Collected Commentary, Economic Prosperity in the 1920S
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Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1891-1957, Record Group 85 New Orleans, Louisiana Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, LA, 1910-1945
Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1891-1957, Record Group 85 New Orleans, Louisiana Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, LA, 1910-1945. T939. 311 rolls. (~A complete list of rolls has been added.) Roll Volumes Dates 1 1-3 January-June, 1910 2 4-5 July-October, 1910 3 6-7 November, 1910-February, 1911 4 8-9 March-June, 1911 5 10-11 July-October, 1911 6 12-13 November, 1911-February, 1912 7 14-15 March-June, 1912 8 16-17 July-October, 1912 9 18-19 November, 1912-February, 1913 10 20-21 March-June, 1913 11 22-23 July-October, 1913 12 24-25 November, 1913-February, 1914 13 26 March-April, 1914 14 27 May-June, 1914 15 28-29 July-October, 1914 16 30-31 November, 1914-February, 1915 17 32 March-April, 1915 18 33 May-June, 1915 19 34-35 July-October, 1915 20 36-37 November, 1915-February, 1916 21 38-39 March-June, 1916 22 40-41 July-October, 1916 23 42-43 November, 1916-February, 1917 24 44 March-April, 1917 25 45 May-June, 1917 26 46 July-August, 1917 27 47 September-October, 1917 28 48 November-December, 1917 29 49-50 Jan. 1-Mar. 15, 1918 30 51-53 Mar. 16-Apr. 30, 1918 31 56-59 June 1-Aug. 15, 1918 32 60-64 Aug. 16-0ct. 31, 1918 33 65-69 Nov. 1', 1918-Jan. 15, 1919 34 70-73 Jan. 16-Mar. 31, 1919 35 74-77 April-May, 1919 36 78-79 June-July, 1919 37 80-81 August-September, 1919 38 82-83 October-November, 1919 39 84-85 December, 1919-January, 1920 40 86-87 February-March, 1920 41 88-89 April-May, 1920 42 90 June, 1920 43 91 July, 1920 44 92 August, 1920 45 93 September, 1920 46 94 October, 1920 47 95-96 November, 1920 48 97-98 December, 1920 49 99-100 Jan. -
Lonesome (1928)
Lonesome (1928) By Raquel Stecher they’re really neighbors. The audience “In the whirlpool of modern life -- The suspends their disbelief for the joyous most difficult thing is to live alone.” reunion of the two lovebirds who will never be lonesome again. For the film industry, 1928 was a turbulent year. A major transition was If it wasn’t for the insistence of Fejos, occurring; one that would forever alter Lonesome might never have been how movies were made. Just one year made. Much like the industry itself, prior, The Jazz Singer (1927), a part- Fejos was in a state of transition. Born talkie, a silent film with a few talking and raised in Hungary, he studied sequences added in, would make a medicine, became a medical orderly splash in Hollywood. Audiences flocked during WWI and then switched careers to the theatres and the once reluctant and worked on films in his native studio heads realized that the transition country. He moved to New York City in to sound was inevitable. Filmmakers the 1920s but struggled to make ends scrambled to learn the new technology meet. He then moved to Hollywood and develop movies to go with it. In determined to make his first feature film. 1929 all-talking films became the With some hard work, ingenuity and standard and once the industry was well some help, he produced The Last into the 1930s silent filmmaking was Moment (1927). The film was officially a thing of the past. The time successful and Universal Pictures came between 1927 and 1929 was pivotal and calling. -
Business in the 1920S Is This Photo of President and Mrs
BECOMING MODERN: AMERICA IN THE 1920S PRIMARY SOURCE COLLECTION ONTEMPORAR Y IN OMMENTARY THE T WENTIES C — BUSINESS — * Aptly illustrating the faith in American business in the 1920s is this photo of President and Mrs. Coolidge in 1924 welcoming members of the Republican Businessmen’s Association of New York. In an address the next year, Coolidge delivered his most frequently quoted statement: “After all, the chief business of the American people is business.” For by 1925 the nation’s economy had lifted itself out of the dreadful postwar recession and was setting new highs for production and consumption. American free enterprise was robust, confident, and delivering the goods, literally. Collected here is period commentary on the “chief business of the American people,” the rewards and pitfalls of its predominance, and the proper relationship of business and government in promoting the general welfare. An early proponent of applying scientific management principles to market analysis, Percival Percival White White published this essay on Americans’ embrace of business as a national ideal, satirizing “The Almighty Minute” while applauding its centrality in Americans’ sense of the successful modern life. Atlantic Monthly, July 1920 Business is not a part of American life; it is American life. The American businessman devotes 1440 minutes a day to business. Before daybreak, an alarm clock wrests him from his fitful business dreams. He gulps down business news along with his eggs and coffee. He plans business on his way to the office. His morning is spent in reading business, dictating business, and talking business. He keeps a business engagement for luncheon. -
