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F  26 Apr 2007 - 9 Nov 2020 2006 2007 2008 ▾ About This Capture 12/31/2020 » Russinovich: Malware will thrive, even with Vista’s UAC | Zero Day | ZDNet.com APR MAY SEP http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=175 Go ⍰ ❎ 27 captures 26 f 26 Apr 2007 - 9 Nov 2020 2006 2007 2008 ▾ About this capture Members Log In Site Assistance Newsletters RSS Feeds Home News Blogs White Papers Downloads Reviews Podcasts Between the Lines Berlind's Testbed All About Microsoft Enterprise Web 2.0 Chipland Zero Day RSS Feeds home / blogs Zero Day search Search Go! Ryan Naraine Tracking the hackers Subscribe Alerts Bio Pick a blog category view April 23rd, 2007 Russinovich: Malware will thrive, even with Vista’s UAC Posted by Ryan Naraine @ 12:24 pm Categories: Patch Watch, Hackers, Zero-day attacks, Microsoft, Windows Vista, Browsers, Rootkits, Vulnerability research, Responsible disclosure, Spam and Phishing, Botnets, Exploit https://web.archive.org/web/20070526221136/http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=175 1/4 12/31/2020 » Russinovich: Malware will thrive, even with Vista’s UAC | Zero Day | ZDNet.com code, Viruses and Worms, Data theft, Pen testing, Digital rights managementAPR, MetasploitMAY SEP, Privacy Tags: http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=175 Go ⍰ Security, Microsoft Windows Vista, Malware, Ryan Naraine ❎ 27 captures 26 f 26 Apr 2007 - 9 Nov 2020 2006 2007 2008 ▾ About this capture +8 30 votes Worthwhile? Despite all the anti-malware roadblocks built into Windows Vista, a senior Microsoft official is lowering the security expectations, warning that viruses, password-stealing Trojans and rootkits will continue to thrive as malware authors adapt to the new operating system. Mark Russinovich (right), technical fellow in Microsoft's Platform and Services Division, used the spotlight of the CanSecWest security conference in Vancouver to discuss the implementation of UAC (User Account Control) in Windows Vista and made it clear that the feature is not meant to be a security barrier. "It's a best effort to raise the bar and stop malware from making changes to the operating system but it's not a security boundary," Russinovich said of UAC, the oft- criticized mechanism that requires that all users run without full admin rights. In a straightforward assessment of the threat landscape in a Vista world, Russinovich described malware authors as ISVs that will code for a standard user environment. "There is no guarantee that malware can't hijack the elevation process or compromise an elevated application," Russinovich said after providing a blow-by-blow description of how UAC works in tandem with Internet Explorer (with Protected Mode) to limit the damage from malicious files. Even in a standard user world, he stressed that malware can still read all the user's data; can still hide with user- mode rootkits; and can still control which applications (anti-virus scanners) the user can access. "We'll see malware developing its own elevation techniques," Russinovich said. He demonstrated a social engineering attack scenario where a fake elevation prompt can be used to trick users into clicking "allow" to give elevated rights to a malicious file. He predicted a world where malware authors create programs that elevate rights to jump accounts and disable security or develop general and application-specific elevation hijacking. "You will see malware spoofing over-the-shoulder credential prompt and even launching a medium integrity level process int he administrator's account," Russinovich said. At this level, the malware author has access to all the administrators data and can inject itself into the admin's account (e.g. the Runkey) to use additional elevation techniques. "The malware author will say, 'I can live in a Vista world without needing to take over the entire box'. They will end up thriving in the standard user environment, setting up botnets, grabbing your keystrokes," he declared. Russinovich stressed that UAC's fundamental contribution is to make it possible (in most cases) to run as standard user to protect the system and other users on the system. "Elevations are a convenience and not a security boundary," Russinovich reiterated, hinting that Windows will evolve further to promote the standard