DOCSLIB.ORG

The Rules of Material Inference Theory of Deep Disagreements

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Rules of Material Inference Theory of Deep Disagreements THE RULES OF MATERIAL INFERENCE THEORY OF DEEP DISAGREEMENTS JASON SCHULTCHEN Bachelor of Arts, University of Lethbridge, 2016 A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy University of Lethbridge LETHBRIDGE, ALBERTA, CANADA © Jason Schultchen, 2020 THE RULES OF MATERIAL INFERENCE THEORY OF DEEP DISAGREEMENTS JASON SCHULTCHEN Date of Defence: April 18, 2020 Dr. B. Brown Professor Ph.D. Thesis Supervisor Dr. K. Peacock Professor Ph.D. Thesis Examination Committee Member Dr. K. Stevens Assistant Professor Ph.D. Thesis Examination Committee Member Dr. S. Aikin Assistant Professor Ph.D. External Examiner Vanderbilt University Nashville, Tennessee Dr. J. Linville Associate Professor Ph.D. Chair, Thesis Examination Committee Abstract Robert Fogelin’s problem of deep disagreements is the existence of certain disagreements in which arriving at an agreement by way of argumentation can appear impossible, even if the disagreeing parties are mutually committed to achieving a resolution through earnest argumentation. The essential feature of a deep disagreement is a clash of “underlying principles” which leads the interlocutors to an impasse with respect to deciding upon a means of resolving their disagreement. How we answer the question of whether there is room for effective argumentation in deep disagreements turns upon our understanding of the aforementioned underlying principles. I offer one possible theory of deep disagreements wherein the underlying principles at issue are construed as Wilfrid Sellars’s rules of material inference. My claim is that this Sellarsian take on deep disagreements effectively captures Fogelin’s problem while leaving room for optimism about the various roles that argumentation might play in a deep disagreement. iii Acknowledgements I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Michaela, my family, my supervisory committee, and the many wonderful people I have had the good fortune to meet while attending the University of Lethbridge. iv Table of Contents Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. iv List of Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... vi Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: Deep Disagreements, Pragmatism and Sellars ................................................... 6 1.1 What is the problem of deep disagreements? ............................................................. 7 1.2 What is my understanding of pragmatism? .............................................................. 16 1.2.1 Concepts as Fundamentally Related to Actions ................................................ 18 1.2.2 The Social Nature of Belief Acquisition ........................................................... 22 1.2.3 Fallibilism .......................................................................................................... 26 1.3 What is Sellarsian Inferentialism? ............................................................................ 30 Chapter 2: The Rules of Material Inference Theory of Deep Disagreements ................... 44 2.1 Ranalli’s Project ....................................................................................................... 45 2.1.1 The WHC View ................................................................................................. 47 2.1.2 The FEP View.................................................................................................... 50 2.2 The RMI View and Ranalli’s Desiderata ................................................................. 51 2.2.1 Constitution question ......................................................................................... 51 2.2.2 Attitude question ................................................................................................ 56 2.2.3 Systematicity...................................................................................................... 57 2.2.4 Reason-taking .................................................................................................... 60 2.2.5 Persistence ......................................................................................................... 62 2.2.6 Disagreement ..................................................................................................... 64 Chapter 3: The Role of Argumentation on the RMI View of Deep Disagreements .......... 70 3.1 The RMI View and Optimism .................................................................................. 71 3.1.1 Pessimism .......................................................................................................... 71 3.1.2 Optimism ........................................................................................................... 77 3.2 The RMI View and Some Argumentative Strategies ............................................. 102 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 115 References ........................................................................................................................ 