. n ./V? ,
Classification changed U ^MsnaOTp#^! Luther>> tyfly zf-[7 Q^/*= fjt CJV A1 8&^ 3 /7 ::w ty [dto l fiafA L' JOHNlt^GH " Cal, C*v ^ian y-v)" 1
•*.•'• "
lb
PUBLISHED BY A.C.oF S., G-3 HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
lib u u
NUMBER 5 21 MARCH, 1945 2"S 28 APR 1945 —=a/q /°.c>y%8p Li
>-r-v
•V|,|^v •'"•^' •n-
INTRODUCTION
I'Mch. valuable experience has "been-gained by units participating in the camoai«?n to liberate the Philippines, some of which merits, dissemination throughout the Sixth Aw This.is especially truejhere new ideas are involved and may prove of value in preparation, for xuture combat*
In order that all unit's may reap the full advantage of the valuable experiences of others it. is essential to publish this information to^all units of the command at an early date, "Combat Notes" was designed for this, purpose; and--i*i order to continue its usefulness, I^request ychao . commanders review the recent experiences of, their units In combat vauh a view of selecting those incidents that involve Valuable lessons • . learned,, or the employment of new or.particularly effective meunods. A clear, complete and concise report of each such incident should tnen be submitted* through channels, to this headquarters .-marked* A-ocenuion; G~3* These report3* where applicable, should include discussion and analysis of errors or shortcomings, a recommended solution and.a ^ _ discussion of the capabilities and limitations of weapons and equipment as evidenced "by performance under combat'conditions* These reports Wi11 be parefully studied and those'considered of highest value will be published in an issue of "Combat Notes11 • Your cooperation in this matter is earnestly so^icit^d and will 1 : be greatly appreciated. - ' r . .
I f a {.../ .4, / 7 Qrt). 3DDLEI:SIT, Brigadier General, G. S» C»-, of 3** Gr*3'# Iff inr
N'T 11 x
CONTENTS
Rescue by the Rangers Page 1
Use of Long Range Artillery • Page' ' 11'I
The Napalm Fire Bomb Page 15
Japanese Employment of Tanks on Luzon Page 20
Employment of Japanese Antitank Weapons on Luzon Page 22 j • Reduction of San Maiiuel Town '. page 2lj.:
Loss of a Tank Platoon on Luzon Pager 31
w
S f4 Volume Number 1|.» Combat Notes
\
Sixth Arny SECRET letter, file AG 384-C9 subjects: "Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in K-2 Operation11, dated 25 November 1944» is to be considered Volume Number 4 of "Combat Notes", and is hereby re classified- as C(EVIDENTIAL.' RESCUE BY THBTRANGERB 9.
.... .This articlele ^^a!l covering,..the-;..l,i'berati.pn ?f ^^ri'daa and Allied prisoHers- of 'Tf'ar from tfeer Japanese stpc.kacie ^art paaga"tiari .?ul)mitted by; tile Commanding-"off icer ,; 6th Ranger Battalion, a par- tion oi" y/hicb-.'fbrDied the nucleus of the rescuing force,
- l/uch. credit must also go, however, to the ilamo scouts, who have shadowed the japs from the''"Admiralty Islands to -lingayen. Likewise con tributing to the"success of this foray- were the Guerrillas who by their knowledge of the terrain, ability to penetrate enemy' positions, and liaison with the populace have been of material assistance - throughout, the .present Campaigns in the Philippines. ;
Othekv daring rescues of large groups of internees from well,'guarded stockades located far behind enemy lines -were, subsequently effected at ganto Tomas and Bilibid prison in Manila,-and at Los Banos, Laguna province, yhis operation is presented for the tactical value which it contains.
NARRATIVE:
Gii the morning of 27 January 1945 guerrillas reported that 300 - 5^0 .American and Allied prisoners of war -were being held in a stockade at pangatian, guarded by a small enemy garrison.
• intelligence reports indicated that large numbers of enemy., including tanks, were evacuating to the North along -the Cabahatuan •» Baloc * san Jose (Highway 55) the cabanatuan - Cabu - Risal routes (see sketch). Be cause of our.-air activity., the enemy moved at night and rested in concealed areas or trails it coiips during the day * one of these transit -camps was kngwn to be located at pangatian. Groups of enemy-were reported as located at pinagpanaan,Talavera, Baloc and-just east of the Licab River bridge (between Consuelo and Baloc). • '
Realizing that our gradual advance toward pangatian might soon cause the - jap.s to evacuate or otherwise dispose of the prisoners , the Commanding General, sixth'Army, directed that immediate.steps be taken to effect-their rescue. ' . .: 'V
Since this-mission required coordination with guerrilla forces who were acting under q»2 supervision, the overall planning for the task was entrusted to the G*2t Sixth jy?my, who without further delay selected an Alamo scout group qf 3 officers and 10 men to act as the vanguard of the force, obtaining native guides at Guimba this group was- then, to move-to plater03,'contact" ascertain hoy* manyt -ade area. ' Losing 1 e,' -"£M;sr<6a^ty kd^pafe ed from Guimba the night 1 Uv5:'W ' " PUP! p§Sil81 of 2? January
Concurrently the Commanding Officer, 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion was directed to furnish a company ..plus one platoon to effect the. rescue. . . .. This was difficult to do as all wished-to volunteer, but finally the men were selected, each one of whom took an oath that he would die before ' allowing harm to come to a single one of the prisoners, sixth jrmy g-2 , thoroughly briefed the Ranger officers, thus chosen, on the situation and general plan, which had been formulated without ground reconnaissance by utilizing maps and available aerial photographs covering the stockade area.
This accomplished, the force of 5 officers and 115 enlisted men (Company C plus 2d Plat, Company F), under personal command, of the Battal ion commander, moved by truck to Guimba. on the. morning of 28 January. .After arrival, the command posts of the 6th Infantry Division; the 1st. . • infantry Regiment and the 20th infantrjr Regiment were• visited in order to coordinate recognition signals with these adjacent units, in this respect it was agreed that the Ranger force would use two green flares to identify themselves on their return,- the nearest elements of the 6th.Division answering with the same signal. Also, during the -day a forward radio, station was established at quimba by Ranger personnel, who- were, to main tain communication with an SCR 694 which was to be carried with the. force.
T^ese arrangements completed., the Rangers' departed from Guimba at 1400 28 January 1945.» each carrying a 2 day supply of K rations in addi tion to normal.combat equipment. The force moved across country to the guerrilla headquarters of captain Joson, near Lobong, where his detach ment of 80 armed men was attached, and' the force then proceeded, fording, the Talavera River at 2^00 hours, crossing the Rizal Road near -General Luna at 0400 29 January 1945» and finally reaching the bivouac area at Balincarin at 0600 hours.
While there, arrangements were made with Captain Jpajota, guerrilla • area -commander at. cabu, to lend assistance as follows• Guerrilla troops ' were to establish and maintain all around security in depth;, civilians already in the area north, of the Cabanatuan - Cabu'road were to remain there, and any other personnel entering the/area were to be held in the area until the rescue had-been effected; all chickens were to be penned , up, and all dogs tied and muzzled; the guerrillas were to secure and organize an ox cart -train of. sufficient size to haul 200 men; and, finally, food was to be obtained for 650 men, to be distributed along the route of .return. . in addition, the force v;as augmented by attaching captain pajota's group of 90 armed and 160 unarmed men, the latter to be used as litter bearers. ,
•ilso while at Balincarin the Rangers met the jjlamo Scout group, who had not yet been able to secure definite information on the stockade but had sent civilians and guerrilla scouts to maintain-a continuous watch on it. one final detail vras arranged before leaving the bivouac area. radio was sent to/Sixth Army requesting air 'overage .
