The Practicalities of Living with Failed States

Seyoum Mesfin & Abdeta Dribssa Beyene

Abstract: State security and survival are critical issues in the rough regional environment of the Horn of Africa. Ensuring security for a state and its population is a priority and a raison d’être for any government. The buffer zone has emerged as a key strategy for nations in the Horn of Africa to manage successfully the security challenges of the several failed states in their neighborhood. Buffer zones are established adjacent to the borders of stronger states that oversee the buffer zones’ affairs directly or through proxies. This essay explores the practical aspects of power asymmetries between successful and failed states from the perspectives of two officials in successful states who deal directly with this security challenge within the constraints of current norms and practices of sovereignty. The situation in the Horn of Africa provides in- sights into the effects of failed states on the security of their neighbors and the challenges that failed states present to the wider international community.

Failed and failing states lack the political will and the capacity to enter into, much less abide by, agreements with other states to ensure mutual security. This situation points to problems that attend the growing asymmetry not only in the capacities, but also in the divergent character of the domestic political orders in the Horn of Africa. This asymmetry, assessed from SEYOUM MESFIN is Ethiopia’s the perspectives of two officials of a nation adjacent to Ambassador to the People’s Re- two failed states, challenges some of the basic tenets public of China. Prior to that ap- of an international system of states, such as govern- pointment, he was the Ethiopian ment capacity to abide by agreements. These failed Minister of Foreign Affairs for states fundamentally lack the capacity to fulfill obliga- nearly twenty years. tions of sovereignty, such as monitoring and govern- ABDETA DRIBSSA BEYENE is the ing their territories to prevent different actors there Executive Director of the Centre from launching unauthorized attacks on neighbors or for Dialogue, Research and Coop- more generally spreading disorder across their bor- eration (cdrc) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He previously served as ders. These problems remain a primary source of con- Director General for African Af- flict in the Horn of Africa, and have become increas- fairs at the Ethiopian Ministry of ingly pressing for countries that neighbor Libya, Syria, Foreign Affairs. Afghanistan, and other tumultuous and failing states.

128 The Horn of Africa hosts an assortment mentary strategies: supporting islands Seyoum of failed and failing states. Somalia and of governance and creating buffer zones. Mesfin & Abdeta South Sudan clearly belong to the catego- With decades of combined experience at Dribssa Beyene ry of totally failed states. Officials in Sudan the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, and South Sudan have lost a significant por- we note that Ethiopia’s strategy is most ev- tion of their capacities to enforce their au- ident vis-à-vis the “Republic of Somali- thority in large parts of their respective ter- land,” and to some extent the “Puntland ritories; Eritrea’s leadership frequently de- State of Somalia.” Both provide basic lev- fies basic international norms; and Kenya’s els of order and security to their popula- recurrent electoral violence raises doubts tions locally. Though not diplomatically about whether its government can ensure recognized, close ties to Ethiopia enable domestic stability. In addition, states in the their citizens to travel on local documents subregion face very real threats of terrorist and help these authorities to organize in- attacks from Al Shabaab, a Somalia-based ternational trade relations and develop in- terrorist group. This regional political en- frastructure, as well as influence develop- vironment tempts governments to use ments in Mogadishu and elsewhere. armed groups as proxies to influence pol- Ethiopia’s support is critical to limit the itics in neighboring countries. Since the extent to which other foreign governments 1960s, many countries have participated are compelled to intervene in the internal in tit-for-tat violence to undermine rivals, affairs of these semiautonomous regions forcing some to create buffer zones along over matters of mutual concern. Ethiopia their borders. also assists in the establishment of oth- Ethiopia, for example, engaged in this re- er regional states in Somalia. All these ef- taliatory violence in the 1980s when its gov- forts face challenges from Mogadishu: the ernment provided refuge to the Sudan Peo- strategy is perceived to be weakening rath- ple’s Liberation Army as leverage against er than unifying Somalia because it under- Khartoum’s support for rebel groups inside mines the monopoly of coercion that the Ethiopia. In this case, Ethiopia was recipro- political center should theoretically exer- cating against Sudan and Somalia, which cise although it currently lacks the capaci- had similarly protected groups hostile to ty to do so. This situation creates a dilem- Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s. This sym- ma whereby Ethiopia is forced to infringe metry of support for proxy-armed groups on the sovereign prerogatives of the de jure also meant that the governments routine- recognized sovereign authority of Somalia. ly agreed to cease this behavior for mu- In fact, the government of Somalia is un- tual benefit. The records of these agree- able to credibly guarantee to Ethiopia that ments from that time show that these gov- these territories will not be used to threat- ernments possessed the political will and en Ethiopia, so Ethiopia often is blamed for the capacity to abide by these agreements. interference. This criticism highlights the While Ethiopia’s government strives to paradox in which Ethiopia has to infringe abide by the principle of respect for the on Somalia’s sovereignty in territories that sovereignty of its neighbors, the practical- Mogadishu is unable to control in order to ities of living next to failed and failing states ensure the fulfillment of basic obligations now challenge the country’s official com- required of a sovereign state. mitment to adhere to these principles. A second strategy revolves around creating and maintaining buffer zones. Ethi- For Ethiopia, managing these problems opia and Kenya sustain buffer zones inside in Somalia in particular involves comple- Somalia, effectively denying Al Shabaab

