SOUTH ASIA MONITOR

NUMBER 36 AUGUST 1, 2001

The Agra Summit

The three-day summit between Indian prime minister Atal innocent contact among Kashmiris was being held hostage to Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani president Pervez India-Pakistan problems. However, it caused understandable Musharraf, their first contact since Musharraf took power resentment on the Pakistan side, because it signaled India’s in October 1999, ended without a joint statement. Both lack of interest in working out such progress jointly and giving sides subsequently stressed their intention to continue Pakistan a share of the credit. working on their countries’ troubled relationship. • Start with the Kashmiris: The ideal Kashmir settlement, Although few expected a breakthrough at the summit, the from India’s perspective, would have the Kashmiris reconcile leaders’ failure to agree on a process for resolving themselves to remaining within India without passing through differences between India and Pakistan will strengthen the any negotiations with Pakistan. Indian officials hope to entice hard-liners in both countries. The two leaders are due to enough Kashmiri politicians into the Indian electoral process meet again on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly to restore tranquility in Kashmir, and to undercut the argument this fall, as well as later this year in Pakistan. Neither can that India represses the Kashmiri people. Unlike some others afford a repeat performance, and both governments have in his government, however, Vajpayee recognizes that much work to do before Vajpayee and Musharraf meet Pakistan must be part of the process for a settlement to again. survive. India’s major moves in the last six months have alternated between gestures toward the Kashmiris (such as the India: Keeping the initiative: India claims all of the old ceasefire) and Pakistan-oriented events (such as the invitation princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. It denies any real to Musharraf). This pattern makes both the Kashmiris and Pakistani role in resolving the problems in Kashmir, and Pakistan uneasy about being marginalized, a result the Indians asserts that the Kashmir “issue” is only one of a long list of probably quietly welcome. problems on the table with Pakistan. Many believe that India could accept a settlement that turned the current Line of The Indian government is at best ambivalent about the Control between the Indian- and Pakistani-held parts of question of Kashmiri leadership. It prefers to deal with Farooq Kashmir into an international border. However, Indian Abdullah’s National Conference, which made its peace with government and opposition figures alike vocally reject any India years ago and which was elected, in controversial hint of compromise at this early stage. elections, to lead the state government in Kashmir. The Conference, however, has little popular credibility. It is hard India’s position on the substance of its problems with Pakistan to see how any settlement can take root without including has not changed, but Prime Minister Vajpayee and some of his leaders connected with the Kashmiri militancy, a group India closest advisers seem to have concluded early this year that would find less friendly. The All Parties Hurriyet Conference their efforts to isolate Pakistan and their refusal of political- (APHC) claims the leadership mantle, and the Indian level contact were not working. Vajpayee’s current approach government has intermittently been willing to deal with them. appears to have three primary elements: • Keep the process moving: India’s positive initial response to Previous Indian peacemaking gestures laid bare disagreements the Kashmiri ceasefire initiative last August fits this pattern. within the Indian government on how far India ought to soft- So do the Indian ceasefire declaration in early December, the pedal its position in the interest of launching a new initiative. three extensions of the ceasefire, the nomination of a special In his dialogue with Kashmiris and with Pakistan, Vajpayee negotiator with the Kashmiris after the ceasefire lost its luster, has carefully avoided spelling out his view of Kashmir as an and finally the invitation to Musharraf. “integral part of India,” only to have his subtlety undercut by • Keep the initiative in India’s hands: India’s distaste for statements from members of India’s nationalist movement. third-party intervention in its discussions with Pakistan is well This increased the importance the Indians attached to the other known. Its recent actions suggest a strong preference for subject of verbal gymnastics – the hoped-for statement by unilateral moves. Besides the measures listed above, examples Pakistan that it would foreswear “cross-border terrorism.” include India’s pre-summit announcement that it would issue visas to Pakistanis at the Line of Control. This gesture was a Pakistan: Prominence for Kashmir, legitimacy for welcome response to the long-standing complaint that Musharraf: Pakistan, by contrast, has spent the last year and