- 2 I-M : ' ' rou^e of withdrawal,, commencingat 19,00, 29 .January, with the mission to. attack trucks and tanks only. This covetf' i'iv wasbelieved might aid in materially retarding an armored or motorized ..pursuit, which was consider ed the greatest hazard to a successful withdrawal.
The force departed .from. Balincaji.in at 1800- 29 January'1945 £°r Flater03 where the guerrilla scouts .reported that- many japs were.spending the night in the stockade area, and also that a'large body of eneniy" troops was moving north on the road, past the"camp:, -In view of this information it was deemed: advisable to. postpone the attack one. day.
j\t 090030 January an ;officer and 1 mah; of the ^lamo scout group, guided by guerrilla Lieutenant Tombo, left the bivouac.to scout the prison camp for final definite information on the routinepersonnel and installa tions in the camp.- information obtained was as follows: activity in the .. carnp was normal j; the area was. .inclosed by tail barbed wire fences, each •;6 - 8 feet tall and spaced .4.feet apart, its .interior being further sub- \ divided by single barbed wire fences; the stockade was 600 yards wide, (east .to west), and 800 yards. long (north to "south); a pillbox with an opening in its top, located at-the.NE corner of the camp, wes. occupied hy 4 heavily armed Japs three*' 12 foot towers were also occupied (see Sketch no. 2): -the main entrance was closed by an,8 foot gate,, secured with a heavy lock, and guarded by a 'sentry in a revetment, beneath the tower on'the west:side of the gate; within the carrjp there were 4. tanks -and'2 trucks located in a shed (see sketch No-. 2); the. transient troops reported to be at,the stockade on 29 January had departed early 30 Jan uary toward cabu5 a. concentration-of approximately 800 Japs* with tanks and .trucks, was. at Cabu; traffic past the camp during the day had been light; the prisoners of -war were located in.the buildings in the north east section of the stockade; ljO Jap transients had moved into the stock ade at 1100 apparently to rest for the day, which, coupled -with'the jap garrison of 73 officers and men comprised.a sizeable force. '
Since approximately 7000 Japs and a number of 'tanks.were' known to- .be in cabanatuan, the' .decision was made'to initiate action early in the evening; otherwise these troops, proceeding from Cabanatuan would inter- , . fere with the-attack. Each man was completely briefed on the overall plan of action,, and also upon the individual role he1was to play. Particular emphasis was placed on'the necessity for absolute and l; complete surprise if. the mission were to succeed'.
The taste assigned were as follows;
The .80..armed guerrillas undfer Captain- Joson would establish a road ' block. 800' yards southwest of the pow camp to block, enemy vehicles j tanks and troops moving from. Cabana tuan'towards Cabu. antitank pro-- .; ' . tection would be furnished by a Ranger bazooka team of six men*
Eighty armed guerrillas tinder Captain Pa jot a would establish a road block at the small bridge 300 yards northeast ^f the POW camp to, prevent enemy vehicles, tanks and troops';, then in CQ1ou from re- : iiiforcisg the garrison* one Ranger would accompany this force,to , insure1 liaison. - '
The 2d. platoon, Company F would send a sis man squad to destroy the pillbox at the northeast corner of the stockade, a 3 man' group to kill the sentry in the watch tower at the center of the east'.side , and a small group to kill the sentry in the watch tower at the south east corner of the stockade,; The remainder of the platoon would' kill the enemy guards at the .rear entrance of the stockade and in the nearby buildings, would.then'dispose of the Japs in the transient quarters, and would iii addition prevent the '.enemy from.moving into the section of the compound occupied by the prisoners. .
The 1st Flatoon, Company C would force the front gate, push. :. through rapidly, and destroy the enemy, personnel, tanks and trucks •whose locations had been determined by the preliminary reconnaissance The 1st Section of this platoon would kill the guards posted at the gate and those.sleeping in the guard houses nearby® T^e 2d section from initial positions on the right of the 1st section1 would fir© through the-fence atenemy "installations covering the 1st section's attack, ijhe Weapons section would follow the 1st section through the gate and then move straight ahead to destroy "-the- tanks and, /trucks in the s hid with bazooka fire, AS the weapons section passed through the gate, the 2d Section would cease firing, move through the gate, \and occupy positions from.which they could cover the west ©dge of the stockade to prevent any enemy from escaping^in that / direction.''- '" "
To the 2d platoon. Company C» fell the task of opening the> prisoners•section of the camp and at the same time-augmenting the. fires of the :1st platoon, and of the 2d platoon, Conpany jr. in' accomplishing this the 1st Section would; follow the 1st platoon , through the raai'n git e, force" the entr.eiiice. to; the'prisoner s' en-, closure, push rapidly to the rear of this enclosure and open fire'.;. on the buildings occupied by. the Jap,transients. The: 2d section• "would follow the 1st section.- in*, would occupy-positions on the .west; flank of the. enclosure and fire on'the Jap officer's and enlisted .. men's quarters," thus preventing the enemy from entering the enclosure The weapons section, in.force reserve, and the ilamo scout :group would assemble the, prisoners and direct them through the .main gate.
, Telephone lines leading frop 'the camp would b© cut by guerrilla lieutenant TOEibo oh the north and . a Ranger on. the south while, other . designated Rangers' 'would seek and destroy any radios in...the camp.