147 (1) Winter 2018 129 The and other extremist groups the capacity to international system.1 This situation re- Practicalities launch attacks inside Ethiopia and Kenya. flects the reality in which state and non- of Living with Failed States More recently, Uganda has pursued a sim- state actors compete with one another. ilar strategy vis-à-vis South Sudan. Ethio- These actors and this reality of interstate pia’s intensive coordination with local au- conflict and competition among states thorities inside South Sudan remains neces- with sharply asymmetrical capacities con- sary to prevent the recurrence of the kind of tinue to be the basis for analysis.2 The de- attacks that occurred in April 2016 in Ethio- vice of the buffer zone is one of the main pia’s Gambella Region, where cross-bound- reasons why failed states do not challenge ary ethnic violence and ancillary cattle rus- this basic structure of the international tling and kidnapping have incited tensions system in the Horn of Africa, and in fact among local communities and the two contributes to its maintenance. states. Weak governance shapes interstate rela- The ways that Ethiopia, Kenya, and Ugan- tions in other ways. Civil-military relations da use buffer zones sheds light on how these scholar Herbert Howe has identified three governments manage their relations in an military strategies that African states use environment that includes states that ex- to address the threats to their present exis- hibit widely varying domestic capacities tence. These strategies include regional in- and organizations of authority and regional tervention forces, private security compa- susceptibility to involvement in proxy wars nies, and Western-sponsored assistance to and other interference on the part of exter- state militaries. He argues that all these are nal actors. While the Horn of Africa exhib- likely to fail unless African states empha- its particular features, this disjuncture in size indigenous military professionalism.3 the domestic capacities to exercise de fac- This conventional view misses the buffer to sovereignty has become more acute in zone as a self-help mechanism to maintain the region as state failure in Somalia and regional order, though some states are bet- South Sudan persists. ter than others at mastering this technique. This strategy of the region’s more-capable A buffer zone is “a neutral zone de- states is based on four core assumptions: signed to prevent acts of aggression be- 1) a state that establishes a buffer zone between two hostile nations; and any area yond its borders must have the capacity to serving to mitigate or neutralize potential provide and sustain order in its domestic conflict.”4 Buffer zones can be established realm and in the buffer zone; 2) the state in a shared territory or created unilateral- that maintains a buffer zone requires pro- ly through force and monitored exclusive- fessionalism of the state security appara- ly by one state or through proxies in a non- tus; 3) the buffer zone’s inhabitants must be shared area in (a) relatively weaker state(s), able to benefit from order and development or on the other side of the enemy’s terri- within the neighboring strong state; and tory that harbors a threat to the stronger 4) de jure borders remain fixed. In short, state. These threats can emerge from reb- a successful buffer zone’s inhabitants do el groups, religious movements, and oth- not have to like this intervention, but they er armed groups organized in neighboring do have to share in the benefits of security states in territories that are outside the con- and economic opportunities that the buffer trol of local state authorities. Convention- zone provides to the stronger state. al tools of international relations, such as In the Horn of Africa, state failure does pressuring a national government to ful- not challenge the military-focused and fill the obligations of its sovereignty, do state-centered paradigm of security in the not work when a state lacks a government

