CHASING UTOPIA: HOW THE GAVE US TODAY’S ISLAMIC STATE

BY

DIANA INGEBORG BOLSINGER

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Major Subject: GOVERNMENT

NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY

LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO

MAY 2016 “Chasing Utopia: How the Arab Spring Gave Us Today’s Islamic State,” a thesis prepared by Diana Ingeborg Bolsinger in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts, has been approved and accepted by the following:

Loui Reyes Dean of the Graduate School

Neal M. Rosendorf Chair of the Examining Committee

Date

Committee in charge:

Dr. Neal M. Rosendorf, Chair

Dr. Yosef Lapid

Professor Kim Seckler

Dr. David Keys

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Like most students, I leave my studies deeply in debt. Thankfully, my obligation is not to a bank or institution, but to the many generous scholars who shared their knowledge, judgment, and insights. Dr. Neal M. Rosendorf served as committee chair, advisor, and mentor. My time at NMSU would have been much the poorer without his humor, generosity, and counsel. This thesis grew out of coursework and independent study with Dr. Yosef Lapid. I gained immensely from

Dr. Lapid’s expertise and remain deeply grateful for his support. Dr. Jiaqi Liang, too, provided invaluable mentoring and guidance. Dr. Neal Harvey took a chance on a graduate student and allowed me to design and teach my own class on . I hope the results repaid his trust. Professor Kim Seckler and Dr. David Keys’ incisive questions helped clarify my analysis and provided future directions for research.

Jason McWhorter reviewed early drafts of my arguments, providing key sources and insights. Any remaining gaps or errors are, of course, my own responsibility.

Finally, neither this thesis nor my graduate studies would be possible without the boundless support of my husband Dan. There are no words to express my gratitude.

iii VITA

November 23, 1964 Born in Arlington, VA

1981 Graduated from Encinel High School Alameda, California

1985 Bachelor of Arts in International Studies, Reed College, Portland, Oregon

1990 Masters of Art in International Relations, George Washington University, Washington, District of Columbia

2002 Masters of Education, Marymount University, Arlington Virginia

Field of Study

Major Field: Government

iii ABSTRACT

CHASING UTOPIA: HOW THE ARAB SPRING GAVE US TODAY’S ISLAMIC STATE

BY

DIANA INGEBORG BOLSINGER

NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY

LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO

MAY 2016

This thesis acknowledges existing scholarship that portrays the Islamic State as the product of conditions in following the 2003 U.S. invasion but argues the

Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 transformed the Iraq-based group into a larger movement. The revolts weakened governments, allowing the Islamic State and other jihadi groups to seize territories. Syrian regime brutality against civilians strengthened jihadi claims was in danger. Jihadis released from prisons during and after the uprisings openly recruited and organized new factions, many of which later switched their allegiance to the Islamic State. Above all, counterrevolution and violence following the initially peaceful movements of 2011 expanded the pool of alienated youth susceptible to . The Islamic State’s success in seizing these openings suggests the merits of applying a path-dependent approach to analyzing the spread of terrorism.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES…......

……………………………………………………………...... ix

INTRODUCTION………...... ……………………………………...... 1

Setting the Stage: The Arab Spring……………………………...... 4

Structure of the Argument…………………………………………………...... 9

Scope, Definitions and Terminology………………………………………….. 14

CHAPTER 1: POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE………………………………………………….……. 17

Political Islam………………………………………………………………….. 18

Islamic Resistance……………………………………………………………... 22

Rise of the ……………………………………………..... 25

The Evolution of Modern ………………………………………………... 33

Building the Islamic State in Iraq……………………………………………… 39

The Missing Ingredient………………………………………………………... 44

Putting Together The Pieces…………………………………………………... 53

CHAPTER 2: THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY……………………………… 56

Independence and Instability…………………………………………………... 59

Republican Monarchs…………………………………………………………. 61

It’s A Family Affair…………………………………………………………… 66

Private Profits, Public Costs…………………………………………………... 68

A New Battleground?...... 75 v Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….. 81

CHAPTER 3: AFTER TODAY NO MORE FEAR: THE ARAB UPRISINGS OF 2011……………………………………………………………………….. 84

“A Volcano Waiting to Explode”……………………………………………... 85

Flash Mobs and Strange Bedfellows…………………………………………... 87

Egypt: From Tahrir to the Sinai……………………………………………….. 93

The Islamists…………………………………………………………………... 95

The Military Steps In: and ……………………………………... 99

Divided Nations, Divided Militaries………………………………………….. 103

Libya and : A Swift Turn to Violence…………………………………... 106

‘Standing Up:’ The Emotions of Rebellion…………………………………... 109

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………. 113

CHAPTER 4: AL-QA’IDA EXPLOITS THE NEW OPENINGS……………….. 115

Egypt………………………………………………………………………….. 122

Tunisia………………………………………………………………………… 127

Syria…………………………………………………………………………... 130

Libya………………………………………………………………………….. 132

Awash in …………………………………………………………… 133

Safe Havens and Jihadi ……………………………………………... 135

Hearts, Minds, and Shari’a: Yemen and Syria………………………………... 138

Libya’s ‘Jihadi Factory’………………………………………………………. 142

Crossroads of Africa and the Levant: The ……………...….... 146

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………. 148 vi CHAPTER 5: COUNTERREVOLUTION AND THE ISLAMIC STATE……… 150

Opening the Door to Jihad……………………………………………………. 150

The “Five Star Jihad” …………..…………………………………………….. 158

Finding a Reason to Fight…………………………………………………….. 161

Becoming A Member…………………………………………………………. 173

Bringing the Islamic State Home……………………………………....……… 175

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………. 180

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………… 183

REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………… 187

vii LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN SYRIA, 2011 - 2015 AND IRAQ, 2003 - 2007……………………………… 161

TABLE 2: TERROR ATTACKS IN , 1995 – 2015………………………………………………………….. 180

viii Introduction

The time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their long slumber in the darkness of neglect—The time has come for them to rise. –Muhammad al-‘Adnani, Announcement of the Caliphate, July 2014

Accounts of the Islamic State focus on the group’s metamorphosis from an al-

Qa’ida allied faction in Iraq fighting U.S. and coalition troops in Iraq. This narrative emphasizes the rise of the Islamic State in the chaos following the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. Scholars trace the legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, founder of the group that later became the Islamic State, in shaping the group’s nihilistic ideology, as well as its brutal use of violence against Shi’a, Christian, and other non-

Sunni populations. According to this narrative, the Islamic State in Iraq was reenergized in 2011 by the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, followed by attempts by then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki to exclude Iraq’s Sunni community from sharing power. The Islamic State in Iraq then drew renewed support from many of the same Sunni tribes and former Ba’athists that had turned against it turning the 2006

“Sunni Awakening.”

The Islamic State in Iraq then extended its organization into the Syrian civil in August 2011. Group leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent a group of Syrian-born followers to establish a presence there, named Jabhat al-Nusra l’Ahl as-Sham (“The

Support Front for the People of the Levant”). Jabhat al-Nusra quickly gained ground in the , bolstered by foreign volunteers and funding, as well as its

1 leaders’ superior fighting and organizational skills. Jabha al-Nusra rejected al-

Baghdadi’s attempt in 2013 to reassert control over its activities, spurring a formal break with the Islamic State in Iraq. When al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri supported al-Nusra against al-Baghdadi, al-Baghdadi declared independence from al-

Qa’ida leadership in 2013. Al-Baghdadi asserted instead that his group was the true leader of the jihadi movement and core of what would eventually become a global

Muslim caliphate.

The revived Islamic State in Iraq began a series of military victories in 2014, capturing Fallujah in January and then seizing Mosul in June from much larger government forces. The group then seized territory on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border, proclaiming the end to Western-imposed borders separating Muslims and declaring the establishment of the Islamic State. Al-Baghdadi claimed to be the true caliph, or leader of Islam, demanding obedience from Muslims worldwide. In the months and years that followed, this putative Islamic State inspired an unprecedented influx of foreign fighters and young “jihadi brides” from around the world.

The Islamic State recruited these volunteers through sophisticated online propaganda, which included both graphic videos of beheadings and other executions as well as utopian portrayals of life under its rule. The group built alliances with other jihadi groups around the world, who declared allegiance to al-Baghdadi in return for recognition as ‘provinces’ of the Islamic State. Islamic State leaders encouraged supporters who could not travel to Syria, Libya, or one of the group’s other allied

“provinces” to launch terror attacks in their own countries. Even as the Islamic State

2 lost territory inside Iraq and Syria in early 2016, these world-wide attacks continued to raise the group’s global profile.

According to these accounts, the critical factor in the creation and rise of the

Islamic State was the U.S. occupation of Iraq. A U.S. invasion of Muslim lands and inept government that exacerbated sectarian and tribal divisions was followed by a weak, and corrupt regime that was beholden to . These events prompted the Sunni rebellion, which was exploited by an al-Qa’ida offshoot. The resulting organization evolved into the Islamic State. This thesis does not challenge the accuracy of these accounts. Instead, this new account attempts to bridge the gap between studies of the early development of the Islamic State and the large body of scholarship covering its current activities. This thesis asserts that a specific set of circumstances created by the failed social revolutions in 2011 popularly known as the Arab Spring enabled the

Islamic State in Iraq to expand beyond Iraq’s borders, in the process attracting a far wider pool of potential recruits.

This thesis limits its scope to developments in five states: Tunisia, Egypt,

Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Arab Spring demonstrations occurred in every state in the

Arab League, but these are the five states which either experienced regime change or have devolved into civil war. Further, these are also the Arab States where the Islamic

State appears to have made the greatest gains in terms of recruits and territory held.

This thesis argues this is not a coincidence. Rather, the results of the uprisings accentuated already-existing grievances, providing an opening to jihadi recruiters. To be clear: the Arab Spring neither created the grievances in these five nations, nor did

3 radicalization begin in these states with the Arab Spring. Rather, the 2010-2011 uprisings represented a high point of hope for peaceful transitions that was dashed by counterrevolution and devolution into civil war. The result was a series of openings for a new, more brutal and nihilistic terrorist movement.

This study includes only limited discussion of the radicalization of youth around the world, particularly in the West, and long-term radicalizing factors such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. Preliminary research findings suggest recruits from Arab countries and elsewhere might have different motivations (Gambetta and Hertog

2016; Quantum 2015; Magdy, Darwish, and Weber 2015). It is possible, however, that the early surge in Islamic State recruiting from Tunisia and Egypt helped create the sense of momentum that then sparked interest among Western volunteers. This effort to tease out the factors involved in the radicalization of a specific and bounded set of Islamic State recruits—youth from the five republics most affected by the Arab

Spring—represents an attempt to clarify how differing political circumstances may affect opportunities for jihadi groups’ growth.

Setting the Stage: The Arab Spring

The Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 represented a profound rejection of the status quo, particularly in six countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and

Bahrain. In each of these states, non-violent crowds spearheaded by university- educated youth demanded jobs, economic development, an end to corruption, and freedoms of speech and assembly. As the demonstrations spread to other groups, these demands evolved into calls for regime change. The long-time authoritarian 4 rulers of Egypt and Tunisia were driven from office when military troops sided with the demonstrators, forcing their ouster and paving the way for a transition to electoral democracies. In Libya, Yemen, and Syria, however, militaries split or sided with the ruler. Violent attacks on peaceful demonstrators led to armed uprisings. While

Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi and Yemen’s President were eventually ousted, neither follow-on government has succeeded in reestablishing national control. At the time of writing, Syria, Libya, and Yemen remain embroiled in civil war, with hundreds of thousands killed and millions more displaced. (Note: (The confrontation in Bahrain involves multiple issues of sect and Gulf state relations that are outside the scope of this study. Further, the heavy Shi’a presence among Bahraini protestors suggests alienated activists are unlikely to turn to an anti-Shi’a group such as the Islamic State.)

The link between the Arab Spring and the expansion of the Islamic State rests on several events occurring during or as a result of the 2011 demonstrations. First, the

Arab Spring uprisings and regime change substantially weakened government monopoly on violence in the five focus countries. The change in leadership in Egypt and Tunisia and devolution into civil war in Syria, Libya, and Yemen created openings for non-state actors to operate with impunity. Salafi jihadi groups established pockets of control in Syria, Eastern Libya, Yemen, the Sinai Peninsula, and in Tunisia’s southern regions bordering Algeria and Libya. Several of these groups, including the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) group in the Sinai and the Ansar al-Sharia groups in Libya’s Sirte region, transferred their allegiance to the Islamic

5 State in 2014, when leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared a caliphate. The Islamic

State thus gained footholds in North Africa, which it has used to extend its reach and launch terrorist attacks on tourists in Tunisia and the Sinai Peninsula.

Secondly, mass releases of prisoners during and after the 2011 uprisings injected thousands of additional jihadis into the populations, including both experienced al-Qa’ida leaders and former criminals radicalized in jail. Members of this group, including al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s brother, established new militant groups, including a network of legal parties called Ansar al-Sharia that operated openly under the new post-uprising Islamist-led governments. Ansar al-

Sharia groups recruited extensively among unemployed and disenfranchised youth, drawing thousands to volunteer to fight the Assad regime in Syria. Other released militants spearheaded the organization and recruitment for al-Qa’ida’s faction in

Syria, Jabha al-Nusra. Several of these former prisoners later emerged as leaders of the Islamic State, following the 2013 split between al-Nusra and the Islamic State.

Other new Salafi groups in the Sinai, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen either transferred their allegiance in toto to the Islamic State or split, with offshoots becoming Islamic

State provinces or allies.

Thirdly, the Arab Spring contributed to radicalization by undermining the appeal of moderate political Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its Tunisian counterpart, Ennhada

(“Renaissance”), initially benefitted from the uprisings. Both groups gained disproportionately in the first elections following the Arab Spring, both through their

6 grassroots organizations and their popular image as comparatively “clean” alternatives to the corrupt established political parties. The Muslim Brotherhood won

Egypt’s first parliamentary and presidential elections following Mubarak’s ouster, while Ennahda dominated Tunisia’s new ruling coalition. Neither regime was able to deliver on its promises, however. Salafi groups condemned both parties’ failure to implement Islamic law, shari’a, and willingness to make political compromises while in office. Secular groups denounced Islamist groups’ few attempts to Islamize society, including their failure to rein in growing jihadi terror. Neither government was capable of stemming continued economic decline or growing social polarization.

Aging Brotherhood and Ennahda leaders also faced growing internal challenges from young members within their own parties, empowered by the Arab Spring uprisings to seek a greater role in party decision-making.

The Egyptian military’s ouster of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed

Morsi in July, 2013, followed by a violent crackdown on the party, further fuelled radicalization. The deaths of more than a thousand Brotherhood supporters, arrests of thousands more, and accompanying reimposition of harsh limits on public speech and activity convinced many that non-violent resistance had become futile. The counterrevolution played to jihadis’ argument that only violent Islamic revolution could overturn authoritarian rulers.

The fourth, and possibly most profound, way in which the Arab Spring boosted the spread of the Islamic State was thus emotional. Alienated youth risked their lives to spearhead demonstrations against their rulers. In Tunisia and Egypt, they

7 succeeded in driving out those rulers, only to find their situations worsened. Activists had made the cognitive leap to believe their situation could be radically improved, only to face declining prospects. Tunisian and Egyptian youth unemployment has worsened in the years following the Arab Spring uprising, in part because of the political and social upheavals. Meanwhile, government crackdowns have further limited speech and freedoms of assembly.

The collapse of central government control in Syria, Libya, and Yemen has led many local youths to join the Islamic State and its allies. While some join out of conviction, many others are driven by other motivations, including revenge, a desire to fight with the most capable forces, or a need for income or protection. Such grudging support may be conditional, but it reinforces the Islamic State’s power so long as group leaders are capable of delivering followers’ demands. So long as the

Islamic State controls these territories, it also retains access to territorial population and resources as well as a safe haven for recruiting and training foreign supporters for operations elsewhere in the world.

Together, these factors suggest the aftermath of the Arab Spring—like the aftermath of many revolutions before it—creates the conditions for chaos. Neither the

Islamic State nor any other jihadi group has ever demonstrated the power to seize territory from strong, stable governments. They are well able, however, to profit and even thrive in situations of disorder and fragmentation. This link between Arab regime weakness and the spread of ever more brutal versions of Islamic terror is worth continued study. While individuals around the world have proven susceptible

8 to jihadi radicalization, the most powerful and dangerous groups to date have all evolved in the Muslim World. The continued presence in the Muslim World of the elements fuelling the rise of groups such as the Islamic State is thus a world-wide danger. A clearer picture of the dynamics of radicalization in the Arab states themselves is thus important to determining what policies might best address the threat.

Structure of the Argument

Chapter One asserts Islamic political opposition movements, , and the

Arab Spring arose in reaction to continued authoritarian rule in the . The chapter surveys the existing scholarship on authoritarian in Arab states, as well as the relationship between regime manipulation of rule of law and the evolution of Islamic political movement. The discussion differentiates between several kinds of Islamic political movement, including Islamist movements that work within established political systems, such as the Muslim Brotherhood; Salafi movements that distance themselves from contemporary political structures; and Salafi jihadi movements that seek violent revolutionary change.

The argument seeks to frame both the Arab Spring uprisings and the Islamic

State as contemporary reactions to continued authoritarian rule in the Arab World, noting the demonstrations were largely driven by secular youth who rejected Islamic political solutions. The discussion asserts the Arab Spring not only failed to deliver the freedoms and economic opportunities these activists had sought, but ushered in a

9 period of counterrevolution and political chaos. A brief discussion of earlier findings on triggers for radicalization illustrates how this series of events fostered the conditions for a new and unprecedented wave of radicalization. Finally, chapter one briefly reviews key academic findings on the spread of the Islamic State that provided a platform for later arguments.

Chapter Two surveys the methods authoritarian leaders used to maintain power, tracing the impact of strategies such as rigged elections and manipulating tribal and sectarian divisions on national cohesion. The discussion covers the deterioration of the social contract between post-colonial Arab governments and their citizens, particularly as aging rulers confronted a new generation. Today’s Arab youth represents the largest and best-educated generation in the region’s history, yet members face declining economic prospects. Cultural mores magnify the impact of youth unemployment, limiting young people’s ability to marry, start families, and become recognized as fully adult. The resulting extension of adolescence into the 30s and even later fostered a new youth culture, alienated from authority. Meanwhile, the spread of satellite television and eroded regimes’ ability to control the flow of information to their populations, encouraging new discussion of regime corruption and ineptitude. In order to better control their restive populations, regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria rolled back earlier openings, tightening controls on speech and political activity.

Chapter three addresses the Arab Spring uprisings themselves, as well as their immediate impact on societies. The discussion portrays the demonstrations as a

10 transcendent moment for participants, who described their experience as deeply emotional. While secular youth groups spearheaded the early demonstrations in

Tunisia and Egypt, they soon were joined by broad cross-sections of their nations’ populations. These coalitions crossed class and political boundaries, uniting Islamists and Marxists, old and young, and drawing even members of the lower government bureaucracies. The size and makeup of the turnout was decisive in convincing

Tunisian and Egyptian security forces to turn on Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak, ousting them from power. At the same time, the ad hoc nature of these coalitions and the lack of a common program beyond shared opposition to the old regimes undercut activists’ ability to shape the post-revolutionary outcomes. The Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda party, both latecomers to the uprising, leveraged their grass-roots organizations and behind-the-scenes contacts with regime elites to take power in both countries.

Meanwhile, militaries in Libya, Yemen, and Syria split or stood with their embattled leaders. All three countries split along multiple tribal and sectarian lines, as competing militias and insurgent groups sought either to capture central power or to carve out their own territory. In addition to providing breeding grounds for radicalization, the resulting economic collapse and exodus of refugees undercut stability in neighboring countries, including Tunisia. Not only did Tunisia lose access to tens of thousands of jobs in Libya’s oil industry, but the country increasingly was pulled into expanded networks of black arms dealers, human traffickers, and drug smugglers. By 2013, Tunisian and Egyptian officials were warning of increasing

11 numbers of youth addicts and suicides. Hundreds of these suicides were by the same method of self-immolation used by vegetable seller Tarak al-Tayeb Bouazizi in

December 2010 that triggered the first marches of the Arab Spring.

Chapter four traces the Salafi jihadi response to the Arab Spring. Al-Qa’ida leaders initially were unprepared for the non-violent uprisings, having previously argued that only violent revolution could oust leaders such as Ben Ali and Mubarak.

