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273 4Chan, 210–11 9/11 Attacks, 38, 134 9/11 Commission, 134 Abbas Index 4chan, 210–11 anticelebrity ethic, 209–10, 9/11 attacks, 38, 134 219–20, 226 9/11 Commission, 134 anti-counterfeiting trade agreement (ACTA), 156, 160, 175 Abbas, Wael, 232 anti-globalization protests, 196–7 accountability, 27, 66 Antisec, 218, 223–7 advertising Apache videos, see Collateral Murder classified, 39 video revenue, 89 Apple, 46, 52, 153, 166, 171 affinity groups, 194, 197–8, Applebaum, Jacob, 166–7, 170–3, 175 206n11 app stores, 153 Afghanistan War, 38 Arab Spring, 4, 9, 28, 92, 146–7, 156, Afghan War Logs, 2–3, 31n5, 79, 209, 229–32, 236–42, 266–9 106–7, 109, 135, 245, 248, 252 Argentina, 159–60 Agee, Philip, 102, 104 Assange, Julian, 3, 5, 9, 40, 79, 81, 97, agency, 91, 99 123, 155, 175, 178, 191, 247, 249 agenda setting, 89–90, 97–8 alleged sexual misconduct by, The Age of WikiLeaks (Mitchell), 3 95, 108 aggregation sites, 14 attempts to discredit, 108 Al Akhbar, 230, 240, 266, 267 celebrity cult of, 251–2 Al Jazeera, 13, 27, 229, 267 conversation with, 254–71 All the President’s Men (film), 35, demonization of, 258–9 101, 258 descriptions of, 22–4, 26 Amazon, 42, 52, 152, 156, 166, extradition case against, 269–71 170, 171 Amazon Web Services (AWS), 42, 43 Bachman, Michelle, 18 American Independent News Bagdikian, Ben, 127 Network, 14 Bahamas, 68 analogue leaking, 125–8 Bank of America, 46, 166, 171, 268 anarchy, 21 Barr, Aaron, 217 Anderson, Chris, 36 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 95–6 AnonOps, 214–15, 217, 219–22 Ben Ali, Zine al-Abidine, 237, 240 anonymity, 92, 131–2, 157, 195, 211, Benkler, Yochai, 40, 166 213, 219 Berglez, Peter, 58 Anonymous, 8, 49–50, 156, 175, Berlin Wall, 268 191–6, 201, 203–4, 206n12, Biden, Joe, 259 209–28, 230–2 Blair, Tony, 179, 181 anticelebrity ethic and, 209–10 bloggers, imprisonment of, 155 birth of, 210–13 blogs, 18–19, 86, 90, 158, 200 ethical principles, 218–21 botnets, 213–18 informants infiltrating, 225 Bouazizi, Mohammed, 237, 267 media coverage of, 226–7 Brand, Stewart, 233 use of botnets by, 213–18 Brin, Sergey, 161 273 274 Index Britannica, 28 collective identity, 201–3 British National Party (BNP), 106 collective meaning making, 87, 94 BrusselsLeaks, 27 communicate, right to, 262–5 Bugged Planet, 154 communication infrastructure, 41–3 Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 50 community broadcasting, 152, Burton, Finn, 210 159–60 Bush, George W., 16, 181 confidentiality, 28 Bush Administration, 169 Contempt of Court Act, 183 business environment, 37 content control, 149–56 business models, 170–4 content production, 48–9 Buxton, Peter, 102 Coombs, David, 117, 137, 139, 142n8 Cooper, Anderson, 17, 18, 19 Cablegate, 3, 5–6, 28, 40, 42, 56–77, Copyright Alert System, 151 123, 129–33, 135–6, 237–9, 245, copyright laws, 167 248, 266–7 Courage to Resist, 45 cable reporting, blocking of, 67–9 Cowen, Tyler, 16 Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) credibility, 98 v. Information Commissioner and Critical Art Ensemble, 193 Ministry of Defence, 186 crowdsourcing, 88–9 Castells, Manuel, 89, 124, 125 Cryptome, 233 censorship, 7, 59, 67–9, 147, 149–50, Cult of the Dead Cow, 193, 205n4 156, 167, 184, 232–3, 256, 