130 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences with the capacity or political will to exer- ernment has to contend with the appear- Seyoum cise even minimal control over its territo- ance of competing militias and counter- Mesfin & Abdeta ry and armed forces. systemic movements such as violent Isla- Dribssa Beyene Failure by states to solve these crises and mist organizations across its borders with conflicts, and their subsequent inability to Mali and Libya. Egypt must manage its af- provide protection and basic social ser- fairs with a fragmented Libya, while Sudan vices to the majority of their peoples, can has its own problems providing credible generate popular support for various non- sovereign authority along Egypt’s south- state armed groups as communities look ern border, apart from the challenges of beyond the state for protection. Officials in border disputes between the neighbors. failing states often desperately seek alter- Why does a state construct and sustain native ways to retain their coercive pow- an expensive buffer zone to ensure secu- er, which usually has the effect of creating rity? What are the implications of buffer refugee crises amidst massive violations of zones as a mechanism for protecting sov- basic human rights and the large-scale dis- ereignty under the increasingly globalized ruptions of livelihoods. international construct? Variation in the Buffer zones play their paradoxical role origins and aims of managing buffer zones while states with stronger domestic capa- points to the importance of symmetries/ bilities that develop their own broader di- asymmetries of domestic capabilities of mensions of effective internal and exter- the states involved in their administration nal sovereignty, such as Ethiopia, step in to and sustainability, and the impact of their manage the effects of this extreme asymme- creation on international norms, such as try of domestic control. The stronger state sovereignty and territorial integrity. then violates the sovereignty of the weaker The concept of the buffer zone is at the to provide the basis for the semblance of an heart of the paradox of asymmetries of do- orderly state system in the region. This he- mestic capabilities; it is an effort to pre- gemony can appear as domination, but to serve the sovereignty of the state creating its architects, it is also the only viable alter- it while deliberately attenuating the sov- native to manage the regional destabilizing ereignty of others, however dressed up effects of state failure and collapse. This is such action may be by the apparent accep- particularly important for states like Ethi- tance of the affected party. States that bor- opia, which shares a long border with So- der failed states and states with limited ca- malia, a failed state that generates violent pacity to control their own territories inev- illicit activities, cross-border insurgencies, itably face a number of challenges. These refugee flows, and other disruptions that include various types of security threats: threaten efforts in Ethiopia to transform refugee crises, illegal immigration, drug its domestic political economy. Disorder trafficking, cattle rustling, trafficking in in the borderlands is a historical problem and proliferation of small arms and light for state-builders, but the difference now is weapons, terrorism and extremism, and that stronger states no longer have the op- the spread of communicable diseases, all tion (or are no longer inclined) to solve this of which are discussed in a series of essays problem through conquest. Instead, they in the previous issue of Dædalus. A failed or have to maintain order in weak states. failing state either no longer has the necessary institutions to address such prob- This issue of buffer zones is relevant to the lems or is incapable of dealing with them, growing asymmetries of state capacities either immediately or in the longer term that appear in other regions. Algeria’s gov- within its own territories.5

147 (1) Winter 2018 131 The William Reno, for example, has shown Buffer zones in other contexts have been Practicalities the “connection between terrorism and constructed to deal with threats, but most of Living with Failed States the failure of central governments in were designed to manage contentious re- some states to control their national ter- lations between states of roughly symmet- ritory and monitor their populations.”6 rical capabilities. For example, United Na- Powerful states, Reno asserts, collaborate tions–monitored zones between Israeli even with groups struggling for secession. and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights and These groups control their local turf and between forces in Cyprus have endured for their ability to provide access to outsiders, decades. These are maintained by third like the more powerful state next door, and parties and have a recognized place in the to deny refuge to terrorists or other rebel maintenance of order in the internation- groups, which is critical in this calculation al system of states. The problem for Ethio- and reinforces the tenets of the U.S. coun- pia and others who have to build their own terinsurgency doctrine. buffer zones, however, is that there is no The pursuit of security through creating realistic and viable international commu- and maintaining buffer zones might appear nity response to the problem of disorder in to weaken international norms construct- failed states and the threats that emerge ed and recognized by various regional and from them. The U.S. and un interventions international organizations. The unilater- in Somalia in the early 1990s did little to al creation of buffer zones, whether to en- nothing to help Ethiopia with these securi- courage the potentiality for the creation ty problems, and made clear that no super- of a failed state, speed up the creation of power will lead the region to stability. The new states, or create areas that larger and Americans could fail and then decide that more powerful states annex, certainly it was time to go home, but Ethiopia and may threaten stability in the longer term. other countries in the region do not have In reality, however, the creation of a buf- this option. In subsequent years, Ethiopi- fer zone does not weaken shared interna- ans, Kenyans, and others have had to deal tional norms and can succeed in contribut- with the proliferation of unconvention- ing to the security of the intervening state, al threats that comes from living next to since stronger states are employing buffer failed states, for which they have had to zones because of practical threats against devise their own responses. which international norms do not provide Ethiopia constructs buffer zones to pro- protection. tect its citizens from threats coming from This development may mean either that the adjacent areas. This absence of any real the whole “failed” state can become a buf- capacity of a neighboring state to fulfill ba- fer zone, or that the unilateral creation of a sic obligations to control threats on its own buffer zone undermines the sovereignty of territory is a big problem for other states the targeted state to the extent that it may too, such as Algeria. For now, Algeria has actually lead to failure of that state. Costs not established a visible buffer zone across and intensity of effort, the extent and delin- its border with Mali, even though Mali ful- eation of the formal and informal borders fills the necessary conditions, including the of the states involved, the relative control existence of terrorist groups bent on desta- exerted by the actors, and factors that de- bilizing the region and the lack of capaci- termine the level of impermeability of the ty to control its territories and maintain a zones to protect against attacks–the main monopoly on violence in its territories in objective of establishing buffer zones–are the peripheries. Algeria, however, has yet taken into consideration. to securitize the threat, since those destabi-