116 v List of Abbreviations FEP Fundamental Epistemic Principle FNP Fundamental Normative Principle RMI Rule(s) of Material Inference WHC Wittgensteinian Hinge Commitment vi Introduction What I want to do is look at the following question against the backdrop of a pragmatism informed by Sellarsian inferentialism What role, if any, is there for argumentation1 in deep disagreements? This question (which is really two questions) is a point of contention amongst argumentation theorists. The question of whether there is a role for argumentation is debated by optimists (who say “yes there is”)2 and pessimists (who say “no there isn’t”).3 The question of just what that role might be, meanwhile, is the source of disagreement amongst the optimists. I will ultimately claim that the Sellarsian inferentialist is among the optimists and endorse a number of possible roles various optimists have suggested argumentation might play in a deep disagreement. The argumentative problem of deep disagreement is first raised in Robert Fogelin’s 1985 “The Logic of Deep Disagreements.” To say that two people have a deep disagreement is to say that they are faced with a clash between their respective systems of underlying principles which can (at least appear to) preclude any hope of rational resolution. Fogelin provides the examples of debates over abortion and affirmative action 1. Argumentation will be understood as a linguistic (verbal or written) exchange of ideas. I will include as argumentation any linguistic exchange which occurs in what Sellars has called “the space of reasons” and which involves “justifying and being able to justify what one says.” (Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), §36, p. 76). This is taken to be in line with Finocchiaro’s description of argumentation as “essentially ‘reasoning-together,’ that is, reason-giving and reason-assessing.” (Maurice Finocchiaro and David Godden, “‘Deep Disagreements: A Meta- Argumentation Approach,” OSSA Conference Archive, no. 31 (2011), p. 7). The sense of argumentation with which I am concerned will be called earnest argumentation and its telos is truth. 2. Some optimists whose positions will be explored in this thesis include Andrew Lugg, David Adams, David Godden and William Brenner. 3. Some pessimists whose positions will be explored in this thesis include Jeremy Barris, Chris Campolo, and Fogelin himself. 1 as cases of deep disagreements. His point is that our failure to resolve these debates through argumentation is, at least sometimes, better understood as the manifestation of a deeper disagreement which has to do with the underlying principles related to the interlocutors’ respective understandings of personhood (in the context of the abortion debate) or fairness (in the context of the affirmative action debate).4 Fogelin’s claim is that, since argumentation relies on a certain minimum of unstated agreement (or common ground) between interlocutors, when two interlocutors are faced with sufficiently incompatible systems of underlying principles, argumentation between them will become impossible because the very “conditions for argument do not exist.”5 It should be clear at this point that how one understands deep disagreements turns upon how one understands the nature of the differing underlying principles to which each interlocutor is committed, and this is by no means settled amongst writers on the subject. It is not uncommon in the literature on deep disagreements to offer some account of how the underlying principles at issue in a deep disagreement ought to be understood and I will not stray from the herd here. My contribution in this regard will involve considering the underlying principles at issue in a deep disagreement through the lens of Sellarsian inferentialism (very roughly, the view that any meaning some statement may have is had only in virtue of the inferential role that that statement plays in a rule governed language),6 and the centrally-related
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Replies to Commentators on the Concept of Argument: Clarifying Themes, Answering Questions, Settling Objections Harald R
    Document generated on 09/28/2021 7:52 a.m. Informal Logic Replies to Commentators on The Concept of Argument: Clarifying Themes, Answering Questions, Settling Objections Harald R. Wohlrapp Volume 37, Number 4, 2017 Article abstract The paper provides a series of responses to the papers published in Vol. 37, No. URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1042917ar 3, of this journal that explored the ideas in Harald Wohlrapp’s The Concept of DOI: https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v37i4.5004 Argument (2014), where arguing is understood as the theoretical or theory-forming activity that can be found in research of all kinds. Thus, the See table of contents approach taken focuses on the validity of theses. This approach is clarified further as the author considers points raised by his commentators and provides answers and, where necessary, corrections. Publisher(s) Informal Logic ISSN 0824-2577 (print) 2293-734X (digital) Explore this journal Cite this article Wohlrapp, H. (2017). Replies to Commentators on The Concept of Argument: Clarifying Themes, Answering Questions, Settling Objections. Informal Logic, 37(4), 247–321. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v37i4.5004 Copyright (c), 2017 Harald R. Wohlrapp This document is protected by copyright law. Use of the services of Érudit (including reproduction) is subject to its terms and conditions, which can be viewed online. https://apropos.erudit.org/en/users/policy-on-use/ This article is disseminated and preserved by Érudit. Érudit is a non-profit inter-university consortium of the Université de Montréal, Université Laval, and the Université du Québec à Montréal. Its mission is to promote and disseminate research.
