resources in their home country. A Dutch Moroccan internet use that connects new immi- interviewee in Siddiquee and Kagan’s grants to an alternative socio-political (2006) study said that e-mail was a life- space whose gaze is focused neither on line for “maintaining quick, cost effective the home country nor the host society. connections to [their] geographically dis- New immigrants may deploy this to tant … country of origin.” Flourishing explore both personal (Turkle, 1995) and matrimonial websites for non-resident collective identities (Rheingold, 1991). Indians of the United States are another Two of the more common collective example of how new immigrants remain identity spaces are religious and diasporic tightly connected to resources in their virtual networks. Some religiously orien- country of origin (Adams and Rina, ted new immigrants use the internet to 2003). construct a virtual community that has no By using online news media, new direct reference either to here or there. ff immigrant groups are now able to parti- These include Muslim networks (Schi auer, cipate in the public sphere of their home 1999) and Hindu online groups (Brasher, country. In a survey conducted in 2003, 2004). Some diasporas, especially those home country news was the most read or who can be categorized as exiles or refu- watched news among Korean Americans gees forcefully uprooted from their home- in Los Angeles (Kim and Ball-Rokeach, land, have constructed online networks. 2003). The internet and traditional ethnic One example is PALESA (Palestinian media were the main sources of this type Scientists and Technologists Abroad), of news. The net also has made it easier which was set up by Palestinian profes- for new immigrants to participate in the sionals overseas who have been dis- opinion formation process in the home connected from their homeland since the country (Kaldor-Robinson, 2002). They installation of the Palestinian National can contact politicians, news media, or Authority (Hanafi, 2005). This network’s government agencies in their homeland to geographical reference is weak because it register their opinions about homeland refers to the Palestinian Territories which issues, especially emigration policies. Political constitute only a “fragile center of grav- participation can involve direct support to ity” for the Palestinian diaspora. Hanafi political groups in the homeland, even comments that new media can be an participation in “netwars” supporting important tool “for connecting these com- politically dissident or rebellious groups. munities to each other without having to Two examples of such networks are the go through the center” (596). support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil As we mentioned earlier, immigrants’ Eelam in Sri Lanka by the Tamil diaspora internet use patterns are often dynamic (Tekwani, 2003) and “guerilla sites” con- and fluid. Immigrants may change their structed by Zapatista supporters outside internet use pattern from one type to Mexico (Froehling, 1999). another following a decisive shift in the

281 YONG-CHAN KIM AND SANDRA J. BALL-ROKEACH host or home country. Virtual uses of the develop multi-local attachments. The internet, based on religious or professional internet is used by some new immigrant networks without a particular geographical groups to manage their social contacts here reference, can soon be transformed into and there (Chan, 2005). Many of their assimilation or transnational uses due to social networks cross over local or global events such as, to mention some recent boundaries, revealing a form of net- examples, the immigration law reform worked individualism (Wellman et al., protests during 2006 in the United States, 2003). For example, one recent study of or socio-political disasters such as the Turkish and Moroccan immigrants to the September 11th terrorist attacks and the Netherlands and Belgium found that their subsequent wars in the Islamic countries. e-mail contacts were evenly distributed These critical turning points can lead between the home and host countries immigrants toward place-based political (d’Haenens et al., 2007). Adams and Rina engagement, such as using networks (2003) have introduced the concept of to organize protests, encourage voting, “bridgespace” to capture a space where or the mobilization of resources for non-resident Indians in the United States neighborhood development, here and/or leverage their connections to diverse there. resources from both the United States and India, describing it as “a virtual space that supports flows of people, goods, capital Hybrid internet use, connecting and ideas between South Asia and North to both “here” and “there” America.” Unlike the 1920s and 30s’ sociological descriptions of assimilation as a zero-sum game, we are now observing the possibi- The internet use type/civic lity for new immigrants to leverage their engagement relationship social, economic, political, and cultural resources. Disconnecting from a homeland While we have drawn the typology of is not a necessary precondition for assim- new immigrant uses of the internet ilation into the host society (Thompson, around issues of civic engagement, we 2002). Hybridity or the construction of are unable to make confident predic- identities across here and there was pre- tions about civic engagement outcomes viously regarded as problematic (Naficy, on this basis alone. Ideal types are useful 1993) or as just an intermediate rite of only to the extent that they capture passage from “separation” from their broad differences between groups. homeland to complete “incorporation” Personal and social contexts influence into the host society. But as Castles and both internet use and civic engagement. Davison (2000) have suggested, cross-cul- The next step, then, is to account for tural competence that entails adaptation differences in both the intensity and the to multiple social spaces can be desirable geographical focus of new immigrants’ in networked societies (Castells, 2000). In civic engagement, and how this relates to a global world, hybridity can be con- the four types of internet use we have just sidered cultural intelligence (Hoogvelt, sketched out: assimilation, transnational, 2001): new immigrants can use it to virtual, and hybrid. We turn now to connect to multiple social and political theorizing the individual and contextual resources. factors that are likely to modify the Internet use can be one facilitator in internet use type/civic engagement the process through which new immigrants relationship.

282 NEW IMMIGRANTS, THE INTERNET, AND CIVIC SOCIETY

Individual-level factors Gender Past studies have found that female Class immigrants more easily shift their orien- Classical studies of cultural assimilation or tation toward the host society than their acculturation have suggested that upward male counterparts (Jones-Correa, 1998). mobility of immigrants is positively Some suggest that this is due to the fact related to an increased level of assimila- that males are more likely to experience tion into the host community and a downward mobility than females when decreased level of connection to the they migrate from the homeland to home country. However, recent studies the host country (Guarnizo et al., 2003). have found that middle class and profes- These very limited findings suggest sional immigrants are more likely to take that females may be more likely to advantages of available resources, includ- develop assimilation internet uses, while ing new communication technologies, to males may be more likely to develop leverage social, cultural, or economic transnational uses. capital from both here and there (Portes and Zhou, 1992). Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) observed that among Kurds in the Reasons for immigration United Kingdom, lower class immigrants The decision to immigrate is influenced could not find the time to attend rallies by various push and pull factors but only for better social, political, and legal con- a limited number of studies examine the ditions for asylum seekers in the U.K. relationship between reasons for immigra- because they were already mobilized tion and civic engagement. A few studies around homeland political agendas. These compared the two major drivers (political limited observations suggest that higher and economic) and found that political class levels may be associated with hybrid motivations tended to be more positively internet use, while low-income migrants, related to civic or political participation in when they have access to the internet, the host society than economic motivations are more likely to use the internet to (Agurrie and Saenz, 2002; Doerschler, maintain their connection to the 2006). Immigrants who were forced to homeland. leave their home country for political reasons tended to have lower expectations of going back home. Thus, they may Education have relatively high motivation to invest Some studies suggest that high levels of their time, money, and efforts in the host education help immigrants to quickly country political process. Immigrants who learn the language of the host society and, came to their host communities primarily therefore, to assimilate faster than the less for finding better economic opportunities educated (Alba and Logan, 1991; Hechter (jobs, education, and so on) usually wish and Okamoto, 2001). But other studies to go back to their country of origin as have shown that education increases soon as their goals are achieved. Unlike political participation not only in the politically motivated immigrants, they immediate social environments but also usually do not have enough time and around more global issues, including other resources to invest in developing homeland politics (Tarrow, 1998). We new political skills and interests. can speculate that education increases the Based on these limited empirical findings, likelihood of hybrid internet use. we propose the hypothesis that politically

283 YONG-CHAN KIM AND SANDRA J. BALL-ROKEACH motivated immigrants would more likely roles. They help immigrants integrate into display an assimilation type of internet use the receiving society, while providing them (if they have access to political capital in with the institutional, social, cultural, or the host community) or a virtual type of psychological resources to remain connected internet use (if they do not have access to to the country of origin. Religious mem- political resources in the host commu- bership also provides immigrants with nity). We would also expect that eco- opportunities to withdraw from matters nomically motivated immigrants would be related to either their host community or more likely to develop a transnational their country of origin and to construct pattern of internet use. Relationships private, spiritual spaces. Roles vary among between immigration motivations and religious institutions. For example, obser- internet use types would be either medi- ving Salvadoran immigrant communities ated or moderated by other factors such as in U.S. metropolitan areas, Menjívar age, gender, immigration generation, lan- (2003) found that Catholic churches put guage skill, education, and income. more emphasis on community-building efforts and the integration of Salvadoran immigrants into their host communities Length of residence and than evangelical churches that emphasized immigration generation individual spiritual experiences. The fea- The traditional view is that the longer tures of religious institutions that might immigrants are in a host country, the more affect their role in their affiliates’ internet likely it is that they will engage with it use type may include their place orienta- and disconnect from the homeland. The tion (here, there, neither-here-nor-there,or corollary prediction was made for immi- both-here-and-there); whether the religion gration generation; that is, that the second has strong transnational or global net- generation would be less connected to works; and whether it is in the main- the homeland than the first generation, stream of the host society (for example, and so on. A few recent studies suggest Christianity in most western countries). that these predictions may no longer hold. Guamizo et al. (2003) found that Internet connectedness length of residence in the host society does not significantly decrease interest or Any type of internet use for political involvement in homeland politics. Several engagement requires internet access and studies have shown that second-generation will be affected by the level of internet immigrant children do have substantial skill. Metamorphosis Project studies of interest in their and their parents’ home- new immigrant groups in Los Angeles land (d’Haenens, 2003; Hiller and Franz, have shown that different groups of new 2004). These studies suggest that we may immigrants in different places vary in not find assimilation internet uses to be as terms of having internet access, internet prevalent as they once were. This opens use skills, and internet use goals (Jung up the possibility of hybrid internet uses, et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2002; Gibbs et al., in which people develop civic interest 2006). Internet access and a certain level both here and there. of skill is an obvious pre-condition for internet use for civic engagement. What may not be so obvious is that not all new Religion immigrant groups meet this pre-condition In most contemporary immigrant com- (Jung et al., 2007). Also, it will be munities, religious institutions play multiple important in future studies to know the

284 NEW IMMIGRANTS, THE INTERNET, AND CIVIC SOCIETY full range of goals that are implicated in and spaces available for civic life as immi- internet use. We hypothesize that when grants (such as ethnic media or immigrant immigrants use the internet generally organizations) (Vertovec, 2001; Østergaard- for social and self-understanding goals, Nielsen, 2003), the internet is more likely they are more likely to develop hybrid to be used for strengthening new immi- internet uses. grants’ connections to the host society (assimilation uses) or bridging between the host society and the country of origin Contextual factors (hybrid uses). The political environment of the host society Socio-economic difference between new comers and the host The political environment in the host society society can be an important contextual factor in the uses that new immigrants Previous studies of migration and assim- make of the internet. Societies and com- ilation have found that socio-economic munities with high levels of social capital divisions between newcomers and mem- (Putnam, 2000) afford a conducive envir- bers of the host society is a factor in the onment for new immigrants. Similarly, pace of assimilation (Guarnizo et al., new immigrants living in communities 2003). When new immigrants have lower with strong communication infrastructures socio-economic status, the bigger the gap, will have greater opportunities to become the slower the pace of assimilation. This engaged than those living in communities suggests that new immigrants will be less with fragmented communication infra- likely to develop assimilation or hybrid structures (Kim and Ball-Rokeach, 2006). internet uses when they enter a society Accordingly, both of these political where they are toward the bottom of the environments should foster assimilation socio-economic ladder. and/or hybrid internet uses. Home country emigrant policies Host society’s immigration policies States vary in their policies toward those The host country’s immigration policies who leave. Some, such as Haiti, try to are features of the environment that are maintain hegemony over emigrants. Some likely to affect how new immigrants deploy states encourage dual citizenship, while the internet. As Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) others do not. Those that reach out to observed, in countries like Germany and their emigrants should foster more dur- many East Asian countries where migrants able civic connections and this is more are categorized as foreigners and excluded likely to promote either the transnational from full access to political rights, new or hybrid patterns of internet use. immigrants are more likely to use the internet for either connecting or recon- Immigrants’ communication necting to their country of origin (trans- environment national uses) or for finding a “third space” that belongs to neither here nor Different immigrants live in different com- there (virtual uses). On the other hand, in munication environments (Kim and Ball- a society emphasizing multiculturalism Rokeach, 2006). Having access to trans- such as the Netherlands or the United national news channel such as Al Jazeera States, where there are many resources for immigrants from the Middle East, or

285 YONG-CHAN KIM AND SANDRA J. BALL-ROKEACH

Telemundo for Latinos, and satellite TV groups. Rather, it requires expansion of networks for Asian immigrants (e.g., the theory to allow for the case of civic Arirang TV for Koreans overseas) affords engagement over multiple spaces. Such transnational connections to the home expansion is fully consistent with the country. Local ethnic media have flour- larger need to grasp aspects of the globa- ished in many immigrant communities lization process that include immigration around the world. These have the poten- flows. tial to promote immigrants’ civic partici- Much of the research that bears upon pation in their host societies. But studies individual and contextual factors that may have also found that ethnic media play a shape new immigrants’ internet uses is limited role in this regard (see Ball- based upon case studies. While these are Rokeach et al., 2001). When new media useful,wehavealongwaytogoincreat- such as the internet come into an indivi- ing theory-driven, multi-method inquiry. dual’s or a community’s communication Comparative studies will be especially environment, their social meanings and helpful in building theory. For example, roles are largely shaped by the character- studies of the same ethnic immigrant istics of the existing communication group in different places, and immigrants environment (e.g., Jung et al., 2007). We of different ethnicities in the same place propose that immigrants’ internet use may generate insights into how immi- types (assimilation, transnational, virtual, grants operating under different personal or hybrid) are influenced by the kinds of and contextual conditions form their communication environments they experi- internet uses. ence. For example, if an immigrant com- These issues matter because new munity has a local storytelling network immigrant decisions on media use are likely encouraging integration into the host to reflect and to intensify the identity society, assimilation internet use is more negotiations that have substantial implica- likely. If immigrants live in a communications for civic engagement. Immigration tion environment discouraging engage- flows are not likely to lessen in the fore- ment in the host community, their seeable future; we need to conduct social internet use is likely to be of either the science research on the internet in a way transnational or virtual type. that incorporates this trend, and to allow for the possibility of internet-related civic engagement here and there. Conclusion

Considerations of how the internet is Guide to further reading woven into immigration processes and immigrants’ lives are not suﬃciently the- Castles and Davidson (2000) provides a orized in communication studies. We nice overview about the issues regarding have presented an internet uses typology migration and civic engagement in both formulated around the issue of new global and historical contexts. Appadurai immigrants and civic engagement. It will (1996), Giddens (1991), Hall (1994), and serve its intended purpose if this typology Morley and Robins (1995) also oﬀer spurs other internet politics researchers to useful conceptual tools to understand the incorporate new immigrants into their multiplicity of issues around migration, studies. As this chapter illustrates, incor- communication technologies, and place poration means more than adding new attachment in the globalizing world. For immigrants to sample frames or study recent discussions about transnationalism,

286 NEW IMMIGRANTS, THE INTERNET, AND CIVIC SOCIETY we recommend Vertovec (2001) and Most of the previous works on immi- Guarnizo et al. (2003). In his introductory grants’ internet use are based on case article in Journal of Ethnic and Migration studies. Among them, we recommend Studies, Vertovec offers very useful sum- Mitra (2001), D’Haenens et al. (2007), maries of conceptual issues and criticisms Østergaard-Nielsen (2003), and Siddiquee about transnational approaches to migra- and Kagan (2006). The works from the tion and immigration. Guarnizo et al. (2003) Metamorphosis Project at the University is an important article for anyone inter- of Southern California (Hayden and Ball- ested in the factors influencing immi- Rokeach, 2007; Jung et al., 2007; Kim et grants’ political actions in multiple social al., 2007; Matei & Ball-Rokeach, 2001) spaces. For recent discussions about immi- provide contextual knowledge about how grants’ assimilation, Zhou and Cai (2002) the internet is woven into existing com- provide an excellent overview of different munication environments and community approaches and recent developments. life among new immigrants.

287 21 One Europe, digitally divided Jan A. G. M. van Dijk

The digital divide in Europe still is a problem, and the goal of universal access to computers and internet connections has yet to be achieved. In this chapter the extent of the problem will be analyzed in terms of user access, and the public policy options for solving the problem will be reviewed. A comprehensive description will be made of the current status of the digital divide in Europe, highlighting the gaps between Northern and Southern, Western and Eastern Europe and the gaps between population groups within these countries. The description will follow a fourfold model of access: motivation, physical access, digital skills, and usage.

Access for all is important for internet those who do and those who do not have politics in the world. This certainly goes access to new forms of information tech- for Europe where at least the policy texts nology. Most often these forms are com- of the European Union abound with puters and their networks but other digital phrases such as “an information society equipment such as mobile telephony and for all” and “e-inclusion.” Yet, reality digital television are also included by shows otherwise, as even in the latest some users of the term. Eurobarometer statistics persistent large The term digital divide probably has access gaps appear between Northern and caused more confusion than clarification. Southern or Eastern and Western European According to Gunkel (2003) it is a deeply countries and between people with dif- ambiguous term that is caused by the ferent social class, education, age, and sharp dichotomy it refers to. Van Dijk gender within all these countries. (2003, 2005) has warned of a number of The second part of the chapter will pitfalls of this metaphor. First, the meta- deal with policy issues. What solutions phor suggests a simple divide between have been proposed and practiced in the two clearly divided groups with a yawn- European Union? What are the prospects ing gap between them. Second, it suggests of solving this presumed problem in an that the gap is very difficult to bridge. A environment of increasing global economic third misunderstanding might be the and informational inequality? What are impression that the divide is about abso- the political implications when the digital lute inequalities between those included divide problem in Europe, and elsewhere, and those excluded. In reality most is not sufficiently solved? inequalities of access to digital technology But first of all, we have to take a closer observed are of a relative kind. A final look at the core concepts of digital divide, wrong connotation might be the sugges- universal access, or simply access to com- tion that the divide is a static condition puters and the internet. The digital divide while in fact the gaps observed are con- commonly refers to the gap between tinually shifting. Both Gunkel and van

288 ONE EUROPE, DIGITALLY DIVIDED

Dijk have emphasized that the term access for all. For those not connected at echoes some kind of technological deter- home, public access and public service in minism. It is often suggested that the ori- community and government buildings, gins of the inequalities referred to lie in libraries, telecenters, and internet cafés are the specific problems of getting physical the second option. In developing coun- access to digital technology and that tries household access is a luxury that is achieving such access for all would solve far beyond reach. There public access is particular problems in the economy and the first option; access in public buildings, society. In the last suggestion not only a community centers, and commercial tele- technological bias but also a normative centers or cafés is the only achievable aim bias is revealed. of access in a short or medium term. The great merit of the sudden rise of However, the biggest conceptual pro- the term digital divide at the turn of the blem is caused by the term access itself. centuryisthatithasputtheimportantissue Usually access is equated with physical of inequality in the information society on access. This narrow definition causes the scholarly and political agenda. Between many problems. It does not sufficiently the years 2000 and 2004 hundreds of scien- explain the diversity of phenomena that tific and policy conferences and thousands are related to inequality concerning the of sessions on regular conferences have been use of digital technology. It is no surprise dedicated to this issue under the call of that all conceptual elaborations of the the term digital divide. In the years 2004 terms digital divide and technology access and 2005 attention has started to decline. of the last five years have tried to extend In terms of policy and politics many obser- the concept of access or to go beyond vers, particularly in the rich and devel- access narrowly defined. My own research oped countries, reached the conclusion is characterized by a model with four that the problem was almost solved. After successive and accumulative types of all, a rapidly increasing majority of their access that mark the steps to be taken by inhabitants obtained access to computers, individual users in the process of appro- the internet, and other digital technologies. priating digital technology. The first type From a scientific point of view the is motivation or motivational access. The concept ran into difficulties; ever more second is material access, particularly expressions such as “redefining the digital physical access. Then comes skills access: a divide” and “beyond access” appeared. number of “digital skills” required to However, this does not mean that the work with digital technology. The last concept has become an empty cover. On type of access is the purpose of the whole the contrary, it is more of a container process of technology appropriation: usage. concept carrying too many meanings. This model of access (Figure 21.1) will Therefore, one should carefully distin- serve as a framework for the current state guish between different kinds of digital of the many digital divides in Europe to divide. In this chapter this will be done be described in the following large section. by a distinction of four types of access. Universal access also has been defined rather differently. We have to observe The digital divide in Europe that the developed and the developing countries try to realize this principle of Motivation (tele)communication policy in different ways. In the developed countries uni- Acquiring the motivation to use a compu- versal access usually means household ter and to achieve an internet connection

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Figure 21.1 A cumulative and recursive model of digital technologies access. is the ﬁrst step to get access to these percent of experienced internet users digital technologies. Many of those who (UCLA, 2003: p. 25). German and Dutch remain at the “wrong” side of the digital surveys from 1999 to 2006 revealed that divide have motivational problems. It about half of those not connected to the appears that there are not only have- internet explicitly refused to obtain such a nots, but also “want-nots.” Probably, the connection (ARD-ZDF, 1999; van Dijk, motivational divide has become smaller in Hanenburg, and Pieterson, 2006). the last two decades, at least in developed The main reasons for not wanting a societies. In Europe it is increasingly taken home internet connection mentioned by for granted that people have a computer European inhabitants in a large-scale and internet connection if they do not European survey of 2005 (Eurostat, 2006) want to become marginalized in society. in percentages between brackets are: does Also, it seems that the phenomena of not want internet, content is not useful technophobia and anxiety that usually (41), equipment costs are too high (25), accompany the advent of a new, perhaps lack of skills (24), access costs of tele- frightening, technology have diminished. phony etc. too high (23), and has access In the 1980s and early 1990s, large parts elsewhere (18). Eight percent do not of the European and American popula- want the internet because content is tions showed signs of technophobia, harmful etc.; privacy and security reasons computer anxiety, and distrust in a world are called by 6 percent and 13 percent dominated by computers in nationwide mention other reasons. surveys. The factors explaining motivational However, fears and dislikes have not access are both of a social or cultural and a disappeared. They are surprisingly persis- mental or psychological nature. A primary tent. According to a representative UCLA social explanation is that “the internet survey in 2003 more than 30 percent of does not have appeal for low-income and new American internet users reported that low-educated people” (Katz and Rice, they were moderately to highly techno- 2002: p. 93). To dig deeper into the phobic and the same applied to 10 reasons for this lack of interest it seems

290 ONE EUROPE, DIGITALLY DIVIDED appropriate to complement the large-scale most consumer expenditure surveys. surveys with qualitative studies in local Among these expenses are subscriptions, communities and cultural groups. Those the growing number of computer per- who did discovered the importance of cul- ipheral devices, the rising prices for pri- ture, ethnicity, and particular lifestyles for mary products such as ink, paper, and the motivation to obtain and use digital electricity, and, in general, the accelerat- technology (van Dijk, 2005: pp. 35–9). ing obsolescence of computer hardware However, most pronounced are mental and software. and psychological explanations. Here the The current state of the physical access phenomena of computer anxiety and divide in Europe can be described in terms technophobia come to the fore. Computer of the gap between European countries or anxiety is a feeling of discomfort, stress, or regions, and the gap of relevant demo- fear experienced when confronting com- graphics such as age, gender, educational puters (Brosnan, 1998; Chua, Chen, and level, type of employment, and ethnic Wong, 1999; Rockwell and Singleton, minorities. The question posed in this 2002). Technophobia is fear of technol- section is whether these gaps are narrow- ogy in general and distrust in its beneficial ing or widening at the time of writing. effects. Computer anxiety and techno- In Northern and Western Europe the phobia are major barriers of computer and physical access divide in terms of compu- internet access, especially among seniors, ters and internet connections has started people with low educational level, and a to close after the year 2000. This means part of the female population. These that the upper strata in terms of education phenomena do not completely disappear and income were no longer adopting with a rise in computer experience. these digital media at a faster rate than the lower strata. On the contrary, people with lower education and income, and Material and physical access seniors have been catching up since The following type of access is the one that time. The physical access divide of that draws all attention in digital divide gender in Northern and Western Europe research, opinion, and policy. Many already closed before 2000. (See annual people think that the problem of the Eurobarometer research summarized in digital divide is solved as soon as (almost) GESIS, 2004.) everybody has a computer and internet However, in Southern and Eastern connection. That this assumption is Europe the physical access divide has still wrong forms the tenor of this chapter. In grown after the year 2000. Only recently this section we first have to make a dis- it can be observed that particular coun- tinction between physical access, that is tries in Southern Europe slowly enter the having a computer and internet connec- phase of a closing divide (Eurostat, 2006). tion, whether at home or in a public See Figure 21.2. This goes for Spain and place—provisions at work are not sup- Cyprus, where computer possession in posed to be used for every purpose—and 2006 rose above 50 percent and internet material access. This is the broader con- connections at home became available for cept that includes all expenses for com- more than a third of the population in puter and network hardware, software, that year. However, Greece and Portugal and services. While computers and inter- were still running behind. net connections on their own are getting Figure 21.2 shows that there are large cheaper every year, total expenses for gaps between Northern and Southern and these media are not dropping according to between Western and Eastern European

291 JAN A. G. M. VAN DIJK countries considering household access to Cultural factors might be more impor- computers, the internet, and broadband tant than usually thought. One of the connections. Inside Eastern Europe dif- factors explaining lower access rates in ferences are very large. Countries such as Southern Europe is a lifestyle of living Slovenia and Estonia already have access outdoors and on the streets more than figures around the EU average, while in cold Northern Europe. Here people countries such as Romania and Bulgaria spend a large part of leisure time at home, run very far behind with access figures of among others behind their computer a Third World country. screen. What explains these North–South and Except for the disparities at the country West–East divides? Generally, they are level and the regional level—within ascribed to the economic wealth and European countries there are pronounced the level of development of nations. differences between city and rural regions However, the causes are deeply entren- with rural regions often lacking broad- ched features of each country’s economic, band access (see Eurostat, 2005)—one can cultural, and political character: the avail- observe access differences at the level of ability and cost of digital technology in a organizations with some organizations and country; a country’s general level of lit- categories of employees having more eracy and education; the language skills of access than others—that are not discussed a country’s population, speaking English here—and at the individual or household in particular; the level of democracy level. Individual-level disparities in Europe (freedom of expression); the strength of touch the same social categories as in all policies to promote the information society other continents of the world. Those in general and access in particular; a cul- with senior age, lower educational level, ture that is attracted to technology, com- positions outside the labor market or puters, and computer communication (van educational institutions, and to a lesser Dijk, 2005: p. 57). extent with female sex and ethnic minority

Figure 21.2a Personal computers, internet access, and broadband speed in the European Union, by region, 2006: Northern Europe. Source: Eurostat (2006). Note: Data for 26 European Union members from 2005, data for Norway and Iceland from 2006.

292 ONE EUROPE, DIGITALLY DIVIDED origin, have less physical and material with no computer use and 71 percent access to computers and the internet. As a with no internet use while these percen- general proposition one can maintain that tages were only 8 and 28 percent for these social category digital divides are Europeans with high education. Finally, more pronounced in countries with lower Table 21.1 shows large differences of social and economic development and a physical access between European stu- lower rate of diffusion of information and dents, employees, and the self-employed communication technology (van Dijk, on the one side and European unem- 2005). Taking into account that Europe ployed, retired, and inactive people at the on average has a relatively high position other. globally on both rates (development and The gender gap of physical access in diffusion) the social category digital Europe has closed for the youngest age divides in Europe still are very articulate. group of 16–24, but not for older age Table 21.1 shows broad divides of age, groups. Gender differences are biggest in level of education, and occupational posi- the age group of 55–74. The general tion. In 2005, 61 percent of Europeans physical access figure for the 25 EU between 55 and 74 years of age had never counties in 2004 for computer access was used a computer and 81 percent did not 58 percent for males and 51 percent for regularly use the internet. Among the females, and regarding internet access it youngest adult age group (16–24) 9 per- was 51 percent for males and 43 percent cent never used a computer and 32 perfor females. cent no internet. Europeans with low Physical and material access to compu- education had a proportion of 57 percent ters and the internet of ethnic minorities,

Figure 21.2b Personal computers, internet access, and broadband speed in the European Union, by region, 2006: Western Europe. Source: Eurostat (2006). Note: Data for 26 European Union members from 2005, data for Norway and Iceland from 2006.

293 JAN A. G. M. VAN DIJK most often migrants from other continents, “information capital”. Steyaert (2000) and usually is very much lower than that of van Dijk (1999, 2003, 2005) introduced the ethnic majority in a particular country. the concept of “digital skills” as a succes- Evident problems are a lack of employ- sion of three types of skill. The most basic ment, material resources, and understanding are operational skills, the capacities to work of the official language in a country, or with hardware and software. These skills the knowledge of English. The ethnic have acquired much attention in the lit- composition of European countries is so erature and in public opinion. The most different that general ethnic majority and popular view is that skills problems are minority access figures cannot reasonably solved when these skills are mastered. be conveyed here. However, many scholars engaged with information processing in an information society have called attention to all kinds Skills access of information skills required to success- After having received the motivation to fully use computers and the internet. use computers and some kind of physical Information skills are the skills to search, access to them, one has to learn to select, and process information in com- manage the hardware and software. Here puter and network sources. Two types of the problem of a lack of skills might information skills can be distinguished: appear according to the model in Figure formal information skills (ability to work 21.1. This problem is framed with terms with the formal characteristics of computers such as “computer, information, or mul- and the internet, e.g., file and hyperlink timedia literacy” and “computer skills” or structures) and substantial information skills

Figure 21.2c Personal computers, internet access, and broadband speed in the European Union, by region, 2006: Southern Europe. Source: Eurostat (2006). Note: Data for 26 European Union members from 2005, data for Norway and Iceland from 2006.

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(ability to find, select, process, and evaluate both require knowledge of computer and information in specific computer and net- network skills and some substantial knowl- work sources following specific questions). edge of the field under consideration, for Finally, we can distinguish strategic skills. example understanding the way the labor They can be defined as the capacities to market, the government bureaucracy, or use computer and network sources as the hospitals work and knowing particular means for particular goals and for the laws and regulations. general goal of improving one’s position Empirical research of all kinds of digital in society. An example of a strategic skill skills is scarce. Actually, the only data are on the internet is the task to find the about the command of operational skills. nearest hospital with the shortest waiting Institutions offering computer courses list (means) for a particular knee operation sometimes record the achievements of (particular goal). Usually, strategic skills course takers. Some national surveys that

Figure 21.2d Personal computers, internet access, and broadband speed in the European Union, by region, 2006: Eastern Europe. Source: Eurostat (2006). Note: Data for 26 European Union members from 2005, data for Norway and Iceland from 2006.

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Table 21.1 Computer and internet non-use, and skills among selected demographics in 25 EU countries, 2005

Demographics Not regularly using the internet Never used a computer Age 16–24 years old 32 9 25–54 years old 51 27 55–74 years old 81 61 Education Low education 77 57 Middle education 53 25 Higher education 28 8 Employment Students 22 4 Employees and self-employed 46 22 Unemployed 68 36 Retired, inactive, other 84 64 Total Average across 25 EU countries 57 34 Computer skills Never Low Medium High Education Low education 65 10 15 10 Age 55–64 years old 61 13 16 10 65–74 years old 83 7 7 3 Employment Retired, inactive, other 73 11 11 5 Unemployed 44 14 23 19 Total Average across 25 EU countries 41 13 24 22 Internet skills Never Low Medium High Education Low education 67 17 12 4 Age 55–64 years old 65 26 8 1 65–74 years old 85 12 3 0 Employment Retired, inactive, other 76 17 6 1 Unemployed 48 27 19 6 Total Average across 25 EU countries 43 31 20 6

Source: Author’s calculations based on data available from Eurostat (2006). ask population samples to report about Analyzing the data of this survey, it their computer and internet skills are appears that all three social demographics— available (for example van Dijk et al., age, educational level, and gender—are 2000; Park, 2002; UCLA, 2001, 2003). significantly related to the level of com- Mostly, they only pay attention to the puter and internet (operational) skills but command of hardware and software, not that age is most important, educational to information skills. attainment second, and gender third. The latest estimation of computer and Measuring computer and internet skills internet skills, in this case also mainly with general surveys poses two funda- operational skills, of the European popu- mental problems: a measurement problem lation were made in the Community and the problem that only operational Survey on ICT use in Households and by skills and not information and strategic Individuals (Eurostat, 2006). Table 21.1 digital skills are considered. The first pro- also portrays the overall low computer blem is the validity of survey measure- and internet (operational) skills of the ment for this purpose: are self-reports European population in 2006, emphasiz- valid measurements of actual skills pos- ing the even worse situation of the poorly sessed? Many people have difficulties in educated, the senior users, and the retired. judging their own skills. It is well-known

296 ONE EUROPE, DIGITALLY DIVIDED that males and young people give higher computer anxiety and there she observed self-estimations than females and seniors. that the less computer anxiety subjects Moreover, in the surveys referred to, reported, the higher they perceived their including the Eurostat survey, it is asked fluency while not showing lower actual whether a particular operation has ever fluency. been executed, not whether it was per- An investigation with performance tests formed well. This goes among others for of digital skills in a media lab comparable the use of a search engine. Probably most to that used by Hargittai, is presently people are very bad in using search being done by myself and a Ph.D. student engines. However, this can only be at the University of Twente in the summer validly determined by performance tests of 2007. A stratified random sample of a in a controlled environment. Most mea- hundred Dutch residents, age 18 to 70, is sures of computer literacy or digital skills invited to perform a series of tests to have an educational background; they are measure the level of operational skills the tests finishing computer classes or (formal and substantial), information skills, courses. One of the few attempts to give and strategic skills separately. The sample performance tests of actually mastered is stratified in four age groups, three edu- computer and internet skills in a con- cational attainment groups, and two sexes. trolled experimental environment that Two general hypotheses still waiting have been reported, is the experiment of for conclusive evidence in surveys and the American sociologist Esther Hargittai. performance tests of digital skills are (1) For her dissertation she conducted a series that the divides of skills access are bigger of experimental tests with American user than the divides of physical access, and (2) groups charged with tasks of finding par- that while physical access gaps are more ticular information on the internet or less closing in the developed countries, (Hargittai, 2002, 2003, 2004). In this way, the (relative) skills gaps tend to grow, the she also measured some formal and sub- gap of information skills and strategic stantial information skills. Subjects were skills in particular. selected and matched according to age, sex, and education. Enormous differences Usage access were found in the measure of accom- plishment and time needed to finish these Actual usage of digital media is the final tasks. Only half of the experimental group stage and ultimate goal of the total process was able to complete all tasks in the first of appropriation of technology that is experiment, but for some subjects time called access in this chapter. Having suffi- required for a particular task was a few cient motivation, physical access, and skills seconds while others needed 7 to 14 to apply digital media are necessary but minutes (Hargittai, 2002). Another attempt not sufficient conditions of actual use. was made by Ulla Bunz of Florida State Usage has its own grounds or determi- University. She compared the actual nants. As a dependent factor it can be versus the perceived “computer-, e-mail-, measured in at least four ways: usage and web fluency,” as she calls the digital time; usage applications: number and skills, of a group of 61 first-year students diversity; broadband or narrowband use; (Bunz et al., 2006). Considering the more or less active or creative use. command of skills she found no gender One of the gravest errors in statistics of differences of actual fluency. Females only computer and internet diffusion is that the revealed a lower level of perceived flu- possession of a computer and access to the ency than males. However, she focused on internet are conflated with actual use.

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Some people have a computer but rarely Sometimes they lead to surprising results. or even never touch it. At least 20 per- In 2000, this Agency found that the cent of those having formal access to the number of weekly hours of computer and internet at home in Europe and North internet use of males at home was double America are not using this medium as compared to that of females (SCP, themselves, but one or more housemates 2001). In 2005 the distribution was still do. Those really using a computer and the same: males used the computer and the internet can do this for a few minutes internet at home 5.2 hours and females a week or they can use them everyday 2.4 hours a week. The gender physical and all day long. Usage time might be a access gap may have been almost closed in better indicator of the digital divide than the Netherlands, but this certainly does dichotomous physical access (yes/no). not apply to the usage gender gap. Eurostat measures frequency of internet Usually, the average number of internet use in a number of categories (once a day, applications used overall, such as the a week, etc.) and for several demographics twelve applications mentioned in Table (see Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu. 21.2, is between two and six (van Dijk, int/portal). Generally, the same disparities 2007). However, experienced users, people can be observed here as with physical with high education, and young users use access and skills access mentioned above. considerably more applications than inex- However, the most valid and reliable perienced users, people with low educa- estimations of actual usage time are tion, and senior users. The same goes for made in detailed daily time diary studies people with broadband access as com- that measure all daily activities to the pared to narrowband and dial-up access minute. For example, the Dutch Social (van Dijk, 2007). Comparable results and Cultural Planning Agency measures appear in surveys relating the diversity of detailed home usage times for compu- usage applications to demographic char- ters and the internet every ﬁve years. acteristics of users (for the U.S. see

Table 21.2 Internet activities of Europeans, by age and education subgroups, 2005

Internet activities Age Group 16–24 25–54 55–74 Level of education Level of education Level of education Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Information from public authorities 19 29 43 – 37 51 – 32 40 Information on health and food 21 25 29 – 40 44 36 41 40 Information on goods and services 63 74 85 77 83 86 71 76 79 Reading online papers and magazines 26 36 41 24 33 47 – 29 37 Training and education 37 48 34 – 28 35 – 20 28 Travel and accommodation 22 42 54 – 51 61 – 55 60 Financial services 13 28 44 – 43 53 – 39 45 Selling goods and services (auctions) 11 16 16 16 19 18 –– 12 Playing and downloading games and music 61 57 50 28 29 30 – 15 15 Chat and instant messaging 65 57 53 28 26 28 – 14 14 Web-radio and web-TV 32 31 31 17 18 25 – 10 14

Source: Eurostat, 2006. Note: Includes people in 27 European Union countries who have used the internet in the last three months.

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Howard et al., 2001a, Horrigan and Rainie, applications for information, communica- 2002a; UCLA Center for Communication tion, shopping, and entertainment” (van Policy, 2003 for Europe see Eurostat, Dijk, 2005: p. 130). 2006 and Table 21.2). Evidently, specific Bonfadelli (2002) has shown that in social categories of users prefer different Switzerland, in the year 2000, 72 percent kinds of applications. The studies just of internet users with low education used referred to all show significant differences entertainment types of internet applica- among users with different social class, tions as compared to 35 percent of users education, age, gender, and ethnicity. Table with high education. Further, 64 percent 21.2 also portrays the differences among of users with high education employed the two most important categories: age information types of application and 45 and education. percent transaction services, as compared This table shows a generation gap in to 53 percent information applications playing and downloading games and and 31 percent transaction applications by music, in chatting or instant messaging, users with low education. I have observed and in receiving web-radio and web-TV the same tendency in 2005 in the as the youngest age group uses these Netherlands (van Dijk, 2007). Users with applications much more; conversely, high education used significantly more internet users with middle and high ages applications of information, news and benefit more from information on health current affairs, jobs and vacancies, internet and food, financial services, and travel or banking, buying and selling goods, and accommodation services. However, dis- the use of government websites than users parities between people with different with low education. On the other hand levels of education, an important indicator users with low education used sig- of social class, are much bigger. This also nificantly more applications of gaming goes for the youngest generation that has and downloading or exchanging music grown up with digital media. and videos, chatting and entertainment as In this context some investigators (van a whole. The situation of Europe as a Dijk, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2004; Bonfadelli, whole in 2006 shows the same pattern. 2002; Park, 2002; Cho et al., 2003) per- Table 21.3 reveals that internet users with ceive a so-called usage gap between people low education perform less activities of with different social class and education information retrieval, text communication that is comparable to the phenomenon of (both e-mail and reading newspapers and the knowledge gap that has been magazines), financial services, and services observed from the 1970s onwards. While of mobility (travel and accommodation) the knowledge gap is about the differ- than users with medium and high educa- ential derivation of knowledge from the tion. Simultaneously, they perform more mass media, the usage gap is a broader entertainment activities: playing and down- thesis about a differential use of computer loading games and music, chatting and and internet applications as a whole in all instant messaging, and web broadcasting. kinds of activities. I have observed “the first signs of a usage gap between people of Other digital divide high social position, income, and educa- considerations tion using the advanced computer and internet applications for information, Usage of narrowband versus broadband communication, work, business, or edu- connections appears to have a strong cation and people of low social position, effect on usage time and on the type and income, and education using more simple range of applications. People with broadband

299 JAN A. G. M. VAN DIJK connections take much more advantage be reinforced by computer and internet of the opportunities of the new media. use. In most, if not all, spheres of societal They are much less deterred by the costs participation (economical, social, political, of connection time; they use much more cultural) and citizenship, those already applications and for a longer time. This occupying the strongest positions tend to has been observed in the U.S. (Horrigan benefit more from access and usage of and Rainie, 2002b; UCLA, 2003). ICTs as potentially powerful tools than Unfortunately, Eurostat only supplies data those occupying the weakest positions for household broadband access per (van Dijk, 2005). This is sometimes called country in Europe, not individual demo- the rich are getting richer effect or the graphics. However, most likely in Europe Matthew effect, a term first coined by the a “broadband elite” also exists that uses sociologist Merton in 1968 referring to the connection for ten or more online the Gospel “For to everyone who has, activities on a typical day (Horrigan and more shall be given” (Matt. 25: 29, New Rainie, 2002b). As a matter of fact, American). Without necessarily defending broadband also stimulates a much more an instrumentalist view of technology it active and creative use of the internet can be claimed that computers and the (Horrigan and Rainie, 2002b). internet can be used as tools to strengthen Despite its image of being interactive, one’s position in society. The better one most internet usage, apart from e-mailing, commands this tool the better it can be is relatively passive and consuming. Active used for this purpose. and creative use of the internet, that is, the If this proposition is true, it could lead production of internet content by users to a dark perspective for policies to themselves still is a minority phenomenon reduce the digital divide of skills and despite all contemporary promises of Web usage access as types of relative inequality. 2.0 and the rise of participatory media Every measure one could take would perspective. Active contributions are pub- benefit those in the strongest positions lishing a personal website, creating a more than those in the weakest positions. weblog, posting a contribution on an Is this perspective inevitable, or are there online bulletin board, newsgroup or other, more focused policy options that community, and, perhaps, in a broad only or primarily benefit people in the definition, exchanging music and video weakest positions? What digital divide files. From the Eurostat data it appears policies are available anyway? What has that people with lower age and social class Europe done to close the digital divide? or education are exchanging music and Are European digital divide policies spe- video files more often than people with cial, for example as compared to U.S. middle and senior age and high social class policies? These questions will be discussed and education, but that the distribution is in the following sections. opposite for people with high education in creating web pages and posting messages to chat rooms, newsgroups, or Policies to solve the digital online discussion forums. divide in Europe A first general conclusion of many investigations is that, increasingly, all There are two main reasons for countries familiar social and cultural differences in to develop policies that help to reduce the society are reflected in computer and digital divide. The first is economic internet use (van Dijk, 2005). A second development or innovation, and the second conclusion is that these differences tend to is social inclusion or the reduction of a

300 ONE EUROPE, DIGITALLY DIVIDED level of inequality that tends to become This strongly applies to ICTs. Here the too high. Traditionally, the first reason is prime strategic orientation is the liberal- more important for governments and ization of telecommunications. The con- corporations, though legitimizing digital struction of new infrastructures and their divide policies usually is framed more in general diffusion is left to the market. The terms of social inclusion and access for all. EU and its member states try to stimulate Clearly, a persisting digital divide reduces and direct development with innovation the potential of the labor force and of funds and to correct by regulation. innovation. Advanced high-tech societies cannot afford to exclude about a third of First policy phase: emphasizing this potential labor force and of all hidden physical access talents for innovation it contains. Moreover, information and communication technol- During the second half of the 1990s and ogy is considered to be a growth sector in the first years after the year 2000, when the economy that should be supported in the digital divide first appeared as a policy global competition. problem for governments, the European With regard to economic development Union and its member states were very and innovation the digital divide statistics much preoccupied with the diffusion of in the former section are a matter of the technology and the achievement of grave concern for the European Union. physical access to computers and the In its Lisbon 1999 declaration, the EU has internet for as many Europeans as possi- launched a strategy to become the most ble. This was enacted by the principles innovative economy in the world by the of universal and public access and of year 2010. In the year 2007, it has to universal service. In this context these acknowledge that a very large proportion principles mean that every citizen or of the European population has never inhabitant should either have a private even used a computer and internet con- connection to a computer and the inter- nection. At the level of countries, the EU net, preferably at home, but also students should be concerned about the enormous at schools and employees in working disparities of physical access between places (universal access) or a public con- Northern and Southern, Western and nection in a public place such as a library Eastern member states. and a community access centre (public In all documents of the EU of the last access). 15 years that dealt with access to the The principle of universal service was information society, both the issues of defined by the European Commission as economic development or innovation and “access to a defined minimum service of of social inclusion and participation of all specified quality to all users independent Europeans in the information society of their geographical location and, in were present. light of specific national conditions, at Officially and ideologically, the European an affordable price” (Commission of the Union (27 member states from January European Communities, 1996: p. 22). Here 2007 onwards) is very much occupied it was accepted that physical access itself is with an all-inclusive information society. not sufficient and that the price, quality, Documents with titles like An Information and geographical availability of services Society for All have abounded since the should be safeguarded and kept under middle of the 1990s. However, like the some regulatory control. This is an instance U.S. the EU adopts a market orientation of the broader concept of material access in technological innovation and diffusion. and it requires a particular distribution of

301 JAN A. G. M. VAN DIJK material resources. In the U.S. this has digital competence.” (Commission, 2005: taken the form of the Universal Service p. 9). Fund that reaps a small part of the tariffs This new policy was summarized in the of telecom users to afford connections, Riga Declaration of 2006. The background computers, and other resources in (pri- of the policy shift was explained in a 2007 marily) schools. The EU has not seriously working document: “It focused on three tried to create such a fund. Instead the facets of eInclusion: the access divide (or EU attempts to realize universal service ‘early digital divide’) which considers the by regulation (Commission, 2003). A gap between those with and without large number of obligations have forced access; the usage divide (‘primary digital telecom operators to interconnect their divide’) concentrating on those who have networks, to open up their connections access but are non-users; and the divide for access to the internet and other digital stemming from quality of use (‘secondary media by telephone subscribers, and to digital divide’) focusing on differentials in provide some pubic access points. participation rates of those people who In the first phase additional steps were have access and are users” (European made to provide extra resources focused Commission Staff, 2007: pp. 33–4). on disadvantaged groups in Europe. They In the Riga Declaration (Ministers of were hardware and connection cost sub- the EU, 2006) six broad policy areas for sidies to schools in poor neighborhoods inclusion are defined: older workers and or regions and additional means in pub- elderly people; the geographical digital licly accessible buildings and community divide; eAccessibility and usability; digital access centers, for example staff to guide literacy; cultural diversity in relation to new users and to give computer courses. inclusion; inclusive eGovernment. In the In some European countries yet another Riga Declaration very ambitious targets further step was made: to supply hard- are expressed: “the differences in internet ware, software, and training for the usage between current average use by the unemployed to increase their chances on EU population and use by older people, the labor market. people with disabilities, women, lower education groups, unemployed and ‘less- developed’ regions should be reduced to a Second policy phase: half, from 2005 to 2010.” emphasizing skills, usage, and Here, for the first time, EU digital motivation divide policy is explicitly focused on the In the action plan eEurope 2005: An elderly and on the countries and regions information society for all (Commission, with low access to computers and the 2002) the emphasis was still on the (broadband) internet. To close the geo- rollout of (broadband) infrastructure, new graphical divide the EU now aims broad- services, and content. However, here first band coverage to reach at least 90 percent mention was made of the necessity to of the EU population in 2010. So-called re-skill adults for the knowledge society eAccessibility and usability mean better outside formal education for mainly and more user-friendly software and ser- young people. In 2005, a long-term vices to be obtained by voluntary industry strategy was announced in the context of commitments and by EU-legislation for so-called i2010 that could be framed as a particular standards where they are new digital divide policy: “In i2010 appropriate. According to the Declaration strong emphasis is given to full participa- this also means that “attention must be tion and to providing people with basic paid to further improve user motivation

302 ONE EUROPE, DIGITALLY DIVIDED towards ICT use, as well as trust and also emphasized physical access. It is confidence through better security and conspicuous that it is not made in the privacy protection. Furthermore, greater United States. After the installation of gender balance in the information society the Bush administration in 2001 the remains a key objective.” (Ministers of digital divide was no longer a government the EU, 2006: p. 2). policy problem. The U.S. was heading to Another new focus is on digital literacy be A Nation Online: How Americans are and competence. Here actions also are Expanding Their Use of the Internet tailored to the needs of groups at risk of (National Telecommunications and exclusion: “the unemployed, immigrants, Information Administration, 2002). So, people with low education levels, people the assumption was that the problem was with disabilities, and elderly, as well as already being solved. The Bush adminis- marginalised young people” (p. 4). Here tration concluded that government action the EU ministers want to cut the gaps of was no longer needed. It proposed to literacy by half in 2010 but, evidently, they terminate programs like the CTC do not know what they are talking about as (Computer Technology Centers) program it is admitted that operational definitions of and the TOP (Technology Opportunities this type of literacy still have to be made. Program). Of course, this does not mean Cultural diversity in relation to inclusion that there is no government policy in means “fostering pluralism, cultural identity terms of the diffusion of ICTs and the and linguistic diversity in the digital space” spread of digital literacy, or that American (p. 4). This is supposed to stimulate civil organizations will not call attention European cultural diversity and the partici- to digital divide issues. Only, that cur- pation of immigrants and minorities in the rently there is no concerted government information society. As many eGovernment action. Karen Mossberger will analyze the applications are not yet accessible for EU digital divide in the U.S. in Chapter 13 of citizens a final Declaration aim is to this handbook. “promote the accessibility of all public websites by 2010, through compliance with the relevant W3C common web Conclusion accessibility standards and guidelines” (p. 4). Two things are striking in this new The general implication of the digital policy direction. First, a shift is made from divide is social exclusion of large sections an emphasis on physical access with a of the population in several fields of hardware and services orientation to skills society: the economy, politics, culture, and usage access stressing digital literacy and education, community life, mobility and applications that enable people to partici- transport, social and sexual relationships, pate in the information society. This and even citizenship (Warschauer, 2003; move echoes more recent analyses of the van Dijk, 2005). In politics it means more digital divide as a multifaceted phenom- or less disenfranchisement. Currently, this enon or as a problem that goes “beyond has started to take a modest form, but access.” A second shift is the transition when the digital divide problem is not from a general policy of universal access solved, ultimately citizens will even be and service to a much more focused disenfranchised as voters. approach for particular social categories The modest forms we witness today all and European regions lagging behind. are disadvantages for citizens and voters This double shift is also made in some that appear because in their provisions other countries of the world that previously governments and politicians increasingly

303 JAN A. G. M. VAN DIJK expect that people have computers and EU not closing the digital divide would internet access and are able to work with mean an even more divided Europe, these media. In this chapter it was shown contrary to its mission. While actually, the that these are erroneous assumptions. Yet, “information society for all” project most current innovations in the field of clearly has been one of the main unifying politics and government are spent on and legitimizing projects for the EU as an information and communication technol- institution; failing in this respect would ogy. Those with access are able to benefit lead to even larger regional disparities from them, and those without are not. This between Northern and Southern, Western is not only caused by a lack of physical and Eastern Europe. access but also by insufficient digital skills. It even goes for usage access where those already politically involved have proven to Guide to further reading benefit much more from the new digital opportunities than those less interested. Current and old policy documents of the Contemporary examples of modest dis- European Union regarding information enfranchisement are valuable e-government society access and the digital divide are services, online voting guides, online poli- available at the EU Information Society tical and government information, cam- Thematic Portal: http://ec.europa.eu/ paign news, online petitions and discussions, information_society/policy/ecomm/index_ the opportunity to send e-mails to politi- en.htm. Statistical data regarding access cians and civil servants, and many other are available in a freely accessible database internet applications that cannot be used called Eurostat Data Navigation Tree: by digitally excluded citizens. Additionally, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/ one of the main venues for European policy/ecomm/index_en.htm. Summarized citizens to be informed about the EU data over many years (archive) are avail- project and EU policies so far away for able at GESIS: http://www.gesis.org/ many Europeans, EU websites would en/data_service/eurobarometer/. Specific only be available for an elite among them. country reports of all EU countries and In the mean time the election process Norway and Turkey are available at: also is digitized step by step. Electronic http://countryprofiles.wikispaces.com. voting with computers in poll stations has The conceptual background of this become common practice in many devel- chapter is elaborated in van Dijk (2005) oped societies. Electronic voting from and (2006). The latter book also contains home, though contested, is a potential a comparison of the general information future step. In that case those without society policies of the European Union, the access would certainly be disadvantaged. United States, and East Asia. Additionally, Of course, they would be offered alter- comparisons of digital divide policies of natives for a long time to come. But with the European Union and the United States each of these innovations it appears that can be derived from Mossberger et al. step by step those at the wrong side of the (2003) and Wilhelm (2004). Comparisons digital divide are pushed to the margins of of digital divide policies worldwide, political and citizen participation. focusing on developing countries are In this chapter the policies of the EU available in Warschauer (2003). have received much attention. For the

304 22 Working around the state Internet use and political identity in the Arab world

Deborah L. Wheeler

Whereas the internet is an increasingly common tool used in Arab everyday life, only a handful of scholars have studied what impact internet use is having on Arab societies. This study remedies this lacuna by providing an analysis of the relationship between internet diffusion and democratization; the role that IT diffusion plays in economic growth and development; and the extent to which internet access enhances individual agency and empowerment (especially in terms of gender and social class, and given authoritarian information environments). It argues that in spite of government attempts to censor and police the network, individual citizens manage to work around the state, constructing a wide range of internet meanings and practices, which often challenge norms. The cumulative, long-term effects of these subversions will alter the ways in which people live their lives in the region, but may not on their own transform authoritarian states.

In the Middle East, as in all regions of the explanations of the internet’s global dif- world, the internet and its constituency fusion and meaning. It is a middle-ranked evolve daily. In spite of this flux, key economic region (Kane, 2007); it is a patterns in regional internet culture are place with one of the fastest internet dif- clearly visible, and it is these regional fusion rates on the planet (2000–7), and it themes that form the foundation for this is a region with a mostly literate popula- analysis of the internet and Arab political tion where computer literacy is often identity. It is estimated that most of the encouraged by state and society. At the Arab public’s use of the internet happens same time, the Arab world is a place with in a community access point, yet surpris- distinct security challenges, both for state ingly, few scholars if any have analyzed and individual (Eid, 2004; Bellin, 2005). what goes on in internet cafés and com- It is a place where authoritarianism rules munity telecenters throughout the region. and information environments are his- This article attempts to fill this gap by torically not prone to free flow and analyzing recent data collected in internet openness (Noland, 2005; Kalathil and cafés in Jordan and Egypt to illustrate the Boas, 2003). It is also a region with sig- subtle changes in the politics of everyday nificant gaps between haves and have life in the Arab world. nots, urban dwellers and rural inhabitants, The Arab world is a compelling field men and women. These conditions pro- site for testing many of the competing vide a good environment for examining

305 DEBORAH L. WHEELER the relationship between internet diffu- Internet diffusion in context: a sion and democratization; the role that look at the Arab world IT diffusion plays in economic growth and development; the extent to which Internet diffusion has been increasing internet access enhances individual agency exponentially in the Arab world over the and empowerment (especially in terms past few years. This high rate of diffusion of gender and social class, and given contrasts sharply with the early years of authoritarian information environments). the internet’s regional spread. Some of the Moreover, a study of internet diffusion earliest adopters of the technology include and identity issues in the Arab world Tunisia (1991—NSFNET connection), enables us to see the ways in which the Cypress and Kuwait (1992), Egypt, Turkey, technology’s meanings are, in part, and UAE (1993), Jordan, Morocco, socially constructed. Algeria, and Lebanon (1994). In the early Over the past ten years the author has years, diffusion was slowed by state con- performed ethnographic studies of the cerns about losing an information mono- internet’s meanings in Arab contexts poly, low public awareness and demand including studies of culture in Kuwait for the technology, high cost of access, (Wheeler, 2006b), Egypt (Wheeler, limited computing skills among the 2003a, 2003b), Jordan (Wheeler, 2006a), population, and sparseness of Arabic-lan- Oman, Tunisia, and Morocco. These in- guage web content. For example, in depth case studies were supplemented by 2000, it was estimated that internet users short research trips to Syria, Turkey, and in the Arab world constituted 2,474,800; the United Arab Emirates. This chapter in other words, less than 1 percent of the synthesizes this research in light of com- population. By 2007, however, the peting explanations to produce a bird’s number of internet users in the Arab world eye view of the internet and its multi- has risen to approximately 39,777,500 colored meanings in the Arab world. It (according to Internet World Stats), which looks at different levels of analysis, focus- means that access has increased 15-fold. In ing upon the varying responses to the some oil-rich Gulf countries, internet internet by states and societies in the Arab access rates have reached an all-time high world. It asks the fundamental question of of just over 35 percent penetration (UAE). whether or not the internet is transform- But even in countries such as relatively ing identity and politics in the Arab cash-poor Morocco, internet penetration world. The analysis maintains the possibi- has reached a surprising 15 percent of the lity that the internet, instead of being population. This represents an astounding transformative, is simply a vehicle for seven-year growth rate of 4,500 percent relationships that already exist in real life. for Morocco’s internet users, 1,500 per- One thing we know for sure is that the cent for the region as a whole. prophecies about the internet under- As illustrated in Table 22.1, there are mining authoritarianism and ushering in a gross differences among countries in the period of Athenian-style democracy Arab world in terms of internet use and worldwide have not come true (Gore, access. Scholars have explained this diver- 1994). This does not mean, however, that sity in terms of a country’s per capita the internet is insignificant. The following income, literacy rates, PC and telephone pages explore a handful of reasons why. penetration rates (Kirchner, 2001; Ghareeb, In the end, this chapter makes an argu- 2000; Warshauer, 2003). A state’s attitude ment for why the internet matters in the towards the technology also shapes internet Arab world. diffusion. For example, in the Syrian and

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Saudi cases in the early years of regional Qatar, where per capita income is high, adoption, both of these governments internet penetration is also high. In Syria, initially banned the technology, greatly where per capita income is low, internet slowing diffusion. Only after it was clear penetration rates are also low. In Morocco, that their populations were going to have Jordan, and Lebanon, however, per capita access to the internet—perhaps illegally, income is relatively low, and internet through foreign dial-up accounts—did penetration rankings are relatively high. they slowly introduce the technology. Thus, some variable beyond per capita Even today, Syria has a low internet income must be influencing internet pene- penetration rate, but the rapid increase in tration rankings, especially in non-oil- users from 2000–7, growing at more than producing states. 3,500 percent, illustrates that even if the Table 22.2 shows that literacy rates as state wants to block internet access for its well are not a sufficient variable with own security concerns, it cannot afford to which to explain internet penetration. For be technologically cut off from the rest of example, the top four countries for inter- the region and the world, mostly for net penetration—the UAE, Qatar, economic reasons. Kuwait, and Bahrain—all fail to make it To show that economic prosperity is into the top four countries for regional not robust enough an indicator by itself to literacy. Moreover, all four of the top predict internet penetration consider countries for literacy—Palestine, Jordan, Table 22.2. In only 3 countries out of 17 Lebanon, and Libya—rank 11th, 7th, 5th, is there symmetry in terms of per capita and 15th respectively for internet pene- income and internet penetration: the tration. This chapter seeks to explore UAE, Qatar, and Syria. In the UAE and some of the contextual variables at play in

Table 22.1 Internet connectivity and growth in the Arab world, 2000–7

Country Total population, 2007 Internet users, 2007 Percent change in (%) internet users 2000–7 Algeria 33,506,567 6 3,740 Bahrain 738,874 21 288 Egypt 72,478,498 7 1,011 Iraq 27,162,627 0 188 Jordan 5,375,307 12 295 Kuwait 2,730,603 26 367 Lebanon 4,556,561 15 133 Libya 6,293,910 3 1,950 Morocco 30,534,870 15 4,500 Oman 2,452,234 12 217 Palestine 3,070,228 8 594 Qatar 824,355 27 630 Saudi Arabia 24,069,943 11 1,170 Syria 19,514,386 6 3,567 Tunisia 10,342,253 9 854 United Arab Emirates 3,981,978 35 90 Yemen 21,306,342 1 1,367 Total 268,939,536 16 1,500 North America 334,538,018 70 115 European Union 493,119,161 52 171

Source: Internet World Stats (2007).