258–60 cyberactivism, 4, 8, 191–206 Center for Independent Media, 14 Cyber Intelligence Sharing and charitable foundations, 50–1 Protection Act (CISPA), 153–4, child pornography, 149, 192–3 168 China, 21, 38, 67, 167, 175, 233, 246, cyberlibertarianism, 195, 205n6 259, 264–5 cybersecurity, 153–4, 168 Chomsky, Noam, 265 Church of Scientology, 106, 192, 209, Dahlgren, P., 87, 94 211–13 Daily Kos, 15 citizen journalism, 105, 146, 147, 158, Daily Mail, 18 232, 247–8 Damiens, Robert-François, 138 citizen media, 90 data analysis, 47–9, 50 citizenship, 91–2 data dumps, 134–41 civic culture, 87, 94 data journalism, 57 civil liberties, 38, 238–9 Data Retention Directive, 160 civil society, 58–60, 94, 159–60, 192 Davies, Nick, 79 classified advertising, 39 Davis, Daniel, 38 classified information, release of, 6–7, decentralization, 21, 30, 90, 240 79, 123 de Certeau, Michel, 214 cloud protesting, 8, 191–206 Deep Throat, 35, 102 cloud services, 42, 152, 256 Defence, Press and Broadcasting CNN, 59 Advisory Committee (DPBAC), collaboration, 36 80, 184 Collateral Murder video, 2, 22, 40, 44, Defence Advisory Notice (DA-Notice), 95, 106, 123, 166, 191, 229, 245, 184 255 De George, Richard T., 104 collective action, 191–2, 195–203, Dele, Ojolede, 69 205n7, 205n10, 209, 215, 232 DeLong, Brad, 16 Index 275 democracy, 94 Facebook, 37, 90, 146, 154, 172, 173, democratization, 146, 148–9 240, 241 denial of service (DoS) attacks, 43 Factcheck.org, 14, 18, 19 Dershowitz, Alan, 261–2 Federal Trade Commission, 17 Der Spiegel, 2, 23, 25, 26, 44, 110, 112, file-sharing sites, 149 114–19 filtering content, 149–50, 167 Deseriis, Marco, 213 Financial Times, 39 detainee assessment briefs, 82 First Amendment, 80, 96 digital broadcasting, 152 First Gulf War, 13 digital information, 124–38 Flanagan, Tom, 259 digital leaking, 124–41 Foreign Intelligence Services Act diplomatic cables, leaking of, 40, 42, (FISA), 174 56–77, 92–4, 123, 129–33, 135–6, Forward Operating Base (FOB), 130–1 230, 237–9, 266–7 Foucault, Michael, 138 disclosure fourth estate, 11–12 future of, 49–52 see also networked fourth estate political economy of, 35–55 Fox News, 18, 19, 222, 258 distributed denial of service (DDoS), freedom of expression, 7, 8, 96, 8, 156, 170, 193, 212, 215, 224 146 –65 Doctorow, Cory, 233–4 obstacles to, 148–56 Domscheit-Berg, Daniel, 3, 48, policy initiatives to ensure, 156–60 50, 251 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), donations, 43–7, 50–1 184–7 Dorling, Phillip, 62 Freedom Ops, 217 Drudge Report, 18 Free Press, 159 Dyer-Whiteford, Nick, 47 free space, 215 frequency allocation, 152 eavesdropping hardware, 153–4 Friedman, Thomas, 17, 20–1 eBay, 52, 166, 171 Egypt, 28, 67, 151, 155, 230, 231, Garbaya, Samir, 240 232–3, 238, 240, 266 gatekeeping role, 87, 89–90, 97–8 Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Geithner, Timothy, 268 171, 173 general intellect, 47 electronic surveillance, 38 geopolitics, 36–9 Ellsberg, Daniel, 7, 42–3, 102, 104, Gharbia, Sami Ben, 229 123, 125–8, 133, 134, 139–40 Ghonim, Wael, 147 embassy cables, see diplomatic cables Gingrich, Newt, 258–9 Encarta, 12 Gitlin, Todd, 135 Espionage Act, 104, 133, 136 Gleaner Newspaper group, 92–4 ethics, 4, 66, 96–7, 205n4, 218–21 GlobaLeaks, 233 European Court of Human Rights