Their initial attempts to reframe the revolts into an Islamist movement bent on establishing shari’a were clumsy, and likely hampered by ’s death in May 2011. Affiliates in Yemen, Iraq, and North Africa quickly regrouped, however, reinforced by thousands of experienced jihadis who had been released from prison during and after the Arab Spring demonstrations. These affiliates and former prisoners established numerous groups in each country to take advantage of the new circumstances. These new groups, hiding their al-Qa’ida association, operated legally in Egypt and Tunisia through 2013. They openly recruited fighters for jihad in Syria and attacking U.S. Embassies, art galleries, cinemas, and other allegedly corrupting influences in society. Meanwhile, allied armed factions cemented control of newly ungoverned regions in the Sinai, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. The combination of legal groups and allied factions holding territory allowed jihadi groups to recruit, radicalize, and train a significant new cadre before the novice governments in Tunisia and Egypt became fully aware of the new threat.

Chapter five details the Islamic State’s success capitalizing on radicalization in the five Arab republics under review. While al-Qa’ida initially had profited from

12 the new operational environment after the Arab Spring, many of the new groups it created soon pledged loyalty to the Islamic State. The year 2013 proved to be a turning point. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood regime led by Mohammed Morsi alienated both secular groups who accused Morsi of attempting to rule autocratically and Salafi factions who accused him of abandoning efforts to institute shari’a. The

Egyptian military ousted Morsi in July 2013, killing more than a thousand

Brotherhood supporters in subsequent weeks. Meanwhile, in Tunisia, the elected government restored broad security powers in the wake of rising terrorist attacks.

Continued civil war in Syria, Libya, and Yemen together with counterrevolution and economic decline in Egypt and Tunisia reinforced the jihadi claim that only violent revolt can bring true change to the Muslim World. Insecurity, violence, and alienation expanded the audience for the Islamic State’s apocalyptic vision. Propaganda aimed at Arab youth emphasized not only the group’s promise of revenge against oppressors, but the vision of a utopian life within reach.

Counterterrorism research has long identified the perceived narrowing of options as an essential element in radicalization.

The Arab Spring neither created the Islamic State nor the problem of jihadi terror, but its failure convinced an unprecedented number of youth that they had few peaceful options for transforming their lives. The Islamic State played to these youth’s needs and, in turn, young Syrians, Tunisians, Egyptians, and Libyans provided the bulk of the group’s initial fighters outside of Iraq. Thus, the decisions by large numbers of Syrians, Tunisians, Egyptians, and Libyans to support the new

13 caliphate provided the momentum that, in turn, attracted the interest of youth in

Europe and further afield. This key link between the Arab Spring and the spread of the Islamic State suggests the value in approaching the spread of terrorist groups as a path-dependent phenomenon, with specific necessary ingredients at each stage of growth.

Scope, Definitions and Terminology

This thesis builds on al-Zayyat’s (2004) definition of “Islamists” as Muslims who seek to apply Quranic law, shari’a, to modern governance (xiii). Al-Zayyat’s definition encompasses too wide a range of approaches to be analytically useful, including groups ranging from regime-supported movements preaching abstention from politics and obedience to temporal rulers to the apocalyptic Islamic State. Here, the use of Islamist will be limited to groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the

Tunisian group Ennahda, who seek peaceful and incremental Islamization, compete in electoral politics (when given the opportunity), and acknowledge traditional Islamic jurisprudence.

The term “Salafi” will be used to describe groups and individuals who advocate implementation of shari’a law, a return to the traditions and norms of the salaf, or companions of the Prophet Mohammed, and seek to cleanse Islamic practice of “innovations,” including the Shi’a, Sufi, and other sects which arose after the

Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime. Salafi jihadis, or merely jihadis, is used to describe

14 the minority subgroup of Salafis who seek to implement their program through violence.

This thesis also adopts the U.S. Military Academy’s Countering Terrorism

Center’s practice of using the various names claimed by the Islamic State and its predecessors, rather than popular delegitimizing terms such as Daesh. The goal is not to support the group’s claims, but to clearly differentiate between its several phases.

The faction began in 2003 as Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (JTWJ), an independent cell led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and loosely aligned with al-Qa’ida. It became popularly known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) after al-Zarqawi pledged loyalty to Bin

Laden in 2004 and was renamed the “Islamic State in Iraq” in 2006 after al-Zarqawi’s successors attempted to build an Islamic government within captured territories.

“Islamic State in al-Shams” (ISIS) describes the group in the year between its April

2013 break with al-Qa’ida and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of the caliphate in

November 2014. “Islamic State” describes the group in its current incarnation.

The mass uprisings that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread throughout the Arab World in subsequent months have been given many names, including the Arab Spring, the Second Arab Awakening, the Arab Revolts and the

Revolutions of 2011. While each of these terms has utility in highlighting aspects of the movements, this thesis adopts the most common term, Arab Spring, for the sake of simplicity. Like the “Czech Spring” of 1968 and the “Spring of Nations” of 1848, the term also captures the flavor of a brief moment when it appeared the world might, indeed, be reborn.

15 16 Chapter 1: Political Islam and the Rise of the Islamic State

Both Islamic groups and the Arab Spring evolved out of resistance to authoritarian rule in the Arab World. The evolution of both peaceful and jihadi groups represents an attempt to provide an alternate political and social framework to the status quo. Authoritarian leaders in the Muslim World, meanwhile, have manipulated both modern ideologies such as secular nationalism and Islamic symbolism in attempts to assert the legitimacy of their rule. The Arab Spring reflected an attempt by broad ad hoc and largely secular groups to reject both frameworks of reference.

While participants in the mostly-peaceful demonstrations generally described themselves as pious Muslims, their expressed goals—economic development and opportunity, an end to corruption, and expanded freedom of speech and assembly-- were secular. These goals represented a wholesale rejection of the violent revolutionary imposition of shari’a law advocated by Salafi jihadi groups such as al-

Qa’ida. The Arab Spring thus represented a moment in which millions of tried to transform the political paradigms that had characterized politics in the Arab World for decades. This chapter explores the academic literature describing the political reality these activists rejected, both the corrupt and authoritarian regimes and the multiple Islamic groups who seek to build alternative states based on their own interpretations of shari’a. Finally, this chapter outlines academic work underpinning the argument that the Arab Spring provided an opportunity for Salafi jihadis, particularly the Islamic State, to profit from the results of the Arab Spring. Topics

17 surveyed include scholarship addressing the Arab Spring, associated youth movements, and the spread of Salafi jihadi groups in the aftermath of the uprisings.

Political Islam

Political Islam reflects both a rich history of Islamic jurisprudence and today’s globalized society. Advocates’ agendas reflect both memories of a lost golden age and the reality that many of today’s believers live in poverty and oppression. From the popular televised “Satellite Sheikhs” who preach that obedience to rulers and the

Qur’an will lead to material abundance to the Islamic State’s apocalyptic promise of violent overthrow, today’s Islamic political movements reflect a mélange of traditional symbolism reinterpreted through a post-modern lens. Academic attempts to understand political Islamic groups frame these movements as reactions to modernity and the economic and political realities of followers’ lives.

Huntington (1991) attributes the failure of democracy to take root in Muslim- majority states to Islam’s conflation of religious and political authority. Huntington expands on this schema in his 1996 The Clash of Civilizations, positing that Islamic civilization constituted a distinct civilization that had responded to modernity not by democratizing, but with a popular resurgence of religious piety. He characterized modern Muslim polities as societies polarized between authoritarian leaders and revolutionary Islamic oppositions, generating unending conflict with non-Muslim neighbors. Lewis (1993; 2002), Kedourie (1992), and Pipes (1984) also argue that

Islam itself was the root cause of the absence of democracy in the Muslim World.

They cite the precedent set by the Prophet Mohammed, who ruled as both religious 18 and spiritual leader of his community, to argue authoritarian relationships within the family and community, and the absence of cultural prerequisites to democracy combined to make democracy an inappropriate transplant to Muslim society. Lewis

(2002) argues that a different and pre-modern understanding of the concept of freedom, both in thought and political activity, blocked Muslim states’ political and economic progress. For Kedourie (1992), democracy is an “alien mind-set” that simply had no appeal in Muslim culture.

Within these frameworks, is conceptualized as a product of the same cultural forces that fosters authoritarianism, rather than as a reaction to that authoritarianism. Indeed, Huntington (1996) argues that the many conflicts dating back to the medieval spread of Islam and the European crusades will inevitably continue, as Western cultural values foster Muslim reaction and resentment (213).

Lewis (2002), too, describes a broad, culturally determined reaction to the West as

Muslims look for a scapegoat to blame for the failure of their polities to advance.

Scholarship in the early twenty-first century grew more nuanced as researchers began to focus on both the differences among Muslim societies and the mechanisms authoritarian leaders used to maintain power. Posusney (2004),

Brownlee (2005), Diamond (2010), Lust-Okar (2004) and Bellin (2004) drew from comparative studies of authoritarian rule and regime transition in Latin America and post-1989 Europe to find common patterns across cultures and regions. These scholars tend to focus on the actions of actors and institutions, rather than culture as the critical factor in blocking democratization.

19 One focus of scholarship has been how authoritarian leaders manipulated rule- of-law to strengthen their own position, establishing constitutional regimes that undercut rivals’ ability to build civil society institutions or opposition parties.

Posusney (2004), Bellin (2004), and Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (2015) challenge the argument that Islam and democracy are incompatible, arguing scholars instead should study the role external supporters, such as the United States, played in reinforcing regime control. Diamond (2010) empirically demonstrates that non-Arab

Muslim states are significantly more likely to democratize than Arab nations, further delinking Islam and authoritarianism. Stepan and Linz (2014) note that more than a half-billion Muslims already live in electoral democracies, finding no significant difference in expressed support for democracy between Muslims and their non-

Muslim neighbors.

The picture that emerges is one where the Arab world remains the least democratized region on the planet, with only Lebanon holding comparatively free elections before the 2011 uprisings. While all five Arab republics staged regular elections, Lust-Okar (2004; 2009) and Lust-Okar and Gandhi (2009) document regime leaders’ success in manipulating election laws and ballot stuffing to control election results. Brownlee’s (2004) statistical analysis of 135 authoritarian regimes finds the presence of such controlled multiparty elections actually strengthens authoritarian rulers by allowing them to manage competition among elites. Brumberg

(2002; 2003; 2014b) documents authoritarian leaders’ use of fear to coopt minority and secular groups and divide potential opponents, polarizing domestic groups in the 20 process. Achy (2015), Diamond, Plattner, and Grubman (2014) and Bueno de

Mesquite (2011) establish corruption as a deliberate regime strategy, meant to coopt and reward key elites. Volpi builds on Weber’s definition of “sultanistic rule” to describe the Qadhafi and other North African authoritarian regimes, arguing the category was analytically useful in explaining the logic of authoritarian rulers who deliberately weaken government institutions in order to strengthen their own control.

Sadiki (2000), Rand (2013), and Dresden and Howard (2015), document how aging

Arab dictators grew increasingly out of touch with their youthful populations, increasing overt repression and corruption while delivering fewer economic opportunities in the final years before the 2011 uprisings.

Both the spread of Islamic political movements, including violent jihadi groups, and the Arab Spring uprisings represent popular responses to authoritarian rule. Islamist groups have long defined themselves as the alternative to the ruling regimes in the Arab World. Kassem (2004), Bokhari and Senzai (2013), and Nakhleh

(2009) argue that non-violent Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, have proven to be the most successful challengers to authoritarian rule due to their mass bases, social welfare programs, and perceived aura of cultural authenticity. The Arab

Spring, in contrast, represented a movement spearheaded by mostly-secularly oriented youth who rejected jihadi arguments that change could only come about through violence. The failure of these peaceful movements to bring about the increased freedoms and opportunity sought by the demonstrators has inadvertently strengthened the arguments of those who claim violence is the answer. The Islamic

21 State represents the latest and most extreme Islamist attempt to create an alternative to the secular rulers who have dominated their countries for so long.

Islamic Resistance

Contemporary scholarship frames the rise and evolution of both political

Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the spread of Islamic terror groups such as al-Qa’ida and Islamic State as reactions to entrenched authoritarian and monarchical rule in the Arab World. Early post-colonial rulers such as Gamal

Nasser, Habib Bourguiba, and Hafez al-Assad attempted to impose new ideologies—

Pan-Arabism, nationalism, and Ba’athism—as part of their state-building projects.

Secular ideologies were tools to help legitimate these new rulers, who came from minority or outsider groups and ruled new states. Ernest Renan (1994) describes a nation as “un âme, un principe spiritual” that exists among a people with a shared heritage of glory…” (17) The new states such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or Libya had none of these, instead grouping together competing sects and tribes within borders drawn by European colonists. State-imposed nationalism, backed up by military force, became a tool for state building and a means for rulers to maintain control.

Arab intellectuals underpinned this new identity by resurrecting ancient histories of pharaonic Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Phoenicia that Muslim scholars had long dismissed.

The key ideological struggle in the Arab world during the decades following independence was thus between nationalism and pan-Arabism, rather than between nationalism and religion. In the first decades following independence, many observers 22 viewed political Islam as largely a spent force, tamed by rulers. Sociologist Peter

Bergen predicted in 1968 that religious believers would largely vanish as a political force by the twenty-first century (in Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011, 1). Ira Lapidus assessed in 1988 in his History of Islamic Societies “the capacity of Islam to symbolize social identity has been merged into national feeling” (887). These predictions failed to recognize the appeal of religion as an alternative schema once secular governments had proven themselves incapable of meeting their citizens’ needs. Nor did they recognize the potential backlash of rulers’ attempts to use religion to their own purposes.

Rulers repressed Islamic political movements, such as the Muslim

Brotherhood, while manipulating Islamic symbolism to reinforce their claim to legitimacy. Saudi monarchs claimed the title “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,” and richly rewarded clerical supporters for their support. Kings of Jordan and

Morocco stressed their direct descent from the Prophet Mohammad. Egyptian

President Anwar Sadat built thousands of mosques, adopted a new first name of

“Muhammad” and declared himself the “Believer President” (Mandaville 2014, 105).

After Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was driven from , he added Allah Akbar

(“God is Great”) to the Iraqi flag and launched a program to send Ba’athists for

Islamic legal training. Atwan’s (2006, 328) assertion that Hussein also sought al-

Qa’ida for support against an anticipated U.S. invasion remains unsupported. It is clear, however, that many of the Ba’athists trained in Hussein’s Islamization program became jihadis, including Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

23 Toft, Philpot and Shah (2011) argue leaders’ efforts to promote state-captured versions of Islam while banning potential religious opponents instead gave credibility to repressed organizations. By claiming Islam as a foundation for their rule, leaders inadvertently legitimized religion as a contemporary political yardstick and highlighted their own breaks with Islamic teachings on justice. Their attempts to eliminate alternative means of religious expression further alienated believers, while giving repressed groups additional popular credibility as martyrs to injustice. To the degree a regime succeeded in eliminating the moderate Islamic parties that might publicly challenge its actions, it also eliminated a non-violent option for angry young opponents who might then become more likely to seek more radical underground groups.

Rulers’ failures fuelled the search for alternative answers in religion. Repeated

Arab defeats by , Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and Iraq’s defeats in two Gulf left claims of Arab strength and unity sounding hollow. Meanwhile, frustration with

Arab governments’ corruption, repression, and inability to meet the needs of their growing population undercut their popular support. Moaddel (2005) argues the failure of secular ideologies to meet citizens’ material needs or provide a sense of belonging fuelled the emergence of Islamic movements as the primary opposition forces in Arab states. Kepel (1993) describes religious renewal as a profound emotional reaction to national and regional decline. The Islamic Revolution in Iran demonstrated religion’s power in inspiring and motivating political action, inspiring Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood who had labored for decades to build mass support.

24 ’s ability to gain worldwide press and unacceptably raise the costs to U.S. involvement in Lebanon, bombing U.S. diplomatic and military facilities and kidnapping U.S. nationals, provided a later model for Bin Laden’s program to drive the U.S. from the Muslim World (Kepel 2002; Kepel and Milelli; Bergen 2006).

Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood

Primary schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna founded the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood in 1928 with only six members, nine years after the Egyptian

Revolution. Al-Banna sought to purify Egyptian society from the Western influences he saw as the legacy of European colonialism. Al-Banna’s primary focus was on education and social welfare projects, but he did occasionally countenance violence in support of his group’s aims. Al-Banna identified with the Arabs fighting the Jewish influx into the British Mandate of Palestine and called on his followers to join the jihad against colonial occupiers of Muslim lands. Al-Banna sent his followers to fight against Jewish forces during the 1936 Palestinian revolt and the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948. Mitchell’s (1969) description of the Muslim Brotherhood’s early years portrays a group that is willing to use violence, particularly against non-Muslim rulers, but also is willing to compromise with the government to achieve its larger aims.

This willingness to work with authority and negotiate a political space for

Brotherhood operations remained characteristic of the group in subsequent decades.

Indeed, Brown (2012b) finds substantial evidence that Islamist parties such as the

Brotherhood maximized opportunities by shifting focus between social projects and 25 political activity according to the openness of regime-controlled elections. Brown and

Hamid (2014) demonstrate the Muslim Brotherhood also deliberately ran candidates for fewer seats than they could capture to avoid threatening either the regime or secular rivals.

Survey of jihadis’ writings finds they draw heavily on the works of Muslim

Brotherhood ideologist Sayyid al-Qutb, although the Muslim Brotherhood itself has formally rejected al-Qutb’s call for jihad (McCants 2006). Al-Qutb in turn based his work on the writings of the medieval scholar Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Tamiyyah

(1263-1368) and contemporary scholars such as Indian theorist Abul Ala Maududi

(1903-1979). Al-Qutb adapted Ibn Taymiyyah’s fourteenth century rulings justifying resistance to the Mongol conquerors to claim that Nasser, too, was an unbeliever who should be resisted. Nasser’s secularization program threatened the Muslim faith of his people, whose true interests could only be served by a return to the caliphate. Calvert

(2013) details how al-Qutb hardened his views on jihad and violence while jailed by the Nasser regime, coming to believe the post-colonial Arab regimes were as un-

Islamic as their Western predecessors. For al-Qutb, the fight against these regimes qualified as self-defense, and thus justified violence. Manmade forms of government

—whether kingdoms, democracies, republics or dictatorships—were illegitimate and should be resisted. The world was divided into only two zones—Dar al-Islam (the lands of Islam) and Dar al-Harb, the lands of war and apostasy. Compromise between the two opposing zones was impossible and heretical, since no human has the right to compromise God’s plan for his people (McCants 2006; Euben 1999; Kepel 2002;

26 Haddad 1983; Sivan 1985). Al-Qutb’s protégé Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, executed in 1982 for his role in President Sadat’s assassination, built on al-Qutb’s argument to insist that all Muslims must fight for the creation of a universal Islamic

State (Sageman 2004; Euben 1999; Habeck 2006).

The idea of a Caliphate is central to the idea of Islamic government, since

Mohammad himself was the first Caliph and the rule of Mohammad and his first three successors was seen as the most righteous. Habeck (2006) notes that many jihadis list

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 as the end of

“true” Islam (11). Sayyid (2014) posits that the caliphate is a metaphor in Muslim dialogue, representing lost power and glory, as well as a rejection of Western- influenced institutions. Macías-Amoretti (2015) writes the caliphate is synonymous, in the public view, with moral and legitimate government. Kepel (2002) describes it as a symbol of Muslim spiritual unity, representing a larger Muslim nation that transcended Western-drawn political borders. The foibles and fecklessness of many historical caliphs appears to have made no dent in utopian expectations for the institution. McLeod and Hairgrove (2008) found that a majority of the Muslims polled supported the ideal of a single caliphate that unified the Islamic world, and that this support transcended both ethnic and national affiliations and ideological orientations.

The Islamists’ understanding of religion as an alternative organizing principle to national ties underpins the religious challenge to the contemporary state in the

Arab world. Juergensmeyer (2008) argues nationalism and religion both function as 27 “ideologies of order,” providing adherents with coherent worldviews, as well as the authority for violence. Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011) similarly portray religion as an emotional and organizing force that can bind adherents across space in a temporal and imagined community. Euben (1999) notes that the failure of Arab states to deliver opportunity to their peoples undercuts the appeal of nationalism, creating new support for an ideology that harkens back to a golden age. Kepel (2002) describes al-Qutb’s program as a deliberate effort to supplant nationalism with his puritanical version of

Islam, dismissing nations, flags, elected parliaments, and contemporary rulers as

“idols.”

