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DEF CON 24 (2016) Report Version 1A (2016-08-07)

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DEF CON 24 (2016) Report Version 1A (2016-08-07) DEF CON 24 (2016) Report Version 1a (2016-08-07) POC: Steve Holden, technewsradio@gmail.com, www.technewsradio.com, @technewsradio ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ LICENSE: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0) ​ ​ These are my own personal notes taken at DEF CON 24. This includes notes from talks I attended in person (marked with a *), but also my analysis of key information from slides that were provided on the CONFERENCE DISC (these are limited at v1a). Updated notes will be periodically posted as time permits. Corrections, suggestions, comments, etc are welcome. I also have similar reports from DEF CON 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, & 23 These notes include links to external sites. Most of the sites have been validated but there could be some issues. Each talk is linked to the Official HTML version of the DEF CON program (https://DEF CON.org/html/DEF ​ CON-24/dc-24-schedule.html). Presenations (those on the CONFERENCE DISC & those that were presented without ​ being on the DISC) should ultimately end up at: (https://media.DEF CON.org/DEF%20CON%2024). ​ ​ Thursday, August 4, 2016 Workshops (did not attend any of these): ● Machine Duping 101: Pwning Deep Learning Systems - Clarence Chio ​ ● Maelstrom - Are You Playing with a Full Deck?... - Shane Steiger ​ ● Beyond the MCSE: Red Teaming Active Directory - Sean Metcalf ​ ● Weaponize Your Feature Codes - Nicholas Rosario (MasterChen) ​ ● Real time bluetooth device detection with Blue Hydra - Zero_Chaos & Granolocks ​ ● Hacker Fundamentals and Cutting Through Abstraction - LosT ​ Friday, August 5, 2016 Feds and 0Days: From Before Heartbleed to After FBI-Apple - Jay Healey ​ ● No slides *DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge Award Ceremony - Mike Walker & Dr. Arati Prabhakar ​ ● No slides ● Automated vulnerability patching and exploits ● Teams worked to keep services up and take down other teams services ● Very interesting visualizations (Blue lines for code working correctly, and then red/black lines for code being exploited or not running as expected) ● Formal Verification (verifying code example: http://smaccmpilot.org/) ● Cyber Fast Track was the start http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/darpa-says-goodbye-to-hacker-friendly-cyber-fast/ ● Review of DARPA projects: biohacking, autonomous vehicles, synthetic biologies, next grand challenge (spectrum specific - radio networks with embedded AI). ● DARPA is focus on “trust” - how do you trust data, systems, networks, etc. ● Teams (lowest to highest): CRSPY, JIMA, GALATICA, RUBEUS, MECHANICAL PHISH, XANDRA ($1 million), Mayhem ($2 million) ● Teams were tested against reference Proof of Vulnerability (PoV) Introduction the Wichcraft Compiler Collection : Towards universal code theft - Jonathan Brossard (endrazine) ​ ● No Slides BSODomizer HD: A mischievous FPGA and HDMI platform for the (m)asses Joe Grand (Kingpin)&Zoz ​ ● Slides on conference disc Compelled Decryption - State of the Art in Doctrinal Perversions - Ladar Levison ​ ● Slides on conference disc *Project CITL - Mudge Zatko & Sarah Zatko ​ ● No slides (need to get the slides) ● CITL = Cyber Independent Testing Lab ● A quantifying software risk as a measurement of workload imposed upon the adversary ● http://www.cyber-itl.com/ ● Examining 100+ applications, examining expolits on applications vs. OS. ● Review of LINUX installations (OS + applications) - bell curve - Firefox (73) vs. Chrome (80) with 0 being super hackable. ● Office suites are in the 35-50 range. ● Firefox is really low (softer target) in Mac OX where Chrome is higher and Safari in the middle. ● Windows 10 is much higher (safer) overall but more 3rd party applications the attack surface gets smaller ● Measures: Static Analysis (Binaries) ○ Complexity (code size, branch density, stack adjustments, cyclomatic complexity) ○ Application Armoring (Compiler, Linker, Loader) ○ Developer Hygiene (POSIX/ANSI functions) ● Dynamic Analysis -> Exploitability, Disruptability, Runtime Complexity. ● Files on OS is another attack vector being researched … many major files have risky functions associated with them. ● There are also some functions in an OS that can not be completely fortified (Linux is better than Mac OS). ● You need to look at both executables but also the actual source code (example of Anaconda - DARPA software for doing big-data analytics libraries and packages) ○ The total customer list is major people: Fortune 100, DOD, etc. ○ Each OS has a different set of issues ○ 600+ binaries ○ Some binaries in the LINUX were based on using 2005 version of GCC vice the more secure latest version of GCC ● More data is planned for later release in 2016 and 2017 ● Not working on a