307 Table 22.2 Information access, income, literacy, and freedom in the Arab world

Country Daily newspapers Percentage of Personal computers Number of Income per Literacy rate Freedom per 1,000 people households per 1,000 people internet cafés capita percentage male/ (2006) (2002) with TV (2004) (2004) female over 15 (2004) (2004) Algeria 27 98 9 3,000 7700 78.8/61.0 not free Bahrain ––– 90 25300 91.9/85.0 not free Egypt 31 95 32 400 4200 68.3/46.9 not free Iraq ––8 50 2900 55.9/24.4 not free Jordan 74 97 55 500 4900 95.9/86.3 partially free Kuwait – 95 183 300 21600 85.1/81.7 partially free Lebanon 63 93 113 200 5500 93.1/82.2 partially free Libya 14 – 24 700 12700 92.4/72.0 not free Morocco 29 76 21 2,150 4400 64.9/39.4 not free Oman – 79 47 80 14100 83.1/67.2 partially free Palestine – 94 48 60 1500 96.3/87.4 partially free Qatar ––– 80 29400 89.1/88.6 not free Saudi Arabia – 99 354 200 13800 84.7/70.8 not free Syria – 80 32 600 4000 89.7/64.0 not free Tunisia 19 90 48 300 8600 83.4/65.3 not free United Arab Emirates – 86 116 191 49700 76.1/81.7 not free Yemen – 43 15 120 900 70.5/30.0 not free

Source: Daily newspapers per 1,000 people in 2002, percent of households with TV in 2004, personal computers per 1,000 people in 2004, income per capita in 2004, and literacy rate ability to read and write for males and females over 15 years old in 2004. WORKING AROUND THE ARAB STATE shaping internet diffusion in the Arab Ambassador William Rugh, reinforcing world. Alterman’s position, does not include the The question remains, why should study of the internet in his revised classic we care about internet diffusion (and on Arab mass media, claiming that the other IT access) in the Arab world? technology “does not reach a mass audi- International aid organizations are fond of ence in the Arab world” (Rugh, 2004: arguing that “Information technology has xiii). Instead he focuses on radio, televi- become a potent force in transforming sion, and print media. social, economic and political life globally. Rather than try to rank the importance Without its incorporation into the infor- of one IT mode over another, this chap- mation age, there is little chance for ter views the internet as part of a process countries or regions to develop” (Hafkin of IT diffusion that is more widespread and Taggert, 2001: 1). But do Arabs and important than the internet in isola- themselves place any value on these tion. For the sake of analytical clarity, technologies? Is their value an imported however, this chapter looks at the inter- concept, driven into local culture and net as representative of this IT diffusion state politics by rhetorical promises of process, understanding that the technol- improved human and economic develop- ogy has not yet reached the critical mass ment by outsiders? that TV or radio has. Given the rapid Some scholars of new media diffusion growth rates of internet access, however, in the Middle East have argued for the this article argues that it is just a matter of importance of satellite TV over the internet time until the internet will be a mass as a technology capable of re-shaping based technology. The number of inter- Arab identity in a mass way. They base net cafés, especially in countries with such arguments on the assumption that supposedly low penetration rates, suggests more people in the region have regular that even for those who cannot afford a access to satellite TV than to the internet. PC, or their own IP address, internet access They also argue that illiteracy is not a is available, and demand is growing. More barrier to accessing satellite TV program- than likely, the growth rates and percentage ming, whereas with the internet, literacy of penetration figures above fail to accu- (being able to read and type) and com- rately reflect the number of internet users, puter literacy (familiarity with using a especially the high percentage of the computer and surfing the net) are keys to region’s population that goes online at a successful internet access and use. For community access point (café or telecenter). example, Jon B. Alterman observes, One observer estimates that close to 80 “Assessing the impact of the information percent of all internet use in the Arab technology revolution in the Middle East world takes place in a community access solely in terms of internet use would be a point (Rochidi, 2004). These narratives huge mistake. A number of technological suggest that it does make sense to look at innovations are poised … to have an even the impact of the internet on everyday greater impact in the years to come” citizens’ lives. (Alterman, 2000: 23). Satellite TV, for Among Middle East specialists studying instance, reached “between 20–30 per- IT diffusion in the Arab world, high cent of the region’s population” by 2000 expectations and value are placed on the (Alterman, 2000: 23). During that same regional diffusion of new media technol- year, the internet reached less than 1 per- ogies. For example, as Marc Lynch cent of the population in the Arab world, observes, new media (from fax machines thus, one can understand Alterman’s point. to mobile phones, newspapers to satellite

309 DEBORAH L. WHEELER

TV, the internet and beyond) are toge- state responded with a grave punishment ther creating “a new kind of Arab public for the brave and vocal critic. The response and a new kind of Arab politics” (Lynch, is designed to intimidate would-be oppo- 2006: 2). These technological transfor- sition. Another move, which calls into mations are enabling citizens to construct question the retreat of the state in new “the underpinnings of a more liberal, media environments, is the government’s pluralist politics rooted in a vocal, critical recent call to revise the Egyptian con- public sphere” (Lynch, 2006: 3). Several stitution in order to extend the powers of years earlier, Jon B. Alterman, observed, the presidency (Slackman, 2007a: 11). “Change brought on by [this] new tech- The vote was boycotted by dissidents. It nology does seem certain” (Alterman, was reported in the press that the vote 1998: 68). Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. was likely rigged by the regime. The new Anderson outline a potential explanation laws introduced by this vote have been for what kind of change can be expected. interpreted by several international orga- As a result of increasing “access to con- nizations as the worst violation of human temporary forms of communication that rights in the past 26 years of Egyptian range from the press and broadcast media politics (Slackman, 2007b: A7). The new to fax machines and audio and video legislation, which passed with “over- cassettes and from the telephone to the whelming public approval,” gives Hosni internet,” Eickelman and Anderson argue Mubarak the legal right to “dissolve that “increasingly open and accessible forms parliament without holding a refer- of communication play a signiﬁcant role endum, to suspend civil protections in in fragmenting and contesting political cases the president deems associated with and religious authority” (Eickelman and terrorism and to limit the role of judges in Anderson, 1999: 1–2). The key to their monitoring future elections” (Slackman, argument is that “the state is powerless to 2007c: p. A5). This expansion of state limit their [new media] use without dis- power comes as internet use in Egypt rupting the economy” (Eickelman and has expanded more than one thousand Anderson, 1999: 3). percent over the past seven years. This The following pages consider two levels situation in Egypt illustrates the com- of analysis, the state and societal uses of plexities of determining how and why the the internet to decipher the ways in internet matters in the Arab world. Mixed which new media technologies are shap- messages are ripe in the region, as states ing Arab identity and politics, to see if the expound the values of the Information internet matters, and if so for whom, and Age for their societies, their commitment why. Augustus Richard Norton argues to democracy, and openly acknowledge that internet use, and other forms of hor- the need for reform, as demonstrated izontal communication, are producing the for example, in President Mubarak of “slow retreat of authoritarianism” in the Egypt’s speech to the Arab Reform Muslim World (Norton, 1999: 27). The Conference in 2004 (Mubarak, 2004). In Egyptian government’s recent arrest and spite of the rhetoric, states in the region, sentencing of a blogger to four years in including Egypt, often arrest citizens for prison illustrates the Arab state’s calculated openly criticizing the regime and resist response to the threat of person-to-person the tides of reform by more heavily forms of opposition (Associated Press, entrenching state power and controls over 2007b: A6). Some Egyptian blogs pub- public life. Making some sense of these licly raise doubts about the legitimacy of mixed messages is the goal of the following Hosni Mubarak’s regime. In this case the sections.

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Arab states and the internet: resources” to work for the creation friend or foe? A top–down of knowledge-based industries. approach to the internet and (King Abdullah, 2007) its meanings In the UAE, the country with the highest Concern over the increasing gaps between internet penetration in the region (35.1 haves and have nots in the information percent), information technology has age are being exasperated by the advent been viewed by the state as a path to of internet led globalization and the rise of economic development. Epitomizing this the knowledge economy. This process of strategy are the Dubai Internet City pro- creating an information rich class and an ject and the Media Free Trade Zone. information poor class has created a fun- Both of these Dubai-based IT and damental transformation in international economic development initiatives have aid policy, Arab state economic policy (at “attracted both venture capitalists and least in theory or at the rhetorical level), foreign direct investment in industries rela- and the perceived value of IT locally (in ted to information technology” (Rosenthal, the Arab world) and beyond. The goal of 2007). At the societal level, the UAE has stimulating IT led development is a worked to introduce youths to IT and common feature of regional leaders’ spee- computing from a young age. The UAE’s ches, official documents, and projects. For 2007 Yearbook explains that it is a part of example, King Abdullah of Jordan on his government education policy to spur IT official website states: awareness and economic development through education. For example, the Jordan is rapidly emerging as a hub Yearbook explains, “one of the govern- for technology investment in the ment’s goals is to provide a computer for region. E-leadership through a every 10 children in kindergarten, every 5 strong public–private sector part- pupils in primary schools, every 2 students nership, an educated and talented in preparatory school and one computer workforce, local and foreign direct per student at university” (UAE Yearbook, investment, and world-class infra- 2007). structure are enabling the develop- Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has ment of a competitive Information been an advocate for his country’sIT and Communications Technology revolution, and has sought to expand the (ICT) industry role of Egypt as a regional IT hub, com- (King Abdullah, 2007). peting with Jordan and the UAE for foreign direct investment in the IT sector. According to the website, the King and In 2000, Hosni Mubarak made an official his advisors identified that: visit to the United States designed to create greater cooperation between the IT “information” had become a source sector in the U.S. and Egypt. During his of wealth in its own right, and visit, the President of Egypt chose to release immediately set out to enable indus- the following speech to the American tries associated with the manipulation, people via the AOL server. He observes: storage, transmission, or retrieval of information, better known as ICT. As Egypt, as one of the world’s fastest a nation with little “natural resour- growing markets for the Information ces,” the focus of King Abdullah II was industry, promises unlimited potential to leverage Jordan’squalified “human of cooperation with the United

311 DEBORAH L. WHEELER

States in this field. I therefore chose bulge, one of the highest illiteracy rates in to extend this digital message directly the region, and increasingly vocal oppo- to the American people through the sition movements. Egypt also has an largest online community in the internet penetration level of only 6.9 world, to highlight some of Egypt’s percent. The fact that Egypt is one of five views on the Information age. Middle Eastern countries listed on the (Mubarak, 2000). “Internet Enemies” list also calls into question the sincerity of the state’s com- To expand on those views, President mitment to empowering all Egyptians with Mubarak in his letter to the American IT (Reporters without Borders, 2006). people observes: In spite of the rampant and elative state rhetoric regarding the celebrated powers The technology that portrays itself of the internet and other information to be global needs to be truly so not technologies for building opportunities only in terms of reach, but more across the social spectrum, what has importantly in terms of equal access lagged in the region is the delivery on and mutual benefit. That is not promises for real change in the structure of necessarily the case in many instan- wealth and power in Arab societies. For ces; which lays down a salient task example, in 2000, Egypt’s e-government to be undertaken by the world projectmadeitpossibletoordertraintickets community, as a whole. These new online and to download and print the technologies need to be geared documents needed to renew one’s driver’s towards the advancement of the license. In 2004, the Jordanian govern- developing world. The countries, ment partnered with Intel Corporation to previously known as the Third implement a high-profile initiative called World, can not afford to miss what the e-Education project. The idea was to is currently known as the Third create a series of “discovery schools” Wave. Every effort must be made throughout Jordan, with each school to utilize the new technologies to wired to high-speed bandwidth and support leapfrog development stra- operating an e-math, e-science and other tegies. Technology transfer is the only e-based curricular transformations. While vehicle to make sure that the world, all of this may sound like progress, in now coming together by technol- actuality what it produces is a confusing ogy, does not fall apart by inequality gap between state rhetoric and social and the neglect of the basic needs of impact. Raising a child’s knowledge of the world’s poor. computing does not solve the problem (Mubarak, 2000) of extremely high youth unemployment; moreover, being able to order train Egypt made its commitment to building an tickets online is only useful for those elite IT revolution along the Nile transparent few who own a computer, a printer, a when Ahmad Nazif, former Minister phone line, an internet connection, and of Communication and Information need to (and have the means to) ride by Technology was made Prime Minister reserved train coach (Economic and Social during a summer of 2004 cabinet reshuf- Commission for Western Asia, 2002). fle. In spite of these changes and strate- It is not by accident that Arab states gies, Egypt remains a country with severe commonly look to Singapore, China, and development challenges including grow- other Asian Tigers for inspiration for their ing poverty, unemployment, a youth IT led economic goals. It is not uncommon

312 WORKING AROUND THE ARAB STATE to hear Jordan, for example, refer to its The 2007 version of the report stresses development goals and transition to the the necessity for a profound change in information economy as a desire to become mindsets to realize the region’s full the Singapore of the Middle East (Ang, potential. Entrepreneurship, an element 2004). In Asia, high human development has that is often cited as the key to unlocking been achieved, without democratization. the potential of the Arab economies, can Contrary to the Washington Consensus, only take root in societies where freedom political liberalization does not have to of thought, enthusiasm for inquiry, and precede or accompany economic liberal- critical thinking are popular values (el- ization, as the case of Singapore illustrates. Diwany, 2007: p. 1). The goal of the Arab state has been to use A tension clearly exists in the Arab IT as a tool for enhancing economic world between the concepts of freedom, growth opportunities, while at the same security, and economic growth. Ideally, time maintaining a tight grip on society’s Arab states would like to increase eco- use of the internet for political change. nomic growth, while stifling political To illustrate the effectiveness of this strat- transformation. The question is, can egy, consider that the two countries with increasing access to the internet and other the highest level of internet penetration, potentially empowering communication the UAE and Qatar are rated by Freedom technologies open up new spaces for House as “not free.” Table 22.1 suggests entrepreneurialism without stimulating that there is a freedom gap in the Arab innovative political experimentation in world, in spite of the growing spread of the Arab world? Elsewhere I have ana- the internet (United Nations Development lyzed attempts to create an IT enabled Program, 2004). The governments in the entrepreneurial class in the Middle East region have been able to run the IT (Wheeler, 2003a, 2003b, 2001a). This “revolution” as they please, adding infor- chapter focuses instead on the residual mation capabilities to a growing percen- political and social experimentation that tage of the population, attracting new occurs in spite of state efforts to control economic investment, while at the same the information revolution and its mean- time retaining a tight grip on the reins of ings. For the past ten years the author state power. Economists argue, however, observed a growing critical mass of dis- that if the region is going to continue to senting voices emerge to challenge restric- grow, it is going to have to allow for tive political and social practices in the more freedom, at least for the potential Arab world. Gal Beckerman calls this dis- entrepreneurs. For example, the most recent cursiveshifttheemergenceof“AnewArab World Competitiveness Report observes: conversation” which “reflects a new culture of openness, dialogue and question- Today, the Arab world is at a critical ing” (Beckerman, 2007: p. 1). Beckerman juncture. The region’s economies are continues: currently very dynamic and offer tremendous business opportunities; Whether it is a Jordanian student there is no doubt that improvement discussing the taboo subject of to national competitiveness and closer the monarchy’s viability or a Saudi integration with the global economy woman writing about her sexual and within the region are necessary experiences or an Egyptian com- if this growth momentum is to be menting with sadness at an Israeli sustained. blogger’s description of a suicide (Schwab, 2007: p. 1) bombing, each of these unprecedented

313 DEBORAH L. WHEELER

acts is one small move toward Blogs and chat: Arab opening up these societies. societies’ internet use and (Beckerman, 2007: p. 1) constructions of meaning

Part of what makes this picture complex The Arab blogosphere is the way in which the Arab state puts security above freedom, and in the end, In spite of state attempts to control infor- above economic growth and entrepre- mation environments in the Arab world, neurialism. Jordan may have its REACH the following section demonstrates the initiative, which is designed to spur ICT ways in which internet access is shaping led development in Jordan, but this does public life, facilitating critical thinking, not mean that the state is not above using free thought, and entrepreneurialism. its coercive power to stop citizens from Participants in this social “revolution” adapting technologies that are good for are aware of the power of these contesta- business, to technologies which empower tions to shape identity, even if institu- oppositional imaginations (Jordan Times 11 tions, especially those of the state, are July, 2000). In Jordan, in spite of clear state proving impervious to such public inter- efforts to build an economically moti- ventions. Ahmed Zewail, an Egyptian vated information society, with a thriving scientist and Nobel Laureate, recently ICT industry, citizens still face prison time described how the internet was creating a if they publish things “considered ‘harm- pathway towards a Muslim renaissance. ful to the country’s diplomatic relations’ He explains: or to do with the king and the royal family” (Reporters without Borders, 2007a). Now, with the internet, ambitious Similarly, in Egypt, “a national plan devel- young people in Egypt or Morocco oped by the Ministry of Information and can go to the internet cafes and see Communication Technologies” attempts what is going on in Los Angeles or “to link national development with global Kuala Lumpur—or even Qatar, forces using ICTs” (el-Sayed and Westrup, which now has a GDP per capita 2003: p. 77). At the same time, Egypt close to the U.S.—but they can’t remains one of five Middle Eastern seem to get it [income] themselves. countries on Reporters Without Borders’ That feeds their frustration. When “List of Internet Enemies,” defined by the we can convert that frustration into organization as “a roll of shame reserved positive energy, there will be hope for countries that systematically violate for the young Arab Muslims who on-line free expression” (Reporters with- now see a different future. out Borders, 2007a). The five states (Zewail, 2004: p. 2) included on this list include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Iran, and Syria. Imagining, discussing, and implementing If Arab states wish to take full advan- a new future for the Arab world is the tage of the global economy they will have goal of many regional bloggers. From all to change their policies of attempting to across the political spectrum, young Arabs muzzle opposition and manipulate eco- narrate their visions for a new Middle nomic opportunity so as to co-opt the East. For example, Egyptian blogger Abdul- entrepreneurial class (Heydemann, 2004). Moneim Mahmud, whose blog is called Both freedom of expression and freedom to Ana Ikhwan (www.ana-ikhwan.blogspot. innovate are keys to building an information com), reports “arbitrary arrests and acts of economy. torture by the [Egyptian state] security

314 WORKING AROUND THE ARAB STATE services” and criticizes the excesses of state to stay in the country or leave. This coercion. He was arrested by Egyptian urgency makes the commentary more authorities on April 14, 2007. Similarly, complex and interesting Egyptian Abdel Kareem Nabil Suleiman (Beckerman, 2007: p. 4). has used his blog (www.karam903.blog spot.com) to “condemn the government’s When thinking about the meaning of authoritarian excesses.” He was recently blogs in the Arab world, obvious ques- arrested for his outspokenness. Another tions emerge. Who is blogging? How Egyptian blog, “From Cairo with Love,” widespread is blogging? Do blogs have explains the importance of blogs when any political significance? Are they insti- the author observes: tuting the “slow retreat of the state” (Norton, 1999a: p. 27)? While data is not Its really different to read a piece of really available to answer these important news, opinion, or thought on a questions at this stage, some initial respon- weblog than on a “traditional” news ses can be obtained by looking at regional site. The difference I guess is that and local portals, and by doing some they mostly reflect personal opi- content analysis of the blogs themselves. nions, provide lots of freedom for The initial results of this investigation everyone to voice their opinion, suggest that blogging is new, but gaining and to hear opinions and news momentum. In its present state, it seems those are not channeled through mostly to be young people who blog, and mainstream media. They also allow these young people seem to be mostly for contribution where everyone is urbanites. Moreover, their blogs reveal actually contributing to the news that they are generally from the regional delivery. upper classes. There are strategies to (From Cairo with Love, 2005: p. 1) translate blogging into a vehicle for political change, as evidenced by “meet-ups” In terms of the regional impact of blog- and strategies to take blogging to the grass- ging, Gal Beckerman explains that in the roots. Moreover, blogs are increasingly Arab world: quoted in the world media and even presidential speeches, as authentic voices The historical and the personal slam from the region and representative of up against each other daily … This views beyond state propaganda. All of gives even mundane musings ele- these indicate something about the vated significance. Bloggers are potential of blogging, even if we are not writing about their lives. But those yet seeing the retreat of the state. lives are taking place in environ- In his book the Politics of Small Things, ments in which politics and history Jeffrey C. Goldfarb examines “the power cannot be perceived as mere elements of the powerless in dark times” by obser- on the margins. For the twenty- ving that “daily life shapes the economy, somethings growing up in Riyadh, the polity and civilization itself.” His text writing resentfully about the power is an exploration of the ways in which of the religious authorities, the “people make history in their social questions are fundamental ones about interactions” (Goldfarb, 2006: p. 1). In the state of her society. For the some small ways, bloggers are making Egyptian blogger, the brutal sup- history with their narratives. Through pression of a demonstration can make their blogs they are creating new forms of the difference of whether he chooses social interaction, and expanding the realm

315 DEBORAH L. WHEELER of public discourse to include open, frank, changed their lives. The answers to this and challenging narratives. When blog- question in particular provided a rich gers overstep certain boundaries of the canvas against which to understand the permitted, they are publicly punished in draw of the lower and middle classes to disproportionate ways. The brutality of the technology. Together, their responses the Arab state in these matters is both a tended to coalesce around one of three demonstration of its monopoly on the use main themes: (1) developing a political (not necessary legitimate) of coercive consciousness; (2) building social net- resources to preserve the status quo. works and knowledge capital; and (3) At the same time, this extreme response transgressing boundaries, especially lines to freedom of expression and public of gender, nation, and social class. Each of opposition to the status quo reveals the these themes, and a selection of the precarious nature of the state’s monopoly narrative samples that created them, are on power. Hannah Arendt observed sev- examined in more detail below. eral decades ago, that when states have to By conducting interviews in internet resort to violence, torture, repression, this cafés, this study provides windows on the is when legitimacy has died, and power “grass-roots” of internet use in the region. is on the wane. Blogs reveal to us the This approach takes the focus away from process through which “members of the cosmopolitan elite, and replaces it subordinated social groups invent and with views from the lower and middle circulate counter-discourses to formulate classes. In general, the data gathered for oppositional interpretations of their iden- this case study suggest that individuals tities, interests and needs” (Fraser, 1991: who use internet cafés as their main p. 123). The question remains, how will source for access don’t have a computer these counter-narratives be institutiona- and internet access at home. If they are lized, if at all? Do they matter? The fol- employed (many are not) and have access lowing section demonstrates how internet at work, they are not high enough on the access matters in the lives of internet café hierarchy to be able to use the technology users, most of whom are from the middle freely for personal use. Moreover, many to lower classes. internet café users do not use the technology in their work environments (car- penters, sales people in small- and Internet café users in Jordan medium-sized enterprises, tea boys, stu- and Egypt dents, customer service representatives, The data analyzed for this section was housewives), nor do they typically have collected during ﬁve months of internet any formal training in using computers. café research in Jordan and Egypt, internet café users in Jordan and Egypt January–May 2004. The goal of this study tend to have learned to use the technol- was to uncover whether or not the inter- ogy in an internet café, and they tend to net was an important part of everyday life be taught to use the tool by a family for the average or below average citizen member or a friend. In most cases, these in the Arab world. Also key in the study café users have subsequently taught a was to identify the ways in which the friend, family, or community member to internet mattered to their lives. Those use the internet, thus demonstrating a interviewed were not prompted to think form of civic engagement whereby knowl- of the internet as a political tool. Rather, edge once attained is shared with others they were asked, in an open-ended fash- through informal networks. Moreover, ion, to narrate how the internet may have many became internet users to reduce the

316 WORKING AROUND THE ARAB STATE costs and increase the likelihood of stay- gender freedoms. For example, a 24-year- ing in touch with friends and family old female internet user from Zarqa members, especially when individuals in observes: their kin and care networks are abroad. Many internet café users in Jordan and Through the internet, I got to Egypt are not educated beyond the high know many girls and made many school level, and most are not online to good female friends in Amman and transact business. Most are not comfor- Madaba. I also made a relationship table using English, and surf websites or with a man that was my friend in chat mainly in Arabic. According to the chat. I became more open minded participants, the most intense draw of the and less conservative since I started technology is its ability to transport them talking with people in chat. to places they could not go otherwise. (Interview: Jordan internet café, The technology is celebrated by internet March, 2004) café users in Jordan and Egypt because it enables them to act more freely, in A second example of the internet’s trans- conversations, and in building networks formative powers is demonstrated by the beyond carefully circumscribed bound- technology’s ability to enable the sharing aries, which govern the practice of of political ideas and opinions publicly, everyday life beyond cyberspace. One 24- beyond face-to-face trust networks among year-old female internet café user from family and friends. For example, one 27- Jordan epitomized the region’s enthusiasm year-old female internet café user from for the technology when she observes, Cairo observes: “it’s the best thing that ever happened to me” (interview: Jordan internet café, I love the internet. It has made a March, 2004). huge difference in my life. It is a One form of internet-enabled political world of its own, and it has its own maneuver in the Arab world is the particular charms including abundant attempt to use the technology to circum- information, the chance to know vent and transgress gender boundaries. people from all over the world, For example, a recent study of the impact having all kinds of discussions from of the internet in Saudi Arabia observes, politics to social issues to religious “Saudis are poised on the edge of a sig- debates … It is interesting to chat nificant new social landscape,” because and to make friends. I like talking to “new forms of private communication, foreigners. I am not that keen on like electronic mail and chat, but also the closed Arab mentality. I like online public discussion areas … for the people who are themselves in first time enable communication between chat … no masks. In person they males and females in this gender-segregated have to put on masks. society” (Yeslam al-Saggaf, 2004: 1). (Interview: Cairo internet café, Recent studies of the internet in Kuwait May, 2004) support Saggaf’s findings, suggesting that in the conservative Gulf, it is the politics Finally, in the Arab world the internet, in of gender that are most easily transgressed addition to creating more outspoken citi- and subverted online (Wheeler, 2001b, zens, is also expanding their knowledge 2004). As explored below, internet café and social capital. For example, a 38-year- users in Jordan and Egypt also discuss the old married Muslim female from Zarqa importance of the internet for enhanced says the internet, “gives her greater access

317 DEBORAH L. WHEELER to more news” (interview: Jordan internet English and computer use greatly effects café, February, 2004). Similarly, an internet job placement, as well as job status café manager in Zarqa claims that the (Barsoum, 1999). If this is true, then internet, “has given people access to honing these skills in internet cafés can unlimited information about everything advance the social status and employment for study or business or news, especially opportunities for youths who may be news that is not covered well on TV or denied such skills previously, because they radio” (interview: Jordan internet café, were only afforded government education January, 2004). The net effect of this where foreign language and IT curricula wider access to uncensored information, are weak. according to a Jordanian internet café While it is clear from the 250 inter- manager, is that “the internet educates views with internet café users in Jordan people, adds to their general knowledge and Egypt that major changes in their and information.” The interviews also everyday life are accorded by internet use, highlight more specific forms of knowl- we are still left wondering if any kind of edge acquisition. For example, an internet significant political change will emerge, in café manager, in Zarqa, Jordan observes of the face of authoritarian control. From his 200–300 customers per week, “their use engaging a global cyber-public in political of the net improves their English” (inter- debate to building networks of influence view: Jordan internet café, March, 2004). and opportunity beyond one’s structural This perspective is validated by an 18- position (defined by nation, tribe, reli- year-old female Muslim high school stu- gion, class, gender) internet access is link- dent from Zarqa who observes, “the ing communities of people regionally internet improved my English language.” who are becoming accustomed to having An 18-year-old Muslim male from Jordan an opinion, who are increasingly comfor- agrees. He claims, “the internet benefited table in making demands, who are grow- me in using and advancing my English ing accustomed to exercising agency to language from chatting” (interview: Jordan create change in their circumstances, and internet café, March, 2004). who are experimenting with other ways In Cairo, internet users as well celebrated of being heard and seen in politics. All of the tool’s ability to improve their English. these forms of experimentation illustrate For example, a 22-year-old Christian ways in which the internet precipitates male explains: civic culture in unexpected locations. But the question remains, will the state be I have a good time on the net. I forced (or encouraged) to retreat? Or will enjoy every minute. It helps me it lash out, violently and repressively to greatly with my research papers and maintain the status quo? The following for any info for my hobbies and begins to suggest an answer. See Table 22.3. interests. My English has improved These imprisonments are widely reported a great deal since I started chatting in the local media, and discussed via word with foreigners. I learned many new of mouth. They serve to remind citizens words, good and bad. It’s better that the government is watching what than any language center! they do online, reminding them to self- (Interview: Cairo internet café, censor any questionable behavior, from May, 2004). surfing pornography, to logging on to banned sites, or distributing news without A recent study of youth employability a license. At the same time, the forces of explained that having knowledge of globalization are powerfully at work on

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Table 22.3 Examples of attempts by authoritarian regimes to discourage cyber-dissidence

Country Charge Algeria Ahmed Fattani, journalist, was arrested on the 13th of October, 2003 for “posting articles online while the paper he edited, Expression, was ofﬁcially suspended.” Bahrain Galal Olwi was arrested in March of 1997 and detained for 18 months. The charge was sending information via the internet to, “The Bahrain Liberal Movement.” Syria Abdel Rahman Shagouri was arrested on the 23rd of February, 2003 for e-mailing a newsletter Lavant News from the banned website www.thisissyria.net. He is still being held on charges that he “endangered Syria’s reputation and security.” Tunisia Zohair al-Yahyaoui, journalist, was arrested June 4th, 2004 and sentenced to 28 months in prison for “disseminating false news” on the internet through his website TUNISIANE

Arab states. It is not possible for the through and with digital technologies. knowledge economy to take root, grow, And in part, such changes will be con- and spread opportunity without more structed out of the voices and visions of open information environments emer- those trained to use digital technologies in ging. So, the economic incentive to foster the pursuit of economic growth. Just as in a culture of discursive openness is strong the past it has proven difficult to liberalize in Arab societies. At the same time, without democratizing, in the same way, enabling new communications environ- it is hard to sustain freedoms to be crea- ments could also encourage more orga- tive and entrepreneurial economically, nized demands for democratic change in while at the same time, keeping these the region. same concepts and tools from being used to re-engineer political and social life, from the family, to the community, to Conclusion the state. As A. Richard Norton has observed, “Programs of liberalization are This chapter has analyzed the ways in not easily contained: as press controls are which Arab states try to regulate the loosened, demands for accountability internet, and internet-enabled Arab pub- emerge. Controls on associational life may lics try to create change in spite of state be selectively lifted. But, even so, the controls. The persistence of Arab state right to organize freely is hard to contain” attempts to police cyberspace, to publicly (Norton, 1999b: 37). We see similarly punish cyber dissidents who go too far that internet experimentation can help to with their new freedoms of expression, foster a political consciousness and civic and to filter the web give pause to opti- engagement, the tides of which states are mism and temper expectations for unlikely to control fully. It seems reason- institutionalizing political change in the able to expect that like other contexts region. The state, however, may ulti- (Indonesia, China, and Latin America) life mately be fighting a losing battle. The online will have spill-over effects on the global pressure to join the knowledge practice of everyday life. economy means that states in the region can no longer afford to keep their publics digitally muzzled and blindfolded. Future Guide to further reading economic opportunities in the region will be built upon the backs of entrepreneurs, In addition to the works cited for this and agents bent upon creating change chapter, interested readers may want to

319 DEBORAH L. WHEELER consider Marcus Franda’s (2001) work back in 1995. See his article “Cybarites, Launching into Cyberspace: internet develop- knowledge workers and new creoles on the ment and politics in ﬁve world regions, espe- information superhighway,” Anthropology cially the sections on the Middle East. In Today 11(4): 13–15, 1995 (Anderson, terms of more specialized studies of the 1995). He also wrote an important internet’s impact in the Arab world, Occasional Paper for the Emirates Center Middle East Journal in the Summer of 2000 for Strategic Studies entitled “Arabizing oﬀered a special issue on the impact of the Internet” (Anderson, 1998). For one the information revolution in the Arab of the most recent studies of the impact of world. If readers are interested in starting the internet in the Middle East readers at the beginning of scholarly interest in may wish to consult Emma Murphy’s the internet in the Middle East, then they (2006) article “Agency and space: the poli- would need to read the work of Jon tical impact of information technologies in Anderson. Anderson pioneered the study the Gulf Arab states.” of the internet in the Arab world, way

320 Part 4

Law and policy

23 The geopolitics of internet control Censorship, sovereignty, and cyberspace

Ronald J. Deibert

What is the impact of the internet on state sovereignty, and in particular on states’ ability to control information flows across their borders? Whereas once the internet was presumed to be a borderless world of free-flowing information, today countries and corporations alike are carving it up in a bewildering array of filtered segments, often with major unintended consequences. The motivations for these practices range widely, from concerns over national security, cultural sensitivities, and protection of social values, to rent seeking and the protection of economic monopolies. Whereas once it was conventional wisdom to believe that the internet’s technological infrastructure was immune to control, today states and corporations are applying an ever-increasing level of skill and technological sophistication to precisely that mission. The result is that rather than being a single seamless environment, the internet a user connects to and experiences in Canada is far different than an internet a user experiences in Iran, China, or Belarus. This chapter provides an overview of the geopolitics of internet control, and in particular state efforts to control information flows across borders, with comparative data from over 22 countries.

In early 2007, the online mapping service Earlier the same year, Tunisian autho- Google Earth provided a feature on the rities filtered the popular video-streaming ongoing political crisis in the Darfur service, DailyMotion. DailyMotion is region of Sudan. Not long afterwards, known to carry a wide range of political however, an aid worker based inside videos, including many satirical videos of Sudan reported not being able to properly the Tunisian government’s record on load the map, receiving an error message human rights. Many inferred that Tunisia in his browser stating “This product is not had blocked the website because of those available in your country.” Upon further videos, following its known track record inspection, the source of the inaccessi- of blocking access to opposition and bility was Google itself—filtering access to human rights websites (Reporter Without its own services based on the “geoloca- Borders, 2007). However, Tunisia uses tion” of the computer’s IP address making (but does not openly admit to doing so) the request. Google was not permitting IP the U.S. commercial filtering product, addresses based within Sudan from con- Smartfilter, to block its citizens’ access to necting to its service in order to comply information (OpenNet Initiative, 2005a). with U.S. export restrictions against the DailyMotion was, perhaps mistakenly, sale or export of informational products categorized within the Smartfilter database to the country (Geens, 2007). as “pornography”—a category apparently

323 RONALD J. DEIBERT selected by Tunisia for blocking. After Beneath the surface of reports of the DailyMotion block sur- internet communications faced, Smartfilter apparently corrected the categorization error, and access to the What happens to a request when a user DailyMotion website from within Tunisia clicks on a link to a website or sends an was gradually restored. e-mail? For most surfers, the internet The source for much of the evidence experience begins and ends with what and illustrations used in this chapter happens on the computer screen in front comes from the research of the OpenNet of them. However, if surfers follow that Initiative (ONI)—collaboration among e-mail or web request as it leaves a com- the Citizen Lab at the University of puter and passes down the fiber optic Toronto, the Berkman Centre for Internet cable to the servers and routers of a local and Society at Harvard Law School, the internet service provider (ISP), through Cambridge Security Programme, U.K., the internet exchange points (IXPs), the Oxford Internet Institute, and partner international gateways, and on to the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) undersea trunk cables of tier 1 tele- worldwide.1 The aim of the ONI is to communication companies, they will find document empirically patterns of internet a complex and largely hidden infra- censorship and surveillance worldwide structure of filters and chokepoints. using sophisticated means of technically Most people assume that the internet’s interrogating the internet directly. The vast infrastructure is an open, decen- ONI’s tests are carried out both remo- tralized, network of networks through tely from North America and the U.K., which information flows freely along a and in-field by dozens of local shared routing protocol. While this researchers. Our reports over the last description has some basis in the historical several years have documented a disturb- evolution of the internet, and captures ing increase in the scale, scope, and parts of what makes it unique, it also sophistication of internet censorship prac- obscures some of the details that structure tices worldwide.2 This chapter sum- internet communications beneath the sur- marizes some of the main findings of this face. While it is true that there is no single research and draws connections to wider node through which all traffic passes on implications for global politics, security, the internet, and thus no form of cen- and human rights. The main questions tralized control, there are thousands of addressed by this chapter are: how many nodes that parse out and filter information states are filtering access to information and act as gateways. Each of these nodes on the internet? What are the types of and gateways—from routers to IXPs to content that these states are targeting for autonomous systems—present opportunities filtering? What are the most effective for authorities to impose order on internet methods used by states that filter? What is traffic through some mechanism of filtering the range of transparency and account- and surveillance. Some of this control ability practices among states that filter? takes place for technological reasons; some Are states open about their practices? of it takes place for cultural, political, and And, what are some of the wider impli- economic reasons. Instead of a network of cations of these practices? As will be networks, therefore, it is perhaps more described in this chapter, the picture of accurate to characterize the internet as a the internet that emerges from this network of filters and chokepoints. research is of a hotly contested and deeply The means by which content is politicized realm. blocked or filtered on the internet vary

324 CENSORSHIP, SOVEREIGNTY, AND CYBERSPACE widely in terms of complexity, effective- Depending on need and circumstance, ness, and intent. Furthermore, not all of different approaches to filtering can be the means by which states attempt to implemented: control the internet are technological. In some cases, regulations are employed to & Inclusion filtering: users are allowed supplement technical controls, which can to access a short list of approved create a climate of self-censorship among sites, known as a “white list,” only. internet users. The following section All other content is blocked. defines some of the central terms asso- & Exclusion filtering: restricts user ciated with internet content filtering and access by blocking sites listed on a surveillance before turning to specific “black list.” All other content is examples of accountability and transpar- allowed. ency issues. & Content analysis: restricts user Internet content filtering is a term that access by dynamically analyzing the refers to the techniques by which control content of a site and blocking sites is imposed on access to information on that contain forbidden keywords, the internet (Deibert and Villeneuve, graphics, or other specified criteria. 2004). Content filtering can be divided into two separate techniques: address The mechanisms used to do these types blocking techniques and content analysis of filtering vary considerably. Routers act techniques. Address blocking techniques as junctions between networks, passing refer to particular router configurations information packets back and forth, and used to deny access to particular internet thus routers are the main (though not protocol (IP) addresses and/or domain only) nodes where such blocking takes names, or specific services that run on place in the form of instructions written particular port numbers. For example, a into the routing tables. However, filtering state may run a blocking filter at the software can be implemented into vir- international gateway level that restricts tually any node throughout the internet’s access from within the country to web- system. As a consequence, the level at sites that are deemed illegal, such as por- which filtering can be implemented varies nographic or human rights websites. widely too. Filtering can take place on an Content Analysis refers to techniques individual’s personal computer, an office used to control access to information based local area network (LAN), an internet on its content, such as the inclusion of café, an ISP, a wireless network, an SMS specific keywords on a website or the system, at the backbone or international address of a URL. Because parsing mechan- gateway level, or some combination of all isms employ keywords to block access, of these levels. Not surprisingly, national- they are often the source of mistaken or level internet content filtering can vary unintended blockages. Unintended block- dynamically, and across ISPs within a single ing can occur as a result of IP based country (Anderson and Murdoch, 2007). blocking as well, however, as it is not Although filtering traditionally takes uncommon for many domain names to place by blocking requests for information share the same IP address. Filtering that from either reaching their destination or aims to block access to a specific website returning the requested information at by blocking its IP address, in other words, information chokepoints, other non- can result in the collateral filtering of filtering mechanisms can be employed that potentially thousands of unrelated sites achieve the same ends. After all, filtering sharing the same IP. is simply denial of access to information.

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As is described below, new forms of have often been made in error or have blocking access to information are emer- contained contradictory information. ging based on the use of distributed denial The aim of the ONI has been to of service attacks. Such attacks bring overcome these shortcomings by devel- web servers down by overwhelming oping a systematic way to investigate them with requests for information, thus empirically internet filtering practices “filtering” information at its source and from within state borders over an exten- denying access to all users equally. The ded period of time. The project employs same type of denial of service can (and a unique methodology that combines in- occasionally does) take place by cutting field investigations by partners and associ- off power to the building where web ates who travel to or live in the countries servers are located, or misconfiguring concerned, and a suite of technical inter- routing tables to cause what appear to be rogation tools that probe the internet network errors, but which in fact are delib- directly for forensic evidence of content erate attempts to shut off communications filtering and filtering technologies.3 These at the source. tools work from the “inside out” of the As the Google Earth example demon- internet, probing parts of the information strates, filtering can also take place through infrastructure not generally apparent to reverse geolocation—that is, the server the average user. The methods range from hosting websites can refuse to take requests automating connecting requests to servers from users based on the geographical hosting websites simultaneously from origin of their computer’s IP address. The within the country under investigation ONI has documented numerous instances and a control location in a non-filtered of this type of reverse geolocation filtering, location, to using tracing and other net- including by the website georgewbush. work mapping tools to interrogate the com during the 2004 U.S. Presidential location of and technologies used to do Elections (ONI, 2004). the filtering. Tests for accessibility to internet content were based on categorized lists of websites.4 These categories Methods of investigating were meant to cover as comprehensively censorship as possible the likely targets for filtering by states while allowing for as precise as Although filtering practices are wide- possible identification of content cate- spread, knowledge of their use by states gories singled out for filtering. While has tended to be limited. In part, this is a most states that filter target pornographic function of a lack of accountability and content, as will be shown later a wide range transparency among states that block of non-pornographic, political content— access to information. In part, however, it such as opposition parties or minority rights, is also a function of the lack of empirical for example—is now being targeted as evidence about such practices. Up until well by several states. recently, the majority of reports on inter- This method allows for a comprehen- net filtering tended to emerge from users, sive picture of internet content filtering in news reports, or advocacy organizations. a particular country by probing all aspects Not surprisingly, they tended to be of the national information infrastructure unsystematic and sometimes even unreli- (internet cafés, ISPs, wireless networks, able. Moreover, because of the complex backbone gateways) and over an extended and varied ways in which filtering can be period of time testing accessibility in both implemented, as noted earlier, reports English and local languages to lists of

326 CENSORSHIP, SOVEREIGNTY, AND CYBERSPACE thousands of websites in each of these practices as a way to block access to por- categories.5 nography or other culturally sensitive Since 2002, the project has produced material, our research has documented a detailed reports on 11 countries—Belarus, large and growing swathe of content Yemen, Tunisia, Burma, Singapore, Iran, beyond pornography that is targeted for China, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, filtering. At least 14 countries blocked Vietnam, and Saudi Arabia. More recently, access to content that spans the major in 2006 the ONI conducted extensive categories of political, social, and conflict/ tests over several months in more than security content, including Burma, China, forty countries worldwide. The following Ethiopia, Iran, Oman, Syria, Thailand, sections highlight some of the main trends Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and findings emerging from this research. Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen (See Figure 23.1). Some of the countries in which we The globalization of online found evidence of content filtering in censorship each of these major categories began by blocking only a few select sites in one In 2002, only a handful of countries were category, usually pornography. After a known to engage in internet content fil- period of time, however, the scope of tering, most prominently China, Iran, and content targeted for filtering began to Saudi Arabia. By 2007, 26 of 40 exam- increase to other content areas. In Thailand, ined countries were found to engage in for example, what started out as an effort internet filtering practices to some degree. to block pornography has been gradually China is still the world’s most notorious broadened to include politically sensitive and sophisticated censoring regime (ONI, websites as well, particularly since the 2004, 2005a, b, c, d; Dowell, 2006; Li, September 2006 military coup. In addi- 2003; Li, 2004). Its filtering system com- tion to pornographic content, Thailand prises multiple levels of legal regulation blocks access to the popular video stream- and technical control, the latter imple- ing service, YouTube.com, ostensibly in mented primarily at the backbone level response to a single video posted on the using specially configured Cisco routers. service satirizing the deposed King. Pakistan The system involves numerous state began filtering websites that contain ima- agencies and thousands of public and pri- gery offensive to Islam, and now targets vate personnel, and a dense web of ever- all sites related to the Balochistan inde- thickening legal restrictions. pendence movement as well. The Thai The range of information that China and Pakistan cases are illustrative of what seeks to limit and control from within its may be a more general trend: that is, once borders is broad. China targets content for the tools of censorship are put in place, filtering across every major category tested, the temptation for authorities to employ including human rights, opposition and them secretly for a wide range of ulterior independence and secessionist movements, purposes may be large—particularly in minority faiths, pro-democracy groups, circumstances where there is little civilian search engines, free e-mail and webhost- oversight or accountability—a phenom- ing services, anonymizers and circumven- enon we refer to as internet censorship tors, pornography and sexually explicit “mission creep.” material, and others. A number of other countries were However, China is not alone. Although found to be engaged in less pervasive forms many countries justify their censorship of internet filtering, typically concentrated

327 RONALD J. DEIBERT around a single content area or con- examples above, we might hypothesize tentious internet service. For example, in that over time these states will likely use addition to blocking some gambling and their filtering systems to block a growing pornographic sites, ISPs in South Korea body of content. block access to all websites related to North Korea. India blocks access to websites related to extremist and militant Increasing censorship groups, particularly those associated with sophistication Hindu and Islamic extremism. A number of Middle Eastern and Gulf Countries, Not surprisingly, the methods used to do including Syria, Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, internet content filtering have become and Saudi Arabia, block access to the more sophisticated, as states and the firms entire Israeli (.il) domain (see also Warf that sell censorship and surveillance tech- and Vincent, 2007). Though having strict nologies continually refine them. There controls over traditional media and are several examples of increasing sophis- heavy penalties for libel, Singapore tication. First, authorities are becoming blocks access only to a small handful of increasingly adept at targeting newly devel- pornographic websites (see also Rodan, oped modes of communication, such as 1998). Following the Thai and Pakistani blogs, SMS, chat, and instant messaging

Figure 23.1 Content ﬁltering by major category. Source: Faris and Villeneuve, 2006.

328 CENSORSHIP, SOVEREIGNTY, AND CYBERSPACE protocols, and voice over internet protocol 2005, showed a similar relationship among (VOIP) services. In the past, such newly English and local language filtering (ONI, devised methods of information sharing 2005c). In the case of Iran, many of the could be used as a means to circumvent blocked websites in various categories had internet censorship. However, today a higher percentage of inaccessibility in authorities are becoming more adept at Farsi as opposed to English. Overall, 80 targeting new media and developing meth- percent of the Farsi-language websites ods particular to such services. Second, tested were inaccessible whereas 45 per- although content filtering is prone to cent of English-language sites were inac- overblocking and error, there are exam- cessible. Such localization filtering—where ples where authorities have been able to “international” sources of information are use such technologies with precision. left accessible while local variants are A good example is China’s targeting of blocked—may at first seem counter- the specific string of codes embedded in intuitive. However, there are two potential the URL of the Google cache function. explanations. First, localization filtering The latter is a service provided by Google targets those groups that matter most to whereby users can connect to archived regime stability and power, such as local information from websites stored on opposition movements and dissident Google’s servers, rather than on the ser- groups presenting contentious informa- vers of the original website. The service tion in languages spoken by citizens was designed to provide a way to access within the country. Second, the disinformation through redundancy, but it is proportionately open access to English- also a very simple and effective way to get language international sites can give the around content filtering. Since users con- impression that access to global informa- nect to Google servers rather than to the tion is wide open, particularly to foreign blacklisted servers, they bypass the con- journalists who do not speak local lan- tent filters. Upon learning of this techni- guages. Authorities can point to contentious que, China implemented a blocked string human rights and news sites and say that on their backbone/gateway routers that they allow access to information while prevented any use of the Google cache blocking relatively more obscure sites function from within China. from a global perspective that matter most A third example of increasing sophisti- in local politics. cation of content filtering is the targeting The tests conducted across 40 countries of local languages and websites of oppo- in 2006 provided further confirmation sition movements and dissidents particular that state content filtering tends to con- to a specific national context. Tests from centrate on local content and websites. within China comparing the top 100 Table 23.1 shows the percentage of web- Google search results for keywords in sites blocked by country in the local and English and Chinese show a very sig- global content categories respectively. For nificant disproportionate amount of key- each country, two baskets of websites words are filtered when they are searched were used for comparison: a local list, for in Chinese as opposed to English which includes categorized websites rela- (ONI, 2005b). For example, a search for ted to the particular context of each the terms “Chinese Labor Party” in country in question; and a global list, Chinese yields a 93 percent inaccessible which is a control list of categorized rate when compared to the same search websites tested for accessibility in every performed in English, which yields only a country. The local list contains mostly 20 percent inaccessible rate. Iran, in local-language content of each country in

329 RONALD J. DEIBERT question (e.g., Farsi for Iran) while the content that matters most within their local global list contains English-language con- country context. tent. The percentage of blocked websites in the local category was higher than in the global category for many coun- Use of commercial filtering tries in which filtering was found. When technologies pornographic-related content is removed (which tends to be mostly global in char- The increased sophistication of internet acter and filtered as a default by many content-filtering practices can be attrib- countries using commercial filtering appli- uted, in part, to the services provided by cations), the percentage of local content western (mostly U.S.-based) software and targeted for filtering is even higher. internet service firms. Whereas once the Among countries found to be engaging best and brightest of Silicon Valley were in content filtering, UAE, Bahrain, China, associated with wiring the world, con- Ethiopia, India, Iran, Korea, Libya, necting individuals around the globe, and Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, opening up access to vast stores of infor- Thailand, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam mation, today they are just as likely to be all blocked relatively more local- than known for doing the opposite. global-related content. What this suggests Although Microsoft, Cisco, Yahoo, is that states who filter the internet tend Skype, and Google have all come under to concentrate on social and political scrutiny for colluding with China’s internet

Table 23.1 Percent of tested websites blocked in 21 countries, by type of local and global content, 2006

Country Blocked websites, all Blocked political websites Local Global Local Global Azerbaijan 2 98 0 100 Bahrain 62 38 86 14 China 80 20 92 8 Ethiopia 95 5 95 5 India 100 0 100 0 Iran 43 57 87 13 Libya 100 0 100 0 Myanmar 62 38 89 11 Oman 15 85 0 100 Pakistan 94 6 96 4 Saudi Arabia 22 78 68 32 Singapore 43 57 –– South Korea 81 19 100 0 Sudan 7 93 0 100 Syria 84 16 95 5 Thailand 81 19 100 0 Tunisia 32 68 73 27 United Arab Emirates 17 83 58 42 Uzbekistan 80 20 92 8 Vietnam 94 6 98 2 Yemen 10 90 22 78

Notes: Local websites are those designed for users in a speciﬁc country, and are usually in that country’s national language. Global websites are primarily English language content, and include pornography.

330 CENSORSHIP, SOVEREIGNTY, AND CYBERSPACE censorship practices, perhaps the most sovereignty and the free flow of infor- significant, serious, and yet overlooked mation raised by internet censorship, contribution to internet censorship by unfortunately most states do not allow Western corporations comes from the such a debate to take place prior to fil- manufacturers of the filtering software tering, and have been shown to be used to block content. deceitful about the content they block Internet security companies, like Fortinet, and the filtering practices they employ. Secure Computing, and Websense, create There are accountability and transpar- off-the-shelf filtering products that block ency issues around the disclosure of fil- access to categorized lists of websites. tering practices. Among states that filter, While these products are primarily mar- few are willing to admit the full scope keted to businesses, they have been read- and scale and precise nature of their fil- ily employed by censoring states like tering systems. For example, Saudi Arabia Tunisia (Secure Computing), Iran (Secure provides a substantial level of detail about Computing), Myanmar (Fortinet), and their filtering practices in published reports, Yemen (Websense) to block access to including an acknowledgment on the politically-sensitive content. block page it sends back to users’ com- Just like businesses that do not want puters, as does the UAE. Other countries their employees to view gambling or are not so open, and some engage in sport sites on company time, these gov- deceptive practices. For example, in China ernments simply tick off those categories when users make a request for a website of websites they do not want their citi- that is banned, the request is blocked at zens to access, such as “advocacy groups” the router level and an error message is or “militancy and extremist groups”— sent back to the user’s machine effectively two categories in Websense’s database. penalizing that machine’s IP address from The former is defined by Websense as making further http requests for a varying “sites that promote change or reform in period of time. From the user’s end, the public policy, public opinion, social prac- penalization appears as a “time-out” error tice, economic activities, and relation- with no explanation (Clayton et al., ships,” while the latter is defined as “sites 2006). Tunisia uses the same commercial that offer information about or promote product as Saudi Arabia—Smartfilter— or are sponsored by groups advocating anti- but alters the block page functionality of government beliefs or action” (Websense, that program to deliver a false error indi- 2007). As the Tunisia example listed in cation to users. When users attempt to the introduction illustrates, however, the access blocked content, they receive a block lists used by these companies can page that appears to be a “File not found” contain categorization errors leading to error page but is in fact a block page untended blockages of websites. designed to deceive users. In Uzbekistan, block pages sent back to users explain a site is blocked because it contains porno- Digital deceit graphy even though the sites blocked are not pornographic but political in nature. One troubling trend is been the lack of Additionally, some Uzbeki ISPs redirect accountability and transparency over requests for banned content to unrelated internet content-filtering practices by sites or sites that are disguised to appear states that censor. While there is certainly like the original site but which third par- a legitimate debate to be had about the ties operate and which contain false or balance between a state’s right to cultural misleading information. As countries that

331 RONALD J. DEIBERT censor are generally sensitive about it report instances of inappropriate blocking, being known that they block access to and open acknowledgement of filtering political information, they tend to be policies. Consistency measures the varia- opaque and/or deceptive about their fil- tion in filtering within a country across tering practices. Only very rarely do states different ISPs. fully disclose their filtering behavior. Table 23.2 also shows the variation in As outlined in Table 23.2, most coun- filtering practices among countries in tries lack transparency and accountability terms of relative centralization of content when it comes to processes around internet filtering methods and consistency among filtering practices. Very few openly ISPs within the country. Many states acknowledge filtering at all. Concealed defer the implementation of internet filtering reflects either efforts to conceal content filtering to individual ISPs, some the fact that filtering is occurring or the of whom do not fully comply with failure to clearly indicate filtering when it authorities or choose their own methods is occurring. Decentralized filtering is any or software products to perform the fil- blocking that occurs at the sub-national tering. The result is that accessibility to level, although this study does not include internet content within certain countries, filtering at the institutional level, e.g., such as Azerbaijan, Burma, Iran, and cybercafés, universities, or businesses. Vietnam, for example, can vary widely Transparency considers the presence of depending on the ISP to which a user concealed filtering, provisions to appeal or connects. When combined with a low

Table 23.2 Centralized, decentralized, concealed, transparency, and consistency of website ﬁltering in 22 countries, 2006

Country Centralized Decentralized Filtering Transparency Consistency filtering at filtering at concealed of filtering across country national level sub-national level from user policies ISPs Azerbaijan Â low low Bahrain ÂÂlow high Burma Â medium low China ÂÂ Âlow medium Ethiopia ÂÂlow high India Â high medium Iran Â medium medium Jordan low high Libya low high Oman Â high high Pakistan ÂÂ Âhigh medium Saudi Arabia Â high high Singapore Â high high South Korea Â high high Sudan Â high high Syria Â medium high Thailand Â medium medium Tunisia Â low high United Arab Emirates Â medium low Uzbekistan ÂÂlow high Vietnam ÂÂlow low Yemen Â medium high

Source: Faris and Villeneuve, 2006.