Several scholars have explored the interrelationship between medieval and modern ideas in Islamist ideology. Sivan (1985) notes the modern importance to

Islamic revivalists of historic figures and events: the Prophet’s acts, early Islamic military victories, Saladin’s victories against European Crusaders, and more. Sivan describes the Islamic revival as a reassertion of culture, as well as faith. He describes contemporary Islamic political movements as a reaction to the sense that Islam had been isolated from believers’ daily lives and that they needed to return to their faith to more fully assert their own identities. Such perceptions reflected both alienation from a seemingly foreign and hostile modern global system and oppression by rulers who limited freedom of speech, association, and information. Kepel (2002) ties ’s appeal to its promise of social justice, describing Islamists’ vision as utopian from the first (6).

28 Kepel (1993; 2002), Euben (1999), Wagemakers (2012), Sivan (1985) and

Lahoud (2010) document the many ways these new Islamic movements represented breaks with traditional Islam, despite their proponents’ claim of authenticity.

Traditional ulema (religious leaders), focused on personal devotion and piety, rather than politics, and generally trained in madrassas (Islamic academies) or Islamic universities such as al-Azhar. In contrast, this new group of Islamic leaders first pursued secular careers. This trend holds true across multiple Islamist and Salafi movements. Al-Banna and al-Qutb trained as public schoolteachers. Usama Bin

Laden trained as a civil engineer and Ayman al-Zawahiri as an eye surgeon. Indeed,

Gambetta and Hertog (2016) found that 46.5 percent of Arab Islamic militants have university educations—a finding that becomes even more striking given the comparatively low percentage of Arab youth who attend university. Islamist programs reflected influences from the very philosophies they rejected as alien, particularly in their tactics and strategy. Al-Banna’s concept of the Muslim

Brotherhood as a vanguard meant to educate and lead the masses, for example, reflects Leninist organizational concepts, while Islamic State military tactics reflect

Soviet influences (Nance 2015; 2016).

The Islamists’ program would, if implemented, transform Islamic scholar’s role from supporting the ruler to becoming the most powerful element within government, as the sole individuals capable of implementing and enforcing shari’a law. This represents a break from centuries of Sunni tradition, in which Islamic scholars advised rulers, rather than ruled themselves. Kepel (2002) interprets this

29 vision of Islamic modernity as a “complete and total blend” of society, culture, religion, and politics—something that aims to erase not only Western ideas of the separation of mosque and state but the many localized cultures and traditions influencing Muslim’s daily lives. Hegghammer (2010) describes an associated ideology, pan-Islamism, as the view that all members of the Muslim community, or umma, were responsible for protecting each in times of crisis, such as foreign invasion. According to this ideology, national borders and differences of tribe, ethnic group, or nation were irrelevant to a Muslim’s primary duty to the umma.

Modern Islamic political movements evolved in multiple directions. The

Muslim Brotherhood, including multiple offshoots outside Egypt, focused on developing mass support through education and social service programs. Kandil

(2015), Mitchell (1969), Pargeter (2013) and Wickham all describe a hierarchical system in which potential members are vetted, tested, and constantly reevaluated as they rise through the organization. Periodic regime crackdowns, often involving the arrests of hundreds or thousands of members, shaped the party’s internal culture.

Leaders stressed secrecy, loyalty, discipline, and long-term planning. Hamid (2014) observed the Brotherhood adapted to its environment by seeking only gradual, incremental change, privileging self-preservation and consensus over rapid gains.

Party leaders forswore violence in the 1970s, concluding the resultant crackdowns cost the party more than any potential gain.

Hamid (2014) concluded from extensive interviews with Muslim Brotherhood leaders that they saw themselves as permanent fixtures in society making slow, but

30 inevitable generational progress to transform their communities into Islamic societies.

Their program was evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. The Muslim Brotherhood recognizes national boundaries, favors working through democratic means, and has repeatedly collaborated with secular, Christian, and Shi’a groups in pressing for regime reform (Rajan 2015). Lahoud (2010) describes the Muslim Brotherhood as having tacitly compromised the idea of a universal caliphate in favor of a modern nationalism comprising the current international order of nation states, albeit with some version of shari’a providing the legal framework within each Muslim state.

Meanwhile, the , founded in the nineteenth century in reaction to the spread of Western ideas, gained millions of new supporters in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Salafis advocate a return to the society and mores of the salaf, or companions of the Prophet Mohammad, arguing these first

Muslims provide the best example for emulation. Salafis recognize only the original texts of Islam—the Qur’an and Hadith, or actions of the Prophet—throwing out centuries of Islamic jurisprudence. They reject perceived innovations in faith, including the traditions of Sufi, Shi’a, and other branches of Islam, as well as the construction of elaborate tombs. ’s official version of Islam, popularly known outside the Kingdom as Wahhabiism, is a branch of Salifism. Meijer (2009a;

2009b), notes Salafis’ distinctive dress, strict laws of behavior, and tendency to form close-knit communities are particularly attractive to young Muslims outside the

Kingdom, who assert a Salafi identity to differentiate themselves from an older

“corrupt and lax” generation (15).

31 Schielke (2015), too, describes young Egyptians turning to Salafism as an escape from the boredom and anomie of their lives. Schielke, who did ethnographic fieldwork in rural and poor urban Egyptian neighborhoods, argues Salafism is strikingly similar to nineteenth- and twentieth-century positivist movements that stressed experience, rather than textual learning. Unlike traditional Islamic jurisprudence, which required decades of study to master, Salafis believe the Qur’an and Hadith are self-explanatory, accessible to any believer. One demonstrates one’s piety and gains status in the Salafi community through how one’s actions reflect understanding of God’s commandments, rather than through formal religious training.

Lahoud (2010) describes a resulting split between traditional Islamic scholars and the new Salafi revival movements that allowed individuals to serve God directly.

By lowering the bar to membership, Salafism thus offered adherents a promise of a future paradise in the next world and a chance for meaning, status, and companionship in the present. As Salafism spread in recent decades, its influence affected even uncommitted youth, shaping a popular religious revival and a return to veiling among many young women. This resurgence of outward manifestations of piety reflected multiple social currents: a reassertion of identity, a rejection of the

West and foreign influences, a search for meaning and independence, or a desire to fit in with peers. Spiegel (2015) notes that Salafi groups specifically target youth seeking direction and meaning, providing them not only with spiritual rewards but the opportunity to gain status as organizers and proselytizers within Salafi parties.

32 While all Salafi movements shun innovations in Islamic practice, and advocate the establishment of governments based on shari’a, their strategies for pursuing these goals varies widely. Wiktorowicz (2006) categorizes the many Salafi groups into three currents, differentiated by strategy rather than goal. Purists focus on fostering personal piety among followers, refraining as much as possible from involvement in corrupt societies and politics. These Salafi groups generally preach obedience to temporal rulers. The second group, political Salafis, seek to promote shari’a law through non-violent political engagement. Finally, Salafi jihadis argue that engagement with corrupt and un-Islamic political systems is futile and that believers are instead obligated to pursue violence to ensure the return of the caliphate.

The Evolution of Modern Jihad

Government repression under Egyptian presidents Nasser and Sadat, together with successive Arab military defeats by Israel, convinced many Muslim Brotherhood members and political Salafis to abandon long-term reform programs in favor of violent revolution. Kepel (1993; 2002) details the rise of a younger generation of

Brothers who, jailed and tortured by the Egyptian regime, sought to punish both the government and society for their sins. This group, strongly influenced by al-Qutb’s prison writings, asserted the right to target those they determined to be apostates.

Kepel (1993; 2002) describes the rise of violent Brotherhood spin-offs as also the product of generational changes. Youth with no memories of the anti-colonial fight rejected both nationalist ideologies and the governments that had proven themselves incapable of either defeating Israel or providing just rule. Unprecedented 33 numbers of young Egyptians attended universities with active branches of the Muslim

Brotherhood and Salafi groups such as the Gama’at al-Islamiyyah (“Islamic Group”).

Millions more were exposed to conservative Salafi teachings while working in Saudi

Arabia or attending one of the thousands of mosques and schools built throughout the region with Saudi money after the 1970s oil boom. Influence flowed both ways, as

Egyptian Muslim Brothers fleeing Nasser and Sadat’s security services took teaching positions in Saudi Arabia. Nishino (2015) and Wright (2006) document the formative role Sayyid al-Qutb’s brother, Mohammad al-Qutb, had on many young Saudis, including Usama Bin Laden, during his years teaching at Jeddah’s King Abd al-Aziz

University. Nishino documents the roots of al-Qutb’s teachings, including such classic anti-Semitic literature as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Wright (2006) notes Bin Laden also regularly attended al-Qutb’s weekly public lectures, participating in discussions afterwards on how to combat the perceived Western threat to Islam.

Hegghammer (2010) details how such overlapping Islamist links shaped the

Arab response to the Soviet invasion of . Egyptian militants such as

Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman al-Zawahiri saw Afghanistan as an opportunity for jihadis to gain military experience for later use against their own governments.

Egyptian Muslim Brothers also sought to gain international status by supporting the

Afghan mujahedin, using preexisting links to Afghan mujahedin who had studied at

Cairo’s al-Azhar University to broker introductions with Saudi financiers.

Meanwhile, Saudi leaders viewed the invasion as an opportunity to assert leadership

34 in the Islamic world, coordinating military and humanitarian aid to embattled

Afghans. The Saudis also paid the salary for another al-Azhar graduate and Abd al-

Aziz professor, Palestinian Abdullah Azzam, who was entrusted with the job of mobilizing Arab support for the mujahedin.

Azzam’s argument that all Muslims were personally and individually required to protect other Muslims from non-Muslim occupation represented a paradigm shift.

Hegghammer (2010) explores the differences between previous jihadi movements’ focus on revolutionary change in their own countries and Azzam’s new doctrine.

Azzam’s assertion that Muslims’ primary loyalty was to the community of believers undermined the concept of individual Muslim nation states and implicitly posited a universal Muslim struggle against non-Muslim rulers in any country with Muslim inhabitants. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the initial focus, but Azzam’s doctrine could equally be applied to Palestine, Kashmir, , or Chinese

Xinjiang. Moghadam (2008) argues it also was Azzam who also revived the idea of martyrdom as something glorious and posited that the ultimate goal of jihad should be the restoration of the caliphate.

Azzam’s definition of the commitment as a fard ayn, or personal obligation, further implied that each and every capable Muslim was obligated to join or support the jihad. Hegghammer (2010) attributes the lasting power of Azzam’s doctrine’s to its justification of private individual’s decision to engage in foreign battles on their own initiative. A second factor important in later struggles such as Bosnia, Iraq, and

Syria is that it played to individuals’ desire to see themselves as acting morally,

35 rescuing oppressed civilians. Jihadi propaganda played to such motives, focusing on pictures of suffering women and children in need of rescue.

The Afghan War transformed the jihadi movement. Coll (2004) and Soufan

(2011) provide the most comprehensive accounts of the evolution of the “Afghan

Arabs” from foreign fighter to terrorist. The jihadis were convinced they alone had driven the Soviets from Afghanistan, beginning the chain of events that ended in the dissolution of the . If they could defeat one superpower, why not the other? What was to stop them from overthrowing the apostate regimes ruling Muslim territories? The Islamic Revolution in Iran had proven it was possible to oust even a ruler with strong security forces and U.S. backing. In the period immediately following the Soviet withdrawal, the Afghan Arabs cast about for a new direction.

Many returned home, launching terror campaigns in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, and elsewhere. Usama Bin Laden and his closest allies remained in , Pakistan, casting about for a larger goal. Should the jihad continue in Afghanistan against the surviving Communist regime, or move on to Kashmir, Chechnya, Chechnya, or

Jerusalem?

Kepel (2002) and Atwan (2006) detail how the First provided Bin

Laden’s circle with new direction and motivation. Islamists, who had been united in opposition to the Soviet occupation, were forced to choose whether to support the

Iraqi aggressor or a non-Muslim force on Muslim lands. Saddam Hussein played to this audience, declaring Kuwait an illegitimate Western puppet and having himself filmed prostrate in prayer on a Kuwaiti beach. The Saudi Government’s implicit

36 acknowledgement that it could not protect its territories without outside help, followed by the rapid U.S. destruction of the , demonstrated the West’s military superiority over Islamic forces. Many Salafis, including Bin Laden, believed

Riyadh’s invitation to non-Muslims to deploy near the two holiest sites in Islam constituted apostasy. Bin Laden revived Azzam’s call for jihad, declaring his organizations of Afghan War veterans would serve as the “Base of Jihad”-- al-Qa’ida al-Jihad.

Rudner (2013) explores the strategy driving al-Qa’ida’s terrorism, drawing on published al-Qa’ida internal documents. Al-Qa’ida leaders intended their organization to serve as the ideological center for a worldwide network of jihadi cells. This Islamic vanguard was to attack the U.S., as the “center of disbelief,” in order to drive the U.S. from the region and inspire the Muslim masses. An initial “Awakening” phase, beginning with the August 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, would polarize Muslim-Western nations and inspire new recruits. In later phases, growing jihadi forces would seize power in Muslim nations, confront the non-Muslim world, and eventually establish a global Caliphate. This order of operations reflected a policy victory by Bin Laden over colleagues such as al-Zawahiri and Libyan

Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) leader Benotman, who favored first targeting the

“near enemy,” the authoritarian leaders ruling their home countries. Ryan (2013) and

Atwan (2006) draw from Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and other al-Qa’ida leaders’ writings to establish the group’s focus went beyond merely eliminating the West’s

37 physical presence in the Muslim World, extending to purging the region of its cultural influences as well.

Al-Qa’ida leaders justified their violent campaign by insisting only violent revolution could succeed in overthrowing the “apostate” and oppressive governments ruling Muslim states. Peaceful change within the system, as proposed by the Muslim

Brotherhood, was impossible given the overwhelming U.S. military and economic support given to national security services. Lynch (2010) details how this split between al-Qa’ida and the Muslim Brotherhood emerged in the mid-1990s as the primary ideological cleavage within the Islamic community. Both groups operated globally, with branches throughout the Muslim World and in expatriate communities in the West. Both sought to develop mass support, focusing primarily on Muslim youth. Each claimed a program that would revive Muslim glory and ultimately lead to the establishment of a single caliphate.

Muslim Brotherhood leaders formally rejected Qutb’s call for revolution in

1969, aiming instead to position the group in the popular mainstream. The

Brotherhood participated in rigged elections, seeking a voice in civil society and legislatures and pressing regimes to expand democratic institutions. Brotherhood leaders denounced al-Qa’ida’s mass casualty attacks as un-Islamic, noting most victims were Muslim. They sought to differentiate themselves from jihadi groups, arguing terrorism gave regimes the pretext for expanding repression. Al-Qa’ida leaders, in turn, argue Muslims are commanded to avoid contact with corrupt systems. They denounce the Brotherhood’s participation in elections and legislatures

38 as apostasy that reinforces regimes’ false claims to legitimacy and undercuts popular support for jihad. Despite the ideological confrontation between group leaders, the

Muslim Brotherhood also served as a potential recruiting pool for al-Qa’ida, which woos younger Brotherhood members impatient with the group’s tight internal discipline and focus on slow, incremental progress over generations.

Strategic divisions within al-Qa’ida itself widened after the , when organizational momentum shifted from the central leadership to affiliates in Iraq, Yemen, and North Africa. Al-Qa’ida members and affiliates questioned Bin Laden’s insistence on prioritizing attacks on the “far enemy,” the

United States. For affiliates, local targets—including not only national governments, but tribal and political rivals—were more salient. Brown (2007) argues affiliates’ eagerness to exploit local issues, including tribal rivalries in Yemen and , clashed with al-Qa’ida leaders’ vision of a global pan-Islamic movement. Brown argues the focus on targeting the United States also alienated previous allies, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which had no interest in fighting targets other than Qadhafi. This tension over strategic direction grew more intense after 2003, with the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the emergence of a new center of jihad.

Building the Islamic State in Iraq

Accounts of the Islamic State’s evolution to 2011 are largely consistent. All trace the evolution of the Islamic State from the jihadi splinter group, Jamaat al-

Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (JTWJ) launched in Iraq by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Hosken 39 (2015) and Wagemaker (2012) detail al-Zarqawi’s formative relationship with leading Salafi jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi while serving time together in Jordan’s al-Jafr prison in the late 1990s. Stern and Berger (2015) describe

Maqdisi--who expanded the concept of takfir to Shia’s and even observant Sunnis who support “unIslamic” governments--as al-Maqdisi’s “spiritual father.” Stern and

Berger (2015) also note al-Zarqawi’s apparent exposure during this period to the writings of another jihadi ideologue, Abu Musab al-Suri. Al-Suri wrote of an apocalyptic struggle against “Persians” (Shi’a) and “Crusaders” (Christians) which would initiate the millennium. By the time al-Zarqawi was released and traveled to

Pakistan to offer his services to al-Qa’ida, he already had adapted a new and more brutal doctrine that alienated even Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri

(Hosken 2015; Napoleoni 2014; Warrick 2015; Burke 2015; Weiss and Hassan 2015).

Multiple authors also give overlapping accounts of al-Zarqawi’s troubled relationship with al-Qa’ida. The differences were both personal and ideological. Zelin

(2014b), reports that Bin Laden distrusted al-Zarqawi from the start. Where Bin

Laden and al-Zawahiri were educated professionals from the upper class, al-Zarqawi was a tattooed former street thug who could barely write his own name. Moreover, al-

Zarqawi made no secret of his intention to first wage jihad against Shi’as and local autocrats, rather than the Western targets favored by Bin Laden. Hosken (2015) and

McCant’s (2015) speculation that Bin Laden’s Syrian-born mother was Shi’a could, if true, further explain Bin Laden’s resistance to al-Zarqawi who, even then, was pressing for an anti-Shi’a jihad.

40 Despite these differences, al-Zarqawi leveraged his contacts in Syria to gain al-Qa’ida’s support in launching JWTJ, which became al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) after he pledged loyalty to Bin Laden in 2004. Hafez (2010) notes al-Zarqawi significantly expanded al-Qa’ida’s operational understanding of legitimate targets. In addition to actual members of the “apostate” government, AQI targeted any Iraqi who gave aid

“by word of mouth” or “assisted enemy in any way;” essentially defining anyone not directly supporting their group as a legitimate target (30-31). Al-Zarqawi and his successors also continued to prioritize attacks on Shi’as, deliberately targeting Shi’a mosques and holy sites in an effort to spark sectarian warfare. McCants (2015b) provides a detailed account of the tactical, strategic, and ideological differences that emerged between al-Zarqawi and al-Qa’ida leaders after 2003, when he led his followers into Iraq to fight U.S. forces. Working from captured al-Qa’ida letters,

McCants documents a succession of al-Qa’ida directives reminding al-Zarqawi to focus on the U.S. target, rather than Iraqi Shi’as, and avoid excessive violence.

In “Buddies or Burdens: Understanding the al-Qaeda Relationship With Its

Affiliates,” Byman (2014) draws on organizational theory to compare al-Qa’ida and its affiliates with a business operating franchises. Byman notes that this relationship carries costs and benefits for both parties. As demonstrated by al-Zarqawi’s continued defiance of al-Qa’ida orders, al-Qa’ida had little day-to-day control over the actions of its affiliate in Iraq. Byman’s study, one of the few projects researching terrorist group alliances, found that the relationship supported al-Qa’ida’s view of its role as the vanguard of the Islamic community. Al-Zawahiri and his successors’ role in the

41 was thus a double-edged sword. Al-Qa’ida’s public “brand,” its appeal to the Muslim population, was at risk when fighters using its name massacred Shi’as or even Sunni Muslims who refused fealty to al-Zarqawi. At the same time, the parent group gained media attention from its Iraqi affiliate’s attacks on U.S. forces, and gained access to new recruits inspired to fight Western forces occupying a Muslim land. Letters recovered from Bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad in 2011 show he was deeply concerned over what Brown (2010) termed “brand drift,” and had seriously considered changing al-Qa’ida’s name to mark a break with this wanton violence (Joscelyn 2015c).

The consensus among counterterrorism scholars is that the U.S. invasion of

Iraq in 2003 both gave al-Qa’ida new energy, reinforcing its call for volunteers to fight to protect Islamic lands from “U.S. crusaders” and allowed al-Zarqawi the chance to implement his brutal agenda. As Haykel (2010) notes, the invasion met every one of Azzam’s requirements for a “defensive jihad,” thus requiring foreign

Muslims to come to their co-religionists’ rescue. Weiss and Hassan (2015) and Nance

(2015) introduce another element in the growth of Zarqawi’s group: a cadre of former members of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party, who had been fired from their jobs in the Iraqi military and bureaucracy on the orders of U.S. Nance (2015) provides the most comprehensive account to date of the evolution of former members of Saddam’s regime into allies of al-Qa’ida and, later, important figures in the Islamic State.