pass/fail score but something that can be compared against products. DEF CON Welcome & Badge Talk - L0sT & The Dark Tangent ​ ● No slides DEF CON 101 - Meet the Feds - Jonathan Mayer & Panel ​ ● No slides Honey Onions: Exposing Snooping Tor HSDir Relays - Guevara Noubir & Amirali Sanatinia ​ ● Slides are on conference disc BlockFighting with a Hooker -- BlockfFghter2! ​ ​ ● No slides ● https://github.com/K2/EhTrace ● This can be used for attack HyperVisors *CAN i haz car secret plz? - Javier Vazquez Vidal & Ferdinand Noelscher ​ ● No slides ● Chip hacking is something that is new, internal data, OEM specifics ● Protocols (CAN Bus): UDS, TP2.0 (tunneling ● CANBadger Hardware overview ($25) ● CANBadger firmware (supports UDS, TP2.0, RAW CAN / Man In The Middle (MITM) support) ● Enables: protocol analysis, MITM (drop frames, manipulate bytes, etc) ● They also came up with a CANBadger server that can connect and manage multiple CANBadgers (capture data, etc) ● New solutions on newer cars iare working on OEM security tools so these enables testing these technologies (SecurityAccess Hijack) ● You can also mess with Insurance Tracking Dongles (use OBD2 data, and can mess up GPS reporting) / DEMO: Andriod car interface looks like it is driving around but the car is not running. ● You can also use the CANBadger as an emulator for testing, development, etc. ● Code will be on GITHUB. The are also doing some training sessions at DEF CON. ● @fjvva, @s1ckcc 411: A framework for managing security alerts - Kai Zhong ​ ● Slides are on conference disc Frontrunning The Frontrunners - Dr. Paul Vixie ​ ● No slides ● https://twitter.com/paulvixie *Cheap Tools for Hacking Heavy Trucks - Six_Volts & Haystack ​ ● Slides are on conference disc ● There is going to be a github whitepaper and source code soon ● Diesel Pickup Trucks work a lot like most cars ● Truck “stuff” very compatible and interoperable (electronics can speak with each other) ● Telematics: logs, navigation, Windows embedded, cellular network, CANs, etc. ● These are very expensive so they built a TRUCK IN A BOX (v1 = $10K) ● Recreated networks and sensors and some control units with fake units (like accelerator pedal) ● Protocols: J1708, J1939 ● Connectors: DLC/DLA ● Software release Truck Duck using BeagleBone https://truckhacking.github.io ​ ● Demo of exploit (some fuzzing, static analysis) Research on the Machines: Help the FTC Protect Privacy & Security - Terrell McSweeny & Lorrie Cranor ​ ● Slides are on conference disc ● Looking for ideas related to securing IOT ● On Twitter @McSweenyFTC *(Ab)using Smart Cities: the dark age of modern mobility - Matteo Beccaro & Matteo Collura ​ ● No slides ● Contact info: @_bughardy_ @eagle1753 ● Review of smart city capabilities (linking of previously disconnected systems ● Transportation focus: traffic, lighting, parking, transportation (rail, bus, etc) → these are then communicating to the citizen ● There is also “shared” transport: ride sharing, car sharing, bike rental, etc. ● Architecture: physical (at the edge), to the cloud (API, mgmt), then to the client (hardware/software/services) ● Deep dive into a smart parking meeting. Hardware overview, firmware analysis, debug interfaces (USB, NFC) ○ The software on the smart parking meter communicating back to the cloud is pretty wide open and able ○ Demo of changing price time, fare, time used, or minimum frame ● Deep dive into bike rental services (NFC or Mobile app for checkout and then a check in procedure) -- mobile app has no obfuscation with Multiple SQL injections (APIs) and hardcoded vendor credentials (very easy to replay attack the NFC cards) ● What is next: surveillance systems, traffic light systems, whole city (they are looking for a hotel) ● Slides are supposed to be posted to https://www.opposingforce.it/ per the presenters ​ ​ How to Make Your Own DEF CON Black Badge - Badge Hacker Panel ● Slides are on conference disc ● Mickey Shkatov (@Laplinker) Intel Advanced Threat Research ● Michael Leibowitz (@r00tkillah) Senior Trouble Maker ● Joe FitzPatrick (@securelyfitz) Instructor & Researcher, SecuringHardware.com ● Dean Pierce (@deanpierce) Security Researcher, Intel ● Jesse Michael (@jessemichael) Security Researcher, Intel ● Kenny McElroy (@octosavvi) Hacker Sentient Storage - Do SSDs Have a Mind of Their Own? - Tom Kopchak ​ ● Slides are on conference disc *How to design distributed systems resilient despite malicious participants - Radia Perlman ​ ● Slides on conference disc ● Radia Perlman, EMC, radia.perlman@emc.com ​ ● Crowdsourcing can be attacked by a single person (whitepaper link) ● Things that don’t work but do: wikipedia, ebay (in the most part) ● Trust models - bad or dishonest or confused certificate authorities (CA) [good/bad] ○ Monopoly ○ Oligarchy (most browsers today) ○ Etc … (see slides) ● Review of her proposed recommended model (CA’s by namespace) … leverage by a DNS (creating
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