332 CENSORSHIP, SOVEREIGNTY, AND CYBERSPACE degree of transparency and accountability, & the internet was inaccessible to such a lack of consistency can be a vexing subscribers using Minsk Telephone experience for users within the country access numbers on March 25 (the who are unaware of what content is being day of a major demonstration, where denied to them and experience different riot police were used to disperse forms of censorship depending on the ISP and arrest protestors); to which they connect. & the website of the main opposition candidate, Aleksandr Milinkevich, was “dead” on March 19 and Blocking by computer experienced access issues on March network attack and DNS 21–22, (the post-election protest tampering period); and & an opposition website (Charter 97) Rather than blocking access to a site, entire was only partially accessible between websites can be forced offline and essen- March 19–25. tially silenced by attacks that overwhelm the servers that host the websites. For The internet is likely to be targeted by example, during elections in Kyrgyzstan, subtle methods of information disruption several opposition newspapers came under that are not so easily tracked and traced as simultaneous distributed denial of service are more traditional forms of filtering and attacks. The opposition websites were surveillance. Moreover, the participants in moved to a hosting service at the Citizen these contests over information space are Lab in Toronto for analysis. The attacks likely to include more than just state were carried out by a hacker or group of authorities, such as NGOs and activists, hackers known as “shadow team” based who benefit politically (with the outside in the Ukraine, and although no con- world) by being able to claim they are clusive proof could be obtained, the under attack just as much as authorities Kyrgyz authorities cannot be ruled out as may benefit by having their information being responsible. In addition to the kept offline (ONI, 2006). attacks on the opposition websites, other The trends towards offensive computer attacks temporarily suspended access to all network attacks as methods of filtering are websites on two Kyrgyz ISPs (Elcat and even more significant in the context of AsiaInfo) (ONI, 2005d). the role the U.S. military is playing in The same pattern of disruption during setting doctrinal examples and establishing election periods was observed in Belarus norms of acceptable practices in areas like in April 2006. Although no evidence of information warfare. The recently declas- state-directed filtering or sponsorship of sified “Information Operations Roadmap” denial of service attacks could be found, makes it clear that the U.S. and its regio- there were several suspicious events: nal allies intend on taking the war on terrorism to the internet, using a variety of & 37 opposition and media websites means ranging from taking down “illegal were inaccessible from the state- content” through to using the internet as owned Beltelecom network on a means to “deter, deny and destroy ter- March 19 (election day), although rorist groups” (U.S. Department of Defense, they were accessible within Belarus 2003).6 Such militarization of cyberspace from a different ISP network as could legitimize the type of denial of ser- well as from the external control vice actions that occurred in Kyrgyzstan location; and Belarus, and open up dynamics of

333 RONALD J. DEIBERT competitive state and non-state offensive criminal networks. Whereas once the activities aimed at bringing down the promotion of new information and com- sources of online information through munication technologies were widely “active,” offensive means. Certainly the considered benign public policy, today lessons have not been lost on the Chinese states of all stripes have been pressed to and Russian militaries, which are also find ways to limit and control the internet supportive of a free-ranging scope for as a way to check their unintended and military action over the internet. Taken perceived negative consequences. together with the shift in U.S. strategic As the research shows, these efforts to policy towards preemption of threats control internet content are growing in “before they are fully formed,” this stance scope, scale, and sophistication world- has effectively opened the door for states wide. Moreover, the methods used by to use computer network operations as a states to filter content demonstrate a sys- means to act unilaterally and extra- tematic lack of accountability and trans- territorially to combat self-defined threats parency. Although at first glance these to national security emanating from the policies and practices may be attributed internet. As a consequence, computer net- simply to the strategic interests of states to work operations and information warfare control information flows across their are amongst the most secretive and fastest territorial borders, the policies and prac- growing areas of investment for military, tices of internet content filtering—in par- security, and signals intelligence organiza- ticular the use of computer network tions worldwide. Moreover, as the recent attacks and offensive information war- revelation concerning the U.S. National fare—suggest a much deeper geopolitical Security Agency’s extralegal tapping of struggle over the internet’s architecture domestic communications (including the that is only beginning to unfold. Just as internet) suggest, even open and democratic the domains of land, sea, air, and space societies are undertaking covert internet have all been gradually colonized, mili- surveillance. The impact that these doctrinal tarized, and subject to inter-state compe- shifts will have on the internet environ- tition so too is the once relatively ment is likely to be substantial, and will unencumbered domain of cyberspace. make the challenges around accountability Of course these efforts by states to and transparency even more substantial. intervene in global internet communication flows are not going uncontested. The growth of state content-filtering practices Conclusion has generated a burgeoning grass-roots transnational social movement around Over the last several decades, the internet the protection and preservation of the has enabled new, nimble, and distributed internet as an open commons of infor- challenges to states worldwide, manifest mation (see Deibert, 2003; Deibert and in vigorous, mobilized opposition move- Rohozinski, 2007). The movement ments, protests, and in some cases, even includes major NGOs, such as Amnesty revolutionary changes to political authority. International and Reporters without Although these challenges have presented Borders, and efforts directed at multiple the most serious problems for non- levels, from the construction of censorship democratic and authoritarian regimes, circumvention technologies and other even among democratic states, the inter- “hacktivist” tools to lobbying for the net has presented serious challenges inso- promotion of norms of openness and access far as it empowers militant, terrorist, and to information at international levels.

334 CENSORSHIP, SOVEREIGNTY, AND CYBERSPACE

These developments should make scho- on corporate complicity in internet cen- lars of world politics and the internet sorship practices in China. Those inter- rethink assumptions about not only the ested in exploring some of the topics character of the internet but the social raised in this chapter concerning infor- and political implications that flow from mation warfare practices will find a much it. Although it is true that the internet larger set of studies. Arquilla (1995, 1996), helped unleash non-territorial forces and and Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) are flows that have helped redefine the land- essential background, with Adams (2001), scape of global politics, the internet’s Berkowitz (2003), Cohen (1996), Denning architecture is now being hotly contested (1999), Der Derian (2000), Libicki (1998), and an object of competing discourses and Nye and Owens (1996), and Rattray practices of securitization. Almost cer- (2001) all highly recommended as well. tainly a new set of implications, many of them unintended, will flow as its architecture undergoes political transformation Notes as a result of this competition. 1 OpenNet Initiative. http://opennet.net/ 2 For additional detail on the analysis presented Guide to further reading here, see Ronald J. Deibert, John G. Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski and Jonathan Zittrain, (eds.) Access Denied: the practice and policy of In light of the fact that it is such a recent global internet filtering, (MIT Press: 2008). issue, there is relatively little scholarship 3 Those familiar with intelligence practices will about internet censorship and content fil- recognize the combination of human and tering practices (outside of the work of technical intelligence methods. The adoption of these methods, as well as other aspects by the OpenNet Initiative outlined in this which the ONI operates, from intelligence- chapter). The latter is covered compre- derived approaches has been deliberate. The hensively in Deibert and Rohozinski ONI’s researchers take considerable personal (2007) with overviews of 41 countries risks to carry out the tests, and great effort is and 8 regions, as well as several analytical taken to minimize those risks by securing group communications and employing com- chapters on the legal, social, and political partmentalized information techniques. The implications of internet filtering. Those latter means that researchers and experts interested in exploring general issues of consulted about or in a particular country state control of internet communications may not know the identity of the testers in might begin with Deibert (2003), Drezner that country, and vise versa. Testing in some countries has been hampered by personal (2004), as well as Goldsmith and Wu security considerations. In several instances, (2006), Goldsmith (1998), Lewis (2006), ONI researchers have been apprehended and and Kalathil and Boas (2003). Villeneuve interrogated by authorities for their activities. (2006) and Wu (2006) deal with some of 4 Multiple categories of websites have been the general issues concerning internet subject to internet filtering, including web- fi sites on a range of topics, from a range of site content ltering. There is a growing ff fi producers, or o ering a range of services: free scholarship on internet content ltering in expression and media freedom; political specific country and regional contexts, transformation and opposition parties; poli- including Turkey (Altintos, 2002), China tical reform, legal reform, and governance; (Dowell, 2006; Hachigian, 2001; Lacharite, militants, extremists and separatists; human 2002; Li, 2003; Li, 2004), Singapore rights; foreign relations and military; minority rights and ethnic content; women’s rights; (Rodan, 1998), the Middle East (Goldstein, environmental issues; economic develop- 1999), and Iran (Granick, 2005). Human ment; sensitive or controversial history, arts Rights Watch (2006) did a major study and literature; hate speech; sex education and

335 RONALD J. DEIBERT

family planning; public health; gay and les- 5 We group these categories themselves into bian content; pornography; provocative attire; four major categories: political, social, con- dating; gambling; gaming; alcohol and drugs; ﬂict/security, and internet tools. minority faiths; religious conversion, com- 6 The Pentagon document was written in mentary and criticism; anonymizers and cir- October 2003, but recently obtained and cumvention; hacking; blogging domains and released by a Freedom of Information request blogging services; web hosting sites and portals; from the National Security Archives at George voice over internet protocol (VOIP); free e- Washington University. It can be obtained mail; search engines; translation; multimedia from: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSA sharing; peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing; groups and EBB/NSAEBB177/info_ops_roadmap.pdf social networking; commercial sites.

336 24 Locational surveillance Embracing the patterns of our lives

David J. Phillips

This chapter discusses three prevalent systems of locational surveillance. The surveillance of mobility is facilitated by many diﬀerent technical systems. Mobile phones, closed circuit television (CCTV), and radio frequency identiﬁcation tags all can signal the changing location of physical objects. Standardized addresses, sophisticated maps, and analytic software make this movement legible. The chapter then examines the economic and legal pressures that shape access to those systems. Finally, it suggests avenues for intervention into the development of new technologies of mobility.

Many diﬀerent political and historical Techniques and practices of tensions shape the contours of surveillance locational surveillance practice. Nevertheless, two factors occur consistently in these developments. First, Mobile phones, emergency global corporations or national govern- response, and location-based ments control signiﬁcant portions of the services surveillance infrastructure. Second, the dichotomy of security versus privacy Mobile telephone carriers have emerged occurs again and again as a discursive as primary generators of locational data. device to frame the stakes and implications In one sense, this is obvious—carriers of surveillance. These two organizing must locate the call’s recipient in order to structures contribute to the development route the call. Yet, especially in the U.S., of surveillance systems that are always the locational capacity of mobile phone more or less useful for large organizations networks has become both sophisticated to control and manage large populations. and standardized. This is due to a nation- To counteract this trend, to encourage wide mandate to integrate mobile phone the development of surveillance practices networks within the existing emergency that are small scale, grass-roots, and local, response system (ERS). and to grasp the social and political Originally ERS was designed to auto- implications of such practices, policy- matically open a direct voice line between makers should look to legal theories of the caller and a public safety answering common carriage and intellectual com- point (PSAP) whenever the caller dialed mons. Sociologists and system designers 911. The PSAP operator would then, in should look to the processes by which conversation with the caller, dispatch the identity and place arise out of commu- appropriate response team. In the 1980s nication and situated interaction. U.S. Federal Communications Commission

337 DAVID J. PHILLIPS

(FCC) supported upgrading the ERS channels with auxiliary data channels, and system so that it automatically delivered provide mapping tools and other inter- to PSAPs not just the call itself, but also faces. As neither the wireless nor the the phone number and address of the wireline carriers are expert in all of these, caller. To aid dispatching, local authorities alliances among carriers and with third- disambiguated and normalized street names party developers have become common. and addresses, especially in rural areas. Throughout, demands for interoperability In the late 1990s the FCC mandated among current and future institutions and that mobile phone carriers make their technical structures have prompted the networks compatible with this system. It transformation of the U.S. emergency ordered that mobile carriers be able to response system from a special-purpose, determine the location of any phone local, emergency communication system calling 911 to deliver that location, along into a generic, modular, national, locational with the phone number and the call itself, surveillance system. In particular, there to the nearest PSAP. A standard infra- has been a strong incentive to implement structure of location determination and that modularity and interoperability delivery has evolved in response to this through the use of internet protocols, mandate. During a 911 call, the carrier rather than telephony switching protocols. locates the phone using either terrestrial This infrastructure is useful not only for triangulation, in which the caller’s voice the provision of emergency services, but signal is located by reference to nearby also for many other location-aware appli- antennas, or using the global positioning cations. Typically, these services operate system (GPS). In this latter case, the under a paradigm very similar to the ERS phone polls orbiting satellites for their system. Mobile phone carriers determine positions and forwards that data to the a phone’s location, and deliver that loca- carrier, which performs the triangulation tion to a location-based service (LBS) calculations to locate the phone. Usually provider. The LBS provider then makes GPS devices perform that calculation geographic sense of the locational data, locally, but phone carriers and manu- perhaps triggering alarms if the phone is facturers have off-loaded the calculation, traveling at a certain speed, or is outside a in part to make the handsets lighter. Thus prescribed area, or is near a particular in either case the carrier is the first holder location of interest. of the locational data. The carrier then The subscribers to these services may forwards that locational data and the caller’s not be the person using the phone. For number to a specialized geographic data- example, TeleNav, in cooperation with base, which determines the nearest PSAP. mobile carriers and phone manufacturers, The carrier transfers the call and continues offers a service to managers of mobile to update the geographic database, which workers. Each worker carries a phone the PSAP accesses to track the caller. In that regularly reports its location, via the the PSAP itself, specialized mapping and mobile carrier, to TeleNav’s servers. dispatching software help make visual TeleNav records and maps this data, and sense of the locational data. triggers alarms when workers enter or Development of this infrastructure has leave certain areas, or spend more than a required many types of expertise, includ- specified amount of time at a location. ing the ability to locate calls, operate The employer accesses these maps and geographic databases to determine such alarms through a web interface, and qualities as “nearness,” route calls based communicates with the workers through on geographic conditions, link voice specialized Java applets in their phones

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(TeleNav, 2007). Sprint offers Family cameras linked to software that captures Locator, which alerts parents when their the text of the license plates within the children near a specific location. Verizon’s video image. The system then collates Chaperone sends an alarm to the parent various appearances of that license plate, when their children leave a “geo-fenced” calculates each car’s road usage, and sends area. Another service, soon to be offered a bill to the car’s owner. While the sys- by Sprint, alerts the user whenever a tem’s primary purpose and justification is “buddy” is near (Magid, 2007). toll collection, the system operators will alert police when unregistered or unli- censed vehicles appear. They will also, Closed circuit television systems upon police request, watch for and for- Closed circuit television systems, in their ward data regarding “suspect” license simplest form, may consist simply of a plate numbers. Of course, these systems video camera recording the activity in a also provide for more extensive retro- single location, perhaps a till or a store spective surveillance. entrance. The system operators, perhaps the store owner or manager, would Radio frequency identification probably watch these recordings only after some anomalous event, such as a Radio frequency identification (RFID) robbery. But in the past few decades, systems consist of three parts: tiny short- CCTV systems have grown in complexity range transmitters (tags) that emit a so that, for example, a single guard can unique digital code, readers that activate watch a building’s several entrances the tags and receive their signals, and the simultaneously. By far the most sophisti- databases and administrative processes that cated, extensive, and pervasive CCTV are activated upon their receipt. Radio systems are in the U.K., where over 4 frequency identification systems are quite million cameras are in use, often covering common; in general, any card that one entire downtown areas and monitored by waves at a reader, rather than swiping central police stations (Edwards, 2005). through a reader, probably contains an A standalone CCTV camera will only RFID tag. Common RFID applications tell you whether someone is present at a include automatic toll collection (for particular location; coordinated CCTV example, the EZPass system in the U.S.) systems can be used to track individuals’ and building access cards. movements. In practice, this tracking is Because the tags are short-range trans- usually retroactive. That is, after a crime mitters, RFID systems are in a way occurs, police consult recorded CCTV inherently locational. If the reader has images to view the scene of the crime and read the tag, then the tag was near the trace suspects’ movements backwards as reader. Initial applications were concerned they leave and enter cameras’ fields of with taking the action appropriate at a vision. particular place—assess this toll, open this Newer CCTV systems are augmented door. But multiple readers linked to with software that can automatically common databases offer a vantage point recognize objects within their field of from which to note movement of a par- vision and respond appropriately in real ticular tag from reader to reader. This time. The most common such systems are kind of tracking is becoming perhaps the used for the collection of road tolls. predominant use of RFID tags. Retailers Roads and highways in central London such as Wal-Mart are requiring their sup- and elsewhere are lined with CCTV pliers to tag products in order to track

339 DAVID J. PHILLIPS inventory through the supply chain. to calculate their position by triangulating Currently, Wal-Mart’s tagging is done at local WiFi signals, then report that posi- the pallet level and tracking stops when tion to a third party (Magid, 2007). But items are stocked on the shelves. But GPS, cell phone location, CCTV, and item-level tagging is increasingly common. RFID are the most pervasive, institutio- Michelin embeds a unique tag in each tire nalized, and standardized location techni- it manufactures (Michelin, 2006). Airports ques. They are mature enough that the use RFID to track baggage (Friedlos, infrastructures supporting their use have 2007). A U.S. Department of Agriculture begun to merge and interact. The U.K. is project uses RFID tags to track feed ani- planning to integrate satellite positioning mals from birth to slaughterhouse (U.S. into its road pricing system, especially as Department of Agriculture, 2007). that system extends beyond the dense This sort of lifetime product tracking urban areas most amenable to CCTV involves coordination of readings as the surveillance (Oliver, 2007). Bermuda and tagged item moves through institutions: the U.K. both plan to embed RFID tags manufacturer, shipper, and retailer, at the in license plates (Ferguson, 2007). very least. Verisign, the U.S. company Police are also growing more sophisti- that manages two of the internet’s cated in their analysis of the vast amounts thirteen root name servers, as well as the of data produced by locational surveil- .com and .net domains, has developed a lance systems, and can integrate other system to facilitate this sort of global types of data into that analysis. In the RFID tracking, creating “a unified view U.K., police use i2 Analyst’s Workstation, of sightings of individual … tags” (Juels, which integrates license plate data with 2006: 383). other data sources and provides an inter- It is a short hop from tracking objects face to visualize temporal, geographic, or and animals to tracking people. In some associative patterns in the data. That is, cases, locating an object effectually implies the operator can map the path of a parti- locating a person. One can reasonably cular vehicle, highlight areas frequented assume, for example, that if an RFID by suspicious vehicles, or note the regular equipped car passed a toll booth, then the appearance of a cohort of vehicles (i2 Inc, car’s driver passed it too. But developers 2007). are also offering RFID applications speci- Research is underway on systems to fically designed to track or locate people. integrate face recognition and other bio- Usually such tags are embedded in a worn metric data into CCTV and RFID systems. object, for example a bracelet worn by a The RFID based secure alert tracking child at an amusement park, an inmate in system will not only inform casino a prison, or a patient in a hospital (Bennet managers of their employees’ locations, it and Crow, 2005; Bushell-Embling, 2007). will also let managers know if the However, some companies are offering employee’s heart is racing (Swedberg, subcutaneous tagging for dementia suf- 2007). Researchers in Europe are devel- ferers likely to wander from their care- oping a system to monitor every airline givers (Penn, 2007). passenger through CCTV cameras installed in the backs of seats, and automatically recognize suspicious activities, like lip- Convergence licking, blinking, or rapid eye movements These are not the only techniques avail- (Leake, 2007). able for locational surveillance. For exam- Police agencies and global corporations ple, laptop computers can be programmed are not the only ones to take advantage of

340 LOCATIONAL SURVEILLANCE the growing sophistication, maturity, and Radio frequency identification technology interoperability of these techniques. Grass- is relatively inexpensive in itself, though roots organizations, individuals, and small its supporting infrastructure has evolved businesses are also taking them up. Radio to satisfy the needs of global trade, and is frequency identification readers and satel- operated by the most powerful commu- lite positioning receivers are relatively nications corporations in the world. cheap. Cell phones are practically ubiqui- Huge global corporations are also impli- tous in some communities. Google has cated in these infrastructures as individual published the specifications that permit locational data is supplemented by other relatively unsophisticated users to create sources of personal data. ChoicePoint, “mash-ups” that link databases to maps. which operates the systems allowing U.K. So, for example, one need only go to police to quickly link license plate www.housingmaps.com to see a map numbers with other sources of data, had with “pins” stuck in it marking the loca- revenues of over a billion dollars in 2006 tion of available apartments. Click the (ChoicePoint, 2007). Google and Microsoft, pin and you are shown the ad for that two behemoths in the computing indus- apartment. The Institute for Applied try, are the primary providers of maps and Autonomy has developed a web-based mapping services used in ad hoc mash-ups. service mapping the locations of CCTV A further trend is that these systems are cameras in Manhattan, and allowing users used not only for the tracking of individual to plot “paths of least surveillance” people or items, but for geographic sense- (Institute for Applied Autonomy, 2007). making and pattern analysis. These appli- Nokia offers a phone with a built-in cations require sophisticated and expensive RFID reader, making possible applica- software generally available only to those tions where the RFID tags are stationary with deep pockets. and the readers mobile (Nokia, 2007). The following section investigates fur- Thus, the phone user can wend her way ther the laws, policies, and economic around an unfamiliar city, referring to arrangements that act to structure access databases about locations, rather than to locational surveillance infrastructures, having the operators of those locations and so order social relations and distribute refer to databases about her. social power. While nothing in the technologies themselves necessitates a top–down, pan- optic structure of locational surveillance, Structuring the order of certain trends are nevertheless apparent. surveillance The infrastructure is controlled, maintained, and used by governments and In general, there are two phases of the large corporations. Telephone companies, configuration of access to locational sur- especially, are important players, in that veillance resources. The first is the config- they produce and control the locational uration of the technical infrastructure that data regarding the phones on their system. makes certain practices possible. The second Closed circuit television systems are is the legal, economic, and cultural infra- expensive to deploy and coordinate, and structure that constrains and shapes actua- are generally operated on a large scale tions of that potential. Nowhere is this dual only by those for whom they can pro- structuring more apparent than in the con- duce income (as with toll collection sys- figuration of police access to locational data. tems) or when they are supported by a The E911 system in the U.S. is the result tax base (as with public police surveillance). of very specific, articulate, and well-funded

341 DAVID J. PHILLIPS policy mandates to provide the technical regulations, and it is to these that we now capacity for locational surveillance. There turn. is no opt-out of the system. All telephony carriers must provide a 911 service, locate Data protection in the EU their callers, and deliver that location to the PSAP. Having extended this mandate The Data Directive of 1995 (European from wired to wireless carriers, the FCC Union, 1995) required EU countries to is again extending it to voice over inter- pass laws regulating the processing of net protocol (VOIP) carriers. Every personally identifiable information. These internet telephony service provider who is laws are intended to protect personal capable of receiving calls from, or making privacy of individuals, and must instanti- calls to, the public switched telephony ate certain principles of data protection. network, must also be able to inter- Thus, in general, across Europe, data connect with the E911 system and deliver subjects have the right to know when a “registered location” to the PSAP. For data is collected about them, to opt out of now, this location is relatively static. The that collection, and to access and correct user provides it to the VOIP carrier when that data. first signing up for the service. However, Certain tensions and ambiguities have the FCC is also considering requiring arisen as regulators attempt to apply these VOIP operators to institute real-time, principles to modern surveillance prac- automatic location determination (Federal tices. For example, the principles are expli- Communication Commission, 2005). citly intended to protect individual privacy. Laws requiring data collection and But often the purpose of surveillance is to retention are another policy mechanism discover or create usable patterns in vast through which police and security agents amounts of data, rather than to isolate or attain potential access to locational data. act upon any particular individual. Any Many countries have enacted legislation social, rather than personal, implications to require mobile phone carriers to obtain of that sort of knowledge production are identification from all of their clients, orthogonal to the principles’ intent. making anonymous pre-paid mobile Moreover, since the principles apply phone cards illegal (Centre for Policy only to “any information relating to an Research on Science and Technology, identified or identifiable natural person,” nd). European lawmakers have proposed regulators are forced to tackle the ques- to make it illegal to provide false infor- tion of what it is to “relate” to an indivi- mation when opening a web or e-mail dual, and what it is for an individual to be account (Shannon, 2007). A new law in “identifiable.” Green and Smith (2003) New York City mandates video surveil- note that British mobile phone carriers lance of entrances and exits of night- have taken advantage of this ambiguity. clubs (Rivera, 2007), and a proposed Clearly, when those carriers market the law in the U.K. would require all CCTV locational data of the cell phones in their operators to produce images of sufficient system, they act as though that data is clarity to identify their subjects (Johnston, related to an individual. After all, it is the 2007). link between the cell phone and its user All of these are specifically intended to that gives that locational data its monetary make the technical infrastructure of value. Yet, until recently, regulators refused surveillance efficiently available to police to apply privacy principles to that data, and security agencies. Of course, that viewing the cell phone’s location as a access can be constrained by non-technical non-individuated, non-personal bit of

342 LOCATIONAL SURVEILLANCE information “on par with a bus ticket” with the customer’s “express prior con- (Green and Smith, 2003: p. 580). sent” (P.L. 106–81 (5)(2); 47 U.S.C. 222 The prevalence of RFID surveillance, (f)). This requirement for consent is waived where the link to the individual is more in several cases. First, of course, is in the tenuous, but the granularity of tracking provision of emergency services. It is also potentially more pervasive, has brought waived if the carrier is presented with a these questions before policy-makers with court order for disclosure. There are also greater urgency. In response, an EU populations who are deemed unable to policy team has recommended that data consent or who have had their right to be subject to privacy regulations if it “is consent revoked. Consent also can be used to determine or influence the way in coerced. We will discuss these situations which [a] person is treated or evaluated” in turn. (European Union, 2005). This would Police agents have been eager to avail certainly seem to cover, for example, themselves of the locational data gener- mobile carriers supplying marketers with ated in mobile telephony. Until recently, anonymized locational data that would courts were generally ready to assist them nevertheless permit the marketers to deli- in this, by classifying that data as routing ver location-specific messages to mobile information, the release of which, under phones. However, the recommendations U.S. law, is subject to a very low level of specify that the data be used to influence judicial review. Since 2005, however, a “person,” and it is not clear that it judges in several jurisdictions have denied would apply to the wholesale use of large such requests. In doing so, they have quantities of anonymized locational data if accepted the argument that the use of that information were used in ways that such routing information turns the cell affected the lives of many people (for phone into a tracking device, the use of example, in siting billboards or road which by police agents is subject to the blocks), so long as none of them were very highest level of judicial scrutiny targeted individually. (Savin, 2006). These rulings are recent, local, and contested and they apply only to real-time surveillance. It remains Privacy law in the U.S. unclear what judicial standards apply to Unlike the EU, the U.S. has taken a sectoral retrospective access to locational phone approach to informational privacy, where records (Schwartz et al., 2006). each type of data (for example financial The unquestioned necessity for potential records, health records, or video rental police access is one principle underlying records) is subject to a different policy both European and U.S. data regulation. mechanism. Locational data, especially Consent is another. Both the EU and the that generated by mobile phone systems, U.S. data protection regimes, to varying enjoy the highest legislative protection. degrees, require that individuals be given As was mentioned earlier, the software, the opportunity to consent to the collec- networks, and expertise involved in emer- tion and use of their personal information. gency response systems are also useful in The actual implementations of that right commercial location-based services. But to consent are too varied and intricate to be while the locational infrastructure may be reviewed here. Nevertheless, certain issues generally available to non-emergency arise whenever consent is an operating services, access to the locational data itself principle. is highly restricted. Carriers are forbidden One issue is that consent, to be mean- to disclose a customer’s location except ingful, must be informed. Individuals must

343 DAVID J. PHILLIPS know the likely results of their decision to Some of this resistance is in the form of consent. But that sort of prognostication legislative lobbying. This tends to be is impossible, either for the data subject or more successful in the EU, with its the operator of the surveillance system, established and expansive regimes of data especially since surveillance is used not to protection. There, employers are required act upon a particular individual, but to to disclose and justify all monitoring fashion social edifices like market seg- activity (Townsend and Bennett, 2003). ments or political districts. Nor is with- Legislative initiatives are more difficult in holding consent particularly effective. the U.S. Even though the U.S. sectoral While each individual may regard the approach does grant high protection to establishment of a surveillance state with locational data, that protection is trumped distaste or alarm, it is not clear that the by consent, and workers are legally actions of any individual will do much to deemed to consent by taking (or keeping) prevent it. the job. Instead, U.S. workers must either Another issue is that certain populations— explicitly bargain for contractual limits on children and the mentally incompetent surveillance, or argue before labor rela- for example—are deemed unable to con- tions boards that surveillance constitutes a sent. And other populations, like prisoners, significant change to established working are deemed to have forfeited their right to conditions. consent. It is not surprising that these— Bennett and Crow (2005) report that children, hospital patients, Alzheimer’s U.S. unions are addressing employee sufferers, and prisoners—are among the tracking more frequently in their contract first human targets of RFID tracking. negotiations, and sometimes have called Ideally, consent is freely given and strikes to resist the imposition of tracking uncoerced. Yet every decision occurs in during a contract period. Though increas- relations of power. This is especially true ingly common, these efforts have met in another of the most common practices with mixed success. Appeals to labor of human tracking, workplace surveillance. relations boards have generally failed, In recognition of these power differentials, with the board holding that surveillance different regulatory regimes come into in the workplace is simply a reasonable play in the workplace. automation of managerial prerogative. However, two new arguments are being formulated. The first holds that surveillance Labor law and workplace and communication systems do not merely regulation operate within the work environment but Mobile phone based employee tracking that they are the work environment. They systems, such as the Navtrak system are “are the primary tools through which an extensions of a long line of electronic employee accomplishes his or her work, surveillance of mobile workforces, starting [and] also … a primary mediator of first with the trucking industry (Lappin, employees’ interactions with coworkers 1995). In the U.S., union resistance to and clients. As such, information and workplace surveillance has historically telecommunications systems [define] both been feeble (Townsend and Bennett, the nature of the work and the social 2003). However, resistance is growing as environment in which it occurs” more workers in more fields—cab drivers, (Townsend and Bennett, 2003: 196). The case workers, and hospital employees, for second nascent argument is that the per- example—are subject to finer observation manence of the records of surveillance and control. constitutes a material shift in the relations

344 LOCATIONAL SURVEILLANCE between employers and employees, if for Copyright issues are also at play among no other reason than that these records private purveyors of geo-data. In North become available to police under subpoena. America and Europe, Navteq and Tele Atlas are the two dominant private providers of geo-coded data. Google licenses Access to maps this data for their Google Maps and Individual location only makes sense in a Google Earth services. In providing inter- geographic context. Maps form the back- faces to these mapping systems, Google drop against which mobility is under- facilitates the generation of ad hoc, com- stood. Access to maps is influenced by a munity-oriented locational surveillance host of regulatory, economic, and histor- systems such as the mash-ups mentioned ical conditions. This confusion is espe- earlier. However, all creators of Google cially evident in the U.S., where national mash-ups are subject to Google’s licensing E911 emergency response initiatives gen- agreements. These forbid the bulk down- erated a lot of local mapping activity. load of geographic data, as well as the Sometimes local authorities compiled these integration of Google’s maps with “any maps from existing utility company data. products, systems, or applications installed In other cases, localities commissioned or otherwise connected to or in commu- entirely new maps using aerial photo- nication with vehicles capable of vehicle graphy and satellite positioning systems. navigation, positioning, dispatch, real- As localities adopted policies regarding time route guidance, fleet management or public access to those maps, they had to similar applications” (Google, 2007). take into account their contracts with data They also require that the services be providers, the local and regional “sun- non-commercial and limited to 50,000 shine” laws regarding access to govern- page views per day. In effect, while ment documents, and cost recovery policies. Google and their map providers seek to Localities also negotiate national security encourage experimentation and novel issues as they make mapping data available. developments in mapping practice, that Similar tensions among issues of intel- encouragement guides those applications lectual property, economic policy, and into a market logic, and protects market security are played out across the globe. domination where it already exists. In the U.S., the government does not To circumvent the restrictions of both hold copyright to any of the information private and state control of geographic data, it compiles and cannot collect royalties. some groups like OpenStreetMap are trying However, one political trend is to assess to generate open source or “wiki” maps. access fees to recover the cost of data These use open protocols to generate collection, processing, and delivery. Another useful geo-coded databases using either trend is to outsource data gathering to public domain maps or, ideally, new data private companies, allowing those com- generated by users with personal geopo- panies to retain copyright and paying sitioning devices (OpenStreetMap, 2007). them for government use of the data. In the EU and Canada, governments Social movements generally can and do hold copyright. However, across the EU, the regulatory The open source mapping movement is trend is to encourage the free availability of not the only ground-swell reaction to government maps, in the hope that such increasingly pervasive, regularized, and availability will spur economic develop- institutionalized locational surveillance ment through new location-based services. practice. This reaction is, however, mixed.

345 DAVID J. PHILLIPS

While polls indicate that most U.S. technical or social configuration. There is mobile phone users worry about loca- little overall reconceptualization of the tional privacy (Harris Interactive, 2007), political stakes and or the long-term social there has been little organized resistance implications of locational surveillance. to CCTV surveillance, though perhaps There are exceptions to this. European resistance will be piqued by “talking” Union policy-makers, especially, are engaged video cams, which allow CCTV station in far-sighted attempts to broadly recon- operators to verbally chide litterers and sider qualitative changes in surveillance loiterers in real time. Resistance to nation- practice (Commission of the European wide vehicle surveillance in the U.K. Communities, 2007; European Union, seems to be geared toward the road tolls 2005, 2007). Some legal scholars are that the system facilitates, rather than to beginning to apply the insights of critical the surveillance itself (Oliver, 2007). geography—that is, the idea of places as Radio frequency identification tech- constructed, not merely monitored, by nologies, on the other hand, have excited surveillance practice—to labor law and some effective opposition. In part due to privacy law. organized backlash, retailers have had to But the broadest, deepest, most entren- delay or defend their plans for RFID ched and prevalent exception to the frag- tagging (Wolinsky, 2003). Several U.S. mentary approach is the dominance of states have banned forced RFID implants two paradigms: the security paradigm in humans. The U.S. Senate recently manifested in the explicit articulation of responded to public distrust of RFID sys- the interests of police and security agen- tems by stipulating that the mandatory cies into every aspect of regulatory infra- anti-counterfeiting protection on con- structure, and the privacy paradigm with sumer pharmaceuticals must be visual and its individualist rather than collectivist may not include readers or scanners (S. understandings of the threats of surveillance. 1082 Sec 514(2)(A)(i)). The legal, economic, and technical infrastructure of locational surveillance is developing in a way that makes its Conclusion resources most readily available to large- scale police and corporate entities. Those Dominant and entrenched institutions, entities use the locational infrastructure to especially police agencies, telecommunica- organize and administer populations and tion corporations, and global manufacturers processes, whether workforces, traffic and retailers, have the political and eco- flows, urban crowds, or manufactured nomic capital to instigate expansive infra- goods. While this involves noting and structural changes in locational surveillance. responding to the actions of individuals, As new techniques and practices develop, its primary focus is efficiency and nor- regulators, policy-makers, or activists malization. This normalization entails a respond to those novelties, generally to “God’s eye view” and the imposition of a make sure that emerging infrastructures matrix against which individual actions are adaptable to their interests. The reac- are measured and analyzed. tive response calls on previous regulatory Regulatory responses to surveillance are regimes, especially privacy and data pro- framed by the concepts of security and tection law, but also telecommunication, privacy. Security is the most powerful of media, and labor law. these framing devices, in part because it This reaction tends to be fragmentary, encompasses the entire surveillance pro- and limited to the attributes of a particular cess and understands the control of

346 LOCATIONAL SURVEILLANCE populations. The privacy framing, on the them. Many of these policy suggestions other hand, tends to be quite restricted in recommend that the underlying infra- its purview. Privacy and data protection structure of surveillance—the data sources regimes protect individuals rather than and networks of exchange—be kept open communities. They only peripherally and available to action from the peri- protect the ability to interact in public, to pheries rather than constrained by the create and use public spaces, or to engage economic and political interests of cor- in the production of social order. Yet the porations and governments. In particular, production of order is exactly the purpose they suggest that telecommunication of surveillance. policy require openness, interconnection, New theoretical approaches are neces- and interoperability among data and tele- sary in order to effectively engage with phony networks (Lane and Thelwall, and counter the expanse of surveillance as 2005). European Union policy docu- a mechanism of normalization and con- ments extend this principle, recommend- trol. The relatively new discipline of suring an open service for tracking RFID veillance studies is making great strides in tags (Commission of the European this direction, especially in the articulation Communities, 2007). of surveillance as “social sorting” (Lyon, Urban Tapestries also recommend that 2002; Haggerty and Ericson, 2006). geo-data be publicly available. Further, While that theoretical and empirical work they suggest that many forms of locational has helped to elucidate the processes and knowledge be integrated. That is, to implications of surveillance, there remains recognize that people make sense of a great need for concrete policy or reg- where they are not only by latitude and ulatory guidance. longitude, but also by signage, archi- Some legal theorists have suggested that tectural style, and the fashion sense of the regulation of oversight technologies passersby (Lane and Thelwall, 2005). be geared not to protect privacy per se, Most importantly, Urban Tapestries but to protect the “contextual integrity” recognized that while people are eager to of social activities (Nissenbaum, 2004). share and create locational knowledge, While this is a welcome direction, it must this desire is tempered by questions about also be abetted by a constructivist under- how and by whom the knowledge would standing of context and activity as mutually be used (Lane and Thelwall, 2005). This constitutive. As Dourish puts it, context is an important policy issue regardless of “is an achievement, rather than an obser- how locational surveillance capacity is vation; an outcome, rather than a pre- distributed. Grass-roots locational knowl- mise” (Dourish, 2004: 22). The central edge production is no more inherently policy question then becomes how to benevolent than state or corporate sur- “support the processes by which context veillance. Mash-ups pinpointing the homes is continually manifest, defined, nego- of gynecologists working at family plan- tiated, and shared” (Dourish, 2004: 26). ning agencies are of ambiguous social Moreover, to counteract a tendency value. The new dynamics of social visibi- toward monolithic normalcy, context lity raise ethical, social, and legal questions creations should be messy, overlapping, that are only beginning to be articulated. dissonant, and mutually productive. But these are exactly the questions that The Urban Tapestries project offered must be addressed. Unless we do, awe an excellent ethnographic venture into will be thrown back on the dichotomy of the processes of geographic context crea- security (defined always as national secur- tion, and the policies that might support ity, the security provided by police and

347 DAVID J. PHILLIPS armies) versus privacy, and individuals will in North America, see Phillips (2005) and be managed, to a greater or lesser extent, Bennett and Crow (2005). Thorough by overbearing organizations. analyses of the policy implications of RFID have recently been published (Commission of the European Communities, 2007; Guide to further reading European Union, 2005, 2007). Dourish (2004) oﬀers brief and persuasive argu- Norris and Armstrong (1999) provide a ments for articulating context creation classic study of public CCTV systems in into the design of pervasive computing the U.K. Though the technical conﬁg- systems. Finally, Haggerty and Ericson’s uration of the systems they study is already (2006) The New Politics of Surveillance and somewhat quaint, their ethnographic and Visibility is a brilliant collection of the best political economic insights are enduring. current theoretical and empirical research For more on the development of mobile on surveillance. phone tracking and location-based services

348 25 Metaphoric reinforcement of the virtual fence Factors shaping the political economy of property in cyberspace

Oscar H. Gandy, Jr. and Kenneth Neil Farrall

Understanding the political economy of the internet requires a comprehensive assessment of the strategic resources that interested actors bring to bear at critical points of engagement with those institutions that identify, assign, and enforce the rights and responsibilities that define it. This chapter is focused on the role of the U.S. Supreme Court and the appellate courts that help to set its agenda in defining the nature of property in cyberspace. An analysis of the strategic use of metaphor by justices, judges, plaintiffs, defendants, and a rapidly growing pool of “friends of the court,” reveals the ways in which boundaries are drawn, fences are raised, and rules regarding their height, density, and inviolability are set into place. While legal scholars assume that some logic governs the use of particular metaphors, such as those that reflect an internal or users’ perspective rather than an external or engineering orientation, the fact is that it is strategic impact, rather than logic or allegiance to a particular community of interest, that governs their use. Although continuing tension between property and liberty interests has marked the development of cyberspace, appellate courts have tended to use a broad array of metaphoric constructions to justify reinforcing limits on access to virtual property. The future of cyberspace will be shaped, explained, and justified through the strategic use of metaphors and analogies. The challenge will be to understand how their use reflects and reinforces existing distributions of power.

Fences are both a technical and a sym- Laws defending the use of barbed wire bolic force when marshaled by those who in the American West had much in seek to announce and defend their prop- common with Section 1201 of the Digital erty interests. Fences are also seen as a Millennium Copyright Act (Herman and constraint on the freedom of others to Gandy, 2006). Each served to reinforce make use of public or collective resources. the claims of property rights holders who Although the ultimate status of a parti- were engaged in the development of new cular bit of fence was often determined frontiers. through the use of deadly force The power of law is magical. It has the (Anderson and Hill, 1975), the resolution ability to establish as fact, things that we of these conﬂicts at a more general level know in our hearts are not so (Madison, came to depend upon the establishment, 2005). As Balkin (2003: 8) puts it, law “is interpretation, and enforcement of the a form of cultural software that shapes the rule of law (McFerrin and Wills, 2007). way we think about and apprehend the

349 OSCAR H. GANDY, JR. AND KENNETH NEIL FARRALL world.” Legal doctrines establish facts as defending property interests in these well as systems of rights and responsi- intangible goods. A substantial increase in bilities associated with the social actors legislative and judicial activity has been a and objects that are created along with largely ineffective response to this grow- those facts (Tiller and Cross, 2005). ing uncertainty (Landes and Posner, 2004). Development and change in the nature of We focus our attention in this chapter what we treat as right or wrong is the on the ways in which conflicts between product of a complex interaction of property and liberty interests in cyber- socio-technical factors that include the space have been pursued within the U.S. strategic efforts of social actors seeking to appellate court system. The appellate courts maintain or establish power or advantage serve as the final authority on the mean- over others (Etzioni, 1988). These actors ing of legislative acts designed to establish bring a variety of resources to bear in rights as well as to control the behavior of their attempts to shape the law and its cyberspace residents and guests. And, influence over behavior. We have chosen although the production of influence to focus on the use of metaphor and within the appellate court system differs analogy as resources in the discursive in important ways from its production construction of the regime of rights and within the legislative arena (Baumgartner responsibilities that helps to determine the and Jones, 1993), the pursuit of group character of cyberspace. interests in both venues shares much in common. Although judicial decisions are con- Political economy and the strained to a certain extent by professional transformation of cyberspace norms and expectations regarding the influence of legal doctrine and precedent, Cyberspace is more than the internet, we are also mindful of the fact that jurists’ although its infrastructure provides the interpretations of the law will be shaped matrix within which its countless trans- to some degree by their own moral, actions and interactions take place. The ethical, and ideological commitments number and variety of communicative (Balkin, 1991). interactions that determine the character of cyberspace continue to expand as a function of socio-technical factors (Garrie, The metaphoric construction 2005) that both shape, and are shaped by, of cyberspace transformations in the global economy (Spar, 2001). In 1690 philosopher John Locke wrote Although there are ongoing debates the following about metaphor: about whether the emergence of global markets for information goods and ser- … all the art of rhetoric, besides vices represents a fundamental change in order and clearness; all the artificial the nature of the market system (Webster, and figurative application of words 2002), there is little doubt that the com- eloquence hath invented, are for modification of information has been a nothing else but to insinuate wrong driving force in its transformation. ideas, move the passions, and This process of commodification has thereby mislead the judgment; … been especially troubled, however, by the And therefore, however laudable or immaterial nature of information, and the allowable oratory may render them associated difficulties of establishing and in harangues and popular addresses,

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they are certainly, in all discourses To say that the internet is a library or a that pretend to inform or instruct, town square are metaphorical construc- wholly to be avoided … tions that involve key entailments of a (Locke, 1959: 146) source domain (library, town square) that the receiver of the message can then map Locke’s concern about the misleading on to the target domain (the internet). In aspects of metaphor has been particularly the case of cyberspace, the entailments of salient within legal discourse. Susan this source domain, other than that it is Tiefenbrun (1986: 118–19) notes “Students some form of space, do not emerge from of law are taught early in law school to common experience. People derive their avoid the use of emotive or metaphoric sense of the meaning of cyberspace from language in legal brief writing. Despite its usage in popular culture, mass media, the generally held belief in this conven- and other extant discourses. tion, however, metaphors are commonly The cyberspace metaphor has had a found in cases.” Further, as Haig Bosmajian tortuous history. While the word as first (1992) demonstrates, it is the metaphors used was associated with freedom, inde- (or “tropological passages”) in court opi- pendence, and new frontiers (Barlow, nions that are likely to be quoted in 1996; Post and Johnson, 2006), its overt subsequent decisions. spatial entailments came to be seen as That metaphors may, in fact, play a playing into the hands of established critical role in legal discourse where clear interests and the march of global capital- logical thinking is paramount, should no ism (Cohen, 2007). Far too often, from longer come as a surprise given recent the perspective of some, courts have work in the philosophy of language. tended to oppose the treatment of cyber- Certainly, George Lakoff and Mark space locales as equivalent to spaces in the Johnson’s (2003) seminal work, Metaphors material world, in part because it might We Live By, helped scholars across aca- subject service providers to additional demic discourses gain a greater apprecia- burdens under equal accommodations laws tion for the vital, central role of metaphor (Access Now v. Southwest Airlines, 2002). in human cognition and communication. Today, the term seems to have lost much In Lakoff and Johnson’s framework, of its power (both positive and negative) metaphor is constructed of a source and and is instead just one of the words one target domain. The source domain is one might pull from a thesaurus to avoid the in which the communicating agents are stylistic faux pas of repeating the word assumed to be familiar (or at least to share internet or network one too many times. knowledge of certain relative characteristics) while the target domain is the less Metaphor as a twin-edged familiar area, where understanding can be sword increased via association with the source domain. The act of communicating in There is considerable disagreement in the metaphor is an invitation to the receiver legal literature as to the specific role of to consider the less familiar in terms of metaphor in the development of cyber- the more familiar. The familiar aspects of space. Hunter (2001) suggests that meta- the source domain are its entailments. phor, when used to understand the The entailments inherent in metaphoric internet, often clouds and constrains the expressions mean that certain aspects of thinking of the court. McGowan (2005), the target domain are highlighted while however, through careful readings of the others are hidden. cyber-trespass case law, makes a compelling

351 OSCAR H. GANDY, JR. AND KENNETH NEIL FARRALL counter-argument that judges are more particularly dominant legal metaphors sophisticated in their reasoning than the such as the “marketplace of ideas” metaphoric blinders’ criticism suggests. (Ingber, 1984). The phrase, first coined Further, as McGowan (2005: 4) points by Justice Holmes in his dissenting opi- out, focusing exclusively on metaphorical nion in the 1919 case Abrams v. United constraint “trivializes judicial opinions States, has become the dominant meta- without engaging them.” phor in free speech cases. On the other While McGowan is persuasive, hand, although the importance of the Balganesh (2006) shows us that jurists can marketplace of ideas metaphor is beyond still be led astray. This can happen when a debate, its actual impact on legal discourse chain of case decisions, beginning with is harder to gauge. Cass Sunstein (1993) instrumental, rather than truly conceptual has criticized the metaphor for what it uses of metaphor, becomes locked into a hides, for obscuring important aspects of conceptual path that ends up corrupting free speech in a democracy. In his view, the core concepts along the way. “Aggregative or marketplace notions dis- Deference to precedents activated by regard the extent to which political familiar metaphors means that discursive outcomes are supposed to depend on discourse corrections become more and more cussion and debate, or a commitment to difficult. This outcome is quite clear in political equality, and on the reasons the case of decisions regarding the defini- offered for or against alternatives” tion of property and trespass as they relate (Sunstein, 1993: 249). to intangibles (Balganesh, 2006: 316). Philip Napoli’s (1999) examination of The troubles, according to Balganesh the use of the marketplace metaphor in (2006: 282–3), began in earnest when a the Federal Communications Commision court needed to provide a rationale to (FCC) policy discourse over a period of justify its attempt to curb the actions of 33 years showed that it had been used spammers. with two very distinct sets of entailments The CompuServe court reasoned that in mind: the economic dimension, which electronic interference with a server could Sunstein criticizes above, and the demo- be equated with a tangible invasion, and cratic theory dimension, which is much thus it was appropriate to apply the doc- more focused on the role of free speech trine of trespass to transactions in cyber- in democratic self-government. space. The rhetorical stance selected by Napoli’s analysis suggests that the FCC the court was not without consequence has not consistently associated specific for subsequent cases involving trouble- kinds of regulatory policy-making with some access and use of internet resources. particular interpretations of the market- In his view, the “doctrinal ambiguities and place of ideas concept. Thus, although inconsistencies” that have followed the this metaphor typically has been used to CompuServe decision (Balganesh, 2006: 267) justify deregulation of the communica- may make recovering from its discursive tions industry, these decisions have been mis-steps exceedingly difficult due to the predicated almost as much upon demo- nature of associated path dependencies. cratic theory principles as they have upon the goal of promoting economic efficiency and consumer satisfaction (Napoli, Metaphoric dominance and 1999:164). distortion Napoli’s observations help to under- The fact that metaphors both highlight score a number of key issues that arise in and hide has led to much criticism of the study of metaphor and legal discourse.

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How does metaphor affect legal reason- are quite varied, but they include the ing? What motivates its use? How does defense of institutional interests, such as metaphor help jurists to understand new those represented by members of some and unfamiliar legal contexts? In what professional group such as librarians or cases can metaphor constrain reasoning in engineers. On occasion, members of ways that negatively impact the public Congress or representatives of adminis- interest? trative agencies offer briefs in support of prior decisions that have been challenged. Paul Collins (2006) suggests that the The strategic use of metaphor arguments presented by pressure groups In order to answer these questions, we have had a measurable impact on the must first recognize that metaphors are policy decisions reported by the Supreme instrumental resources, used strategically Court. Amici play a role in the courts by plaintiffs, defendants, and a host of similar to that played by lobbyists seeking interested parties in an effort to influence to influence the legislature—they provide the outcome of a court’s deliberation. information, including information about These discursive resources are deployed at the preferences of other interested parties critical moments through well-established and the public more generally (Spriggs channels and means that include briefs, and Wahlbeck, 1997). While the infor- direct testimony, and the majority and mational component of amicus briefs dissenting opinions of the court. often contains “alternative and reframed Courts (and judges) issue finely crafted legal arguments,” what Collins (2006: 11) opinions that are woven throughout with sees as particularly important is the way analogies and metaphors that have been these arguments are used to illustrate the selected because of their likely effect in “broader social ramifications of the case.” making judicial reasoning available to While the influence of amicus briefs is others as both justification and guidance difficult to determine precisely, in part as (Berger, 2002). When, as is quite likely in a function of the nature of the dependent the case of cyberspace transgressions, there measures chosen by analysts (Songer and are competing doctrines that are arguably Sheehan, 1993), as well as by a rather relevant to the facts at hand, opinions are dramatic increase in the number of likely to make use of a metaphor that amicus briefs being submitted, most foregrounds a particular doctrine that observers conclude that the ideological supports a preferred behavioral or policy bias of the courts determines the extent to outcome (Cass, 1995). A carefully con- which a court will highlight arguments structed opinion that uses a familiar, or an drawn from an amicus brief (Kearney and especially powerful, metaphor to justify a Merrill, 2000). Indeed, legal scholars sug- particular doctrinal choice allows the gest that when a court is politically uni- court to appear principled, when it may fied, even established legal doctrine will in fact be pursuing a political end (Tiller be ignored if it is in conflict with the and Cross, 2005). policy preferences of the court’s majority Friends of the court (amici) are active, (Tiller and Cross, 2005). and increasingly important, participants in appellate decision-making (Kearney and Property versus liberty interests Merrill, 2000). Their involvement is limited primarily to the provision of formal Among the more troublesome issues in arguments, or amicus briefs. The nature the development of cyberspace law and of the interests that amici might pursue policy is the nature of property, and the

353 OSCAR H. GANDY, JR. AND KENNETH NEIL FARRALL meaning of property rights as they relate being similar to other forms of civil dis- to theft, unauthorized access, or trespass obedience (Kreimer, 2001), or to accept (Loughlan, 2006). Conflicts over objects well-publicized hacks of supposedly secure and interactions in cyberspace tend to systems as a form of whistle-blowing arise as individuals and institutions seeking (Jordan and Taylor, 1998: 773). to protect their interests come to define Another difficulty in cases involving those interests in terms of property crimes against property is the demonstra- (Radin, 2006). tion and assessment of the harm caused to In order to convince the courts that the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s interests. The property rights in information, or in the problems involved in this determination infrastructures that enable the exploitation are quite substantial when the property is of those rights have been abridged, plain- intangible, or the harm or loss is spec- tiffs have to establish parallels between ulative or potential, rather than docu- crimes against property in the material mented. Still, we find courts willing to world and crimes against property in grant that a plaintiff has met the requisite cyberspace (Lipton, 2004). demonstration of harm even when the Adifficult problem of representation burden is as insignificant as an increase in emerges in those cases where the theft or the number of electrons flowing through misappropriation of property is based on a system, some temporary loss of the full unauthorized access to some facility. functionality of a server, or the distraction Here, the challenge is to describe this of otherwise productive workers by property in such as way as to make the unauthorized e-mail (Intel Corp.v.Hamidi, law of trespass seem appropriate. Within 2003). The courts’ assessments of these the common law in the United States, burdens are rarely based upon any readily important distinctions have been made agreeable standard of measure; instead between trespass to real property and they reflect the courts’ evaluation of the trespass to chattels (McGowan, 2005). relative worth of an imagined class of Often in cases in which the nature of victims and the agents who might cause the link between tangible property and them harm. Well-chosen metaphors help theft is difficult to establish, petitioners to establish and reinforce the impressions will deploy metaphors that they hope will that their sponsors desire. influence the characterization of those charged with misbehavior. Persons who The tyranny of perspective: derive benefit from the creative labor of internal versus external others are compared with those who would “reap without sowing.” Such a The ways in which a court might inter- construction is less menacing than the pret the facts of a particular cyberspace image of lawless and dangerous criminals case may depend upon whether the dis- that is evoked by reference to pirates course focuses on the ways in which users (Loughlan, 2006: 218). Nissenbaum perceive their interactions or transactions, (2004:199) identifies recent decisions by or on the ways in which an engineer the courts as contributing to the char- might describe them. A users’ perspective acterization of hackers as the “white- might reflect a kind of virtual reality that collar criminals and terrorists of the can be readily distinguished from the Information Age.” Because they have physical reality of computers, peripherals, been constructed rhetorically as criminals, and network infrastructure. Orin Kerr it is difficult for the uninvolved and (2003: 357) labels these two perspectives uninformed to treat cases of hactivism as internal and external, and he suggests:

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“many of the disputes within the field of The judges who decide these cases ‘cyberlaw’ boil down to clashes between arguably seek to achieve an appropriate internal and external perspectives.” balance between the interests of property As Kerr (2003) observes, judges and holders and a host of other interests and other participants move easily between values that are placed at risk as property internal and external perspectives, depend- rights are extended or reinforced. We ing upon the nature of the argument they understand many of these risks as threats seek to make. He suggests that in our to freedom and autonomy. We see the efforts to apply the laws of the physical search for a morally and politically defen- world to those of the virtual world we sible balance between property and liberty tend to look for analogies or metaphors interests as being at the heart of the judi- that support the application of particular cial construction of cyberspace. We doctrines. On the other hand, those who review these cases in chronological order oppose constraints on the imagined free- because each provides a framework against doms of cyberspace challenge the appro- which the subsequent cases are likely to priateness of those metaphors (Froomkin, be compared. 1995). Legal scholars, such as Lawrence Lessig, who frequently intervene as Universal City Studios v. friends of the court, often reveal well- Reimerdes: hyperlinks as the established preferences for one perspective ties that bind over another. Kerr (2003: 374) identifies Lessig’s famous declaration that “Code is We examined the case of Universal City law” as the basis for his belief that Studios v. Reimerdes (2000) because of the “because external code is internal law, we ways in which a fundamental feature of should regulate external code from an cyberspace navigation was explicitly chal- internal perspective.” lenged. The U.S. Court of Appeals We are not in a position to suggest affirmed the decision of a lower court that which perspectives should determine the barred the publication of a computer outcome of cases and the future of program, or the provision of hypertext cyberspace; instead we seek to character- links to other websites publishing the ize the ways in which these perspectives, program because of its likely use for inherent in the metaphors chosen to copyright infringement. convey them, have been used strategically The Reimerdes (later Corley) case attrac- by the competing interests that come ted a large number of amici representing before the court. both property and liberty interests (Universal City Studios v. Corley, 2001). First Amendment interests were involved Central cases and their because the defendant, Eric Corley, was a metaphors publisher whose website often contained material related to stories printed in his We have identified three cases that we magazine. In this particular case, the site believe mark critically important turning included a copy of the decryption pro- points in the path-dependent develop- gram, DeCSS, so named because it was ment of cyberspace. We have also been routinely used to circumvent CSS, the attracted to these cases because of the ways software that the motion picture industry in which the deployment of metaphors was using to prevent unauthorized view- reflects fundamental tensions between ing and copying of its films. Corley’s site property and liberty interests. also included links to other websites that

355 OSCAR H. GANDY, JR. AND KENNETH NEIL FARRALL had posted the program. Following a (ACLU et al., 2001: 21–2). The brief also decision by the District Court in NY to suggested “linking effectively ties the grant an injunction against Corley, he entire web together into a single inter- appealed to the 2nd Circuit. Although the connected body of knowledge made up Court explicitly recognized the complex of all individually published web pages of policy concerns that required the balan- different users around the world.” Like cing of access and fair use aspects of many of the participating computer sci- communications and technology policy entists, these amici sought to challenge against copyright interests, they chose to the court’s arguments regarding function- sidestep these issues and define the provi- ality by suggesting that if an annotated sion of hyperlinks as the equivalent of bible and Thomas Acquinas’ commen- trafficking in dangerous contraband. taries were shelved near each other on a There were two ways in which hyper- library’s shelves, this enhanced access links were discussed within the courts. should somehow lessen the constitutional One, which we would characterize as an protection that those commentaries would internal construction, emphasized the ordinarily have enjoyed (ACLU et al., transportation of the user to some place; 2001: 22–4). They also challenged the the other, which was also presented from court’s assertion that linking to a site with the users’ (internal) perspective, emphasized the DeCSS program was the “functional the transportation of text, or image, or in equivalent” of providing the program this case a computer program, to the user. more directly. External constructions focused on the actions The U.S. government also saw this case of users, and the technology involved in as being of particular importance, and the transfer. In noting the distinction, the participated as an intervenor in support of Circuit Court revisited the explanation copyright interests. The government’s offered by the District Court judge: brief repeated the district court’s evo- cation of an internally oriented trans- In applying the DMCA to linking portation metaphor to characterize the (via hyperlinks), Judge Kaplan function of hyperlinks as a way to “trans- recognized, as he had with DeCSS fer the user to another web page.” In the code, that a hyperlink has both a government’s view, the “sole function of speech and a nonspeech compo- a link is to ‘take one almost instanta- nent. It conveys information, the neously to the desired destination (on the internet address of the linked web internet) with the mere click of an elec- page, and has the functional capa- tronic mouse” (United States, 2001: 60–1). city to bring the content of the On the other hand, the government linked web page to the user’s com- rejected the characterization of code as puter screen (or, as Judge Kaplan speech, suggesting instead that hyperlinks put it, to “take one almost instanta- are “the technological bridges that con- neously to the desired location”). nect different internet websites for myriad (Universal City Studios v. Corley, purposes.” Further they argued that for 2001: 455–6) “those who use internet links to join with others who share their beliefs, the act of The American Civil Liberties Union linking might be said to constitute asso- (ACLU) and its colleagues offered an ciation in cyberspace” (United States, extended metaphor describing the internet 2001: 64). By emphasizing the associative as “a vast library” where “links serve as both function of hyperlinks, the government its card catalog and its digital footnotes” sought to invoke the application of First

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Amendment principles that relate to asso- technology pits public libraries against the ciational contact, rather than speech and federal government, and does not directly the press. Arguably this was because asso- involve a struggle over exploitative rights. ciations whose purpose is unlawful would In its long-term struggle to erect fences not enjoy the same level of constitutional or technological barriers that would pre- protection as the speech of those whose vent children from gaining access to por- views are merely unpopular. nography or other dangerous content, the The Court noted that the defendants U.S. Congress sought to require libraries and their allies focused on speech, while to install filters that would screen out assiduously avoiding consideration of the objectionable material with the Children’s functional aspects of hyperlinks. In discuss- Internet Protection Act 2000 (CIPA). ing this transparently strategic use of meta- The American Library Association (ALA) phor and analogy, the Court noted that the: argued that the imposition of a filtering requirement was an unconstitutional limit Appellants’ supplemental papers on the rights of adult users of the library. enthusiastically embraced the argu- While the ALA had been successful in able analogy between printing book- convincing a District Court that internet store addresses and displaying on a access in a library was a public forum, web page links to websites at which and therefore entitled to substantial First DeCSS may be accessed. … Like Amendment protections, the Supreme many analogies posited to illuminate Court majority was not so easily persuaded. legal issues, the bookstore analogy is The metaphoric struggles in this case helpful primarily in identifying char- were focused on the characterization of a acteristics that distinguish it from the public library’s activities with regard to context of the pending dispute the internet. The first, and perhaps most (Universal City Studios v. Corley, important, issue was the extent to which 2001: 457) the provision of internet access for its clients was the same as, or equivalent to, the For the Court, the distinction that establishment of a public forum. The second mattered was that the “digital world” issue was related to a comparison of fil- ensured that “the materials are available tering with other routine decisions about for instantaneous worldwide distribution which books and periodicals the library before any preventive measures can be would acquire for the benefit of its clients. effectively taken” (Universal City Studios v. The majority argued that the provision Corley, 2001: 457). of internet access did not create a desig- Despite its implications for First Amend- nated public forum because libraries did ment interests and concerns, this Court not introduce internet terminals to “create acted to defend copyright interests against a public forum for web publishers to what it came to see as a never-ending series express themselves, any more than it col- of technologically enabled threats. lects books in order to provide a public forum for the authors of books to speak” or to “encourage a diversity of views United States v. American from private speakers.” They agreed with Libraries Association: filtering Congress that the internet was “no more the public sphere than a technological extension of the The second case we have selected differs book stack” (U.S. v. ALA, 2003: 206–7). in critical ways from the other two because With regard to petitioner’s arguments its fundamental conflict over cyberspace about the lack of discretion over which