. / : signal for the attack-would be th©" opening burst of fire by the platoon attacking* the rear entrance, since this force had. the great est distance to traverse in reaching its assault position, signal for the-'wit-hd-r-awal of the'Rangers would be a red flare, fired by the CQ vO
$ 5 & S£ 3 3 ££&£& company commanded fiftilS IBS MS1! pHJttftiiMiM feieldt,e& thb stbckM^i The Rangefi jtditifi MiSia S.oW a &ri& iri cfertfying the invalids fend w<3uuad&dv '• Wh6h the eolumn hMd proceeded a mile fx"am the caifipg. the company coranand^ would fire a second red flare,, the signal fort the two guerrilla forces to withdraw from their roadblock posi tions and form a rear and flank guard for the column® J.IX.units left plateros at 1700 30 January and moved to a final assembly area 700 yards north of the stockade„ 1800 the Rangers began the approach to assault positions, circling eastward along the stream very alowly to avoid detection* it 1925. Company C concealed by darkness was in its position* a small ditch, about 20 yards from the front gate® it 1945 the 2d platoon. Company F opened fire, and the attack began® The action proceeding exactly according to plan^ the surprised enemy fcrce was destroyed before it could organize effective resistance® 2015 the company coianander® after satisfying himself that.all prisoners had been evacuated5 fired the first red flare„ the signal to commence the withdrawal* prcm the main gate the prisoners had been guided to an assembly area8 from which they were dispatched to plateros in carabao carts®, where ne°» cessary, litter patients were. carried by Filipinos and Rangers • 'The only easualtj'' among those liberated occurred when one, overcome by the excitement or exertions dropped dead of heart failure as he was leaving the gate® When the tail of the column had cleared the pampanga River enroute to plateross the company commander fired the second red flare9 the signal fcr the guerrilla forces to vdrfchdraw* Thereupon 9 Captain Jos oil's force retired from the southern roadblock and took positions to protect the rear and left flank of the column® . llei'ted by the firing at pangatian, about 600 Japs in formation chant ing weird incantations came .down the road at a trots captain pajota had disposed his forces in a narrow shaped formation with the open end to- wards-~.±he enemy * when the leading Japs were, 15 yards from the vertex of the »yb9 "the guerrillas opened fire with.Biff's, submachine guns and rifles. The japs in the trap and those caught on the bridge were slaughtered# The remainders utterly disorganized, began, fieing wild.ly« Soon thereafter jap tanks that had follo\?ed the column came up and opened fire but did not cross the bridge# When the signal for withdrawal came® Captain pajota's men were still engaged with the enemy <> in hour later the guerrillas broke contact by melting away into the darkness in small groups . gome 24 hours latex* when the last of Captain pajota's fcrce had rejoined the column it was found that: in accomplishing their mission they had killed or wounded approximately 300 japs while themselves suffering only 9 casualties, WIA« The column halted in Flateros to reorganize, gather-more carts and give! .food and- water-, _t.o....t.^e men» cots were set up in the schoolhouse by •" if - A o^ CNJ 0^^' g\ #jj] y ( JQ n 0=3 0 i H irir&® O « 'Hg s pi S ^ ON • I I I I I I I ^ H CM ct^-^tu^NO O- A "imi i& »-fc§fe' local guerrilla doctor, who treated the sick and wounded with med icines gathered by the guerrillass from the entire countryside- Those rescued men able to walk were dispatched in groups guarded by Bangers to Bali near in as fast as tie y could be organized, the first group leaving plateros at 2100 30 January 1945• Litter cases were transported in carabao carts. An American medical officer and an aid man* both among those rescued, volunteered to remain at plateros with the Ranger medical officer, who had been wounded in the stomach, and a Hanger who had been shot in the groin. The Alamo Scout group and about 8 Rangers, with a guerrilla force„ remained to guard these men, and to construct a cub strip for possible evacuation of the wounded® The medical officer died at 1100 on 31 January? and the Rangers and Scouts were able to carry the wounded man overland to sibul. Upon arrival at Balincarin all men were given food and water while 15 more carts were secured to transport those unable to walk further. The , column left Balincarin at midnight and reached Mataas na Kahoy at 0200 31 January® Here 11 more carts were obtained, making a total of 51» "thus lengthening the column to a mile and a half,, Again the civilians supplied all with food and feter. At 0230 the group left Mataas na Kahoy for General Luna. The 1st platoon, company C moved ahead, preceded by guerrilla scouts, to establish road blocks 011 the Rizal road.® The 1st Section with a bazooka and anti tank rifle grenades set up a block 400 yards northeast of the point where the column entered the road, while the 2d section with a bazooka and ant ir tank grenades established another, block. 400 yards south of the point 'where the column left the road. It required from. 033° until 043° for. the long column, to move the mile down the road and then clear the road. ii short halt was made at 0530, at which, time several ua^uppossffcl attempts to communicate with the station at Guimba by radio were made? At 0800 the column reached sibul, where food and water were Qgaln provided by the civilians and where information by "radio ^r$io§ted- th^t Ta^avera was now in-our possession, thereby rendering secure the south flank ef the column. Meanwhile, Sixth Army fr-2 had assembled ambulances and trucks juist north of Talavera at 0900, Here a request was received by. runner for the . transportation, to be sent to Sibul to pick up the 100 litter cases and the 412 other liberated men, who were then moved to Guimba where they > were placed in an Evacuation Hospital. Casualties, apparently inflicted on the assault force by overages from the Jap tanks, mortars and automatic weapons firing at captain pajota.'s roadblock,, were 1 Ranger medical officer DCW, 1 Ranger KLk» '. 1 Ranger 1IA. and. 1 Alamo Scouffc.^I^rfiJap killed or wounded in the -cans?' totalled over \200* ' . V 1 1.1 : siN " - 8 - JAP PRISON CAMP PANGATIAN NTJEVA SCIJA PROVINCE •> - :.^r • * , *- Organization''and armament of the Ranger company are; The company is composed of a company headquarters of 1 officer and 3 men, and 2 platoons, each with 1 officer and 31 men* Each platoon has a platoon headquarters of 1. officer and 3. ffiens a special weapons section of 6 men, and 2 assault sections, each with 11 men® E&ch assault section has a section headquarters of 1 man, an assault squad of 5 men and a light machine gun squad of 5 mean iXmament of the assault squad is 5 - Ml rifles; of the LMG squad, normally 1 - IMG, 2 pistols and 3 - Ml rifles;, of the assault section leader, 1 «• Ml rifle; of the special weapons section, 1 bazooka, 3 pistols and 3 - Ml rifles; of the men in platoon headquarters, 1 - SMG» 1 pistol and 1 sniper rifle; of the men in conpany headquarters, 1 - SMG» 1 pistol and 1 Ml rifle; and of each officer, 1 - SMG* For this action the 6 - IMG's were replaced by 11 tutu's. in the pangatian action the rescue farce.