132 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences lizing elements have not constituted a crit- The spread of Somalis across borders since Seyoum ical challenge to the survival of the Algeri- the collapse of an effective central gov- Mesfin & Abdeta an state or directly threatened the people of ernment in Somalia in 1990 has occurred Dribssa Beyene Algeria. Like Ethiopia in the 1990s, Algeria against the backdrop of previous irredentist stands by as an international intervention ambitions of elites to build Greater Somalia force attempts to restore order. But that in- in the Horn. Cold War politics and subse- tervention force is discovering that there is quent government policies created animos- not much of a Malian state to which they ities between peoples that led–paradoxi- can pass off this task. Algeria has to watch cally–to one of Africa’s most vicious inter- its border with Mali and accept the pros- state wars in 1977–1978, the Ogaden War pect that the foreign force will leave once it between Somalia and Ethiopia. As men- becomes frustrated with its own shortcom- tioned above, even after Somalia’s defeat, ings. Meanwhile, Algeria’s engagement is its government in the 1980s supported anti- very careful and well managed. The recent government rebels in Ethiopia, against a build up of a huge arms cache along the bor- strategy Ethiopia employed in retaliation. der might force policy changes, and certain- Ethiopia and Somalia reached agreements ly the poor record of foreign-led, large-scale to manage these contentious relations, and state-building projects in the midst of con- records show that both governments pos- flict do not inspire much confidence. The sessed the political will and the capacity to American failure in Iraq casts a very long abide by these agreements before their col- shadow over the calculations of govern- lapse in 1991. ments that benefit peripherally from large- Due to the wars of the 1960s and 1970s, scale foreign intervention but are fated to the Ethiopian-Somali region remained a manage the problems associated with failed backyard, and a military zone for the ad- states on their borders. ministrations in Addis Ababa until the fall The construction of buffer zones takes of Ethiopia’s Derg regime in 1991. Subse- place with the attention of powerful ac- quent Ethiopian regimes handled the So- tors such as the United States, the Euro- mali region of Ethiopia in different ways, pean Union, and international organiza- but historically the region has served tions. It also attracts occasional attention the country as a buffer zone. That reality from conventional news media and from changed in 1991 after Ethiopia institution- social media. Even in failed states, inhabi- alized a federal arrangement that helped tants commonly have access to 3g or even to manage its internal insurgencies, such 4g connectivity. This means that construct- as those involving al-Itihaad al-Islamiya ing buffer zones comes with the strategic (aiai) and the Ogaden National Libera- need to minimize the degrees of violence in- tion Front (onlf), and began to protect its volved and to pay careful attention to how border areas by stationing troops there.7 the buffer zones are viewed by local inhab- However, dealing with internal actors with itants. Navigating this environment plac- cross-border links via a troop presence at es significant demands on Ethiopia’s own the borders was not sustainable so long capabilities. Indeed, Americans and others as the insurgents had rear bases in adja- might have much to learn about promot- cent territories of Somalia that were not ing order over the long term in difficult en- under the control of any central govern- vironments through patient and nuanced ment. Building a “big, beautiful wall” was techniques that have been adapted to the not an option. The border areas were sim- specific political and social environments ply too porous and too long, and it was dif- of failed states. ficult to control movements fully.

147 (1) Winter 2018 133 The Establishing a buffer zone involved a long the wider international community’s re- Practicalities and intensive process of learning and con- sponse for peace-building in Somalia. of Living with Failed States siderable patience. In 1995, Ethiopia took, The central government in Mogadishu for the first time, a unilateral measure to re- appears to be at the forefront in the imple- move the Islamic insurgents aiai, who still mentation of the federal arrangement in So- run an active insurgency along the Somali malia. But, there is no guarantee that this border. Ethiopia launched a second military policy will continue. Reversal is a possibili- intervention in 1998, following Eritrea’s ef- ty; and recently the federal government has fort–in collaboration with a Baidoa-based been accused of meddling in the business of Somali warlord and former U.S. Marine local governments. The recent Gulf crisis is veteran of Operation Desert Storm, Hus- also affecting the relationship between the sein Aideed, and involving the Oromo Lib- center and the periphery. In the meantime, eration Front and the onlf–to open a sec- a number of regional states have been es- ond front against it. Ethiopia’s biggest in- tablished, and Ethiopia, through the igad tervention came in 2006, when it fended (the Djibouti-based regional Intergovern- off an imminent threat from the Islamic mental Authority on Development) and Courts Union (icu) and supported the frag- the African Union, has assisted in the re- ile Somali Federal Government’s occupa- alization of the federal arrangement. Pri- tion of Mogadishu. Ethiopian forces rout- or to these, Ethiopia either created proxies ed the icu fighters in a series of convention- or supported existing ones to reinforce its al and counterinsurgency battles, forcing buffer zone. Following the 2006 incursions, the icu collapse, after which Ethiopia cre- Ethiopia tried to prop up the Somali govern- ated and reinforced proxies to keep local ment for two years until its troops withdrew threats at bay, thereby putting in place real in January 2009. Following the withdraw- buffer zones. The buffer zones’ sizes shift- al, Ethiopia reinforced groups that collabo- ed depending on the threats at hand. Ethi- rated in the fight against Al Shabaab along opia institutionalized the buffer zones and its border. supported these areas, successfully ward- This was not a smooth and easy endeav- ing off threats coming through the territo- or. Ethiopia sometimes failed to recognize ries that remained relatively peaceful and actors that could be proxies outright. When unifying proxies in blocking infiltrations Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (aswj) formed, a through the years. religious paramilitary force created to de- Whenever Somalia’s regional admin- fend clans threatened by Al Shabaab’s on- istrations have faced challenges from lo- slaught, particularly the Ayr subclan of the cal forces or factions supported by extra- Hawiye, Ethiopia simply considered it an regional actors undermining Ethiopia’s se- Islamist group. When in 2007 the Ministry curity, immediate Ethiopian engagement of Foreign Affairs was requested to consid- has been needed to avert a crisis. Ethio- er aswj as an actor to fill the buffer zone pia thus contributes to an ad hoc stabili- between Beledweyne and Galkayo in the ty inside Somalia, despite criticism from Central Regions of Somalia, the Ministry some Somali and international actors. declined and responded to the embassy in This building-block approach stresses the Mogadishu: maintenance of local order, which was first aswj’s engagement is a very interesting advocated by the United Nations but then phenomenon, including the timing of the abandoned. Ethiopia picked up this strat- fighting between the two [with Al Shabaab]. egy amidst criticism, but since 2014, this But, of course, you have not yet gotten into approach has become the cornerstone of what kind of animal the new group is–their

