Headquarters Sixth Army
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Luther>> tyfly zf-[7 Q^/*= fjt CJV A1 8&^ 3 /7 ::w ty [dto l fiafA L' JOHNlt^GH " Cal, C*v ^ian y-v)" 1 •*.•'• " lb PUBLISHED BY A.C.oF S., G-3 HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY lib u u NUMBER 5 21 MARCH, 1945 2"S 28 APR 1945 —=a/q /°.c>y%8p Li >-r-v •V|,|^v •'"•^' •n- INTRODUCTION I'Mch. valuable experience has "been-gained by units participating in the camoai«?n to liberate the Philippines, some of which merits, dissemination throughout the Sixth Aw This.is especially truejhere new ideas are involved and may prove of value in preparation, for xuture combat* In order that all unit's may reap the full advantage of the valuable experiences of others it. is essential to publish this information to^all units of the command at an early date, "Combat Notes" was designed for this, purpose; and--i*i order to continue its usefulness, I^request ychao . commanders review the recent experiences of, their units In combat vauh a view of selecting those incidents that involve Valuable lessons • . learned,, or the employment of new or.particularly effective meunods. A clear, complete and concise report of each such incident should tnen be submitted* through channels, to this headquarters .-marked* A-ocenuion; G~3* These report3* where applicable, should include discussion and analysis of errors or shortcomings, a recommended solution and.a ^ _ discussion of the capabilities and limitations of weapons and equipment as evidenced "by performance under combat'conditions* These reports Wi11 be parefully studied and those'considered of highest value will be published in an issue of "Combat Notes11 • Your cooperation in this matter is earnestly so^icit^d and will 1 : be greatly appreciated. - ' r . I f a {.../ .4, / 7 Qrt). 3DDLEI:SIT, Brigadier General, G. S» C»-, of 3** Gr*3'# Iff inr N'T 11 x CONTENTS Rescue by the Rangers Page 1 Use of Long Range Artillery • Page' ' 11'I The Napalm Fire Bomb Page 15 Japanese Employment of Tanks on Luzon Page 20 Employment of Japanese Antitank Weapons on Luzon Page 22 j • Reduction of San Maiiuel Town '. page 2lj.: Loss of a Tank Platoon on Luzon Pager 31 w S f4 Volume Number 1|.» Combat Notes \ Sixth Arny SECRET letter, file AG 384-C9 subjects: "Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in K-2 Operation11, dated 25 November 1944» is to be considered Volume Number 4 of "Combat Notes", and is hereby re classified- as C(EVIDENTIAL.' RESCUE BY THBTRANGERB 9. .... .This articlele ^^a!l covering,..the-;..l,i'berati.pn ?f ^^ri'daa and Allied prisoHers- of 'Tf'ar from tfeer Japanese stpc.kacie ^art paaga"tiari .?ul)mitted by; tile Commanding-"off icer ,; 6th Ranger Battalion, a par- tion oi" y/hicb-.'fbrDied the nucleus of the rescuing force, - l/uch. credit must also go, however, to the ilamo scouts, who have shadowed the japs from the''"Admiralty Islands to -lingayen. Likewise con tributing to the"success of this foray- were the Guerrillas who by their knowledge of the terrain, ability to penetrate enemy' positions, and liaison with the populace have been of material assistance - throughout, the .present Campaigns in the Philippines. ; Othekv daring rescues of large groups of internees from well,'guarded stockades located far behind enemy lines -were, subsequently effected at ganto Tomas and Bilibid prison in Manila,-and at Los Banos, Laguna province, yhis operation is presented for the tactical value which it contains. NARRATIVE: Gii the morning of 27 January 1945 guerrillas reported that 300 - 5^0 .American and Allied prisoners of war -were being held in a stockade at pangatian, guarded by a small enemy garrison. • intelligence reports indicated that large numbers of enemy., including tanks, were evacuating to the North along -the Cabahatuan •» Baloc * san Jose (Highway 55) the cabanatuan - Cabu - Risal routes (see sketch). Be cause of our.-air activity., the enemy moved at night and rested in concealed areas or trails it coiips during the day * one of these transit -camps was kngwn to be located at pangatian. Groups of enemy-were reported as located at pinagpanaan,Talavera, Baloc and-just east of the Licab River bridge (between Consuelo and Baloc). • ' Realizing that our gradual advance toward pangatian might soon cause the - jap.s to evacuate or otherwise dispose of the prisoners , the Commanding General, sixth'Army, directed that immediate.steps be taken to effect-their rescue. ' . .: 'V Since this-mission required coordination with guerrilla forces who were acting under q»2 supervision, the overall planning for the task was entrusted to the G*2t Sixth jy?my, who without further delay selected an Alamo scout group qf 3 officers and 10 men to act as the vanguard of the force, obtaining native guides at Guimba this group was- then, to