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Fear, Death, and Being-A-Problem: Understanding and Critiquing Racial Discourse with Heidegger's

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Fear, Death, and Being-A-Problem: Understanding and Critiquing Racial Discourse with Heidegger's University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 6-20-2019 Fear, Death, and Being-a-problem: Understanding and Critiquing Racial Discourse with Heidegger’s Being and Time Jesús H. Ramírez University of South Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the Philosophy Commons Scholar Commons Citation Ramírez, Jesús H., "Fear, Death, and Being-a-problem: Understanding and Critiquing Racial Discourse with Heidegger’s Being and Time" (2019). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7896 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Fear, Death, and Being-a-problem: Understanding and Critiquing Racial Discourse with Heidegger’s Being and Time by Jesús H. Ramírez A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Joshua Rayman, Ph.D. Alex Levine, Ph.D. Lee Braver, Ph.D. Adriana Novoa, Ph.D. Date of Approval: May 21, 2019 Keywords: black, brown, bodies, existentiell, identity, racism Copyright © 2019, Jesús H. Ramírez Dedication For Apa and Papa Chuche Acknowledgments I would like to thank my family for all their support, especially my mom and dad for working all their lives to make sure my sisters and I were educated. Thank you to my oldest sister Mari for yelling at me, “Don’t say ‘I can’t,’ JR!” right before I was kicked out of high school. It was a big sis pep talk that carried me through some tough times at school. Thank you to my second oldest sister Lupe for making me apply to San José State University as an incoming undergraduate even though I had legitimate reasons to be skeptical about being accepted. Thank you to my third oldest sister Ruby for being inspired by The Autobiography of Malcolm X as much as I was, and for all the discussions it generated between us back in the day. Thank you to my brothers-in-law: David for his commitment to writing, Cesar for his encouraging words, and Victor for consistently texting me from the West Coast, reminding me to take a break, have a beer, and watch a Warriors game. Thank you to my nephews and niece (Benito, my Godson Tristan, Quetzal, Alex, Juan Ollin, and Gaby) for inspiring me to be a better Tío even though I moved far away to work on my doctorate. Thank you to William Nguyen for always visiting me in Tampa and being my Vietnamese “brother from another mother.” He humbles me with his work ethic, loyalty, and unwavering commitment to his craft. Thank you to Xian Ballesteros for inspiring me with his dedication to his family, education, music, and community. Thank you to Erli Mërtika for intellectually challenging me with his Nietzsche powers whilst drinking beers together. Thank you to Kyle Stroh for wisely advising me on how to take editing comments. Thank you to Christine Wieseler for always reaching out to me and letting me talk about anything. To my dissertation committee: thank you to Dr. Adriana Novoa for taking time out to meet with me over the years and letting me process ideas with her; thank you to Dr. Lee Braver for his expertise on Heidegger’s Being and Time and the clarity of his writings and teaching; thank you to Dr. Alex Levine for supporting me from the very first version of my dissertation right up until this last one, and for always providing detailed comments that compelled me to critique my philosophical stance; thank you to my major professor, Dr. Joshua Rayman, for pushing me to write better and think harder. He emboldens me to be a stronger philosopher and a resolute scholar. I would like to thank Dr. Douglas Henslee, my first philosophy professor at San José State University as an undergraduate. He died on June 5, 2010, but I will never forget him or his humorous disdain for most undergraduates. He was the first professor to motivate me to learn about philosophy. Thank you to Dr. Rita Manning of San José State University, who once wrote on one of my homework assignments, “Jesús, you should try to major in philosophy, or at least get a minor.” She has always been my role model. Thank you, Dr. Manning. One day I will call her “Rita” as she insists, but today is not that day. Thank you to Dr. Pankaj Mehta and Mr. Girish Mehta for welcoming me into your beautiful family and for supporting my academic efforts. Finally, thank you to Dr. Pangri Mehta, my lady, but also my hero. She has helped me think through this entire dissertation and we have been talking about death and racism for a few years now because of it. I promise to talk about it a little bit less after this dissertation is approved. Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 Why Care? .......................................................................................................................... 3 Why Racial Identity? .......................................................................................................... 4 Broad Narratives ................................................................................................................. 5 Example: A Boy and a Professor ........................................................................................ 6 Chapter 2 - Racial Identity as an Existentiell: How Heidegger Overcomes the Abstraction Critique ....................................................................................................... 8 Chapter 3 - Covered Up with Bodies: Dasein as a Fear Existentiell and Societal De-Severance ............................................................................................................... 10 Chapter 4 - Bodies and Lives Matter: Death of Dasein as a Fear Existentiell .................. 11 Chapter 5 - Being-a-problem and Du Bois’ Double Consciousness................................. 12 Chapter 6 - “Second Sight” and the Augenblick: Seeing Authentic Being-a-problem’s Situation ........................................................................................ 14 Chapter 7 - Tottering Ontical Reports: Authentic Being-a-problem and Philosophies of Struggle .............................................................................................. 15 Chapter 8 - Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 17 Chapter 2 - Racial Identity as an Existentiell: How Heidegger Overcomes the Abstraction Critique .................................................................................................................................... 19 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 19 Mariana Ortega’s Abstraction Critique ............................................................................. 21 Heidegger’s Existentiell .................................................................................................... 24 Dasein as Ontico-Ontological ........................................................................................... 27 Heidegger Scholars on the Many Uses of “Existentiell” .................................................. 29 Sheehan on Existentiell and Meaning ............................................................................... 31 Braver on Thrown-Projection ........................................................................................... 32 Replying to Ortega’s Abstraction Critique ....................................................................... 36 Dasein’s Racial Identity .................................................................................................... 38 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 41 Chapter 3 - Covered Up with Bodies: Dasein as a Fear Existentiell and Societal De-Severance ........................................................................................................................... 44 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 44 Taking Dasein as Present-at-hand: Dasein as a Body ....................................................... 44 Dasein’s Fallenness ........................................................................................................... 47 Bodies as Present-at-hand or Ready-to-hand? .................................................................. 50 Fear Existentiell ................................................................................................................ 55 Idle Talk and Fear ............................................................................................................. 60 i Das Man Listens to Dasein ............................................................................................... 63 Dasein-with, Being-with, and “Bodies”...........................................................................
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