357 OSCAR H. GANDY, JR. AND KENNETH NEIL FARRALL websites would be blocked or screened out, proprietary criteria for blocking the majority focused on the rapidly evolving material are completely hidden from character of the internet, and the virtual public scrutiny. This is in no way impossibility of librarians making informed analogous to a decision by libraries decisions about which content to block. to acquire a book on Mark Twain What really mattered to the majority, rather than one on rap music, for however, was whether the use of block- example. It is, instead, analogous to ing software could be equated with other the scissoring by a government decisions that libraries made about their contractor of important articles from collections. The majority held that “a a magazine to which the library library’s decision to use filtering software subscribes and to which library is a collection decision, not a restraint on patrons expect full access. private speech” (U.S. v. ALA, 2003: 209). (APA, 2003: 3) In their dissents, Justices Souter and Ginsburg engaged the distinction between The majority appears to have been con- decisions about which materials to acquire, vinced, or at least supported by the and the blocking of content from all of metaphoric constructions included in the the library’s public terminals. Their rejection brief submitted by the state of Texas, and of equivalence is explicit and extensive: from a group of legislators who had sponsored the original legislation. At every significant point, however, As a counter to the criticism of the the internet blocking here defies imprecision of available filters, the legisla- comparison to the process of acqui- tive supporters of CIPA suggested that: sition. … deciding against buying a “The fundamental question presented, book means there is no book … but then, is whether public libraries, merely blocking the internet is merely by providing internet access, are con- blocking access purchased in its stitutionally required to relinquish all entirety … The proper analogy editorial discretion over what is permitted therefore is not to passing up a book in the library … simply because current that might have been bought; it is technology does not permit them to either to buying a book and then exclude such material with mathematical keeping it from adults lacking an precision” (Lott et al., 2003: 4). acceptable “purpose,” or to buying The court majority based its rejection an encyclopedia and then cutting of the public forum designation on an out pages with anything thought to assumption about the kinds of discretion be unsuitable for all adults. that librarians, like public broadcasters, (U.S. v. ALA, 2003: 236–7). have to exercise over what to acquire and make available to the public. The fact Although neither Souter nor Ginsburg that requiring librarians to delegate that credit any of the amici for the metaphors responsibility to third-party vendors of they use in their dissent, the core of their blocking software would have the same argument can be found in the brief effect apparently did not give the majority submitted by the American Publishers pause. The majority also rejected the Association: public forum designation because the internet, as a novel resource, could not be CIPA takes such decisions away equated with public parks and sidewalks from libraries and delegates them to because “the doctrines surrounding tradi- software filtering companies whose tional public forums may not be extended

358 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROPERTY IN CYBERSPACE to situations where such history is lack- network technology. The U.S. Supreme ing” (U.S. v. ALA, 2003: 206). Court rejected the decision of a lower court The majority also appeared concerned and created great uncertainty about the that there was some risk involved in their extent to which software distributors could application of the public forum doctrine be held liable for contributory infringement, to the internet so early in its develop- despite the fact that their network resources ment, because of the implications of such could be used for substantial and socially a doctrinal shift for future decisions. They important non-infringing uses (MGM v. expressed this concern early in the process Grokster, 2005). The case was seen as chal- through a series of pointed questions about lenging an earlier and more liberal doctrine other settings in which the public forum established by the Sony court (Sony v. designation might or might not be applied. Universal City, 1984). Without the benefit The response of the ALA’s representative, of the doubt previously granted to new while on point, was apparently not suffi- information technology by Sony, many cient to satisfy the court’s majority: saw the future for technological innovation as far more unsettled and uncertain. Well, Your Honor, if you allow the Of all the cases we examined, this Government to define its forum as intellectual property case drew the highest all content under the sun … ever level of involvement by friends of the invented by mankind except the court. Fifty-five amicus briefs were filed, piece that they don’t like, then I and the greatest proportion of these briefs submit that … will be the end of (47.2 percent) supported the respondents the public forum doctrine because (Grokster et al.) or the lower court’s there will never be any situation in favorable decision rejecting the charge of which the Government will be contributory infringement. constrained in any way to censor Briefs were presented by coalitions of out a particular piece of content … academics, representing a variety of dis- from the public forum. ciplines from intellectual property law to (Smith, 2003: 35–6) media studies and computer science. Briefs were also presented by coalitions of The metaphors and analogies that domi- authors, music publishers, broadcasters, nated the discussion in the U.S. v. ALA motion picture studios, as well as venture case were almost entirely internal, reflect- capitalists, and telecommunications service ing the views of internet users. Although firms. Public interest organizations on the there was some attention paid to the right and the left formed a loose coalition mechanics of blocking, the fact that this in support of the respondents, while the technology was proprietary served to limit U.S. government submitted a brief in discussion to the consequences, rather support of MGM. A coalition of 39 state than the details of its use, and the fact that governments, excluding California, also no one had “presented any clearly super- supported the copyright interests. They ior or better fitting alternative” (U.S. v. were joined by a group of high-profile ALA, 2003: 219). economists including Kenneth Arrow, Gary Becker, William Landes, and Steven Levitt who charged the lower courts with MGM v. Grokster: safe havens encouraging inefficiency in markets and the engineer’s crystal ball (Arrow et al., 2005: 7–8). This final case involved a set of decisions Information service providers used a with the potential to shape the future of variety of metaphors to describe the status

359 OSCAR H. GANDY, JR. AND KENNETH NEIL FARRALL of a market in which a cloud of uncer- But information stored digitally can be tainty hung over its participants. Where accessed only by copying it from stored advocates of free speech were likely to memory …”(Intel Corp., 2005: 22). In talk about the chilling effect of a court’s the oral arguments phase of the case, decision, investors and venture capitalists Grokster’s representative, Richard Taranto, tended to talk about the risky and dan- suggested that nearly every component of gerous environment for entrepreneurs. the infrastructure, and nearly every parti- Representatives of the copyright indus- cipant in the process of internet commu- tries offered similarly gloomy images of nication make digital copies. He concluded the economic landscape they would face that the challenge for the court was in the future without a favorable decision determining just “which pieces, if any, by the court. and under what standard, get singled out Grokster amici frequently challenged the for a judicially fashioned secondary copy- accuracy of the doomsday scenarios offered right liability doctrine” (Taranto, 2005: 36). by their opponents. In its brief, the The proposed tests that would deter- National Venture Capitalist Association mine whether a new technology was (NVCA) accused the entertainment indus- capable of substantial non-infringing uses try of “crying wolf for a century, ever came in for numerous pointed critiques. since John Philip Sousa claimed that the Intel suggested that the test would player piano spelled the end of music in “require an innovator to have a crystal America” (NVCA, 2005: 11). They sug- ball” because it would “require innovators gest that the industry is “like the drunk to anticipate often unforeseeable infring- searching for his key under the street ing uses to which their inventions … lamp because the light is there” when might be put” (Intel Corp., 2005: 16–17). they “focus their attacks on the inventors, The antidote to uncertainty among investors, and entrepreneurs who create innovators and entrepreneurs was thought the technologies that make the many acts to reside in the safe harbor that Sony, “the of infringement so easy to commit” rather ‘Magna Carta’ of the information technol- than on those who actually infringe ogy industry” had established (Intellectual (NVCA, 2005:14). Property Professors, 2005: 10). Although Because the Grokster case was so fun- the motion picture and copyright industry damentally concerned about the making petitioners argued for a revision of the of unauthorized copies, it was in the Sony safe harbor, with a standard more in interest of those seeking to avoid restric- line with that established by the Digital tions on the use peer-to-peer (P2P) tech- Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) nology to underscore the fact that digital (MGM Reply Brief, 2005: 12), the Court technology in general, and the internet in was not yet ready to take that step. particular functioned by making copies. Although Justices Ginsburg and Breyer They relied upon metaphors and analo- joined their colleagues in reversing the gies based on an external perspective in lower court’s decision on the basis of order to inform the court about how this evident criminal intent, they divided their technology actually worked. They argued colleagues with regard to the nature of that the current operation of the internet the evidence that there was, or could be could not be imagined without wide- substantial non-infringing usage of P2P spread copying. technology. Justices Breyer, Stevens, and The brief from the Intel Corporation O’Connor expressed support for the reminded the court that “to access infor- more forward looking meaning of “cap- mation from a book, one opens the book. able,” while the conservative majority

360 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROPERTY IN CYBERSPACE seemed ready to condemn the technology We observed greater consistency in the on the basis of its early troublesome use appellate courts when the contending (MGM v. Grokster, 2005). interests could be defined more clearly. The battle of good against evil set the copyright industry against pirates and those Conclusion who would assist them. In its defense of copyright interests, the Court of Appeals In 1997, the Supreme Court rejected the upheld a lower court’s decision to ban the Communications Decency Act as a ten- direct and indirect provision of software able solution of the problem of children that could be used to gain unauthorized gaining access to pornography (Reno v. access to commercial media content. ACLU, 1997) in part because its survival While there was considerable academic also depended upon compelling demon- interest surrounding the extent to which strations of awareness and intent on the computer software was speech, and part of likely defendants. More critically, therefore entitled to greater protection, the barriers to access that it would establish the courts’ decisions were primarily based threatened the future of cyberspace. Indeed, on the ways in which this speech actually the court expressed the belief that if the functioned in cyberspace. CDA were allowed to stand, they would The courts’ commitment to defending be doing more than “burning the house to copyright interests, however, would not roast the pig”; their inaction would threaten be well served by an emphasis on an to “torch a large segment of the internet engineer’s understanding of hypertext. community” (Reno v. ACLU, 1997: 882). Instead, the Court of Appeals focused on The internet was too new, and potentially the ways in which either users, or the too important to the emerging informa- content of interest to users, could be tion economy for the Court to allow it to transported around the globe well before be placed at risk in this way. the publishers or legitimate content dis- In 2003, however, the court approved tributors could act to defend their prop- the government’s alternative (CIPA), erty interests. In the Reimerdes case, the despite the obvious flaws in its technol- courts were little swayed by the efforts of ogy. They did so in part because of the amici to define the court’s ruling as identity and character of its behavioral imprecise, and a threat to the future of target: the nation’s public librarians. cyberspace. The court was willing to risk Despite charges of imprecision by amici weakening the central infrastructure of and dissenting justices, the majority global network in order to reinforce the offered a tortured definition of informed links in copyrights’ virtual fence. choice to justify the installation of a In the Grokster case, the determination technological fence. In claiming that a of the court to defend copyright interests decision to use filtering technology was a against the threat of cyberspace tech- collection decision, the court majority nology led them not only to overturn the engaged in strategic misdirection: first by decision of a lower court, but also to ignoring the fact that the use of filters was invite a frontal assault on established a requirement of funding, and a delega- precedent at the highest level. In one tion of decision-making to the providers sense, we might understand the driving of filtering software, and second, by lim- force behind the challenge to P2P tech- iting the definition of speech to expres- nology as an attempt to mine the safe sion, ignoring the public’s interest in harbor for innovators that Sony had access to information. provided.

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Rather than rejecting Sony directly, cyberspace. This is a problem desperately however, the Grokster court argued that in need of scholarly attention. the lower court misunderstood its meaning. Future courts will determine the meaning of Sony’s safe harbor unless a Guide to further reading revision of the DMCA by the legislature provides a more agreeable solution to the For those interested in further exploring conflict between the copyright industries the nature of metaphor and analogy from and the developers of cyberspace. a range of disciplinary perspectives, Ortony’s On the horizon, battles over the com- (1993) edited book is a good start. Within moditization of personal, especially trans- cognitive science, Fauconnier and Turner’s action-generated, information will be (2003) work on conceptual blending fought using some of the metaphors that offers a rigorous theoretical model that have been field tested in the cases we explains how the juxtaposition of dissimilar have reviewed in this chapter. More will concepts can generate powerful insights be required. and fuel the evolution of language. Given the role of the legal fiction of Blavin and Cohen (2002) provide a property in protecting personal privacy in useful chronological overview of three the course of U.S. history, it is still worth dominant internet metaphors: information attending to the concept of property in superhighway, internet as novel space the hopes of affecting some form of (cyberspace), and internet as real space. course correction within the courts. Work by Hunter (2003) and Lemley Approaches to privacy that construct it as (2003) provide important and oft-cited an ongoing process of boundary negotia- critiques of the use of spatial metaphors in tion rather than a stable condition or internet law, in particular how the cyber- social good to be conserved (Margulis, space as place metaphor and its applica- 2003) have not gained much traction tion to trespass to chattels doctrine has within political economy or surveillance enabled a second enclosure movement, a studies. At the same time as communica- period of expanding property interests tion and social practice increasingly shift that Heller (1988) has called an “anti- to the electronic, networked world, commons.” Benoliel (2005) takes a dif- people lose both the legal and physical ferent approach to the issue of space and affordances of privacy that have been property online, suggesting the construc- associated with real property. Yet, as tion of online locales as a legal fiction Balganesh (2006) has shown, the courts could more easily facilitate the translation have been reluctant to create any new of territorial privacy rights to the internet. doctrines of online territoriality that Cohen (2007) moves beyond the debates would extend the concept of real prop- about what cyberspace is, and instead erty and the private spaces it affords to the focuses on the social construction of the internet. term and the emergent, contested rela- It will not be easy to construct a new tionship between embodied space and language of the online boundary, yet we networked space. cannot ignore a growing sense that we Lessig’s (1999, 2001, 2004) series of have somehow lost our ability to negoti- books provides the most thorough intro- ate our personal boundaries. The resour- duction to the dangers of the copyright ces we once had, in particular the walls, regime and the increasing propertization windows, doors, and fences of our private and commoditization of information, in spaces, no longer hold sway, as it were, in particular its negative impact on creativity,

362 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROPERTY IN CYBERSPACE innovation, and culture. Benkler (2006) a metaphor, Zittrain’s (2006) new turn of offers a detailed picture of the emerging phrase, the “generative internet,” is rife structure of the “networked information with linguistic entailments that challenge economy” and demonstrates how its pro- well-established assumptions about the ductivity and value can and does flourish open architecture of the internet and its without proprietary rights in the infor- support for the production and diffusion mation it produces. While technically not of innovations.

363 26 Globalizing the logic of openness Open source software and the global governance of intellectual property

Christopher May

In an age of so-called global information abundance, disputes over intellectual property are central to politics. This chapter explores the tension and conflicts between openness and property in the realm of computer software. First, the context of global governance that underpins the making of knowledge and information into property is established as the global political economic background to this increasingly important issue. The chapter then sets out the impact these political structures have had on the realm of digital technologies and the internet. The discussion focuses on the development and utilization of free and open source software as a reaction to the attempts by information capitalists to control their (now digitized) knowledge assets through the deployment of digital rights management technologies. Although this conflict between openness and ownership is often depicted as taking place predominantly in North America and Europe (the developed areas of the global system), it is developing in much more important ways in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the developing world, where the fruits of the information revolution have yet to be fully enjoyed. The chapter concludes that the fight to establish open digital systems is central to the global political economy.

However one might view the claims management technologies. Although this about the arrival of the information age, it conﬂict between openness and ownership seems clear that more people than ever is often depicted as taking place pre- before are aware of the existence (and dominantly in North America and importance) of intellectual property rights Europe, its more profound impact can be (IPRs). In this chapter I seek to brieﬂy found in sub-Saharan Africa and else- establish the context of global governance where in the developing world. that underpins the making of knowledge More generally, I will suggest that the and information into property, and attempts at the beginning of this new explain the impact these political struc- millennium to continue or even expand tures have had on the realm of digital control over information through com- technologies and the internet. This leads moditization and digital rights manage- me to focus on the development and ment have engendered a political response utilization of free and open source soft- that we can call “openness.” While ware as a reaction to the attempts by IPRs are unlikely to wither away any information capitalists to control their time soon, a social balance is being knowledge assets through digital rights (re)established between property and

364 OPEN SOURCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY openness; these are not unconnected and to have something done to them, but separate realms, but rather encompass a rather the “right” to halt certain rights- range of political positions about how we infringing behavior by others. Intellectual should value and exchange knowledge property rights establish the right of and information, and the services and owners to halt the actions of others at a products dependent to a large part upon distance, even when such actions produce them. no actual loss to the social utility for owners. Infringements of IPRs can have a commercial impact, but this is not always The nature of intellectual obviously the case. While limitations on property rights use imposed by IPRs have always been constrained by the assertion of public The most important role of IPRs is in the benefits in most IPR legislation, the formal construction of scarcity—where remaining enforceable rights still have a none necessarily exists—in matters related significant effect on the freedom of action to knowledge and information use. of others. For example, there is a clear Unlike material things, knowledge and tension between the rights of AIDS information are not necessarily rivalrous. patients to receive life-extending treat- Coincidental usage does not detract from ment and the rights of multinational utility. With certain exceptions, such as pharmaceutical companies to receive the use of trademarks to identify makers financial rewards for the utilization of of goods, the deployment of knowledge their patents to produce those medicines and information resources by multiple when patients or their governments users does not reduce their usefulness, nor cannot afford the price demanded by does it diminish the quality or quantity of patent holders for their drugs. such resources. In this sense, usually Given that this is a state of affairs that knowledge, before it is made property, non-owners of intellectual property might does not exhibit the characteristics of resist, especially when this is related to material things before they are made vast differences in wealth, the developed property: knowledge is not naturally countries, who own and control most of scarce in the same way materially existing the world’s IPRs, have spent much dip- things are. Where there are information lomatic effort establishing a global gov- asymmetries, advantage may be gained by ernance regime to protect the rights of keeping information “scarce” (i.e., redu- the corporations domiciled in their coun- cing its circulation), but this seldom serves tries, on a global scale. Before turning to the wider social good. Thus, because it the impact of IPRs and the open alter- is difficult to extract a price for the use natives, I shall briefly introduce the intel- of non-rival knowledge goods, a legal lectual property governance regime that form of scarcity—intellectual property—is has been established in the last decades. introduced. Although predicated on the notion of individual creators’ and innovators’ rights, The global governance of most IPRs are owned and exploited not intellectual property by innovating individuals but by commercial enterprises. Moreover, many of Since 1995, IPRs have been subject to the rights intellectual property is intended the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual to establish are not the freedoms for an Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement individual owner to do something or not overseen by the World Trade Organization

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(WTO). The agreement represents an governance of IPRs. This treatment undertaking by members of the WTO to ensures that any agreement in favor of a uphold certain minimum standards of specific country must be extended to all protection for IPRs and to provide legal other trading partners. Previously, under mechanisms for their enforcement. To be the auspices of WIPO, a diverse group of clear: the TRIPs agreement is not a conventions with different sets of signa- model law that must be adopted by tories shaped the international relations of national legislation, nor an international intellectual property, alongside a complex law that directly enforces IPRs; rather it pattern of bilateral treaties. Now, under requires that national legislation must TRIPs, and due to MFN, all under- produce the enforcement effects that the takings apply to all members of the agreement sets out. However, and most WTO. Furthermore, favoritism accorded importantly, the WTO’s stringent dis- domestic inventors or prospective owners pute-settlement mechanism encompasses of IPRs relative to non-nationals is halted; international disputes about IPRs, and can national treatment (article 3 of TRIPs) be used to ensure national laws do bring stipulates that foreign individuals and about the effects required. Prior to 1995, companies must be treated no worse than there were longstanding multilateral trea- domestic companies. This is an important ties for the international recognition and shift as many national IPR systems had protection of IPRs, overseen by the previously favored domestic “owners” World Intellectual Property Organization either through legislative or procedural (WIPO) (May and Sell, 2005; May, means. 2007). However, the governments of the Overall the TRIPs agreement facilitates U.S. and various members of the EU, as a significant international extension of the well as many multinational corporations rights of the owners of intellectual prop- (MNCs) based in these countries, regar- erty. Although the TRIPs agreement is a ded these agreements as toothless in the complex and wide-ranging multilateral face of “piracy” and infringement. This instrument, here I shall only focus on prompted a number of MNCs to play a aspects of the governance of IPRs that are major role in the negotiations that resul- related to computer software, as this has a ted in the inclusion of the TRIPs agree- direct relevance to the political economy ment within the structure of the WTO of the internet and the expansion of (Sell, 2003: 96–120). These companies “openness” as a political movement being therefore had a significant impact on the discussed here. rights supported by the TRIPs agreement, Despite calls for a “new world infor- and it is no surprise that the TRIPs mation and communication order” in the agreement’s conception of information (as 1980s, during the Uruguay Round of noted in the title of the agreement itself) multilateral trade negotiations the full is “trade related.” potential of the internet had not yet been The TRIPs agreement builds on prin- fully appreciated. While this round of ciples that are central to the WTO: negotiations, concluding in 1994 with an national treatment; most-favored nation agreement to establish the WTO, did (MFN) treatment; and reciprocity. Although establish a number of mechanisms that reciprocity does little to change the intel- developing countries could deploy to lectual property regime (due to a long counter the domination and economic history of bilateral arrangements), the power of the richest countries in global introduction of MFN (under article 4 of markets, this shift was notably absent in TRIPs) has transformed the international intellectual property, especially as related

366 OPEN SOURCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY to digital technologies (May and Sell, limitation of the protection for software 2005: chapter seven). Indeed, for many under TRIPs to copyright, and software national negotiating teams the issue of ideas, procedures, or methods of opera- intellectual property was seen more as an tion and mathematical concepts were item for horse-trading and bargaining in excluded from the agreement (Sell, 2003: the overall trade negotiation rather than 114). Thus, the TRIPs agreement exten- anything that would have an immediate ded international copyright protection to impact on a country’s ability to access and cover software, as the U.S. Congress had use technologies to pursue both develop- similarly extended the scope of U.S. ment and social welfare. However, since copyright 15 years earlier. the establishment of the WTO, with Under article 10.1 of the TRIPs TRIPs as one of the key elements of the agreement “Computer programs, whether “single undertaking” required by all in source code or object code shall be members in the wake of the final settle- protected as literary works under the ment of the Uruguay Round, the control Berne Convention (1971).” The question of software through IPRs has become a of patents for software was left unsettled, much more evident concern for develop- although more recent discussions at the ing countries seeking to utilize new WIPO suggest that, if achieved, the information and communications tech- Substantive Patent Law Treaty is likely nologies, and for those in the developed to include protection for software. countries who reject the commoditization Nevertheless, by protecting software of software and information or knowledge under copyright, its form (as language) more generally. was given precedence over its use as a Like other elements of the TRIPs tool. This afforded it the longest protec- agreement, the spur towards a multilateral tion period possible and removed the governance settlement for the protection registration procedure required for proof IPRs in software was initiated by U.S. tection. Conversely, the advantage of corporations. In 1980 the U.S. Congress patents is that the function of software is passed the Copyright Act that defined protected, even if the actual code has software programs as literary works, and been modified sufficiently to avoid copy- protected them through copyright, right infringement. However, while there including operating systems, their object, may be industry pressures to recognize and source code. This entrenched a view software patents in specific jurisdictions, of software as an individualized creative and software patents have been established process (amenable to commoditization), in the U.S. and elsewhere, this is not and willfully ignored the collective pro- currently required by any countries’ multi- cesses of software development that until lateral commitments at the global level. then had been prevalent in the industry Thus, in the last decade the international (Halbert, 1999: 52–4). The difficulty of market for software has enjoyed the fitting software into traditional modes of increasingly robust protection available copyright subsequently suggested to some through copyright. As countries have companies that patent protection might become TRIPs-compliant, so the ability better serve their needs. Thus, in the new of software companies to protect their millennium there have been a number of IPRs internationally has been enhanced. attempts to secure patents for specific This may not go as far as many corpora- software tools. However, at the time of tions would like, but the market for soft- the Uruguay Round negotiations, the ware is one that is now largely patterned Japanese government managed to secure a by IPRs.

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This protection has been further Corporation included a “rootkit” on enhanced by the development of techni- some of their commercial CDs. Once cal means of protection or digital rights loaded onto a computer to be played, this management (DRM) to enforce copy- installed software onto the users machine right. The legal position of these new allowing Sony or their agents unfettered protection technologies was not firmly access to the hard disc, via the internet, to mandated by the TRIPs agreement, there- monitor usage for illegal activity. This was fore in 1996 the WIPO adopted the widely condemned as a DRM-initiated WIPO Copyright Treaty. This introduced security risk and an invasion of privacy. the anti-circumvention principle for DRM Software that prohibits certain functions, into the multilateral governance of IPRs. such as copying, or amending files in e- Recognizing that technological fixes are book readers, again is driven by the logic seldom permanent, the Treaty sought to and practices of DRM, as in a more establish a legal layer of protection for reactive way are click-through licenses these technologies’ digital mechanisms. that require you to agree to terms and This legal innovation subsequently was conditions that are both extensive (includ- enacted in the U.S. Digital Millennium ing your acceptance of the vendor’s Copyright Act (DMCA) and the EU complete denial of any liability for pro- Copyright Directive. Both sets of legisla- blems with their software) and opaque. tion, among other things, made the Perhaps most obviously in the realm of avoidance of these technical limitations digital music players, DRM ensures that (“circumvention”) illegal. Ironically, while downloads from one vendor (such as these laws recognize that there may be a iTunes) will only play on certain MP3 “fair use” or “fair dealing” justification for players, ensuring you are locked in to a access to encoded information, to gain certain company’s technology (although legal access without authorization is rendered at the time of writing, resistance to this impossible by the complete prohibition lack of interoperability, has prompted on any modification of the technological Apple to remove DRM from some controls of DRM programs. This expan- iTunes music files). ded legal protection underpins the effec- The early history of DRM in the soft- tiveness of DRM systems, and embodies ware sector was a period of experimenta- the clash of values that is the focus of the tion, with successive software limitations rest of this chapter. being “hacked,” and broken by those who wished to retain some flexibility of use, or who relished the challenge of Intellectual property and cracking the software. More recently, the digital technologies continuing deployment of DRM in software has prompted not only complaint, In recent years DRM has been exten- critique and hacking, but also long-running sively deployed in the realm of software, legal “resistance” in the form of a turn to digital entertainment products, and digi- open-source and free software, and open tally stored information goods of all kinds. access to information. DRM is now When your computer refuses to install a politicized. specific piece of software until you have Although, computing itself has a long downloaded the most recent version of and often-told history (Ceruzzi,1997; Microsoft Explorer, this is DRM at Winston, 1998), this need not detain us work. The most notorious recent exam- here. The story presents the information ple of DRM came in 2005, when Sony society as partly the result of individual

368 OPEN SOURCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY efforts to free computing from the dom- both limit and reveal user activities and ination of the mainframe, and partly the practices, enabling software providers to fulfilling of computing’s characteristic discriminate between various users, for destiny as an individualized technological instance through single user and multiple tool; a narrative of individual freedom, users site licenses. While many economists against which (intellectual property may celebrate this ability to run more owning) corporations have continually accurately priced parallel markets, for had to struggle in their need to “own” users there is a considerable cost in the their important digital assets. realms of privacy and control, costs that The establishment of a non-technical, are borne not by the companies that non-specialist market for software was benefit from price discrimination but largely driven by IBM’s development of by the subjects of surveillance and the the PC, the advance of Microsoft, and the limitations on use. dominance of the Windows operating Partly because the potential for this system by the late 1980s. Given the control and surveillance was obvious to growing ease of copying complex com- some from the start, the early stages of the puter files, even by technically unsophis- commercialization of software prompted ticated users, once large companies began the first moves towards an alternative: to see the profit potential from a mass open source working and the campaign market in software, the need to protect for free software. The non-proprietary products from unauthorized duplication model of software development shaped became a key strand of research and the early, non-commercial period of development. Indeed, as the effort to computer development, during which create software has always far outweighed computing source code was routinely the effort required to copy it, this issue shared, and development work col- arose almost from the beginning of the laborative and essentially “unowned.” software industry, as a separate sector. However, after the U.S. Department of Contemporary forms of DRM con- Justice prosecuted IBM for anti-trust vio- strain users of PCs and other devices and lations in the 1970s, software and hard- may also adversely affect the security of ware provision was split, prompting the their hardware. Digital rights management development of a separate software systems in software can deny or at least industry, which sought to “own” code as constrain interoperability. This control a means of profiting from it. As a response allows market segmentation and price to the widening scope of this model discrimination, because DRM can easily of “ownership,” Richard Stallman and halt the emergence of secondary markets others established the Free Software for protected products. Although histori- Foundation to support a positive and cally copyright has included a “first-sale” explicit movement to keep software free doctrine that has allowed a vibrant second- from ownership. hand market to emerge alongside the market Stallman, with some legal advice, then for new items, in software this is constrained produced what he regards as his “greatest by license conditions, sellers’ DRM restric- hack”; the GNU General Public License tions on the hardware on which software (GPL) sometimes referred to as “copyleft” will run, and the rapid product cycles for (reproduced in Annex 1 of UNCTAD upgrades that are characteristic of the 2003). The GPL permits the user to run, information technology industry. copy, or modify a software program’s Increasingly the use of surveillance sys- source code, and if they so wish, to tems within DRM allows suppliers to distribute versions of the program.

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However, it does not allow them to add However, while this is certainly an rights-related restrictions of their own. interesting and important development, Often termed the “viral clause” of the perhaps the greatest impact of openness GPL, the license compels subsequent will be not in the developed countries, programs utilizing aspects of GPL licensed whose entry into the information age has software to be fully compatible with the been relatively unproblematic, but rather GPL. Crucially the license utilizes copy- in the developing countries, where wealth right law to ensure it is both included in effects can severely inhibit access to any derivative works as well as ensuring informational goods and services. It is in the GPL itself remains unchanged; to sub-Saharan Africa especially where we change the license terms included in the can see both the appeal and utility of software is to violate the copyright of the openness for those who are disadvantaged software and invite prosecution. While in the information society. It is also where this guarantees that GPL-protected pro- we can see the strength of the campaign grams are never commoditized, it has also by corporations to maintain ownership of undermined the development of hybrid their resources, despite the high social free/proprietary software tools. costs. Here, the tipping of the long-term While there are philosophical differ- balance between private rights and public ences between the “free software” and goods, in favor of the former is clear and “open source” software movements, both its effects difficult to dismiss. are based on what I term a “logic of openness.” The use of the term “free and open source software” (FOSS) tries to Making a difference: open paper over these differences to allow source software in Africa those interested in promoting free software and open source software, to focus Across sub-Saharan Africa the ability to on the key joint endeavor: the establish- take advantage of any sort of computing is ment of a logic of openness as the defin- unevenly distributed on the basis of ing practice of the information society; a wealth and education but the continuing practical and often formally articulated spread of community computing centers, critique of the controlling logic of IPR alongside access via mobile telephony, has enforcement in digital goods and services. ensured that while still uneven, con- The appeal of the open approach is nectivity is no longer clustered over- perhaps best exemplified by the success whelmingly in a few major urban of the Firefox web browser. After centers. The character of the internet, the dismemberment of Netscape and however, allows owners of operating sys- the “triumph” of Internet Explorer, the tems and other key software protected by developers of Netscape, though now dis- proprietary rights to enjoy monopoly persed across various other computer rents when these technologies become companies, kept developing their browser industry standards. As the domination of and released an open source version computer operating systems by Microsoft (Firefox) that has recently become the demonstrates, the considerable network main threat to Internet Explorer, gaining effects of a communications infrastructure market share as more and more people have allowed a near monopoly to be become disenchanted with the Microsoft established in some software products. product (and indeed forcing Microsoft to Moreover, the trade in software in sub- copy some of Firefox’s innovations in the Saharan Africa can be easily characterized latest version of its web browser). as rent-taking by owners who have already

370 OPEN SOURCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY fully recovered their costs of development Ironically, the European Commission has and made significant profits in developed funded research, published in 2007, that country markets. noted the savings for organizations in the Across Africa, the policy problem of public and private sectors of switching to intellectual property has so far been side- open software based products (BBC News stepped due to the easy availability of Online, 2007), and it is becoming clear pirated software in urban centers. The that this switch to openness need not savings from piracy, of course, remain merely be a minority pursuit. Unlike the dwarfed by the vast financial transfers developed countries where there is established by the current IPR system already a vast base of Windows-installed from consumers on the continent to pre- machines (with billions of stored files), dominantly U.S. software corporations. across sub-Saharan Africa, and other areas And considerable political pressure is being of the majority world, PCs and other brought to bear, both bilaterally and digital devices are only now starting to be through the WTO, for countries to deployed in growing numbers: for many properly enforce the rights mandated by users the choice between FOSS and pro- the TRIPs agreement, as a means of prietary products remains very much a curtailing piracy. Mass participation by genuine one, still largely unencumbered Africans in the global information society by issues of backwards compatibility. remains far in the future in the context of This is why both proprietary companies this policy regime. and FOSS developers are trying to cap- Under previous national legislation the ture the next generation of users, and as high social costs of IPRs have usually more users come online across the African prompted recourse to some form of “fair continent so their choices over the pro- use” provision, according to which copy- grams they use will become crucial to right is ignored in specific circumstances African countries’ domestic software sec- that served a wider social good. However, tors. Recognizing that its use can play a such strategies have been severely con- “key role to extend and disseminate strained under the TRIPs agreement, and human knowledge” UNESCO’s support in any case the move to DRM limits by for FOSS includes an extensive website technological means any unauthorized that provides access to information about distribution. Furthermore when the source FOSS, access to developer tools or soft- code of software is protected, reverse ware, and extensive background materials. engineering of specific programs for local UNESCO has also worked with the modification is inhibited by TRIPs-com- New Zealand Digital Library Project and pliant law. This further restrains develop- Human Info from Antwerp to develop the ment as reverse engineering in the past Greenstone Digital Library software allowed local innovators to improve off- package that enables the development of the-shelf technologies to reflect local open source digital libraries of scientific, conditions, and by doing so familiarize educational, and cultural resources pre- themselves with these new technologies. dicated on open access and public domain Not only are the tools that are central information. The Regional Information to “informational development” expensive, Society Network for Africa, responsible previous methods for taking advantage of for aiding the migration to low-cost them are being withdrawn under immense FOSS hardware and software by public political pressure from the U.S. and the sector and civil society organizations, is EU to maintain the developed world’s also supported by UNESCO (Barry and competitive advantage (Wade, 2002). Dauphin, 2003).

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There are many practical advantages to have begun to promote the use of FOSS the utilization of FOSS in developing products to establish greater technological countries (not least of all substantial long- independence. Many national and regio- term cost savings) but here I will briefly nal governments are at various stages of focus on the wider political implications establishing a major role for FOSS in the of this move to openness. public sector. Policy-makers have become The clearest political advantage of concerned about ceding too much con- FOSS for developing countries is the trol over their central communicative potential to establish independent national functions to a single (foreign) software capacity in one of the key strategic supplier. As Peruvian Congressman Edgar technologies of today. Indeed, for some Villanueva stressed in a widely publicized commentators the adoption of FOSS exchange of letters with Microsoft Peru (specifically LINUX) is a counter- in 2002: “to guarantee free access by citi- hegemonic strategy against the domination zens to public information, it is indis- of the Microsoft based mode of establish- pensable that the encoding and processing ing information society linked develop- of data not be tied to any single provi- ment (e.g., Sum, 2003). Late entrants face der … the usability and maintenance of significant challenges, as they do in all software should not depend on the industrial sectors, but FOSS offers a strat- goodwill of suppliers or on conditions egy for side-stepping the most significant imposed by them in a monopoly market” monopoly in the sector, the domination (quoted in UNCTAD, 2003: 111). This of operating systems by Microsoft Windows. issue has also been recognized in Europe, Certainly the software industry remains where a number of governments cur- remarkably concentrated, dominated by rently either utilize or are investigating the developed countries’ companies, but open source solutions to particular compu- as the recent emergence of both Indian ter projects, having become increasingly and Chinese software development sec- disenchanted with expensive proprietary tors has amply demonstrated this is not contracts. necessarily fixed. Although one should A significant difficulty is that the costs not underestimate the locational path of switching once expertise has been dependency in software development and gained and files generated and archived deployment—Silicon Valley remains a are high, and may deter even those who major center of software development assume that FOSS programs are superior. after all—neither are the opportunities for This has been compounded in the past by breaking into these markets as narrow as development agencies configuring ten- Microsoft’s domination of operating systems dering requests for aid project contracts might suggest. around proprietary software. The ability As internet usage expands across the to access sought-after funds and support continent, the promotion of FOSS could has often required the adoption of specific be utilized as an infant industry support software platforms for the convenience of strategy for informational and digital ser- the donor/supporting agency. Many non- vices. The danger is that this may also governmental organizations (NGOs) and ghettoize African software companies, if other agencies seem unaware, or do not export markets do not also shift significantly prioritize, developments in computing to FOSS programs. However, govern- and software. Equally, as developers in ments across the developing world that Africa admit, the FOSS community has are suspicious of the involvement of U.S. been slow to bridge this gap (Bridges, companies in public sector procurement 2004: 10–12). As in many ways the

372 OPEN SOURCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY underlying political perspectives of many internet. If it can, this may produce new NGOs fit quite snugly with the social markets for software in developed coun- developmental aims at the center of the tries for companies based in Africa FOSS movement there is at least sig- offering FOSS-based programs. Utilizing nificant potential for collaboration. Indeed FOSS could enable developing countries the celebration of openness and access to establish new forms of valuable exper- would seem already to figure quite widely tise, while at the same time freeing in NGO campaigns, although the link themselves (at least partly) from depen- with the enforcement of IPRs is most dence on the developed countries for often made in the realm of AIDS medi- information and digital manufacturing cines and biotechnology. and services. This can be achieved while If the TRIPs agreement has often been complying with their multilateral com- a mechanism for consolidating the grip of mitments under the TRIPs agreement. companies in developed countries on high technology markets, a developmental strategy that stresses FOSS programs may Bounded openness be more suitable for countries that are technological “followers.” This has the The developments noted above and else- clear advantage of allowing countries in where in the majority world, where sub-Saharan Africa to fully comply with participation in the information society is their multilateral obligations under TRIPs, patterned by wealth effects, are paralleled while also supporting the development of by developments in the U.S. and Europe, a potentially competitive industry in one where a similar desire to sidestep proprie- of the key technologies of this new cen- tary software and other limitations on tury. Thus, if African countries can enhance openness has become a growing response their software development communities, to the attempts to maintain and expand and specifically the scope of FOSS-related control over digitized informational con- skills in the labor force, then they will also tent and tools. Eric von Hippel has have started to develop sales opportunities detected a move to openness across many for customized software to these and other sectors through what he terms the demo- potential users (UNCTAD, 2003: 120). cratization of innovation. This encom- That non-U.S., non-EU software com- passes developer-led openness of the sort panies can become globally competitive typified by open software, and aspects of has already been adequately demonstrated customer-generated innovation and adap- by the software sector based in Bangalore, tation, which is then commercialized India. At the same time, the relative pre- by companies. As von Hippel points out ponderance of mobile telephony in sub- this notion of unorganized innovation Saharan Africa has undermined Microsoft’s requires a shift from a property logic in potential desktop domination, with many knowledge and information to an open, new hand-held devices from Symbian and or commons, logic, where exclusion is Palm to Nicholas Negroponte’s “100 not the default position (von Hippel, dollar laptop” all already running, or 2005: 112–15). potentially able to run, non-proprietary While von Hippel’s observations are software. important, openness is not merely about The central issue is whether a critical commercial activity. One of the key areas mass of FOSS users can be established that where the logic of openness has become will act as an alternative gravitational pole prominent is in the access to, and dis- for users about to enter the world of the tribution of, knowledge and information.

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Here, openness maps on to the desire to of guidance, of some more able to control establish open access, which itself has content than others. become a major project both within the What might be termed “bounded university (and science) sector (Jacobs, openness” indicates that the project of 2006; May, 2005) and more widely with openness itself cannot be a totalizing the current A2K (access to knowledge) demand, but rather a recognition that in campaign, which seeks to link a wide many cases, openness may have some range of concerns about the commoditi- clear social benefits that need to be zation of information. This campaign accorded weight in the face of the con- attempts to draw together the political trolling logic of IPRs. This bounded momentum discussed in the previous openness implies, as Sandra Braman has section, and the high-profile campaign forcefully argued, that the erosion of the around the wealth effects of IPRs in the ownership of knowledge may also bring health sector (most obviously, but not with it the parallel erosion of confidence exclusively, related to AIDS medicines), in the information accessed (Braman, and link these campaigns to others around 2006). This suggests that other forms of open science (and access to scientific authority will need to be established research), as well as demands to limit the within the open realm to substitute for effects of DRM and expand the “knowl- the authority that flows from defined edge commons.” This movement reflects ownership. Here the strategy of peer a logic of openness that also finds its production of relevance and accreditation expression in the increasing popularity of information, perhaps best exemplified by weblog publishing and other open digital Web 2.0 ranking systems such as Digg, or initiatives of which one of the best known Google’s more mechanical PageRank has been the development of Wikipedia. algorithm that identifies how many other Wikipedia, while overseen by a group pages link to relevant pages thrown up by of editors led by the project’s founder searches to establish a rank, may offer one Jimmy Wales, remains a collective endea- path out of this dilemma (Benkler, 2006: vor, mostly open to all willing to con- 76–7). In other words, a key challenge for tribute and share (Benkler, 2006: 70–4). the openness movement is to find ways of To be sure openness here (as with the delivering the quality-related quick and role of Linus Torvalds in the LINUX ready assessments that previously were community—see Moody, 2001) does not delivered via proprietary modes of estab- indicate an absence of controlling author- lishing information and knowledge. ity. Rather, the editorial intent at the Wikipedia is to maintain an open resource, which sometimes (due most often to Conclusion ideologically driven “vandalism” of contentious pages) requires absolute openness As the above indicates, rather than an to be (perhaps temporarily) constrained. either/or proposition, we can see a more Thus, here the advantage of openness is fluid set of possibilities, reflecting prag- balanced by the disadvantage of assuming matic choices between property and open- that collective contributions will be in ness, within the socio-economic relations good faith. Certainly, multiple and con- of the global information society (Carlaw tinuing peer scrutiny may strip out many et al., 2006). Openness can act as a coun- invasive and ill-meant contributions, but tervailing force, balancing the more out- the logic of openness, at its limits, sits landish and excessive claims to property uncomfortably with the idea of a hierarchy rights. The key to developing something

374 OPEN SOURCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY that resembles the early positive ideas of commoditization that currently dominates the information society, and thus reigns in innovation and knowledge creation. the more pernicious aspects of a rampant information capitalism, may be the conjunction of ownership and “openness” in Guide to further reading an ongoing dialectical relationship, each modifying and depending on the other. Much has been written about the rise of This recognizes both the continuing open source software. The majority of strength of the dominant regime of IPRs, this literature is quite populist. The best as well as understanding the challenge of these popular treatments is Moody represented by openness; the dialectic (2001). For a more recent and more between these two poles may be volatile detailed social scientific analysis either and subject to political challenge and Weber (2004) or Benkler (2006) can be contest, but this in itself may be its main recommended. Neither of these books appeal. A continual (re)balancing, seen as deals with the technical side in any great a process, and not as an end, allows shifts detail but both attempt, utilizing different in social needs and interests to be articu- methodologies, to explain its appeal and lated and mediated. This is preferable to sustainability. Jacobs (2006) is a good the domination of the “one-size-fits-all” place to start if you are seeking to explore logic of IPRs, but also reflects the histor- the technical issues that surround the ical development of the limitations to the move to digital openness. For those seek- rights accorded intellectual property owners. ing accounts that develop a more political Although earlier commentary on the argument von Hippel (2005) offers a view internet and its possibilities tended to of open innovation from the perspective assume that there was some sort of tech- of business, while Halbert (2005), Perelman nological inevitability that would free (2002), and Strangelove (2005) seek to information from the shackles of prop- place the free software and open source erty, the last decade has demonstrated that software movements in a political context the protection and expansion of the of resistance. Here, the anti-capitalist information commons is a political pro- potential is emphasized in direct contrast ject requiring extensive agency. to von Hippel’s more pragmatic perspec- The supporters of openness are going tive. For those wishing to place intellec- to have a fight on their hands. Indeed, tual property in a much longer historical openness is the contemporary manifesta- context, my book with Susan Sell (May tion of a historical tendency within the and Sell, 2005) attempts to establish a political economy of intellectual property two-and-a-half millennia history behind for resistance to emerge when the privi- the contemporary battles to make knowl- leges and rights claimed by owners inflict edge and information into property, while onerous and unacceptable costs and duties Winston (1998) offers a longer history of on non-owners (May and Sell, 2005). digital technologies than is normally The notion of sharing rather than owning, found. Lastly, for a guide to up-to-date of open access rather than digital control, arguments about the open source com- has nonetheless begun to establish a social munity, there is no better place to start presence. This suggests, at the very least, than Wikipedia, an artifact of openness that it will offer a clear alternative to the itself.

375 27 Exclusionary rules? The politics of protocols

Greg Elmer

Is internet governance an oxymoron? What are the political implications of internet software standards, and how are such software settings used for political ends? Obviously there are political interests when it comes to engineering decisions and standards setting for internet infrastructure. But even after those decisions are made, not only do ideological perspectives appear in internet content, but these perspectives continue to influence design decisions that effect who can see which content, when. This chapter looks at internet protocols as distinct political artifacts, tools in effect that political actors use to supplement their more traditional communication strategies. The chapter makes particular reference to the Bush White House’s use of the robots.txt commands, a technique for excluding website content from search engine databases. The chapter subsequently tracks the emergence of the proposed robots.txt protocol as an instance of informal internet governance and regulation to its integration into software offered by search engine giant Google. In the last instance, the chapter highlights how adoption of internet protocols, with little to no public debate or scrutiny, can impact upon access to public information and harness the work of internet users for the benefit of information aggregators like Google.

The international network of computers particular form of techno-governmentality. has posed a series of challenges to legisla- In part because of the rapid development tors worldwide.1 Attempts to regulate, and deployment of the internet—histori- censor, and otherwise police the internet cally speaking—the network’s standards face complex decentered and distributed continue to be overseen by a set of engi- architectures that often present multiple neers and computer scientists who first opportunities for unregulated commu- initiated its common protocols, namely nication and networking. The internet is, TCP/IP.2 What results is a complex mix however, not without its historical and of self-regulatory ethics defined by uni- technological forms of governance, and versity researchers, research and develop- since its days as a wing of the U.S. mili- ment (R&D) departments from the new tary (ARPANET) it continues to be media sector, and public sector policy- defined and refined. This chapter is thus makers—many of whom routinely move concerned with the set of technological in and out of these three spheres. rules, standards, and protocols that pro- While much has been written about vide for common functions and software new regulatory bodies charged with platforms on the internet. This digital overseeing the global governance of the commons is distinct, however, in its internet (Kahin and Keller, 1997; Mueller,

376 THE POLITICS OF PROTOCOLS

2002), in addition to the controversies commands. The chapter then focuses on that such bodies have of late been adjudi- the broader public articulation and ratio- cating (internet addresses, standards, reg- nale of robots.txt commands made in ulations, and protocols) (Pare, 2003; response to a political controversy. Latour Galloway, 2004), studies of the internet’s (2005) makes a compelling argument that distinct technological forms of govern- studies of social systems should begin by mentality (in and through code) remain “feeding off controversies” in an effort to underdeveloped. To limit our under- locate its central actors, and discursive standing of internet governance to such characteristics, formats, reach, and inten- institutions as the Internet Society, the sity, in lieu of assuming a priori the Internet Engineering Task Force, or the legitimacy and centrality of traditional World Wide Web Consortium (W3), political institutions. Since the internet is would significantly downplay the syner- such a dispersed, content rich environ- gistic forces that have come to produce ment, however, we see in the example of other internet conventions that similarly robots.txt commands that information attempt to regulate practices of internet controversies often erupt at the very connectivity and networking. This chap- highest level, for the simple fact that they ter focuses on one such convention, expose contradictions in traditional, hier- robots.txt exclusion commands, to outline archical centers of government. Information the contours of internet governmentality controversies are made more broadly on the peripheries of the regulatory bodies. public (to less “wired” worlds), in other Exclusion commands offer both famil- words, as mass mediated controversies. iar yet unique perspectives on debates Furthermore, information controversies, over internet governance and politics. To as we shall see, are also often articulated as start, the commands are meant to exclude political controversies, particularly on the web content from internet search engines, web where libertarian ethics still prevail in a practice that raises questions about certain circles. security, censorship, and the representa- We therefore begin by mapping the tiveness of search engine databases—all political controversy that erupted on the issues that have been dealt with at length internet over the White House’s use of by the aforementioned bodies. Robots.txt robots.txt exclusion commands to report- commands were also, at one time, subject edly keep content related to Iraq from to review by the Internet Society, though being included in search engine databases. to date the convention has not been The controversy refutes the fallacy that adopted as a formal protocol by the data cleaning and formatting are simply Engineering Taskforce. The point being attempts at making information retrieval of course that the exclusion commands more relevant, useful, and aesthetically serve a governmental role without having pleasing. Rather, the chapter argues that been formally recognized as such through robots.txt commands serve to expand the internet’s governmental bodies. proprietary spaces and ideologies of the This chapter begins with a historical web, even where no explicit forms of and technical overview of robots.txt security—or password protected domains— commands, making note of its relation- exist. ship to industry insiders/engineers, the The remainder of the chapter focuses protocol governance process through the on Google, both as governmental archive Internet Society, and most importantly and self-regulatory space. Earlier in the the rather banal language used to frame chapteritisnotedthattheshearpaucityof the need for—and functionality of—such public information on robots.txt exclusion

377 GREG ELMER commands has amplified the monopolistic about the exclusion policy and the manner tendencies of Google’s ranking of infor- in which it would in effect exclude search mation on this topic. The “inventor” of engine robots from archiving content and robots.txt commands dominates the top- hyperlink architectures of websites, can be ranked Google pages on the topic. traced back to June 1994. Moreover, in addition to centralizing and By December of 1996 Koster had amplifying the language of the informal developed a draft policy on robot exclu- protocol’s inventor, Google has also sion for consideration by the Network sought to develop new tools to yet again Working Group, a committee of the highlight the unruly and unmanageable Internet Engineering Taskforce. To date robots.txt commands and files. The chap- the draft remains the most comprehensive ter concludes with a discussion of how technical document in broad circulation Google’s own web management systems (Koster, 1997). For reasons unknown, and software have incorporated the robot Koster’s proposal was not adopted by the exclusion convention in an effort to group as an official standard. The docu- increasingly standardize—and make ment provides a number of rationales for search-engine ready—the formatting of the development of a standard and a web content via web management tools. shared technique for restricting access of web content—and in effect limiting the scope and reach of search engines. Koster Commanding a standard (1996) offers four reasons why webmasters may want to respect access to The robots.txt exclusion command is an their site. Koster’s language implies a informal internet rule or convention that sense of privacy and proprietorial interest, attempts to restrict search engine robots but in general makes few clear statements from crawling and archiving specific files about the transparency, control, or pub- on a website. The robot exclusion com- licity of the net in general. Rather in mand was discussed in parallel with the clinical language he writes: “Robots are deployment of the first automated search often used for maintenance and indexing engine indexing robots and the web purposes, by people other than the browser. Like many protocols and stan- administrators of the site being visited. In dards developed for implementation on some cases such visits may have undesired the internet and the web, discussions effects which the administrators would about limiting the reach of web robots like to prevent, such as indexing of an was conducted in informal online com- unannounced site, traversal of parts of the munities that worked in large part by site which require vast resources of the consensus, itself a metaphor—if not a server recursive traversal of an infinite model—for internet governmentality. URL space, etc.” Much of the documentation on robot Koster’s website of robots—which exclusion protocols has been compiled by includes extensive information on robots. Martijn Koster, a former employee of the txt exclusion scripts, history, and advice— early search engine company Webcrawler is, consequently, like much of the tech- (owned by America Online). Koster nical literature on the topic, decidedly developed robot exclusion policies in vague. In a brief description of the use of conjunction with a dozen or more robot exclusion, for instance, Koster’s site researchers housed at computer science notes that, “Sometimes people find they faculties at major American, British, Dutch, have been indexed by an indexing robot, and German universities.3 Early discussions or that a resource discovery robot has

378 THE POLITICS OF PROTOCOLS visited part of a site that for some reason in other words, would later be explained shouldn’t be visited by robots.”4 Like as an innocuous piece of code that merely much of the internet’s governance and gave individuals some control over what history for that matter, the robots.txt to publish on the web and other banal protocol offers a seemingly innocuous forms of digital housekeeping. technical rule, developed by engineers, In October 2003, with the United that offered few if any hints or discussions States slipping further into political crisis about their possible implication for the with an increasingly unpopular war in broader circulation and accessibility of Iraq, bloggers and then mainstream media information on the web. Indeed, while began to report that the White House Koster’s work and robots.txt information had been using the robot exclusion tags site still tops Google’s ranking of resources within their website to exclude a number on the subject, his home page in the of files from search engine indexing. spring of 2006 offered few clues about his Approximately half of all White House involvement in the process, rather, the web files excluded from search engine site offered visitors a number of images indexing included the term “Iraq,” assur- from the Star Wars films.5 Such informing the story extra attention.6 Not sur- alities, however, while providing some prisingly a series of articles and web posts insight into the cultures of internet pro- questioned the use of such strategies as a duction and regulation, technologically means of censorship. More generally, of speaking, stand in stark contrast to the course, the use of robot commands by the protocol’s emergence as an increasingly White House also raised broader concerns professionalized and universal—though about the use of this technology as a some might say secretive—technique that means of filtering potentially controversial has the potential for excluding access to content from the public eye, at least as large amounts of web content. indexed through the major internet search engines. The robot controversy also highlighted a little-known fact among The White House robots.txt the broader public, that search engines are files in effect constructed databases that reflect choices and biases of search engines, their The debate over the Bush White House search logics, and robot archival strategies use of the exclusion protocol in 2003, (Introna and Nissembaum, 2000). however, provides a stark contrast to the Unlike other censorship stories that vague and purposefully broad discussions have largely focused on the corporate of web exclusion standards outlined in the sector (Google and China for example), technical and governmental literature. the White House website robot exclusion Yet, at the same time this particular controversy also focused attention on the example of robots.txt use, while see- relationship between technology, pub- mingly under the glare of the mass media, licity, and the writing of history. The politicians, and bloggers worldwide, controversy was heightened by the accu- further highlighted the protocol’s eva- sation that the White House was using siveness, its ability to confuse and defuse the exclusion protocol to manipulate the accusations of information control and historical record. In May of 2003 the censorship. The protocol that was devel- Washington Post reported that the White oped with little discussion or explanation, House had issued a press release with the with regards to its ability to filter or title “President Bush announces combat exclude content from the net-publics eye, operations in Iraq have ended.” Some

379 GREG ELMER months later, however, the same press of documents, the suitability of posts, release was found on the White House appended comments, and hyperlinks have site with a new title: “Bush announces all been replayed since at least Ted major combat operations in Iraq have Nelson’s Xanadu hypertext vision/mani- ended” (emphasis added).7 On his blog, festo (the debate over Wikipedia being Stanford professor Larry Lessig wrote in the most recent), the robot exclusion response to the controversy, “Why would protocol focused the debate about virtual you need to check up on the Whitehouse, knowledge once again (as was the case you might ask? Who would be so with web cookies) on the control over— unAmerican as to doubt the veracity of and management of—PC, server, and the press office? … if you obey the code remote hard drives in a networked infos- of the robots.txt, you’ll never need to cape (Elmer, 2002). If the White House worry.”8 Lessig’s last point here is crucial: did not want files to be archived why the robot exclusion protocol has the were they not kept in private folders, on potential of removing public documents another server, or in an unpublished from archival platforms such as Google folder? Part of what this exclusion proto- and other web archives, calling into col calls into question then is the creation question their status as reliable—and ulti- of files that are relatively accessible for mately unchangeable—forms of the those with knowledge of the system,11 “public record.” but are excluded from third-party search It should be noted, however, that engines archives. while the White House did change the wording of a previous released public statement, the use of the robot exclusion Google’s symbiotic business protocol’s role in the matter was widely model: site maps contested and debated. When confronted by accusations of rewriting e-history, the The legal status of web code, internet White House argued that its use of content, and the regulation of crawlers robot exclusion commands merely inten- and search engine bots is of course big ded to avoid the duplication, or the news for new media big businesses. retrieval, of multiple copies of the same Search engine industry leader Google content.9 Some online critics agreed that now considers robots exclusion to be a in fact the White House could have significant obstacle for their business of merely been using the protocol as a indexing and ranking web content and means of managing its web content.10 pages. Part of their concern stems from Questions still abound, however, most the haphazard organization of robots obviously, why were so many files stamped exclusion tags that are typically attached “Iraq” on the White House’s exclusion to specific web pages, and not sites as a list? And intentional or not, did the act of whole. There are a number of ways in excluding content on the White House which webmasters can control or exclude website facilitate the “revision” of pre- robots from archiving their respective viously released statements to the media content. First, a webmaster can insert a and public? tag, or short script, in the server log file Regardless of the White House’s intent, that hosts the website. This exclusion file the controversy offers a unique perspec- then tells robots not to archive specific tive on new techniques in information files on a server. The following example management on the web. While concerns tells all robots to avoid archiving the file about the multiplicity of authors, versions that begins with the name /911:

380 THE POLITICS OF PROTOCOLS

User-agent: * with regards to the development of the Disallow: /911/sept112002/text12 internet) is the manner in which Site Maps attempts to offer a universal technical Having to determine and then write code support platform for webmastering. The to exclude specific files on a site can be a team for example characterizes Site Maps terribly complicated and, moreover, time- as “making the Web better for Web consuming process.13 Consequently, pro- masters and the users alike.”14 The reali- ponents of robot exclusion have also zation of this vision in effect means going developed a second more efficient tech- beyond Google’s initial vision of the nique for excluding robot indexing. search engine business to create suites of Webmasters can insert the tag within the tools that facilitate a symbiotic manage- HTML header instructing robots not to ment platform between the Google data- index or crawl links on that specific page. bases and individual webmasters. In many The benefit of this technique is that respects the Site Maps platform represents webmasters do not need to have access to Google’s attempt to provide easily their server, rather they can exclude robots downloadable (crawled and archived) much more easily by making changes “templates” of websites. The tool is, from directly within the code of their websites. the perspective of the webmaster, also Consequently, with patches of content quite alluring. Site Maps clearly helps on sites and now across the web being manage a website, providing one window tagged as “out of bounds” for robot that would summarize the overall struc- archiving, the search engine industry is ture and functionality of hyperlinks and faced with the possibility of users increas- code, in effect making it easier to keep a ingly limiting access to their lifeblood and site up to date. From the webmaster’s main resource—unfettered access to all of perspective, the tool also benefits from the internet’s content and structure. A indexical efficiency, specifically by having parallel might be drawn from the televi- their site ranked higher with Google’s sion industry’s concern with digital video results list. Site Maps thus offers a parallel recorders, which, when first introduced, window or interface for the webmaster, were able to cut out or fast forward with html and site management on one site through the industry’s main source of inherently linked through a convergence revenue, advertisements (Boddy, 2003). of coding and indexing conventions (or Google responded to the threat of “templates”). large-scale excluded content by treating it In February 2006 Google announced as a broader concern about website man- the inclusion of a robot exclusion management, including of course the promo- agement tool for Site Maps. This new tool tion of one’s website through their own also conforms to the symbiotic function page-rank search engine ranking algo- of Site Maps, providing users—and of rithm. Google’s solution, Site Maps, a free course Google—with a common platform software suite for webmasters, offered a where robots.txt commands can be input, number of web management tools and edited, and reviewed. While the Site services, most of which assist in managing Maps program is still a relatively new the content, structure, and interactive technology, there are obvious questions functions of their website. In a published about its treatment of information, its discussion and interview with Google’s impact upon the privacy of webmasters, Site Maps team a broad overview and and of course its overall impact upon the rationale for the tool was articulated. Of accessibility of information through their particular interest (historically speaking search engine. Site Maps, in addition to

381 GREG ELMER providing management tools also serves similar profit-seeking rationale (e-mail an aggregation function, bringing toge- spam bots, for example). There are, of ther data of immense interest to a search course, other examples of protocols that engine company. The simple structure or have automated the collection of personal architecture of sites, for example, would information from individuals with little or offer a great deal of information for no notice. Thus, given the proliferation Google, information which the search of surveillance and user tracking protocols engine giant could use to then prompt its on the internet, such as web cookies Site Maps users to revise or amend to fit (Elmer, 2002), web bugs, and other state- into its web archiving goals. Another hosted programs such as the National potential concern is the user base for Site Security Agency’s Internet surveillance Maps. While the tool is fairly user-friendly program in the United States that auto- one could assume that more advanced matically collect personal information in webmasters, or at least those with more hidden—and for some—undemocratic complex websites, would form its user ways, the monitoring of robots.txt exclu- base. The symbiotic effects of the rela- ded content might be viewed as a justified tionship between such users and Google form of counter-surveillance—and an might further skew the links-heavy, important democratic practice. “authoritative” logic of its search engine.15 Moreover, as we increasingly rely upon One might speculate that more estab- information aggregators and search engines lished or resource-heavy businesses or to make visible the contents of the internet, organizations are also much more apt to the limits of their archives should become adopt such technology. Lastly, as the important public concerns and not simply technology becomes more widely adop- opportunities to forge more symbiotic ted as a tool for managing website con- business models. Robots.txt excluded tent, it is not inconceivable that this tool documents constitute one of the most may start to regulate and even define best important sites of new media research as practices for excluding content or not they both articulate and attempt to struc- excluding content from the eyes of the ture the very limits and scope of the search engine. internet—not only the access to information, but also the economic, legal, proprietorial, and ethical claims to new Conclusion cyberspaces. The governance of such spaces, commands, and excluded lists, are Since the protocol has never been adop- equally worthy of counter-surveillance, ted by the Engineering Taskforce or other that is to say, such web artifacts—if larger regulatory bodies such as the reverse engineered or otherwise laterally Internet Society, one could argue that the mapped—highlight the rather informal protocol merely replicates a questionable nature of internet governance. history of informal and professional con- Thus, a protocol proposal rejected (or ventions that few outside of computer left to expire) by the committees of the science departments and R&D units have Internet Society has, through the index- debated. The protocol is in effect entirely ical and content formatting strategies of voluntary, respected by those actors who companies like Google, become a rather can harness it for commercial purposes formalized informal protocol. The paucity (search engine optimization), and rejected of information on the proposed robots by others who themselves seek to mine exclusion protocol has also created, through internet data for a less respected yet Google’s own search engine ranking

382 THE POLITICS OF PROTOCOLS algorithm, a near monopoly of information Notes on robots.txt commands, further restricting or marginalizing critiques and questions of 1 The author would like to thank the follow- their applicability, legal status, and poten- ing individuals for their assistance in prepar- ing this chapter: Phil Howard, Andrew tial impact upon publicly accessible online Chadwick, Zach Devereaux, and Ganaele archives and political communications. Langlois. The research was made possible by grants from the Canadian Media Research Consortium and the Social Science and Guide to further reading Humanities Research Council of Canada. 2 Vint Cerf, for example, remains active in developing protocols for the net and in This chapter is largely inspired by a sub- September 2005 joined Google as an advisor, set of new media studies referred to as or “Chief Evangelist.” See: www.google.com/ “software studies.” A broad survey of this press/pressrel/vintcerf.html [accessed April 9, approach, which typically questions the 2007]. political and social aspects of software Cerf also serves on the board of the internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers innovation and artifacts, would be best (ICANN). served by reading Wardrip-Fruin and 3 An archive of the listserv that discusses the Montfort’s (2003) brilliant edited collec- formulation of the exclusion standard can be tion The New Media Reader. While the found at: www.robotstxt.org/wc/mailing-list/ Reader offers an excellent historical per- robots-nexor-mbox.txt 4 www.robotstxt.org/wc/exclusion.html [acces- spective on the place of software in new sed June 12, 2006]. media studies, Hawk, Rieder, and Oviedo’s 5 By the fall of 2006, though, Koster had (2008) Small Tech collection offers more uploaded a more conventional home page traditional individual essays that highlight that included links to the robots.txt resource case studies of software. Conversely, a pages and a page that listed his other major more sustained discussion and exposition technical contributions to the early days of the web. of the tenets of software studies is prob- 6 www.bway.net/~keith/whrobots ably best served by Matthew Fuller’s (2003) 7 www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A11 readable—though at times tangential— 485–2003Aug18?language=printer Behind the Blip: essays on the culture of soft- 8 www.lessig.org/blog/archives/001619.shtml ware. A more consistent contribution to 9 www.2600.com/news/view/print/1803 10 www.2600.com/news/view/print/1803 the software studies literature, which builds 11 The keywords “white house” together with on the importance of software code and “robots” in Google, for instance, return an formats, is offered by Adrian Mackenzie’s exclusion list from the White House server. (2006) Cutting Code: software and sociality. 12 www.whitehouse.gov/robots.txt [accessed Theoretically speaking, however, I still October 9, 2006]. ’ 13 The protocol does, however, provide for the recommend Alex Galloway s (2004) exclusion of all robot crawling: # go away Protocol, a frustrating read, but one that User-agent: * successfully challenges the reader to think Disallow: / about laws, conventions, and rules enco- http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots.html ded in layers of computer and internet [accessed October 9, 2006]. 14 www.smart-it-consulting.com/article.htm?no software. Finally, see Elmer (2004) for a de=166&page=135 broad treatment of technologies associated 15 www-db.stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html with profiling and surveillance. [accessed October 9, 2006].