move-to plater03,'contact" ascertain hoy* manyt -ade area. ' Losing 1 e,' -"£M;sr<6a^ty kd^pafe ed from Guimba the night 1 Uv5:'W ' " PUP! p§Sil81 of 2? January Concurrently the Commanding Officer, 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion was directed to furnish a company ..plus one platoon to effect the. rescue. .. This was difficult to do as all wished-to volunteer, but finally the men were selected, each one of whom took an oath that he would die before ' allowing harm to come to a single one of the prisoners, sixth jrmy g-2 , thoroughly briefed the Ranger officers, thus chosen, on the situation and general plan, which had been formulated without ground reconnaissance by utilizing maps and available aerial photographs covering the stockade area. This accomplished, the force of 5 officers and 115 enlisted men (Company C plus 2d Plat, Company F), under personal command, of the Battal ion commander, moved by truck to Guimba. on the. morning of 28 January. .After arrival, the command posts of the 6th Infantry Division; the 1st. • infantry Regiment and the 20th infantrjr Regiment were• visited in order to coordinate recognition signals with these adjacent units, in this respect it was agreed that the Ranger force would use two green flares to identify themselves on their return,- the nearest elements of the 6th.Division answering with the same signal. Also, during the -day a forward radio, station was established at quimba by Ranger personnel, who- were, to main tain communication with an SCR 694 which was to be carried with the. force. T^ese arrangements completed., the Rangers' departed from Guimba at 1400 28 January 1945.» each carrying a 2 day supply of K rations in addi tion to normal.combat equipment. The force moved across country to the guerrilla headquarters of captain Joson, near Lobong, where his detach ment of 80 armed men was attached, and' the force then proceeded, fording, the Talavera River at 2^00 hours, crossing the Rizal Road near -General Luna at 0400 29 January 1945» and finally reaching the bivouac area at Balincarin at 0600 hours. While there, arrangements were made with Captain Jpajota, guerrilla • area -commander at. cabu, to lend assistance as follows• Guerrilla troops ' were to establish and maintain all around security in depth;, civilians already in the area north, of the Cabanatuan - Cabu'road were to remain there, and any other personnel entering the/area were to be held in the area until the rescue had-been effected; all chickens were to be penned , up, and all dogs tied and muzzled; the guerrillas were to secure and organize an ox cart -train of. sufficient size to haul 200 men; and, finally, food was to be obtained for 650 men, to be distributed along the route of .return. in addition, the force v;as augmented by attaching captain pajota's group of 90 armed and 160 unarmed men, the latter to be used as litter bearers. , •ilso while at Balincarin the Rangers met the jjlamo Scout group, who had not yet been able to secure definite information on the stockade but had sent civilians and guerrilla scouts to maintain-a continuous watch on it. one final detail vras arranged before leaving the bivouac area. radio was sent to/Sixth Army requesting air 'overage . - 2 I-M : ' ' rou^e of withdrawal,, commencingat 19,00, 29 .January, with the mission to. attack trucks and tanks only. This covetf' i'iv wasbelieved might aid in materially retarding an armored or motorized ..pursuit, which was consider ed the greatest hazard to a successful withdrawal. The force departed .from. Balincaji.in at 1800- 29 January'1945 £°r Flater03 where the guerrilla scouts .reported that- many japs were.spending the night in the stockade area, and also that a'large body of eneniy" troops was moving north on the road, past the"camp:, -In view of this information it was deemed: advisable to. postpone the attack one. day. j\t 090030 January an ;officer and 1 mah; of the ^lamo scout group, guided by guerrilla Lieutenant Tombo, left the bivouac.to scout the prison camp for final definite information on the routinepersonnel and installa tions in the camp.- information obtained was as follows: activity in the .. carnp was normal j; the area was. .inclosed by tail barbed wire fences, each •;6 - 8 feet tall and spaced .4.feet apart, its .interior being further sub- \ divided by single barbed wire fences; the stockade was 600 yards wide, (east .to west), and 800 yards. long (north to "south); a pillbox with an opening in its top, located at-the.NE corner of the camp, wes. occupied hy 4 heavily armed Japs three*' 12 foot towers were also occupied (see Sketch no. 2): -the main entrance was closed by an,8 foot gate,, secured with a heavy lock, and guarded by a 'sentry in a revetment, beneath the tower on'the west:side of the gate; within the carrjp there were 4.