Following Zarqawi’s death in 2006, Iraqi members—including several former

Ba’athists—gained prominence in the group. McCants (2015a; 2015b) makes the 42 important point that these individuals’ background as members of the secular Ba’ath

Party does not necessarily mean they were less committed to the Islamic State’s ideological program. By placing young supporters in Salafi schools, Saddam Hussein inadvertently created a new cadre of fervent believers, including the sui dissant caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Arendt (1951/1968) and Hoffer (1951) further note devoted followers of one totalitarian movement often prove ready converts for another. These new members with Ba’athist backgrounds brought to AQI their expertise in intelligence, counterintelligence, organizational management, and conventional military tactics. Stern (2013) describes the Iraq War as a “school” for new jihadis, while Fishman and Felter (2007) documented the war was attracting youth from new recruiting pools in North Africa.

Despite these reinforcements, AQI failed in its attempt to transform itself after

2006 into an “Islamic State in Iraq,” governing seized territories according to its own brutal interpretations of shari’a. McCants (2015b) documents how the group largely collapsed, providing al-Qa’ida leadership with an object lesson of the dangers of attempting to hold territory before the “far enemy” has been driven from the region.

The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and the subsequent misgovernment by Iraq’s then-Prime Minister Malaki changed the equation. Without the U.S. presence, the jihad was transformed into a struggle between Sunni rebels and a repressive Shi’a

Government.

43 The Missing Ingredient

This thesis argues the rebirth of the Islamic State in Iraq after the U.S. withdrawal was not, alone, sufficient to have allowed the group to evolve beyond the borders of Iraq. Nor would a jihad against the Shia-dominated Iraqi Government have drawn an unprecedented number of foreign fighters from around the globe. Instead, events outside Iraq and not directly related to the group’s activities created a set of openings that the group was able to exploit.

The Arab Spring, a cascading series of popular demonstrations, began in

Tunisia in December 2010 and eventually spread to every country in the Arab World.

In most of these countries, the demonstrators were quickly either coopted or repressed, but six nations were impacted more dramatically. Tunisian President Zine

El Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian President were ousted by their militaries after millions of demonstrators took to the street protesting corruption.

Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi was ousted and killed after an armed popular uprising and NATO intervention. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh held on for nearly a year, but eventually stepped aside in a brokered agreement. Meanwhile,

Syria slid into civil war as President Bashir Assad’s forces attempted to stamp out what began as a peaceful pro-reform movement. Demonstrators in a sixth country,

Bahrain, were put down with the help of Saudi forces.

The results of the Arab Spring largely support structuralist theories that identify regime strength and unity as the key factor in determining a revolution’s success. Skocpol and Goodwin’s (2004) argument that sultanic regimes—narrow,

44 personalistic authoritarian states--are most vulnerable to social revolution appears born out. Five of the six regimes that fell or faced significant challenges fit this mold.

The regimes most directly affected by the Arab Spring—Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,

Yemen, and Syria, all fit the description of sultanic regimes with notable corruption and increasingly narrow bases. Hale’s (2013) observation, that successions are moments of particular vulnerability for sultanic regimes, is salient. Geriatric leaders who were grooming sons or relatives as successors ruled four of these five states; in the fifth, Bashar al-Assad already had succeeded his father. Leaders’ relationship to their militaries proved crucial to their survival. In the two cases where the military broke with the leader—Tunisia and Egypt—the leaders were ousted and security forces survived as significant influences in follow-on regimes. In the three other countries where the military split along sectarian or tribal—Libya, Syria, and Yemen

—the countries devolved into extended violence and civil war.

Structural theory thus largely predicted the eventual outcome in which the millions of Tunisians, Egyptians, and others who risked their lives to demand the ouster of authoritarian rulers had minimal say in the ultimate outcome. By Skocpol’s definition of a revolution, the fundamental change of the structure of authority in a nation, all the revolutions except Tunisia’s must be classified as failed (Skocpol

1979). Judging from the goals of the youth who spearheaded the demonstrations, however, even Tunisia has failed to deliver. Honwana (2013), Wright (2009),

Dhillon, Dyer and Yousef (2009) and Collins (2011) document that Tunisian youth demonstrated against unemployment, corruption, and censorship, rather than

45 specifically for democracy. Lynch (2012), Noueihed and Warren (2012), Brownlee

(2015), Weyland (2012) and many others note the revolts were driven by broad opposition coalition that represented an unprecedented range of interests within their societies, but lacked the cohesion needed to command obedience or negotiate for the opposition with the regime.

Wendy Pearlman (2013) documents that emotions played a critical role in driving the Arab Spring demonstrations. Pearlman quotes a range of participants to argue that a need for this transformational experience, rather than rational choice, accounted for their decisions to risk their lives and join demonstrations even after regimes began killing participants. Reed (2004) similarly theorized that moral outrage, moral indignation, and revulsions drive popular rejection of previously accepted regimes. Reed divides “delegitimizing” events into three categories: those driven by the state itself, those instigated by revolutionaries, and “contingent accelerators”—unexpected events with deep moral and emotional significance.

Through this lens, Bouazizi’s suicide provided that decisive moment in triggering pent-up anger because it captured and vividly expressed the frustrations of millions of his compatriots. Eric Selbin (2010) convincingly argues that revolutions are about passionate commitment, more than about the specifics of power transfer. The Arab

Spring uprisings fit this model.

These accounts also dovetail with Filiu’s (2011) account of a new popular

Arab interest in millennialism. Filiu notes a surge of popular Arab-language writings and discussion of an approaching end of the world, fuelled by the September 11, 2001

46 attacks and the . McCants (2015b) notes participants in the Arab

Spring demonstrations adapted this framework for their experiences, alleging

Mubarak was the anti-Christ and claiming to have seen the Mahdi (messiah) at Tahrir

Square. McCants also draws from recent Gallop polls to establish a majority of

Muslims polled expected the Mahdi’s return within their own lifetimes, while media reports indicate many interpreted Arab Spring events as signs of the End Times (Fathi

2011). Sprinzak, Ariel, and Ne’eman (2002) document a close historical link between apocalyptic expectations and violence, finding individuals who expect an imminent end of the world frequently have participated in violence against members of their society perceived as “impure.”

Kaplan’s (2002; 2010) analysis of doomsday cults and “fifth wave” terror groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army finds significant a significant overlap in members’ motivations and worldview. Kaplan’s observation that these groups are more likely to resort to violence when state power is used to suppress religious or political belief is particularly salient in Tunisia where generations of rulers, influenced by French traditions of laïcisme, have attempted to marginalize Islam’s role in politics. Marks’ (2013) characterization of an anarchic element within the new

Salafi jihadi movements in Tunisia, with individuals seeking to strike out at established institutions and authorities, dovetails with Kaplan’s findings. Meanwhile,

Kazimi’s (2008) observation of the continued emotional appeal of the caliphate to modern Muslims is salient, given that the caliphate represents both past glory and a necessary prelude to the millennium.

47 The Arab Spring and the subsequent counterrevolutions and civil wars fostered the spread of Salafi jihadi activity. Thousands of jihadis released from jail during or after the revolts regrouped and founded new jihadi factions. The Muslim

Brotherhood took power in Egypt and a similar Islamic group, Ennhada, led the ruling coalition in Tunisia. Both governments sought to differentiate themselves from their predecessors, allowing Salafi jihadi groups to openly recruit and organize from

2011 until mid-2013, when each reinstituted controls after domestic terror attacks.

Neither these governments nor the embattled new regimes in Libya or Yemen had full control of their military or security forces.

Tribal insurgents in Syria, Sinai, Yemen, and Libya soon asserted control over local territories, creating a vacuum later filled by Salafi jihadi groups. Thousands of tons of weapons looted from abandoned Libyan arms depots reinforced jihadis’ ability to hold captured territories. Arsenault and Bacon, Khalaf (2015), Kilcullen

(2009), Baylouny (2010), and Revkin (2013) document how jihadis established themselves as de facto rulers of newly ungoverned territories, offering inhabitants a degree of protection and stability in return for their obedience. Sabry’s (2015) seminal account of the transformation of the Sinai Peninsula to a jihadi bastion paints the most comprehensive picture available of the overlapping regional impact of prison releases, regime contraction, an influx of smuggled weapons, and the rise of

Salafi courts.

Youth disappointment and disillusionment in the wake of the failed revolutions also played a significant role in fuelling radicalization. Magdy, Darwish,

48 and Weber (2015) found that individuals tweeting support for the Islamic State were highly likely to have previously tweeted disappointment with the results of the Arab

Spring uprisings. Honwana (2013), and Schielke (2015) document growing alienation among the youth who had spearheaded the 2011 uprisings. Economic conditions and unemployment—factors that had first fueled the uprisings—continued to decline in the months and years following the uprisings. Gambetta and Hertog (2016) describe university graduate under- and unemployment—the same factor that contributed to the Arab Spring—as a driving force behind jihadi recruiting. If so, the economic decline which followed the failed revolutions would further contribute to alienation and radicalization. Meanwhile, McCants and Meserole (2016) find a direct correlation between increased youth unemployment and urbanization—which increased in the aftermath of the uprisings--and Sunni militancy. They found, further, that this association was particularly strong in Francophone countries such as Tunisia with a history of secular government.

There also appear to be dynamics intrinsic to the revolutionary process itself that contribute to radicalization. Zimmermann’s (1990) observation that successful revolutions are generally followed by disenchantment as the new regime faces overload in meeting raised expectations is salient. Schaebler (1999) argues failed revolutions inevitably leave a residue of deep social ambivalence that potentially threatens the common understanding that underpins society’s “imagined community”

(Anderson 1994). Most revolutions, successful or not, have led to periods of increased social violence, driven by the state, opposition groups, or both. 49 Stinchcombe’s (1999) portrayal of the post-revolutionary period as a time of deep and widespread uncertainties, with groups jostling for power and losers questioning their position in the new state is salient. Stinchcombe notes the aftermaths of revolutions usually are more deadly than the revolutions themselves, as factions jostle to establish their positions in the new order.

Scholarship on radicalization supports the argument that the repression following the Arab Spring created a new pool of potential terrorist recruits. Arquilla,

Ronfeldt, and Zanini (1999) note the appeal of terrorism, particularly apocalyptic religious movements, lies in the promise of destroying an unacceptable present in favor of a utopian future. Hoffer’s (1951) finding that many who join revolutionary movements are driven by a need to transform their own lives is salient both to participants in the Arab Spring demonstrations and those who leave their home to join the Islamic State. Crenshaw in her seminal 1981 article “The Causes of Terrorism,” noted that support for terrorism often is triggered by a single, crystalizing incident or campaign of regime repression, which both reinforce individuals’ sense of powerlessness and provides a graphic example of regime injustice. Substantial evidence indicates a key step in the radicalization process is the individual’s arrival at the point where he or she believes violence is the sole means of achieving his or her goals (Stern 2003; Crenshaw 1981; Kruglanski et al. 2014; Sarangi and Alison 2005;

Louis 2009). Activists’ failure to achieve their goals by peaceful means during the

Arab Spring thus leaves them more open to terrorist recruiters’ arguments that only violence can succeed in overthrowing repressive regimes and creating a just society. 50 The brutal repression of the Assad regime provides additional fuel for recruitment, driving what Zimbardo (2007) describes as a need among radicalized youth to believe they are fighting for the moral good. Weiss and Hassan (2015) quote interviews with captured Islamic State members inspired by the groups’ promises to fight oppression and injustice. The emotional nature of the Arab Spring itself, moreover, heightened the psychological impact of renewed repression, leaving many youths desperate for new direction in their lives. Rice (2013) explored the aftermath of the Arab Spring, describing escalating terrorism as a response to individuals’ perceived impotence in the face of state violence. Rice argues for reframing discussion of terrorism to put emotions at the center of analysis, focusing on what terrorism offers recruits in terms of perceived identity, achievement, and social bonding.

Empirical evidence supports Rice’s premise. There is a jarring similarity between the descriptions Arab Spring participants used to describe their experiences and many of the statements made by Islamic State recruits. Both groups described emotional thrills, a reassertion of identity, a sudden discovery of meaning, and profound feelings of connection to a new “family” (Lynch 2012; Hassan 2014;

Winter 2015). Islamic State propaganda, meanwhile, plays to these needs. Winter’s

(2015) content analysis of Islamic State propaganda found the brutal images and threats popularly associated with the group made up only 19 of the 892 messages surveyed, or 2.13 percent of the total. Many more messages directed at potential targets stressed victimhood, belonging, individual achievement (including 51 celebrations of members who ‘achieved’ martyrdom), and the ongoing need for

Muslims to join the battle against evil. Olidort (2015), too, finds that the Islamic

Spring frames its propaganda to offer material and emotional rewards to potential recruits. Olidort applies game theory to argue the Islamic States’ recruiting success rests on its ability to manipulate Salafi value systems to convince individuals alienated from their own communities that joining the Islamic State is a rational solution to their problems.

Al-Qa’ida-sponsored Salafi jihadi cells initially gained ground in the wake of the Arab Spring, but the Islamic State’s more aggressive and youth-oriented agenda is better tailored to capture a new generation of alienated youth. The Islamic States’ leaders are a generation younger than the sexagenarian al-Zawahiri. Islamic State propaganda, using the same social media tools leveraged by Arab Spring activists, stresses its differences from al-Qa’ida. Winter (2015) documents how the Islamic

State tailors its propaganda to capture youth’s imaginations, promising an immediate opportunity to transform their lives for the better. Where al-Qa’ida envisions a project of generations before the caliphate can be created, the Islamic State promises immediate gratification. While al-Qa’ida targets rulers, the Islamic state already rules.

Haykel and Creswell and Hegghammer’s (2015) research exploring Islamic State poetry, music, and culture details a self-conscious effort to create an appealing youth counter-culture that, combined with offers of brides, excitement, and career advancement, promises to fill perceived holes in recruits’ lives.

52 Stern and Berger (2015) suggest, quite plausibly, that the Islamic State’s exploitation of social media was inspired by the social media successes of Arab

Spring activists, who used these to inspire unprecedented mass uprisings. Atwan

(2015) documents how the Islamic State has developed a professional cadre of web designers, filmmakers, and even computer game designers to support a constant flow of propaganda targeting the youth market. Berger (2015a; 2015b) notes how Islamic

State propagandists seek to isolate potential recruit, lavishing attention on these often- isolated youth, offering hijra (migration to the Islamic State) as the solution to their problems. Berger (2015a; 2015b) notes the potential emotional power of this ‘virtual intimacy’ on alienated youth, particularly when accompanied by the apocalyptic messages urging immediate action. These messages have been successful with youth far beyond the Arab Spring states. This thesis contends, however, that the unprecedented numbers of new recruits from Tunisia and Egypt suggests the Islamic

State’s appeal has a particular appeal for the youth of these countries in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

Putting Together The Pieces

This thesis rests on an extensive body of scholarship addressing the Arab

Spring, its aftermath, and the rise of the Islamic State. Holbrook (2012) and Lahoud

(2013) detailed al-Qa’ida’s efforts to regroup after the unanticipated uprisings. Aaron

Zelin (2012; 2013c; 2014a; 2015b) and Thomas Joscelyn (2012c; 2013b; 2014c;

2015a) produced dozens of papers documenting the rise of a new network of Salafi

53 groups known as Ansar al-Sharia (“Partisans of the Sharia”) and establishing that these groups were linked to al-Qa’ida. Gartenstein-Ross (2014) documented the roles released jihadi prisoners were playing in reviving Salafi jihadi movements across

North Africa and Syria. Richard Barrett (2014a; 2015) documented the surge in the

Islamic State’s worldwide foreign fighter recruitment. Lahoud (2013) and Hoffman

(2012) addressed how jihadis interpreted the meaning of and opportunities created by the Arab Spring, tracing a substantial learning curve from early 2011 to 2012. Stern and Berger (2015). Hosken (2015), Warrick (2015), Cockburn (2015), and Napoleoni

(2014) explored the Islamic State’s roots, appeal, and strategies. Nance (2015; 2016) analyzed the role of Iraq’s Ba’athists and Sunni tribes in building the Islamic State, as well as the group’s military capabilities and doctrine. McCants analyzed Islamic State use of Islamic scripture to justify its rule.

Meanwhile, country specialists analyzed the deterioration of conditions in each country in the wake of the Arab Spring. Hamid (2011; 2014; 2015) tracked the

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the dominant political party in the wake of Mubarak’s fall, its rise to power, power struggles with military leaders and rapid fall. Lynch (2012; 2013; 2014a; 2014c) and other members of the Project On

Middle East Studies (POMEPS) produced many valuable assessments of the resurgence of authoritarianism and the growing polarization in the Arab region

(Brynen 2012; Gao 2012; Sayigh 2015; Heydemann 2015; Brown 2012a; Springborg

2015). Pack (2013) and Fitzgerald (2015) wrote of the reemergence of Islamist and

54 Salafi groups in Libya following Qadhafi’s fall. Yassin-Bassab and Al-Shami (2016,

262) and Lister (2015; 2016) detailed Syria’s downward spiral into civil war. Filiu

(2015) offered a model for the reassertion of state security forces and pre- revolutionary elites, claiming they represented a “deep state” and the true power governing Arab states.

Many of these studies addressed individual outcomes of the Arab Spring, such as the spread of weaponry or jihadis’ growing territorial control. No study addressed all of these outcomes. This thesis argues that it is the combination of these multiple changes in societies that together explain the Islamic State’s ability to expand beyond

Iraq. This thesis does not attempt to extend its argument to include the many

Westerners attracted by the Islamic State. Preliminary surveys of captured fighter statements suggest Western volunteers tend to have a different mix of motivations for joining the Islamic State than do Arab recruits (Quantum 2015). This thesis does speculate, however, that the Arab Spring helped to create the conditions bolstered the

Islamic State’s attractiveness to Western followers. In particular, the large number of

Tunisian and Egyptian volunteers who joined the initial influx of foreign fighters to

Syria generated global interest in the Syrian jihad. Further, the spread of Salafi jihadi groups in North Africa after the Arab Spring added significantly to the pool of existing organizations that declared allegiance to the Islamic State upon its declaration of a caliphate in July 2014. These Islamic State “provinces” created a sense of momentum and have provided bases for prominent Islamic State terror

55 attacks, including the 2015 attacks on Western tourists in Tunisia and Russian

Metrojet departing the Sinai Peninsula.

Chapter 2: The Search for Legitimacy

Governments of the industrial world, giants of meat and steel, I come to you from cyberspace, the new home of the mind. In the name of the future I ask you, who belong to the past, to leave us alone… You have no legitimacy to rule over us, nor do you possess means to vanquish us of a sort that would merit our fear… Ahmed Gharbeia, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”.

The political underpinning for the Islamic State’s appeal is its claim to have the answer to the Muslim World’s problems. First, Islamic State leaders claim to offer a culturally and religiously authentic alternative to the current systems of government in the region, many of which have grown increasingly oppressive and alienated from their populations. Secondly, they insist their alternative, based on Islamic law rather than the current Western-derived nation state and constitutional law, will reverse centuries of decline, making the Muslim world the leading global power. The current rulers of Muslim states are portrayed as lackeys of Western powers, responsive to

America and Israel, rather than God or their own people.

Meanwhile, the young activists of the Arab Spring also aimed to overturn their nation’s authoritarian regimes. These youths had little interest, however, in

Islamic revolution. Instead, most sought democratic systems that would foster economic growth and greater opportunity. In contrast to the hierarchical organization and attempt at disciplined unity fostered by the putative caliphate, these youth represented a range of ideologies, sects, and worldviews. Rather than ideology, 56 scholarly accounts of the roots of the Arab Spring focus on the isolation of the long- ruling sultanistic leaders that undermined their claim to legitimacy, the rise of a new generation of youth frustrated by diminished prospects, and freedoms and the excesses of corruption (Rand 2013; Amin et al. 2012; Assaad and Barsoum 2009;

Onodera 2015; Cole 2014), and the rise of regional and social media allowing activists to evade regime censorship (Lynch 2014a, 340; Muzzamil and Howard

2013; Howard and Hussain 2014). The common thread among all these movements was opposition to the current political order in the Arab world and a desire for more legitimate and responsive government.

