Questioning a Deity: a Contemplation of Maneuver Motivated by the 2008 Israeli Armor Corps Association “Land Maneuver in the 21St Century” Conference
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Small Wars Journal Land Warfare Forum Questioning a Deity: A Contemplation of Maneuver Motivated by the 2008 Israeli Armor Corps Association “Land Maneuver in the 21st Century” Conference RUSSELL W. GLENN, PH.D. November 2008 Published by the Israeli Armor Corps Association, Latrun, Israel. For questions regarding use or further copies, contact the Director, Institute for Land Warfare Studies ‐ Latrun, Brigadier Avidor(Israeli Army, Retired) Gideon Avidor, Tel. +972‐52‐ 8409001, Fax. +972‐8‐9421079, email: [email protected] Small Wars Journal ii Small Wars Journal iii Preface On September 16‐17, 2008, the Israeli Armor Corps Association hosted its second annual conference, this entitled “Land Maneuver in the 21st Century.” The centerpiece for speaker presentations and related discussions was “maneuver:” what it is, what it should be, and its relevance to security operations in light of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and other recent or continuing conflicts. An international speaker slate proposed a broad spectrum of thinking in that regard, a spectrum ranging from general acceptance of the current definition of maneuver to considerably expanding what the concept encompasses. This document considers maneuver in light of these speaker presentations and the discussion stimulated by them. First sampling maneuver historically, it follows with an analysis of how theorists, doctrine writers, and military personnel conceive of maneuver in the first decade of the 21st century. These dual foundation stones of history and current thinking serve to underpin presentation of the treatment given the topic during the conference. The closing analysis considers the implications of thinking of maneuver in terms different than is currently the case…or, contrarily, the impact if it instead remains unchanged. The document will be of interest to individuals in the armed forces, academics, and others desiring to investigate alternative conceptualizations of maneuver in the 21st century. Small Wars Journal iv Contents Preface ..................................................................................................................... iii Figures ......................................................................................................................vi Summary................................................................................................................. vii Acknowledgments...................................................................................................xi Glossary ................................................................................................................. xiii 1. Introduction.......................................................................................................1 General Background........................................................................................1 Document Structure, Conference Objective, and Sponsors .......................3 2. A Concise History of a Broad Topic: Maneuver...........................................5 4. Debating the Character of 21‐Century Maneuver..........................................13 Staying the Course: Retaining the Essentiality of Maneuver as Defined.....................................................................................................13 Changing Tack: A Proposal for an Expanded Concept of Maneuver ....17 Is an Expanded Concept of Maneuver Already Inherent in Existing Doctrine?..................................................................................................25 The Limits of Full Spectrum Operations .................................................28 Implications of Introducing an Expanded Concept of Maneuver ..........30 A Potential Solution to the Conundrum.....................................................32 In Conclusion, A Brief Look Ahead ............................................................33 Appendix 2: Speaker Biographical Sketches (as available) ..............................37 Colonel (Retired) Clinton J. Ancker III ....................................................37 Brigadier General (Retired) Avraham Bar David ..................................38 Major General (Retired) Professor Isaac Ben‐Israel ...............................39 Colonel (Retired) Donald W. Boose, Jr. ...................................................41 Brigadier General Itay Brun......................................................................41 Opher Doron ...............................................................................................42 Major General (Retired) Chaim Erez .......................................................43 Dr. Russell W. Glenn..................................................................................43 Nisim Hadas................................................................................................44 Major General (Retired) Yitzhak Harel ...................................................45 Amnon Lipkin‐Shahak...............................................................................47 Colonel (Retired) Bennie Michalson ........................................................48 Major General Avi Mizrahi .......................................................................50 General (Retired) Sir Rupert Smith..........................................................50 Lieutenant General (Retired) Moshe Yaalon ..........................................51 Major General (Retired) Aharon Zeevi‐Pharkash..................................53 Small Wars Journal v Bibliography ............................................................................................................55 Small Wars Journal vi Figures Figure 4.1: A Notional Example of Lines of Operation............................................15 Figure 4.2: Gaining Advantage During Industrial War...........................................18 Figure 4.3: Gaining Advantage During War Amongst the People.........................19 Figure 4.4: Grievances Versus Costs – A Forum for Expanded Maneuver...........22 Figure 4.5: Graphical Depiction of the U.S. Army Full Spectrum Operations Operational Concept (A Notional Example) .....................................................29 Small Wars Journal vii Summary A gathering of nearly 200 individuals representing four nations met at the Israeli Armor Corps Association’s museum and memorial in Latrun, Israel on September 16‐17, 2008 to contemplate the topic of land maneuver. Granted currency by ongoing security challenges in Israel, that nation’s July‐August 2006 Second Lebanon War, coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and other contingencies recent and current, the two days of presentations stimulated no little debate and considerable thought. This document seeks to first provide background for a discussion of what transpired at Latrun and, secondly, to summarize and analyze the perspectives emanating from that event. Those perspectives fell into two general categories: (1) maneuver should retain its present definitional construct unchanged, and (2) maneuver as currently understood has a character valuable beyond the bounds of how it is understood and used today. Historically, maneuver – defined in U.S. doctrine (and similarly understood by those from the other nations present: Israel, the United Kingdom, and Canada) as “employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission”1 – has been historically consistent in basic character but different in detail when contrasted with it as currently understood. Pre‐Napoleonic maneuver was taken to mean the polar opposite of battle; maneuver was the preferred option to fighting as it preserved men, money, and materiel otherwise consumed. Subsequently, particularly in the aftermath of World War I, maneuver acquired a new polar opposite in the minds and writings of many: attrition. It became the answer to the slaughter of the trenches. In both of these characterizations we see a common thread: maneuver as a means to avoid unnecessary loss. Small Wars Journal viii Maneuver today retains vestiges of the past that can muddy its doctrinal meaning, but careful reading makes clear its bounds and breadth. It has application across the breadth of the spectrum of conflict and throughout the three levels of war (tactical, operational, and strategic). To paraphrase Brigadier General Gideon Avidor (Israel Defense Forces, retired), it spans a scope that includes a single vehicle employing fire and movement to gain advantage in relation to a foe to the overarching theories of such writers as Basil Liddell‐Hart. Entire armies moving over oceans falls under its auspices given that their movement to a theater meets the caveat that – eventually if not immediately – they serve the purpose of bringing fires or the threat of fires to bear in gaining advantage over an enemy and abet the accomplishment of sought‐after objectives. It is this understanding of maneuver that established the common ground for all meeting on those two late summer days in central Israel. Succinctly, the issue of relevance then and herein is whether military doctrine should retain maneuver in the sense of its current definition or be expanded to allow (1) employment of more than fires and movement alone and (2) application to other than combat situations. The U.S. Army’s Director of the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Colonel (U.S. Army, retired)