383 28 The new politics of the internet Multi-stakeholder policy-making and the internet technocracy

William H. Dutton and Malcolm Peltu

The internet grew with the support of standardization, management, and other governance procedures. These involved mainly technically oriented groups and the network’s initial sponsor, the U.S. government. However, demands for widening this policy-making base have grown as more stakeholders have understood the internet’s enormous potential to transform activities throughout societies and across the world. The UN’s World Summits on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 and 2005 were a signiﬁcant and controversial recognition of this growing global importance. A key WSIS characteristic was its commitment to multi-stakeholder global internet policy-making. But was this just a symbolic gesture with little lasting impact, or did it signal a shift away from the internet technocracy in the political dynamics shaping internet developments and their social implications? This chapter seeks answers to these and related questions by critically assessing the WSIS experience to identify any ways its multi-stakeholder model could contribute to enduring internet governance processes, as well as its limitations. After an introductory overview, the nature and outcomes of WSIS multi-stakeholder processes and procedures are examined, as are diﬀering perceptions of their value and limits. An analytical framework for understanding the underlying dynamics of internet governance is also proposed.

The internet is often viewed as a pri- The changing politics of marily technical project, centered on internet policy-making information and communication technologies (ICTs).1 However, from its initia- As the internet’s capabilities, reach, and tion in the 1970s as the U.S. Department impacts across all sectors of society around of Defense’s Arpanet project (e.g., see the world have grown, other nations and Leiner et al., 2003) a “politics of the stakeholders have sought to play a grow- internet” has shaped its development. In ing role in formal and informal processes its early phases, this was governed pri- determining the internet’s direction. For marily by an internet technocracy: tech- example, many more national governments nical experts and constituencies, with have sought to exert influence, from fil- financial support. Oversight was provided tering internet content to demanding a from the U.S. government, which gen- greater role in the internet governance erally took a hands-off approach to its policy-making processes that determine operation and technical evolution albeit how the internet’s infrastructure is actu- with the potential to intervene. ally managed and operated. Meanwhile,

384 THE INTERNET TECHNOCRACY global commercial companies have sought of the multi-stakeholder approach, as it more control over certain sectors, while was one of the first major UN events to end users have continued to exercise their embody a multi-stakeholder model as a own controls, such as by creating and basic principle determining its aims, orga- disseminating key innovations at the nization, procedures, and outcomes. This edges of this network of networks. chapter focuses on this aspect of WSIS to The fact that there have always been explore how an understanding of its suc- such structures of control and influence cesses and failures can help to raise and illu- over the development and use of the minate questions about the changing nature internet has been a point missed by those of internet governance more generally. who have sought to promote—and decry—more recent efforts to develop The governance challenge “internet governance” as a new concept posed by the WSIS tied to a set of emerging structures (e.g., see Dutton et al., 2007). The call for The WSIS was controversial because the internet governance should therefore be central multi-stakeholder element in its more accurately viewed as an effort to strategy challenged the received wisdom transform the politics of the internet by of those who regarded it as dangerous to internationalizing and diversifying the define the debate so broadly. The fear is structures of political control and account- that this could undermine the delicate— ability that have been governing this and largely successful from a technical technology. Is this occurring? Is a new perspective—processes that have evolved politics of the internet emerging in a to enable experts to govern technical substantial way? standards by consensus, without inter- Two related issues might signal a trans- ference from commercial or other special formation from the “old” technocratic interests. Some view policy-making by a and U.S.-centric politics of the internet much broader range of stakeholders to be towards a more global and pluralistic an impractical ideal in this field, of no “new” politics. One of these issues is the more than symbolic value. This view growing debate over global internet regards technical innovation and develop- governance. Is it a vital step forward? ments as the prime factor governing the Or is it a misdirected, potentially danger- future of the internet and the information ous, development that puts the future of society, not public policies (Zittrain, 2006). the internet at risk? The other issue However, there are also those who concerns the ways in which wider looked to the WSIS as a vital attempt to stakeholder groups can become involved translate into practice a genuinely valuable in the new forms of multi-stakeholder new structure of accountability. From policy-making that have been articulated this perspective, internet policy-makers increasingly since the late 1990s across a will need to prioritize a multi-stakeholder variety of public policy sectors.2 One of approach at some point in order to protect the key aspects of this is the crucial need the future of the internet from a wide when enlarging the base of stakeholders range of threats to its security and con- involved in internet politics and policy- tinued growth (e.g., see Cave et al., 2007). making to avoid alienating key traditional The sharpness of debates about the sig- players, particularly the essential commit- nificance of the WSIS indicates it might ment of technical experts. have touched a nerve at a key transition The World Summit on the Information point towards a new structure of political Society (WSIS)3 is a significant example control of the internet. Contrary to warnings

385 WILLIAM H. DUTTON AND MALCOLM PELTU of the pessimists, this chapter draws on WSIS will be influential. It is therefore evidence to suggest that the multi-stake- useful to clarify the concept of multi- holder processes typified by the WSIS stakeholder policy-making in relation to could be a valuable means of widening the WSIS. the base of influential internet political The broad aim of the WSIS, held in processes. This could lead to the erosion two phases (culminating in major events of the formerly strong—almost autono- in Geneva in 2003 and Tunisia in 2005), mous—influence exerted by technical was to harness the potential of ICTs to experts. It could also internationalize promote international development ambi- control by reducing the relative dom- tions, such as to meet the UN Millennium inance of the U.S. in internet governance. Development Goals (see www.un.org/ For better or worse, or better and worse, millenniumgoals). These grand social and is the politics of the internet undergoing a economic ambitions led many to question radical change? the relevance and effectiveness of the To investigate these issues, the chapter WSIS. At one end, a set of views depict explores the WSIS as an exemplar of the the WSIS as a waste of time or a risky shape of any emerging new politics. An venture that should be ignored. At the analysis of its processes is used to explore other end of the spectrum are those who their relevance to traditional and new see it as the start of an important new era internet governance structures, including in multi-stakeholder global policy devel- initiatives that grew from the WSIS and opment. In between is the view that thereby inherited the multi-stakeholder valuable steps were taken towards creating ethos. It offers an analytical framework, a wider and more informed debate about the “ecology of games” and an internet the information society, although there is issue classification, to help understand the no agreement about which were the best underlying social dynamics affecting the steps forward or where they are leading. politics of the internet in general. The Those who saw the WSIS as misguided analysis draws on a growing base of research or largely a waste of time highlight the on internet policy and multi-stakeholder astounding success of the internet. They collaboration,4 interviews with key parti- emphasize its dependence on a continuing cipants, and a series of seminars reflecting stream of technical innovations and stan- on civil society participation in the WSIS, dards-setting processes that have been and two international forums on internet enabled, they argue, by the absence of governance5 (see Dutton and Peltu, 2005; control by elected politicians, regulators, Dutton et al., 2007). and public agencies. These critics point to what was not achieved at WSIS. For instance, no significant policy remedies The WSIS: a case study of were produced for major issues, such as how global multi-stakeholder to provide adequate financing mechan- policy-making isms to sustain ICT for Development (ICT4D) initiatives that could close economic, cultural, age, gender, ICT access, A waste of time, or an exemplar and other “digital divides.” There was of a new policy-making also no agreement on whether the inter- paradigm? net should be regulated or, if so, by Many doubt that moves in internet which international bodies, beyond a governance towards the kind of multi- general acceptance of the evolution of the stakeholder processes exemplified by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names

386 THE INTERNET TECHNOCRACY and Numbers (ICANN) towards more the establishment by the United Nations international accountability (Dutton and of the Working Group on Internet Peltu, 2005). The wide range of conflict- Governance (WGIG, see WGIG, 2005 and ing interests, perceptions, and values www.wgig.org) and subsequent Internet among the diverse stakeholder groups Governance Forum (IGF, see www. involved in the WSIS was also seen to intgovforum.org). The IGF offers a tan- make the search for agreements or con- gible legacy from the WSIS as a notable sensus extremely difficult. part of the global internet policy-making Many of those who recognize the sub- arena open to a broad range of stake- stantive value of key aspects of the holders (Drake, 2005). summit also acknowledge the assessment encapsulated in the title of a WSIS Civil Society (2005) statement: Much More Civil society as a key Could Have Been Achieved. For instance, stakeholder in the WSIS the Digital Solidarity Fund (see www.dsf- fsn.org) was first articulated in the WSIS The multi-stakeholder origins of (2003) Declaration of Principles, as a the WSIS means of bridging digital divides by contributing 1 percent of certain public ICT The WSIS was organized by UNESCO contracts to the fund. However, there has and the International Telecommunication been strong opposition to such initiatives Union (ITU). The origin of this event within industry and many developed generated much skepticism from the start, nations. The UN backing of the WSIS since critics viewed this as an attempt by helped to signal the significance of the the ITU to broaden its scope beyond tele- internet as an issue of global importance. communications to include the internet, At the same time, media coverage and and also to create a platform for civil general public awareness of the Geneva society participation. and Tunis events were relatively limited The presence and participation of civil and indicated that many still did not society in the WSIS lay in the summit’s appreciate its significance. origin in UN Resolution 56/183, adop- Nevertheless, the relatively high profile ted in December 2001. This encouraged of the WSIS has helped to redefine the “intergovernmental organizations, includ- internet policy agenda and create a greater ing international and regional institu- awareness and understanding at many tions, non-governmental organizations, civil levels of the substantial breadth and mag- society and the private sector to con- nitude of potential ICT4D impacts and of tribute to, and actively participate in, the the key global issues of internet govern- intergovernmental preparatory process of ance affecting attempts to spread as widely the Summit and the Summit itself” (UN, as possible the benefits tied to the inter- 2001: 2). It is therefore a relevant case for net’s use. The gain in understanding was examining wider multi-stakeholder poli- highlighted by one experienced senior tical processes, particularly those at a global international official who commented level. Here, civil society is increasingly that at the first Geneva event many being recognized as a significant new people were not even sure what “the policy-making actor involved in a dialog internet” meant and why it should be with business, non-governmental organi- significant to them—let alone what a zations (NGOs), global entities (such as concept like “internet governance” sig- the UN and ITU), and state, regional, nifies. Yet the 2003 Geneva phase led to and local government bodies.

387 WILLIAM H. DUTTON AND MALCOLM PELTU

This wider relevance is shown by a political activity. Although this lessened report to the UN Secretary-General on the event’s overall authority and potential strengthening UN systems, prepared by a practical signiﬁcance, it also freed more panel headed by Fernando Henrique space in which active civil society partici- Cardoso, the former President of Brazil. pants could seek to shape its agenda and This concludes: “The rise of civil society outcomes. This makes it particularly sui- is indeed one of the landmark events of table as a case that can help elucidate the our times. Global governance is no longer role of civil society as an active partner in the sole domain of Governments. The policy-making. growing participation and inﬂuence of The WSIS Executive Secretariat created non-State actors is enhancing democracy a Civil Society Division with responsibility and reshaping multilateralism. Civil society for civil society participation. Formal rules organizations are also the prime movers were introduced to support this goal. For of some of the most innovative initia- example, Rule 55 of the WSIS (2002) tives to deal with emerging global threats” procedures establishes the conditions within (Cardoso, 2004: 3). The WSIS could be which representatives of NGOs, civil viewed as setting a precedence that could society, and businesses accredited by the illuminate potentialities and shortcomings WSIS Executive Secretariat can sit as of this new approach to multi-stakeholder observers at public meetings of the WSIS politics in which the role of civil society is Preparatory Committee and its sub- more formally acknowledged. committees (Cammaerts and Carpentier, Participants at the WSIS in Geneva and 2005). Such observers could make oral Tunis came from a cross-section of stake- statements on questions in which they holders (Table 28.1). For a global event of had special competence. If requests to the stature and ambitions of the WSIS, speak were too numerous, the civil society however, noticeably low-key or negli- entities could have requested to form gible roles were played by many relevant themselves into constituencies whose views major global players, such as larger Western were articulated through spokespersons. countries, private enterprises, and NGOs with a development rather than informa- Was the multi-stakeholder tion and communication orientation. For approach a success or failure in example, the U.S. delegation of 66 at the the WSIS? Geneva summit was the same size as that from Gabon. Assessments made of the success of civil The sparseness of many big players at society participation have often depended the WSIS has two-edged implications for on the degree and nature of involvement the summit as an exemplar of global in WSIS of those making the judgments.

Table 28.1 Participants at the WSIS phases in Geneva and Tunis

Type Number of participants Number of entities represented Geneva Tunis % change Geneva Tunis % change 2003 2005 2003 2005 State 4,590 5,857 +28 176 174 –1 International organizations 1,192 1,508 +27 100 192 +92 NGOs and civil society entities 3,310 6,241 +89 481 606 +26 Private enterprises 514 4,816 +837 98 226 +131

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The civil society groups and individuals could subdivide civil society into different most closely involved seemed to feel they caucuses and working groups was resented made a difference, but not enough to feel by some participants, including objections fully represented within the summit’s to the inclusion of some local govern- outcomes. The main overall influence of ment entities as civil society actors. civil society was probably in reinforcing On a broader front, inequalities in the and prioritizing human-centered issues in distribution of financial resources and the summit’s information society agenda institutional, technological, and transport (e.g., see Padovani and Tuzzi, 2005). This infrastructures were among the strongest is expressed in the final WSIS (2005:1) restraints on civil society participation. Tunis Commitment as: “We reaffirm our This affects both virtual access to ICT- desire and commitment to build a people- related capabilities and physical access to centered, inclusive and development- location-specific events and activities. For oriented Information Society, premised instance, 17 percent of the active partici- on the purposes and principles of the pants in physical WSIS meetings were Charter of the United Nations, international from Africa but 40 percent of civil society law and multilateralism, and respecting fully organizations showing earlier interest and upholding the Universal Declaration came from that continent (Cammaerts of Human Rights, so that people every- and Carpentier, 2005). Sufficient funds where can create, access, utilize and share for transport, translation services, and information and knowledge, to achieve meeting places to support civil society their full potential and to attain the groups are also required to build and sus- internationally agreed development goals tain meaningful engagements with policy and objectives, including the Millennium processes.6 Development Goals.” Different civil society interests at times A major practical success for many civil clashed with each other, as well as with society participants was their establish- those of government or business. Civil ment of new and better informal pro- society representatives from some coun- cesses of networking among such groups tries seemed to be putting forward restric- and activists. On the other hand, unrea- tive views on freedom of speech and listic expectations raised by the imprecise access that were much closer to those of promise implied by the notion of partici- governments with traditions of state cen- pation seemed to be at the root of more sorship than to openness advocated by pessimistic views of the outcome. Both information and communication activists the formal WSIS rules and the practices of (e.g., the Communication Rights in the those actors with most real-world power Information Society (CRIS) campaign, substantially limited the scope of what see www.crisinfo.org). Extremists within participation could achieve in affecting some political and religious movements the decisions made by those with access are also part of civil society, but often to government policy-makers. have views on freedom of speech that clash For example, restrictions were placed directly with those of more libertarian on the right of civil society actors to vote. groups. In addition, the WSIS Executive Secretariat On the other hand, the diversity could act as gatekeepers in excluding or represented by civil society helped to put allowing in particular groups by deciding on the WSIS agenda a wide range of to withhold or grant official accreditation topics that might otherwise have been (Cammaerts and Carpentier, 2005). The ignored. These include issues such as: free way the WSIS Civil Society Division and open source software; the ICT4D

389 WILLIAM H. DUTTON AND MALCOLM PELTU needs of minority communities (e.g., with high technical content often made it indigenous peoples); technological waste; difficult to engage in dialogs leading to alternatives to largely Western commer- productive outcomes. And rather than cial concentration of media power (e.g., working within a set of well developed see Dutton, 2005); and the empowerment procedures and processes, actors spent much of local communities through knowledge time on developing rules and procedures gained from an open “information comfor managing and sustaining a range of mons” (e.g., see Kranich, 2004). inputs and the resolution of differences. One reason why the WSIS participa- Table 28.2 provides a summary compar- tion from development NGOs was rela- ison of the multi-stakeholder processes tively low is indicated by the way many adopted by the WSIS with more tradi- non-technical participants found it diffi- tional patterns of internet governance. cult to engage with more technically oriented issues. This could have led many NGOs to fail to see how the main WSIS Will the WSIS focus on the information society could multi-stakeholder model address their own economic, social, and characterize a new phase in health concerns. This could have led internet governance? these NGOs to attend the summit in only token numbers, or primarily through their The multi-stakeholder approach of the ICT specialists. WSIS has been inherited by the WGIG Despite these divisions and conflicts, and IGF global internet governance the WSIS process exemplified distinctive initiatives, which were among the most characteristics of a process that differed concrete outcomes of the summit. But is substantially from earlier internet policy- this a signpost to a significant new “third making processes (Table 28.2). Traditionally, phase” direction in the evolving history governments represent all relevant groups of internet governance developments, and interests within their constituencies, moving away from the internet technoc- including the diversity of interests within racy that has characterized the first two the business and civil society sectors. In phases? contrast, the WSIS had an explicit commitment to a multi-stakeholder approach The first two phases of internet in which governments would come to governance (1960s to 2000) the table with representatives of business and civil society. In practice, this led to The multi-stakeholder approach adopted significant variations from more tradi- by the WSIS challenges the autonomy of tional patterns of public policy-making the more technically dominated standar- processes. Government representatives to dization and governance arrangements in the WSIS played a central role, such as in the first few decades after the emergence the final stages of negotiation at the of the internet in the late 1960s (see summit, but in comparison to more tra- Simonelis, 2005 for details of the history ditional forums, a range of more marginal of internet governance bodies). For instance actors became active participants alongside the Internet Engineering Task Force government representatives. Instead of (IETF)7 was founded in 1986. And the technical issues being handled reasonably Internet Society (ISOC) was created in efficiently by committees and groups with 1992 to provide an institutional home much technical expertise, the number of and financial support for the internet lay participants involved in discussions standards process, which by then had to

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Table 28.2 Internet governance: comparison of traditional and WSIS processes

Aspect of internet governance process Traditional patterns WSIS multi-stakeholder patterns Representation Governments represent Explicit commitment to a legitimate interests multi-stakeholder approach Representation of key actors Major nations and actors play Low key (or non-existent) key roles across a number of engagement by many “big issues players” (countries, businesses and NGOs) Legacies and historical Legacy of entrenched interests New area, with few entrenched dependencies interests (e.g. compared to other global policy-making arenas such as trade talks) Incorporation of technical Delegated to specialized More technically oriented issues expertise committee structures and difficult to engage with by bodies, such as standards groups many participants (e.g. development NGOs) Representation of non- Elected officials and public Civil society organizes itself, but governmental, civil society agencies take on responsibility sometimes with splits and actors for aggregating the interests of a tensions between civil society pluralistic array of groups participants and difficulties in determining who represents civil society Indirect v. direct participation Business and civil society Specific provisions for civil represented by elected officials. society, including business, to participate directly in formal WSIS processes; but some rules, processes and resource divides restrict participation Sustainability Reliance on major institutions, Difficulties in sustaining virtual lobbies, and organized groups to and physical participation maintain access and among some civil society actors participation accommodate growing commercial inter- the establishment in 1998 of ICANN, ests in this network of networks. which is an internationally organized not- A second phase began in the late 1990s. for-profit corporation based on the laws Until then, the U.S. government had of California. Its formation signaled a sig- ultimate control over core internet “root nificant step towards the latest phase of server” files, but their administration tasks wider stakeholder participation in internet were performed by an internet pioneer, governance, which could reduce the the late Jon Postel of the University of autonomy of technical experts and their Southern California (see Leiner et al., constituencies. However, the internet 2003). However, there was a growing technocracy with the support of the U.S. feeling in the U.S. government and among government remained the most powerful some other major stakeholders that such participants. an independent technical mechanism The first two phases of internet gov- could not take account of the broader ernance arrangements worked well as a range of social, commercial, and political basis for the internet’s phenomenal growth issues that could be substantively affected for three main reasons. First, the techni- by technical internet governance deci- cal community involved had a commit- sions. This perception was a key factor in ment to maintaining the founding design

391 WILLIAM H. DUTTON AND MALCOLM PELTU principles of end-to-end (E2E) openness, which could be called the new politics— core architectural stability, and indepen- was triggered by the involvement in the dence as a shared resource for the ben- internet of a much wider base of com- efit of all. This community was small mitted stakeholders. This could be a sig- and homogenous enough to allow for nificant departure that lessens the degree decision-making that was both consensual of control of the internet technocracy and reasonably efficient in translating and the U.S. government by stimulating agreed standards into effective technical countervailing pressures through the policy- enhancements, as well as to solve pro- making involvement of other governments, blems within the operational infrastructure. business, international bodies, and civil Second, innovation flourished through society stakeholders. This approach has activities at the edges of the network, been adopted by the ongoing WSIS- with creative users and businesses develop- influenced IGF global internet governing innovations such as the web, browsers, ance initiative. and social networking. This was achieved Technical participants in the initial in ways that maintained a cascading array phases may not even have thought of of innovations. Third, the U.S. govern- themselves as being involved in government played a largely hands-off role. At ance activities, as that term is often the same time, from the outset it has been incorrectly perceived as implying direct the ultimate policy authority for key aspects government-led regulation. However, of the internet infrastructure, such as they were indeed involved in undertaking files in the highest level internet root governance functions. And the processes servers that determine vital operational they used were inherently political, as for issues like the allocation of web domain any policy formation effort needing to names. balance the interests and perceptions of a diverse range of stakeholders. This has been the case even when they have focused on The emergence of a third phase essentially technologically oriented issues, In the twenty-first century, a new phase as indicated by the U.S. government’s in internet governance was triggered as hand on important technical levers such as the internet’s impact as a global socio- the internet root servers. economic as well as technical phenom- As internet governance processes have enon was first fully realized. This came moved from being the preserve largely of about through the wide enactment in an internet technocracy towards a wider everyday life of the much-forecast diffu- ownership of the related substantive issues, sion and convergence of digital technolo- the politics involved have become more gies, from multimedia online content to a critical, more global, and more diverse. huge range of mobile consumer devices This is indicated by the multi-layered, and an increasing use of embedded sensor fragmented, complex, and generally highly networks (e.g., see Dutton et al., 2005). It distributed nature of internet governance. also stemmed from growing threats to the The internet itself is not one technology, internet’s infrastructure, from amateur but an assembly of many at different hackers and spammers to organized crim- levels. Similarly, governance is not one inal efforts to exploit vulnerabilities in the process, but several at different levels and internet’s architecture, such as the ability in overlapping arenas addressing specific to mask identities. issues. This means different government A crucial difference in this emerging models and agencies involving many dif- third phase of internet governance— ferent institutional, group, and individual

392 THE INTERNET TECHNOCRACY stakeholders, will continue to be needed content producers, consumers, regulators, to address different governance issues. and others (e.g., see Stern, 2006). The dispute arose because some infrastructure suppliers were seen to be seeking tiered Can elements of best practice services in order to charge differential from the past be maintained? rates for access to its channels for different A major challenge for the multi-stakeholder types of content (e.g., enabling a revenue orientation of the third phase of internet stream from on-demand video). Network governance politics is to preserve and neutrality became a global issue when strengthen the so-far successful insulation regulators sought to anticipate industrial of the technology’s essential core infra- strategies in the U.S. within the poten- structure from political and commercial tially lucrative sector of entertainment, manipulation by special interests. Technically but with the relevance of that strategy creative and elegant designs need to be varying across nations. For example, the invented and implemented on a global high level of competition in the provision scale. At the same time, appropriate proof broadband services in the U.K. made cesses need to be explored to address the this debate less relevant, since the market diverse range of substantive issues and was well positioned to shape online stakeholder needs raised by the increasing offerings. intertwining of internet use with wider social, economic, and political policies and activities. Implications of the multi- This is a difficult challenge as it involves stakeholder perspective pressures from diverse and often conflicting viewpoints and interests, which reflect The value of incorporating a wider base very different values and cultural and of stakeholders in internet policy-making political understandings. For instance, such and reducing technocratic control to some conflicts include: governments seeking to degree is the way involving more stake- empower and safeguard or exploit and holders from, and representing, developing subjugate their citizens; enterprises want- countries in the WSIS and IGF has helped ing to promote locally driven develop- to move debates on ICT4D away from ment or dominate and manipulate new their traditional focus on a single digital markets; users seeking creative benefits or divide in access to ICT infrastructure and defensive protection from their online systems. Instead, a broader view is emer- connections; and experts striving to main- ging of the many important differential tain the integrity of the architecture or impacts of use (Williams, 2005). The IGF undermine it maliciously. is seeking to use the multi-stakeholder The impact of real-world political issues model to try to build a new form of in internet governance is illustrated by a internet governance framework that offers debate over what has been called “net- light-touch coordination with a broad work neutrality.” This fundamental internet scope and diverse inputs. The aim is to design principle has sought to ensure that establish and maintain a “big picture” the network provides E2E routing with- coherence that can avoid an unmanage- out inspecting or changing the data being able fragmentation of the internet gov- carried. In the U.S., network neutrality ernance mosaic (Dutton and Peltu, 2005). became a hotly contested area among A previously narrow focus, primarily telecommunications infrastructure suppli- on the divide in internet access, has led ers, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), media some policy-makers and researchers to

393 WILLIAM H. DUTTON AND MALCOLM PELTU claim that “the” digital divide might ICTs.8 For example, developing countries already be over now, making it seem that often dismiss the internet as a poor repla- there is perhaps little left to do in internet cement for radio, such as in orchestrating governance to assist development. However health campaigns. However, the internet social research in this field (e.g., Dutton et can be used to support health campaigns al., 2006; Dutton and Helsper, 2007) is through the radio and other mass media increasingly showing that there is not just by helping to network health officers and one divide based on access. Instead, there program makers across the developing are many divides along multiple social, world, enabling access to richer content, economic, cultural, geographic, political, and preventing every agency from having and other dimensions. These follow and to reinvent existing materials. This also reinforce similar existing divides in societies, illustrates how input from the internet as well as creating new ones. technocracy remains central to developing The kind of internet governance agenda appropriate solutions to different stake- favored in developed Western countries holder requirements. has generally focused on market liberal- Despite these kinds of benefits, the ization as the prime solution to the divide multi-stakeholder model is limited in in access. This is being widened by several respects. There are two main rea- initiatives such as the IGF to take account sons for these constraints: it does not of the specific needs of developing reflect the real diversity of issues and countries and regions. For instance, gov- actors; and it has so far failed to incorpo- ernments in developing countries are rate the technocrats effectively into this often a major source of ICT know-how, process. infrastructure development, and capacity A major constraint of the multi-stake- building, together with the private sector, holder model is its inability to incorporate universities, and NGOs. Such govern- the full complexity of the actors and their ments also generally view internet access interplay of objectives and motives that as a key to many economic and social shape choices about the internet. The development areas, so it is unrealistic to issues that shape the future of the internet expect these governments to stand aside and the information society are many, and from active participation in internet gov- arise at multiple levels and in multiple ernance processes, as some would prefer. arenas. People do not seek to govern the Given the financial, political, cultural, and internet or the information society as other constraints faced by developing such, but aim to achieve more immediate countries, building a better understanding and focused objectives. Multi-stakeholder between them and developed countries policy-making also raises critical questions within a coordinated internet governance about who represents different stake- strategy could be valuable in addressing holder constituencies—questions that are internet-related regulations affecting key particularly difficult to answer in an non-technical areas, such as freedom of agreed way for the multitude of diverse speech, human rights, and intellectual civil society interests involved. Keeping property rights (IPR). technical experts committed to, and Incorporating multiple stakeholder per- enthusiastic about, the governance process spectives in policy-making can also high- is also essential to successful outcomes light the value that can be gained not because their advice and knowledge is only from leading-edge ICTs but also from essential to the successful implementation applying still-relevant older technologies, and operation of any agreed technically often in conjunction with the latest related policies.

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Understanding the dynamics where rules are shaped by policies in of multi-stakeholder wider related—but distinct—sectors, such decision-making as by copyright (Table 28.3). As in an ecology of games, different actors in dif- A framework is now proposed to help ferent arenas seek to address these differ- understand how a multi-stakeholder ent issues. The examples in the table approach can best be applied to internet relate to some key internet policy-making governance in a way that addresses its games. potential flaws and builds on its positive An illustration of the value of the clas- benefits. This has two main elements: a sification proposed in Table 28.3 is the three-part classification of internet issues; way in which the WSIS process often and the concept of internet governance artificially separated internet governance being viewed as an “ecology of games” in from development issues, rather than which many actors are pursuing their treating them as separate but interrelated own goals through a range of interactions. fields (Williams, 2005). As highlighted The concept of an ecology of games earlier, this separation created a percep- can help to understand the real-world tion of the summit as being technically contexts and interactions shaping out- oriented and less relevant to development comes from the new politics of multi- issues. An important role for a coordinat- stakeholder policy-making, including ing body such as the IGF could be to taking account of the range of issues out- highlight this interdependence by alerting lined above (Dutton, 2004). This idea is existing development agencies and affec- based on the notion of a game,9 defined ted stakeholders to the internet govern- as an arena of competition and coopera- ance issues of intrinsic relevance to their tion structured by a set of rules and development activities, but which may be assumptions about how to act to achieve obscured to them by the opaqueness to a particular set of objectives. internet non-experts of some key innovations in governance can then be seen to be the the internet and related digital technolo- outcome of a variety of choices made by gies. Nevertheless, it is important to rea- many different players involved in separate lize that many people interested in the but interdependent governance games. economic development of a particular Multi-stakeholder policy-making is an nation or locality might well be unin- example of an ecology of games. terested in structures governing internet governance issues such as domain names. Different actors are focused on different A classification of internet issues. governance issues In an ecology of games such as those Given the different goals and interests of illustrated in Table 28.3, no single set of participants in a multi-stakeholder policy- actors actually seeks to control govern- making model, classifying governance ance as such, but each player pursues issues into areas focused on particular more focused goals in collaboration or types of outcome can be of much value. competition with other actors. Actual Table 28.3 illustrates one such classifica- goals could be, for example: to create an tion based on three categories: internet equitable market for registering and mana- centric, which is intrinsically focused on ging internet names (Type I); enhance the internet, such as domain names; socio-economic development by pro- internet-user centric, where rules need to moting equity of internet access (Type II); focus on users; and non-internet centric, or close wealth divides with the help of

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Table 28.3 Selected games shaping internet governance for development

Domain Game Main players Goals and objectives Internet centric Transnational Governments, regional Participation in jurisdictional entities, internet and governance bodies to governance “turf other governance gain or retain, limit or struggles” agencies, such as IGF, expand control over ICANN, WIPO (on internet resources (e.g. IPR-related issues), the root servers). experts Names and numbers Individual experts, Obtain, sell, allocate ICANN, Registries, domain names, etc. for ISPs, users sites, servers, users. Internet-user centric Network neutrality Telecom infrastructure Negotiate terms of suppliers, ISPs, content access to internet providers, consumers, content, taking account media businesses, of different stakeholder regulators, civil society views (e.g. on social activists, lawyers, public equity, development, policy-makers. free markets, the internet’s open e2e design principle). Privacy and data Governments, citizens, Prevent or seek protection regulators, private firms, disclosure of personal lawyers, journalists, civil data depending on liberties activists negotiated or imposed criteria. Non-internet centric Freedom of expression Political and religious Individuals, groups, activists, writers, artists, organizations aim to media rights advocates, facilitate or constrain news media, bloggers, the expression and governments, censors exchange of certain viewpoints. Copyright, digital rights Legislators and Negotiate access and management regulators, creative rights to balance players’ industries and other goals (low-cost access content providers, for consumers; highest telecom suppliers, ISPs, return on assets for ICT vendors. content creators and suppliers). internet use (Type III). The same actors The politics of participation: who could own all these goals, while partici- represents civil society? pating in games that could be called “internet names and numbers,”“internet The multi-stakeholder goals and rules fi diffusion,” and “economic development.” de ned by the WSIS process exemplify a One of the games illuminated by the “politics of participation” game. Civil WSIS is about the politics underlying the society is diverse both in its structures and conceptualization of who comprises civil ideological orientations, ranging from society and the processes determining extremely conservative to radically pro- how different interests are represented. gressive. This leads to numerous competing

396 THE INTERNET TECHNOCRACY and complementary interests and interac- the established internet technocracy, it is tions between actors in overlapping civil vital to harness ICANN’s expertise to any society games. These take place at house- governance process, if that process is to be hold, community, state, and other arenas, effective. up to the level of the global ecology of Participation in policy-making pro- games that characterized the WSIS. cesses typically demands large amounts of The social dynamics of interactions time, effort, and accumulated expertise, as between grass-roots movements and was involved in attending preparatory communication with higher levels often meetings and analyzing discussions and leaves the grass-roots without a voice that documents at the WSIS. This can result in fully articulates their particular interests, relatively few people representing an enor- particularly as there are many inequalities mous range of civil society interests. For in economic, educational, and other sup- instance, the wording of the main WSIS port that militate against the views of the Civil Society (2003; 2005) “Declaration disadvantaged being heard or getting high of Principles” and “Tunis Statement” was on policy agendas. Many civil society developed by a relatively small core of participants in the WSIS seem to have people. This is not new, or unique, to the been largely self-selected and driven by internet governance processes, as sug- individual commitment. In addition, users gested by Robert Michels’ (1915) “iron as a category are considered most often by law of oligarchy.” However, there is a designers of systems and artifacts when danger that civil society representation will seeking to create markets for products, not be viewed as legitimate and that some rather than as full participants in the representatives can be “captured” within design process. Ambiguity over the offi- policy processes, which to some extent cial status of local authorities and city can distance them from their constituencies’ administrations as civil society actors, and ongoing experience and evolving views. the desire of some governments to represent their citizens—as they are elected to do—further illustrates the lack of clarity Conclusion in delineating the contours of civil society representation. The global diffusion of the internet, along The central role of ICANN creates with twenty-first-century digital con- further ambiguity. As a private corpora- vergence, has accelerated pressures from tion, rather than a public body, its status numerous stakeholders to engage in shap- as a representative of users is not clear to ing the design, development, and gov- many stakeholders. Yet it has more ernance of the internet, as well as in using financial resources than perhaps any other the technology to meet their diverse needs actor in the internet governance sphere, and aims. other than governments themselves (with The WSIS was an important event as it an annual income in the neighborhood of had strong institutional backing from key $50M in 2007). ICANN’s rules and pro- global bodies, such as the UN and ITU, cedures are geared towards involving users and helped move internet politics towards and other stakeholders, but it has its own a more pluralistic process. Even though it approach to aggregating global interests failed to achieve its ambitious goals, and that can be in conflict with those of probably highlighted more problems con- traditional bodies such as the UN, which cerning its multi-stakeholder model than rely on negotiation among state repre- tangible successes, it was a significant and sentatives. But as a key representative of interesting exemplar of a wider trend (as

397 WILLIAM H. DUTTON AND MALCOLM PELTU highlighted, for example, by the Cardoso The WSIS multi-stakeholder experience Report) to develop a new politics rooted can also help to suggest research directions in a vision of broad multi-stakeholder for investigating how different stake- participation. This includes a strong civil holder sectors (e.g., civil society, business, society presence and seeks to deal with a government) and groups within a sector wide range of social and economic as well (e.g., libertarian civil society advocates as technical policy issues. The establish- versus more restrictive civil society inter- ment of the IGF was a valuable initiative, ests) can cooperate more effectively, while and continues to offer an arena for acknowledging and addressing conflicting examining the issues explored in this perspectives. This could include examin- chapter. ing the factors promoting “real engage- The WSIS was therefore far from being ment” between multiple stakeholders, a waste of time and hasn’t had the sub- where participants in discussions respond stantive damaging effects feared by its directly to each other in productive ways strongest detractors. In addition to initia- even if they approach the topic from dif- tives like the IGF, its main long-term ferent backgrounds and conflicting values benefits could lie in the network ripples it (e.g., see Dutton et al., 2006). sent out when bringing together a wide The questions raised earlier about who range of groups who learned about each represents civil society could equally apply other only through contacts linked to the to business and NGOs, for instance in WSIS, including some who were pre- differences between larger and smaller viously unaware how much their own entities or between those engaged in dif- interests could be well served by taking a ferent sectors of activity. The WSIS keener interest and involvement in inter- experience and follow-on activities such net developments, use, and governance. as the IGF could be further analyzed to In addition, as this chapter has argued, seek answers to crucial questions such as: analyses of the WSIS processes and out- What kinds of people and groups should comes, here and elsewhere (e.g., Servaes be called civil society? How are their and Carpentier, 2005), reveal important representatives chosen? What criteria can insights into the opportunities and diffi- be used to assess their validity as a legit- culties created by an emerging new imate representative voice of those for internet politics. whom they claim to speak? Civil society is a major new actor in There is also a need to clarify who and the new politics, which opens a number what other stakeholders represent. For of important avenues for exploring social instance, the ambiguous status of local research on the new politics, both in government at the WSIS, and claims by relation to the internet and the wider some governments that they speak on issues highlighted in the Cardoso Report. behalf of their civil societies, raise perti- For instance, analysis of the WSIS raises nent points about the voices articulated important issues surrounding the con- by government representatives. The rea- ceptualization and enactment of notions sons why many development NGOs were like participation, access, and power that not greatly attracted by the summit’sinfor- are applicable to wider political arenas. mation society focus could help to reveal These are illustrated by the description approaches that could make wider con- given of the tensions between formal stituencies aware of the need to engage rules of participation, the promise of full more vigorously in policy-making that participation, and the realities of pluralistic shapes outcomes tied to convergent digi- processes that fall short of democratic ideals. tal technologies. Academic researchers can

398 THE INTERNET TECHNOCRACY also help to articulate grass-roots user and the following entry points to each topic. social requirements to policy-makers and The history of the internet remains con- product, system, and service designers troversial, central role of technical experts and developers. inventing the internet is conveyed well by In meeting such challenges, social Hafner and Lyon (1996). Dutton (2004) research could offer both practical and provides an overview of issues of the conceptual insights. Good empirical data information society dealt with at the and evidence-based analyses would enable WSIS. With respect to internet govern- researchers to work with policy-makers ance, Bill Drake’s (2005) edited com- and practitioners to identify and evaluate pilation of papers by members of the the priorities that are most likely to lead Working Group on Internet Governance to sustainable strategies and institutions to offers an insider’s perspective on key assist disadvantaged areas and groups. In issues. These can be delved into directly internet governance, issue-based policy to explore the diversity of viewpoints and research that is likely to be of most value issues, as well as ongoing developments, could include empirical studies of actual at the IGF’s website (www.intgovforum. uses10 and action research11 based on a org). Chadwick (2006: 229–56) provides strong scholarly grounding for analyzing an analytical perspective on the political experimental uses of the internet. Analytical stages of internet governance. A key work frameworks from academic research, such on the ecology of games is Long’s (1958) as the ecology of games and internet article. governance issue classification outlined in this chapter, can also help to understand the politics of participation in bodies such Notes as the IGF. One of the most significant challenges 1 This chapter arose from research initiated is to explore how the talent and enthu- throughout a seminar series on the World siasm of the internet technocracy, which Summit of the Information Society (see served the network so effectively since its www.oii.ox.ac.uk), which was supported by a grant (RES-451-26-0295) from the U.K. inception, can feel comfortable working Economic and Social Research Council. The in a multi-stakeholder framework that authors acknowledge the valuable insights could empower both experts and the lay and information from these seminars, which policy actors. If this is handled success- they have been able to draw on for this ff fully, the technical understanding of all chapter. The contributions of Sonia Li , Warwick University and former Visiting participants could be enhanced, while the Fellow, Oxford Internet Institute, and OII technical experts will gain a better Research Officer, Victoria Nash, who coor- understanding of how their knowledge dinated the series with William Dutton, are can benefit a wider range of users particularly valued. 2 For example, see the European Multistake- holder Forum on CSR, Review Meeting, December 2006 at http://ec.europa.eu/ Guide to further reading enterprise/csr/forum_2006_index.htm 3 See www.unesco.org/wsis or www.itu.int/ This chapter works at the intersection of wsis for details. four different topics: the history of the 4 A key account of developments within WSIS internet; the WSIS; internet governance; and the WGIG is provided by Drake (2005), particularly a section on multistakeholder and new institutionalist perspectives on collaboration, pp. 7–46. politics such as the ecology of games. 5 Organized in collaboration with the Berkman Each has much to explore, but we suggest Center for Internet and Society at Harvard

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Law School and sponsored by Afilias, the station obtain answers from the internet and Economist, Nominet U.K., and the Public broadcast them over the radio. Internet Registry. 9 The term game is used here only in this sense 6 For instance, only 7 percent of civil society and should not be seen as trivializing an arena organizations were involved from start to by suggesting it is like a sporting or enter- finish in the 2003 WSIS (Cammaerts and tainment game. Carpentier, 2005). 10 For example, the World Internet Project 7 A large international community of network covering over 20 countries (www.worldin- designers, operators, vendors, and researchers ternetproject.net), including the OII’s responsible for the development and stability Oxford Internet Surveys (OxIS) in Britain of the internet’s architecture. (www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research). 8 For instance, the Kothmale Community 11 An example of such action research is Radio and Internet Project (www.kothmale. StopBadware.org, an initiative run by the OII org) integrates radio and internet services. and Berkman Center for Internet and Society This includes allowing listeners to send to provide practical defenses against malicious questions to the radio station. Staff at the software programs (www.StopBadware.org).

400 29 Enabling effective multi-stakeholder participation in global internet governance through accessible cyber-infrastructure Derrick L. Cogburn

The global policy processes for internet governance are becoming increasingly complex. A dizzying array of institutions are involved, from the established Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, the World Wide Web Consortium, and the Internet Engineering Task Force to the newly emerging set of institutions that arose from around the UN World Summit on the Information Society, the Internet Governance Forum, and the Global Alliance for ICT and Development. One trend evident within these global policy processes is the focus on “multi-stakeholder” participation, designed to create space at the negotiating table for civil society organizations and the private sector alongside governments and international organizations. However, in most cases, the current working methods of internet governance policy processes do not facilitate active participation by developing countries and civil society. Simply allowing non-state actors to register and be physically present at meetings is not suﬃcient. Using international regime theory as a conceptual framework, this chapter seeks to clarify the structure and relevance of the institutionalized policy processes related to global internet governance. It explores the potential for “cyber-infrastructure” to overcome some of the problems of this emergent regime by enabling more eﬀective participation by developing countries and civil society participants.

As the internet continues to grow in make these possible have become known importance, its relationship to commerce, as “internet governance,” and they involve science, government affairs, and political a diverse group of national and interna- advocacy becomes more evident, as does tional institutions. This chapter seeks to its global nature. The internet is at once clarify the structure and relevance of these deceptively simple and staggeringly com- institutionalized policy processes related plex. With relative ease, you can click a to global internet governance and to few buttons on a hand-held device or explore the potential for information and laptop computer and view highly detailed communications technologies (ICTs) to audio, video, and textual information enable more effective participation in from nearly every country in the world. them by developing countries and civil Almost effortlessly, you can make a per- society participants. fect copy of that information and send it to a friend or collaborator six time zones away. The technical protocols, security Research questions and mechanisms, and underlying infrastructure theoretical framework of the internet, while quite complex, have remained hidden from the average This chapter asks three principal research user. The global policy processes that questions. First, what are the current

401 DERRICK L. COGBURN institutionalized policy processes related approaches to international relations, which to global internet governance and how focus on the interactions of powerful state are they structured to include multi- actors and the interplay of their strategic stakeholder participants? Second, in what interests around international conferences ways are ICTs being used to include and negotiations. The biggest contender multi-stakeholder participants? Finally, to these approaches is sometimes called could the scientific concept of “cyber- the idealist or neoliberal institutionalist infrastructure” be harnessed to enable the approach, which focuses on the role of institutionalized policy processes of global international organizations in creating a internet governance to better include multi- just and fair world order. stakeholder participants, especially those In recent years, state primacy in inter- with geographical and physical limitations? national negotiations has been challenged Two approaches drive this chapter. The by the emergence of far more hetero- first approach, which covers the first and geneous stakeholder groupings in nearly second research questions, involves a the- all of these processes—transnational civil oretically driven analysis of six important society organizations. Individual citizens, entities within the internet governance represented by non-governmental orga- regime. However, with the third research nizations and transnational networks, have question, the study switches to an “action been increasingly recognized as important research” approach (Lewin, 1946; Freire, stakeholders in global governance. The 1970; Davison, Martinsons, and Kick, UN has even commissioned studies to 2004), by exploring the degree to which understand how it might redesign its rela- ICTs might enhance the ability for tionship with civil society (Cardoso Report, diverse multi-stakeholder groups to parti- 2004). These civil society organizations cipate in global governance processes. represent a new energy and dynamism While contemporary international public that is seen as critical to the growth and policy seems to be wrestling with the development of the information society. concept of global governance, there is already a significant academic literature International regimes, exploring this phenomenon. Much of the knowledge, and networks literature emerging from international relations focuses on addressing the “anar- The term international regime draws chy problematique.” If the world-system explicitly on the canonical definition comprises sovereign and equal nation-states, developed by Krasner (1983), which as well as a range of critically important refers to “sets of implicit or explicit prin- non-state actors, all operating in a global ciples, norms, rules and decision-making environment devoid of any semblance of procedures around which actors’ expecta- a world government, how are decisions tions converge in a given area of interna- made and enforced, resources allocated, and tional relations.” internet governance is stability and order maintained? This fun- essentially about the international regime damental problem of international coor- formation processes illuminated by Krasner’s dination and collaboration has been studied definition. However, unlike Krasner’s by a wide range of scholars (Keohane, approach, which focused mostly on states, 1984; Axelrod, 1985; Oye, 1986; Keohane this study takes a broader perspective to and Nye, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Rosenau include non-state actors in what is known and Czempiel, eds., 1992). as a “multi-stakeholder” regime formation Much of the literature on global gov- process. Such multi-stakeholder processes ernance is dominated by realist or neorealist ostensibly create space at the international

402 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE negotiating table for non-state actors such standards for the global internet commu- as civil society organizations (Cogburn, nity. In practice, much of internet gov- 2005) and the private sector (Haufler, 2001), ernance boils down to who actually along with the more traditional state manages the internet’s system of unique actors—governments and international identifiers, such as domain names (for organizations. example, www.nytimes.com), generic top- International conferences play a critical level domains (such as.edu, .com, .net), role in global governance and specifically country code top level domains (.uk,us), regime formation (Cogburn, 2004b). They IP addresses (128.230.84.47), the under- serve as focal points for contestation of lying software protocols and databases that the norms, principles, values, and decision- tie it all together (e.g., IPv4, IPv6, TCP/ making procedures of the emergent regime. IP, Whois), and the procedures for They also serve to nurture global networks handling disputes within this system. In of recognized policy experts and epis- 1998, the U.S. government established an temic communities. Policy-actors interact innovative approach to internet govern- at these global forums and practice “con- ance when it subcontracted many of the ference diplomacy” in an attempt to technical functions formerly assigned to influence outcomes (Kaufmann, 1968). Department of Defense contractors to a Unfortunately, simply allowing non- private, not-for-profit corporation with state actors to register for a conference relatively broad-based international parti- does not necessarily create an environment cipation: the Internet Corporation for in which these individuals and organiza- Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). tions can effectively participate and influ- Currently, ICANN administers the domain ence policy outcomes. After all, developing name system (DNS) and performs such countries have participated in interna- important tasks as introducing competi- tional negotiations for decades, and in tion among domain name registrars and most cases have failed to significantly managing a system of dispute resolution influence the outcomes. for domain name trademark conflicts The formulation of an equitable inter- (Mueller, 2002). In addition to ICANN, national regime requires the active and other institutions that play an important effective participation of multiple stake- role in internet governance include the holders who can adequately represent World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), their own interests. One key to this may and the Internet Engineering Task Force be active membership in transnational (IETF). policy networks and significant linkages ICANN and these other organizations with like-minded epistemic or knowl- are supposed to have a “narrow” technical edge-producing communities. The current mandate. However, technical decisions also working methods of most international have social and political consequences. policy processes do not take full advantage ICANN makes collective policies that of geographically distributed networks touch the lives of people around the and require restructuring in order to world. However, it is now facing serious facilitate active participation. challenges.