* with negligible casualties, accomplished the following: made a 29 mile forced march into enemy territory obtained the full support of local civilians and guerrillas, undetected, determined accurately the enemy dispositions; crawled nearly a mile through flat and open terrain to assault positions; destroyed two trucks, four tanks and a jap garrison nearly double the size of the attacking force itself; in the dark assembled over five hundred prisoners and evacuated them from the stockade area within twenty minutes after commencing the assault; and in a c0luiijii a mile and a half long evacuated some 300 walking and 200 invalid prisoners through 19 miles of enemy territory. Such brilliant accomplishment of a difficult mission can. in no way be attributed to'any undue /dispensation at the hand of fortune. in the formula for winning battles no comparable substitute has been found for thorough prior reconnaissance, detailed, painstaking planning and surprise action, executed by well trained, disciplined and courageous troops. It was a combination of these fac,tor.s,. rather than an inordinate amount of luck which insured the success of this audacious enterprise. The tactical principles employed by this rescue force differed in no way from those used by infantry units in other successful operations,- The soundness of those principles has thus been further confirmed, .Long range artillery is normally, employed to earry the battle deep behind the enemy front line in order to disraipt his lines of: communication and d.is0rganize :and destroy his rear tactical arid;'service installations,, Generally this is accomplished in the direction-of the main•advance.V with the artillery being emplaced far enough behind'front line troops to be out of range of enemy machine gun', mortar,, and light artillery fifce, ""'Two interesting incidents, in deviation from the usual pi-actice and' demonstra ting the exploitation of the maximum range and heavy striking power of :155-tnm guns and 8" howitzers, have occurred in recent operations in the jMXipp&ciseV ' - ' ~ '" ; ' : " " LESTTSt V ; . r ' , : .. ' . / • • v«r forces had advanced OTupLeyte Valley to Ciarigara' Bay arid' had then turned south (Sketch No* 1 - top) toward the port of c-rtaoc, the prin cipal remaining Jap supply base. Forward elements of the main effort were held up in'the Vicinity of Limon, approximately-' 20 miles from1 Lrnios.* Due to rugged terrain and strong -enemy, resistance:'our forces would not; have been able to reach, trmoo iior some 'wefeksV-Moreover • it'was definitely estab lished that the enemy was' running our ineffective air gauntlet and pouring - reinforcements and supplies* into tmoc® This city had a long, concrete pier'which' was enabling the Jap'to add to the discharge rate available from lighterage and aided him in building up a large base at this-•point* From map study and observation of the terrain from artillery-liaison planes 'it was determined that a battalion of 155-0321 gutisv»' if emplaced weU .for ward and deep into the foothills Sif of ja;ro in Leyte' Valley, could inter dict orrnoc when firing south-westward at the maximum range of 25.000 yards (Sketch "Fo« 1 - bottom), Immediate ground- reconnaissance -deterained that !t: the project was feasible ,T but'"difficult"'#- and the Army Commander directed that the plan be put,.into eff@6t» Within 24 hours'lie guns were emplaced, the base piece registered, and harassing fire using both HE and WP Shell was placed on the enemy base. Large fires and explosions resulted from the she3:ling indicating the presence of gasoline and other stores and a few days later the mayor of :ormoc, who had escaped from the city,-' reported that Btrmoc had been destroyed by artillery fire from the east"» I^ter-a pw reported that % transport was prevented from unloading one night by some 300.rounds of artillery that fell intermittently at the base of the pier,: and this trans port was sunk by iimerican aircraft while trying to leax^e the harbor the next morning." lU'/i ^:)LTXe v, . .. -J.-jt ••,v. . ••;. ••• t? jL— * "•• '' .• ,'IL' j' ' '•'• ./'.-I'i .• •*..» • ."•;'•'•••• .-ju^y vc;^ •fi \}v : •'•'••• nt *" * - / ... '••••' V* "» . "<-••/ • ",*.U j.. :^i. , ".:s X". ••••' L;: , , Y -;UJ ,;i f «\ /''W •.' v. \r,'"••• • i ^'28f286 .*« £'.y :l. v." /: .'/ * '. v£*v.: .'. : ••- ;• • ' • :. ; - \ I •• . ?: . : ...M , 'i \ . . .. .' .... v • 't •-> v*. ? '•''' V • «' " , V ; v *" ./ i '• i-'.' •.>'>•. GO ;?;u:U? Lc. wan iWii u ^,n.j POSITIONS 3,800* Sea Level ORlfiOC 25*000,yds. -rrr PRGFIL5 OF GUN-'JARGST LINE AND TRAJECTORY - - a-T T, ' ^ -i. Xr £- -r / •„r ., ii}i VS. f-- Et3 MP fgplt Central Plaintej infdas'matiitsh. %ks obtained thatVfclie^ &nemy"was evacuating northwest along Highfey 5 /thru Balete pass (Sketch' Kof 2 top) and. . avoid- iilg oiii* air attacks by moving only under cover of darkness,® At this time our forces had advanced to the foot of the mountain range just east of •Batchelor, and within-h6a?y artillery range (Sketch Ko. 2 - bottom) of Balete pass to the northeast.. Due to the intervening'-difficult mountain- our terrain, the early seizure of the Balete Bass area was out of the question. South of Balete pass, .however, the evacuation road passed through many defiles where artillery fire could cause landslides, block or destroy the road, and disrupt traffic in!'general. 'The Army Commander directed that artillery be pushed forward to accomplish this mission, A battery of 8® howitzersf and one battery of 155-wm guns, were emplaced as directed and registered on. the highway. Effectiveness of the - subsequent firing is indicated by the following re ports 1 "Fired interdictory fire with 8" howitzers and 153 gums cn Highway •$ during night resulting in hits on large enemy motor convoy moving north. Destroyed 8 trucks„ damaged 7s caused large explosions believed to be ammunition," "Fired 78 round 155*-!1®-gun on Highway 5, causing landslide which blocked the road and destroyed estimated- 22 enemy trucks <,« Subsequent reports have indicated further damage to -enemy •• transport, resulting in his almost total avoidance of the area under firei' (XMENHS? Deviations from normal procedure are justifiable in unusual situa tions which demand practical solutions. In both instances reported herein, the Array Commander pushed his long range artillery well forwards, even taking the risk of losing it,- - in order to accomplish missions deep behind the enemy's lines which were beyond the scope of our supporting air force. The results speak for themselves, ' Many tactical problems can be similarly solved by exploiting to the fullest.extent the capabilities of supporting weapons8. whether they be artilleryj tanks, tank destroyers or smaller weapons0 c-ur recent campaigns are replete with instances where the resourceful commander'-turned the tide of battle by a judicious employment of the means available to him. 'Ctff-pfitf1 >S T*4J • ' *- —• Santa Pe, LUZON , . - r'/'Mt'.'.'/, .V'WSiL'!!*'- , •. ...! ...... jr >•>. r.,.^ • • '"£/ * 'i%t; BALBTE * PASSi^- - . ..vj ,.J. r* .. • * -.. ,y .. . . , i '. ft', •• .... ,s. J- :.V>, r° +$603 > . ,r % 155mm GUN ''v ~ ~. ; ' ),! 4 . • - - N. 'V_'rV f! ,'V"r "^s» Resales Airfield 11,6101 '•>)' i S648?® 8" HOW BTRY 155mm GUN BTRY BALETE PASS f 3J.OOO* 250» 17,500 yds ±9,500 yds 'GEKERfeXt The: Napalm fire bomb, now in the.latter stages of experimentation, has attained'high ra.nk as an air force munition within the past' few months. Used chiefly as a go\md 'supportweapon to elear enemy personnel from dug- . in positions, it is,equally effective as a general incendiary against sup ply dumps, buildings, motor'convoys , and other combustible targets. Ground troops have reported enthusiastically, on it's effective Use ana suc cess in the Luzon operation. /; ••• The fire bomb is not -in a true sense a bomb at all,- but is ah over grown Molotov Cocktail, Its secret is Napalm, a chemical powder of alumi num stearates ana aluminum naphthenates. The name, itself is believed to have derived from previous experiments .with thickened gasoline and sodium/ -palraitate. When produced by anits in the field, its formation is initiated by adding from three to eight percent of Napalm to gasoline .under1 air agi tation. Suspension., is maintained by continual injection of compressed air until the mixture partially dissolves and. at the same time begins to thicken. The resulting substance is allowed to stand for a period of four hours or more depending upon the viscosity desired, which may range from that -uf SkS $0 lubricating oil to an almost solid gelatin. The fire bomb itself is formed by tranferring the Napalm to a belly tank t©'-whi$h is aLso added.:an igniting - devise. When ready for use, . fighter planes carry the bombs to the designated target where they are dropped just short of the objective area from an altitude of seventy-five , to one hundred feet, the, mixture is ignited by the activation; upon impact of an- all-way fuze, which in turn.explodes a grenade, white phos phorus foreground, targets and sodium for water targets, i,t'the-same time . the tank- is ruptured propelling the contents-forward by the