The Arab world has missed every wave of democratization and political change. Not one Arab nation transitioned to democracy between 1972 and 2002, even as the number of electoral democracies in the world almost doubled (Bellin 2004,

139). Instead, the leaders who seized power in earlier decades aged in office, growing increasingly out of touch with their populations. A 2002 UNDP-sponsored survey listed the Arab World the “least free” region on the planet (Fergany 2002, 22-29).

Other surveys found the and North Africa to be the regions with the highest rates unemployment, particularly for youth (Heydarian 2011). The militaries that drew disproportionate shares of the national budgets failed in the field, as demonstrated by the rapid collapse of the Iraqi Army in 2003 and 1991. New technologies—satellite television, social media—increased popular awareness of the outside world, but also increased relative perceptions of deprivation. The malaise extended into the worlds of science and culture. Egyptians filed only 77 patents 57 between 1980 and 1999 and published a yearly average of only 375 books (Zand

2011; Ajami 1995). By the fall of 2008, nearly half of the youth of Egypt and Tunisia polled said they wanted to migrate (Cole 2014, 45, 115).

Islam alone is not the issue, despite the arguments of Huntington (1991),

Lewis (1993), and others who claim the religion is incompatible with democracy. The bulk of the world’s Muslim population already lives in electoral democracies, including—among many others--Indonesia, India, Malaysia, , and Senegal.

More than a half-billion Muslims live and participate in democratic systems, and 17 of the 78 countries that experienced substantial democratization between 1972 and

2009 had Muslim majorities or pluralities (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011, 91).

Surveys of Indian Muslims find no significant differences in support for or trust in democracy from their Hindu neighbors, while majorities of Muslims in the Middle

East, Africa, Central , and elsewhere express support for democracy (Stepan and

Linz 2014, 84; Pew Research Center 2013; Telhami 2013, 146). The salient question thus is not why Muslim countries have failed to democratize, but why democratization has stalled in Arab countries specifically.

Contemporary attempts to explain absence of democracy in the Arab world center on the role of foreign support in bolstering autocrats’ control, as well as their ability to autocrats’ manipulate rule-of-law and tribal, ethnic, and sectarian divisions.

Bellin (2004) argues the “Third Wave” of democratization only became possible when regimes’ foreign sponsors withdrew their support at the end of the Cold War.

Once Eastern European leaders could no longer draw on Soviet support and Latin 58 American, African and other leaders could no longer cite their anti-communist credentials in Washington, they could no longer stave off popular demands for reform. Arab rulers, however, continued to draw U.S. support, however, in return both for stable oil supplies and collaboration against shared Islamic terrorist threats.

Indeed, the United States and other western states increased their support to Qadhafi,

Mubarak, Saleh, and others as part of the “,” even as the same leaders increased domestic repression. Hazbun (2015) concurs that Arab rulers look first to external supporters to guarantee their tenure, tracing the pattern to Ottoman rule.

“Even after they were granted independence, ruling elites in Arab states were often more dependent on external powers,” Hazbun writes, “than on popular support for maintaining control” (57).

Independence and Instability

Muasher (2014) notes Arab states from the first days of independence paid little attention to developing pluralistic systems of governments or balancing executive power. Neither the monarchs who rested their claim to power on descent or religion nor the executives who based their legitimacy on leadership in the independence struggle permitted the free development of opposition movements. The resulting states were fragile. Billingsley (2010) counted 32 coups d’état in the Arab world from 1949 to 1966 (78). Ideologies—Ba’athist, nationalist, pan-Arab—were tools for new groups to justify their claim to power. The men leading the revolutionary movements that took power in the 1950s and 1960s came from outside traditional power. Nasser was the son of a postal worker from a minor village in 59 Lower Egypt (Aburish 2004, 7). Saddam Hussein and Mu’ammar Qadhafi’s families herded sheep and goats (Aburish 2000, 18; Pargeter 2012, 53). Hafez al-Assad was the grandson of an itinerant Turkish wrestler and the member of the Alawi minority that made up, at most, perhaps 12 percent of Syria’s population (Seale 1990, 3;

Mackey 2011). Yemen’s Ali Abdul Saleh also came from a minority sect, the Zaidis, and had less than an elementary education (CNN 2015).

Lacking traditional sources of authority, these new leaders create new sources of legitimacy to justify their rule. Nasser and other revolutionary leaders consolidated state power by promising modernization, jobs, urban housing, and subsidies for bread, oil, and other foodstuffs. Sadiki (2000) argued the arrangement was a version of Burke’s social compact, expressed in the term dimuqrdtiyyat al-khubz

(“democracy of bread”). “Political deference has been traded for khubz, or ‘bread,’ used here in a generic sense to refer to free education, health care, and other services… Arab authoritarianism has reproduced itself not by relying solely on brute force, but also by relying on elements of negotiation or accommodation” (79). The leaders seized on new ideologies—Ba’athism, nationalism, pan-Arabism and

Qadhafi’s “Third Universal Theory”—to justify their centralization of power, while ensuring that popular subsidies and police powers kept the population quiescent.

These social contracts grew less tenable in the 1980s and 1990s, as governments were forced to cut subsidies and massive public work projects to accommodate IMF demands. During the 1980s, bread riots broke out in Egypt,

Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Algeria, Jordan, and Lebanon (Sadiki 2000, 81). 60 Privatization of state farms in Syria and subsequent droughts destroyed the livelihoods of at least 800,000 Syrian peasants between 2000 and 2010 (Yassin-

Kassab and Al-Shami 2016, 33). As globalization undermined the earlier social contract, regimes increasingly focused on what Gershewski (2013) describes as the three pillars of authoritarian stability: legitimation, co-optation, and repression.

Leaders staged elections, adopting democratic façades, and manipulated Islamic symbolism to enhance their popular legitimacy. They used government resources and control over business sectors to coopt the “selectorate,” the groups of tribal, business, or military leaders needed to maintain their rule (Transparency International 2011, 5;

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2011, 5). Finally, these leaders maintained their rule through repression, creating police states where freedoms of speech and association were increasingly curtailed, while thousands disappeared into prisons or mass graves

( 2011a, 649; 2011, 423).

Republican Monarchs

By the beginning of the Twenty-First century, the Arab republics were ruled by aging dictators who had shaped their regimes’ institutions to maximize their own power, rather than respond to the needs of the governed. Egyptian courts sentenced sociologist to seven years in prison after he coined the popular neologism ‘jamlukiya’, a combination of the words jamhuriya (republic) and malakiya (monarchy) to describe the transformation of Arab republics into de-facto monarchies. “(A)ny country where the same leader rules for a decade or more, even if

61 its form of government is the republic, he begins to feel that the country is his private property,” Ibrahim explained (Cole 2014, 32). The term captures Weber’s

(1951/1978) description of ‘sultanic’ rule, a non-traditional ruler comes to dominate a regime and its powers purely on the basis of his own discretion (230). These personalized autocracies lacked the boundaries on executive action associated with other forms of rule, since the ruler maintained direct control over state institutions and had the power to change the rules of the game at will (Kailitz 2013, 49). Filiu (2015) described the coteries of security, military, and intelligence elites that grew up around these modern-day sultans as modern incarnations of the , enslaved personal guards who derived their legitimacy from the caliph and ruled from behind the scenes after the caliphs lost effective power (Filiu 2015, 45).

All five of the nations that experienced either regime change or civil war in during the Arab Spring—Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria—were ruled by aging sultanic leaders. In December 2010, Libya’s Mu’ammar Qadhafi had ruled

Libya for 47 years. Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak had ruled since 1981, Tunisia’s Ben Ali since 1987, and Yemen’s Saleh since 1979. Bashar al-Assad, the youngest of group, had only held power for a decade, but he inherited the presidency from his father, who seized power in 1971. All had either seized power by force or took control upon the death of their predecessor. All manipulated national , rule-of-law, and domestic tribal, sectarian, and ethnic divisions to cement their control. All also channeled their nations’ wealth to enrich their families and key supporters, and used

62 regime security forces to quell dissent. And all appeared to maneuver to install sons or other family members as rulers following their own deaths.

Instead of building continuity and capabilities into state institutions, these leaders reshaped them into mechanisms to solidify control and reward supporters.

Power was personalized as presidential portraits dominated public spaces. Qadhafi’s jamhariyya (mass democracy) was the most the most idiosyncratic of the republics.

Qadhafi’s efforts to stamp out competing loyalties atomized society and created a weak and divided government. He banned NGOs and civic associations, appointing and firing followers at whim (Anderson 2011). Qadhafi routinely shifted positions, perks, and influence between his lieutenants and institutions to maximize their dependence upon him alone.

No other Arab leader went quite as far to destroy state institutions as Qadhafi, but all worked to personalize their rule. When asked to describe Tunisia’s political system, former Tunisian President Bourghiba once replied “System? What System. I am the system” (in Billingsley 2010, 71). Saleh’s strategic positioning of relatives in government reflected more than nepotism; he was ensuring loyalty within key government institutions. Close relatives—sons, brothers, and nephews—ran the executive, military, and security establishments, while cousins and tribesmen profited from appointments as local agents for foreign corporations. “If something happens to the president,” one member of parliament observed, “they’ll all suffer too, so they let him be” (Clark 2010, 281). In Syria, 5 percent of the population—primarily urban

63 families connected to the Assads--controlled 50 percent of the country’s wealth

(Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami 2016, 32).

National constitutions became yet another mechanism of control, rather than a source of protection for individual rights. Tunisia’s described the president as ‘the guarantor of national independence, of the integrity of its territory and of respect for the constitution and the laws” (in Billingsley 2010, 71). Egypt’s 88 eliminated judicial oversight over the country’s blatantly rigged elections. Other constitutional amendments banned political parties based on religion—undercutting the status of Egypt’s leading opposition party, the

Muslim Brotherhood, and set requirements for presidential candidates unattainable by any but regime-sponsored candidates (Shehata and Stacher 2007; Rand 2013, 47). A

2007 amendment gave Mubarak the power to order civilians to be tried in military courts, eliminating legal protections against arbitrary arrest and warrantless searches

(Brown, Dunne, and Hamzawy 2007). Other amendments gave the president the power to dissolve parliament at will and set such stringent requirements for presidential candidates that it was effectively impossible for opposition parties to legally run a candidate against the incumbent Mubarak. Hosni Mubarak justified his electoral rigging to Maryanne Weaver as normal, insisting “no president ever steps down!” (Weaver 2003).

Meanwhile, Ben Ali undercut potential challenges from Tunisia’s unicameral parliament by creating an upper house, dominated by presidential appointees (Filiu

2015, 84). Mubarak and Ben Ali rewrote their nations’ constitutions to extend their 64 own terms (Rand 2013, 59; Shehata and Stacher 2007). Ben Ali’s 2002 constitutional amendment not only eliminated presidential term and age limits, but blocked potential challengers. Assad supporters rewrote the Syrian constitution’s requirement that a president be 40 to permit the 34 year-old Bashar al-Assad to take power (Billingsley

2010, 106). That same constitution gave the executive—Bashar or his father Hafez— the power to rule by decree, veto any parliamentary law, or dissolve parliament at will

(Kassem 2004, 6). The end result of the constitutional manipulations was what Rand

(2013) termed “de-democratization through rule-of-law reforms.” RAND scholars reported a consensus among their contacts that Egypt had grown less democratic by the early 2000s than at any point in the previous two decades (Oweidat et al. 2008, 8).

This de-democratization through rule-of-law preserved a façade of legality while increasing leaders’ actual power. As Brown, Dunne, and Hamzawy (2007) note, tailored constitutional amendments allowed Mubarak to appear responsive to pressure from Washington for political liberalization while actually increasing his actual control over the electoral system. The long-term impact of these maneuvers was to undercut respect for the law and convince regime opponents that working through the system for change was pointless. A former Tunisian ambassador wrote that Ben Ali’s revisions to the constitution “took away any last hope there could be a democratic transition… Le Pouvior no longer even pretends to consult or respond to public opinion” (in Rand 2013, 62).

Elected bodies became another tool of sultanic rule, helping leaders co-opt potential opponents. Supporters gained office and associated benefits—access to 65 government contracts and parliamentary immunity--in rigged elections. Opponents were either banned or allowed a predetermined number of seats to maintain the façade of democracy and increase their dependence on the ruler. A recent survey noted the institutional co-optation has grown common among autocracies; only 50

(11 percent) of the 460 dictators in power between 1946 and 2004 chose not to create a party or legislature (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014, 333).

Arab republican leaders used widespread rigging, ranging from arresting or banning opponents to vote rigging, to ensure control of electoral results. Anwar Sadat described democracy as “a safety valve so I know what my enemies are doing”

(Weaver 2003). “The election of (Egyptian) local councils is so fraudulent,” Perry

(2004) observed, “that only 4-20 percent of the people bother to vote” (97). Voter participation in Egypt’s People’s Assembly elections dropped from 48 percent of eligible voters in 1995 to 23 percent in 2005 and less than 15 percent in 2010 (Inter-

Parliamentary Union 2016; Onodera 2015, 26). Without genuine contests, there was little pressure for rulers to innovate or reach out to new groups. Politicians and parties who win election, whether pro-regime or ‘opposition,’ respond to executive, rather than learning “the arts of representation, mobilization, and compromise” (Brumberg

2014a, 9). A 1995 study found members of the Egyptian parliament initiated only seven laws in 1991, of which they passed one, while approving all 214 laws proposed by Mubarak (Khandeel 1995, 62). Lust (2009) quotes a Syrian legislator who deflected legislation questions by insisting, “We’re members of parliament. We don’t

66 make laws!” By the year 2000, fewer than 10 percent of the Libyan population bothered to take part in their “mass democratic” system (Joffé 2013, 26).

It’s A Family Affair

Family control over governments also allowed leaders and their relatives to build extensive fortunes. Mubarak and his family stashed away between $40 and $70 million during his decades in office (Goldstone 2011). Mubarak’s wife Suzan controlled millions in foreign aid donations through her position managing Egyptian

NGOs (al-Sayyid 2015, 54). Their son Gamal created “parallel structures” within government bureaucracies with no outside accountability to direct Egypt’s privatization program. Thousands of Egyptians were thrown out of work, while

Gamal, his brother and their friends made millions on government contracts and sales

(Chayes 2015, 83-86). Tunisian First Lady Leila Trabelsi, a former hairdresser, collected villas, real estate and bank accounts, while her ten siblings used their government links to gain control over a substantial share of the nation’s business

(Sadiki 2010). “The telecom sector attracted them,” said Karim Ben Kahla, the dean of Manouba University’s business programs. “Well-known international companies like Danone, and of course the banks” (Chayes 2015, 93). “They looked upon Tunisia as a vast personal enterprise that they could tap at any moment,” one of Bin Ali’s former servants recalled (Chayes 2015, 92).

The pattern was similar in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. Bashar al-Assad’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, became the richest man in the country through

67 systematically using the judiciary and intelligence agencies to intimidate his business rivals (U.S. Treasury 2008). Other members of the Assad family, as well as the offspring of Hafez al-Assad’s allies also were granted generous government contracts or quasi-monopolies over particular industries in return for their family’s continued support (Noueihed & Warren, p. 222). Yemen’s Saleh skimmed between $32 and $60 billion dollars from Yemen’s national oil and gas revenues, according to a United

Nations panel’s 2005 estimate (Browning 2015).

Three of the elderly leaders ousted during the Arab Spring were grooming sons to follow them, while a fourth, Bashar al-Assad, already had succeeded his father as Syria’s president. Yemen’s president Saleh appointed his son Ahmed Ali as chief of Yemen's Special Operations Force and Republican Guard Mubarak, both to control the security arms and better position Ahmed to move quickly in a succession crisis. After Mubarak’s fall, his former advisor Mostafa al-Fiqqi claimed the regime had planned to stage mass prison releases and riots after the senior Mubarak’s death, after which Gamal would step in and restore calm. The plan, according to al-Fiqqi, was meant to establish Gamal as the strongman capable of rescuing the nation from chaos (Sabry 2015, 21). Qadhafi’s children fought publicly to establish themselves as his heir, with eldest son Saif-ul-Islam the leading contender. Only Ben Ali had no sons. His refusal to name a successor fueled persistent rumors that his wife or one of her many brothers planned to take power upon his death (Chayes 2015; Noueihed and

Warren 2012).

68 Private Profits, Public Costs

The public costs of these patronage systems were substantial. Pressing public needs go unaddressed, while the gap between the governed and their rulers grows wider. Corruption probably slowed national growth between one and three percent per year, as leaders and their coteries maneuvered to corner government contracts and build business monopolies (Cole 2014, 348). Some $20 billion dollars allegedly spent on irrigation in Syria since the 1990s disappeared, leading to massive crop failure in

2006 and subsequent drought years (Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami 2016, 33).

Meanwhile, population growth increasingly strained the states’ capacity to provide the jobs and subsidies they used to buy populations’ tacit support. Popular alienation, youth frustration, and widespread cynicism pervaded youth culture in the decades leading up to the Arab Spring.

The youth boom of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century created new pressure for change. Between 1990 and 2011, the population aged 15-29 grew by

50 percent in Libya and Tunisia, 65 percent in Egypt, and 125 percent in Yemen

(Goldstone 2011). This generation was better educated than their parents, but with fewer job prospects. Half of all Tunisian graduates with a Masters degree were unemployed in 2010, while unemployment among Egyptian college graduates was ten times higher than among those with only an elementary school education

(Noueihed & Warren, 2012; Goldstone 2011). Youths accounted for more than half of the Middle East’s unemployed workers in 2005 (Dhillon, Dyer, and Yousef 2009,

20). In Syria, first-time job seekers represented 78 percent of the unemployed, while

69 more than 80 percent of those unemployed in Egypt—or roughly 1.6 million youth-- were in the 15 to 29 age group (Kabbani and Kamel 2009, 20; Assaad and Barsoum

2009, 76). The majority of the jobs that are available are either in the informal sector, temporary, or otherwise poor-quality jobs that form an inadequate basis for starting families (Assaad and Barsoum 2009, 78).

Cultural norms exacerbated the impact of economic decline on the youth population. In traditional Arab societies, young men and women live with their parents until after marriage. Marriage, in turn, depends on a young man’s ability to prove to his brides’ family that he can support her and their future family. The result is what Diane Singerman (2007) termed waithood, an extended period of adolescence when young Arab men and women struggle to secure jobs and direction (6). Dhillon,

Dyer, and Yousef (2009) found young Arab men have the lowest rates of marriage in the developing world, with half of all men still unmarried at thirty (24). “They want to feel useful, to earn a livelihood, and love, have a home and build a family. While seemingly simple desires, these goals for the most part are hopelessly out of reach”

(Herrera 2006, 9). In cultures that restrict mixing of the genders and only consider an individual an adult after he or she becomes a parent, the personal cost of these delays can be high, with youths living as dependents under their parents’ control well into their 30s.

In the face of growing popular frustrations, leaders increasingly turned to police, intelligence, and military organizations to enforce their rule. Extensive military budgets were directed to domestic security services, rather than external 70 threats (Gause 2003, 274). In Tunisia, the military maintained only 35,000 troops, but

130,000 members of multiple domestic security forces including the Presidential

Guard, National Guard, tourist police, university police, local police forces and more

(Schraeder and Redissi 2014, 204). Credible estimates of the cost of Saleh’s personal defense forces in 2003 approached 40 percent of Yemen’s annual budget (Clark 2010,

281). These multiple overlapping layers of security both intensified leverage over populations and prevented any single security organ from gaining the power to challenge Ben Ali’s control. Similar arrangements in Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Yemen maintained control, while driving increasing repression.

Repression increased during the decade leading to the 2011 uprising. Even peaceful dissenters risked jail, torture, or death. Human Rights Watch reported in

January 2011 that Egypt was holding at least 5,000 prisoners under emergency law, while continuing to “disappear” and torture political detainees, including human rights activists, bloggers, and labor activists (Human Rights Watch 2011b). The

Egyptian penal code mandated imprisonment for crimes such as “advocating, in any way, changing of basic principles of the constitution” or disseminating “, information or rumors that disturb the public peace…” (Kassem 2004, 57). In 2010,

Reporters Without Borders ranked the Arab republics among the worst states on the planet for press freedoms (Reporters Without Borders 2010). Reporters were jailed for covering such topics as official corruption, Mubarak’s failing health, labor protests in Tunisia and Saleh’s counterterrorism policy in Yemen (CPJ 2010). Both

Syria and Libyan law criminalized “doubting the aims of the revolution” (Ménard and 71 Tehini 2006, 3; Freedom House 2010). Amnesty International reported arbitrary detention, the use of torture, severe curtailment of freedoms of speech and association, were common and “committed with impunity” in all five of the Arab republics under study (Amnesty International 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d; 2010e).