The Foreign Service Journal, December 1928
AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Photo from E. G. Greenie TEMPLE OF HEAVEN, PEKING Vol. V "DECEMBER, 1928 No. 12 The Second, the Third —and the Tenth When an owner of a Graham Brothers Truck or Bus needs another—for replacement or to take care of business expansion—he buys another Graham .... No testimony could be more convincing. Repeat orders, constantly increasing sales, the growth of fleets—all are proof conclusive of economy, de¬ pendability, value. Six cylinder power and speed, the safety of 4-wheel brakes, the known money-making ability of Graham Brothers Trucks cause operators to buy and buy again. GRAHAM BROTHERS Detroit, U.S.A. A DIVISION QF D D n G & BRDTHE-RS C a R P . GRAHAM BROTHERS TRUCKS AND BUSES BUILT BY TRUCK DIVISION OF DODGE BROTHERS SOLD BY DODGE BROTHERS DEALERS EVERYWHERE FOREIGN JOURNAL PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION VOL. V, No. 12 WASHINGTON, D. C. DECEMBER, 1928 The Election THE final count of electoral votes cast in One of the striking features of the election was the election of November 6 shows a total the heavy popular vote for Governor Smith in of 444 votes for Herbert Hoover to 87 for spite of the overwhelming majority of electoral Gov. Alfred E. Smith, of New York, a margin votes for Hoover. The total popular vote was of 178 electoral votes over the 266 necessary for the largest ever polled in any country. The votes a majority. cast in presidential election from 1904 on, taking The popular vote has been variously estimated into account only the major parties, are as to be in the neighborhood of 20,000,000 for follows: Hoover to 14,500,000 for Smith. -
Visual Metaphors for the People a Study of Cinematic Propoganda in Sergei Eisenstein’S Film
VIsual Metaphors for the people A Study of Cinematic Propoganda in Sergei Eisenstein’s Film ashley brown This paper attempTs To undersTand how The celebraTed and conTroversial figure of sergei eisensTein undersTood and conTribuTed To The formaTion of The sovieT union Through his films of The 1920s. The lens of visual meTaphors offer a specific insighT inTo how arTisTic choices of The direcTor were informed by his own pedagogy for The russian revoluTion. The paper asks The quesTions: did eisensTein’s films reflecT The official parTy rheToric? how did They inform or moTivaTe The public Toward The communisT ideology of The early sovieT union? The primary sources used in This pa- per are from The films Strike (1925), BattleShip potemkin (1926), octoBer (1928), and the General line (1929). eisensTein creaTed visual meTaphors Through The juxTaposi- Tion of images in his films which alluded To higher concepTs. a shoT of a worker followed by The shoT of gears Turning creaTed The concepT of indusTry in The minds of The audience. Through visual meTaphors, iT is possible To undersTand The moTives of eisensTein and The communisT parTy. iT is also possible, wiTh The aid of secondary sources, To see how Those moTives differed. “Language is much closer to film than painting is. For example, aimed at the “... organization of the psychology of the in painting the form arises from abstract elements of line and masses.”6 Works about Eisenstein in the field of film color, while in cinema the material concreteness of the image theory examine Eisenstein’s career in theater, the evolution within the frame presents—as an element—the greatest of his approach to montage, and his artistic expression.7 difficulty in manipulation. -
Current Literature
Journal of Accountancy Volume 48 Issue 3 Article 10 9-1929 Current Literature American Institute of Accountants. Library Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa Part of the Accounting Commons Recommended Citation American Institute of Accountants. Library (1929) "Current Literature," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 48 : Iss. 3 , Article 10. Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol48/iss3/10 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Current Literature Compiled in the Library of the American Institute of Accountants. [Photostatic reproductions (white printing on a black background) of most of the articles listed in The Journal of Accountancy or Accountants' Index may be obtained from the library of the American Institute of Account ants, 135 Cedar Street, New York, at a rate of 25 cents a page in. x 11 in.), at 35 cents a page (11in.1/2 x 14 in.), plus postage. Members and Associates of the American Institute of Accountants are entitled to a discount of 20 per cent. Identify the article by author, title, name of periodical in which it appeared, date of publication and paging. Payment must accompany all orders.] ACCOUNTING Gill, S. Laurence. On the Value of Accountancy in Business. Cost Ac countant, July, 1929, p. 40-7. Hayes, Monard V. Accounting from the Management Viewpoint. New York, National Association of Cost Accountants, July 1, 1929. -
Union Power and the Great Crash of 1929