Internet governance UN World Summit on the Information Society The term internet governance refers to When the United Nations General the making of collective policies and Assembly agreed to convene the two-phased

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World Summit on the Information (Klein, 2004; Cogburn, 2004b). However, Society (WSIS) held between 2003 and while the WSIS was praised for its multi- 2005, it was not clear that it was a delib- stakeholder participation, its implementa- erate attempt to challenge the existing tion of the idea left a lot to be desired. internet governance order. However, that For example, one of the central compo- is precisely what happened. nents of the first phase of the WSIS was The WSIS brought together the world’s the negotiation of text for a Declaration of governmental, private sector, and civil Principles and an Action Plan (WSIS, society leaders in a discussion about the 2003a, b). In the UN context, this nego- uses of information and communication tiation around text is a lengthy process. technologies in the development of a Each document is endlessly debated, page global information society. The ITU, a by page, paragraph by paragraph, and specialized agency of the UN focusing on word by word. Participants in the nego- the technical and developmental aspects tiation process suggest specific text, of telecommunications, organized the known as “language,” that usually reflects WSIS and had a clear interest in its their own parochial interests in the issue outcomes. It saw the WSIS as an oppor- in question. This often takes place in a tunity for it to regain a central role in very large plenary session. In this critical telecommunications policy, since tele- process during the WSIS, civil society was communications, and indeed the internet, limited in its inputs to the first five min- which itself is underpinned by tele- utes of each morning or afternoon session communications infrastructure, plays a (the same was true for the private sector). critical role in the information society. During this time, they had to offer their The WSIS was explicitly “multi- suggested language for every issue plan- stakeholder,” and established a significant ned to be negotiated during that session. precedent within the UN for the invol- In stark contrast, governments (all gov- vement of non-state actors in policy ernments, both developed and develop- formulation (Klein, 2004). With new sta- ing) had free reign during the session to keholders come new policy perspectives. take the floor, offer language, and respond The WSIS brought together diverse to other suggestions. Civil society and the actors from around the world, in devel- private sector delegates had no such oped and developing countries, to focus opportunities. These structural limitations on an incredible array of policy issues, were pervasive throughout the structure from infrastructure financing and devel- of the WSIS, greatly reducing the impact opment to multi-lingual content creation. of civil society on its outcomes. While it is quite appropriate to criticize the outcomes of the WSIS, as many have Dynamics of change done (see Franklin, 2007), there is no doubt that it unleashed a dynamic for In the course of the WSIS debates internet change in the existing global internet governance emerged as one of the thorn- governance regime. This new multi- iest ICT policy issues. The crux is the stakeholder dynamic has emerged to chal- following question. If the internet is lenge the existing internet governance going to serve increasingly as the under- mechanisms organized around ICANN. lying infrastructure for nearly all the In many ways, the WSIS was an overt applications that enable the global infor- attempt to create the principles, norms, mation society, who should control the and values necessary for the global gov- allocation of scarce resources relating to it, ernance of an international issue area and what should be its overall global

404 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE governance mechanisms? On one hand In response, ICANN put the imple- are the proponents of ICANN, who mentation of the new domain on hold. argue that ICANN is already a function- Even with the support of the chair and ing, complex, multi-stakeholder global numerous board members, the .xxx deci- institution, based on the principles of sion was voted down in May 2006 internationalization and privatization of (Westerdal, 2007). For many, this turn of governance. It has numerous institutional events shows the substantial influence— structures already in place, and a relatively both latent and actual—of the U.S. on proven set of mechanisms. what is supposed to be a global, inde- On the other hand, this position is pendent, and neutral technical body. heavily criticized by those who ask: should The second significant element of these the future of such a valuable resource as debates concerns the tension between free- the internet be determined by ICANN, a dom and control. Some states, some but not-for-profit corporation registered in not all of which are authoritarian, want to the United States, which is still overseen ensure that they have the capability to by a contractual relationship with the U.S. control the internet within their own government, or should a more global, countries. While this is frequently presented independent, and representative institution as the desire to “protect” their citizens, evolve to assume these responsibilities? the reality is that it allows them to exert Again, the ITU is seen by many, but significant censorship and surveillance of certainly not all, as just such an interna- their citizens’ online activities. Many of tional mechanism and one that provides a these types of governments see the UN role for the UN system in internet environment as much more amenable to governance. The continued dominance their individual or collective influence than of states, and in some cases the relative the current “U.S.-dominated” ICANN strength of developing countries within structures. For them, the WSIS presented the ITU, is a significant negative for some an alternative to raise these issues and try to policy activists. But many of the propo- shift the debate to familiar UN territory. nents of the UN-based approach argue After all of the international wrangling that ICANN is too politically beholden to between these warring camps and the the U.S., and will bend to its political will. creation of a new Working Group on The most interesting recent illustration Internet Governance (WGIG) following of this pressure came when significant the Geneva WSIS in 2003, these issues lobbying from the U.S. conservative reli- were still unresolved with the conclusion gious right was applied to the Bush of the WSIS at the 2005 Tunis summit. Administration’s Department of Commerce As a result, two new follow-on mechan- to oppose the proposal for ICANN to isms were born, the Internet Governance approve an .xxx domain (Westerdal, Forum (IGF) and the Global Alliance for 2007). The ICANN board determined in ICT and Development (GAID). In parti- June 2005 that the proposal met all of its cular, the IGF is designed to continue the requirements and initiated a process to process of UN-led global discussion on begin a contractual relationship with the future of internet governance. ICM, the proposing company, which was approved in final form on August 1, 2005. Shortly after, domestic political mobilization Enabling participation? against the decision began in the U.S., and the government officially announced The preceding section addressed the first its opposition to ICANN’s decision. research question by outlining the contours

405 DERRICK L. COGBURN of internet governance. The second is an Address Supporting Organization, a research question asks: in what ways are Country Code Domain Name Supporting ICTs being used to include developing Organization, a Generic Names Supporting countries and civil society participants in Organization, an AT-Large Advisory these regime formation processes? Committee, and a Governmental Advisory Numerous obstacles exist to the effec- Committee (GAC). A Board of Directors tive participation by multiple stakeholders oversees this structure, as well as a in global policy formulation. At the President who oversees the ICANN Staff. international level, MacLean (2004) has All of these structures have well-devel- identified the lack of easy, affordable, and oped and in most cases multi-lingual and timely information; the structure, func- accessible websites that provide back- tioning, and working methods of inter- ground information, membership appli- national forums; and the ineffective use of cations, announcements, blogs, listservs, financial resources available for participa- and many other information distribution tion as some of the primary factors. At the features. national level, he identifies a lack of In November 2007, ICANN held its awareness among decision-makers, lack of 39th public meeting in only its ninth year technical and policy capacity on ICT issues, of existence. On average, it holds about and weaknesses in national and regional four public meetings a year, and like ICT policy processes and institutions. most other international meetings, they Internet governance organizations have are in exciting destinations (for example, barely begun to tap into the potential of Singapore, Berlin, Santiago, Los Angeles, the internet to overcome some of these Cairo, Yokohama, Melbourne, Stockholm, obstacles and to enable remote participa- and Montevideo, to name just a few). All tion and geographically distributed colla- of these meetings are open to the public, boration. This section compares some of and are advertised on its well known the efforts to date. website. Here one may also find information about how to register for a meeting, background documents, and other ICANN preparatory materials. As early as March Without a doubt, ICANN is still the cen- 2000, in its fifth meeting, ICANN was tral organization in global internet gov- already using a variety of techniques to ernance. Through its public meetings and enable some level of remote participation complex organizational structure, ICANN in its meetings. For example, it would touts its role in maintaining the “ongoing make a transcript of the main plenary ses- security and stability” of the internet sions available online in almost real time, through its various multi-stakeholder policy and would take questions and comments and decision-making processes. from the internet. Although the structure of ICANN has changed since its inception in 1998, sev- The WSIS eral of the same basic elements are still in place. These attempt to honor the goal of From the perspective of enabling multi- bringing together the technical commu- stakeholder participation, the WSIS pre- nity, the commercial constituency, the sents numerous analytical challenges. The non-profit constituency, individual users, UN General Assembly resolution that cre- and governments. Each of these constitu- ated the WSIS explicitly stated that civil encies has an organizational role within society groups would be equal participants the ICANN structures. For example, there in the process. However, it was apparent

406 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE from the outset how difficult it is to put and efficient. If this was to be the extent this desire into practice. of civil society participation—while gov- To begin, the WSIS was a very ernments could take the floor as fre- elongated policy formulation process. Not quently as they liked to negotiate on only did it have two distinct phases every single sentence and paragraph being (Geneva 2003–Tunis 2005), it also had a debated—then there is a clear need for number of fairly complicated regional and alternative mechanisms. preparatory rounds. From an international The primary focus of the use of ICTs regime formation perspective, these were during the WSIS was on the dissemina- in many ways far more important than tion of information. From the official the summit itself. The sheer number, WSIS website, anyone with internet geographical distribution, and duration of access could download nearly every these meetings were overwhelming. It document under formal discussion (in was almost impossible for any developing multiple languages), and could access country or civil society organization to be webcasts of the formal plenary sessions. active participants in all of the WSIS pre- While these uses of information technol- paratory rounds. For those fortunate few ogy are helpful, they allow for very little who could attend each of the meetings, at (if any) interactivity, and focus on passive significant financial expense, fully active receipt of information as opposed to participation was yet another hurdle. enabling remote participants to engage in The formal Preparatory Committee a deliberative process. meetings (PrepComs) were held mostly in Geneva (with one in Tunisia), and each WGIG lasted two weeks. For many people, “participation” in these conferences meant The WGIG was organized as a multi- physically traveling to Geneva, staying in stakeholder working group after the close a hotel for two weeks, and traveling every of the first phase of the WSIS, when the day to the conference center to sit internet governance issues remained through the PrepCom meetings. After all intractable. Unlike the structural limita- this expense, time, and effort to get to tions described above in the WSIS pre- Geneva to attend the PrepCom, what paratory meetings, the WGIG members “participation” actually meant for civil were all able to participate relatively society organizations was being able to equally in the WSIS processes, albeit contribute to a “collective” civil society mostly behind closed doors. One aid to statement that could be made at the this process was the decision to organize opening five minutes of the morning the WGIG using Chatham House rules, session, and again at the opening five meaning that while members were free to minutes of the afternoon session. Other use the information discussed during than that, there was no official mechanism meetings, no member was allowed to for civil society input into any of the attribute anything to any individual actual deliberations and negotiations member or their institution. This well- being conducted on the various policy known rule is designed to stimulate a issues and draft documents. free-flowing exchange of information and Even if we accept the argument that ideas—crucial in difficult policy areas. these meetings and their subsequent Since most of the WGIG procedures documents are important to regime for- were behind closed doors, it is difficult to mation, it is difficult to accept that parti- assess the extent to which ICTs were used cipating in this manner was cost-effective to support their processes and the degree

407 DERRICK L. COGBURN to which remote participation was encour- a nearly verbatim transcript was made aged or used. However, it seems likely available in real-time to the public from that e-mail listservs were the dominant the IGF website. This complemented the technology. Transcripts of public con- multiple webcasts and multi-lingual audio sultations were made available, as well as feeds. The secretariat set up a team of submissions from various groups. Very experts to receive e-mail responses and little eﬀort was made to accommodate questions from remote participants, and members that could not physically attend the panel moderators were instructed to meetings. integrate those questions and comments into their session moderation. Particularly illustrative of this approach was the session IGF moderated by Ken Cukier of the Economist, Building upon the structural innovations who skillfully integrated the remote par- of the WGIG, the IGF has introduced ticipants into the physical session. In more innovative mechanisms for multi- addition to this e-mail based interactivity, stakeholder participation and has gone the IGF secretariat organized two mobile further than nearly any other internet gov- phone lines for receiving caller questions ernance institution in terms of facilitating and comments, a blog for conference remote participation. participants, and a free wireless network The IGF does not have a selective (though the latter broke down at various “membership” structure like the WGIG. stages). It is an open and multi-stakeholder venue for discussion. At its 2006 inaugural UN Global Alliance for ICTs and meeting in Athens, the IGF gave birth to Development yet another innovation, the “Dynamic Coalition,” which was supposed to be a The remaining WSIS follow-on activity, bottom–up self-organizing mechanism for the UN Global Alliance for ICTs and multi-stakeholder interest groups to con- Development (GAID) is important due to vene. However, at the same time, some its focus on the development aspects of of the selective participatory elements the internet and the information society, from the WGIG were incorporated into and on getting developing countries more the IGF as the secretariat appointed what actively involved in the process. it called a “Multi-stakeholder Advisory The GAID held its inaugural meeting Group.” This was designed to be the in Kuala Lumpur in June 2006. It invited highest advisory grouping to support the multi-stakeholder activists from around decision-making processes of the IGF. The the world. They organized a steering IGF also supported the creation of a parallel committee, a high-level panel of advisors, academic body called the Global Internet and champions’ networks, all chaired by Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) Craig Barrett, chief executive oﬃcer of to allow for scholars and academics to Intel Corporation. In February 2007, the organize around the IGF meetings. Global Alliance held its second meeting at More importantly from the perspective the headquarters of Intel in Santa Clara, of this chapter, however, was the decision the heart of Silicon Valley. But at neither to facilitate interactive, geographically of these meetings did the GAID make distributed, multi-stakeholder participation any attempt to use ICTs to better engage in the IGF. In Athens, this happened on civil society or participants from develop- at least two levels: the plenary sessions, ing countries. As with many of the other and the workshops. In the plenary sessions, post-WSIS initiatives, the GAID has mostly

408 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE used its website to disseminate informa- for example, ICTs were a key aspect of tion to the public about events, with the Global Deliberative Dialogue on Internet some background information on how Governance, established by a consortium the organization is structured and governed. led by the Center for Research on The comparative analysis of these Collaboratories and Technology Enhanced organizations and forums shows that in Learning Communities (COTELCO) at nearly all of the cases, there has been some Syracuse University, of which the author effort to use ICTs to facilitate remote is Director. Timed to coincide with the participation. The usage is varied and WSIS Tunis PrepCom 3 in 2005, this occasionally patchy. Clearly, the dominant used synchronous and asynchronous technology is still e-mail and listservs. This technologies to bring together interested is followed by audio and video webcasts, parties from governments, international which allow remote participants to follow organizations, the private sector, and what is going on in meetings, frequently civil society to debate the internet gov- in multiple languages. Often, text-based ernance policy issues being addressed on transcripts of meeting discussions support the ground in Geneva. Given that most these webcasts. However, most of these of the physical participants in the approaches are still one-way broadcasts, PrepCom were usually passive spectators and do not promote much interactivity in the conference room, watching other and participation. people—mostly governments—present and debate text, they had significant time to be able to participate in the dialog. It also Emergent participatory created an opportunity for experts, both practices on the ground in Geneva and around the world, to help educate novice participants As the discussion has shown, there is a about the substantive and fundamental desire on the part of most institutions issues. This blended approach, taking involved in global internet governance to synchronous and asynchronous commu- enable some form of remote participation. nication and collaboration tools, and fur- Unfortunately, most of these approaches ther blending participation on the ground take a “broadcast” approach, and focus on with geographically distributed indivi- allowing remote participants to read, see, duals, was seen by most participants as and/or hear what is going on at the tremendously powerful. meetings. These approaches are mostly Similarly, outside of the main plenary not highly interactive, and fail to capture sessions of the IGF in Athens in 2006, the essential knowledge, expertise, and additional innovations occurred in the involvement of most of the remote parti- workshops. The Internet Governance cipants. More importantly, this approach Project (2004, 2005) used workshops to continues to highlight and reinforce the demonstrate the broader potential of reality that the “physical” meetings are remote participation. Both of the projects’ really the most important, and where the panels used web-conferencing technolo- “action” really occurs. gies to allow remote participants to deli- But in common with most contempor- ver presentations, watch and hear the ary international gatherings, official meet- presentations of others, and ask questions. ings in the internet governance policy Finally, the Internet Governance Project area have often been accompanied by a and COTELCO organized a tri-partite number of “unofficial” experimental par- web-conference linking the Athens IGF ticipatory mechanisms. During the WSIS, with the Caribbean Internet Forum and a

409 DERRICK L. COGBURN gathering of faculty and students at Syracuse These three functions include: (1) people- University. Speakers at each location were to-people; (2) people-to-information; and also able to interact with participants not (3) people-to-facilities (Science of Colla- located at any of the three sites. boratories, 2007). A set of collaboration The success of these initiatives indicates tools and social practices supports the the potential for enhanced participation in functioning of an effective collaboratory. global policy processes through cyber- For example, in the people-to-people cate- infrastructure and policy collaboratories. If gory, a collection of tools would support multi-stakeholder policy processes are to the ability for members of the group to be successful, what kinds of mechanisms remain aware of and in touch with the are required to enhance the participation, various members of the research team. influence, and ownership of these inter- Regarding people-to-information functions, national regime formation processes by a collaboratory would use content man- transnational civil society organizations agement systems and other tools to ensure and developing countries? The chapter’s that there was sufficient access to the final research question asks: could the digital libraries and other knowledge concept of cyber-infrastructure be inte- and information required by the mem- grated into the institutionalized policy bers. Finally, certain collaboration tools processes of global internet governance to such as web-conferencing and application better include developing countries and sharing would be used to provide remote civil society participants? access to facilities, such as conference rooms. Some pilot studies have introduced the Enabling multi-stakeholder concepts of collaboratory and cyber- participation with infrastructure into existing networks active collaboratories and in the WSIS (see Cogburn, Johnsen, and cyber-infrastructure Battacharrya, 2008). However, the overarching question is how relevant are these In the field of computer-supported coop- concepts to the structure, functioning, erative work important literature has and needs of the global internet govern- focused on a new and highly innovative ance process? This involves examining institutional form called a “collaboratory.” each component of the collaboratory A collaboratory blends the words “colla- concept to see how it might apply to the borate” and “laboratory,” and emerged out practices required by current internet of the U.S. National Science Foundation governance processes. The hypothesis is in the mid 1980s. In 1989, William Wulf that the insertion of a policy collaboratory argued at an NSF-sponsored workshop into global governance processes can that a collaboratory was “a center without enhance the ability for policy actors from walls, in which the nation’s researchers developing countries and transnational can perform their research without regard civil society groups to participate in these to geographical location” (Wulf, 1989: p. conferences by facilitating their interac- 2; NAS, 1993: p. vii). Collaboratories can tion in geographically distributed epis- be found in scientific fields as diverse as temic communities. This hypothesis has oceanography, space physics, and molecular been tested in the context of action biology. research. The author designed, developed, An NSF-funded project called the deployed, and evaluated the application of Science of Collaboratories has identified collaboratory approaches to the inter- three distinct functions of a collaboratory. national ICT policy domain within the

410 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE processes of the World Summit on the have attempted to provide such awareness Information Society. at a distance. Some have used elaborate It is possible to work collaboratively video or audio hook-ups that are always with geographically distributed policy on to create virtual hallways or virtual actors to enhance the following areas: shared offices. administrative capacity, policy development capacity, deliberative capacity, den- Digital repositories sity of social networks; and degree of engagement with epistemic communities. The digital repository functionality of For example, it would be possible to use collaboratories facilitates document sto- the policy collaboratory to hold geo- rage, digital library resources, shared data graphically distributed seminars and panel and archives, as well as photo directories presentations on key themes, both to raise of members, and so on. Projects inevi- awareness of the themes, and to conduct tably generate lots of digital artifacts, substantive training. These training ses- such as data sets, drafts of manuscripts, sions can include panelists from around proposals, planning documents, schedules, the world sitting in their own organiza- contact lists, recordings of sessions, tion, and participants from around the photos, and many more. An emerging world sitting in a virtual plenary room. body of research shows that online photo Following the seminar discussion, partici- directories may help to develop and pants can be moved into multiple virtual strengthen social capital within distributed breakout rooms. This infrastructure can communities (Resnick, 2001; Resnick also be used to hold robust issue debates, and Shaw, 2003). A project intranet is a strategy sessions, and to conduct adminis- web-accessible repository of these materi- trative business. Evaluation and iterative als and can be developed with certain redesign are critical components of a levels of public viewing and access, while policy collaboratory. maintaining strict security to control access. Security at several different levels of granularity can be provided, starting Presence awareness with something as simple as a login Presence awareness functionalities in a with password. Being able to share collaboratory include such applications as material across sites is extremely valuable. instant messaging; easy to use person-to- There are now numerous open source person voice, video, and data transfer; and content management systems, such as e-mail listservs and archives. When people Dotnetnuke, Plone, or Mambo, that can are co-located, it is common to drop in be used to build these content manage- on someone else’soffice or bump into ment systems. someone in the hallway or coffee room. A further challenge of coordinating a Further, it is usually easy to tell whether geographically distributed group is the the other person is available for an inter- scheduling of activities and shared access ruption or is too busy. This kind of to calendars. A number of software appli- informal interaction is critical to colla- cations are now available to collaboratory boration. It is also very difficult to do at a planners that facilitate easier scheduling of distance, and indeed research has shown formal and informal joint activities, and that it introduces considerable delay into awareness of other distributed collabora- processes that require interaction among tory members. Various methods can be dispersed participants (Herbsleb et al., used to control access to information 2000). A number of research projects from such calendars.

411 DERRICK L. COGBURN

Web-conferencing and possible to carry out a variety of both application sharing formal, scheduled sessions like lab meetings, colloquia, or seminars, and more Finally, within collaboratories, web-con- informal interactions among a small group ferencing and application-sharing func- of researchers. tionalities allow for virtual seminar rooms, with voice and video over internet protocol, multimedia content, whiteboards, The potential of polling and decision-making tools, and cyber-infrastructure in internet real-time application sharing. Web-con- governance ferencing substantially facilitates interac- Given this background to collaboratories tions among researchers involved in a and cyber-infrastructure, the chapter will project. At present most of the interac- briefly explain how these ideas and tools tions in the WSIS processes take place might be successfully integrated into the either face to face, which requires expen- existing practices of the internet govern- sive air travel and lodging, or via e-mail ance institutions, specifically the IGF and lists (Cogburn, 2005). Internet-based web- ICANN. conferencing tools make possible audio To begin, presence awareness packages and video interactions, with the advan- could be used in a variety of innovative tage that these are much less expensive ways. For example, the informal practice ffi and frequently more e cient than long- of the secretariat sharing their instant distance teleconferencing or traditional messaging addresses could be formalized. video-conferencing. The secretariats could hold virtual office An important companion to web- hours if they did not wish to make conferencing is application sharing. The themselves too available or visible by ability to share any software applications being constantly online. In addition, the open on one computer with the members various working groups and committees of the web-conference presents numerous organized within ICANN and IGF could opportunities. Using these technologies, use these to help strengthen relationships. researchers can collaboratively edit docu- These tools could also be used when it is ments, review data sets, run and interpret necessary to bring small numbers of par- statistical calculations, observe remote ticipants together for meetings, or to video cameras, and much more, all in real involve them in a small working-group time from the comfort of their own session being held physically. home or office. Application sharing allows Some of the internet governance insti- all participants access to the editable tutions are already using digital reposi- object (with appropriate floor control tories in the form of content management protocols), and to jointly annotate work systems. However, in nearly all cases, material such as charts, photos, and pre- they are not using these to their full sentation slides. In short, a high degree of potential, such as in supporting the needs real-time interactivity is possible. Further, of multiple and sometimes overlapping these materials can be archived and teams by allowing granular control and replayed, an especially useful capability access to resources. In some cases, the for long-distance education. In a number user-management features of these sites of prior collaboratories this set of cap- are not even activated. Much more atten- abilities has turned out to be one of the tion should be paid to the specific use of most useful features. By combining con- these sites to build trust and cohesion ferencing and application sharing, it is within subgroups.

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Finally, perhaps one of the most impor- used as pawns to project a false image of tant contributions cyber-infrastructure could multi-stakeholderism. make to the existing internet governance Pursuing this inclusive approach to institutions comes in the form of inter- internet governance is an important step active remote participation in all meet- towards increasing awareness of and ings, large and small, formal and informal. adherence to the regime’s principles, norms, As I have mentioned, many of the UN values, and rules. Such an approach will institutions have done a fairly good job of certainly increase the legitimacy of the webcasting audio and video from their internet governance process. However, it meetings, though ICANN has done far requires the active and effective participa- less of this. However, the one-way audio tion of multiple stakeholders. Effective and video broadcast promotes a passive participation must go beyond one or two approach to remote participation. Through face-to-face meetings per year. the use of web-conferencing, large num- Key to this effective participation are bers of remote participants could not only transnational policy networks and epis- hear and see events at the meetings, they temic communities. Empirical evidence could participate actively by raising their shows that these already exist in develop- hands and getting into the queue to ing countries and civil society organiza- speak. They could ask questions of the tions (Cogburn, 2005). The working speakers, and even speak themselves, give methods of international policy processes, presentations, and make comments from especially internet governance, need to be wherever they happen to be located. restructured in order to facilitate their active participation. In order to overcome the current limitations, institutional mech- Conclusion anisms to strengthen geographically distributed collaboration among the multiple This chapter has ended by sketching out a stakeholders should be pursued. The vision for multi-stakeholder democratic institutional mechanism of a policy colla- participation in global information and boratory provides a model. communication policy processes. Drawing on international regime theory, it suggested that the WSIS and its follow-on Guide to further reading mechanisms were an explicit attempt to formulate the principles, norms, and values This chapter has covered a range of issues of an emergent international regime to and has drawn on interdisciplinary litera- govern the information society in general, tures. Four primary themes—global gov- and the internet specifically. Given the ernance, multi-stakeholder participation, broad reach of the internet and its impli- internet governance, and collaboratories cations and potential for socio-economic and cyber-infrastructure—form its spine. development around the world, it is cri- The literature on global governance is tical that the broadest diversity of ideas quite voluminous and varied. Readers and talents be included in the debate interested in global governance should and discussions around its development. start with Keohane (1984). In addition, see However, the point is not just to have Ruggie’s (1993) classic book, which explains those voices included in the meetings, but the role of international institutions in also to ensure that developing countries maintaining stability and world order. and civil society organizations are genuine After these foundations, readers could partners in the process, and are not merely work their way up to the perspective

413 DERRICK L. COGBURN drawn upon most heavily in this chapter: technology to support deliberative democ- international regime theory. The canonical racy found in Button and Ryfe (2005). work is Krasner’s(1982)articlethatlaysout On internet governance, one of the the accepted deﬁnition of international best texts for a complete overview of the regimes. For the alternative perspective, technical, economic, and policy issues, is Susan Strange’s classic confrontation with Mueller (2002). In addition, see Goldsmith international regime theory is included in and Wu (2006), which staunchly supports the same special issue of the journal a realist perspective and highlights the International Organization which contains important role states continue to play in Krasner’s piece. Peter Cowhey’s (1990) this area. work on the roots of high-technology Finally, in the ﬁeld of collaboratories regimes explores the evolution of the and cyber-infrastructure, it would be best international telecommunications system. to start with the National Academy of For multi-stakeholder participation in Science (1993) report, which takes much global policy processes and deliberative of the previously disparate work in this democratic practices, see the special UN area and focuses it into a clearly written review of its relationship with civil society treatise on the subject. Then, read the more organizations (Cardoso, 2004). For delib- recent 2003 report on cyber-infrastructure, erative democracy, start with the roots a report of the Blue-Ribbon Commission deep in the Habermasian (1989) literature (Atkins et al., 2003) to explore the further on the public sphere, then move to the expansion of the collaboratory concept. recent analysis of the use of information

414 30 Internet diffusion and the digital divide The role of policy-making and political institutions

Kenneth S. Rogerson and Daniel Milton

As governments, businesses, and society tackle the digital divide, understanding why the divide persists and whether it is widening or is narrowing is crucial. This chapter analyzes attempts to make policy and implement programs relating to the internet and the diffusion of technology in four constitutionally democratic countries. The aim is to generate hypotheses regarding the potential role of institutions in this process. Each case—Brazil, Estonia, Singapore, and the United States—is a recognized leader in technological diffusion in its region. While the literature on the digital divide emphasizes the very real impact of economic and societal forces, political institutions and policy processes are also important drivers of technology diffusion.

A number of studies provide theoretical 2001: p. 234). Notwithstanding the explanations for how and why the digital acknowledgment of these other minor divide persists and whether it is widening variables, Norris clearly signals economic or narrowing. These explanations can be development as the key catalyst to brid- synthesized into three categories: eco- ging the digital divide. nomic, societal, and political. The second argument is societal in Norris comes to the conclusion that nature. In order for societies to bridge the “the root cause of unequal global diffu- gap, people must learn more about the sion of digital technologies is lack of eco- internet and how to use it. These argu- nomic development” (Norris, 2001b: p. ments run along a spectrum. At one end 233). As countries find the economic is the position that knowing more about resources to provide citizens with access technology enables individuals to utilize it to the internet, the divide will narrow. to increase their economic and political Norris acknowledges that with economic participation: “The higher the educational development must also come a change in background, the more people use the the political will of governmental institu- internet in an instrumental way” (Bonfa- tions to address these issues through tra- delli, 2002: p. 81). The other end of the ditionally overlooked societal groups, spectrum is that technical knowledge in such as “poorer neighborhoods and per- and of itself is not enough to bring people ipheral rural areas, the older generation, to a point at which the technical knowl- girls and women, ethnic minorities, and edge gives them greater power and influ- those lacking college education” (Norris, ence in the political and economic systems

415 KENNETH S. ROGERSON AND DANIEL MILTON in which they live (Bonfadelli, 2002; different ways in which computer net- Neuman and Celano, 2006). There are working is used by governments and citi- too many other necessary factors, like socio- zens. They suggest that there is no economic status or political opportunity. relationship between government type and The third argument states that political technology use. For example, although factors are really the underlying force there is some censorship in all authoritar- driving change. It is the formulation of ian governments, they do not attempt to new regulations and policies, or changes suppress information flows over the and adaptations in existing ones, that internet in the same ways or to a similar make a difference in how the digital extent. divide is addressed. Though economic or The question driving this chapter is societal catalysts for change have an whether this same conclusion holds true impact, a flexible and adaptable internet with technology-related policy in con- policy environment can make or break stitutionally democratic political systems. digital divide initiatives. While media use We focus on national political institutions patterns are shaped by technical, eco- to identify their role in the formulation nomic, and social factors, the impact of and implementation of technology-related regulatory and policy-making factors is policy. Which institutions have an impact understudied and underestimated, espe- on information technology policy at a cially in light of Guillén and Suárez’s view national level, and how? that “Governments can implement spe- In contrast with the approach of Kalathil cific policies that would make this medium and Boas (2003), what follows is a com- more widely used by the population” parative case study of four democracies of (Guillén and Suárez, 2005: p. 697). They varying types. These countries are drawn suggest that countries that understand this from different regions of the globe. In can have “the largest effects in terms of each case we focus on policy related to magnitude” on the bridging of the digital the digital divide and to privacy, security, divide. and online risks. More importantly, each Ernest Wilson (2004: 56) makes a similar country has been chosen because it has argument. Successful technological diffusion exhibited a global reputation for techno- depends upon a democratic institutional logical initiative in its region, both in culture. In order to effectively integrate matters of technical development and in technology into a society, Wilson pro- information policy (see Table 30.1). poses that political institutions play a strong, pivotal role in technology policy. In fact, a central tenet of his research “is Country profiles that the information revolution is an institutional and political revolution more Brazil has been at the forefront of tech- than a technical one” (Wilson, 2004: p. 56). nological experimentation in politics. Its constitution, completed in 1988, gave the country its current parliamentary repub- Democratic governments and lican system. Executive power is vested in bridging the digital divide a president, who is both the chief of state and head of government. Various minis- Does government type matter in the for- tries operate under the direction of the mulation of technology policies? Kalathil president. The Ministry of Science and and Boas (2003) describe similar types Technology is the bureaucracy charged of authoritarian governments but very with the prime responsibility for regulation

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Table 30.1 Internet diffusion trends

Country (2006 Population) 2005–6 2000 Brazil (188,078,227) Internet users 25,900,000 5,000,000 Percentage online 13.8 2.9 Estonia (1,324,333) Internet users 690,000 366,600 Percentage online 52.1 25.6 Singapore (4,492,150) Internet users 2,241,800 1,200,000 Percentage online 53.9 28.9 United States (298,078,227) Internet users 205,326,680 124,000,000 Percentage online 68.8 44.1

Source: Authors’ compilations from Central Intelligence Agency (2007) and Internet World Stats (2007). and expansion of IT infrastructure. The political party holding more than 30 per- legislature is comprised of a Federal Senate cent of the seats. The National Court is with 81 seats, and a Chamber of Deputies headed by a chairman appointed by with 513 seats. Power in the legislature is parliament for life. diluted among a number of the country’s Singapore is a democratic country main political parties. The highest level of according to its constitution but in prac- the judiciary is the Supreme Federal tice it is semi-authoritarian. It prides itself Tribunal, with 11 ministers appointed by on its level of networking and technolo- the president and confirmed by the Senate. gical development. Under Singapore’s Estonia is a former communist system 1965 amended constitution, the president and an emerging democracy often held and prime minister share executive power. up as a leader in IT development in east- The president appoints heads of the ern Europe. Estonia formalized its con- individual ministries and the heads are stitution in 1992 after the collapse of the responsible to the parliament. The Ministry Soviet Union. The executive power in of Information, Communication, and the Estonia, unlike Brazil, is split between a Arts is responsible for technology policy. president and a prime minister. Under The Infocomm Development Authority the prime minister is the Council of of Singapore (IDA) is responsible for tech- Ministers, composed of various heads of nology diffusion and infrastructure main- the bureaucratic arm of the government. tenance within Singapore. There are 84 Various ministries have made strides in seats in the unicameral Parliament, although the technology policy sector, the leading 82 of these seats are in the hand of the body being the Ministry of Economic People’s Action Party (PAP). The pre- Affairs and Communications, which has sident, in consultation with the prime been charged with the coordination of minister, appoints the chief justice, and in the government’s IT activities. The turn consults with the chief justice in Ministry of Justice deals with internet appointing other members. Singapore has crime and security, while the Ministry of the basic features of a liberal democracy Education and Research plays a minor but the PAP dominates parliament. In role in various technology education addition, the prime minister wields con- initiatives. The legislature is a unicameral siderable power and is able to limit poli- parliament with 101 seats, with no single tical participation by opposition groups.

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This power of control over certain types vision is fueled by the fact that less than of activity also extends to the mass media 15 percent of Brazilians identify them- and the internet (Rodan, 1998: p. 65; selves as internet users. Kluver, 2004: p. 449). Brazil’s government has played an active The oldest of the democracies in the role in increasing public access to infor- study is the United States, which ratified mation technology. The government’s its constitution in 1787. The president is “Computers for All” program, completed both head of government and chief of in late 2006, aimed to make computers state. With the consent of the Senate, the available to people from all social classes president appoints secretaries to lead the by helping finance over 450,000 machines federal bureaucracies. A number of federal for distribution to citizens (Yan, 2006). agencies have a hand in technology Another program, the $4 million Casas policy, ranging from National Technology Brazil project, involved the construction and Information Administration in the of 75 computer centers to provide internet Department of Commerce, the Federal access to poorer areas (Yan, 2006). Communications Commission, and the However, despite the government’s Federal Trade Commission to the investment in financing the purchase of Department of Homeland Security. There computer equipment for lower- to middle- are two chambers in the Congress, the income Brazilians, some citizen groups Senate having 100 seats and the House of have complained that the programs do Representatives having 435. Within the not go far enough in helping the people chambers of the Senate and House, there with newly purchased computers to take are congressional committees that deal the next step and connect to the internet. with specific areas of legislation. The Internet service provider costs are not highest level of the judiciary in the United defrayed by the government programs States is the Supreme Court. Members of and consequently most of those with new the court are appointed by the president, computers remain unconnected (Yan, with the advice and consent of the 2006: p. 1). Senate. Brazil’s legislators have been active in For each country we present a snapshot proposing regulations to enable the mon- of the recent principal technology policy itoring of internet users. One senator in discussions in the areas of the digital the Brazilian legislature recently noted divide and privacy and security. These that while the internet is a tremendous stem from proposals in legislatures (some asset to Brazilian society, it also offers the of which may have become law), pro- potential for criminals to extend their grams within executive branches being enterprise. A current legislative proposal implemented by bureaucracies, and other will allow the government to gather proposals from societal groups. information on internet usage (Chang, 2007: p. A18). The Brazilian government has also mounted a legal challenge against Brazil Google to force the handover of infor- Brazil has been at the forefront of tech- mation on users of Google’s Orkut social nology adoption in South America. For networking site as part of an effort to stem example, in 2005, president Luiz Inacio the tide of child pornography flowing Lula da Silva went on record encouraging through the country. The appellate court all government ministries and schools to ruled that the Brazilian prosecutor’soffice use open source software as a means of did not have a right to the information reducing costs and improving access. This (Chang, 2006: p. 1).

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These initiatives have drawn criticism security policy. This outlines the need for from public interest groups. One group, cooperation between the public and pri- iCommons, claims that the Brazilian vate sectors, as well as the need to protect authorities still have a long way to go in basic human rights in the process of secur- protecting freedoms and better regulating ing information systems (Ministry of Eco- the online industry. The group cites a nomic Affairs and Communications of lack of legislative leadership as an expla- Estonia, 2006: pp. 33–4). nation for the Brazilian judiciary’s heavy In the bureaucratic arena, several min- hand when it comes to online freedoms istries have proposed and enacted policies (Chang, 2007: p. A18). on information security. In 2005, the government established the Computer Emergency Response Team of Estonia Estonia (CERT Estonia) to help protect citizens Many nations of the former Soviet bloc from online threats from viruses. CERT have spent the last decade rediscovering Estonia also provides incident response in ethnic identity and rebuilding economies. the event of an attack on the country’s Estonia has quickly gained a reputation networks (Ministry of Economic Affairs for being a leader in technological diffu- and Communications of Estonia, 2006: sion and innovation. For example, Skype, pp. 35–6). In addition, the Ministry of a popular online telephony program, was Economic Affairs and Communication created there. In 2007, the country established a task force that will constantly became the world’s first to allow voting draft, review, and update policies on the in a national parliamentary election via protection of “technology assets.” This the internet. government organization provided key Diffusion of technology in Estonia has services to both the public and private increased dramatically over recent years sector during the April and May 2007 and its current internet user rate rivals denial-of-service attacks on Estonia’s other developed countries. By early 2007, internet infrastructure. The team was able 95 percent of Estonian schools had access to isolate the source of some of the to broadband internet connectivity (though attacks and filter out all traffic from surveys show that only about 20 percent Russia, as well as limit online users to of teachers actually use it in the curricu- those in the Baltic states and Scandinavia lum (Archdeacon, 2007)). One of the (Finn, 2007: p. A1). programs credited with igniting the tech- The Estonian legislature has extended nology push in Estonia was a government various protections to guard against iden- initiative that set up 500 public-access tity theft and misuse of personal informa- computer centers across the country (Swartz, tion. In May of 2004, the legislature 2003). The Estonian government has con- revised the Personal Data Protection Act, tinued to emphasize public access to broad- updating several antiquated provisions and band and has assigned this responsibility to establishing a committee of security experts the Ministry of Economic Affairs and to review and propose amendments to the Communications of Estonia (2006: p. 9). Act as necessary (Ministry of Economic Estonia has been particularly active in Affairs and Communications of Estonia, developing policy on internet-related crime. 2006: p. 71). The legislature has also In 2005, it created a task force of public enacted a proposal to better integrate the and private sector representatives to create government’s information systems (Ministry the guiding principles underlying the of Economic Affairs and Communications government’s information technology of Estonia, 2006: p. 68).

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Despite its relatively poor economic gathered in more than 1,600 online gov- status, Estonia has prioritized its resources ernment services (Singapore to set up for technology innovation and diffusion. cyberwatch, 2006). The purpose of the The evidence suggests that technology center is to monitor, in real-time, threats policy forms an important component of to government information systems. activity within the government and the Singapore is an interesting case. It is a legislature. de jure democracy and a de facto authoritarian system. Government has moved to regulate and restrict internet use by Singapore opposition parties. But as the cyber crime Singapore has long been regarded as a law examples shows, there is genuine technologically advanced nation. In the legislative discussion about the appropriate mid 1990s, the country began its “paper- limits of such policies. less” initiative to make all government records electronic in form. Its population The United States is highly connected, and this reflects the fact that in the mid 1990s the government A variety of branches of the U.S. gov- established policies to open internet access ernment have a stake in the internet and to all citizens through, for example, its technology policy areas on which we SingaporeONE program. Government focus. Policy relating to the digital divide has worked closely with private compa- has been haphazard, but present in one nies to achieve its goals (Burton and form or another since the mid 1990s. Williams, 2005: p. 10). By 2006, 56 per- On February 2, 2000, then U.S. cent of all households that had internet President Bill Clinton introduced a pro- access connected via broadband (Ministry of posal to help bridge the digital divide. In Finance, Government of Singapore, 2006). creating $2 billion in tax incentives, Singapore’s government has sought to Clinton encouraged the expansion of exercise greater control over the internet. access to technology, increased education In 1998, the Computer Misuse Act became and training, and the promotion of online law. It was revised in 2003, granting the content. Additionally, Clinton’s initiatives government the power to monitor online included means to increase the funding of activities and act preemptively to prevent Community Technology Centers. The criminality (Yun, 2004). While the gov- funding for these centers and other tech- ernment promised that all information nology development programs were gathered about innocent citizens would administrated through the Technology be protected, and that the new powers Opportunities Program office (TOP), will only be used for national security which lost its funding in 2005. Other threats, civil liberties groups such as Think programs focused on education included the Centre and some legislators have argued E-rate program, which provided discounted that it will lead to greater political technology to educational institutions. oppression (Burton, 2003: p. 2). In the United States, policy debates The government has also moved to about government’s role in regulating establish better security measures to pro- online privacy have focused on content tect its technological investment. The such as pornography, pedophilia, extreme Infocomm Development Authority (IDA), violence, and gambling. Congress has the government’s technology policy arm, debated over various proposals in all of has recently enacted a cyber-watch center these areas, and several bills have become to monitor and protect the personal data law since 1995.

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As part of the broader Telecommuni- 107th Congress was how to regulate the cations Act of 1996, Congress passed the internet to protect homeland security. Communications Decency Act (CDA). In November 2002, President Bush The CDA was designed to create penal- signed a Homeland Security Bill that had ties for individuals who transmit indecent far-reaching implications for computer or patently offensive information online. security and internet privacy. The bill Though the intention was to keep includes a provision that “shields internet improper information out of the reach of service providers (ISPs) from customer children, the law was criticized for being lawsuits if providers share private sub- overly vague and ran into problems with scriber information with law enforcement the First Amendment. It was judged authorities” (Krebs, 2002: p. 1). The infor- unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme mation industry welcomed the exemption Court in 1997. in the bill, which paved the way for When it became clear that broadly companies to cooperate with the govern- defined legislation would not pass the test ment and share sensitive information. in the courts, other, more specific, routes were attempted. The 105th Congress passed the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Internet policy and Act. This limited the type of information democratic institutions that an operator of a website or online service could collect from a child without We return now to our original question: parental consent. Also, in 1999, senators how might we hypothesize the potential proposed the Children’sInternetProtection role of institutions in shaping technology Act (CIPA), which called for an amend- policy? Some trends can be discerned ment to the Communications Act of from the preceding discussion that may be 1934 to make libraries, elementary and helpful in this regard. secondary schools ineligible to receive First, we can hypothesize that legis- federal funds if the institution’s internet latures matter. They have the ability to access does not have government-approved prescribe programs, provide resources, internet filters. The courts have ruled that and set the agenda. The persistent U.S. this law also violates the rights of library Congress has repeatedly tried to pass leg- patrons. In June 2003, however, the U.S. islation to protect children from what it Supreme Court upheld CIPA, saying that considers inappropriate internet content. it did not violate individual rights because A caveat is that whereas some countries each library had the discretion to adapt seem to be able to respond to changes in the law to local needs, and filters could be technology relatively quickly, the grid- lifted by request. Interestingly, both lib- lock in the U.S. Congress may hinder erals and conservatives have been inter- timely policy responses to technology- ested in issues of online content. related issues (see Neuman, McKnight, An important category of internet and and Solomon, 1998). technology policy comes as a result of the Second, executive leadership could also terrorist attacks on the United States on be a factor. Wilson (2004: 366) discusses September 11, 2001. Legislation such as information champions: “individual lea- the U.S. Patriot Act (2001) has had an ders who recognize and seize opportunities impact on internet-related issues, espe- and make things happen.” Sometimes that cially in the area of surveillance systems to leadership can derive from the public investigate and combat terrorism. One of sector as with Brazil’s president Luiz the most heated legislative topics in the Inacio Lula da Silva’s and U.S. President

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Bill Clinton’s emphases on bridging the in the semi-authoritarian Singapore, there digital divide. Leadership could also come was some public opposition to the Com- from the commercial sector, international puter Misuse Act. While the impact of organizations, or societal groups, but these the opposition is not easily discernible, its groups are often dependent upon gov- existence is intriguing and worth further ernment intervention to achieve their examination. aims such as subsidies, funding for a new Finally, older political institutions can program, or legal enforcement (such as also be said to exert historical influences. the internet security community calling Estonia had the benefit of being the on Estonia’s CERT team to help with the home of the Soviet Cybernetics Institute cyber attacks on the private sector). In for Computer Studies, a unit of govern- addition, while every country has a ment bureaucracy that remained after the ministry or sub-ministry devoted to the fall of the Soviet Union and which con- internet and technology, their utilization tinued to play an important role in the is relative to executive attention and the development of information technology prominence of other agenda items. policy (Lander, 2005). Third, we may hypothesize that ideological divisions do not have a strong influence on technology-related policy. In Conclusion fact, in the United States, “High-tech issues enjoy broad bipartisanship,” as Marc Brailov, Klapper (1960) famously observed that it a spokesman for the American Electronics is difficult to isolate the effects of different Association put it (Mosquera, 2001). In forms of mass communication because the Estonian legislature, multi-party con- they interact with so many other “med- sensus means that there is little ideological iating factors and influences” (p. 11). The gridlock on issues of technology policy. nature of policy-making is one of those Fourth, the impact of civil society groups mediating factors—one that has arguably will play a role. Milner (2006) argues that been neglected. While most literature on the ability of societal groups to influence the digital divide emphasizes the very real democratic institutions has the strongest impact of economic and societal forces, influence on technological diffusion. Shuler political institutions and policy processes and Day (2004) present a volume full of are also important drivers of technology examples of how civil society organiza- diffusion. tions have a positive impact in technology policy-making for social change. However, they acknowledge that “most information Guide to further reading society policy development of the past decade has occurred to the exclusion of Much has been written about the diffu- civil society in the policy processes” sion of technology and the digital divide. (Schuler and Day, 2004: 354). In Brazil, Early important works on technological for example, groups “encountered repe- diffusion include Everett Rogers’ (2003) ated disputes and roadblocks in building The Diffusion of Innovations and Daniel out the architecture of the Brazilian Lerner’s (1962) The Passing of Traditional internet backbone and defining the rules Society. of access to it” (Wilson, 2004: 329). But, Norris (2001) provides a well-written at the same time, policy there has been empirical examination of the digital divide. forged from the interplay between Brazilian Other works include Castells and Himanen interest groups and the government. Even (2002), Wilson (2004), and Wilson and

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Wong (2007). These projects are focused discussion on the role of civil society on cases, countries, and the impact of groups see Schuler and Day (2004), Hajnal institutions. (2002), and Hick and McNutt (2002). Kalathil and Boas (2003) treat issues Finally, some of the underlying assump- within authoritarian systems. Two good tions in this chapter address questions of edited volumes, Hacker and van Dijk whether politics drives technology or (2000) and Ferdinand (2000), address the whether technology drives politics. These issues of how technology helps or hinders arguments are laid out very succinctly in democratization. For a more anecdotal Street’s (1992) book Politics and Technology.

423 31 Conclusion Political omnivores and wired states

Philip N. Howard and Andrew Chadwick

Over the last decade, the internet has emerged as an important source of political information for many people around the world. A growing portion of the populations of developed countries have omnivorous appetites for political news: they regularly choose multiple media and multiple news sources, and they produce and consume political content. In developing countries, the internet has significantly extended the organizational capacity of civil society actors, political parties, and nation states. The authors in this collection have analyzed many important trends in contemporary patterns of political communication. This chapter summarizes their findings, and identifies some of the issues, contexts, and research challenges that scholars of internet politics are likely to face in the near future.

Over the last decade an important new collection are mostly upbeat. Some offer medium for political communication has evidence of the clear positive effects of emerged, a tool unlike other media in its internet use on voter sophistication, institu- capacity for distributed and targeted tional transparency, and political delibera- interactivity. To understand contemporary tion. And even those who are critical of politics, the theoretical reach of commu- the ways in which new information nication analysis must be expanded to technologies are used for political manip- include our assumptions about new ulation, surveillance, and social control patterns of political behavior, and our suggest interventions to counter these awareness of new and different policy negative effects. challenges (Chaffee and Metzger, 2001; Howard, 2005; Chadwick, 2006). Positive roles In several important ways, the internet is The findings in this collection playing a positive transformative role in our political lives. McNair (Chapter 16) Overall, the goal of this volume is to charts significant shifts in the global media analyze the impact of new information environment, driven by the proliferation and communication technologies on our of online news and citizen-produced political lives. The impact and implica- reporting, the overall effect being a dis- tions are immense, with positive and comfiting shift for national and global negative outcomes in terms of both the political elites. Bimber et al. (Chapter 6) capacities and constraints for political identify and theorize the wide variety of action. Yet the contributors to this collective political action possible in an

424 CONCLUSION era of extraordinary technology-enabled mobilization networks; those networks organizational fecundity. Online discus- that use internet tools to allow for a sion, according to Brundidge and Rice greater range of “action stories” or which (Chapter 11), seems to expose people to invoke the need to connect a specific diverse political perspectives. The internet issue with citizen action are more likely has fast become a crucial fact checking to be successful than those that focus on tool according to Hardy et al. (Chapter tight ideological integration and strong 10), and those who use it seem better ties in offline interaction. Rogerson and equipped to distinguish between the true Milton (Chapter 30) draw attention to and false claims of political campaigns. how national political institutions and Moreover, with the rising number of policy shape the digital divide. referendums as a tool for deciding on major public policy issues, Wells and Negative roles Reedy (Chapter 12) find that internet use seems to drive up voter knowledge In several important ways, the internet is during referendums at the sub-national, playing a negative transformative role. national, and transnational levels. Davis et Given the challenges of internet access, al.’s (Chapter 2) analysis of U.S. elections whether in the form of personal motiva- reveals a growing willingness among tion, physical access, digital skills, and actual politicians and citizens to create internet- use, political inequalities are being rein- fueled, decentralized, distributed campaign forced as many are unlikely to become organizations, while Coleman (Chapter 7) digital citizens without a concerted public suggests that the aura of impenetrability commitment. Van Dijk (Chapter 21) and secrecy that surrounds legislative confirms this for the countries of the institutions is in the process of being dis- European Union, Mossberger (Chapter mantled by the emergence of a new 13) for the United States, and Wheeler political culture of citizen assertiveness. (Chapter 22) for the Arabic-speaking In a similar vein, Margetts (Chapter 9) countries. Brundidge and Rice (Chapter makes a claim for a new framework for 11) find that the information rich get public sector bureaucracies that serves as richer as they use the internet, and that an explanation for technology-driven the positive impact of internet use on change and as a normative ideal for more political sophistication is larger for those responsive, citizen-centric and holistic who are already information literate. governance. Dutton and Peltu (Chapter Brundidge and Rice’s research suggests 28) offer a critique of the recent interna- that online discussion exposes people to tional events surrounding the World diverse opinions, but Tewksbury and Summit on the Information Society, but Rittenberg (Chapter 14) find that heavy also argue that the new multi-stakeholder reliance on online news is likely to create process has evolved into a significant a fragmented public. Deibert (Chapter 23) opportunity for civic influence on the exposes the variety of ways in which global public policy deliberations over states filter online content, though he also internet standards and governance. Cogburn identifies the key ways in which citizens (Chapter 29) suggests how global internet can work around such censorship. Elmer governance might benefit from the use of (Chapter 27) exposes how political actors online tools to facilitate genuinely inclu- can significantly shape the public record sive policy deliberation. Bennett and Toft of online content by constraining the (Chapter 18) make a convincing argu- way it is archived and accessed by what ment that political narratives shape online are clearly the internet’s most powerful

425 PHILIP N. HOWARD AND ANDREW CHADWICK gatekeepers: search engines. Phillips The theme of hybridity (cf. Chadwick, (Chapter 24) tracks the use of mobile 2007) is strongly developed in Kim and technologies for surveilling public move- Ball-Rokeach’s (Chapter 20) treatment of ments, a technological development that the complexities of immigrant commu- is far from accidental but deliberately nities’ internet use. Similarly, Stanyer shaped by economic and legal interests. (Chapter 15) identifies contradictory trends in journalism: as old media corporations adapt to the online environ- Surprising roles ment and face competition from new Several chapters in the handbook had media players the internet also reshapes findings of institutional transformation patterns of newsroom production, erodes that were neither positive nor negative, some of the authority of news profes- but which can most simply be described sionals, but creates uncertain effects in a as surprising. Foot et al.’s (Chapter 4) context of unequal capacity on the part of study of 19 global elections found that citizens to produce news and hold politi- even though these elections occurred in cians to account. May (Chapter 26) suggests countries with distinct governance systems that the growing strategic importance for and political cultures, the web strategies developing countries of the internet and of candidates for election, government its related software is likely to lead to a agencies, political parties, news media, complex pattern of resistance to Western and civic groups were remarkably con- dominance in the global political econ- sistent across countries. Ward and Gibson omy of intellectual property, while Van (Chapter 3) isolate changes in the inter- Doorn and van Zoonen (Chapter 19) and intraorganizational spheres of parties argue for a mutual shaping approach to and groups, but suggest that many of technology, which recognizes the contra- these derive from long-running trends dictory ways in which the internet inter- towards individualization and political sects with everyday gender relations. fragmentation. Anstead and Chadwick Finally, Fountain (Chapter 8) traces the (Chapter 5) explain national differences ways in which the structures of classical in online election campaigning between Weberian bureaucracy have shaped the the United States and the United adoption of e-government in the United Kingdom as well as contradictory ten- States, but also how dominant organiza- dencies within each country through an tional models are being reconfigured by analysis of the character of existing the introduction of massive information political institutions as catalysts or anti- flows across government bodies. catalysts. Gandy and Farrall (Chapter 25) reveal the surprising impact of metaphor in distributing legal power and shaping Studying internet politics the way to conceptualize—and regulate— the internet. Papacharissi (Chapter 17) What does this handbook tell us about develops a cogent argument that political the nature of internet politics as an area of life online has taken such an unusual social scientific inquiry? form that the well-worn concept of the public sphere does not really illuminate its Multiple domains main features. This distinct virtual public sphere is narcissistic, selectively mobiliz- The contributions herein clearly establish ing, and a hybrid of civic and consumerist that the internet has a role in multiple features. domains of politics. The volume is structured

426 CONCLUSION around four overarching themes: institu- range of qualitative, quantitative, and tions, behavior, identities, and law and comparative evidence. Davis et al. adopt policy. Within these themes are several an evolutionary approach to electoral cross-cutting domains of research, including campaigning. Fountain’s chapter on e- public administration, political theory, poli- government uses policy analysis and tical economy, comparative politics and area organizational theory. In-depth interviews studies, international relations, electoral give Wheeler insight into the impact of politics, gender politics, and cultural politics. the internet in the political lives of young The political analysis of the internet men and women in several Arab cultures. clearly integrates many subfields. Margetts Archival work and participant observation and Fountain situate e-government in the allow Elmer, Dutton and Peltu, and context of public administration research. Cogburn to study the work of policy- Phillips, Elmer, Dutton and Peltu, and makers and politically engaged computer Cogburn analyze politics at the site of hobbyists. A case study approach was useful technology engineering, standards setting, for Anstead and Chadwick, Margetts, and design. Some contributions, such as Deibert, Foot et al., and Wells and those from Mossberger and van Dijk, Reedy. It allowed for, respectively: the Coleman, and Rogerson and Milton construction of hypotheses relating to interrogate political inequality and public national differences in online campaign- policy options. Some pieces, such as those ing; charting the rise of digital era gov- from Phillips, Elmer, Bimber et al., ernance; typologies of state censorship Bennett and Toft, and Papacharissi, are strategies; political actors’ websites; and political theory, concerning themes such political learning at different levels of as individual freedom vs. state surveil- political organization. Finally, Gandy and lance, prospects for collective action, or Farrall, Elmer, and Phillips employ var- the features of contemporary public dis- ious critical and rhetorical tools for locat- course online. Contributions from May, ing the power behind discursive choices Gandy and Farrall, and Stanyer adopt a in law, policy, and the justifications for political economy approach. Wheeler, van technology design. Doorn and van Zoonen, and Kim and In all, more than a dozen different Ball-Rokeach tackle in different ways the quantitative data sets are analyzed in this cultural politics of identity online. Foot et volume and these reflect the diversity of al., Gibson and Ward, and Anstead and levels of analysis: from the sub-national Chadwick, insist on the importance of a and national, to the regional and interna- comparative approach, while the chapters tional. Several data sets from the Pew by Deibert, Dutton and Peltu, McNair, Internet and American Life Project pro- May, and Cogburn fall into the domain vided survey insight into trends on inter- of international relations. Several of the net use. For U.S. elections, Hardy et al. chapters investigate changes in political use the 2004 National Annenberg learning of various kinds: Brundidge and Election Survey, Rice and Brundidge use Rice, Hardy et al., Reedy and Wells, survey data from the Cornell University Tewksbury and Rittenberg. Survey Research Institute, while Reedy and Wells use the Washington Poll in their analysis of learning in a sub-national Diversity of methodologies and referendum. Data from the World Bank evidence and the International Telecommunications This volume features a diverse range of Union provide some of the base indica- methodologies and an equally diverse tors used by several contributors. The

427 PHILIP N. HOWARD AND ANDREW CHADWICK

UN’s Human Development Index, the communication technologies in the World Values Survey, Freedom Forum, experience of immigrant communities in and Van Hannen’s democracy rankings urban environments. help to provide context on political cul- Many of the chapters in the volume ture in contributions from Wheeler, and have clear implications for public policy. Foot et al. The rich Eurobarometer and For example, Mossberger develops sug- Eurostat data sets enabled the analyses of gestions for tackling political inequality; Gibson and Ward, Reedy and Wells, and Bennett and Toft draw conclusions about van Dijk. why collective mobilization involving underprivileged communities may succeed or fail; van Doorn and van Zoonen’s Critiquing and creating critique points to the need for greater Researching internet politics is exciting involvement by women in the design and for many different reasons but one of delivery of internet technologies and these is the way in which many scholars content; Coleman suggests that political not only critique evolving systems of representatives should adopt the partici- political communication but also conduct patory mechanisms of Web 2.0; Dutton creative public scholarship that simulta- and Peltu encourage us to learn lessons neously collects data and contributes to from the experience of the WSIS; Phillips fixing the problems they identify. Perhaps points out how threats to privacy in because of the nature of the object of electronic surveillance may be resisted by study, several researchers have designed citizens; May calls for the wide dissemina- from scratch research projects that allow tion of open source software applications in for data collection in the unique media Africa and the developing world, while environments online. These purpose-built van Dijk’s critique of policies on the projects often have a public scholarship digital divide points the way to a new goal, seeking to study behavior and ulti- EU-wide agenda for change. The study mately change it for the better. Factcheck. of politics online is both a critical and org (www.factcheck.org) (see the chapter creative endeavor. by Hardy et al.) investigates and assists In the years ahead, scholars of the with the public’s use of the internet to internet and politics will face many chal- confirm campaign claims during elections. lenges in their research. The remainder of The OpenNet Initative (http://opennet. this chapter focuses on two: the fluid and net/) (see the chapter by Deibert) was unfinished nature of technologies them- founded to study the ability of govern- selves and the increasingly omnivorous ments to censor the internet, investigate civic diet for political information; and initiatives to overcome such censorship, the problematic globalization of trends and facilitate dialog between civic stake- already identified in advanced democracies. holders. The Global Deliberative Dialogue on Internet Governance (see the chapter by Cogburn) was created to bring NGOs, The rise of political governments, international organizations, omnivores in the advanced and scholars together to discuss the future democracies direction of the World Summit on the Information Society. The Metamorphosis The internet is often treated like mass Project (see the chapter by Kim and communication media such as television, Ball-Rokeach) was established to analyze radio or the press, primarily through survey and shape policy on the role of new or experimental research that explores

428 CONCLUSION particular software applications. But the that explain why some people have more internet consists of a wide range of infor- or less access, and others get more or less mational tools that allow citizens not only out of it. In important ways, the internet to consume political content but also pro- is more deeply embedded in the lives of duce their own. While studies of broadcast users than newspapers, radio, and even news can look for patterns in audience television. It co-exists with other tech- reception, studying internet news habits, nologies that save and consume our time for example, often requires studying poli- each day. Contemporary newspaper, radio, tical engagement. Interrogating political and television programming frequently content online is different from watching reference website content. While news television news. This makes it difficult to websites offer streaming access to the study the social uses of the internet, and content produced for print and broadcast, many scholars tend to focus on only one they increasingly offer content that is of these aspects at a time: either the exclusively produced for internet access. choice of internet media in comparison Table 31.1 summarizes some of the with other media, the kinds of sources most interesting trends in news consump- people have in their news diet, or the tion during elections in the contemporary ways people interrogate political news United States. Each year, around election and information. time, the U.S. adult population is sur- There is a significant amount of debate veyed on media choice. Many analysts over the role of the internet in news just report the primary media choice or consumption. Some initially argued that aggregate media choices by category, and the news online was simply reproductions doing so suggests that television is still the and transcripts of content developed for dominant media of choice. While this is print, radio or television (Thalheimer, true, it obfuscates interesting changes in 1994). But more recently it has been the pattern of primary and secondary argued that news organizations and poli- choices for election news. In recent years, tical campaigns develop unique content television has been reported as the pri- for the internet, in fact reorganizing their mary media preference for news, but its production systems to ensure that their dominance has slipped over time. More online news is fresh and detailed, with recently, a growing portion of the popu- print, radio, and television being the lation reports that newspapers, radio, or summary of selective stories (Boczkowski, the internet are their primary media. 2004a). From another perspective, during the Elsewhere, it has been argued that an 2000 election season about a quarter of analytical frame for the internet should the adult population did not offer televi- avoid two assumptions: first, that it is an sion as their primary source of political object of study that is a bounded and news, and by 2004 about a third of the finished technology; and second, that it is adult population did not do so. an object of study linked to patterns of In these surveys, interviewers are instruc- behavior and social contexts that are pre- ted to probe for a secondary choice if a sumed to be constant across cultures respondent only reveals one response. In (Howard, 2004). Within this “embedded 2000, fully 64 percent of the U.S. adult media perspective” the internet is not a population offered no secondary media discrete, bias-free tool for exchanging choice. But by 2004 there was a dramatic information. Instead, internet use, and change, with only 40 percent of the more specifically the political use of the population not offering a secondary internet, is grounded in social contexts media choice even after the same probing