134 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences clan composition, most particularly at the can Union Mission for Somalia (amisom), Seyoum leadership level; if they are close to some that funded by the international community, Mesfin & Abdeta are known to us, whom they might be the clos- Ethiopian forces are currently based in: Dribssa Beyene est with; their source of support, both mili- Bay and Bakool, which together with Lower tary and financial; and their background and Shebelle now make up South West State, where they have been until now. How come we largely inhabited by the Rahanweyn clan; failed to know about their existence until now, Central Regions State; Galmudug; the Hi- and if we knew how did we fail to see them ran Region; the Gedo Region, the home of as an asset for the fight against al-Shabaab?8 the Marehan clan; and in parts of the Jub- aland Interim State administration. Clearly, But aswj proved itself an important ac- understanding the information-intensive tor after killing hundreds of Al Shabaab details of local contexts and the crosscur- fighters in the Central Regions in subse- rents of micropolitics in the buffer zone is quent fighting. aswj is now a major play- critical to Ethiopian efforts. As in all failed er in this part of Somalia, fully supported states, local politics in Somalia is especially by Ethiopia’s security institutions as well as intense because there is no central govern- counterterrorism elements from the United ment to impose a regularized order; thus, States, and has carried out many successful the situation on the ground becomes even operations against Al Shabaab. aswj has more complex. also created an administration that is con- Ethiopia’s influence in Bay and Bakool, tested by Galmudug State, an autonomous deep inside Somalia, followed the creation regional authority in Central Somalia. In of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (rra) order to maintain the integrity of the buf- in the second half of the 1990s.10 Manag- fer zone, Ethiopian forces often engage Al ing the rra was critical, as a proxy, to fend Shabaab directly in these areas, depending off threats posed by Eritrea-backed Ethio- on the level of threat the enemy poses.9 pian rebel groups, hosted by a group led by Ethiopia also ensures that aswj and Gal- Hussein Aideed and by Al Shabaab, respec- mudug do not engage in a fight that would tively, in 1998 and 2012. However, the buffer create a space for Al Shabaab to manipulate. zone in Bay and Bakool remained unstable: This is not always successful, since aswj the existing Somali government in Mogadi- and Galmudug, supported by the govern- shu worked to exert its influence in the area, ment in Mogadishu, have at times engaged and the politicians of the region regularly militarily, forcing Ethiopia to intervene to changed their survival strategies in relation stop the conflict. Overall, Ethiopia has es- to handouts coming from Mogadishu. Ethi- tablished a functional collaboration, with opia’s actions also affected the region, for aswj filling the gap in the buffer zone. example, by temporarily withdrawing its The buffer zone continues west of Gal- forces from Hudur in 2013 and from parts mudug to what was an autonomous re- of Hiiraan in October 2016, influencing the gional administration created adjacent to local politics in the buffer zone.11 the Puntland State of Somalia. Represent- In the Gedo Region, Ethiopia continued ing the Suleiban subclan under the name to assist the Somali National Front after its of Himam iyo Heeb, this administration defeat of aiai in 1995 and 1996, although merged with Galmudug in 2015. Then there the leadership failed to establish a func- is the administrative framework for the Ha- tional administration. Ethiopia provides waadle clan in the Hiiraan and Middle She- training and logistics to the Marehan clan belle regions, formed in October 2016 as militia and, in collaboration with Kenya, Hirshabelle State. After joining the Afri- has involved troops directly in the area de-