CEP Discussion Paper No 876 June 2008 Real Origins of the Great Depression: Monopoly Power, Unions and the American Business Cycle in the 1920s Monique Ebell and Albrecht Ritschl Abstract We attempt to explain the severe 1920-21 recession, the roaring 1920s boom, and the slide into the Great Depression after 1929 in a unified framework. The model combines monopolistic product market competition with search frictions in the labor market, allowing for both individual and collective wage bargaining. We attribute the extraordinary macroeconomic and financial volatility of this period to two factors: Shifts in the wage bargaining regime and in the degree of monopoly power in the economy. A shift from individual to collective bargaining presents as a recession, involving declines in output and asset values, and increases in unemployment and real wages. The pro-union provisions of the Clayton Act of 1914 facilitated the rise of collective bargaining after World War I, leading to the asset price crash and recession of 1920-21. A series of tough anti-union Supreme Court decisions in late 1921 induced a shift back to individual bargaining, leading the economy out of the recession. This, coupled with the lax anti-trust enforcement of the Coolidge and Hoover administrations enabled a major rise in corporate profits and stock market valuations throughout the 1920s. Landmark pro-union court decisions in the late 1920s, as well as political pressure on firms to adopt the welfare capitalism model of high wages, led to collapsing profit expectations, contributing substantially to the stock market crash. We model the onset of the Great Depression as an equilibrium switch from individual wage bargaining to (actual or mimicked) collective wage bargaining. -
The Japanese Economy During the Interwar Period
20092009--JE--21 The Japanese Economy during the Interwar Period: 両大戦間期Instabilityの日本における恐慌と政策対応 in the Financial System and ― 金融システム問題と世界恐慌への対応を中心にthe Impact of the World Depression ― Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies 金融研究所 鎮目雅人 Masato Shizume 2009 年 4 月 May 2009 The Japanese economy during the interwar period faced chronic crises. Among them, the Showa Financial Crisis of 1927 and the Showa Depression of 1930-31 marked turning points. The Showa Financial Crisis of 1927 was the consequence of persistent financial instability because of the incomplete restructuring in the business sector and postponements in the disposal of bad loans by financial institutions. The crisis brought reforms in the financial sector through large-scale injections of public funds and the amalgamation of banks. The Showa Depression of 1930-31 was caused by the Great Depression, a worldwide economic collapse, which had been intensified in Japan by the return to the Gold Standard at the old parity. Japan escaped from the Great Depression earlier than most other countries through a series of macroeconomic stimulus measures initiated by Korekiyo Takahashi, a veteran Finance Minister who resumed office in December 1931. Takahashi instituted comprehensive macroeconomic policy measures, including exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary adjustments. At the same time, the Gold Standard, which had been governing Japan’s fiscal policy, collapsed in the wake of the British departure from it in September 1931. Then, Japan introduced a mechanism by which the government could receive easy credit from the central bank without establishing other institutional measures to govern its fiscal policy. This course of events resulted in an eventual loss of fiscal discipline. -
United States Department of Agriculture SERVICE and REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENTS
S. R. A.-B. A. I. 260 Issued January, 1929 United States Department of Agriculture SERVICE AND REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENTS BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY DECEMBER, 1928 [This publication is issued monthly for the dissemination of information, instructions, rulings, etc, concerning the work of the Bureau of Animal Industry. Free distribution service of the bureau, is limited to persons in the establishments at which the Federal meat inspection is conducted, public officers whose duties make it desirable for them to have such information, and journals desiring copies especially concerned. Others may obtain them from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., at 5 cents each, or 25 cents a year. A supply will a station or branch be sent to each official in charge of of the bureau service, who should promptly distribute copies to members of his A file should be kept at each station for references.] force. CONTENTS rag# Changes in directory----------------------------------------------------------------------- 105 Notices regarding meat inspection_ -. _-------------------------- ------------ --------------------- 106 Animal casings for Canada -------------------------------------------------------- 106 Certificate for animal casings destined to Australia ------------------------------------- 106 Mineral oil used as a denaturant ---------------------------------------------------- 106 Animals slaughtered under Federal meat inspection----------------------------------------------- 107 Extent of tuberculosis in animals -
S Ubject L Ist N O. 103