Regime leaders manipulated the fears of their Western supporters to push back on international pressure to democratize, conflated political Islamist opposition with al-Qa’ida and other jihadi factions. “Oh, yes, they say they have renounced violence,” Mubarak insisted to journalist Maryanne Weaver. “But in reality they are responsible for all this violence, and the time will come when they will be uncovered”

(Weaver 1999, 163). Mubarak was far from alone in using the alleged terrorist threat to duck to liberalize or solicit support from the West. Former senior CIA analyst

Emile Nakhleh observed regimes repeatedly assuring senior American officials that domestic stability, not democracy, was the overriding regional issue. “In the old days, they used the anti-communist language,” one Jordanian contact told Nakhleh,

“Today, they use the antiterrorism language and Uncle Sam always comes to the rescue” (Nakhleh 2009, 64). President Saleh channeled U.S. counterterrorism assistance to the very units commanded by his sons, reinforcing his own family and clan’s control (Filiu 2015, 141-142).

Rulers also used Islamist threats, real and imagined, with the domestic audience. Deliberately “mobilizing fear,” Mubarak and Ben Ali, portrayed their

Islamist rivals as threats to religious minorities, women’s rights, and personal freedoms. (Stepan and Linz 2014, 88). Brumberg (2014b) convincingly describes 72 Arab autocrats’ “uncanny knack for manipulating a wide array of ethnic, religious, and sociocultural groups by playing upon their fears of political exclusion” as

“Godfather-style protection rackets” (97). Thus, a spectrum of minorities-- urban secularists, Copts and other Christians, Alawites, Druze, and Shi’a side with the regimes out of fear of the alternatives. The dictators play on fears of the tyranny of the majority. "When your Americans talk about democracy in the Middle East,”

Mubarak told Middle East Institute scholar Youssef M. Ibrahim, “who do they think is going to take over? Democrats? It will be the Muslim Brotherhood's pawns in

Cairo, Amman, Riyadh and Palestine” (Ibrahim 2003, B3).

The dictators’ manipulations reified divisions within society. Favored minorities became identified with the oppressors, creating or exacerbating divisions between tribes, sects, religions, and parties. The Alawis in Syria, Qadhafa tribe in

Libya, and Sanhan clan in Libya were closely identified with the regimes, sharing the profits of their members’ rule and forming the core of regime security establishments

(Lister 2015, 29; Alaaldin 2011; Transfeld 2012). Terrorist attacks on members of the groups over the years, motivated both by members’ regime positions and, later, simply membership in the dominant sect, further drove a wedge between groups.

Other minorities, such as Syria’s Druze or Egypt’s Copts, were less privileged by their regimes, but also came to fear for their safety should the regimes fall. As Nugent

(2016) notes, “(m)emories of past collective violence imbues present conflict, even if non-violent, with aggressive forms of in-group favoritism, a duty of retaliation,

73 generalized hatred, and makes the current situation appear to be a repetition of previous violent conflicts.”

Political manipulations also affected the balance of political power among political factions. Successive Egyptian leaders—Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak—tightly limited the development of political parties. The result, despite decades of targeted repression, inadvertently gave the Muslim Brotherhood a political advantage once controls were lifted. Where secular parties and politicians’ ability to reach out to voters was sharply limited, the Brotherhood gained a constituency and organizational experience through its educational and social welfare programs. Three surveys between February and May 2011 found the Muslim Brotherhood only commanded between 15 and 17 percent popular support, yet the party won pluralities in the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections of 37.5 percent and 24.78 percent respectively (Fisher 2011/2012). The most likely explanation for the discrepancy is that the multiple new and unknown parties split the secular vote while the

Brotherhood was disproportionately able to mobilize their base of committed supporters. The end result was that Egypt’s first democratically elected government was weak and unpopular from the very start. Meanwhile, years of jail and torture affected the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, leaving them suspicious of outsiders and unwilling or unable to compromise with opponents (Hamid 2014, 156; Willi 2015).

Ben Ali’s success in driving the Islamist Ennahda group underground or abroad also gave the group status as perceived martyrs of his regime. Benstead, Lust, and Malouche (2012b) found 72 percent of Tunisian voters could name Rachid

74 Gannouchi as the leader of Ennahda—despite, or perhaps because of his 32 years in exile—while fewer than half could name the leader of any other party (3). The survey team found “Tunisians across the spectrum” described Ennahda as “the party that

‘deserved’ to have power and could most effectively counter the old regime,” rather than the party that most fully reflected their political preferences (Benstead, Lust, and

Malouche 2012a).

Despite the regimes’ overwhelming power, successive waves of opposition pressed for freedoms, protested economic policies, corruption, and foreign policy.

Foreign events often triggered or served as a safe pretext for demonstrations, as rulers calculated anti-U.S. or Israel demonstrations were a safe outlet to allow youths to ‘let off steam’ (Lynch 2012, 31). The Palestinian Intifada, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. invasions of Iraq all triggered street protests in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere which soon refocused on regime ties to the United States.

Labor issues and inflation, too, spurred growing protests, particularly as regime leaders implemented privatization schemes. Ottaway and Hamzaqy (2011) counted more than 1,000 wildcat strikes and labor protests in Egypt alone between

1998 and 2004, while Beinin found 3,000 between 2001 and 2011 (in Masoud 2014).

The protests expanded beyond the usual factory workers, to include Egyptian police, judges, physicians, real estate tax collectors and university professors (Ottaway and

Hamzawy 2011, 2-3). In 2008, unemployed workers and university graduates in the southern Tunisian mining region of Gafsa launched the largest demonstrations seen in the country since 1984 (Gobe 2010, 21). 75 A New Battleground?

The critical difference between the protest movements of the early 2000s and those that had gone before was the changed information environment. Where previously, regimes had largely been able to maintain control over the flow of information, satellite television and the Internet gave populations alternative perspectives. The rise first of satellite television in the 1990s and then social media created a new arena for conflict between regimes and activists. Regimes could no longer limit the flow of information into their countries. Nor, once citizens gained access to the Internet and cell phones, could they prevent citizens from documenting regime abuses or communicating amongst themselves. Both regimes and their opponents spent much of the decade of the century learning how to manage in this new information battlefield.

The introduction of satellite television in the 1990s gave Arabs an alternative to regime-controlled media. According to a 2010 survey, 78 percent of the Arabs polled described al-Jazeera as either their first or second choice for international news

(Noueihed & Warren 2012, p. 50). This Arab-focused, Arab-owned station created what Benedict Anderson (1991, p. 26) would term an “imaginary community” of individuals spread from Yemen to Morocco—and even in diaspora in the West--all watching the same programs together. Because of this common media platform, “This generation of Arabs sees all of the region’s revolutions as part of a single, shared narrative, with a common set of heroes and villains…” (Lynch 2012, p. 11). Game

(2011) describes the reemergence of a new form of pan-Arab identity. Unlike the

76 movement of fifty years ago, focused on the charismatic Nasser, Game argues it is the leaderless and amorphous quality of today’s movement that inspires individuals to join in (Game 2011, p. 86).

The “Al-Jazeera Effect” was a key factor driving the near-simultaneous protests across the Arab world in support of the Palestinian Intifada and opposing the

2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Lynch (2012) makes a convincing case for also identifying al-Jazeera’s talk shows in particular as a driving force in promoting freer political discussion. Libyans saw dissidents call Qadhafi a dictator, Tunisians heard exiled Ennahda members detail their regime’s human rights abuses (Miles 2005, 56).

After Egypt’s 2005 elections, Egyptians tuned into al-Jazeera to watch footage showing machete-wielding thugs prevent opposition voters from casting ballots, while police officers stood by and watched (Seib 2008, 145).

Stories were interactive, using real-time telephone and online polls to involve viewers. Seventy-six percent of viewers of one 2003 program voted “yes” on the question of whether current Arab governments were worse than the old colonial regimes (Lynch 2005, 40). Eighty-six percent of the viewers of another episode voted that they should have the right to criticize their rulers (Noueihed and Warren 2012,

49). Arab viewers not only gained the chance to anonymously express their opinion, they learned those opinions were shared by most of their peers. Timur Kuran (1991) found this moment of discovery, when individuals learned they were not alone in their private opinions, is a critical first step in transforming an onlooker into a committed participant in a social revolution. 77 Regimes attempted unsuccessfully to regain control of the news flow by undercutting ’s access or credibility. Tunisia and Libya severed relations with Qatar over Doha’s refusal to rein in the station, while other countries lobbied hard for controls on the station’s coverage (Miles 2005, 57). The Syrian government spruced up its own domestic news coverage—not by changing content, but by ordering its news anchors to lose weight (Seib 2008, 161). Damascus also alleged al-

Jazeera’s reporting reflected a “Zionist plot to spread discord,” while state-controlled

Egyptian ran cartoons depicting popular al-Jazeera news anchors wearing yarmulkas (Miles 2005, 88). Egypt’s Minister of Information insisted al-Jazeera’s goal was “to harm the reputation of Egypt and the Arab world” (Miles 2005, 89). Al

Jazeera reporters in Yemen faced constant official intimidation and threats of arrest for stories deemed “hostile to Yemen’s unity and security” (Reporters Without

Borders 2009).

Meanwhile, university students across the region began experimenting with opportunities offered by other new technologies—the Internet and mobile telephones.

Unlike street demonstrations, the Internet allowed users anonymity. Tunisian university students founded an anonymous online network, Takriz, in 1998 to discuss their shared frustrations of life under Ben Ali’s rule. “Takriz meetings ‘in real life’ meant ‘spies and police and all these Stasi,’” recalled Takriz founder “Foetus.”

“Online we could be anonymous” (Pollack 2011). Other sites soon followed, mocking the regime and its foibles. “Tunezine” announced a contest for the best joke about the

Ben Ali regime; “First prize is 13 years in prison” (Pollack 2011). Such seemingly 78 small first steps had three long-term results. “Before anyone could even remark on the changes, the most fundamental pillar of Arab authoritarianism”—controlling the discussion—“had fallen” (Lynch 2012, 12).

Secondly, the anonymity of the Internet attracted far greater numbers to speak against the regime. Individuals could express their opinions in safety not only from their governments, but from their parents and other authority figures. Onodera who observed many young Cairenes “going to great lengths to hide their identities,” noted anonymity was an “existentialist concern” for many activists (62). Over time,

“becoming public often marked an important watershed,” but the psychological process that made the move to publicly identifying as anti-regime, with all its risks, first was made possible by developing an online community (Onodera 2015, 61). A

2013 study later found “clearly a deep correlation” across the countries most affected by the Arab Spring, between the spread of online discussion and “new types of bolder, more defiant political activism” (Rand 2013, 41).

The emergence of an online opposition community secondly allowed activists to reach across long-standing social divisions. Members of Youth For Change, better known as “Kifaya” (“Enough!”), an Egyptian coalition that grew out of the 2003 demonstrations against the U.S. invasion of Iraq, ranged from Muslim Brothers to

Marxists (Oweidat et al. 2008). The 6 April Movement, founded in 2008 in solidarity with protesting workers, drew seventy thousand members by 2009, about 7 percent of all users in Egypt” (Cole 2014, 107).

79 Jihadis, too, seized on the Internet and social media as new platforms for their anti-regime message. A UN taskforce estimated in 2010 that the number of terrorist websites had grown from 15 in 1998 to more than 1500 in 2010 (UN 2011) These sites allowed jihadis to reach their audiences directly, instead of working through the mainstream media. Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates opened press offices, posted recruiting videos and online newsmagazines such as Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of the Jihad) and the

English-language Inspire. Al-Qa’ida leaders—Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri,

Yemeni-American Anwar al-Awlaki—addressing the youth of the Muslim world, calling on them to rise up against “U.S. and Zionist” puppets, such as Mubarak,

Qadhafi, Saleh, Ben Ali, and Assad. Online magazines, such as Inspire, and al-Battar

Training Camp, attempted to replicate programs taught in Afghanistan. Articles outlined how to use encryption technology, acquire and use weapons, plan attacks, and even “Make a in the Kitchen of Your Mom” (al-Awlaki 2010, 33). By

2004, al-Qa’ida had posted so many indoctrination and training materials that

Jamestown terrorism analyst Stephen Ulph called the Internet “al-Qaeda’s virtual

Afghanistan,” arguing they had largely recreated the resources lost with the 2001 US invasion (Ulph 2004).

Despite al-Qa’ida’s efforts, most youth looked instead to each other for lessons in how to fight their governments. The Internet allowed activists to share information across international borders, coordinating increasingly public protests and learning from each other’s experiences. Activists studied online accounts of

Otpor (“Resistance”), the Serbian youth movement that mobilized the uprising

80 against President Slobodan Milosovic in 2000. (Onodera 2015, 106). Libyan online activists created “Khalas!” (Enough), modeled on Kifaya, using the dating site

Match.com to hide their activity from censors (Muzzamil and Howard 2013, 194).

“Hactivists” learned to avoid regime censorship with anonymizing software, workarounds, and SMS text messaging.

Increasingly, online activists used cell phone cameras and the Internet to document regime abuses, posting graphic videos on YouTube of regime policemen-- attacking protestors, raping or torturing prisoners. Al Jazeera and other foreign media picked up the stories, beaming the news to the millions of Egyptians, Syrians,

Yemenis, and others in the region without Internet access. Activists publicized each other’s arrests, supporting each other across national and ideological lines, and building alliances with foreign NGOs such as Amnesty international. The international attention provided activists with a new degree of protection, “raising the costs of repression to authoritarian regimes (Lynch 2014b, 102). International campaigns highlighted the names of bloggers who disappeared into regime prisons.

Syrian Karim Arabji, arrested in 2007 for "weakening nationalist sentiment,” Libyan

Abdel Razak Al Mansouri, arrested in 2005 after mocking Qadhafi in an online posting, and Egyptian blogger Abdul Kareem Nabeel Suleiman Amer all were released after their cases drew extensive international attention. (Amnesty

International 2010c; Reporters Without Borders 2006; Amnesty International 2010f)."

In this environment, regime efforts to censor the Internet had only limited success and often only provoked new opposition. Tunisia and Syria channeled all

81 Internet traffic through government-operated filters (Honwana 2013, 50; Open Net

Initiative 2009b). With no written definition of what constituted a forbidden site, enforcement was often arbitrary. Tunisia charged nine Internet in 2004 with

“terrorism” for visiting banned sites, while Syria arrested users who forwarded jokes about Bashar al-Assad (Honwana 2013, 49; Noueihed and Warren 2012, 45). Cyber cafes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria copied users’ national identification cards, monitored sites visited, and were held legally liable for customers’ activities (Open

Net Initiative 2009a). State-owned Tunisian media warned parents to keep their children off Facebook, which allegedly was a tool of American intelligence, drug traffickers, and “sexually abnormal people” (Honwana 2013). Syria claimed in 2007 that Facebook was a potential “tool for Israeli penetration of Syrian Youth” (Lynch

2012).

Regime attempts to control the Internet often backfired, further radicalizing the online community. Tunisian bloggers and “hactivists” allied with the international hackers’ group “Anonymous” to publicize leaked U.S. cables that frankly discussed regime corruption and excesses. “Tunisians knew the basic information in the cables, of course,” “Tunileaks” translator Sami Ben Gharbia explained. “But they didn’t know the Americans knew it too. And when they read the cables, they no longer believed the Americans supported the regime. It brought the middle class out… They thought that without the United States, Ben Ali was very vulnerable” (in Sanger 2013,

285). Lynch (2012) compares Obama’s signal that he would not fight for Mubarak to

Gorbechev’s refusal to save the Honecker’s regime in East (47).

82 Meanwhile, first the online pictures of the brutally beaten corpse of an Egyptian blogger, Khalid Said, together with videos of blatant rigging of Egypt’s December

2010 elections, triggered new anti-regime demonstrations. By the beginning of 2011, a network of between 180 and 216 different Egyptian online, civil society, and other groups began ambitious plans for the largest anti-Mubarak demonstrations to date

(Aly 2011, 3).

Conclusion

The aging rulers of the Arab republics succeeded in prolonging their rule through manipulation of the rule-of-law and repression, but they grew increasingly unable to meet the needs of the new generation of citizens. Unable to envision a future under regimes that offered limited economic opportunity, a new generation of young adults sought alternative means of growth and self-expression. Youth immigration, religion, jihad, drug use and suicide all increased in the early 2000s, but the spread of a new youth online oppositional culture offered an alternative. By following popular Al Jazeera programing, bonding with other youth online, launching individual blogs or building opposition coalitions, young Arabs were able to focus their energies and gain a sense of purpose. Even youth without access to the Internet were affected by the new culture, drawn in by circles of friends, new resistance- inspired music, and even fashions (Lynch 2012; Honwana 2013; Onodera 2011;

Onodera 2015).

83 Social media did not create the conditions driving unrest, but it allowed citizens to reframe their circumstances, changing the dynamics of opposition. Regime efforts to control the flow of information became increasingly more difficult as first regional satellite television and then the Internet provided citizens with alternatives to regime-controlled media. Diamond (2010) coined the term “liberation technology” for the Internet, cell phones, and other technologies that allow citizens to “report news, expose wrongdoing, express opinions, mobilize protest, monitor elections, scrutinize government, deepen participation, and expand the horizons of freedom”

(70). This technology allowed the emergence of a broad youth coalition that crossed ideological and national boundaries, changing the balance of power between sclerotic regimes and the masses they had so long governed. Using technology, activists were able to mobilize larger and broader movements than before. Technology alone, however, could not give these new activists the coherence, discipline, or shared vision needed to maintain control of the movements they created.

84 Chapter 3: After Today No More Fear: The Arab Uprisings of 2011

The Arab Uprisings of 2011 began with tremendous hope, with millions of

Arab citizens turning out to demand freedom and opportunity. The grim results of their efforts—civil war, counterrevolution, and economic collapse—inadvertently paved the way for the spread of the Islamic State throughout the region. The connection between the two events lies not only in the institutional changes that took place as a result of the uprisings but the emotional rollercoaster experienced by the youth who spearheaded the revolts. The events that, at the time, they described as joyous, liberating, and transformational led to alienation, frustration, and diminished hopes.

An Islamic State was not on the agenda when the first demonstrators took to the streets of southern Tunisia in December 2010. Protestors overwhelmingly focused on jobs, an end to corruption, and democracy, rather than shari’a law. Activists in

Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria created broad ad hoc coalitions from deeply conservative Salafi imams to leftist, secular feminists. The shared grievances that brought these groups together could not, however, survive once the common enemy

—Ben Ali, Mubarak, Saleh, or Qadhafi—was ousted. The lack of common vision of who should rule next and what role Islam should play in the new regime’s direction undermined the prospect for stability. Further, new and untried governments were forced to deal with surviving elements of the old regimes, the erosion of state control, and increased threats from non-state actors such as al-Qa’ida. In the end, the incomplete social revolutions of the Arab Spring produced weak governments

85 incapable of satisfying the demands of the peoples who had risked their lives on the streets for change.

To trace how the results of the Arab Spring created the conditions that enabled the Islamic State to spread beyond its original base in Iraq, we must first review the events themselves. The key factors in the assessment are how the participants themselves experienced the events, how the uprisings brought new groups— particularly Islamists and Salafis—into power, the changed power balances within the governments and competing factions, and the eventual exclusion of the very groups that spearheaded the uprisings. As Egyptians, Tunisians, and Libyans positioned themselves to remake their governments, questions of religious ideology, local and tribal affiliation became increasingly salient. When not addressed, these cleavages threatened the coherence of the state, fueling local and leading to civil war in Libya and Yemen.

“A Volcano Waiting to Explode”

The Arab revolts of 2011, popularly known in the West as the Arab Spring, began with the self-immolation on December 17, 2010 of Tarek al-Tayeb Bouazizi, a

Tunisian fruit vender protesting the confiscation of his cart. Upon Bouazizi’s death on

January 4, 2011, roughly 5,000 demonstrators took to the street of Sidi Bouzid and neighboring Kasserine to denounce regime corruption and police brutality (Uppsala

2013). These demonstrations rapidly spread throughout Tunisia, expanding into demands for the ouster of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, whose extended family had used his 24 years in power to reap billions. On January 14, 2011, only ten days 86 after Bouazizi’s death, Ben Ali fled the country. Al-Jazeera’s Arabic-language news crews intensely covered the events of those ten days. These videos of snowballing demonstrations, crowds of Tunisians of all ages and classes, first standing together in moral outrage and later celebrating victory, played to an audience throughout the

Arab World.