147 (1) Winter 2018 135 The pending on the threat level. Although peo- an forces were already on the ground and Practicalities ple inside Somalia closely monitor Ethi- forced Al Shabaab to engage with Ethiopia. of Living with Failed States opia’s Somali-language media and devel- In this way, Kenya got a free ride until Al opments in the Ethiopian-Somali region, Shabaab changed its tactics. Now, whenever which has impacted developments in So- Al Shabaab sustained heavy losses from en- malia, Ethiopia’s government–provided gagement with Ethiopia or its partners, it re- a monopoly over its foreign policy by its taliated against Kenya. Kenya’s defense and constitution–has prevented the Somali intelligence institutions began competing National Regional State from having a po- to address the challenge. The intelligence litical role in developments in Somalia for apparatus first attempted to establish Aza- the last decade. This has helped the Ethi- nia State in exile, based in Nairobi, and then opian government follow a logical policy import it to the adjacent areas of Jubaland, concerning the internal affairs of its neigh- creating a buffer zone that could be man- bor without the interference of the ethnic aged through proxies. Ethiopia expressed Somalis in its own regional state. reservations about Azania, suspecting an in- As noted above, the final element in these visible role from the onlf, with long-term concentric circles of buffer zones, a buffer implications for Ethiopia’s security. zone that covers the regions of Gedo, Mid- The engagement of the Kenyan defense dle Juba, and Lower Juba, has been estab- minister in reconciling the onlf and Ethi- lished along the Kenya-Somalia border. opia diminished Ethiopia’s concerns about Even though this is essentially a Kenyan Azania. More important, the Kenyan De- buffer zone, reinforced through the region- fense Forces spearheaded an invasion of al framework of igad and amisom, Ethi- Somalia, and chose a different faction as opia continues to ensure that no element a proxy, rather than Azania. Contrary to bent on undermining its security will estab- Ethiopia’s approach, the Kenyan policy lish a presence in the Jubaland administra- on Somalia is spearheaded by Kenyan So- tion, as well as the entire Gedo Region. The malis, bringing into the equation all sorts Gedo Region buffer zone serves both Ethi- of baggage. Kenyan (Somali) officials are opia and Kenya. much involved in the decision-making, whereby Kenyan (Somali) elites can ma- Kenya’s buffer zone in Somalia demon- nipulate the indigenous clan balances, fa- strates the difficulties that this organiza- voring the Ogaden clans to have a visible tionally intense strategy imposes on a less role in Kismayu, since most Kenyan Soma- capable implementing state. Kenya creat- lis are linked to the Ogaden clan. But Kis- ed a buffer zone following its intervention mayu is not an all-Ogaden clan territory. in 2012 and the subsequent establishment Marehan and some Hawiye clans close to of the Jubaland administration. Kenya did the Marehan (especially the Ayr) contin- not consider the establishment of the buf- ue to be involved in the politics of Lower fer zone a critical measure since Al Shabaab Juba, forcing Marehans to cooperate with had not disrupted Kenya’s peace and secu- Al Shabaab and attack Kenyan peacekeep- rity before 2012. But bombings in Nairo- ers, and allowing infiltrations into Kenya. bi and elsewhere forced Kenya to revise its The Kenyan government’s weak institu- policy. Ethiopia’s intervention in 2006 not tions and the high-level corruption with- only removed the icu from Southern Soma- in Kenya impact its buffer zones: consti- lia, but also the threat the extremist group tutionally, Kenya’s military involvement in posed to the region. When Al Shabaab’s Somalia does not undergo serious scrutiny, threat to Kenya’s security grew, Ethiopi- and military spending is not audited. Some