(DISTRIBUTED TO THE Official No • f 1029 MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL] ^ v U I . L e a g u e o f N a t io n s Geneva, December 4th, 1929. S ubject L ist N o. 103 OF DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL DURING NOVEMBER 1929. (Prepared by the Distribution Branch.) Sots: Part I contains reference to documents distributed to all Members of the League. Part II contains reference to documents distributed to the Members of the Council only. The Numbers in heavy type in Part I are inserted in order to indicate the existence of Council documents to which reference will be found in Part II. Key to Sigtis. Distributed previously. Key to Abbreviations. A.* Assembly Intell. Co-op. Institute Intellectual Co-operation A. & A.P. Allied and Associated Powers tu te Add. Addendum, Addenda Jan. January Addit. Additional L. of N. League of Nations Adv. Advisory Memo. Memorandum Agrt. Agreement Mtg.* Meeting Ann. Annex Min. Minutes App. Appendix Nov. November Aib. & Sec. Cttee. Arbitration and Security Com Observ. Observation mittee Oct. October Arrgt. Arrangement O.J. Official Journal Art. Article Org. Organisation Ass. Assembly P- Page Aug. August P. A. & A. P. Principal Allied and Assc C.* Council Powers Chapt. Chapter Para. Paragraph Cl. Council Perm. Permanent C.L. » Circular Letter Pet. Petition C.M. * Council and Members Plen. Mtgs. Plenary Meetings Comm. Commission Prelim. Preliminary Conf. Conference Prep. Preparatory Consult. Consultative Pres. President Conv. Convention Prov. Provisional C.P.J.I. * Permanent Court of Interna Pt. Part tional Justice Recomm. Recommendation Cttee. -
Federal Reserve Bulletin December 1929
FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN DECEMBER, 1929 ISSUED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD AT WASHINGTON The Banking Position Branch and Chain Banking Recent Changes in the Wholesale Price Level UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1929 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD Ex officio members: ROY A. YOUNG, Governor. A. W. MELLON, EDMUND PLATT, Vice Governor. Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman. ADOLPH C. MILLER. CHARLES S. HAMLIN. J. W. POLE, GEORGE R. JAMES. Comptroller of the Currency. EDWARD H. CUNNINGHAM. WALTER L. EDDY, Secretary. WALTER WYATT, General Counsel. J. C. NOELL, Assistant Secretary. E. A. GOLDENWEISER, Director, Division of Research E. M. MCCLELLAND, Assistant Secretary. and Statistics. W. M. IMLAY, Fiscal Agent. CARL E. PARRY, Assistant Director, Division of Re* Chief, Division of Examination, and Chief Federal search and Statistics. Reserve Examiner. E. L. SMEAD, Chief, Division of Bank Operations. FEDERAL ADVISORY COUNCIL District No. 1 (BOSTON) ARTHUR M. HEARD. District No. 2 (NEW YORK) WM. C. POTTER. District No. 3 (PHILADELPHIA) L. L. RUE. District No. 4 (CLEVELAND) HARRIS CREECH. District No, 5 (RICHMOND) JOHN POOLE. District No. 6 (ATLANTA) J. P. BUTLER, Jr District No, 7 (CHICAGO) FRANK O. WETMORE, President. District No, 8 (ST. LOUIS) W. W. SMITH. District No. 9 (MINNEAPOLIS) THEODORE WOLD. District No, 10 (KANSAS CITY) P. W. GOEBEL. District No, 11 (DALLAS) B. A. MCKINNEY, Vice President. District No, 12 (SAN FRANCISCO) F. L. LIPMAN. WALTER LICHTENSTEIN, Secretary Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis OFFICERS OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS Federal Reserve Bank of— Chairman Governor Deputy governor Cashier Boston Frederic H. -
Made in Germany : the German Currency Crisis of July 1931
Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries http://www.archive.org/details/madeingermanygerOOferg 31 DEWEY 415 01- 1 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Economics Working Paper Series MADE IN GERMANY: THE GERMAN CURRENCY CRISIS OF JULY 1931 Thomas Ferguson Peter Temin Working Paper 01 -07 February 2001 Room E52-251 50 Memorial Drive Cambridge, MA 02142 This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Paper Collection at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf7abstract id=260993 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Economics Working Paper Series MADE IN GERMANY: THE GERMAN CURRENCY CRISIS OF JULY 1931 Thomas Ferguson Peter Temin Working Paper 01 -07 February 2001 Room E52-251 50 Memorial Drive Cambridge, MA 02142 This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Paper Collection at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf7abstract id=260993 MASSACHUSEnslNSTiTUTT _OFTECHWL0GY AUG 2 2 2001 LIBRARIES Made in Germany: The German Currency Crisis of July, 1931 Thomas Ferguson and Peter Temin* February, 2001 Abstract The Great Depression reached a turning point in the currency crises of 1931, and the German banking and currency crisis was a critical event whose causes are still debated. We demonstrate in this paper that the crisis was primarily domestic in origin; that it was a currency crisis rather than a banking crisis; and that the failure was more political than economic. We clarify the arguments involved as we present this view. German banks failed in 1931, but the problem was not primarily with them.