Egypt was next. On January 17, following Bin Ali’s departure, crowds marched through Egyptian streets chanting “Ben Ali, tell Mubarak there is a plane waiting for him too” (Uppsala 2013). Demonstrations planned for January 25,

Egypt’s national “Police Day,” drew unprecedented crowds. As many as 10 million

Egyptians had joined the demonstrations by February 11, when Mubarak stepped down (Muzammil & Howard 2013, p. 58). Surveys found 83 percent of Egyptians supported Mubarak’s ouster (Gallup 2011).

A cascade of demonstrations and revolutionary movements throughout the

Arab World followed. Protests ranged from roughly 200 in Oman and 300 in Djibouti to 16,000 in Yemen (Muzammil & Howard 2013, p. 58). The protests were short- lived in most countries, as activists returned home after winning concessions such as cabinet changes, increased freedoms, and constitutional reforms. In four countries, however--Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and Syria-- peaceful protests quickly spiraled into violence. Four years later, three of these countries remain torn by tribal and sectarian power struggles, while the fourth—Bahrain—remains under emergency rule. Only

Tunisia has successfully established a new democratic system, using as a yardstick two successful elected changes-of-power.

87 Flash Mobs and Strange Bedfellows

The coalitions that took to the streets during the Arab Spring shared little beyond their common opposition to their ruling regimes. For a short time, the clashing interests of leftist and Islamist, poor and middle-class, tribe, region, and sect could be forgotten. Statements by demonstrators illustrate the degree to which activists collaborated across previously-insurmountable ideological lines. “Ideology now has taken a back seat until we can get rid of this nightmare confronting everyone,” one former Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood activist told reporters. “This nightmare is the ruling party and the current regime. This is everyone’s nightmare”

(Slackman 2011). A member of the leftist agreed, adding

“Nothing brings us together except our love for this country and the desire to reform it” (Slackman 2011). “I like the Brotherhood most, and they like me,” a self-described leftist, feminist Copt told . “They always have a hidden agenda, we know... But they are very good with organizing, they are calling for a civil state just like everyone else, so let them have a political party just like everyone else”

(Kirkpatrick 2011d).

The first groups out on the streets were the youths who had been most affected by economic stagnation. As discussed in chapter two, the patronage systems of the authoritarian regimes concentrated rewards among a few favored families or tribes.

As Ben Ali, Mubarak, and their fellow leaders grew progressively more isolated and corrupt, population growth strained their state’s capacity to provide the jobs and subsidies they used to buy populations’ tacit support. Between 1990 and 2011, the

88 population aged 15-29 has grown by 50 percent in Libya and Tunisia, 65 percent in

Egypt, and 125 percent in Yemen (Goldstone 2011). This generation was better educated than their parents, but with fewer job prospects. Half of all Tunisian graduates with a Masters degree were unemployed in 2010, while unemployment among Egyptian college graduates was ten times higher than among those with only an elementary school education (Noueihed & Warren, 2012; Goldstone 2011).

Shut out from the job market, without the money to marry or achieve full adult status, a growing group of young adults grew alienated from their governments.

“Most of us are under 30,” a 27-year old Egyptian April 6 Youth Movement organizer told reporters (Kirkpatrick and El-Naggar 2011). Similarly, a participant in

Tunisia’s first demonstrations noticed most of the protestors had been born after Ben

Ali took power in 1987. “These are the children of the regime, and they are turning against it”

What made the difference between the protests of 2011 and the many staged during the previous decade was participants’ success in recruiting a wider swath of society to join the protests. Lynch (2011; 2012; 2014c), Noueihed and Warren (2012), and Hussain and Howard (2013) are among the many scholars who attribute this difference to organizers’ use of social media to publicize their cause. One aspect of technology that has not yet been fully explored is the role social media played in connecting the poor rural youth of Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, and the other inland

Tunisian towns with the university-educated cyber activists in who had the technical skills to evade Internet censorship and publicize events for a wider

89 audience. The key appears to be the government-sponsored youth clubs, maisons de jeunes. As Honwana (2013) notes, these centers were originally intended to occupy unemployed young people and divert them from political action, but instead provided the free Internet links that allowed rural and urban youths to coordinate an uprising.

Even before Boazizi’s suicide, frustrated youth in Sidi Bouzid had staged weekly protests demanding jobs and redress for government land confiscations

(Rouissi 2010a; Rouissi 2010b; Pain 2012). Meanwhile, Tunisian cyber activists in

Tunis were collaborating with the hacker group Anonymous on projects to evade

Tunisia’s tight internet controls and to post recently-released WikiLeaks cables detailing the Ben Ali family’s corruption. Alerted to riots in the interior, the cyber activists traveled to Sidi Bouzid, Regueb and Kasserine, posting pictures of police attacks on demonstrators. This alliance across class and region transformed the incident from yet another sporadic local outburst to a national movement. The urban legends that grew up around Boazizi, the 26-year-old whose suicide triggered the first uprisings, are telling. While Boazizi left school before high school, the stories that circulated among youths in Tunis and Cairo described him as an unemployed university graduate—one of their own (Cohen 2011; Beaumont 2011; Campante and

Chor 2012).

Other groups joined in the protests as they continued and spread. The Tunisian

Bar Association called the nation’s lawyers out to protest on December 31, 2010 and then the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT)—Tunisia’s largest civil society organization. Suddenly, this was no longer a youth movement but a national

90 one. As the center of gravity shifted to Tunis, Sfaz and other coastal cities, so, too did the demonstrator’s demands . Instead of focusing on jobs, police abuse, and rural underdevelopment, the urban crowds demanded freedom of expression, civil liberties, and regime change. Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur’s analysis of total participation in

Tunisia’s demonstrations December 2010 through February 2011 is telling. While unemployed youths and workers dominated the initial demonstrations in the interior and suffered the brunt of police violence, government workers, university students, and other members of the professional middle class made up the majority of the total participants in the demonstrations.

On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali fled the country. A new transitional government took power. More than 500 political prisoners were released and Tunisia began the difficult process of negotiating a path towards elections. The demands of the early youth demonstrators were, however, left unmet. Youth played little role in the transitional or follow-on government. The average age of the members of the interim government was over 50 (Honwana 2013, 106). A few of the more prominent urban cyber-activists with university education profited, but jobs became scarcer than ever in the hinterlands as the economy contracted.

Journalists visiting Sidi Bouzid in subsequent months and years found growing bitterness among the residents. “There hasn’t been enough provided or offered,” a local economics professor told The New York Times in August 2011 “The few programs that came were late or insufficient. Young people expected something immediately. They expected that after taking this revolutionary step, there would be

91 some return, in terms of jobs but also recognition” (Fahim 2011). By June 2011, at least 107 Tunisians had imitated Bouazizi, committing suicide by self-immolation --

58 in Sidi Boazi alone-- but even this failed to draw government attention

(Khosrokhavar 2012, 172; Yehia 2015). The Governor of Sidi Bouzid told journalists in 2015 the central government had yet to follow through on promised investment projects in the town. "Not even one project" had been delivered, while the local unemployment rate is five times the national average (Yehia 2015).

Tunisia’s urban youth, too, have been disappointed. A March 2011 National

Democratic Institute (NDI) survey found “profound eagerness of young Tunisians to participate in the current democratic transition” (Collins 2011, 16), but already there were hints of future trouble. “No party represents us,” one participant complained.

“They were living the good life overseas while we were living in agony and suffering” (Collins 2011, 10). Young activists expressed concern over the continued role of members of the Ben Ali regime in the transitional government, the reimposition of Internet censorship, and continued police violence. “Young people were in the forefront of this revolution, but today they have been put aside,” a 24- year-old told Honwana (2013). “It is the older generation that is in the government and busy creating political parties” (109). Another asserted

Ben Ali has been in power for 23 years… and the generation of our parents did not openly confront the regime and take him out... Our generation made the revolution and got rid of Ben Ali, and now the older politicians are all… taking advantage of the change we created but completely disregarding us (112).

92 Tunisian youth voting behavior is another indication of their alienation from the political process. Tunisia’s Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) has extended voting registration deadlines before both the 2011 and 2014 elections in response to low participation. Youth comprised only about 10% of those who voted in the Tunis 2 electoral district in November 2014, the district polling director told reporters (Petré 2014). “I know many people who didn’t go vote because they feel excluded, they feel the revolution has been hijacked. Many political parties claim they stand for youth empowerment but it is nothing but “empty words, empty promises.”

Meanwhile, the legalization of Tunisia’s Ennahda (“Renaissance”) party changed the political equation. Ennahda had played little role in the ouster of Ben Ali.

The party had never regrouped from its near-eradication in the 1990s. “They have people who are 50 years old or 60 years old, but they don’t have anybody under 40 because of the repression,” one political rival noted (Kirkpatrick and Fahim 2011).

Over the decades in exile, power struggles between groups of exiles in and

London—fighting as much over personalities as issues—further weakened the party

(Pargeter 2013). By 2011, however, Ennhada’s remaining members had shed their earlier radicalism. Gannouchi told interviewers he had learned the benefits of democracy during his years of exile, comparing his envisioned role for Ennahda to that of the ruling Turkish AKP (Justice and Development Party).

From 1981 to this day, there have been many changes to the Muslim world, democratic thought has spread and Islamists have realized the danger of dictatorships, and the benefits of democracy. And they have also realized the harm of Islamic regimes that are not democratic such as the model seen in Afghanistan under the and Islamist Sudan (Ghannouchi 2011).

93 Ghannouchi’s endorsements of democracy and pledges to respect Tunisian freedoms only partially assuaged concern among Tunisia’s more secularized voters. He and his party gained strong support, however, from the peripheral regions that had long viewed Ben Ali’s secularization campaigns as attacks on their culture. Ennahda positioned itself as the answer to a widespread hunger in Tunisia for authenticity that grew out of a popular rejection of the Westernized, urbanite Ben Ali and his coterie.

Hamid (2014), who visited Tunisia immediately after Ben Ali’s ouster, noted

the changing character of society was immediately apparent, with a growing number of Tunisians dressing, speaking, and living differently. Mosque preachers, not accustomed to large crowds, reported rows of the devout lining up for prayer. It was almost as if the removal of a dictator allowed society to return to a more natural equilibrium (28).

Ennahda won a plurality in the October 2011 elections, with 37 percent of the popular vote and 41 percent of the seats. Tunisia, the most secularized Arab nation, was now governed by a coalition led by an Islamist party. Ennhada leaders, however, had neither lived in their country in recent years, had prior experience in government, nor built ties to many among the young people who grew increasingly disaffected from their new government.

Egypt: From Tahrir to the Sinai

In Egypt, too, youth spearheaded the 2011 revolt. Youths had pressed a low- level campaign against the Government for months, demanding answers for the June

2010 death in police custody of another young man, Khalid Said. Members of the

“We Are All Khalid Said” movement identified with the 28-year old university

94 graduate: single, unemployed, and “robbed of a future” (Ali 2012). As Egyptian student Amro Ali later wrote,

it was not just the manner of Khaled’s death that had disturbed me, but the deep reach of President Hosni Mubarak’s repressive police state into a neighborhood where I had grown up… Up until then, I naively thought that such things happened to other people, in the slums, Islamist strongholds, in prisons, on the news, Alexandria’s rural outskirts, or any “other area.” My area became that “other area.” (Ali 2012).

Earlier attempts to exploit public anger over Said’s murder, the blatant rigging of the

December 10, 2010 elections, economic decline, and Mubarak’s efforts to ensure his son Gamal’s succession, had all failed, but this time was different. Estimates of total participation range from 6 to 10 million (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2012, 11;

Muzzamil and Howard 2013, 58). The movement against Mubarak was not as broad as the Tunisia’s uprising, but it benefited from Egypt’s stronger civil society. A majority (55 percent) of those participating in the Egyptian Revolution came from middle class occupations. But only 9 percent were workers, 3 percent were students, and 5 percent were unemployed . Unlike Tunisia, the demonstrations were primarily an urban phenomenon, with the notable exception of the Sinai Peninsula.

Beissinger and his colleagues’ figures demonstrate the success of the youth coalitions in tapping into larger pools of popular discontent. At the beginning, it was indeed the youths who launched the demonstrations in and other city centers. By the time Mubarak departed, these committed youths accounted for less than a tenth of those out on the streets. As an unorganized minority, the young activists had little leverage or voice in the transition government. As Lynch notes, the

95 “leaderless crowd was unable to agree on anything more than the simple, clear demand that Mubarak must go” (97). Once that demand had been fulfilled, the youth activists who remained in Tahrir Square pressing for further change grew increasingly isolate and powerless. The group that did gain immediate influence in the aftermath of Tahrir Square—the Muslim Brotherhood—arrived late to Tahrir Square, but had the organizational savvy to take advantage of the new power vacuum.

Most Tunisian and Egyptian demonstrators expressed support for Islam, but religion played little role in the initial Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings. Ninety-two percent of Egyptians polled by Gallup in April 2011 supported freedom of speech,

76% agreed with the statement that freedom of religion should be written into Egypt’s new constitution, and 64 percent advocated a democratic form of government; only 1 percent expressed support for creating an Islamic Republic (Gallup 2011, 22). Only 6 percent of the Tunisians polled and 2 percent of Egyptians queried told the Arab

Barometer Survey they had protested in hopes of replacing their current government with an Islamic regime (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015). The groups that did seek to form an Islamic government were also the ones with the ability to take advantage of the political openings provided by the Arab Spring uprisings: the

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and previously apolitical Salafi groups such as Ad-

Da'wa As-Salafiya (Islamic Call).

The Islamists

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was neither willing nor able to quickly respond to the initial calls for protests. The party was deeply riven by internal debate 96 and reeling from the worst crackdown since the 1960s . Some 6,000 Brothers had been arrested in the past year, according to the Brotherhood’s lawyers; 1,200-1,300 in the past two months (Worth and El-Naggar 2010; Levinson and Khalil 2010;

Ikhwanweb 2011a). Brotherhood leaders initially expected the Mubarak regime to quickly squash the demonstrations, as it had earlier protests, and feared participating would draw additional oppression. They were quick to denounce Interior Ministry allegations that they had “instigated” the Tahrir Square protests (Fahim and El-

Naggar 2011). "The protest in Tahrir Square erupted in a spontaneous way (and) the government knows exactly who participated in the protests, Brotherhood Guidance

Bureau Spokesman Essam al-‘Arayn told journalists (AKI News 2011)."

The Brotherhood also was wary of inadvertently providing their regimes with justification for portraying the demonstrations as Islamist. “If it’s ever perceived that this revolution is an Islamic one,” one Brotherhood activist told Hamid (2014), “the

U.S. and others will be able to justify a crackdown” (140). Brotherhood expectations were shaped by experience. They cited the Algerian military’s refusal to seat the victorious Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1991 and the Western of the democratically elected Government in Gaza as proof that Washington would block any Islamist attempt to gain power (Hamid 2015, 11). On January 24, the day before the scheduled first demonstration, the Brotherhood’s public website reminded readers “this nation is too precious to be the subject of our experiments and games!”

(Ikhwanweb 2011b). A slow, cautious approach better protected the Brotherhood’s investment in outreach and the slow, gradual conversion of Egyptian society. 97 This conservatism at the top clashed with the eagerness of many younger

Brotherhood activists to seize the moment. Young Brothers pressed their leaders in the days leading up to January 25 first to throw the organization’s weight behind the protests and then, failing that, to allow them to participate as individuals. “As young people,” one recalled, “we were not afraid” (Wickham 2013, 157). This was the moment for the shabab al-Ikhwan (Brotherhood youth)—the cadre of young, urban, and university-educated Brotherhood members who had explored blogging and

Facebook, collaborated with their secular counterparts in the Kefiya and April 6 movements, and pressed their leaders to protest the December 10 vote-rigging more strongly. “We told them we’re not going to stay home,” one of the youth recalled, suggesting the Brotherhood leaders faced a party split had they forbidden the youth to participate (Wickham 2013, 160). By allowing the youth to participate as individuals while publicly reiterating the party’s neutrality, Brotherhood leaders covered for dual eventualities—they had deniability, should the regime succeed in repressing the demonstrations while the ability to claim participation from the start, should the uprising succeed.

The size of the turnout on January 25—in the millions, far exceeding all previous anti-Mubarak protests—changed the equation. The next day, Brotherhood leader Mohammed El-Beltagy announced "the Brotherhood will take part in any future popular events and we will pay the price like the rest (AKI News 2011). Then- parliamentary block leader Mohammed Morsi clarified, "We are not pushing this movement, but we are moving with it. We don't wish to lead it but we want to be part

98 of it" (Beaumont and Shenker 2011). Within hours, Morsi and 36 other Brotherhood leaders were arrested, but the organization maintained its new commitment.

The Brotherhood’s contribution to the uprisings proved vital. The group brought hundreds of thousands of committed demonstrators to the streets and squares, as well as structure, organization, and international networks to crowds of unorganized youths. In Tahrir Square, Brothers took to the front lines, providing organization, public address systems, medical care, and defending demonstrators against regime-backed thugs (Lynch 2012). “The youth of the Muslim Brotherhood played a really big role,” April 6 organizer Ahmed Maher recalled. “But actually so did the soccer fans” of Egypt’s two leading teams. “These are always used to having confrontations with police at the stadiums”

Meanwhile, Bedouins in North Sinai had launched their own protests on

January 25, demanding the release of thousands of local tribesmen jailed by the

Mubarak regime on smuggling, terrorist, and other charges. By evening, demonstrators in Suez reported some 110 casualties, with local hospitals and morgues filled to overflowing (El-Ghobashy 2011). Over the next three days, armed Bedouin sacked security compounds in Suez and Rafah, burned police and fire stations, and took control of key towns.

Mass jail releases on January 28—meant to cow middle class demonstrators by sowing chaos and fear for personal security—strengthened the Sinai rebellion as thousands of jailed tribesmen returned home (Bahgat 2014; Sabry 2015). “The police left the city on January 29, 2011 at 4 p.m. heading to Cairo and never came back,”

99 one North Sinai activist told (Elyan 2012). Bedouin tribes who had long chafed at Cairo’s heavy handed police rule burned down the regional State Security

Investigations headquarters in Rafah and attacked the local police station and other official buildings. The attacks continued and, by August, Cairo had lost control of much of the Sinai Peninsula. In August, journalists also reported the local economy had been “transformed” by the unconstrained smuggling of cars, weapons, and construction materials into Gaza (Kirkpatrick 2011c).

The Military Steps In: Tunisia and Egypt

The pattern of events during and following the Arab Spring highlighted critical role of militaries in determining regime survival. Goldstone notes “sultanic” leaders—authoritarians who rule through cults of personality and patronage-- often divide their militaries under numerous commands in order to reduce the likelihood of a coup (Goldstone 2011). A favored personal guard, often either from the leaders’ tribe or recruited from abroad, draws the lion’s share of military spending. The result is potentially fatal, if the ruler succeeds in so thoroughly alienating the military that they view a regime crisis as a choice between defending an individual or their country. The military that ousts a leader in this case may enter the transition as the most powerful political player, allowing military leaders to dominate the transition.

Conversely, a leader who deliberately keeps the military divided and weak or manipulates tribal and ethnic ties to ensure loyalty may survive, even in the face of widespread popular opposition. If the leader does eventually fall, however, the nation is more likely to face severe splits, if not civil war. 100 Egypt and Tunisia provided the two Arab Spring examples of militaries that turned on their leaders. The difference in the trajectories of the follow-on government illustrates the role of military cohesion in both democratic transitions and long-term stability. Ben Ali marginalized the Tunisian military out of fear of a coup, “We were driven into beggardom by the Ben Ali regime,” reported one officer (Pearlman 2013, p. 395). Army Chief of Staff Rachid Ammar refused Ben Ali’s order to fire on demonstrators in Tunis and urged Ben Ali instead to leave the country (Noueihed &

Warren 2012, p. 76; Pearlman 2013; Steinman 2012). The Tunisian military thus entered the transition period with significant popular credibility, but not as a powerful political player or an entity capable of addressing the multiple security challenges that followed.