136 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences fear that Kenya’s military engagement has rica. Rather than taking risks and telling Seyoum opened opportunities for grand corruption Somalis what the reality is on the basis of Mesfin & Abdeta schemes, since there is no inquiry and au- rules governing interstate relations, lead- Dribssa Beyene diting on spending. This matter emerged ers in Somalia tend to concentrate on issues as an issue in the recent contested election that have provoked regional actors to inter- in the country. vene in self-defense or create buffer zones Sustaining buffer zones demands ex- to fend off threats emanating from both traordinary effort: it is expensive, tedious, within Somalia’s territories or from proxies and information-intensive, as the dizzying outside its borders. Somali leaders are also array of local situations, sub-subclan poli- engaged in other activities that do not help tics, and other ever-changing elements of their country. Based on Stephen Stedman’s Somali politics referenced here suggest. analysis of spoiler problems in peace pro- Meanwhile, Mogadishu-based Somali lead- cesses,12 political scientist Ken Menkhaus ers consistently miscalculate political de- has identified Somalia’s leaders as spoilers velopments in Somalia. This approach in- who “have successfully undermined peace evitably destabilizes relatively peaceful ar- accords to perpetuate armed conflict” and eas, as the resources available in Mogadishu “acted only to undercut local efforts to im- create a scramble for power that disrupts prove law and order and reduce criminali- the stability in otherwise relatively peace- ty,” while “still others support peace-build- ful areas. Ethiopia would instead prefer that ing and the reduction of crime, but block Mogadishu provide a government with suf- efforts to revive an effective central govern- ficient capacity to manage Somalia’s terri- ment.”13 tories, whereby a simple framework of co- Somalia’s neighbors have also failed to operation to address the problems would recognize the challenges and all too often spare Ethiopia much trouble. Somali lead- continue to pursue aggressive and con- ers have repeatedly embarked on politi- tradictory policies toward Somalia. The cal adventures to appear as national lead- events of 2006 vividly demonstrate this ers, but politics in Somalia is complex, with point: The icu fought and defeated So- deep divisions at both the elite level and malia’s U.S.-supported warlords, orga- within the society based on clan and sub- nized under the clever banner of “the Al- clan divisions; it takes a lot of effort, and liance for the Restoration of Peace and resources, to unite rival interests and gov- Counter-Terrorism,” and took control of ern all the territories effectively from the Mogadishu and the surrounding areas. center. Time and again since 1991, Somali That much is accepted as fact. But there leaders have tried to forge a common ob- are conflicting views of what then unfold- jective on the basis of nationalism or using ed. Ethiopia, for example, had no problem the Islamic Ummah, but the result has been with icu’s defeat of the warlords in 2006, turmoil that threatens all of its neighbors. since they had created obstacles to the re- Given these realities, the work of any location of the Transitional Federal Gov- leader in Somalia is an uphill struggle. To ernment (tfg) from Nairobi to Mogadi- be considered a Somali leader in the eyes of shu. At the outset, Ethiopia took icu’s rise all Somalis, those who come to power are to power as an opportunity, although the forced to try to exaggerate indigenous na- icu’s policies would subsequently become tionalism, pursue irredentist foreign policy, unacceptable and unhelpful.14 or put forward messages of religious univer- With the international community’s fail- salism in a way that antagonizes custom- ure to appreciate the looming danger, Ethi- ary interstate relations in the Horn of Af- opia approached the problems of Somalia

147 (1) Winter 2018 137 The using a two-pronged approach, engaging prised by the swift conclusion of the war Practicalities with the icu to peacefully resolve the con- and was interested in learning how Ethi- of Living with 15 Failed States flicts while continuing to assist thetfg ’s opia succeeded. The icu’s defeat helped institutions to consolidate peace. Ethio- Ethiopia to ensure its buffer zone’s sustain- pia held eight negotiations with the icu ability. This exemplifies how states can defy in various capitals, including Nairobi, advice from bigger partners on matters of Khartoum, London, Djibouti, Sana’a, and their own security and respond directly to Dubai. Ethiopia could live with an Islam- threats undermining their established buf- ic government in Somalia provided that fer zones. icu leaders accepted international law governing interstate relations and that the Failed states are destabilizing. This fact icu did not allow elements undermining ultimately forced Ethiopia to set up buf- Ethiopia’s national security to operate in fer zones in Somalia. An asymmetry of ca- areas it controlled. But the icu interpret- pabilities means that the failed state can ed this as weakness, declared jihad against nonetheless continue war through other Ethiopia, and subsequently boasted that its means via actors used as proxies. The case forces would be praying in Addis Ababa in of the Ethiopia-Somalia buffer zones clear- a month. Bent on opening a second front ly illustrates how strong states may see it as against Ethiopia, Eritrea’s leaders also ma- imperative to fend off threats through uni- nipulated icu leaders, pitting one against lateral intervention, or to carefully mar- the other and causing an internal split. shal international support in the name of The underlying challenge for Ethiopia peacekeeping. So long as strong states care- was the possible destruction of the buffer fully manage the ungoverned spaces, with- zone it had painstakingly constructed and out getting involved in activities that at- the security threat the icu posed to rela- tract a huge media outcry, the international tively peaceful areas in Somalia. But the community actually supports the strategy. war with the icu was over in a matter of The Kenya-Somalia buffer zones are simi- days. Given the numerous allegations that lar in this regard, although the Kenyan mil- have been made about Ethiopia carrying itary has not fully succeeded in warding off out the United States’ “war on terror,” it threats. Kenya has the benefit of material is important to note that the United States support from the international communi- in fact strongly advised Ethiopia not to get ty, however, which will also usually turn a militarily involved. U.S. officials pointed to- blind eye to state actions taken in self-de- ward the difficulties in Iraq and expressed fense, even if they undermine internation- concern about another such failure in So- al norms, provided that they do not threat- malia. Certainly, after Ethiopia had won the en the interests of great powers or spark a war, the United States provided critical sup- media uproar. port in the United Nations Security Council Moreover, outside countries may often, if to ensure that international condemnation surreptitiously, encourage and pay for such would not arise. And the international com- actions, through a peacekeeping mission or munity was muted, proffering neither sup- through an arrangement that is not public- port nor condemnation. The international ly disclosed. That is why the creation of the media, on the other hand, claimed that U.S. buffer zone does not weaken formulated Special Forces were embedded with Ethio- international norms and succeeds in con- pian forces on the ground, assisting with the tributing to the security of the intervening operation–an allegation that was far from state. Moreover, it is evident that the uni- the truth. In fact, the United States was sur- lateral creation of buffer zones–whether