429 PHILIP N. HOWARD AND ANDREW CHADWICK

Table 31.1 The internet and omnivorous information habits during elections in the United States, 1996–2006

1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 How have you been getting most of your ––78 – 67 59 news about the presidential election campaign? Answered “Television.” Respondent reports a secondary source of ––36 – 60 46 media, either television, radio, newspaper, the internet or magazines The internet is either the primary or secondary –– 9 – 17 23 source of political news and information Did you get ANY news or information 6 6 10 13 30 25 about the [current] elections on the internet or through e-mail? Yesterday, did you look online for news or 79 9817– information about politics or the campaign? Answered “yes.” When you go online to get information – 6 5 16 22 – about the elections, do you ever do any of the following things? Responded doing at least 25% of the offered options. Unweighted N 4,360 3,184 13,343 2,745 4,524 5,758

Source: Reproduced from Howard (2005). Data from 2006 from the Pew Internet and American Life Project (2006). Notes: Each year, respondents were queried about whether they participated in some of the popular online political activities of that election season. Since this list changed (grew longer) over time, this figure is the proportion of people having completed at least 25 percent of the activities suggested by the interviewer that year: looking for news or information about politics or the campaign; having gone online to get news or information about the elections; participating in online discussions or “chat” groups about the elections; registering their own opinions by participating in an electronic poll; getting information about a candidate’s voting record; getting information about when and where to vote; sending e-mail supporting or opposing a candidate for office; receiving e-mail supporting or opposing a candidate for office; contributing money to a candidate running for public office through his or her website; looking for more information about candidates’ positions on the issues; getting or sending e-mail with jokes about the campaigns and elections; getting or sending information about getting people out to vote; finding out about endorsements or ratings of candidates by organizations or groups; visiting websites that provide information about specific issues or policies that interested the respondent, such as the environment, gun control, abortion, or health care reform; visiting partisan sites, such as those run by the political parties, a candidate, or a campaign; visiting nonpartisan sites, such as those run by the League of Women Voters; participating in online discussions, signing petitions online, or donating money online; sub- scribing to candidate or party e-mail notices; volunteering online for campaign service; learning about ballot initiatives or races for presidential, Senate, House, governor, or local offices; finding out how candidates are doing in the public polls; checking the accuracy of politician’s claims with online sources; watching political video clips online; following election returns online. questions from interviewers. A 2000 study 1996a). The national survey data pre- of student media choices suggested that sented in Table 31.1, however, suggest widespread internet use was unlikely to that there have been some interesting diminish the use of traditional news structural changes in media choice. Between media (Althaus and Tewksbury, 2000). 2000 and 2004, television’s dominance as Moreover, the segment of the population the primary medium of choice for news that avoids politics probably does so about the presidential election declined because of the limited appeal of news slightly and a significant portion of the from television, radio, and newspapers population went from relying on one (Doppelt and Shearer, 1999; Fallows, medium to relying on multiple media.1

430 CONCLUSION

In 2000, one fifth of the adult popula- decades, employing combinations of radio tion identified something other than tele- news, television news, newspapers, and vision as their primary source of political news magazines. Chaffee’s work in the news and information, and by 2004 a 1980s revealed the importance of treating third of the population did so. In other news on a Guttman scale—beginning words, one in ten U.S. adults stopped with television, then television and identifying television as their primary newspapers in combination, and peaking medium for getting news and information with television news, newspapers, and about the presidential elections. In 2000, news magazines. In other words, those over a third of the U.S. adults had a sec- who read newspapers tend to watch TV ondary medium for getting this kind of news as well, but those who watch TV information, but by 2004 almost two news do not necessarily read the news- thirds of the population had taken on papers (Chaffee and Schleuder, 1986). secondary media. What explains the While it is reasonable that people who changing distribution of primary media consume lots of political information choice, and the dramatic rise in secondary through one medium might try to do so media? If internet diffusion has drawn through the internet, adding the internet people away from other media, has it also to a Guttman scale would have low had a role in diversifying the range of concept validity. The concept of the media options people consult for political Guttman scale relies on users’ and news? What impact do changes in the respondents’ distinction between types of structure of media choice have on choices media. It is not simply that the internet of news sources and forms of interaction? can replace radio or newspapers as the third Political omnivores are people who or fourth most popular choice of media. increasingly consume news and informa- The internet replicates and integrates con- tion over multiple media. They often tent—text, audio, video—from both new treat the internet as a key primary or and traditional sources, through inter- supplementary source for checking facts, active informational tools. Most con- drilling deeper into stories, researching temporary research on internet use for candidates and issue positions, and con- political news and information tends to suming news in new spatial and temporal treat media choice, source choice, and contexts. In the coming years, it may be interactivity habits as distinct areas of less meaningful to call this domain of inquiry. study “internet politics,” given the chan- Omnivorous news habits may also take ging features, content, and use of com- different forms. Some people prefer the municative technologies. In fact, during name-brand news organizations as sour- the 2006 election one in eight adults ces, but choose to use internet media over reported consuming political news and television. Others will only ever use tele- information through one of a number of vision, preferring to try different sources convergent technologies. This small but but only on television. Still others will growing population reported “listening to actually learn most of their political news radio” by streaming the content information interactively, moving between from a website; they “read a newspaper” media on particular stories, and learning but did so online; they “watched the from candidates and issue groups instead news,” but reported doing so with a of traditional news sources. The distinc- computer, cell phone, iPod, or PDA.2 tion between producers and consumers Many people use more than one of news is further blurred by the grow- medium for news and have done so for ing number of blogs and other types of

431 PHILIP N. HOWARD AND ANDREW CHADWICK user-generated content characteristic of The rise of wired states and Web 2.0. Blogs break news stories, offer political parties around the opinion pieces, and are an important part world of the “shared text” of the public sphere, especially for journalist elites. The dis- The second research challenge will come tinction between news organizations is in comparing the trends around the also increasingly blurred, with local news world, as new information and commu- television channels providing website nication technologies diffuse. Much of content through transcripts of stories, and the literature in our field has developed major national newspapers providing through the study of advanced democ- online editions. These online news stories racies. How well will these theories and are sometimes assembled by different approaches transport to other types of news teams, and at other times are regimes and levels of development? assembled by the print news team but Table 31.2, taken from data gathered structured in such a way as to provide by the World Information Access Project, more depth and interactivity than allowed reveals some interesting trends in the in print. globalization of the political internet. In There are several important reasons for all, the proportion of political parties with conceptualizing political news and infor- a website has increased since the turn of mation in this way. First, while many the millennium. In 2006, 39 percent of scholars continue to use analytical cate- the world’s political parties had a website, gories like television, newspaper, and and by 2007 48 percent of the world’s internet, it is increasingly clear that people political parties did. But there are differ- who consume political news and infor- ences between the use of the internet by mation do not make the same distinc- political parties in developed and devel- tions. A growing number of people rely oping countries. The vast majority of poli- on blogs, special interest groups, and tical parties in wealthy countries have an political candidates for their news. online presence, and while the level of use Government agencies have long been in developing nations has risen, by 2007 important sources of news for citizens and only 38 percent of the 2,351 sampled par- have designed their online presence with ties in the developing world had a website. this in mind (Chadwick, 2001). Television But it is often forgotten that there is an and newspaper stories often refer to fur- important difference between having a ther details online, while many internet website and having the indigenous capa- users seem to prefer visiting the websites city to maintain content online. Among of established offline news organizations. the rich countries, 57 percent of the 738 A significant amount of political learn- parties surveyed had the technical capa- ing is done through information net- city to maintain their own information works that bridge or bond communities infrastructure within their country. The (Norris, 2002). It is not simply that there rest contracted out hosting services to is a new medium—the internet—in our other countries, usually the United States. toolkit for consuming news. It is impor- Among the political parties in developing tant to theoretically distinguish between countries, only 5 percent had the capacity the types of choices people face when to maintain their website infrastructure in pulling from this modern toolkit: choices their own country. of which media to use, which sources to A similar story can be told about the rely on, and the level of interaction to different government information infra- pursue. structures among nation states. Overall, 82

432 CONCLUSION

Table 32.2 Wired political parties and governments around the world

Region 2000 2005 2007 Developing Number of political parties sampled 1,022 1,362 2,351 countries Percent with a website 27 40 38 Percent with capacity to host their own website ––5 Percent of countries with websites for five major ––64 government agencies Percent of countries with capacity to maintain ––18 own websites for five major government agencies Developed Number of political parties sampled 262 250 733 countries Percent with a website 85 83 78 Percent with capacity to host their own website ––57 Percent of countries with websites for five major ––100 government agencies Percent of countries with capacity to maintain ––75 own websites for five major government agencies All countries Number of political parties sampled 1,284 1,668 3,084 Percent with a website 39 46 48 Percent with capacity to host their own website ––17 Percent of countries with websites for five major ––82 government agencies Percent of countries with capacity to maintain ––44 own websites for five major government agencies N of countries 141 166 210

Source: World Information Access Project (2006, 2007). Note: For major government agencies in 2007, 196 countries were sampled. percent of countries surveyed in 2007 had informational infrastructure. So not only websites for ﬁve major government bodies: are political parties and nation states in the executive branch, foreign aﬀairs, taxation developing world less wired, they are and revenue, justice, and legislative branch. more dependent on the informational But only 44 percent of countries have the infrastructure of wealthy countries. informational capacity to maintain gov- Much of the research on internet politics ernment information infrastructure within so far has been conducted in and based their country. All of the wealthy countries upon experience in the wealthier coun- surveyed in 2007 had website portals for tries. Which assumptions will need to be these government agencies, and three quar- abandoned and which new theories will ters of the wealthy countries maintained need to be endogenously formed from their own government infrastructure in- lived experience in developing countries? country. In sharp contrast, developing countries’ governments are much less likely to have a full complement of informational Conclusion resources for their state institutions, and only 18 percent of the developing coun- The Handbook of Internet Politics covers a tries surveyed maintained an in-country huge range of material. It is impossible to

433 PHILIP N. HOWARD AND ANDREW CHADWICK cover all of the theoretical and empirical omnivorous diets for political news and advances in this conclusion. However, information? How should we best investi- contributions can be organized by their gate dependences in the global information broadly positive interpretation of the society, which seem to have differential internet’s role in political change, those impacts on the capacities of states and with a negative interpretation, and those political parties around the world? that reveal contradictory, counter-intuitive, It is time to treat new information and and surprising findings. In addition, look- communication technologies as wide- ing back on the collection has revealed spread and not really so new—they are an three distinctive facets of the study of integral part of communication and learning internet politics: the multiple domains of in our contemporary political information inquiry; the diversity of methodologies environment. With this handbook, read- and evidence; and the combination of ers will extend their capacity for under- scholarly critique and creation. Finally, standing the internet and politics. two intriguing challenges for future research come to light. It seems that more people are using the Notes internet and are treating it as an important source of political news and information. 1 This trend may have been subject to inter- Internet use extends omnivorous news viewer effects as some interviewers would habits, making our news diet more have probed more deeply than others. diverse. In a small but significant way, the However, interviewers were given the same Internet experience may activate omni- set of instructions each year. They were required to note a primary media choice, and vorous news habits, and omnivorous news asked to probe for a secondary media choice. habits may activate political engagement. They were not instructed to rotate options, Moreover, there are clear patterns of however, and offering television first may inequality in the global supply of infor- have biased the response rate for that answer option upwards. mation infrastructure available to political ’ actors as nation states and political parties. 2 Author s calculations from the Pew Internet and American Life Project, “Daily Tracking As scholars, how should we best approach Survey—November 2006,” (Pew Research the increasingly convergent digital tech- Center for the People and the Press, 2006). nologies that seem to have a role in

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486 Index

Abdullah, King of Jordan 311 Adam, A. 266 about this book 1–2; approach 2; collective Adamic, L. and Glance, N. 150 intelligence 5; consumerism, political Adams, J. 335 engagement through 6–7; critique and creativity, Adams, P.C. and Rina, G. 281, 282 internet as combination of 428; democratic Adkins, R.E. and Dowdle, A.J. 66 experimentalism 6; diversity of methodologies and advertising online 19–20 evidence 427–28; ﬁndings in this collection agenda building online 194 424–26; growth of ﬁeld 2–3; informational value agonism, pluralistic 239–41 6; interactivity 7–8; multiple domains of inquiry Agre, P.E. 243 426–27; negative roles of internet 425–26; Aguirre, B.E. and Saenz, R. 283 omniverous news habits 430–32; online video Ahlers, D. 201, 206, 209, 211, 213 7–8; outline 8–9; panoramic perspective 9; Ahrens, F. 22 platform for discourse, internet as 4–5; political Akdeniz, Y. 235 content propagation 6–7; political omnivores, Akrich, M. 268, 270 rise of 428–32; positive roles of internet 424–25; Al-Jazeera TV 207; global media environment 217, research directions 3–4; studying internet politics 218, 221, 224, 227, 228; new immigrants and 426–28; surprising roles of internet 426; Web 2.0 civic society 285 4–8; wired states and political parties, rise of 432–33 Alba, R.D. and Logan, J.R. 283 Abrahamson, J.B. et al. 234, 235 Albrecht, S. 98 Abrams v. United States (1919) 352 Aldrich, J.H. 73 absent ties in social activism 253–54 Alexa Web Service 188 Accenture 116, 126 Alexander, Lamar 14 access: and ability, variability in 181–82, 184; in Algeria 306, 307, 308, 319 Europe 289–300, 303–4; to information online Allan, S. 204, 205, 213 234–35, 236; maps, access to 345; material and Allen, A. 266 physical access in Europe 291–94; physical access, Allen, George 22, 60, 69 emphasis on 301–2; policy solutions beyond Allen, K. 209 limited access 182–83; skills access 294–97, 303; Alterman, J.B. 309, 310 solution to access problem, policies for 300–303, alternative media online 240 304; usage access 297–99, 303; World Alternative Press Center 205 Information Access Project 40, 432–33 alternative sources of news 207–8 Access Denied (Deibert, R.J. et al.) 335n2 Althaus, S.L. 144 Access Now v. Southwest Airlines (2002) 351 Althaus, S.L. and Tewksbury, D. 135, 192, 194, accountability in global media environment 229 234, 430 Acevedo, M. and Krueger, J.I. 74 Altintas, K. 335 ACLU et al. 356 Alvarez, R.M. and Hall, T.E. 175 activism: activist networks, technology and 249–50, Alvarez, R.M. and Nagler, J. 176 258; fall in Europe 26; relationships within 247; American Legion 80 see also social activism American Library Association 182

487 INDEX

American Publishers Association (APA) 358 Arirang TV 286 Amnesty International 80 ARPANET 376, 384 Anderson, B. 280 Arquilla, J. 335 Anderson, C. 4–5 Arrow, Kenneth 359 Anderson, J. 320 Ashby, W. 77 Anderson, K. 204 AsiaInfo (Kyrgyz ISP) 333 Anderson, P.J. and Ward, G. 225 Associated Press 310 Anderson, R. and Murdoch, S. 325 Atkins, D.E. et al. 414 Anderson, T. and Hill, P. 349 Atkins, W. 224 Andrejevic, M. 6 AT&T 242 Ang, I. 313 Attwood, F. 266, 267 Annenberg Public Policy Center 131, 133, 137, audience: independence of audiences of online 143n3 news 187; limitations on audience input 210–11, Anstead, Nick 8, 56–71, 426, xii 212; segmentation of 187; use of online news Anthropolgy Today 320 190–92 anti-globalization websites 240 Aune, M. et al. 270 anti-Iraqi war marches 76 Axelrod, R. 402 AOL (America Online): Arab world, internet use Ayres, R.U. and Williams, E. 178 and political identity 311; News on 205, 208, 209; public spaces online 242 Bahrain 307, 308, 319 Appadurai, A. 275, 280, 286 Baker, Norman 86–87 application sharing 412 Balganesh, S. 352, 362 Applied Autonomy, Institute for 341 Balkenende, Jan Peter 157 “ ” AR ( argument repertoire ) 170 Balkin, J. 349, 350 – Arab world, internet use and political identity 305 Ball-Rokeach, Sandra J. 9, 275–87, 426, xii 20; Algeria 306, 307, 308, 319; AOL 311; Arab Ball-Rokeach, S.J.al. 276, 280, 286 blogosphere 314–16; Arab conversation, new ballot measures: knowledge of 168–69, 171; online – openness in 313 14; Arab politics and new news consumption and 169 – media 309 10; Bahrain 307, 308, 319; blogs, Barber, B. 32, 170 – regional impact of 315; blogs and chat 314 19; Barber, B., Mattson, K. and Peterson, J. 152 – blogs in Egypt, arrest for 310, 314 15; Cairo Barcan, R. 271 internet café, observation from 317–18; dissident Barlow, J.P. 351 action 310; Dubai Internet City project 311; Barnhurst, K.G. 189 Egypt 306, 307, 308, 310, 311–12, 314; Barrett, Craig 408 Freedom House 313; further reading guide Barry, B. and Dauphin, J. 371 319–20; internet and meanings, top-down Barsoum, G.F. 318 approach 311–14; internet café users 309, 316–19; Bartels, L. 144 internet diﬀusion in context 306–10, 319; Barzelay, M. 118 internet use and constructions of meaning 314–19; Baum, J. and Oliver, P. 100 Iran 314; Iraq 307, 308; Jordan 306, 307, 308, Bauman, Z. 227, 241, 245 311, 312, 314; Jordan internet café, observation Baumgartner, F.R. and Jones, B.D. 350 from 317–18; Kuwait 306, 307, 308; Lebanon Baumgartner, F.R. and Leech, B.L. 78 306, 307, 308; Libya 307, 308; Morocco 306, Baumgartner, Jody C. 13–24, xii 307, 308; Oman 306, 307, 308; Palestine 307, Baym, N. 262 308; Politics of Small Things (Goldfarb, J.C.) BBC News 157 315–16; Qatar 307, 308, 313; REACH initiative BBC News 24 218, 221, 224 in Jordan 314; satellite TV 309; Saudi Arabia 307, BBC News Online 157, 204, 207, 209, 210, 221, 308, 314; states and the internet 311–14; Syria 371 306, 307, 308, 314, 319; top-down approach to Bebo 65, 221 internet 311–14, 319; Tunisia 306, 307, 308, 314, Beck, U. 251, 259 319; Turkey 306; United Arab Emirates (UAE) Beck, U. et al. 241 306, 307, 308, 311, 313; World Competitiveness Becker, Gary 359 Report 313; Yemen 307, 308 Becker, L.B. and Dunwoody, S. 133 Archdeacon, T.S. 419 Becker, L.B. and Whitney, D.C. 133 ARD-ZDF 290 Beckerman, G. 313–14, 315 Arendt, H. 97, 145, 244, 316 Beckert, J. 100 Arieanna 75 Behind the Blip (Fuller, M,) 383

488 INDEX

Bekkers, V. 170 Branton, R.P. 162 Bell, D. 231, 273 Brasher, B.E. 281 Bellamy, C. and Taylor, J.A. 38, 116 Brazil 417, 418–19 Bellin, E. 305 Bretschneider, S. 117 Benford, R.D. and Snow, D.A. 248, 259 Bridges.org 372 Benkler, Y. 363, 374, 375 Brint, S.nd Karabel, J. 100 Bennett, C.J. and Crow, L. 340, 344, 348 broadband: broadband opportunities 183; municipal Bennett, L. 136 broadband, potential for 182–83; narrowband Bennett, L. and Serrin, W. 136 versus broadband 299–300 Bennett, W. Lance 9, 73, 246–60, 425, xii Broder, D. 161, 171 Bennett, W.L. 32, 85, 151 Broder, J. 20 Bennett, W.L. and Lagos, T. 250 Brody, R. 144 Bennett, W.L. and Manheim, J.B. 154 Brosnan, M.J. 291 Bennett, W.L., Breunig, C. and Givens, T. 247 Brouwer, L. 279 Bennett, W.L. et al. 248, 255, 256, 259 Brown, Gordon 218 Benoliel, J. 362 Brown, Sherrod 22 Berelson, B. 186 Browning, G. 24 Berger, B.L. 353 Brundidge, Jennifer 8, 144–56, 425, xii Berkowitz, B.D. 335 Bruns, A. 97, 213 Berry, J.M. 74 Buckley v. Valeo (US Supreme Court, 1976) 67 Best, S.J. et al. 191 Bucy, E.P.al. 276 Bimber, B. and Davis, R. 14, 18, 19, 24, 55, 69, Budge, I. 32, 38 71, 145, 147, 150, 155, 158, 236 Buechler, S. 246 Bimber, B. et al. 8, 73, 75, 76, 79, 85, 171, 424 Bunz, U. et al. 297 Bimber, B., Flanagin, A.J. and Stohl, C. 254 bureaucratic reform and e-government in US 99–113; Bimber, Bruce 33, 38, 72–85, 135, 145, 146, 147, Bush administration, “Presidential management 148, 154, 155, 171, 175, 176, 184, 234, 238, agenda” 104–6; business lines, building shared 240, 243, 254, 277, xii services 108–9; CDHS (California Department of Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (2002) Health Services) 110; Clinger-Cohen Act (1996) 67–68 105; Clinton administration, “reinvention of Blair, Tony 61, 218, 220 government” 102–4; cross-agenct web portals Blavin, J.H. and Cohen, I.G. 362 102–3; cross-agency initiatives 106–7; Blears, Hazel 64–65 cross-agency relationships 111–12; blogs: Arab blogosphere 314–16; and chat in Arab E-Government Act (2002) 107, 108; world 314–19; in Egypt, arrest for 310, 314–15; e-government research, future prospects 111–12; election campaigns in United States 17, 20–21; FedBizOpps.gov 106; formal institutions 100; global media environment 226; place blogs 204; further reading guide 112–13; governance – public spaces online 237, 238; regional impact of 107 8; Government Performance and Results in Arab world 315; Web 2.0 204–5 Act (GPRA, 1993) 103, 105; government-to- – Blumler, Jay 97 government projects 106 7; ICTs 99, 100, – Blumler, J.G. and Gurevitch, M. 231, 239 101 2, 105; informal institutions 100; initiatives – Boase, J. et al. 152 and institutional developments (1993 2008) – Boczkowski, P. 188, 189, 200, 429 102 9; INPHO (Information Network for ffi Boddy, W. 381 Public Health O cials) 104; institutional Bogdanor, V. 65 research dimensions 111–12; institutions Bolter, J.D. and Grusin, R. 189, 200 100–101; local and state e-government Bonfadelli, H. 168, 299, 415, 416 developments 109–11; middle level institutions Boogers, M. and Voerman, G. 239 (“middleware”) 100–101; MIIS (Multi-level Bosmajian, H.A. 351 Integrated Information System) 101; NASCIO bounded openness 373–74 (National Association of State Chief Information Bowers-Brown, J. 28 Officers) 109, 110; NPR (National Performance Bowler, S. and Donovan, T. 161, 162, 163 Review) 103–4; OMB (Office of Management Bowler, Shaun 172 and Budget) 106, 107–8; oversight 107–8; Bradley, Bill 18, 19 President’s Management Agenda 105–6, 108; Bradley, C.D. 14 Quicksilver initiative 106–7; shared services Brailov, Marc 422 106–7, 108–9; societal internet uses 102–3; Braman, S. 374 technological challenges 112; web-based

489 INDEX

governemnt, development of 102; Weberian investigating 326–27; Russian censorship 224–25; bureaucracy and American state 101–2 Saudi censorship 224; sophistication of Burke, A.t al. 266 censorship 328–30 Burkhalter, S.t al. 170 Center for Communication and Civic Engagement Burnett, R.nd Marshall, P.D. 44 250 Burnham, D. 116 Cerf, Vint 383n2 Burt, E.nd Taylor, J. 31 Ceruzzi, P. 368 Burt, R.S. 100 Chadwick, A. and May, C. 117, 174 Burton, C. 420 Chadwick, Andrew 1–9, 24, 55, 56–71, 76, 212, Burton, J.nd Williams, F. 420 250, 383n1, 399, 424–34, 426, 432, xii Bush, George H.W. 14, 21 Chaffee, S.H. 191 Bush, George W. 15, 17, 18, 60, 132, 133, 134, Chaffee, S.H. and Frank, S. 133, 140 138, 139, 165, 218, 228, 379–80; administration Chaffee, S.H. and Kanihan, S.F. 146 of 105, 108; administration of, “Presidential Chaffee, S.H. and Metzger, M.J. 187, 424 management agenda” 104–6 Chaffee, S.H. and Schleuder, J. 431 Bush, J. 167 Chaffee, S.H. et al. 151 Bushell-Embling, D. 340 Chaffee, S.H., Zhao, X. and Leshner, G. 133 business bias on internet 134 Chalaby, J.K. 221 business lines, building shared services 108–9 Chan, B. 280, 282 Butler, D. and Ranney, A. 172 Chan, J.K.C. and Leung, L. 189 Butler, David 172 Chang, J. 418–19 Butler, J. 264 Charles II 220 Button, M. and Ryfe, D. 414 Chen, P. 88 Buxton, N. 30 Cheney, Dick 133 Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA, 2000) Cairo internet café, observation from 317–18 357, 358, 361, 421 Cameron, David 8, 61, 70 China: blocking of internet 329; censorship in 224 Cammaerts, B. and Carpentier, N. 388, 389, 400n6 Chirac, Jacques 157 Campaign for Freedom of Information (CFOI) 89 Cho, J. et al. 299 campaigns: communications in US 15–17; finance Choi, J.H. et al. 191 in elections 66–68, 70; operations in US 15; see ChoicePoint 341 also election campaigns in US; parties and Chua, S.L., Chen, D.T. and Wong, A.F.L. 291 election campaigns; social activism Chung, D.S. 210–11 Campbell, A.A. et al. 175, 176 Churchill, Winston S. 220 Campbell, J. 135 CIA World Factbook Online 49, 417 Campbell, J.E. 274 Citizens as Legislators (Bowler, S., Donovan, T. and Can, F. 262 Tolbert, C.) 172 candidates: and campaigns in US 13–14; election of, civic society: consequences of internet use, past direct democracy and 161–62; recruitment and research on 135–36; engagement and internet selection of 65–66 use 276–77, 286; engagement in public spaces Cappella, J. et al. 167, 170 online 233–34; engagement relationship, new Cappella, J.N. and Jamieson, K.H. 132, 136, 142, immigrants 282–86; as key stakeholder in WSIS 148, 233 387–90; narcissism, benefits of 236–39; and Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 388, 414 politics of participation 396–97, 398 Cardoso Report (2004) 398, 402 Clark, J. 32, 252 Carey, J. 232 Clark, J. and Themudo, N. 29 Carlaw, K. et al. 374 Clash of Civilisations (Huntington, S.) 227 Cass, R.A. 353 class and internet use 283 Cassidy, W.P. 188, 189 classification of internet governance issues 395–96 Castells, M. 73, 277, 282 Clayton, R. et al. 331 Castells, M. and Himanen, P. 423 Clinger-Cohen Act (1996) 105 Castles, S. and Davison, A. 282, 286 Clinton, Hillary 13, 21, 23, 61 Cave, J. et al. 385 Clinton, William J. 13, 14, 220, 420, 422; CDHS (California Department of Health Services) 110 administration of 105, 107. 112; administration Ceasar, J.W. and Busch, A.E. 18 of, “reinvention of government” 102–4; censorship: Chinese censorship 224; globalization of Clinton-Gore re-election campaign 14 online censorship 327–28; methods of closed circuit TV systems 339

490 INDEX

CNN 60; global media environment 217, 221, 222, Copsey, N. 33, 34 224, 225, 228; public spaces online 237; Web Copyright Act (US, 1980) 367 2.0 203, 204, 206, 208, 209 Cornell University Survey Research Institute coalitions in networks 253–54, 258 155n1, 427 Cobb, R.W. and Elder, C.D. 177 Cornfield, M. 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 239 Cockburn, C. 268 Cornfield, M. and Rainie, L. 147 Cockburn, C. and Fürst-Dilic´ 270 Cornfield, M. et al. 239 Cockburn, C. and Ormond, S. 268, 274 Corrado, A. 187 Cogburn, Derrick L. 9, 401–14, 425, xii Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act (1883) 68 Cogburn, D.L., Johnsen, J.F. and Battacharrya, S. COTELCO (Center for Research on 410 Collaboratories and technology Enhanced Cohen, E.A. 335 Learning Communities) 409 Cohen, E.L. 188 Cowhey, P.F. 414 Cohen, J. 170 creation of online news 188–89 Cohen, J.E. 351, 362 Cronin, B. and Davenport, E. 265, 266, 267 Cohen, R. and Rai, S. 252 cross-agency initiatives in bureaucratic reform Coleman, S. and Blumler, J. 97, 98 106–7 Coleman, S. and Hall, N. 56 cross-agency relationships and e-government Coleman, S. and Ross, K. 97 111–12 Coleman, S. et al. 88 cross-agency web portals 102–3 Coleman, Stephen 8, 26, 38, 86–98, 237, 241, 425, cross-services integration and public management xii 122–23 collective action 72–73, 74–76 cross-subsidy on Web 2.0 209–10 collective action space 82 Crowley J.E. and Skocpol, T. 73, 74 collective identification 252–53 Crowston, K. and Williams, M. 44 collective intelligence from political web use 4, 5 Cukier, Ken 408 Collins, P.M. 353 Cultural Citizenship (Miller, T.) 245 commercial filtering technologies 330–31 cultural diversity, stimulation of 303 commercialization of public spaces online 234, cultural globalization 227–28 235–36, 242–43 Curtis, Adam 227 communication environment: new immigrants and Cutting Code (MacKenzie, A.) 383 civic society 285–86; parties and election cyber-infrastructure, potential of 412–13 campaigns 68–70 “cybergrrls” 267 Communications Decency Act (CDA, 1996) 361, cyberspace: experimentation in 263–65; metaphoric 421 construction of 350–55; see also property in Community Technology Centers: digital citizenship cyberspace 177, 183, 420; new immigrants and civic society cyborg theory 263 280 cynicism 131, 132, 136, 137, 140, 142, 148, 233; Compaine, B.M. 179 corrosive cynicism 226; political cynicism 139 A Comparative Study of Referendums (Qvortrup, M.) 172 Dacin, T. et al. 100 ComScore 203, 212 Dahl, R.A. 134, 144, 152, 154–55 Conboy, M. 217 Dahlberg, L. 236 connectedness: and electoral web production Dahlgren, P. 170, 234, 239 practices 43, 48; and internet use 284–85 Dahlgren, P. and Gurevitch, M. 203 Connecting Parliament with the Public (House of Daily Express 210 Commons Select Committee on Modernization) Daily Kos 7, 20, 205 91 Daily Telegraph 211 Consalvo, M. 265 DailyMotion, Tunisian blocking of 323–24 Consalvo, M. and Paasonen, S. 273 Dalton, R.J. 26, 27 content analysis 325 Dalton, R.J. and Wattenberg, M.P. 33 content filtering: commercial filtering technologies Danet, B. 263 330–31; geopolitics of internet control 325, 326– Danziger, J. 102 27, 328–30, 331, 332, 334, 335 data: data flow, petabytes of 221–22, 223; convergence of locational surveillance 340–41 importance of 4, 6; protection of, in EU 342–43, Converse, P.E. 134, 144, 197 346 Cooke, L. 189 Davidow, W.H. and Malone, M.S. 81

491 INDEX

Davis, G.F. 24, 188, 200 design of online news 189–90 Davis, G.F. et al. 72, 85 Dessauer, C. 188, 189, 200 Davis, R. et al. 8, 39, 61, 425 Deuze, M. 187–88, 188, 189, 201, 205, 210, 211, Davis, Richard 13–24, 58, 71, 135, 236, 240, 425, 213 xiii Devereaux, Zach 383n1 Davis, S. et al. 24, 231 DeWolfe, Chris 22–23 Davison, R.M., Martinsons, M.G. and Kock, N. D’Haenens, L. 284 402 D’Haenens, L., Jankowski, N. and Heuvelman, A. de Vreese, C.H. and Semetko, H.A. 158, 161, 162, 193 163, 172 D’Haenens, L., Koeman, J. and Saeys, F. 282, 287 Dean, Howard 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 56, 60, 64, 65, Dia, X. and Norton, P. 88 66, 68, 71 Diani, M. 30, 253 decentralization 33, 35, 37, 198 Diani, M. and Donati, P. 27 deception, role of internet in identification of The Diffusion of Innovations (Rogers, E.) 422 131–43; Annenberg Public Policy Center 131, digital changes in public management 123–25 133, 137, 143n3; “business bias” 134; civic digital citizenship 173–85; access and ability, consequences of internet use, past research on variability in 181–82, 184; broadband 135–36; cynicism 132; Dirty Politics: deception, opportunities, comprehensive approaches to 183; distraction and democracy (Jamieson, K.) 133; Community Technology Centers 177, 183, 420; distribution of political information 134; experts, democratic benefits of internet use 174–75; tyranny of 134; FactCheck 137; false claims, digital divide, definition of 177–79; digital differentiation of 142; further reading guide 142; inequality, evolution of research on 177–78; information, role in democratic society 134–35; digital inequality, factors driving 178–79; digital National Annenberg Election Survey (2004) inequality, reduction of disparities 179; 137–42; National Annenberg Election Survey educational inequality, necessity of 183; (2004), statistical analysis and results 139–42; frequency of use and activities online 181; presidential campaign, 2004 US 131–43; press, further reading guide 184–85; information information and democratic society 133–37, 142; literacy 181–82; involvement in politics and press fact and fiction 132; traditional news as government online 175–77, 183–84; Latinos, – custodian of fact 136–37; YouTube.com 131 language and education problems of 180 81; deference: global media environment 220; minorities and technology 179–80; municipal parliamentary democracy, visibility of 95–96 broadband, potential for 182–83; National DEG (“digital-era governance”) 114, 117, 120, 126 Telecommunications and Information Deibert, R.J. and Rohozinski, R. 334, 335 Administration (NTIA) 177–78, 180, 182, 303; Deibert, R.J. and Villeneuve, N. 325 policy solutions beyond limited access 182–83; Deibert, Ronald J. 9, 323–36, 425, xiii political disparities, internet and magnification of deliberative impact of internet 159, 169–70 176–77; politics and government online, growth della Porta, D. 252, 253, 259 and impact of 174–75, 183–84; poverty and della Porta, D. and Tarrow, S. 252 segregation 180; race and ethnicity, role of Delli Caprini, M.X. and Keeter, S. 134, 144 179–81; reading skills, critical nature of 182; Delli Carpini, M.X. and Williams, B.A. 148 segregation and concentrated poverty 180; Delli Carpini, M.X. et al. 170 technical skills 181–82; young, internet and demand-based online operations 90 promise of engagement of 175 Demanding Choices (Bowler, S. and Donovan, T.) Digital City (Amsterdam) 268–69 172 digital deceit 331–33 Democracy Index 47, 49–50, 52 digital divide, definition of 177–79 democratic benefits of internet use 174–75 digital divide, internet diffusion and 415–23; Brazil democratic experimentalism on Web 2.0 4, 6 417, 418–19; country profiles 416–21; democratic governments, bridging the divide 416 democratic governments, bridging the divide democratic institutions and internet policy 421–22 416; democratic institutions and internet policy democratization: demos, democratic process and 421–22; economic development 415; Estonia judgements of the 144; narcissism, effect of 238– 417, 419–20; further reading guide 422–23; 39; ongoing process of 218–19, 229; potential of interaction, mediation and 422; political factors online media for 231 416; Singapore 417–18, 420; societal change Denning, D. 335 415–16; technical knowledge 415–16; United Der Derian, J. 335 States 417, 418, 420–21 Derrida, J. 233 digital divide, potential for widening of 144–45

492 INDEX

Digital Divide (Norris, P.) 184 Dougherty, M. and Foot, K. 46 digital division in Europe 288–304; access in Dourish, P. 347, 348 Europe 289–300, 303–4; cultural diversity, Dowell, W.T. 327, 335 stimulation of 303; digital literacy 303; Downing, J.D.H. 152, 212 disenfranchisement 303–4; electronic voting 304; Downs, A. 74, 146 further reading guide 304; inclusion, policy areas Drake, W.J. 399 for 302–3; information society for all 302–3; Drew, D. and Weaver, D. 169 interactivity 300; material and physical access Drezner, D. 335 291–94; motivation for internet connection Driscoll, C. 267 289–91, 302–3; narrowband versus broadband DRM (“digital rights management”) 368, 369, 371, 299–300; physical access, emphasis on 301–2; 374 skills access 294–97, 303; social and cultural Drucker, P.F. 81 diﬀerences 300; solution to access problem, Dubai Internet City project 311 policies for 300–303, 304; usage access 297–99, Dunleavy, P. and Margetts, H. 116, 118, 122, 123, 303 124, 126 digital enablement of Parliamentary Dunleavy, P. et al. 112, 117, 118, 120, 127 communications 96–97 Dutta-Bergman, M.J. 190, 198 digital-era governance, emergence of 119–25 Dutton, W.H. et al. 202, 385, 386, 392, 394, 398 – digital inequality: evolution of research on 177–78; Dutton, William H. 9, 384 400, 425, xiii factors driving 178–79; reduction of disparities Duverger, M. 63 179 Dworkin, Andrea 266 digital literacy 303 Dwyer, P. et al. 60, 66 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (US, DMCA) dynamics: of change in global internet governance – 368 404 5; of multi-stakeholder decision-making – digital repositories 411 395 97 Digital Solidarity Fund 387 ﬁ digital technologies and intellectual property 368– e-government: de nition of 114; future prospects – – 70 for research 111 12; research on 115 17 DiMaggio, P. and Celeste, C. 181 E-Government Act (2002) 107, 108 DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. 76, 84, 100, 107 e-Government News 183 – DiMaggio, P.J. 100 e-mail communications in US elections 16 17 Dimmick, J. et al. 190 Ebbinghaus, B. and Visser, J. 26 direct democracy: contexts of, variation within 5 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia European political organizations 32; mechanisms 312 of 159–60; parliamentary democracy, visibility of Economist 167, 408 94–95; problems and prospects for 160–63, Edmiston, K.D. 110, 111 171–72; processes of 157–58 education: inequality in 183; and internet use 283 Dirty Politics: deception, distraction and democracy Edwards, John 20, 23, 65, 133 (Jamieson, K.) 133 Edwards, L. 170 disaggregation 118 Egypt: Arab world, internet use and political – discovery in election campaigns in US 14–15 identity 306, 307, 308, 310, 311 12, 314; Cairo – discussion forums online 149–50 internet café, observation from 317 18 disenfranchisement in Europe 303–4 Ehrlich, E. 13 disintermediation 124; and democratic erosion 32 Eickelman, D.F. and Anderson, J.W. 310 dissident action in Arab world 310 Eid, G. 305 distribution of political information 134 Elcat (Kyrgyz ISP) 333 diversity: in online news 208–9, 212; in social Eldersveld, Samuel J. 62, 71 – activism 252–53 election campaigns in United States 13 24; – – The Divided West (Habermas, J.) 244 advertising online 19 20; blogs 17, 20 21; – El-Diwany, S. 313 campaign communications 15 17; campaign DNS tampering 333–34 operations 15; candidates and campaigns 13–14; Doerschler, P. 283 discovery 14–15; e-mail communications 16–17; Doherty, B. 27, 28, 32, 33 experimentation 14–15; exploration 14–15; Dole, Bob 14 fund-raising 18–19; further reading guide 23–24; Donohue, G. et al. 146 home pages 16; internet, advent and Donovan, Todd 172 popularization of 13; internet campaigning, Doppelt, J. and Shearer, E. 430 history of 14; maturation 15–19; media-controlled

493 INDEX

online communication 19–21; mobilization dimension 31; ICTs (Information and 17–18; post-maturation, beyond candidate Communication Technologies) 25–26, 32, 33; website 19–23; social networking 22; support individuals within organizations, role of 27; networking 23; user-controlled online internal democracy 27; internet as activist tool communication 21–23; video recording 21–22; 29–30; internet as democratic tool 31; internet as volunteer recruitment 17–18; websites 16 outsiders’ medium 32–33; internet as recruitment electoral web production practices 40–55; tool 28–29; interorganizational change 32–34, connecting 43, 48; Democracy Index 47, 49–50, 38; intraorganizational change 28–31, 37–38; 52; Engagement Index 47, 50, 52; Freedom normalization 33–34; opportunity structures, House 49, 50; further reading guide 54–55; categories of 35–36; organizational capacity 36; genre effects 52, 54; HDI (Human Development organizational incentives 36–37; organizational Index) 47, 49, 52; human development 49, 52; links, strengthening of 30; organizational reach, ICTs 41–42; informing 42–43, 46; inter-rater extension of 28–29; participation, decline in reliability 45–46; Internet and Elections Project levels of 26–27; passivity, internet and 30; 42, 44–45, 45–54; involving 43, 46–47; political participation and organizational change measurement of 45–51; mobilizing 43, 48–49; 26–28, 37–38; politics as usual 33–34; national developments, comparison of 49–50; representative democracy, decline and crisis? New Media Index 47, 51, 52; Participation 26–28, 37; strategies and activity online, Index 47, 50, 52; political culture 44, 50, 51–52, framework development 34–37; supporter 54; political development 43–44, 47, 49–50, 52, engagement, deepening of 29–30; systemic and 54; political practices and cultures 41, 53–54; technological opportunity structures 35–36; producer types 44–45, 51; site producer types 51, vertical dimension 31; virtual sphere, recruitment 52; spheres analyzed 55n2; technological through 29; Web 2.0 30 development 49, 52; transnational technology European referendums and online politics 166–67 diffusion 40; web practices, comparison of European Union (EU) 302–3, 342, 343, 346, 348 46–49; web sphere, structures of 41; web Eurostat 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 298, spheres, power of genre in 51–52; World Values 299, 428 Survey (WVS) 50 Evans, Karen 107 electronic voting 304 Eveland Jr, W.P. 146, 187 elite demagoguery 154 Eveland Jr, W.P. and Dunwoody, S. 186–87, 189, Elmer, Greg 9, 376–83, 425–26, xiii 191, 193, 199 empowerment, Web of 266–68 Eveland Jr, W.P. et al. 146, 190, 193 engagement: technological change and 80–82; see evolution of media environment 217–21 also political engagement online exclusion filtering 325 Engagement Index 47, 50, 52 experimentation, election campaigns in US 14–15 Engaging the Electronic Electorate (E4) Project experts, tyranny of 134 143n3 Eyerman, R. and Jamieson, A. 253, 259 Engel, M. 218 Entman, R. 148, 248 Facebook 5, 21; gender, internet and theorizing on EPG (Electronic Publishing Group) 88–89 270, 271; global media environment 221; parties Epstein, L.D. 62, 63 and election campaigns 61; technological change ERS (Emergency Response System) 337–39 and political organization 81; Web 2.0 202 ESD (Electronic Services Delivery) 123–24 FactCheck.org 137, 143n1, 428 Estonia: digital divide, internet diffusion and 417, fair trade campaigning 247–48, 255–56, 259 419–20; Ministry of Economic Affairs and Fairlie, R. 178, 180 Communications 419–20 Fallows, J. 179, 226, 233, 430 Etzioni, A. 144, 350 Faris, R. and Villeneuve, N. 328, 332 Eurobarometer 167, 168, 291, 428 Farrall, Kenneth Neil 9, 349–63, 426, xiii European Commission 301–2, 346, 347, 348 Farrell, D. and Webb, P. 27 European direct democracy 160 Farrell, D. et al. 59, 69 European political organizations 25–39; activism, Fauconnier, G. and Turner, M. 362 fall in 26; decentralization of control and FEAP (Federal Enterprise Architecture Programs) authority 33; direct democracy 32; 121 disintermediation and democratic erosion 32; Fearon, J.D. 147 equalization 32–33; further reading guide 38–39; FedBizOpps.gov 106 geographical reach, extension of 28–29; Federal Communication Commission 342 hierarchies, flattening of 31; horizontal Federal Election Campaign Act (1971) 67

494 INDEX

Federal Election Commission 67 Fulk, J. 81 female sexuality, resignification of 267 Fulk, J. et al. 85 feminine discourse 262; see also gender Fuller, J.E. 175 Ferber, B. et al. 88 Fuller, M, 383 Ferdinand, P. 75, 423 fund-raising in US election campaigns 18–19 Ferguson, R. 340 further reading guide: Arab world, internet use and Festinger, L. 150, 151 political identity 319–20; bureaucratic reform Fielding, S. 26 and e-government in US 112–13; deception, filtering the public sphere 357–59; see also content role of internet in identification of 142; digital filtering citizenship 184–85; digital divide, internet Filzmaier, P. 88 diffusion and 422–23; digital division in Europe Finn, P. 419 304; election campaigns in United States 23–24; Finnegan, M. 22 electoral web production practices 54–55; Fisher, D. et al. 253 European political organizations 38–39; gender, Fisher, W. and Ponniah, T. 256 internet and theorizing on 273–74; global Flanagin, A.J. et al. 76, 79, 81, 85 internet governance, multi-stakeholder Flanagin, A.J., Stohl, C. and Bimber, B. 252 participation in 413–14; global media Flanagin, Andrew J. 72–85, xiii environment 229; information and direct Flavian, C. and Gurrea, R. 191 democracy 172; locational surveillance 348; new Flickr 21 immigrants and civic society 286–87; online Foot, Kirsten A. 40–55, 426, xiii news 199–200; openness, globalizing the logic of Foot, K.M. and Schneider, S.M. 24, 41, 42, 44, 48, 375; parliamentary democracy, visibility of 98; 71 parties and election campaigns 71; political Foot, K.M. et al. 8, 50, 55n1, 57, 71, 426 engagement online 155; politics of protocols For the Many or the Few (Matsusaka, J.G.) 172 383; politics of the internet, multi-stakeholder Forbes, Steve 14 policy making 399; property in cyberspace, Ford, Harold 21 political economy of 362–63; public form and content of online news 187–90 management change and e-government 127; formal institutions 100 public spaces online 244–45; social activism Forman, Mark 107 259–60; technological change and political “ ” – FOSS ( free and open-source softwate ) 370, 371 73 organization 85; Web 2.0 213 Fountain, Jane E. 99–113, 117, 127, 426, xiii Fountain, J.E. and Osorio-Urzua, C. 113 Galaskiewics, J. and Wasserman, S. 253 Fox, Michael J. 21 Galbraith, J.R. and Kazanjiam, R.K. 81 Fox, S. 181 Gallagher, Michael 172 Fox, S. and Livingstone, G. 177, 180, 181 Galloway, A. 377, 383 Fox News 207 Galston, W.A. 145 fragmentation of online news 196, 199 Galusky, W. 30 Francia, Peter L. 13–24, xiii Gandy, Jr., Oscar H. 9, 349–63, 426, xiii Francia, P.L. and Hernson, P.S. 15 Gans, Herbert J. 134 Franda, M. 320 Garnham, N. 231 Frank, D. 108 Garrett, K.R. 150, 151, 152 Franklin, B. 69 Garrido, M. and Halavais, A. 252, 253 Franklin, M.I. 404 Garrie, D.B. 350 Franzen, A. 276 Garrison, B. 188 Fraser, N. 234, 316 Garud, R. et al. 100 Freedman, D. 206, 209, 213 Gasco, M. 102 Freedom Forum 428 Gastil, J. 170 Freedom House 218; Arab world, internet use and Gastil, J. and Crosby, N. 170 political identity 313; electoral web production Gastil, J. et al. 145, 162 practices 49, 50 Gates Foundation 182 Frey, D. 150 Geens, S. 323 Friedlos, D. 340 Gelman, A. and King, G. 135 Friere, P. 402 gender: as identity 264; and internet use 283; Frissen, P. 88 relationships in CMC 262, 264–65 Froehling, O. 281 gender, internet and theorizing on 261–74; Froomkin, A,M. 355 “cybergrrls” 267; cyberspace experimentation

495 INDEX

263–65; cyborg theory 263; Digital City Giddings, P.J. 98 (Amsterdam) 268–69; embodied experience, Gitlin, T. 148, 237 importance of 264; empowerment, Web of Global Deliberative Dialogue on Internet 266–68; Facebook 270, 271; female sexuality, Governance 428 resignification of 267; feminine discourse 262; global governance of IP 365–68 further reading guide 273–74; gender as identity global internet governance, multi-stakeholder 264; gender as social structure 271–72; gender participation in 401–14; application sharing 412; bending 264; gender differences online 261–63; cyber-infrastructure, potential of 412–13; digital gender relationships in CMC 262, 264–65; ICTs repositories 411; dynamics of change 404–5; 269, 270, 271; identity, gender as 261–65, 273; emergent participatory practices 409–10; further IRC (“internet relay chat”) 263; Life on the Screen reading guide 413–14; ICANN 406; IGF 408; (Turkle, S.) 263; male domination 262; international regimes, knowledge and networks marketing “the feminine” online 265; MUDs 402–3; internet governance 403–5; multi- (Multi User Dungeons) 262, 263; stakeholder participation, enablement of 410–13; multidisciplinarity, need for 261; MySpace 270, participation, enablement of? 405–6; presence 271, 272; pornography 265–66; situated practices awareness 411; research questions, theoretical and spaces 268–70; social structure, gender as framework and 401–3; transnational policy 265–70, 273; techno-social spaces, uses of networks 413; UN Global Alliance for ICTs and 268–69, 270–72; Web 2.0 270–72, 273; Web Development 408–9; UN World Summit on the 2.0, new questions and outcomes? 270–72, 273; Information Society 403–4; web-conferencing World Conference on Women (1995) 267; 412; WGIG 407–8; WSIS 406–7, 413 YouTube 270, 271, 272 global media environment 217–29; acceleration of genre effects 52, 54 information flow 222–23, 228; accountability geographical reach 28–29 229; Al-Jazeera TV 217, 218, 221, 224, 227, 228; geopolitics of internet control 323–36; censorship, BBC News 24 218, 221, 224; Bebo 221; blogs methods of investigating 326–27; Chinese 226; chaos rather than control 223–25, 228–29; blocking 329; commercial filtering technologies Chinese censorship 224; CNN 217, 221, 222, 330–31; computer network attack, blocking by 224, 225, 228; cultural globalization 227–28; 333–34, 334–35; content analysis 325; content data flow, petabytes of 221–22, 223; deference filtering 325, 326–27, 328–30, 331, 332, 334, 220; democratization, ongoing process of 335; DailyMotion, Tunisian blocking of 323–24; 218–19, 229; evolution of media environment digital deceit 331–33; DNS tampering 333–34; 217–21; expansion of information flow 221–22, exclusion filtering 325; globalization of online 228; Facebook 221; further reading guide 229; censorship 327–28; Google Earth 326; inclusion globalized public sphere, evaluation of 225–27; filtering 325; infrastructure of internet 324–26; interactivity, rise of 223; mass participation, rise internet connections, beneath the surface of of 223; MySpace 221, 223; Netscape Mosaic 324–26; internet security companies 331; IXPs 221; online environment, complexity of 226; (internet exchange points) 324; localization politics and internet 225, 228–29; The Power of filtering 329; OpenNet Initiative (ONI) 323–24, Nightmares (Adam Curtis documentary) 227; 326, 327, 329, 333, 335, 335n2; routers 325; real-time news 222; Russian censorship 224–25; sophistication of censorship 328–30; states, Saudi censorship 224; top-down media apparatus internet challenges to 323–24, 334; Tunisia 219–21; YouTube 221, 223 323–24; VOIP (“voice over internet protocol”) Goffman, E. 238 services 328–29 Goldfarb, J.C. 315–16 Geras, Norman 226 Goldfarb, Z.A. 64 Gerber, E.R. 158, 171 Goldsmith, J. 335 Gershon, P. 121, 122 Goldsmith, J. and Wu, T. 335, 414 GESIS 291, 304 Goldstein, B. 78, 335 Ghareeb, E. 306 Google 345; Google Earth 326; Google News 205, Ghoshal S. and Bartlett, C. 73 206; politics of protocols 377–78, 379; public Gibbs, J. et al. 284 spaces online 242, 243; symbiotic business model Gibson, O. 211 380–82, 382–83 Gibson, Rachel 25–39, 426, xiii Gorbachev, Mikhail 225 Gibson, R.K. and Rommele, A. 35, 55 Gore, Al 15–16, 17, 59, 103, 306 Gibson, R.K. and Ward, S.J. 31, 55 Gore-Lieberman site 15 Gibson, R.K. et al. 29, 35, 39, 41–42, 55, 57, 61, 276 Gore Report on Reinventing Government (Gore, A.) Giddens, A. 73, 223, 241, 251, 259, 277, 286 103

496 INDEX

Governance 117 Hardy, Bruce W. 131–43, 425, xiii government-citizen interaction 115, 123–25 Hardy, B.W. and Scheufele, D.A. 135, 145, 149, Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA, 194 1993) 103, 105 Hardy, B.W. et al. 8, 425, 428 government-to-government projects 106–7 Hargadon, A. and Douglas, Y. 100 GPL (General Public License) 369–70 Hargittai, E. 191, 297 Graber, D.A. 13, 151, 186 Hargittai, E. and Shafer, S. 182 Graf, J. and Darr, C. 175 Hargreaves, I. and Thomas, J. 202 Graf, J. et al. 18, 19, 68 Harmel, R. and Janda, K. 62 Gramm, Phil 14 Harper, C. 136 Granick, J. 335 Harraway, D. 262–63 Granovetter, M.S. 152, 253, 254, 260 Harris Interactive 346 Grant, A. 68 Harrison, T. and Falvey, L. 144 Gray, M. and Caul, M. 26 Hart, R.P. 233, 235, 237 Gray, V. and Lowery, D. 78 Hartley, J. 217 Green, D.P. and Shapiro, I. 76 Haufler, V. 403 Green, N. and Smith, S. 342–43 Havick, J. 187 Greene, A.M. et al. 31, 39 Hawk, B., Rieder, D.M. and Oviedo, O. 383 Greenwood, R. and Hinings, C.R. 100 Hayden, C. and Ball-Rokeach, S.J. 280, 286, 287 Greenwood, R. et al. 100 HDI (Human Development Index) 47, 49, 52, 428 Greer, J. and LaPointe, M. 59 Healy, A. and McNamara, D. 175 Greer, J.D. and Mensing, D. 201, 202, 203 Hechter, M. and Okamoto, D. 283 Grignou, B. and Patou, C. 31 Heckscher, C.C. and Donellon, A. 73, 81 Grossman, L.K. 24, 234, 235 Heeks, R. and Bailur, S. 102 Guardian 204, 207, 226 Heileman, R. 66 Guarnizo, L.E. et al. 283, 284, 285, 287 Heinz, J.P. 78 Guerilla News Network 205 Heller, M. 362 guide to further reading see further reading guide Herbsleb, J.D. et al. 411 Guillén, M. and Suárez, S. 416 Herbst, S. 233 Gunkel, D. 288, 289 Herman, B. and Gandy, O. 349 Gunkel, D.J. and Gunkel, A.H. 231 Herring, S.C. 261–62 Gunter, B. 201, 206, 213 Herring, S.C. et al. 237, 262 Gurak, L.J. 73 Hersch, Seymour 228 Gustafson, K.E. 265 Hersh, S. 220 GWACS (Government-Wide Acquisition Heydermann, S. 314 Contracts) 121, 122 Hick, S.F. and McNutt, J.G. 423 Hickson, D. et al. 76 Habermas, J. 82, 145, 155, 231, 232, 234, 235, 236, hierarchies, flattening of 31 239, 240, 244, 414 Hill, K.A. and Hughes, J.E. 234, 235, 276 Hachigan, N. 335 Hiller, H.H. and Franz, T.M. 284 Hacker, J.S. et al. 180 Hindman, M. 5, 60, 68 Hacker, K.L. and van Dijk, J. 423 Hirji, F. 277 Hackett, Paul 66 HM Revenue and Customs 121 Haddon, L. 270 Ho, K.C. et al. 41 Hafkin, N. and Taggert, N. 309 Hobolt, S.B. 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 169, Hafner, K. and Lyon, M. 399 172 Haggerty, K.D. and Ericson, R.V. 347, 348 Hodkinson, S. 29 Hajnal, P.I. 423 Hoff,J.88 Halbert, D. 367, 375 Hoff,J.et al. 38, 39 Hall, S. 276, 286 Hoffman, A. 100 Hammer, M. and Champy, J. 103 Hoffman, D.L. et al. 178 Hampton, K.N. and Wellman, B. 276, 279 Hoffman, L.H. 136, 141, 189, 198 Hanafi, S. 281 Holbrook, T.M. 135 Hands, J. 243 Holmes, D. 275 Hansard 88, 89, 90 Hood, C. and Margetts, H. 127 Hansard Society 92 Hood, C. et al. 122 Harding, S.G. 268 Hoogvelt, A. 282