South Asia Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3171 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org

a half stressing its willingness to talk to India. Besides the Pakistani government’s many statements to that effect, In addition, India said it would implement the unilateral Pakistan also responded to India’s ceasefire in December with confidence-building measures (CBMs) announced on the eve troop reductions along the Line of Control (LOC) in the hope of the summit, which cover trade, visa issues, educational of bringing about a high-level dialogue. Musharraf's exchanges, and security. The two sides discussed nuclear risk- unexpected telephone call and offer of assistance after the reduction measures, cooperation to stop drug trafficking and earthquake in Gujarat in January 2001 was designed to present other cross-border issues, and trade relations. Pakistan as a responsible member of the international community. Pakistan, in general, and Musharraf, in particular, The scorecard: Musharraf probably gained more from the craved the legitimacy a high-level dialogue would bestow. summit than Vajpayee. His excursion to his childhood home touched people on a human level, and the extraordinary beauty Pakistan has long and unsuccessfully sought Indian of the Taj Mahal reminded audiences in both countries of recognition of the centrality of the Kashmir dispute. Both India and Pakistan’s shared cultural heritage. Musharraf was countries’ diplomats are adept at ensuring that their preferred crisp, direct, and most importantly reasonable. He was widely vocabulary is prominently featured. The theme of Kashmir as praised in Pakistan for “standing firm” on the centrality of “the core issue” appeared daily in Pakistani press statements Kashmir. Although this strengthens his domestic position, it during the week before the summit. The composition of the will also make future compromises more difficult. Militant Pakistani delegation to the summit reinforced the point: about groups in Pakistan have used the summit to illustrate the half the intended participants, including the commerce futility of talks with India and to reiterate that violence is the minister, were cut from the delegation at the last minute. only way to make headway on Kashmir.

Diplomacy by media blitz: Once Musharraf arrived in India Vajpayee, on the other hand, was politically hurt by the the media took center stage. The summit generated the unseemly public display of his disagreements with his political frenzied atmosphere usually reserved for sporting events party and even with his own advisors. He faces a reinvigorated between these two cricket-mad nations. The game was carried challenge from the right wing. Vajpayee’s leadership is crucial out on the field and in the press, with every move eagerly to any Indian peace effort, so his political and physical health dissected by the proliferation of 24-hour satellite channels that are particularly important. crowd the South Asian airwaves. This transparency magnified misunderstandings and publicized statements that might Looking ahead: The critical question is how to turn this impede future dialogue. Indian information and broadcasting modest record of achievement into a serious peace process, minister Sushma Swaraj’s press briefing on the substance of and to prevent the hard-liners in both countries from the talks, which made no mention at all of Kashmir, led to reclaiming the agenda. Eighty people died in Kashmir during Musharraf’s televised breakfast meeting with editors of major the talks. Moving toward peace will require both governments newspapers, pursuing his campaign to get India to to tame their internal critics. acknowledge the primacy of Kashmir. The Indian delegation, upset with Musharraf’s performance, retaliated by releasing Neither side can afford a protracted crisis in their relations. Vajpayee’s opening statement to the summit, which stressed For Pakistan, the conflict drains resources away from the terrorism issue, and by denying Musharraf a final press addressing its fragile economy and its institutional crisis. For conference before he left India, gestures that made the Indians India, the 'Pakistan trap' diminishes its international standing look heavy-handed. and blocks its aspirations, and the protracted low-intensity conflict in Kashmir has a high cost in people and treasure. In this atmosphere, the joint statement fell apart. It appears India and Pakistan cannot solve their problems without that the two delegations were tantalizingly close to joint addressing Kashmir, and a solution to the Kashmir issue must language, which their leaders ultimately could not accept in include India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiris. the overheated public environment of the summit’s last hours. The deal-breakers, unsurprisingly, were the phrases Needed: A sustainable process: As Vajpayee recognized in characterizing Kashmir and terrorism, but the real culprit was his speech describing the summit for the Indian parliament, overblown public expectations. India and Pakistan need to agree on a process for discussing their problems. A viable process would provide Pakistan with Judging by more realistic standards, however, the summit a setting for discussing Kashmir from the start, but would also made a modest step in the right direction. Within a day after accommodate the broader agenda prized by India. It would Musharraf flew home, both foreign ministers made public need the sustained personal backing of Musharraf and statements remarkable for their deft touch, their avoidance of Vajpayee to survive the inevitable crises that would interrupt neuralgic phrases, and their commitment to future dialogue. it. Both countries would need steady leadership to persevere Both ministers spoke of planned summit meetings in New until they can sustain the strategic compromise a genuine York in September, and in Pakistan later. These unilateral settlement requires. announcements sounded as if they had been jointly drafted.

South Asia Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3171 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org

Teresita Schaffer and Mandavi Mehta

South Asia Monitor is published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific public policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the authors. © 2001 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies

South Asia Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3171 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • http://www.csis.org