global financial crisis, 37 (ECHR), 181 globalization, 58–60, 87, 124 European Data Retention Directive, global journalism, 58, 62–7, 71 153 global online news organizations, European Digital Rights (EDRI), 160 13–14 everyDNS, 43, 170, 171 global public sphere, 58–60, 71, 92–4 experience movements, 197, 204 Gongrijp, Rop, 167, 170–1, 172 experts, 16 Gono, Gideon, 68 extra-legal spaces, 260–2 Goodman, Amy, 254–71 276 Index Google, 37, 38, 41, 42, 90, 154, 161, democratization of, 85 172, 175 digital, 124–38 Google News, 13 dissemination of, 89–90, 95–6 government corruption, 237–8 filtering, 149–50, 167 Graham, Andrew, 48 secrecy, in UK, 178–82 Gravel, Mike, 43 information society, 47, 89, 245 Green, Damien, 182 Inside WikiLeaks (Domscheit-Berg), 3 Greenwald, Glenn, 217 intellectual property protection, 156, Guantánamo Bay Files, 3, 82, 106 159–60 Guardian, 2, 3, 6, 22–3, 30, 44, 78–82, International Association for Media 95, 109, 110, 112–15, 117–19, 175 and Communication Research Guy Fawkes masks, 195, 212 (IAMCR), 9–10 International Federation of the Habermas, J., 58 Phonographic Industry, 192 hacker culture, 249–50 Internet hacker ethic, 205n4, 218–21 access to, 151, 241 hacktivism, 4, 193–6, 209, 221–7, blocking of, 167 231–2 business models, 170–4 see also Anonymous censorship, 7, 59, 67–9, 147, 149–50, Hactivismo, 193 156, 167, 184, 232–3, 256, 258–60 Hajji, Lotfi, 13 concentration of ownership, Hamlily, Adil Hadi al Jazairi Bin, 82 173–4 Hardey, M., 91, 99 control of, 41–3, 59, 166–77 HBGary Federal, 217–18, 221 forces for closure, 36–9 Heald, Emma, 98 impact on traditional media, Heller, Jean, 102 12–13 Hill, Amelia, 182 infrastructure, 41–3, 150–2, 155, Hoglund, Greg, 221 159–60 Holder, Eric, 108 privacy rights, 170–4 Honduras, 68 regulation, 38 horizontal networks, 124 services, 7 Hrafnsson, Kristinn, 47 traditional media and, 89–90 Huckabee, Mike, 109, 260 transparency, 229–35 Huffington Post, 90 Internet Corporation for the human microphone, 198–9 Assignment of Names and Numbers (ICANN), 175 Icelandic Modern Media Initiative Internet Feds, 221–2 (IMMI), 148, 157–60, 161 Internet Freedom Agenda, 149 Imus, Don, 19 Internet-relay chat, 199 Indignados, 198 Internet service providers (ISPs), 149, individuality, 191 153–4, 167, 168, 173 individuals, 15–16, 21, 194–5, 196–9 investigative journalism, 35, 39, 50–1, Indonesia, 68 85–6, 96, 247–8 Indymedia, 4, 146, 173, 251 Iran, 154, 238 informal networks, 197–8 Iran-Contra Affair, 229 information Iranian reform movement, 28 access to, 87, 135, 149–50, 241 Iraq War, 38 control, 149–56 Iraq War Logs, 2–3, 107, 135, 254–7 decentralized, 12 Israel, 238, 260, 265 Index 277 Jamaica Gleaner, 92–4 of diplomatic cables, 40, 42, 56–77, Jenkins, Henry, 91 92–4, 123, 129–33, 135–6, 230, Jenkins, Simon, 81 237–9, 266–7 Jónsdóttir, Birgitta, 166, 170–2, in network society, 123–45 175 Pentagon Papers, 7, 16, 42–3, 50, Jordan, 232 87, 102, 123, 125–8, 135, 136, journalism 141n2 citizen, 105, 146, 147, 158, 232, politics of, 209–28 247–8 war logs, 2–3, 31n5, 79, 106–9, 135, data, 57 245, 248, 252, 254–7 ethics, 96–7 Lebanon, 67 future of, 17 Leigh, David, 96 global, 58, 62–7, 71 Leveson Inquiry, 78, 83n1 investigative, 17, 35, 39, 50–1, 85–6, libel
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