    [Show full text]
  • Clarifying Themes, Answering Questions, Settling Objections Harald R
    Document generated on 09/27/2021 3:16 p.m. Informal Logic Replies to Commentators on The Concept of Argument: Clarifying Themes, Answering Questions, Settling Objections Harald R. Wohlrapp Volume 37, Number 4, 2017 Article abstract The paper provides a series of responses to the papers published in Vol. 37, No. URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1042917ar 3, of this journal that explored the ideas in Harald Wohlrapp’s The Concept of DOI: https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v37i4.5004 Argument (2014), where arguing is understood as the theoretical or theory-forming activity that can be found in research of all kinds. Thus, the See table of contents approach taken focuses on the validity of theses. This approach is clarified further as the author considers points raised by his commentators and provides answers and, where necessary, corrections. Publisher(s) Informal Logic ISSN 0824-2577 (print) 2293-734X (digital) Explore this journal Cite this article Wohlrapp, H. (2017). Replies to Commentators on The Concept of Argument: Clarifying Themes, Answering Questions, Settling Objections. Informal Logic, 37(4), 247–321. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v37i4.5004 Copyright (c), 2017 Harald R. Wohlrapp This document is protected by copyright law. Use of the services of Érudit (including reproduction) is subject to its terms and conditions, which can be viewed online. https://apropos.erudit.org/en/users/policy-on-use/ This article is disseminated and preserved by Érudit. Érudit is a non-profit inter-university consortium of the Université de Montréal, Université Laval, and the Université du Québec à Montréal. Its mission is to promote and disseminate research.
    [Show full text]
  • Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation
    PROBLEMS IN ARGUMENT ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION Windsor Studies in Argumentation Volume 6 TRUDY GOVIER Windsor Studies in Argumentation Windsor Ontario Canada Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation by Trudy Govier & Windsor Studies in Argumentation is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License, except where otherwise noted. Copyright Trudy Govier and Windsor Studies in Argumentation ISBN 978-0-920233-83-2 CONTENTS WSIA Editors v WSIA Editors' Introduction vii Preface viii 1. Rigor and Reality 1 2. Is a Theory of Argument Possible 20 3. The Great Divide 56 4. Two Unreceived Views about Reasoning and 84 Argument 5. The Problem of Missing Premises 123 6. A Dialogic Exercise 161 7. A New Approach to Charity 203 8. Reasons Why Arguments and Explanations are 242 Different 9. Four Reasons There are No Fallacies? 271 10. Formalism and Informalism in Theories of 311 Reasoning and Argument 11. Critical Thinking in the Armchair, the Classroom, 349 and the Lab 12. Critical Thinking about Critical Thinking Tests 377 13. The Social Epistemology of Argument 413 WSIA EDITORS Editors in Chief Leo Groarke (Trent University) Christopher Tindale (University of Windsor) Board of Editors Mark Battersby (Capilano University) Camille Cameron (Dalhousie University) Emmanuelle Danblon (Université libre de Bruxelles) Ian Dove (University of Nevada Las Vegas) Bart Garssen (University of Amsterdam) Michael Gilbert (York University) David Godden (Michigan State University) Jean Goodwin (North Carolina State University) Hans V. Hansen (University of Windsor) Gabrijela Kišiček (University of Zagreb) Marcin Koszowy (University of Białystok) Marcin Lewiński (New University of Lisbon) Catherine H. Palczewski (University of Northern Iowa) Chris Reed (University of Dundee) Andrea Rocci (University of Lugano) Paul van den Hoven (Tilburg University) Cristián Santibáñez Yáñez (Diego Portales University) Igor Ž.