momentum of the plane and sudden impact with'the ground or water. This results in a sheet of intense flame that blankets an elliptical area, either 150 feet by 300 feet using a 165 gallon belly tank* or 3.5, feet by 60 feet .using the smaller 75" gallon tank. . For thirty seconds to,one minute thereafter : the fluid burns with the heat/intensity of.gasoline, after which time the .rate of combustion decreases,, thereby preventing excessive heat, loss from rising air currentsv The remainder of the scattered"fuel then burns for a period -of from three to five minutes. Due to its viscosity Napalm tends to cling to any surface it contacts and to penetrate into openings or' 'apertures in fortifications., For example, penetrations into caves on/ - , Corregidor to a. distance of 35 feet were reported. In this'respect ground troops will recognize, in the fire bomb., characteristics similar to present day flame throwers whiqh have utilized thickened gasoline throughout the past year, "• ' M Si# ft \d. vkerning types used, one and five hundred pound incendiary bomb casings, filled'with Napalm - gasoline mixture, have been employed success fully by fighters and light bombers in this theater... However, the belly tank fire bomb has-proved a more effective weapon because of its greater fuel capacity, greater coverage of target.areas, and greater accuracy due to the low altitudes from which dropped. *. The fire bomb causes casualties primarily., by. burning; secondary' ' effects in enclosed places* such as caves, buildings, dug-in emplacements and entrenchments include• suffocation, carbon monoxide poisoning and-heat collapse. The'psychological reaction to the fire bomb is also of great importance. The absolute,, terror inspired by fire .bombing, was well demon strated after the first few Napalm attacks on Tinian. Japs in-dugouts, or open emplacements would leave their.positions at the sight of an approach ing fighter plane carrying belly tanks and would run at right angles to its line, of flight to escape the possibility of a fire bath. As is the rule with all;neYrand successful weapons, the supply of . Napalm and belly tanks has been critical. However, a sufficient amount of the necessary components will, be available1-shortly to satisfy the in- . demand for this new munition. . : The. following reports on Napalm air strikes, illustrate the effeotive- nes's-of this munition: ... 1 »l6 February; 12 A-2Q sf .each carrying one 500 lb HE bomb and one Napalm bomb. ' ' l6 P-381s, each carrying,two Napalm tanks. ' Target;" pillboxes, heavy 5-inch gun emplacementsAA positions,, enemy fortifications and dug-in troops in the area 200 yards on each side • of -Fort. l!cKinley Road, which runs NE and SW between Nichols Field'and Fort. McNinley.. Western limit of rectangular area starts 1000 yards E of the railroad and.runs NE.for 1000 yarda, . Results- Area was first- hit by A-201s which dropped both HE and Napalm bombs; followed by,p~38«s. Air reported area well covered. Ground reported, the strike was' very effective and knocked, out'or neutra lized' most- of the positions in. the. area. Troops moved in and occupied the area following the strike February; 12/A-20* s struck revetted warehouses, in target area on north edge of San Isidro. Warehouses completely destroyed and flash effect of Napalm bombs, completely burned over the area- with a dia meter of 1550 yp«.rds.H J1! February: 12 A-20!s struck enemy positions on the NW corner of -San Jose. . Bombing•caused large flash fires with heavy smoke and•corn*- il^bi^n^ occupied positions in the area. After occupa- "ion of the ares, by oili* wtefep®, approximately 2©-d«atd-- ware found, death believed to have been caUsed by • suffocation and' burning..N "18 Stebruary ;• 8 p-381 s, l6-l6_5 gallon, N&palm tanks'. Target- Ground support mission KW.of Fort Stotsenburge re quested by i|.Oth Division; Results; Bombs were spread throughout assigned area with ex cellent results. . Four automatic gun positions in area were silenced by strafing. Ground controller advised bombs were well placed and mission ' successful. Two fire bombs were dudsj' however, one was fired by strafing." The following report by the Ghemical officer of.the 43&.Division- is the only personal™ground observer report received to date of .Napalm action,, iii the Luzon Operations "The air strike - - - - struck positions, opposing the. 103d Infantry on Hill bOO, northeast of Pczorrubio. I was able to find an. officer who had observed the impact of two Napalm fire bombs, and had been within 250 yards of one of them. The planes carae in, strafing and bombing at an altitude of about 75 feet, and the. two missiles in question were dropped about 300 yards apart. There was a solid mushroom of fire that covered an area approximately 150 yards in diameter -from each bomb, and even at 2^0 yards from the impact of one,, the heat was intense and lasted about 20 seconds before diminishing to a slow-burning blaze which started a secondary fire in the brush. The officer said he feels sure he would have perished had he been within 100 yards of the impact of one of these bombs, and expressed great enthusiasm for the munition as a means of neutralizing difficult enemy positions in that sector. These, positions are horizontal holes in the hillsides,. often on reverse slopes, in deep defilade, and offering almost complete protection from any munition except fire or gas. The caves are not deep enough to attempt suffocation by heavy smoke concentration, and usually they are. mutually-supporting and too numerous for flame thrower assault teams to even begin to approach. - _ _ _ 11 In the Luzon Operation the 43d Division, XI Corps, fighting West of Fort Stotsenburg counted 590 dead Japs believed killed by heavy artillery preparation and Napalm air strike of 5 March. This area contained one ,of the most formida.ble cave types of defense yet encountered in this theater. 'Since artillery is relatively ineffective against this type cf position it is safe to assume that a large proportion of these casualties was. caused by Napalm, - •• During the period 1$ to 22 February, one hundred drums of N®palm were used in air strikes in the- 2ig~Zag pass area between Bagac and pilar on Bataan. .Reports from infantry regiments fighting in this area are quoted belows . * . ?V 17 - " V '"Napalm jtss fine /fc^dause' it'camouflage, enabling infantry to locate enemy 'positions.' WeX • .- "It. is the .opinion-of this command 'that Napa-lm bombing was of very effective assistance to our advance through Zig^Zag pass. -.After each air. strike, there was • evidence. of enemy..withdrawal from the vicinity of the target area, one enemy defensive position on high" commanding, ground was- completely evacuated after a direct hit. only one Napalm bomb fell in this area; it covered B" strip 300 yards by '600 yards...... - "We know-definitely that the Jap hates firfe, that he- fights in - only those areas of excellent observation, with aimple cover and concealment. We know that/, .in .addition to. destroying personnel-, these' ax-eas are com- - • pletely burned off by Napalm, tifei know that it reduces his, morale, that it boosts, ours, . Le.t's have more of it," " ' : ; . COM 3T1&: • • • , '" The ,percentage of Napalm added, to the gasoline controls the burning time of the mixture and also the fluidity for, area coverage * At present • ' a 6 percent Napalm mixture is used, forming a' light gel which burns from 3 to 7 minutes,. It is quite possible that this is not the optimum per centage and it is.also quite possible that the percentage of l&palm should be varied-depending on the target, thereby providing greater- flexibility -and effectiveness in the use of the fire bomb. In order that-the optimum . percentage of Napalm may be determined for particular targets* it -is re quested that ground troops observe all Napalm strikes and'furnish the , - following information to Headquarters Sixth Army?/ . .. , ' • . - ; . > - v • • ' ' 1. Burning time. •' ..,.•••• 2. Area.covered, including description (open, dense trees, buildings, etc.).- ._ " - • • . • 3.. Effect,pn,vegetation, buildings, bunkers and personnel..- 4. Advantages or disadvantages of stickiness characteristic. 