497 INDEX

Hopkins, H. 206 indirect engagement 145 Hopkins, K. and Matheson, D.M. 198 indirect representation 94–95 Horrigan, J. 146, 178, 179 individual-level influences: analysis of 152–54; Horrigan, J. and Rainie, L. 190, 300 measures of 152; results of analysis 152–54 Horrigan, J. et al. 170 Indymedia: public spaces online 240; Web 2.0 205 Houston, F. 188 information: access to online 234–35, 236; Howard, Philip N. 1–9, 15, 18, 40, 44, 53, 55, 61, democratization of 197–98, 199; in electoral web 69, 145, 148, 152, 154, 243, 383n1, 424–34, xiii production 42–43, 46; role in democratic society Howard, P.N. et al. 154, 181, 276, 277, 299 134–35 Howes, M. 277 information and direct democracy 157–72; AR Huang, Z. 110 (“argument repertoire”) 170; ballot measures, Huckfeldt, R. and Sprague, J. 145, 150 knowledge of 168–69, 171; ballot measures, Huckfeldt, R., Johnson, P.E. and Sprague, J. 149, online news consumption and 169; candidate 155 elections and direct democracy 161–62; case Hug, Simon 172 studies 163–67; choices, complexity facing voters Hughes, D.M. 266 161–62; deliberative impact of internet 159, human development 49, 52; HDI (Human 169–70; direct democracy, mechanisms of Development Index) 47, 49, 52, 428 159–60; direct democracy, problems and Human Rights Watch 335 prospects for 160–63, 171–72; direct democracy Hume, E. 189 processes 157–58; direct democratic contexts, Hunter, D. 351, 362 variation within 162–63; endorsements, Huntington, Samuel 227 knowledge of 169; European direct democracy Hussein, Saddam 226 160; European referendums and online politics Hutton Enquiry 222 166–67; further reading guide 172; informational fl – hybrid in uence, public spaces online 242 43 impact of internet 159, 168–71; Initiative and hybrid internet use 278, 282 Referendum Institute, USC 165, 172; internet – hyper-modernism 115 16 and direct democracy 167–71, 172; – hypertext: hyperlinks as binding ties 355 57; in organizational impact of internet 159, 171; online news 189, 193 presidential election 2004, direct democracy and internet use 165–66; US direct democracy i2 Inc 340 159–60; Washington State, state-wide initiatives ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned 163–65; world stage, direct democracy and 158 – Numbers) 383n2, 386 87, 391, 396, 397, 403, information flow: acceleration of 222–23, 228; – – 404 5, 406, 412 13 expansion of 221–22, 228 ICTs (Information and Communication information literacy 181–82 Technologies) 384, 386, 394; bureaucratic information networks in social activism 246–47 reform and e-government in US 99, 100, 101–2, Information Polity 98 105; electoral web production practices 41–42; information richness 145–49, 154 European political organizations 25–26, 32, 33; information society: for all in Europe 302–3; gender, internet and theorizing on 269, 270, information capitalism and 375 271; ICT4D (ICT for Development) 386, 387, information tracking 96–97 393; parliamentary democracy, visibility of infrastructure: change in locational surveillance 346; 87–88, 91 of internet 324–26 identity: gender as 261–65, 273; narratives and Ingber, S. 352 network dynamics 250–54, 258; negotiation of, Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. 237, 240, 245 new immigrants and 276 Initiative and Referendum Institute, USC 165, 172 IGF (Internet Governance Forum) 387, 390, 392, INPHO (Information Network for Public Health 393, 394, 395, 398, 399, 405, 408, 412 Officials) 104 Imfeld, C. and Scott, G.W. 188 institutions: bureaucratic reform and e-government immigration: policies of host society 285; reasons in US 100–101; institutional engagement 80–81; for and internet use 283–84; see also new institutional research dimensions 111–12; immigrants and civic society relationship between 58–59; secrecy of, incentivization 118–19 democratic visibility and 86–87 inclusion, policy areas for 302–3 Institutions of American Democracy (Annenberg inclusion filtering 325 Democracy Project) 143 inclusiveness in social activism 252–53 Intel Corp. 360 independence of audiences of online news 187 Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 354

498 INDEX inter-rater reliability 45–46 Internet Systems Consortium 136 interaction: interactive news 190; mediation and Internet World Stats 306, 307, 417 422; technological change and political interorganizational change in Europe 32–34, 38 organization 79–80 intraorganizational change in Europe 28–31, 37–38 interactivity: digital division in Europe 300; rise of Introna, L. and Nissembaum, H. 379 223 involvement: electoral web production and 43, interest group mobilization 77–78 46–47; in politics and government online internal democracy 27 175–77, 183–84 internal perspectives, property in cyberspace 354–55 IPRs (Intellectual Property Rights) 364–68, International Organization 414 370–71, 373–75, 394 international regimes, knowledge and networks Iran 314 402–3 Iraq 307, 308 International Telecommunication Union 47, 49, IRC (“internet relay chat”) 263 52, 56, 387, 427 Irigary, Luce 263 internet: as activist tool 29–30; advent and IXPs (internet exchange points) 324 popularization of 13; affordances of 83–84; café Iyengar, S. 148, 155 users in Arab world 309, 316–19; campaigning, history of 14; connections, beneath the surface of Jackson, B. and Jamison, K. 132 324–26; consultation on Parliament’s use of 91– Jackson, Brooks 143 94; contextual factors in internet use 285–86; Jackson, N. 61 contingent model, immigrants’ use for civic Jacobs, L.R. and Skocpol, T. 184 engagement 277–82; deliberative impact of Jacobs, N. 374, 375 internet 159, 169–70; democratic benefits of Jaffe, J.M. et al. 262 internet use 174–75; democratic institutions and Jalonick, M.C. 22 internet policy 421–22; as democratic tool 31; Jamieson, K. and Hardy, B. 132, 133, 136, 137, 142 diffusion in context 306–10, 319; and direct Jamieson, K. and Waldman, P. 132, 136 democracy 167–71, 172; dynamics of 82–83; Jamieson, Kathleen Hall 131–43, 143, xiii education and use of 283; election campaigns, Jamieson, K.H. et al. 143 catalysts and anti-catalysts for 62–70; filtering of Janda, K. 63, 71 335–36n4; flexibility of 82–83; gender and use of Jankowski, Nicholas W. 40–55, xiii 283; generation and use of 284; governance of Jankowski, N.W. and van Selm, M. 235 397–98, 403–5; governance of, phases of 390–93; Janssen, D. and Kies, R. 170 hubs and online news 192, 197; individual-level Jefferson, Thomas 133 factors in use of 283–85, 286; informational Jenkins, G.S. 17 impact of 159, 168–71; infrastructure of 324–26; Jennings, M.K. and Zeitner, V. 77, 135 integration of content, role in 431; interaction Jensen, J.L. 170, 239 and engagement 82–84; and meanings, top-down Jensen, M.J. et al. 240 approach 311–14; motivation for internet Johnson, P.E. 80 connection 289–91, 302–3; as outsiders’ medium Johnson, T.J. and Kaye, B.K. 136, 137, 190, 191, 32–33; passivity and 30; as platform for political 231, 276, 277 discourse 4–5; policy-making, changing politics Johnson, T.J. et al. 192 of 384–86, 397–98; political disparities, internet Johnston, P. 342 and magnification of 176–77; as recruitment tool Johnston, R., Hagen, M.G. and Jamieson, K.H. 28–29; religion and use of 284; replication of 135 content, role in 431; security companies 331; Jones, B.D. 177 societal uses 102–3; top-down approach to Jones, B.D. and Baumgartner, F.R. 177 311–14, 319; use and constructions of meaning Jones, S.G. 234, 235 314–19; young, promise of engagement of 175 Jones-Correa, M. 283 Internet and Elections Project: electoral web Jordan 306, 307, 308, 311, 312, 314; internet café, production practices 42, 44–45, 45–54; parties observation from 317–18; REACH initiative in and election campaigns 57 314 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Jordan, A.G. 27 Numbers (ICANN) 383n2, 386–87, 391, 396, Jordan, A.G. and Mahoney, W.A. 27, 30 397, 403, 404–5, 406, 412–13 Jordan, Eason 229 Internet Engineering Taskforce 377, 378, 382, 390 Jordan, T. 30 Internet Governance Project 409 Jordan, T. and Taylor, P. 354 Internet Society 377, 382, 390 Jordan Times 314

499 INDEX

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 287 Kim, Y.M. 197, 199 Journal of Industrial Relations 39 Kim, Yong-Chan 9, 275–87, 426, xiv Journal of Legislative Studies 98 Kimber, R. 61 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Kinder, D.R. 151 117 Kiousis, S. 189 Journalism, Project for Excellence in 202–11, 213 Kirchner, H. 306 Juels, A. 340 Kirsch, I.S. et al. 182 Jung, J.-Y. et al. 181, 284, 286, 287 Kitschelt, H. 35 Klapper, J.T. 422 Kaestle, D.F. et al. 182 Klein, H. 404 Kahin, B. and Keller, J. 376 Kleiner, A. and Lewis, L. 182 Kahn, R. and Kellner, D. 33, 75 Kling, R. 231 Kaid, L.L. 19, 135, 136, 234 Klingemann, H.-D. 26 Kain, J. 180 Klotz, R.J. 59, 69 Kalathil, S. and Boas, T.C. 75, 229, 305, 335, 416, Kluver, R. and Banerjee, I. 41 423 Kluver, R. et al. 24, 39, 40, 41, 71 Kaldor, M. 252 Kluver, Randolph 40–55, 418, xiv Kaldor-Robinson, J. 281 Knobloch, S. et al. 199 Kamalipour, Y. 40 Knobloch-Westerwick, S. et al. 191 Kamm, Oliver 226 knowledge: of ballot measures 168–69, 171; of Kane, T. 305 endorsements 169; gap hypothesis 146; Kasarda, J.D. 180 international regimes, knowledge and networks Katz, E. 147, 150, 187, 196 402–3; technical knowledge 415–16 Katz, J.E. and Aspden, P. 276, 277 Kobayashi, T. et al. 235 Katz, J.E. and Rice, R.E. 145, 146, 155, 178, 181, Kohut, A. 239, 277 184, 290 Koolhaas, R. 245 Katz, J.E. et al. 276, 277 Koster, M. 378–79, 383n5 Kaufmann, J. 403 Kothmale Community Radio and Internet Project Kavanagh, D. 59 400n8 Kavanaugh, A.L. and Patterson, S.J. 277 Kraemer, K. and King, J. 116, 117, 127 Kaye, B.K. and Johnson, T.J. 191 Kraemer, K. and Kling, R. 116 Kaye, K. 20 Kranich, N. 390 Kaylor, C. et al. 110 Kranzberg, Melvin 230–31 Kearney, J.D. and Merrill, T. 353 Krasner, S.D. 402, 414 Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. 246, 259 Kraut, R. et al. 276, 277 Kelly, R. 68 Krebs, K. 421 Kendall, L. 262 Kreimer, S.F. 354 Kenix, L. 240 Kretchmer, S. and Carveth, R. 179 Kennedy, John F. 220 Kriesi, H. et al. 27, 35 Kensinger, L. 267 Kroløkke, C.H. 267 Kenski, K. and Jamieson, K.H. 135, 140, 142 Krosnick, J.A. 196, 197 Keohane, R. 402, 413 Krueger, B.S. 175 Keohane, R. and Nye, J. 402 Kulikova, S.V. and Perlmutter, D.D. 240 Kerbel, M.R. and Bloom, J.D. 237 Kush, C. 24 Kerr, O.S. 270, 354–55 Kuwait 306, 307, 308 Kerry, John 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 60, 132, 133, 134, Kwak, N. et al. 147 138, 139 Kyllonen, P. and Chrystal, R. 175 Key, V.O. 62 Kibby, M. 266 LA Times 207 Kibby, M. and Costello, B. 266 labor law and workplace regulation 344–45 Kidd, D. 254 Lacharite, J. 335 Kim, J. et al. 147 Laegran, A.S. 270, 274 Kim, J.Y. 170 Lakoﬀ, G. and Johnson, M. 351 Kim, M.Y. et al. 276 Lamont, Ned 19, 21, 22, 60, 65, 66 Kim, Y.-C. and Ball-Rokeach, S.J. 276, 280, 281, Lander, M. 422 285 Landes, William 359 Kim, Y.-C. et al. 77, 277, 284, 287 Landes, W.M. and Posner, R.A. 350

500 INDEX

Lane, F. 265 locational surveillance 337–48; closed circuit TV Lane, G. and Thelwall, S. 347 systems 339; control and normalization of 347; Langlois, Ganaele 383n1 convergence 340–41; data protection in EU Langman, L. 240 342–43, 346; emergency response system (ERS) Lappin, T. 344 337–39; further reading guide 348; infrastructural LaRose, R. and Eastin, M.S. 191 change in 346; labor law and workplace Lasch, C. 230, 231, 237, 238 regulation 344–45; location-based services Latinos, language and education problems of 337–39; maps, access to 345; mobile phones 180–81 337–39; privacy law in US 343–44; privacy Latour, B. 250, 270, 377 paradigm, dominance of 346; radio frequency Launching into Cyberspace (Franda, M.) 320 identification (RFID) 339–40, 347; regulatory Lawson-Borders, G. and Kirk, R. 188, 194 responses 346–47; security paradigm, dominance Lazer, D. and Mayer-Schönberger, V. 113 of 346; social activities “contextual integrity” of Leadbeater, C. and Mulgan, G. 32 347; social movements 345–46; surveillance, Leake, C. 340 structuring order of 341–46; surveillance and ff – learning e ects: experiment-based studies 192 93; control in public management 116; techniques survey-based studies 192 and practices of 337–41; Urban tapestries project Lebanon 306, 307, 308 347; workplace regulation 344–45 Lebert, J. 33, 34 Locke, John 350–51 Leblebici, H. et al. 100 London, S. 152 LeDuc, L. 160, 162, 172 Long, N.E. 399 Lee, E. 29 long tail, theory of 4–5 legislative process, digital media and 88 Los Angeles Times 20 Leib, E.J. 161 Lott, Trent 194, 229 Leiner, B.M. et al. 384, 391 Loughlan, P. 354 Lemley, M.A. 362 Lowrey, W. 194 Lenhart, A. 181 Lowrey, W. and Anderson, W. 188, 210, 211, 212, Lenhart, A. and Fox, S. 212 213 Lerner, D. 422 Lowry, R. 18 Lessig, L. 236, 362, 380 Lula da Silva, Luiz Inacio 418, 422 Leston-Bandeira, C. 88 Lupia, A. 158, 159, 161 Levitt, Steven 359 Lupia, A. and Matsusaka, J.G. 158, 160 Lewin, K. 402 Lupia, A. and McCubbins, M.D. 134 Lewinsky, Monica 228 Lupia, L. and Sin, G. 76, 85 Lewis, H. 335 Luskin, R.C. et al. 170 Li, C. 327, 335 Lusoli, W. and Ward, S.J. 29, 30, 39 Li, Q. 262 Lynch, M. 188, 309–10 Li, X. 189, 201, 213 Lyon, D. 347 Libicki, M.C. 335 Lyotard, J.F. 233 Libya 307, 308 Lieberman, Joseph 5, 21, 60 MacAskill, E. 66 Life on the Screen (Turkle, S.) 263 McCain, John 16, 18, 19, 21, 59, 65, 66, 229 Liff, S. 399n1 McCain-Feingold Finance Reform Act (2002) Lijphart, A. 62 67–68 like-mindedness, unity in 149–52, 154–55 McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. 253 Lillie, J.J.M. 265, 266 McCaskill, Claire 22 Lim, J. 188 McCaughey, M. and Ayers, M.D. 39, 75 Lin, N. 77, 276 McChesney, R. 208, 213, 236, 242, 243 Lincoln-Douglas 243 McCombs, M.E. et al. 147 LINUX 372, 374 McFarland, A. 184 Lippmann, W. 186, 219 McFerrin, R. and Wills, D. 349 Lipton, J. 354 McGowan, D. 351, 352, 354 Lizza, R. 18, 22 MacGregor, P. 209, 212 Lloyd, J. 226 Macintosh, A. et al. 88 local and state e-government 109–11 McKay, D. 65 local websites 204 MacKenzie, A. 383 localization filtering 329 MacKinnon, Catherine 266

501 INDEX

MacLean, D. 406 MGM v. Grokster (2005) 359–61, 361–62 McLeod, J.M. and McDonald, D.G. 146 Miami Herald 207 McLeod, J.M. et al. 147 michelinmedia.com 340 McNair, Brian 9, 217–29, 219, 220, 266, 424, xiv Michels, R. 28, 397 Madden, M. 202 Middle East Journal 320 Madison, M.J. 349 MIIS (Multi-level Integrated Information System) Magid, L. 339, 340 101 Maguire, S. et al. 100 Milbank, D. and Van de Hei, J. 132 Mahmud, Abdul-Moneim 314 Miliband, David 61 Mair, P. and Von Biezen, I. 26 Mill, J.S. 145, 155 Malbin, M.J. and Cain, C.A. 66 Miller, T. 108, 245 male domination 262 Miller, W.E. and Shanks, J.M. 144 Malina, A. 234 Milner, H.V. 422 Maltby, S. and Keeble, R. 229 Milton, Daniel 9, 415–23, 425, xiv Manjoo, F. 17 minorities and technology 179–80 Manovich, L. 189 MissyUSA.com 279 maps, access to 345 Mitra, A. 235, 279, 287 Marcella, R. et al. 239 Mobbs, P. 33 March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. 57 mobile phones 337–39 March, L. 35 mobilization: election campaigns in US 17–18; in Margetts, H. and Yared, H. 125 electoral web production 43, 48–49; online 241; Margetts, Helen 8, 27, 114–27, 425, xiv tactics of elites 154–55 Margolis, M. and Resnick, D. 7, 24, 34, 38, 58, 71, Modernization, House of Commons Select 135, 236 Committee on 91 Margolis, M. et al. 236 Monge, P.R. and Contractor, N.S. 81 Margolis, M., Resnick, D. and Levy, J. 13 Monge, P.R. et al. 85 Margulis, S. 362 Monge P.R. and Fulk, J. 73 market leaders on Web 2.0 205–8 Moody, G. 374, 375 Martin, C.H. and Stronach, B. 42 Moon, M. 117 Marvin, C. 231 MORI 61 Marwell, G. and Oliver, P. 85, 254 Morley, D. and Robins, K. 275, 286 mass participation, rise of 223 Morocco 306, 307, 308 Massey, B.L. and Luo, W. 189 Morris, D. 13, 24, 32, 59, 71 Massey, D.S. and Denton, N.A. 180 Morris, Jonathan S. 13–24, xiv Matei, S. and Ball-Rokeach, S.J. 276, 277, 280, Mosquera, M. 422 286, 287 Mossberger, K. et al. 77, 173, 174, 175, 176, 178, material and physical access 291–94 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 304 Matsusaka, J.G. 158, 160, 161, 172 Mossberger, Karen 8, 173–85, 425, xiv maturation, election campaigns in US 15–19 Mouﬀe, C. 233, 241 May, C. and Sell, S. 366, 367, 375 MoveOn 7, 60–61, 68, 69, 250 May, Christopher 9, 364–75, 426, xiv Moy, P. et al. 135, 234 Mayo, E. and Steinberg, T. 90 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick 133 Mayor’s Advisory Council, Chicago 183 MpURL Membersnet 61, 63, 64, 69 media-controlled online communication 19–21 MSNBC 203, 206, 209 media sectors, Web 2.0 and convergence of 204 Mubarak, Hosni 310, 311–12 MeetUp 73, 81, 83 Much More Could Have Been Achieved (WSIS Civil Melucci, A. 85, 246, 253, 259 Society) 387 Menjívar, C. 284 MUDs (Multi User Dungeons) 262, 263 Merrill, J.C. and Lowenstein, R.L. 187, 195, 196 Mueller, M. 376–77, 403, 414 Metamorphosis Project (USC) 280, 428 Mulgan, G. 26 metaphor: dominance and distortion through multi-stakeholder: approach of WSIS, success or 352–53; strategic use of 353; as twin-edged failure? 388–90, 398; origins of WSIS 387–88; sword 351–52 participation, enablement of 410–13; perspective, Metaphors We Live By (Lakoﬀ, G. and Johnson, M.) implications of 393–94 351 multiaxial information environment 148 Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B. 100 multidisciplinarity, need for 261 MFN (“most-favored nation”) treatment 366 municipal broadband, potential for 182–83

502 INDEX

Murdoch, Rupert 225 Neuman, W.R. 146, 155 Murphy, E. 320 Neuman, W.R., McKnight, L. and Solomon, R. Murray, S. 60 421 Mutz, D.C. 155 Neustadt, R.E. 136 Mutz, D.C. and Martin, P.S. 150 new immigrants and civic society 275–87; Al- Myers, D. 276, 278 Jazeera TV 285; Arirang TV 286; assimilation MySociety 90–91 internet use, connecting to “here” 278, 279–80; MySpace.com 5, 21; gender, internet and civic engagement and internet use 276–77, 286; theorizing on 270, 271, 272; global media civic engagement relationship, internet use type environment 221, 223; parties and election and 282–86; class and internet use 283; campaigns 61; public spaces online 242; communication environment 285–86; technological change and political organization Community Technology Centers 280; 73, 81; Web 2.0 202 connectedness and internet use 284–85; contextual factors in internet use 285–86; Naficy, H. 282 contingent model, immigrants’ use of internet for Nagel, J. 73 civic engagement 277–82; education and internet Nahapiet, J. and Ghoshal, S. 100 use 283; emigrant policies of home countries Napoli, P.M. 352–53 285; further reading guide 286–87; gender and The Culture of Narcissism (Lasch, C.) 237 internet use 283; generation and internet use narratives: and frames as analytical constructs 248–49, 284; host society, political environment of 285; 259; identities and technology networks 254–58, hybrid internet use 278, 282; identity, 258–59; identity and network dynamics 250–54, negotiation of 276; immigration, reasons for and 258; public and private opinion, narratives of internet use 283–84; immigration policies of host 231–32 society 285; individual-level factors in internet narrowband versus broadband 299–300 use 283–85, 286; Metamorphosis Project (USC) NASCIO (National Association of State Chief 280; MissyUSA.com 279; Netville digital Information Officers) 109, 110 neighborhood 279; PALESA (Palestinian Nash, Victoria 399n1 Scientists and Technologists Abroad) 281; National Academy of Science Report (1993) 414 religion and internet use 284; residence duration National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES, 2004) and internet use 284; socio-economic differences 131, 132, 133, 137–42, 427; statistical analysis 285; Telemundo 286; transnational internet use, and results 139–42 connecting to “there” 278, 280–81; typology of National Association of State Chief Information immigrant internet usage 282–86; virtual internet Officers (NASCIO) 109–10 use 278, 281–82 national developments, comparison of 49–50 New Media Index 47, 51, 52 national differences, explanations for 56–58 The New Media Reader (Wardrip-Fruin, N. and National Performance Review (Clinton-Gore) 103, Montfort, N.) 383 119 The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility National Republican Senatorial Committee 61 (Haggerty, K.D. and Ericson, R.V., Eds.) 348 National Telecommunications and Information New York Times 137, 150, 191, 192, 194, 207, 209, Administration (NTIA) 177–78, 180, 182, 303 238 National Venture Capitalist Association (NVCA) Newell, J. 57 360 Newhagen, J.E. and Rafaeli, S. 236 Naughton, J. 224 news: consumption of, political effects of 195–98; Nazif, Ahmad 312 media use, political engagement online 145–47; Nee, V. and Ingram, P. 101 niche news providers 204–5, 212; needs-based holism 122–23 reconfiguration of news markets 203–5, 212–13; Negrine, R. and Papathanassopoulos, S. 59 and Web 2.0 202–3 Negroponte, N. 187, 203, 231, 373 Nie, N.H. 135 Nelson, Ted 380 Nie, N.H. and Erbring, L. 30, 135, 178, 277 Netscape Mosaic 221 Nielsen/NetRatings 210 Netville digital neighborhood 279 Nissenbaum, H. 347, 354 network: attacks, blocking by 333–34, 334–35; Nixon, P.G. et al. 39n2 composition 247, 258–59; simplification 122 Noam, E.M. 243 Neu, C.R. et al. 178 Noguchi, Y. 22 Neuendorf, K.A. 45 Nohria, N. and Berkley, J.D. 81 Neuman, S.B. and Celano, D. 416 NOI 60, 69

503 INDEX

Nokia 341 segmentation 196, 199; segmentation of Noland, M. 305 audiences 187; specialization 195–96, 199 non-hierarchical networks 76–77 open-source news 212 normalization: European political organizations open source software in Africa 370–73 33–34; normalizers and optimists, debate openness, globalizing the logic of 364–75; bounded between 58–59 openness 373–74; Copyright Act (US, 1980) Norris, C. and Armstrong, G. 348 367; Digital Millennium Copyright Act (US, Norris, D.F. and Moon, M.J. 111, 117, 127, 174 DMCA) 368; digital technologies and intellectual Norris, P. 26, 29, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43, 49, 55, 144, property 368–70; DRM (“digital rights 145, 151, 184, 190, 277, 415, 423, 432 management”) 368, 369, 371, 374; FOSS (“free Northwest Social Forum (NWSF) 248, 256–58 and open-source softwate”) 370, 371–73; further Norton, A.R. 310, 315, 319 reading guide 375; global governance of Norton, P. 88, 98 intellectual property 365–68; GPL (General NPM (New Public Management) reforms 114, Public License) 369–70; information society, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 126 information capitalism and 375; IPRs NPR (National Performance Review) 103–4 (Intellectual Property Rights) 364–68, 370–71, NRA (National Rifle Association) 81 373–75, 394; LINUX 372, 374; MFN Nye, J.S. and Owens, W.A. 335 (“most-favored nation”) treatment 366; open source software in Africa 370–73; TRIPS (Trade Oates, S. et al. 39 Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Obama, Barack 22, 23, 61, 64, 65, 66 agreement 365–67, 371; UNESCO 371; WIPO Oberschall, A. 72 (World Intellectual Property Organization) 366, ’ O Brien, J. 264 367; WTO (World Trade Organization) 366–67, OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation 371 and Development) 179 OpenNet Initiative (ONI) 323–24, 326, 327, 329, ffl – o ine political discussion, assessment of 155 56n2 333, 335, 335n2, 428 Oliver, M. 340, 346 OpenStreetMap 345 Olivers, D. 256 O’Reilly, Tim 4, 6, 9n1 ’ O Loughlin, B. 236 organization: capacity for, European political – Olson, M. 73, 74 75, 79, 85 organizations 36; of membership of parties 63–65, Olson, M. and Zeckhauser, R. 74 70; organizational fecundity 73, 74–78, 84; Oman 306, 307, 308 organizing and 78–79; structures of 73, 76–77 OMB (Office of Management and Budget) 106, – organizations: impact of internet on 159, 171; 107 8 incentives for European political organizations one-stop provision 123 36–37; links between, strengthening of 30; online: civic association 73–74; consultations 92–94; organizational reach, extension of 28–29 environment, complexity of 226; involvement in – – Ortony, A. 362 politics and government online 175 77, 183 84; Østergaard-Nielsen, E. 280, 283, 285, 286, 287 – non-events in Britain 61 62; success in US Ostrom, E. 402 – 59 61 O’Toole, L. 266, 274 – online news 186 200; agenda building and setting Overholser, Geneva 143 – 194; aggregators 205; audience use 190 92; Oye, K.A. 402 content of 189; creation of 188–89; design of – ff – 189 90; e ects of reading 192 95; form and Paasonen, S. 266 – content 187 90; fragmentation 196, 199; further Paasonen, S. et al. 266 – reading guide 199 200; future research, ideas for Padovani, C. and Tuzzi, A. 389 198–99; getting news online 190–91; hypertext Page, B.I. 170 189, 193; independence of audiences 187; PALESA (Palestinian Scientists and Technologists information democratization 197–98, 199; Abroad) 281 interactive news 190; internet hubs 192, 197; Palestine 307, 308 investigation, need for more 198–99; issue Palfrey, John G. 335n2 agendas, development of 194; learning effects, Palser, B. 189 experiment-based studies 192–93; learning Papacharissi, Zizi 9, 230–45, 426, xiv effects, survey-based studies 192; news Parasuraman, A. and Zinkhan, G.M. 265 consumption, political effects of 195–98; Pare, D. 377 polarization 196–97, 199; psychology of learning Park, H.W. 296, 299 online 193; reading news online 191–92; Park, H.W. et al. 55

504 INDEX

Parliamentary Affairs 98 Britain, comparisons between 70–71; Web 2.0 parliamentary democracy, visibility of 86–98; 65; Webcameron.org 61, 70 Connecting Parliament with the Public (House of The Passing of Traditional Society (Lerner, D.) 422 Commons Select Committee on Modernization) passivity, internet and 30 91; deference 95–96; demand-based online Paterson, C. 208, 209, 212 operations 90; digitally enables Parliamentary Patterson, T.E. 132, 136, 142, 233, 237 communications 96–97; direct democracy 94–95; Patterson, T.E. and Seib, P. 133 EPG (Electronic Publishing Group) 88–89; Pavlik, J.V. 188, 210, 213, 234 further reading guide 98; Hansard 88, 89, 90; Pederson, K. and Saglie, J. 39 Hansard Society 92; ICTs 87–88, 91; indirect Peltu, Malcolm 9, 384–400, 425, xiv representation 94–95; information tracking Peng, F.Y. et al. 136 96–97; institutional secrecy, democratic visibility Penn, I. 340 and 86–87; internet, consultation on Parliament’s Pentland, B. and Feldman, M. 247, 260 use of 91–94; legislative process, digital media Pepys, Samuel 220 and 88; Modernization, House of Commons Perelman, M. 375 Select Committee on 91; MySociety 90–91; Peretti, J. 253 online consultations 92–94; Parliament, visibility Perloff, R.M. 190 to public of 88–91, 97–98; public, Parliamentary Pew Internet and American Life Project 165, 166, visibility of 91–94, 98; public communication, 169, 171, 174, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 185, tracking flow of 97; public distrust of Parliament 213, 427, 434n2 86–87; Puttnam Commission on the Pew Research Center 22, 194, 202, 211 Communication of Parliamentary Democracy Pew Research Center for People and Press 131, 91; representation, concept of 96; representation, 192 speaking for 94–97, 98; representative Pharr, S.J. and Putnam, R.D. 26 government 94–95; social networking 90; Phillips, David J. 9, 66, 337–48, 426, xiv TheyWorkForYou 90; visibility, digital Pianta, M. 253 technologies and 87–88 Pianta, M. and Silva, F. 253 participation: civil society and politics of 396–97, Pickard, V.W. 240 398; decline in levels of 26–27; enablement of? Pickerill, J. 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 39 405–6 Pinochet, Augusto 170 Participation Index 47, 50, 52 Piott, S.L. 160 parties and election campaigns 56–71; Bipartisan Pitkin, Hannah 96 Campaign Finance Reform Act (2002) 67; place blogs 204 campaign finance 66–68, 70; candidate Plant, S. 263 recruitment and selection 65–66; communication Pleyers, G. 256 environment 68–70; Corrupt and Illegal pluralistic agonism 239–41 Practices Act (1883) 68; Facebook 61; Federal Podlas, K. 267 Election Campaign Act (1971) 67; Federal Poindexter, P.M. et al. 140 – Election Commission 67; further reading guide polarization of online news 196 97, 199 71; institutions, relationship between 58–59; Polat, R.K. 168, 169 Internet and Elections Project 57; internet Political Campaigning in Referendums (de Vreese,C. election campaigns, catalysts and anti-catalysts for and Semetko, H.) 172 – 62–70; MpURL Membersnet 61, 63, 64, 69; political culture 44, 50, 51 52, 54 – – MySpace 61; national differences, explanations political development 43 44, 47, 49 50, 52, 54 for 56–58; normalizers and optimists, debate political discussion 147; online, assessment of – between 58–59; online non-events in Britain 155 56n2 61–62; online success in United States 59–61; political economy and transformation of cyberspace optimists and normalizers, debate between 350 – 58–59; organization of membership 63–65, 70; political engagement online 144 56; demos, party-controlled TV 69; party organization and democratic process and judgements of the 144; electoral environment 62–70; Political Parties, digital divide, potential for widening of 144–45; Elections and Referendum Act (PPERA, 2000) discussion forums online 149–50; elite 68; representative democracy optimism 59; demagoguery 154; further reading guide 155; separation of powers 63; sociological indirect engagement 145; individual-level determinism 58; systemic institutional pluralism influences, analysis of 152–54; individual-level 62–63, 70; technological determinism 58, 59; influences, measures of 152; individual-level UK Election Commission 67; United States and influences, results of analysis 152–54; information

505 INDEX

richness 145–49, 154; knowledge gap hypothesis 396–97, 398; policy-making paradigm, WSIS as 146; like-mindedness, unity in 149–52, 154–55; exemplar of? 386–87, 398; social research, mobilization tactics of elites 154–55; multiaxial information society and 398–99; special influence information environment 148; news media use manipulation, insulation against 393; World 145–47; political discussion 147; political Summit on the Information Society 399n1, 428; participation 147–49; public and private spheres, WSIS, case study 386–87 porous boundaries between 151–52, 154; Polletta, F. 251, 259 reinvigoration of, internet and 144; selective Pollit, C. 120 exposure 150–51, 152; social boundaries, Pollitt, C. and Boukhaert, G. 117 weakening of 151–52; sophistication and Polyarchy Dataset 55n6 “enlarged mentality” 145; subtlety in Popkin, Samuel L. 134 engagement 145 Pornocopia (O’Toole, L.) 274 political factors in digital divide 416 pornography 265–66 political participation: online 147–49; and Porter, D. 144 organizational change in Europe 26–28, 37–38 Portes, A. and Sensenbrenner, J. 280 Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act Portes, A. and Zhou, M. 283 (PPERA, 2000) 68 Post, D. and Johnson, D.R. 351 political potential of online news media 231 Postel, Jon 391 political practices and cultures 41, 53–54 Postelnicu, M. et al. 17, 18 political uses of digital media 239–40 Poster, M. 235, 273 politics: and government online, growth and impact postmodern society and public sphere 233, 237 of 174–75, 183–84; and internet in global media Potter, W.J. and Levine-Donnerstein, D. 45 environment 225, 228–29; reinvigoration of, poverty and segregation 180 internet and 144; as usual in European political Powell, W. 81 organizations 33–34 The Power of Nightmares (Adam Curtis documentary) Politics and Technology (Street, J.) 423 227 Politics as Usual (Margolis, M. and Resnick, D.) 58 PQMedia 19 The Politics of Direct Democracy (LeDuc, L.) 172 Preece, J. 276 politics of protocols 376–83; ARPANET 376, 384; presence awareness 411 commanding a standard 378–79; further reading President, US Executive Office of the 105–6; guide 383; Google 377–78, 379; Google’s President’s Management Agenda 105–6, 108 symbiotic business model 380–82, 382–83; presidential campaign, 2004 US 131–43; direct Internet Engineering Taskforce 377, 378, 382, democracy and internet use 165–66 390; Internet Society 377, 382; protocol, press: fact and fiction 132; information and voluntary nature of 382; robots.txt exclusion democratic society 133–37, 142; traditional news commands 377, 378, 379–80; site maps 380–82; as custodian of fact 136–37 techno-governmentality 376; W3 (World Wide The Press Effect (Jamieson, K.H. and Waldman, P.) 143 Web Consortium) 377, 401; Webcrawler (AOL) Press Think (Jay Rosen blog) 137 378; White House robots.txt files 379–80, 382 Price, V. and Cappella, J.N. 147, 151 Politics of Small Things (Goldfarb, J.C.) 315–16 Price, V., Cappella, J.N. and Nir, L. 145 politics of the internet, multi-stakeholder policy Price, V. et al. 147, 149 making 384–400; civil society and politics of Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, UK 183 participation 396–97, 398; civil society as key Prior, M. 140, 190, 192 stakeholder in WSIS 387–90; classification of privacy law in US 343–44 internet governance issues 395–96; dynamics of privacy paradigm, dominance of 346 multi-stakeholder decision-making 395–97; private sphere 244 further reading guide 399; governance challenge producer types 44–45, 51 of WSIS 385–86; internet governance, professional journalists, Web 2.0 impact on 211 comparison of traditional and WSIS processes property in cyberspace, political economy of 391; internet governance, phases of 390–93; 349–63; Abrams v. United States (1919) 352; Access internet governance and WSIS 390–93, 397–98; Now v. Southwest Airlines (2002) 351; central cases internet policy-making, changing politics of and their metaphors 355–61; Children’s Internet 384–86, 397–98; multi-stakeholder approach of Protection Act (CIPA, 2000) 357, 358, 361, 421; WSIS, success or failure? 388–90, 398; Communications Decency Act (CDA, 1996) multi-stakeholder origins of WSIS 387–88; 361, 421; cyberspace, metaphoric construction of multi-stakeholder perspective, implications of 350–55; external perspectives 354–55; filtering 393–94; participation, civil society and politics of the public sphere 357–59; further reading guide

506 INDEX

362–63; hyperlinks as binding ties 355–57; Intel commercialization 234, 235–36; commercially Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 354; internal perspectives public spaces 242–43; democratizing effect of 354–55; metaphor as twin-edged sword 351–52; narcissism 238–39; democratizing potential of metaphoric dominance and distortion 352–53; online media 231; direct engagement, confusion MGM v. Grokster 359–61, 362; perspective, in 240–41; exclusion from public sphere 234; tyranny of 354–55; political economy and further reading guide 244–45; Google 242, 243; transformation of cyberspace 350; property v. hybrid influence 242–43; Indymedia 240; liberty interests 353–54, 361–62; Reno v. ACLU information, access to 234–35, 236; mobilization (1997) 361; safe havens and engineer’s crystal ball online 241; MySpace.com 242; pluralistic 359–61; strategic use of metaphor 353; United agonism 239–41; political potential of online States v. American Libraries Association (ALA) news media 231; political uses of digital media 357–59; Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes 239–40; postmodern society and public sphere 355–57, 361 233, 237; private sphere 244; public and private protests and campaigns 247 opinion, narratives of 231–32; public sphere, protocol, voluntary nature of 382 premise of 232–34, 243–44; reciprocity 234, Protocol (Galloway, A.) 383 235, 236; self-expression, emphasis on 237; state psychology of learning online 193 and public sphere 232–33; subversion and direct fl public: communication by, tracking ow of 97; representation 239–41; subversion online 241; – distrust of Parliament by 86 87; Parliamentary video blogs (vlogs) 238; virtual sphere 1.0 – visibility of 91 94, 98; and private opinion, 234–36; virtual sphere 2.0 236–43; – narratives of 231 32; and private spheres, porous YouTube.com 242, 243 – boundaries between 151 52, 154 Putin, Vladimir 218 Public Administration Review 117 Putman, R.D. 77 public management change and e-government Putman, R.D., Feldstein, L. and Cohen, D. 77 – 114 27; Accenture 116, 126; competition Putnam, R.D. 24, 26, 27, 30, 73, 100, 151, 155, – changes 118; cross-services integration 122 23; 232, 237, 251, 277, 280, 285 “ ” DEG ( digital-era governance ) 114, 117, 120, Puttnam Commission on the Communication of 126; digital-era governance, emergence of Parliamentary Democracy 91 – – 119 25; digitization changes 123 25; disaggregation Pye, L.W. 53 118; disintermediation 124; e-government, fi – de nition of 114; e-government research 115 17; Qatar 307, 308, 313 ESD (Electronic Services Delivery) 123–24; Quicksilver initiative 106–7 FEAP (Federal Enterprise Architecture Programs) Qvortrup, M. 158, 162, 172 121; further reading guide 127; future for governance and research 126–27; race and ethnicity 179–81 government-citizen interaction 115, 123–25; Radin, M.J. 354 GWACS (Government-Wide Acquisition Rainie, L. and Horrigan, J. 174, 176, 206, 207, 212 Contracts) 121, 122; hyper-modernism 115–16; Rainie, L. and Kohut, A. 276 incentivization 118–19; needs-based holism Rainie, L. et al. 131–32, 147, 151 122–23; network simplification 122; NPM (New Ranney, Austin 172 Public Management) reforms 114, 118, 119, 120, Rappoport, P.N. and Alleman, J. 190 121, 122, 123, 126; one-stop provision 123; Rash, W. 234, 235 political agenda, IT policies and 115, 117; public Rathman, T.A. 190 management before e-government 117–19; Rattray, G.J. 335 reintegration 120–22; segmentation by customer Ray, A. 267, 271 124–25; surveillance and control 116; UNPAN REACH initiative in Jordan 314 (UN Public Administration Network) 116; ZTT reading: online news 191–92; skills, critical nature (“zero touch technology”) 124 of 182 Public Management Reform (Pollitt, C. and Reagan, Ronald 21 Boukhaert, G.) 117 real-time news 222 Public Opinion (Lippmann, W.) 219 reciprocity, public spaces online 234, 235, 236 public spaces online 230–45; alternative media Reedy, Justin 8, 157–72, 425, xiv online, importance for political transition 240; Reese, S.D. et al. 194 anti-globalization websites 240; AOL 242; The Referendum Experience in Europe (Gallagher, M. atomized uses of online media 239; AT&T 242; and Uleri, P.V.) 172 blogs 237, 238; civic engagement 233–34; civic Referendums Around the World (Butler, D. and narcissism, benefits of 236–39; CNN 237; Ranney, A.) 172

507 INDEX regulatory responses to locational surveillance 346– Salaverria, R. 188 47 Salter, L. 236 Reid, E.M. 263 Sanchez-Franco, M.J. and Roldan, J.L. 191 reintegration in public management 120–22 Sassi, S. 234 reinvigoration of politics, internet and 144 satellite TV 309 Reith, John 87 Saudi Arabia 307, 308, 314; censorship in 224 religion and internet use 284 Savicki, V. et al. 262 Rennie, D. 167 Savin, R. 343 Reno v. ACLU (1997) 361 El-Sayed, H. and Westrup, C. 314 Reporters Without Borders 312, 313, 323 Scammell, M. 238 representation: concept of 96; representative Schaap, F. 274 government 94–95; speaking for..... 94–97, 98 Schauer, T. 266 The Concept of Representation (Pitkin, H.) 96 Schement, J. and Curtis, T. 235 representative democracy: decline and crisis? 26–28, Schement, J.R. and Scott, S.C. 183 37; optimism for 59 Scheufele, D.A. 153, 155n1 Resnick, D. 33 Scheufele, D.A. and Nisbet, M.C. 145, 147, 192, Resnick, P. 411 236 Resnick, P. and Shah, V. 411 Scheufele, D.A. et al. 145 RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) 339–40, Schiffauer, W. 281 347 Schiller, D. 236, 242 Rhee, J.W. and Cappella, J.N. 146 Schmitt, M. 68 Rheingold, H. 32, 135, 144, 171, 281 Schmitz, J. 235 Rhine, R.J. 151 Schneider, Steven M. 40–55, xiv Rice, Ronald E. 8, 144–56, 425, xiv Schoenbach, K. et al. 194, 198 Richard, M. 191 Schönleitner, G. 256 Richardson, J.E. and Franklin, B. 210 Schudson, M. 186, 234, 237, 240 Riga Declaration (EC, 2006) 302 Schuler, D. and Day, P. 422, 423 Rittenberg, Jason 8, 186–200, 425, xiv Schumpeter, Joseph 95 Rivera, R. 342 Schwab, K. 313 robots.txt exclusion commands 377, 378, 379–80 Schwartz, A. et al. 343 Rochidi, N. 309 Science of Collaboratories 410 Rockwell, S. and Singleton, L. 291 Sciolino, E. 157 Rodan, G. 335, 418 Scofield, John 108 Rodgers, J. 28–29 Scott, A. and Street, J. 33 Rodgers, S. and Harris, M.A. 265 Scott, B. 34, 201, 204, 205, 209, 210, 211, 213 Roe Smith, M. 59 Scott, J..253 Rogers, E.M. 40, 179, 254, 422 Scott, W.R. 76, 82, 100 Rogers, R. 251, 260 Scott, W.R. and Christensen, S. 82 Rogerson, Kenneth S. 9, 415–23, 425, xiv Scott, W.R. and Meyer, J.W. 76, 82 Rohozinski, Rafal 335n2 SCP (Social and Cultural Planning, Netherlands) Rommes, E. 268–69 298 Romney, George 21 Sears, D. and Chaffee, S. 140 Romney, Mitt 22 Sears, D.O. and Freedman, J.L. 151 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 102 Seattle “Battle” of 75–76, 205 Rosen, Jay 137 Seattle Post Intelligencer 207 Rosenau, J.N. and Czempiel, E.O. 402 security paradigm, dominance of 346 Rosenthal, L.E. 311 Sefyrin, J. 270 Rousseau, Jean Jacques 95 segmentation: of audiences for online news 187; by routers 325 customer 124–25; online news 196, 199 Ruggie, J. 413 segregation and concentrated poverty 180 Rugh, W. 309 Seifert, J.W. and McLoughlin, G.J. 109, 110 Russian censorship 224–25 selective exposure 150–51, 152 Rutenberg, J. 137 self-expression 237 Sell, S. 366, 367 Sabato, L.J. 21 Semetko, H.A. and Krasnoboka, N. 240 al-Saggaf, Yeslam 317 separation of powers 63 Sakkas, L. 14 Servaes, J. and Carpentier, N. 398

508 INDEX

Setala, M. and Gronlund, K. 88, 98 social and cultural diﬀerences 300 Sey, A. and Castells, M. 145–46 social boundaries, weakening of 151–52 Shade, L.R. 265, 267, 273 social capital 77 Shah, D., Kwak, N. and Holbert, R. 77, 276 social mobilization 77 Shah, D.V. et al. 135, 147, 149, 151, 188, 189, 198, social movements 345–46 234, 240 social networking: election campaigns in United Shah, D.V., McLeod, J.M. and Yoon, S.H. 277 States 22; parliamentary democracy, visibility of Shahin, J. and Neuhold, C. 88, 98 90 Shannon, V. 342 social research, information society and 398–99 shared services 106–7, 108–9 social structure, gender as 265–70, 273 Shifman, L. et al. 38 societal change, digital divide and 415–16 Shoemaker, P.J. and Reese, S.D. 148 societal internet uses 102–3 Siapera, E. 280 sociological determinism 58 Siddiquee, A. and Kagan, C. 280, 281, 286, 287 Songer, D. and Sheehan, R. 353 Sierra Club 80 Sony v. Universal City (1984) 359, 361–62 Sikkink, K. 259 Sorauf, F.J. 67 Silvester, C. 220 Spar, D.L. 350 Simone, M. 240 Sparks, C. 201, 204, 206, 208 Simonelis, A. 390 Spotila, John 108 Singapore 417–18, 420; Ministry of Finance 420 Spriggs, J.F. and Wahlbeck, P. 353 Singer, J.B. 188, 189, 210, 213 Stanley, L. 179 Singer, J.B. and Gonzalez-Valez, M. 189 Stanyer, James 7, 8–9, 201–13, 426, xv – site maps 380 82 Staples, B. 158 site producer types 51, 52 Star Tribune 207 6, Perri 120 Starr, P. 100, 217 6, Perri, et al. 120, 122 Stern, C. 393 – skills access 294 97, 303 Stewart, A. 227 Skowronek, S. 101 Steyaert, J. 294 Slackman, M. 310 Stinchcombe, A.L. 77 – small-scale forms of political engagement 4, 6 7 Stohl, Cynthia 72–85, xv Small Tech (Hawk, B., Rieder, D.M. and Oviedo, StopBadware.org 400n11 O.) 383 Strangelove, M. 375 Smith, C. 267 Street, J. 423 Smith, M.A. 168 Stromer-Galley, J. 6, 17, 152 Smith, P. 359 subversion: and direct representation 239–41; public Snow, D. and Benford, R. 251, 259 spaces online 241 Snow, D. et al. 259 Suleiman, Abdel Kareem Nabil 315 – – social activism 246 60; absent ties 253 54; activist Sullivan, Andrew 221 – networks and technology 249 50, 258; activist Sum, N.-L. 372 – relationships 247; coalitions in networks 253 54, Sun 211 ﬁ – 258; collective identi cation 252 53; diversity Sundar, S.S. 190, 193 – – – 252 53; fair trade campaigning 247 48, 255 56, Sundar, S.S. and Nass, C. 191 – 259; further reading guide 259 60; identity, Sundar, S.S. et al. 189 narratives and network dynamics 250–54, 258; Sunday Telegraph 211 inclusiveness 252–53; information networks Sunstein, C.R. 24, 34, 135, 145, 151, 155, 169–70, – 246 47; narratives, identities and technology 187, 197, 199, 200, 203, 352 networks 254–58, 258–59; narratives and frames surveillance see locational surveillance as analytical constructs 248–49, 259; network Swanson, D. 239 composition 247, 258–59; Northwest Social Swartz, N. 419 Forum (NWSF) 248, 256–58; permanent Swedberg, C. 340 campaigns 246–47; protests and campaigns 247; Syria 306, 307, 308, 314, 319 social forums 247; strong ties 253–54; targets of campaigns 247; trade justice campaign 248, Tampa Tribune 211 255–56, 259; transnational advocacy 246–47; Tanner, E. 170 weak ties 253–54; “World says No War” 247, Taranto, Richard 360 254–55 Tarde, G. 147 social activities “contextual integrity” of 347 Tarrow, S. 74, 283

509 INDEX

Taylor, P. 21 trade justice campaign 248, 255–56, 259 technical knowledge, digital divide and 415–16 Trammell, K.D. 17 technical skills, digital citizenship and 181–82 transnational advocacy 246–47 techno-governmentality 376 transnational internet use 278, 280–81 techno-social spaces, uses of 268–69, 270–72 transnational policy networks 413 TechnoFeminism (Wajcman, J.) 274 transnational technology diffusion 40 technological change and political organization Tremayne, M. 189, 237 72–85; affordances of internet 83–84; American Tremayne, M. and Dunwoody, S. 193 Legion 80; Amnesty International 80; anti-Iraqi Tremayne, M. et al. 150 war marches 76; collective action 72–73, 74–76; Trend, D. 273 collective action space 82; engagement 80–82; Treschel, A. and Kriesi, H. 160 Facebook 81; flexibility of internet 82–83; Trippi, J. 13, 17, 59, 60, 71 further reading guide 85; institutional engagement TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 80–81; interaction 79–80; interest group Property Rights) agreement 365–67, 371 mobilization 77–78; internet, interaction and Tuchman, G. 148 engagement 82–84; internet dynamics 82–83; Tunisia: Arab world, internet use and political MeetUp 73, 81, 83; MySpace 73, 81; identity 306, 307, 308, 314, 319; geopolitics of – non-hierarchical networks 76–77; NRA internet control 323 24 (National Rifle Association) 81; online civic Turk, Michael 17 association 73–74; organizational fecundity 73, Turkey: Arab world, internet use and political 74–78, 84; organizational structures 73, 76–77; identity 306 organizing and organization 78–79; Seattle, Turkle, S. 263, 264, 281 “Battle” of 75–76; Sierra Club 80; social capital Twist, J. 210 77; social mobilization 77; theoretical integration UAE Yearbook 311 across perspectives 78–84, 84–85 UCLA 290, 296, 299, 300 technological determinism 58, 59 UK Election Commission 67 technological development, web production 49, 52 Uleri, Pier Vincenzo 172 Tekwani, S. 281 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 306, 307, 308, 311, 313 Telemundo 286 United Nations 387; Development Program 313; TeleNav Inc. 338–39 Tewksbury, D. and Althaus, S.L. 150, 191, 192 Global Alliance for ICTs and Development – Tewksbury, D. and Maddex, B. 197 408 9; Human Development Index 47, 49, 52, Tewksbury, D. et al. 192 428; UNCTAD 369, 372, 373; UNESCO 371, Tewksbury, David 8, 186–200, 425, xv 387; UNPAN (UN Public Administration Thalheimer, M. 429 Network) 116; World Summit on the TheyWorkForYou 90 Information Society (WSIS) 403–4 Thierer, A.D. 179 United States: Agriculture Dept. 340; and Britain, Thomas, J.C. and Streib, G. 175 comparisons between 70–71; Defense Dept. 333; Thompson, J.B. 87, 282 digital divide, internet diffusion and 417, 418, Thurman, N. 207, 212, 213 420–21; direct democracy 159–60; news Thurmond, Storm 194 consumption 429–31 Tiefenbrun, S.W. 351 United States v. ALA (2003) 357–59 Tiller, E.H. and Cross, F. 350, 353 Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes/Corley (2000) Tilly, C. 72, 253 355–56, 357, 361 Time 270 Unspun (Jamieson, K.H. and Jackson, B.) 143 Times of London 207 Urban Tapestries project 347 Tkach-Kawasaki, L.M. 55, 57 USA Today 207 Toennies, F. 82 usage access 297–99, 303 Toft, A. et al. 248 user-controlled online communication 21–23 Toft, Amoshaun 9, 246–60, 425, xv user experience, richness in 4, 7 Tolbert, C. and McNeal, R. 175, 194 user-generated news sites 203 Tolbert, C. and Mossberger, K. 175 Uslaner, E.M. 235, 276 top-down approach to internet 311–14, 319 top-down media apparatus 219–21 Valentino, N.A. et al. 55 Torvalds, Linus 374 van Aelst, P. and Walgrave, S. 240 Townsend, A.M. and Bennett, J.T. 344 van de Donk, W. et al. 32, 39, 116 Trade and Industry, UK Dept of 183 van der Wurff, R. 210

510 INDEX van Dijk, J. et al. 296 Washington State, state-wide initiatives 163–65 van Dijk, J., Hanenburg, M. and Pieterson, W. 290 Waskul, D.D. 266, 274 van Dijk, Jan A.G.M. 9, 43, 179, 181, 185, 288–304, Watts, D. 222 425, xv Weare, C. and Lin, W. 136 van Doorn, N. et al. 264, 272 Web 2.0 201–13; Alternative Press Center 205; van Doorn, Niels 9, 261–74, 426, xv alternative sources of news, use of 207–8; AOL Van Hannen’s democracy rankings 428 News 205, 208, 209; audience input 210–11, van Slyke, C. et al. 265 212; BBC News Online 157, 204, 207, 209, van Zoonen, Liesbet 9, 261–74, 426, xv 210, 221; blogs 204–5; CNN 203, 204, 206, Vanden Berg, Jessica 69 208, 209; collective intelligence from political Vanhanen, T. 47, 52 web use 4, 5; cross-subsidy 209–10; data, Vargas, J.A. 21, 22 importance of 4, 6; democratic experimentalism Vedres, B. et al. 44 4, 6; diversity in online news 208–9, 212; Ventura, Jesse 15, 16, 59 European political organizations 30; Facebook Verba, S. et al. 53, 146, 147, 155, 176, 184 202; financial uncertainty and cross-subsidy Vertovec, S. 285, 287 209–10; further reading guide 213; gender, Vice President, Office of the US 103 internet and theorizing on 270–72, 273; Google video blogs (vlogs) 238 News 205, 206; Guerilla News Network 205; video recording election campaigns 21–22 Indymedia 205; internet as platform for political Villanueva, Edgar 372 discourse 4–5; Journalism, Project for Excellence Villeneuve, N. 335 in 202–11, 213; limitations on audience input Virilio, P. 227 210–11, 212; local websites 204; long tail, theory virtual internet use 278, 281–82 of 4–5; market leaders 205–8; media sectors, virtual sphere 1.0 234–36 convergence of 204; MSNBC 203, 206, 209; virtual sphere 2.0 236–43 MySpace 202; new questions and outcomes? Voices of Europe (Hug, S.) 172 270–72, 273; news and 202–3; niche news VOIP (“voice over internet protiocol”) services providers 204–5, 212; online news aggregators 328–29 205; open-source news 212; parties and election volunteer recruitment 17–18 campaigns 65; place blogs 204; principles of 4; von Hippel, E. 373, 375 professional journalists, impact on 211; propagation of content over multiple applications W3 (World Wide Web Consortium) 377, 401 4, 6–7; reconfiguration of news markets 203–5, Wade, R.H. 371 212–13; Seattle, “Battle” of 205; small-scale Wajcman, J. 263, 264, 268, 274 forms of political engagement 4, 6–7; user Waldman, Paul 143 experience, richness in 4, 7; user-generated news Walgrave, S. and Rucht, D. 255 sites 203; website ownership and diversity in Walgrave, Stefan 260 online news 208–9, 212; Yahoo! 205, 206; Walker, J.L. 78, 80 YouTube 202 Wall, D. 27 Webb, Jim 22, 60, 69 Wall, M. 194 Webb, P. 64, 66 Wall Street Journal 207, 218 Webcameron.org 8, 61, 70 Wanta, W. 148 Webcrawler (AOL) 378 Ward, S. and Lusoli, W. 88 Weber, S. 5, 375 Ward, S.J. and Francoli, M. 61 Websense 331 Ward, S.J. and Gibson, R.K. 31 Webster, F. 350 Ward, S.J. and Vedel, T. 34, 39n1 Webster, J.G. and Lin, S.F. 39, 191 Ward, S.J. and Voerman, G. 55 Webster, J.G. and Phalen, P.F. 196, 199 Ward, S.J. et al. 33, 34, 39n2 Weinberger, D. 5 Ward, Stephen 25–39, 56, 71, 426, xv Welch, E.W. et al. 175 Wardrip-Fruin, N. and Montfort, N. 383 Wellman, B. and Gulia, M. 276 Ware, A. 63, 66, 71 Wellman, B. et al. 282 Warf, B. and Vincent, P. 328 Wells, Chris 8, 157–72, 425, xv Warschauer, M. 181, 182, 185, 303, 304, 306 West, D.M. 109, 110, 112, 117, 127, 174, 175, 182 Washbourne, N. 31 Westerdal, J. 405 Washington Poll (2006) Public Policy Attitudes WGIG (Working Group on Internet Governance) 163, 164, 165 387, 407–8 Washington Post 207, 379 Wheeler, Deborah L. 9, 305–20, 425, xv

511 INDEX

Whitaker, C. 253 internet governance, multi-stakeholder White, D.M. 188 participation in 406–7, 413; governance White House robots.txt files 379–80, 382 challenge of 385–86; internet governance, Whitehouse, A. 265 comparison of traditional and WSIS processes Wiklund, H. 102 391; internet governance and 390–93, 397–98; Wilding, F. 267 multi-stakeholder approach, success or failure? Wilhelm, A.G. 24, 175, 304 388–90, 398; multi-stakeholder origins 387–88; Williams, A. 23 policy-making paradigm, exemplar of? 386–87, Williams, A.P. and Tedesco, J.C. 24, 55 398; WSIS Civil Society 387, 388, 389, 397, Williams, F. 234 404, 428 Williams, F. and Pavlik, J.V. 234 WTO (World Trade Organization) 366–67, 371 Williams, H. 393, 395 Wu, H.D. and Bechtel, A. 191 Wilson, E.J. 40, 53, 55, 416, 421, 422, 423 Wu, T. 335 Wilson, E.J. and Wong, K.R. 423 Wulf, W.A. 410 Wilson, Harold 220 Winer, Dave 4 Xenos, M. and Foot, K.A. 44 Winneg, K. and Stroud, T. 132, 135, 141 Xenos, Michael 40–55, xv Winneg, K. at al. 132 Winneg, Kenneth 131–43, xv Yahoo! 205, 206 Winston, B. 368, 375 Yan, W. 418 WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) Yates, J. and Orlikowski, W.J. 44 366, 367 Yemen 307, 308 Wise, C.R. 121 Yervasi, C. 267 Witmer, D.F. and Katzman, S.L. 262 YouTube.com 5, 7–8, 21, 22, 60; deception, role Witt, L. 188 of internet in identification of 131; gender, Wojcieszak, M. and Mutz, D. 149, 152 internet and theorizing on 270, 271, 272; global Wolfinger, R. and Rosenstone, S.J. 175, 176 media environment 221, 223; public spaces Wolinsky, H. 346 online 242, 243; Web 2.0 202 workplace regulation 344–45 Yuan, Y. et al. 85 World Bank 427 Yun, H.K. 420 World Competitiveness Report 313 World Conference on Women (1995) 267 Zaller, J.R. 151, 155 World Information Access Project 40, 432–33 Zayani, M. 224 World Internet Project 400n10 Zewail, A. 314 World Internet Usage and Population Statistics 231 Zhou, M. and Cai, G. 276, 287 “World says No War” 247, 254–55 Zhou, Y. and Moy, P. 188 World Values Survey (WVS) 47, 50, 52, 55, 428 Zittel, T. 35, 38, 57, 88 Wright, T. et al. 264 Zittrain, J.L. 335n2, 363, 385 Wring, D. and Horrocks, I. 32 ZTT (“zero touch technology”) 124 WSIS (World Summit on the Information Society) Zukin, C. and Snyder, R. 192 399n1, 403–4, 428; case study 386–87; global

512