    [Show full text]
  • Raphael Van Riel the Concept of Reduction the Concept of Reduction PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES
    Philosophical Studies Series 121 Raphael van Riel The Concept of Reduction The Concept of Reduction PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES VOLUME 121 Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer Editor Stephen Hetherington, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia Senior Advisory Editor Keith Lehrer, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, U.S.A. Associate Editor Stewart Cohen, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, U.S.A. Board of Consulting Editors Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, U.S.A. Radu Bogdan, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, U.S.A. Marian David, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, U.S.A. John M. Fischer, University of California, Riverside, CA, U.S.A. Allan Gibbard, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, U.S.A. Denise Meyerson, Macquarie University, NSW, Australia François Recanati, Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS, Paris, France Mark Sainsbury, University of Texas, Austin, TX, U.S.A. Stuart Silvers, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, U.S.A. Barry Smith, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY, U.S.A. Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis & Clark College, Portland, OR, U.S.A. Linda Zagzebski, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, U.S.A. For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/6459 Raphael van Riel The Concept of Reduction 123 Raphael van Riel Institut für Philosophie Universität Duisburg-Essen Essen, Germany ISBN 978-3-319-04161-2 ISBN 978-3-319-04162-9 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-04162-9 Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London Library of Congress Control Number: 2014932164 © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014 This work is subject to copyright.
    [Show full text]
  • Cogency V4n1.Indd
    COGENCY Vol. 4, N0. 1 (91-119), Winter 2012 ISSN 0718-8285 Arguments for Rhetorical Arguments: A Response to Aikin Argumentos para los argumentos retóricos: Una respuesta a Aikin Katharina von Radziewsky Department of Philosophy, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada, [email protected] Christopher W. Tindale Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric, University of Windsor, Windsor, Canada [email protected] Received: 8-05-2012 Accepted: 3-08-2012 Abstract: In two well-argued papers, Scott Aikin recently challenged the rhetorical theory of argument (RTA) by claiming that it is self-refuting. This paper deals with the arguments presented by showing that these objections can be rejected by taking into account normative and cognitive specification within RTA. After having interpreted Aikin’s arguments, we show that one cause for his belief that RTA is self-refuting is the belief that an argument should guarantee its conclusion’s truth as far as possible. However, neither RTA nor many other theories of argumentation see the guarantee of truth as a condition for being a good argument. We will identify contextual doubt as the main problem for RTA: because RTA openly states that arguments are devised for eliciting assent, audiences might fear deception by the arguer. In order to show that there is no reason for greater contextual doubt about arguments that are presented under RTA than under any other theory of argument, the idea of ‘reasonable adher- ence’ as the real goal of rhetorical argumentation is introduced. For achieving reason- able adherence, an arguer has to fulfill certain normative and cognitive standards that justify trusting the arguments presented.
    [Show full text]
  • Replies to Commentators on the Concept of Argument: Clarifying Themes, Answering Questions, Settling Objections
    Replies to Commentators on The Concept of Argument: Clarifying Themes, Answering Questions, Settling Objections HARALD R. WOHLRAPP Universität Hamburg Philosophisches Seminar Von-Melle-Park 6 20146 Hamburg Germany [email protected] Abstract: The paper provides a Résumé: Cet article fournit une series of responses to the papers série de réponses aux articles publiés published in Vol. 37, No. 3, of this dans le vol. 37, no. 3 dans lequel les journal that explored the ideas in auteurs explorent les idées contenues Harald Wohlrapp’s The Concept of dans The Concept of Argument de Argument (2014), where arguing is Harald Wohlrapp (2014) où l'argu- understood as the theoretical or mentation est comprise comme l'ac- theory-forming activity that can be tivité théorique ou l’activité qui found in research of all kinds. Thus, forme une théorie qu’on peut trouver the approach taken focuses on the dans toutes sortes de recherches. validity of theses. This approach is Ainsi, l'approche adoptée met l'ac- clarified further as the author con- cent sur la validité des thèses. siders points raised by his commen- L’auteur clarifie davantage cette tators and provides answers and, approche en répondant aux questions where necessary, corrections. soulevée par ses commentateurs et en faisant les corrections qui sont nécessaires. Keywords: justification, objections, objectivity, rhetorical argument, thetical validity, transsubjectivity © Harald R.Wohlrapp. Informal Logic, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2017), pp. 247-321. 248 Harald Wohlrapp Introduction When I began to study argumentation, I was fascinated by the enigmatic relations between different paradigms as they appear, e.g., in the history of science and in the confrontation of cul- tures.