5. Effectiveness against dug-in .positions', * ' - Concerning the use of this new weapon' a. tendency may develop to con sider this bomb .as suitable for.:all .'types of targets and to request its use when other means could be more economically and efficiently employed. , Such a misconception should be guarded against, especially since.the. sup- --.-ply- in all probability not be available in unlimited --.'XV''K' i'1 t* •• ' ' . ' ' -V' X". f-U--- - ,-p "V!,:; . ~ quantities. In this respect experience to date hfis indicated that use cf Napalm should be restricted tc enemy.areas where there are large trcop • concentrations or heavily defended enemy positions, closely confined in a specific area where the maximum benefit of the flash and burning effect of the fire bomb can be utilized. . r GE-E3AL:' The Japanese 2d,Arcored division tm Luzon, constituted toe first formidable armored force to oppose , the advance of ianerican troops towards Tokyo-. Destruction of this division eliminated approximately 20% of the known Japanese armor.. MJlRkTlYBt .• ' Prior to our landing on Luzon, the manner in which the enemy would elect, to employ this 2d ^mored Division was a matter of conjecture. y/ould he mass his armor, end with or without supporting 'infantry, deliver -a-sledgehammer- -blow- from the front or a._.flank? Would he employ • it in mass or small groups to bolster his defensive, dispositions? tr would he fritter it away in small localized counterattacks? Information gained from documents captured earls'" in the campaign indicated that the jap had little intention of pitting.his armor against our General Sherrrjan medium tanks, Later information indicated that he y/ould employ a. ma jor portion of his armor to assist in holding open his escape route through^Cabana tuan and San' Jose, JJafva ECija province, northeast into the .Cagayan valley. .By..5 March..1945''our planes, artillery, tanks, TF's and infantry . • antitank weapons had destroyed 203 medium and 19 light tanks, constituting 95% of the 2d .Division's armor; all but 6 of these had been destroyed in '. the.Munoz' - San Jose .- Lupao - San Manuel - Binalonan - UFdaneta area. Without exception, in this area, the tanks, were employed defensively to stiffen positions in villages. The tanks, well dlug. in under heavy, con cealing foliage and with adobe revetment, were used as a nucleus around :which all. other measures of defense were built. Alternate positions were prepared so that tanks could be shifted about the perimeter as the situa<- tion dictated* Counterattacks were used only as & last resort when it appeared' inevitable that the local' defenses would fall. These limited • attacks were launched under cover of darkness in support of infantry final "banzai" charges. The tankers invariably became confused, making them .easy prey for our antitank weapons. only once, did the .enemy employ armor in daylight, to support an infantry counterattack. The three tanks and two self-propelled 6" how.it- . zers committed, in this attack were destroyed, and three other tanks then ._withdrew without entering the fire fight. In many instances tanks were observed moving in convoy with, general purpose vehicles; however, it was not definitely determined whether this was doiie tp give-,protection to the -column or as a matter of convenience. tfhe hiiinbei' of ill defense of fHrn 9 at UFtlaneta Up t6 52 fet i4inoz. Tiies^ figpres ere bajsed on tanks actually destroyed and do not include the few tanks that withdrew to avoid destruction; • • • types, of ijmjR-mcuvmmEDi- . . The various models tanks encountered were;; 1, Model 97 (1937) Medium Tank. . • - 2. Model 97 modified for installation of a. high muzzle veloci ty 47-i'-: gun. . . • 3, Model 95 (1935) Light Tank. : ;• 4. Model 97 (1934) Tankettes (only 2 encountered). Other types of armor included; 1. iiTtaored car.-with armament of 2 - j.Jmi machine guns (only 4 encountered). 2. Motor Carriage with 15cm Howitzer (only 2 encountered). * i»rtaoi*. on tanks varied frora J" to 1" thickness, iiir medium tanks; and practically all light tanks were equipped with well built, two-way radios, believed to he somewhat inferior to those used by our own artaored units, • Tank 'units apparently had no special equipment' 'to facilitate passage over obstacles,, nor did they possess, vehicles for recovering disabled tanks. Individual medium tanks carried many spare parts and^a large chest of tools, ii.few poorly equipped shop trucks were destroyed, but no in formation regarding higher echelon maintenance equipment was obtained.. COMMENTS: • ' " Based 011 the Jap's employment of tanks on Luzon, it is reasonable , to assume, that in future: operations he will avoid pitting his armor against our unless the odds are heavily in'his favor or, realizing that • his forces face annihilation, lie launches a last, desperate, all-out "banzai" attack, However, he will undoubtedly make extensive use of ,his tanks, well dug in and camouflaged, as a nucleus for many of his strongly . prepared defensive positions. #. * . ; : v . , E|^LOXM^ iUF J^-ESE;J@IgfaJ& ^OKS.^ LU20K '''.-"";,••' s ' 1'-- "v':..Y • . ' : .mm&ir --• -iV; ' ' " V '' ' Ui the plains of Luzon our forces for the first tine operated in. "open, firm terrain, The failure •.•of;our..armor ; to- -ride.'rough shod over the Japanese defenses may be largely' attributed to the enemy-'s skilful,.em- ., ployment of antitank weapons tQ bolster his fortified positions. tt.BR.TI7S: . - ' /" ' v ' i , !• ' en Luzon the enemy has invariably placed his antitank'guns well for ward, and has displayed unusual skill in siting;and camouflaging them. His, fire discipline lias been excellent,,in many cases • fire being held until our vehicles were within'"50 yards. ' -s In and around M&nila mines of almost every type were' employed ex- , tensively, In preparing minefields no definite pattern was followed,. Magnetic mines.., lunge mines, and satchel charges in the .hands of' suicidal Jap. soldiers were" a constant threat -to. our tanks* These soldiers, working in pairs and usually covered by antitank guns, would conceal them- ; selves along avenues of approach and attack our tanks as they passed by. Tank, stalking squads were employed, but in most caises were unsuc cessful as they'were -killed before they could yfach. our tanks. TYSES OF jSTITatiK WE4PCKS EtCi. nwumsmi . Types of. antitank guns encountered'included j, .. 37oja» 47mm, and 75®i antitank guns, battalion and'regimental guns, du&l purpose 20raa, 40mm, 75m and, 120mm anti-aircraft-guns, 12cm naval gUns -and various -types' of artillery. The 47eei AP 'HE.projectile penetrated the turret of the -General Sherman medium tank at'short ranges and its sides at medium ranges. The 75mra iip' HE projectile penetrated the tank turret of the\Shermah at ranges as great -as;500 yards and usually destroyed the" tank, .i-.ll tanks' hit by ; the 12cm naval gun'were destroyed.. - ' ' ' Other types of antitank weapons encountered included: .standard • type mines, improvised mines varying from simple boxes of picric acid- to depth charges, satchel charges', Molotoy -cocktails., hollow charge anti- . tank; rifle grenades, and grenade clusters-, '.-one'-Sherman tank was- blown to : bits by--a 200 pound depth charge f .In the.employment of his antitank weapons'on LuziOn the Jap "had '" demonstrated once mgre\ his skill at exploiting terrain and' natyual cam* ouflage; in.preparing-.^fcbushes - :wmm for our vehicles' and: armor*- To neutralize w""" • * \ the effectiveness of J&p. antitank weapons- in future operations, it~is.~. .. essential that Our reconnaissance be more thorough, jj&dtli as to scope, and ' as to execution, and that our tanks be adequately > •, other weapons as they advance, iilso, It must be constantly ISofnl ^k^mS m that the tank is normally used to destroy or. neutralize hnqgn enemy posi tions • ' Restricted as it is in its ability to locate hostile weapons by sight or sound this vehicles was never ..intended..for employnfeht on recon naissance missions or to develop vague, uncertain situations.