138 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences to encourage the potentiality for creating and have given guarantees that those in- Seyoum a failed state, speed up the creation of new volved in killing Al Shabaab will be protect- Mesfin & Abdeta states, or create areas ready to be annexed ed, although the administration’s failure Dribssa Beyene for inclusion in a larger and more power- to pay salaries affects the work of the secu- ful state–might threaten stability in the rity forces. longer term. The international community needs a In light of this, how might the interna- paradigm shift from a highly centralized ap- tional community use buffer zones to fur- proach to one more closely aligned with So- ther peace and stability, building local malia’s new federal structure, and it needs governance structures with a capacity for to concretely support Somalia’s islands of fighting terrorist groups and to facilitate peace.17 Using the buffer zone to expand the return of refugees to their homeland? areas of peace and security may be critical, Buffer zones create a framework for local both in terms of fighting terrorism and pro- administrations to establish governance viding a favorable situation for returning structures on the basis of strong local po- refugees to their places of origin, once a litical alliances and informal clan networks structured administrative capacity that will with institutions governing the behaviors defend Somalis from terrorist groups is cre- of key actors in the area. This interweaving ated locally. Moreover, administrations in of informal clan networks and institutions buffer zones might lead to better represen- can create a defense mechanism that can tation and enforce better elite bargaining, keep groups like Al Shabaab at bay, or fight making the outcomes of state-building sus- them militarily when necessary. In Somalia, tainable over the long term. These sugges- a national defense force cannot address the tions are tailored for Somalia; other con- threat of Al Shabaab; government forces texts demand equally information-inten- have no mechanism to protect soldiers from sive and locally engaged strategies designed Al Shabaab’s selective revenge actions.16 to address their particular contexts. Those But Puntland forces have recently found of us who live next to failed states have few success against Al Shabaab and support- other options. And we might have much to ers of the Islamic State because tightly knit teach to others who are geographically bet- clan institutions protect Puntland soldiers ter off and perhaps a bit less patient.

endnotes 1 Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, eds., Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research (Abingdon, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2004). 2 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 3 Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001). 4 This is a definition for buffer zone offered by the Random House Kernerman Webster’s Col- lege Dictionary. 5 For a further discussion on areas of limited statehood, see Thomas Risse and Eric Stollenwerk, “Limited Statehood Does Not Equal Civil War,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 6 William Reno, “Redefining Statehood in the Global Periphery,” in Government of the Shad- ows: Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty, ed. Eric Wilson and Tim Lindsey (London: Pluto Press, 2009).

147 (1) Winter 2018 139 The 7 The Ethiopian constitution provides for an ethnic-based federal arrangement, guaranteeing Practicalities Ethiopian Somalis the right to govern themselves. of Living with 8 Failed States The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia responded to the embassy in Mogadishu on Jan- uary 5, 2009, with options to accommodate the aswj to strengthen Ethiopia’s buffer zone. 9 Apart from providing capacity-building support to strengthen aswj administrations, Ethi- opia solicits support from other partners in terms of security, humanitarian assistance, and rehabilitation efforts. 10 The Digil and Merifle clans, commonly known as the Rahanweyn, are sedentary clans that live in the most fertile areas of the Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shebelle regions. These are the Somali clans most subjugated by the other aggressive pastoralist clans. 11 “Explaining Ethiopia’s Curious Strategy in Somalia,” Somalia Newsroom, April 1, 2013, https:// somalianewsroom.com/2013/04/01/explaining-ethiopias-curious-strategy-in-somalia/. 12 Stephen John Stedman, “The Spoiler Problem in Peace Processes,” International Security 22 (2) (1997): 5–53. 13 Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building and the Politics of Coping,” International Security 31 (3) (Winter 2006/2007): 74–106. 14 As the chef de cabinet of the foreign minister of Ethiopia, one of the authors had the opportunity to lead an Ethiopian delegation to the negotiations to open the first dialogue with theicu representatives in Nairobi. The negotiations were conducted for two days without a break- through. Thinking that they had defeated warlords organized and supported by the U.S. government, icu leaders were emboldened and threatened to take both political and military action against Ethiopia. Ultimately, faced with icu threats and requests from the tfg leadership for support, Ethiopia was forced into a war of the icu’s making in December 2006. 15 Both authors traveled to the United States in April 2007 and met with the then-secretary of state and national security advisor of the Bush administration. The U.S. officials were open in their appreciation and wanted to learn what exactly happened, and they expressed the U.S. government’s commitment to assisting Ethiopia going forward. See also Menkhaus, “Gover- nance without Government in Somalia.” 16 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 17 Ilya Gridneff and Brian O’Sullivan, “A New Path Emerges for Troubled Somali Security,” ipi Global Observatory, November 8, 2016, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/11/ somalia-al-shabaab-amisom-ethiopia/.

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