    [Show full text]
  • The Epistemological Approach to Argumentation - a Map
    The Epistemological Approach to Argumentation - A Map Christoph Lumer University of Siena, Italy [email protected] [Published in: Informal Logic 25 (2005). Pp. 189-212. – This is the introduction to two special issues (Informal Logic 25,3 and 26,1) of Informal Logic about "The Epistemological Approach to Argumentation", edited by Christoph Lumer.] Abstract: This contribution gives an overview of the epistemological approach to argumentation. It explains what an 'epistemological approach to argumentation' is, and justifies this approach as being better than a rhetorical or a consensualist approach. It systemizes the main directions and theories within the epistemological approach according to their criteria for good argumentation. It presents contributions by epistemological argumentation theorists to major topics of argumentation theory. Finally, it introduces the articles of the two special issues of "Informal Logic" about the epistemological approach to argumentation. Keywords: epistemological approach, good arguments, function of argumentation, justified belief, acceptability, epistemic accessibility, gnostic criteria, plausibilist criteria, relativism, fallacies, begging the question, literature review This introduction explains what an 'epistemological approach to argumentation' is, comparing it to other approaches (section 1), systemizes the main directions and theories within the epistemological approach according to their criteria for good argumentation (section 2), and presents contributions by epistemological argumentation theorists to major topics of argumentation theory (section 3). Finally, the articles of this and the following special issue of "Informal Logic" are incorporated into the map plotted so far (section 4). 1. What is the Epistemological Approach to Argumentation and Why Is It Better Than Its Rivals? Three full-fledged approaches can be distinguished in the current theory of argumentation on the basis of what they (explicitly or implicitly) assume to be the main purpose or standard function of argumentation.1 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Logic A-Z from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia Chapter 1
    Logic A-Z From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Chapter 1 Antepredicament Antepredicaments, in logic, are certain previous matters requisite to a more easy and clear apprehension of the doctrine of predicaments or categories. Such are definitions of common terms, as equivocals, univocals, etc., with divisions of things, their differences, etc. They are thus called because Aristotle treated them before the predicaments, hoping that the thread of discourse might not afterwards be interrupted. 1.1 References • This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chambers, Ephraim, ed. (1728). "*article name needed". Cyclopædia, or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (first ed.). James and John Knapton, et al. 2 Chapter 2 Apophasis Not to be confused with Apophysis (disambiguation), Apoptosis, or Apophis (disambiguation). Apophasis is a rhetorical device wherein the speaker or writer brings up a subject by either denying it, or denying that it should be brought up.*[1] Accordingly, it can be seen as a rhetorical relative of irony. Also called paralipsis (παράλειψις) – also spelled paraleipsis or paralepsis –, or occupatio,*[2]*[3]*[4]*[5] and known also as prae- teritio, preterition, antiphrasis (ἀντίφρασις), or parasiopesis (παρασιώπησις), apophasis is usually employed to make a subversive ad hominem attack, which makes it a frequently used tactic in political speeches to make an attack on one's opponent. Using apophasis in this way is often considered to be bad form. The device is typically used to distance
    [Show full text]