-' If so., used* losses disproportionate ,to the, results achieved will inevitably follow. S&c3RAL't .' This article is based on a report submitted by the commander of the regiment that .captured San Elknuel,, a> typical* small Philippine town which; was. strongly defended ty the enen$r*. San'Mknuel was the first defensive tastipn of this type encountered by our forces on Luzon;- others, including Uanoa,. Lupao and San Jose were captured in later operations* The "know how" gained at San Manuel -was put to good use in these subsequent operations which were carried out with less expense in personnel and materiel. Japanese strength in San Manuel approximated 800 ttoops, including a few service detachments* but the bulk were infantry and armored units* Except for about a squad outposted at a barrio 2000 yards NW of town along the Sedge of the ridge the entire enemy force'was disposed within San Manuel*: Enercy armored strength consisted of 40 medium and 5 light tanks; other armament included 6 - I05miii howitzers (with prime mover), 7 - 75nBa cannon, 2 - 47mm .ST guns» 14 machine guns and 9knee mortars. .. The. enemy disposed his armor to cover approaches from the west and' southwest (See Sketch No, 1), holding about a third of his tanks in reserve in the sotith, central part of the town* The defense adopted for his foot elements was fluid, thereby permitting him to shift his troops to threatened points and to withdraw them to assembly, positions at the SB and NE corners of town during artillery and aerial bombardments* In keeping with his previous practices, the Jap took full advantage of the thick vegetation for camouflage purposes, benefitting especially by the presence of,numerous clumps of-bamboo which.varied from 20 - 30 feet in diameter at the base# Even the rice paddy dike along the west edge of town was tunneled and bamboo sections were forced perpendicularly through the wall for use as.peep holes* Carefully prepared fieldworks included 75 tank emplacements for firing in the hull-down position and . sited.to cover all approaches. Each of these tank emplacements was au^aented by standard Jap rifle pits and machine gun emplacements* Many of the enenjr,spider holes had a small horizontal recess at the bottom to minimize, effects of artillery,time fire. All emplacements required a. - - direct hit by artillery or bomb in order to destroy armament or personnel* Conduct of the eneii^ defense was marked by superior fire discipline, excellent use of concealment, and suicidal tenacity* The Jap did not react to threats against apparent key points of terrain, except to make repeated small scale counterattacks to retake the ridge "M of the'town', ; which cost him in all 98 officers and men*. In repeated instances the Jap permitted our small reconnaissance patrols to traverse areas unopposed, but subsequently offered determined opposition to combat patrols attempting to traverse the same areas* At one time a strong combat patrol was allowed to eater the S edge of town without .opposition, only to suffer heavy casualties by snipe?'fi^e during its withdrawal* •' : "• - \ .--. v OPESfflJIQNSi - • \ 1 c„w,j; ^1 1 1 -1' ' 1 1 • * 'L< ' I ' " • '3", i ,i'. , ; ' ' • ' •' *•- •• • l i".?.?•'v.z :•; , Our attacking- force consisted of the l6lst RCT '(less' 3d'i:Bn), plus Co Cand 1plat' Co'D, 7l6th;lled Tanlc Bn, and-'-Co.dV 98th'Cm!: The main effort was made against the N edge of'the tovm ^ the-'2d»iBfi'i while ,the secondary effort was directed" against the:'SW c&rn§r of "the to.wn ly the .1st Sn (less 1. rifle Co) supported by tanks. Preceding this attack a 15 minute, preparation was-fired; by" all Bns of- the/25th Division. Arty plus Btry "C", l'68th FA Bn (X^Sm. GunX, \ -un:;-. ; .The '2d Bn began its advance* at 0725» Jan 45, •tU'e"!fcqrnpfcd^;' .moving forward along the S.'side of the ridge until halted '^Just'i shoz$of:A. San Manuel by heavy "sniper; fire from eneny positions on the-dredge of.'.--", town,.'.. The left company, however, under cover of the artillery-.preparation penetrat'ed about .50' yards into the town-where it was stopped- by cross fire. from. Jap machine guns, and then promptly driven~otit of town by., a - - Jap count'ex-attack led .by 3 tanks*. This initial rebuff *plainly revealed- the necessity for more authoritative fire support and .anti-tank .prgtection. Accordingly, -:4iile the battalion itself reorganized., a road ®s dozed Out along.the S'edge of the ridge, along which 2 platoons, each, of cannon and 37imii id? guns were brought forward to give this needed, support# .After a 5 minute preparation fired by 2 battalions of 105 Howitzers the attack ,. was.renewed at. 1700,' the objective,--the-- NW corner of town, being captured against negligible..opposition;;/'-'Commencing'at>once,to consolidate the ./ ground' gained, both 'assault cotap^nies '-began :to< receive .heavy'.automatic weapons and small arms fire from conceaiM: positions tb. their immediate front. Observation revealed 5 Jap tanks, 3 in hull-down position, delivering point-blank machine gun and Lfixam fire. To. counter this . threat K-7 and 37mm J£T guns'were immediately moved forward and succeeded in neutralizing th'q'se., tanks, thus ending .tlie- day's action- for this battalion* During tlie., nighthowever, a Jap' suicade squad inf-iltrating forward destroyed an'M-7 self-propelled mount- by -either a magnetic or a lunge type qf mine* '.'The following day, 25' Jan., the 2d Bn made slight gains to the S and on 26 Jan unopposed took the bridge and'road leading E from, the town, , • •• Ifeanwhile, the 1st Bn (less 1 Co) began its advance at 0715 24 Jan and reached the SW corner of town, where, the tanks, halted , by the drainage ditch, came under M fire frdro the front. Our infantry, deploying to-', protect the tanks, were promptly pinned down by fire from'small arms, - automatic weapons,, and mortars located in the W and S ends. of. town, In this action six of our medium tanks-were knocked' out, .Renewing the attack at .1400 little grolihd was gained, as: an'inspection of our-farthest.advance as indicated on. Sleet.ch" No, 1 will reveal':. Dangerously vulnerable to night attack in that position, our-troops Tathdrew at dusk. 200 yards*'7 of town, from where intensive patrolling v/a& -initiated on the 25th' and 2&th to develop the energy's dispositions. Realizing from this reconnaissance the . futility of further assaults from this quarter, the 1st Bn was moved on . ImU ? ! :^P i#4f®S| ^2f'Jan1>Q an &SgerfMy &rea on the left of the 2u Bn.' Thus '-concbntratfeill Q!i.ii7 .lan the regiment (less 1 Bn) launched a coordinated -attack* battalions abreast* against the. southern.; half ..of the toYto, supported by two lOjmm how bns which fired a preparation and then successive concentrationg'advancing on a time schedule," Although several Jap tanks were knocked out,, .the troops- were, able to " advance only 100 yards. Our casualties were heavy, and personnel of the two rifle "battalions were obviously feeling fatigue# This situation continued with little change until 0100, 28 Jan, when the Japs after much preliminary maneuvering launched an infantry-tank attack against a salient made by the left company of the 2d Bn» Normal barrages of our artillery and mortars did not succeed in halting- the: attack, which toas, nade 1Dy ten tanks advancing in waves of. three, each tank: followed closely try infantry# The first wave, spraying . machine gun lead blindly and firing at point-blank range, overran , our forward positions. This thrust was finally stopped 50 yards inside ; our position-by the combined fire of. rifle AT grenades,, bazookas, cal. ,5° machine .guns and 2 - 37attl AT guns. Obtaining hits and penetrations with each type of fire, our troops scored a possible, knocking out all ten , tanks# Three others which had remained-in the tank assault position (about 125 yards from our foremost elements) then withdrew eastward oiit of town without attacking#-.. The backbone of their defense thus broken, the Japs offered negligible opposition to our advance the next morning# Our losses in the entire action were 9 officers KIA and 11 MA, 101 EM KIA, 6 DOW, 127.WIA, -and 1 MEA#: This included 5 company commanders, a Bn 3-2, and a Bn S~3# In contrast the Jap force of approximately 800 had been practically annihilated#- GOmgffS:' ••• . ; ' ; The infantry self-propelled howitzer employed Singly as an assault gun was most .effective. . The mount was .concealed, as 'close in rear of our forward elements as cover permitted. After scouts had located the target the howitzer section leader made, his reconnaissance, and the mount moved forward to"firing position,, covering itself with the fire of its caliber .30 and ,50 machine guns. . Tlie tank proved vulnerable -;3ien crossing open approaches and was even more vulnerable in the , town. Its most effective use was as an individual assault gun. • .' .Concerning our AT defense,the 37®m AT gun proved the most effective weapon# . The M6 A3 AT rocket for the bazooka was. much more effective than the M6 A1 model, the latter frequentlj*" proving a dud# The bazooka, exposed by its excessive, flare-back, drew promptretaliatory energy fire at night# The rifle grenade M9 A1 was very effective, aS was the cal. #50 • machine gun fired at point-blank range#: •vR-1 CONCLUSIONS{ : II5II' Based on the expedience obtained in the San Manuel action, this regimental commander concludes that there is no quick, easy, sure-fire method to reduce a fortified town, but that the following procedure for reduction of such a posit ion appears sound-: Obtain vertical photographs (stereo-pairs) for wide distribution and study them prior to reconnaissance phase,. Make an air reconnaissance of town and approaches. Assault battalion commanders should be included® Make prompt close-in ground reconnaissance to locate positions of weapons, fields of fire, defenders reactions, etc„ Maintain patrol contact and surveillance of all critical points® Soften up by repeated air strikes using high concussion (depth, charge type) bombs and napalm bombs to burn off cover. Both day and night fire medium artillery for destructive effect, and at night 105mm for harassment« Pay special attention to probable personnel dispersal; areas at the outer edges of town and along stream banks0 No artillery of less than 155™ caliber is satisfactorily efficient in destructive fire® Against personnel, concussion is needed and against dug-in materiel, a heavy weight, shell is required* Mount an attack to establish a "beachhead" on a. portion of the town as a foothold for cracking it® The preparation.should consist of an air strike with concussion bombs followed'by napalm bombs® This should be followed instantly by a ten minute artillery concentration using l55Hm or higher caliber with-HE shells and all lower calibers with time fire®. Infantry direct fire weapons should neutralize any suitable targets® Und&r this prepartion, plus any necessary smoke screening, the infantry advances to within 300 yards at which point artillery fire begins to shift out by 100 yard bounds on call® Infantry weapons then take over the close fire support to advance the riflemen to assault distance® YJhen the infantry fires lift, the riflemen must close with the bayonet, for to hesitate in front of the Jap defenses is to invite heavy casualties Infantry self-propelled mounts and iff guns must move by bounds close in rear of assault troops.» and when'the attack has secured its objective, consolidation must include prompt emplacement of anti-tank weapons with forward rifle elements© Except for urgent reasons, the self-propelled mounts should be withdrawn to secure areas in the rear prior to darkness# Once the beachhead is secured, all subsequent assault should consist of driving"in 'one' or intfre salients as with a crowbar and prying right and left to crack the position block by block.; Each bunker and each dug-in tank presents its own problem, against which the coordinated attack of a unit larger than a company breaks up into isolated assault •0 i • 6|jerati©SiS lay units of company and platoon sise® Against such defenses special assault tactics employing siaoke* bazookas? and flame throweps:•. r-p offer tlx© only sound solutions, TShether or not^o utilize darkness depends on the state of training of the attacking lleA , SAN MANUEL TOWN ~ TANGMLSINAN PROVINCE too O 100 loo SOO 4.0 O 500 i , . fa H( r, tr *r*T 4 I, i i.l J • si This article is based on an experience of a Qenersi gherman medium, tank platoon, as related by the survivors of the action, rphe heavy loss,- es incurred in this action clearly'demonstrate that deviation from approved methods of tank employment :may be expected to result in loss of valuable armor. NARRf^TITS':. • ' ' ; jit about 1630, 7 February 1945» a medium tank platoon, operating as aii interior unit of an independent tank force, in the' city of Manila, was given the mission of clearing enemy from the area 'alongBalite Drive as far south as the 'Reservior (see attached sketch). The platoon, then in an attack position attaint Joseph academy, moved in column, esst. on Esp'ana Extension and sou.iheast on pal'i.te D*ive• . Soon after turning onto Balite Drive, the plat0011, encountered heavy small arms fire from both fla:nks and the front. Due to unfavorable terrain, the platoon could not deploy so fought, its way forward from positions along the Drive, - : "/hen No. 1 tank was within 50 3fards of 2d avenue a fire was started on-its rear deck by a Mo lot ov Cocktail, but the tank continued 011 its', mission. Ealfway between 2d Avenue and the Heservoir its deft center: bogie unit was blown off by fire, from Gun $1, The tank was halted gilder cover just, short of the Heservoir, and two crew members abandoned tank. The other three members gave, a signal of distress by radio, and remained under cover until 1745 "•'hen . n attempt was made to withdraw to the noyth.,, Bevent j*-f ive yards north of the. Reservoir the tank and three ere?/members were .destroyed by fire from Gun #1. . The second tank in column reached 2d,avenue without damage, turned northeast and had advanced about 35 yards when it received several hits from an unlocated 47mm gun, and at the same time lost its . commander by. 20mm fire. This tank turned around and withdrew from the fight via 2d ivenue and Gilmore street. • The third tank fought its way forward, turned northeast on 2d £ve- nue and., advanced by fire and movement about 200 yards. .,'The tank commander then turned his vehicles around and spotted #'-1,Gun whidh was firing 011 • Tanks Kb. 4 snd 5» He had' silenced $1 Gun by firing: two rounds. of into the position when his tank was partially disabled by '47mm fire from an unlocated gun, he himself being wounded,. The .tank 'was. then withdrawn from the fight via 2d. avenue and, Gilmore Street. Tanks No. 4 and 5 2d Avenue through fire from guns of many calibers. Tank No. "iij: wars'dis'abled at the inter section by a mine and the crew escaped just in time to see the vehicle destroyed by fire from Gun $1. Tank No. 5- turned southwest oh 2d ^venue, was penetrated in the right side four times by fire from a fflwi Gun and completely destroyed by fire from Gun $1* During this .engagement small arms and mortar fire- was. so intense -. that observation was extremely limited. The exact 'location or number of antitank guns could not be determined. Those antitank guns shown- on the sketch were definitely knocked, out; and found in position the following 'day. . ; -casualties of the platoon: • Vehicles .. personnel ' AQSi Tteraretl llA - Mli-*. 6 10 "L I CGiiars: .• , \ : although the1 Japanese antitank gun positions were well sited and cleverly camouflaged, the area was so obviously suitable for a tank trap that-, adequate preliminary: reconnaissance could certainly have located most of these positions. Without infantry support or supporting re connaissance elements, the tank platoon blundered into the enemy's trap -and-suffered heavy casualties ill, personnel and materiel before the rem nants of the platoon could- effect, a withdrawal-. • Had supporting infantry or reconnaissance elements been available, •they-, could hay© been utilized to locate the enemy 's positions. T^e tank platoon commanded" cotId then have selected'a covered route of approach, moved his tanks into position, and ..neutralised the enemy's positions with surprise- fire., 13s > z > > z H -< N O o> O" O i 2 n» cn y* !, * i^ COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY F.QR.T. ^AVENWORTH, KS #02ii?5 * 3 1695 00491 1137 *• Ul IRSAFSI 4' / / / 11 m tir:^ ^T-AS^ IA R£PROOUCEO BY 69™ EN«R. TOPO. CO., MARCH 19