user concept with things like per-user installations and secure elevations. https://web.archive.org/web/20070526221136/http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=175 2/4 12/31/2020 » Russinovich: Malware will thrive, even with Vista’s UAC | Zero Day | ZDNet.com [UPDAhttp://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=175TE: April 24, 1007 at 9:04 PM] Russinovich e-mails the followingGo APR in responseMAY SEP to this blog entry:⍰ ❎ 27 capturesIt would be great if you would post an update that clarifies my message and26 that the use of 'thrive' fin 26 Apr 2007the - blog9 Nov 2020 headline doesn't reflect the spirit of my slides or delivery. Please2006 point2007 out2008 that I was▾ About this capture stating that malware will evolve to run as standard user, where it can accomplish many of its goals, not that Vista somehow enables malware — in fact, ASLR, service security hardening, Defender, SDL, and other security enhancements raise the security bar in Vista. Blog This E-mail Print Sphere * Ryan Naraine is a freelance writer specializing in Internet and computer security issues. He can be reached at naraine SHIFT 2 gmail.com Previous postNext post Talkback - Add your opinion Permissions aren't an O/S issue, it's a people issue Why in the world would you think that Vista doesn't have the same general type of permissions? ... (Read the rest) Malware will always exist voska -- 04/23/07 Another article on Vista UAC ju1ce -- 04/23/07 Well, it really is Microsoft's fault John Zern -- 04/23/07 Jesus... who did the airbrushing on Russinovich's photo? (nt) John E Wahd -- 04/23/07 Of course it'll thrive. Human nature transcends any operating system. HypnoToad72 -- 04/23/07 Microsoft is backpedaling on Vista security!! TechExec2 -- 04/23/07 Microsoft is backpedaling on Vista security!! (fixed) TechExec2 -- 04/23/07 Thrive? p_user_001 -- 04/23/07 A possible attackers way could be... ischilling -- 04/24/07 Softening the blow frgough -- 04/24/07 I like this guy Resuna -- 04/24/07 MICROSOFT SHOULD SEEK GOVERNMENT HELP BALTHOR -- 04/24/07 It was a noble effort jajanes -- 04/25/07 hardware, hardware, hardware gdstark13 -- 04/25/07 More code, more bugs, more holes tygrus -- 04/25/07 MS Employee's admit Vista failure spacecase -- 04/26/07 Talk about misinformation! CobraA1 -- 04/29/07 Add your opinion One Trackback The URI to TrackBack this entry is: http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/wp-trackback.php?p=175 Russinovich: Malware will thrive, even with Vista’s UAC Russinovich: Malware will thrive, even with Vista’s UAC by ZDNet’s Ryan Naraine — Despite all the anti-malware roadblocks built into Windows Vista, a senior Microsoft official is lowering the security expectations, warning that viruses, ... https://web.archive.org/web/20070526221136/http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=175 3/4 12/31/2020 » Russinovich: Malware will thrive, even with Vista’s UAC | Zero Day | ZDNet.com http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=175Trackback by Alexa's blog — April 24, 2007 @ 12:34 am Go APR MAY SEP ⍰ ❎ 27 captures 26 f P26o Aprpu 2007la r- 9 wNovh 2020ite papers, webcasts, and case studies 2006 2007 2008 ▾ About this capture VoIP Migration Strategies ShoreTel Best Practices for Migrating to Exchange 2007 Quest Software AMR Research Alert: Rethinking Core Competencies IBM ShoreTel Pumps Up Efficiency at Houston Heart Center with Reliable, Easy-To-Use VoIP Solution ShoreTel Automating Network Management: Leveraging Dynamic Reconfiguration for Utility Computing Cassatt Footwear Company, Dr. Martens, 'Steps Up' with ShoreTel ShoreTel SPONSORED LINKS Free Virtualization The VMware Alternative. Download Free Virtualization Software from www.virtualiron.com Fix Drivers Windows Quickly Repair Windows Registry. Auto-Clean/Speed Up PC! 5 Stars. www.pcperformancetools.com Dont buy Windows Vista OS Ultimate Windows OS Vista $189 4 Laptop 4 all Computers Free Ship www.ecost.com Free Office 2007 Pro Get a Free MS Office Pro 2007 Offer Expires Today! www.everyfreesoftware.com Free Microsoft® Vista Get Microsoft Vista® Free Free Software Offer Ends Soon! www.freesoftwaregifts.com (about) https://web.archive.org/web/20070526221136/http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=175 4/4.
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