Egyptian troops’ break with Mubarak was similarly decisive. While Mubarak was himself a former Army officer, he had grown increasingly distant from the military in his last decade of power, preferring instead to cultivate business leaders

(Steinman 2012). He had continued to allow the military to expand its real estate and industrial investments, which may have accounted for as much as 40 percent of the

Egyptian economy (Nepstad 2013, 342), but those investments would have been at risk had come to power and followed through on his privatization plans. By supporting Mubarak’s ouster, the Egyptian military both gained popular legitimacy and eliminated a potential threat to its economic interests. (Saideman

2012, 718).

101 Further, the military’s intervention left it intact and in a strong position to protect its interests against new challengers. The Supreme Council of the Armed

Forces (SCAF) assumed transitional rule upon Mubarak’s ouster, portraying itself as of not just Egyptian national security, but the revolution itself. The military attempted to shape the debate over constitutional revisions to protect its prerogatives and court liberal support against the strengthened Muslim Brotherhood.

The SCAF’s committee of legal experts appointed in February 2011 to amend the

1979 Constitution met behind closed doors. Only the Muslim Brotherhood had a single representative on the committee; all other groups who had participated in the uprising were excluded (Moustafa 2012, 3).

Egyptian military leaders repeatedly placed their own judgment of the national interests above democratic principles. The SCAF pushed through a national referendum on initial constitutional changes containing protections for military budgets and authority was pushed through in March 2011, portraying the move as necessary before it would surrender power. “The military is aware of the demands of the people,” it announced in response to criticism, “but wants to underline the need for the return of normal life to Egypt” (MacFarquhar 2011).

In the face of ongoing confrontation with the military, the Muslim

Brotherhood abandoned both its initial alliance with the SCAF and its pledges not to seek a parliamentary majority or the presidency. Brotherhood leaders determined they could only “protect the revolution” by acquiring power. The Brotherhood was the largest and best organized political party in Egypt, following the dissolution of

102 Mubarak’s NDP. In contrast to its newly-established secular rivals, who appealed to a relatively small urban base, the Brotherhood had built deep ties in the rural population through decades of social welfare programs. The Brotherhood won a plurality in the elections (37 percent) and, by forming a coalition with newly-formed Salafi parties, such as al-Nour, the Brotherhood, created an Islamist governing coalition holding nearly 75 percent of the seats in the People’s Assembly (Hamid 2015, 149).

Despite the Brotherhood and Salafis’ claim to an electoral mandate, the military continued to claim veto power. General Mukhtar al-Mulla’s December 2011 comments on the military’s confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood were telling.

Al-Mulla claimed the parliament was unrepresentative of Egyptians’ “true” interests or outlook.

So whatever the majority in the People’s Assembly, they are very welcome, because they won’t have the ability to impose anything that the people don’t want… Do you think that the Egyptians elected someone to threaten his interest and economy and security and relations with international community? Of course not” (Kirkpatrick 2011b).

Mohammed Morsi, long identified with the Brotherhood’s more conservative wing, drew 57 percent of the national vote in a June 2012 contest against Mubarak’s last prime minister, Ahmed Mohamed Shafik Zaki (Kirkpatrick 2012). The election— between a conservative Islamist and a man once at the heart of the hated former regime—sidelined the urban liberals, youths, and secularists who had spearheaded the earlier uprisings. Instead of jobs and new freedoms, the political debate increasingly centered on Islamization and the Brotherhood’s attempts to undermine military

103 power. Before long, the youths returned to the street to demand another regime change—this time, with military backing from the start.

Divided Nations, Divided Militaries

The uprisings in Libya, Syria, and Yemen also involved a mix of urban and rural youths, Islamists, and Salafis, but tribal, ethnic, and sectarian divisions added additional complexity to the mix. Authoritarian regimes had not eliminated the deep divisions within their societies, but repressed them. As Tilly (1994) observed in his study of Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, “the weakening of the central power forwarded a quasi-revolutionary situation; it introduced uncertainty into each particular compact between a recognized group and the center” (143).

Ousting a dictator in this situation translated to not merely overturning a ruler and his coterie, but upsetting the power balances among myriad competing groups.

Posen’s (1993) application of the security dilemma to domestic conflict is salient.

There is an incentive for sub-national groups facing sudden domestic anarchy to move quickly to assert their right to territory and resources, particularly in situations where a region is awash in weaponry. Posen notes, “an historical record of large-scale armed clashes, much less wholesale mistreatment of unarmed civilians, however subjective, will further the tendency for groups to see other groups as threats” (31).

In Syria, Bashar al-Assad successfully linked his continuance in power with the survival of Syria’s minority sects—Christian, Druze, Ismaili and his own Alawite faction--faced with an overwhelming Sunni-majority opposition. In a democracy, the

74 percent Sunni majority would, he projected, dominate and oppress the minorities . 104 In Libya and Syria, too, Qadhafi and Saleh had promoted their native tribes and regions, ensuring that an uprising against the leader would engage large groups who stood to lose favored positions in a revolution. These dictators’ success in preventing any other individual or group within their government from gaining enough power or legitimacy to build an independent power base meant that their departure left a hollow , without popular legitimacy or even routine operating procedures for carrying out normal government duties.

Assad, Qadhafi, and Saleh maintained patrimonial control over segments of the military, which allowed them and their tribe or sect to hold off other groups contending for power. The military in all three countries split along the tribal and sectarian lines when faced with uprisings, leading to substantial bloodshed. The outcome of each contest depended upon the balance of power between loyalist and defecting segments of the military and the willingness of outside actors to intervene.

Ongoing bloodshed and civil war in all three of these countries—Yemen, Libya, and

Syria—suggests that sultanic manipulation of existing tribal and sectarian divisions in their societies for their own benefit proves disastrous for their nations in the longer term.

President Saleh’s attempts to solidify his personal control by promoting members of his own family and tribe shaped the splits within the Yemeni military after demonstrations spread to Sana and Aden in March 2011. “In Yemen we don’t really have a military as an institution,” commented one Yemeni analyst. “We have tribal factions in uniform, many of whom can be bought over to the other side”

105 (Steinman 2012). President Saleh had attempted to control the military by placing his own relatives in key command positions. His son and heir, Ahmed Saleh, commanded the elite Republican Guard and Special Forces. A younger son, Khalid Ali Abdullah

Saleh, commanded a specially created division, while nephews, cousins, and a half- brother commanded the National Security Bureau, the Air Force, and Presidential

Guard (Winter 2011, 1). Despite this attempt at control, officers and troops from other tribes, quickly defected, followed by members of Saleh’s own tribe who opposed

Ahmed Saleh’s designated succession (Hale 2013, 346; Winter 2011, 3). Ahmed

Saleh’s Republican Guard, meanwhile, readily fired on both demonstrators and defecting troops (Batty 2011). Hale cites the pattern of military defections in Yemen provides “a stronger case than is typically made… that elite defection, competition, or bet-hedging linked to anticipated succession created conditions crucial to the cascade of protest and revolution engulfing some countries and not others” (Hale 2013, 346).

This weakened and divided military contributed both to Sana’a’s rapid loss of territory in the wake of the Arab Spring and the ultimate breakdown of the government. Yemen had one of the highest population growth rates on the planet, with two-thirds of the population living below poverty (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2012,

900). Unification of the two formerly warring states of North and South Yemen was formally completed in 1994, after a civil war, but Sana’s control in the south remained tenuous. An ongoing uprisings by the Zaidis—a Shi’a minority, a new southern secession movement in 2007, and a growing al-Qa’ida threat all threatened the peace.

106 Meanwhile, President Saleh focused on consolidating his control by reserving key jobs and benefits for members of his own and allied tribes. The uprisings of 2011 thus became a confrontation of tribes, regions—exacerbating the north-south split that already had driven civil wars in the 1970s and 1994—and sects. The Sana’a

University students who demonstrated in their own local Tahrir Square sought freedoms, democracy, and an end to corruption, but the forces they and their fellow demonstrators unleashed undermined the weak ties that held together their fragile nation. President Saleh’s resignation in November 2011 led not to a new start, but to a slow slide to civil war.

Libya and Syria: A Swift Turn to Violence

In Libya, the military also split along patronage lines. Following the divide- and-conquer strategy described by Goldstone (2011), Qadhafi neglected the established Libyan military in favor of creating special “regime protection units” staffed by members of his own tribe or mercenaries recruited from sub-Saharan

Africa (Goldstone 2011; Steinman 2012). By the time of the 2011 uprisings, these special units were twice the size of Libya’s official army While members of Libya’s professional army refused to fire on demonstrators, Qadhafi’s personal forces cracked down brutally, shelling civilian areas and killing more than a thousand civilians in the first week of demonstrations alone (Dziadosz 2011). As Steinman (2012) notes, the members of these units--commanded by Qadhafi’s sons--weren’t fighting just to protect the regime, but for their own survival.

107 The uprisings began Benghazi, Libya’s former capitol under King Idris, and quickly spread through the northeast province of Cyrenaica. This was Libya’s religious heartland and the center for a failed 1990 uprising against Qadhafi.

Documents captured in Sinjar, Iraq, in 2007 revealed 52 youths from Derna had joined al-Qa’ida in Iraq—more than from any other town (Felter and Fishman 2007,

11). More than faith propelled radicalism in the region. This area was the home to the monarchy that Qadhafi had deposed and residents resented a perceived shift of money and power away to the lands of Qadhafi’s tribal base.

Members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and the Libyan

Muslim Brotherhood soon abandoned their truce with the Qadhafi regime. Veterans of the Afghan War, hardened by years in Abu Salim prison, soon founded multiple militias: The 17 February Coalition in Benghazi, the Abu Salim Martyrs Battalion in

Derna, the Umar al-Mukhtar Battalion, and more . Muslim Brotherhood leaders launched new media outlets-- Sabil Rahid, Shabab Libya, and Libya Lion—to publicize the fight while coordinating with Tunsia’s Ennahda and Brothers in Egypt and Qatar to provide aid and supplies to civilians caught in the cross-fire

Meanwhile, defectors from the national army, secular activists in , and a broad range of other tribes and regional groups formed their own militias throughout the country. Support for the revolution cut across the Libya’s spectrum of tribes, ethnic and regional groups—excepting the three tribes at the heart of the

Qadhafi regime . Qadhafi’s decades of efforts to undermine tribal authority had succeeded to the point where tribal leaders only controlled part of their nominal

108 followings. Militias based on sect, civil society group, and city or town competed for members, defying traditional lines of authority. The National Transitional Council

(NTC), formed in Benghazi in late February to coordinate the uprising, raised the old monarchical flag and asserted national leadership, but had no power to enforce its writ.

The absence of a core national military undercut the National Transition

Council’s (NTC) efforts to assert authority over the hundreds of armed militias that emerged in the course of the Libyan uprising. The NTC’s Defense Ministry had neither the military strength to dominate the militias nor the tradition of a truly national military to draw upon. Much of the Libyan population, moreover, had come to view the national military as a foreign mercenary force that existed to oppress them, rather than protect the national interest. At the time of Qadhafi’s death, analysts with the Geneva-based European consortium Small Arms Survey assessed that 75 to

85 percent of the seasoned fighters belonged to revolutionary militias and brigades which acknowledged no government oversight (McQuinn 2012, 13). With no overarching authority, conflicts over turf, ideology, and lucrative smuggling routes soon grew common.

Bashar al-Assad has survived to date by drawing support from abroad, as well as manipulating fears both of regime retribution and terrorist takeover. As in Libya and Yemen, Bashar’s relatives controlled top military positions and as much as 90 percent of the military leadership was drawn from al-Assad’s minority Alawite sect

(Nepstad 2013, 344). Conscript Sunni troops began defecting rather than fire on

109 unarmed demonstrators as early as April 2011 (Chulov 2011). While the strength of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) dropped from an estimated 220,000 soldiers to about

65,000 two years later, the surviving strength represented a committed core of

Alawites that saw their own survival linked to the Assad regime (Holliday 2013, 27).

Assad has survived by bolstering this core with an influx of foreign Shia fighters from

Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon and—more recently—drawing on Russian air support.

Israel’s Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorist Information Center calculated in 2014 that the number of foreign Shia volunteers fighting for the regime outnumbered the

Sunni foreign fighters in the opposition (Weiss & Hassan 2015, 141). The result of the increased sectarianization of the Syrian military was thus increased division among Syrian religious groups as a whole in a negative cycle that contributes to violence and radicalization on all sides of the conflict.

‘Standing Up:’ The Emotions of Rebellion

To understand the full impact of the Arab Spring uprisings—and their failures--on participants, one must recognize participation as a deeply emotional and transformative experience. Kuran (1991) and Weyland write of the sudden explosion of ‘revolutionary bandwaggoning’ as individuals who previously had falsified their preferences—pretended to support the regime—realize a majority of their peers share their opinion. The sudden emergence of a previously silent majority changes the cost- benefit assessment of opposition, so that it becomes a rational choice to join the new majority.

110 While salient, rational choice analyses discount the most important element-- how the participants experienced the moment. Pearlman (2013) documents demonstrators’ assessment that they were likely to be killed for “standing up,” making participation anything but a rational choice. The driving force was moral outrage over regime abuses, coupled with a sense that the situation had grown so bad that they had little to lose. “If you speak, you die. If you stay silent, you die. So speak, and die,” one banner read (Lynch 2012, 115). Bouazizi’s sister described his suicide as a “rebellion against insult,” pushed by “oppression, injustice, and despotism…”

(Pearlman 2013, 395). “(Mubarak) took a proud and ancient civilization and presided over the virtual collapse of its citizens’ sense of public empowerment and political engagement,” claimed Egyptian activist Ashraf Khalil (Pearlman 2013, 396). “A person like (Ben Ali) could sell the country,” commented one Tunisian businessman

(Noueihed & Warren 2012, 72).

John-Pierre Reed theorizes that moral outrage, moral indignation, and revulsions drive popular rejection of previously accepted regimes (2004, 653). Reed divides “delegitimizing” events into three categories: those driven by the state itself, those instigated by revolutionaries, and “contingent accelerators”—unexpected events with deep moral and emotional significance. Through this lens, Bouazizi’s suicide provided that decisive moment in triggering pent-up anger because it captured and vividly expressed the frustrations of millions of his compatriots. Tunisian union leader Attia Aghmouni’s description of the moment supports Reed’s argument. “The

111 fear had begun to melt away and we were a volcano that was going to explode. And when Bouazizi burnt himself, we were ready” (Noueihed & Warren 2012, 74).

Aghmouni was only one of many demonstrators who mentioned overcoming fear as a critical and deliberate step both to joining the revolt and claiming a new identity. “I learned to say no, I am not a coward anymore,” explained one 40-year-old camped in Tahrir Square. “I am Egyptian again, not marginalized, not without value or dignity” (Pearlman 2013, 398). Marchers carried signs declaring, “After today, no more fear” (Pearlman 2013, 394). A Syrian activist insisted “if we don’t take advantage of this opportunity, we will remain cowards forever” (Lynch 2012, 180).

Another Syrian described a euphoric experience in which “you visualize all the walls of fear and the markers of humiliation falling, continuing your hysterical chanting because for the first time you can hear your voice” (Pearlman 2013, 390). As Selbin noted, “Revolutions are about passionate commitment.” (Selbin 2003, 89).

The strength of these emotions contributed to the ferocity of the battles to control the direction of the revolutions in subsequent months and years. Former allies in Tahrir Square or the battles for Tripoli denounced each other’s ‘betrayals’ of the revolution. Revolutionary legitimacy mattered once the ancien régimes fell. Men and women who had risked their lives on the streets of Cairo, Benghazi or felt they had earned the right to a say in their country’s future. For most, however, their living and working conditions only declined.

Many veterans of the Arab Spring uprisings continue to search for a purpose in their lives and to recapture the euphoria of the Arab Spring. Others have given up.

112 Both the Tunisian and Egyptian Ministries of Health report the nation’s addiction rate has increased since the revolution . One Tunisian survey estimated the in youth drug and alcohol use since the revolution at 70 percent (Guizani 2015). Tunisian sociologist Tarek Belhaj Mohammed links the surge in drug use to the revolution.

After the revolution, smoking marijuana became a way for users to show their strength, rebellion, and “manliness” (Guizani 2015). "Following the revolution, it has become very difficult to control the actions of the students,” one middle school teacher observed. “They no longer have respect for teachers or even the principal.

Verbal and physical assault against teachers has increased greatly” (Zebais 2013).

Meanwhile, youth suicide rates in Tunisia and Egypt have soared since 2011

(Tarek 2015; Ajroudi 2015; Fadel 2015). “Without question, the number of the

‘Bouazizis’ committing suicide is increasing month by month,” one Tunisian reporter observes (al-Araby 2015). A 23-year-old Egyptian activist who had marched in Tahrir in 2011 wrote on , "There's no justice... We're lying to ourselves just to live,” shortly before taking her own life (in Sommer 2014). Another activist tweeted in response, “Zeinab Al Mahdi's suicide out of political frustration is 1 of 2 options

Egyptian youth are left with, the other is violent radicalization (in Sommer 2014).”

Anecdotal reports suggest Libya, Syria, and Yemen also are experiencing dramatic increase in youth suicides and addiction, but wartime conditions preclude the collection of reliable data (Dettmer 2013; Shaw and Mangan 2014).

113 Conclusion

Social revolutions are, by definition, dangerous, unpredictable, and most likely to fail. Even the few that succeed are followed by periods of uncertainty, if not violence. The sheer number of factions that turned out to join the demonstrations or fight against Qadhafi. Saleh or Assad guaranteed a clash of visions for the future.

Groups that had suffered under the old regime sought redress, including regional, ethnic, and tribal groups. Returning exiles, Islamists, and other interest groups pressed their own solutions, while elites from previous regimes—particularly the militaries—fought attempts to curb their longstanding prerogatives. The contests among these groups led to civil war in Libya, Syria, and—ultimately—Yemen. The educated urban liberals who demonstrated for democracy are minorities in every country, without the numbers to win elections nor the strength to prevail against armed groups in civil war. To date, Landis’s (2016) bleak assessment has held more true than not:

Middle Eastern potentates have built states that are a reflection of themselves; they collapse when the dictator and his family are changed. They do not have professional civil services and are not built on solid institutional foundations. Regime change brings state collapse.

The group that sparked the revolutions—the youth—perhaps lost the most in the aftermath. Counterrevolution, civil war, and economic decline have ensured that the prospects for jobs, economic opportunity, and personal freedom have declined.

Youth in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere are more marginalized and alienated from their governments than before. Meanwhile, continued civil war in Libya, Syria, and

114 Yemen has destroyed the nations’ economies and educational systems. The slums of

Tunis and Nasr City, refugee camps of Ras Ajdir and Azraq, and backwaters of Sidi

Bouzid and Rafah are fertile recruiting grounds for new jihadis. The revolution that once seemed likely to render al Qa’ida irrelevant instead provided it with one more chance.

115 Chapter 4: Al Qa’ida Exploits the New Openings Oh how great are these days we are living. Praise Allah who has lengthened our life to witness these great events and momentous happenings and to view with or own eyes the fall of the Arab tyrants—Those slaves of America—and the collapse of their regimes. Ayman al-Zawahiri, October 14 2011

The aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings created several openings for the spread of the Salafi-jihad. None of the new governments in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, or

Yemen were able or willing to maintain their predecessor’s strong relationships with their security services. Revolts in peripheral regions carved out areas with minimal state control, allowing newly freed jihadis to use captured weapons to carve out safe havens. Meanwhile, the removal of longstanding controls on Islamist discourse allowed new al-Qa’ida-associated groups to rebrand themselves and work publicly to recruit and press their demands for shari’a-based governments. This proliferation of local al-Qa’ida-aligned groups in turn provided the recruitment base for Islamic

State in 2014, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared a caliphate and called on jihadis to switch their loyalty to him.

None of these developments were inevitable. The al-Qa’ida leadership was initially unprepared for the breakout of demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt. Al-

Qa’ida’s raison d’être was the overthrow of Muslim world regimes and their replacement by Islamic governments, yet the Arab Spring ran counter to their basic understanding of how the process would take place. Al-Qa’ida strategists posited that the regimes, with America’s backing, were too strong to ever be overthrown without first forcing a U.S. withdrawal. Bin Laden envisioned his group as a revolutionary vanguard that aimed both to radicalize the Muslim community and 116 provoke the violence that would drive the U.S. from the region and allow the overthrow of regional governments.

Instead, the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes fell with comparatively little violence and no interference from the United States—except in Libya, where the

U.S. intervened in support of the rebels, rather than to prop up its ally. Even worse, the demonstrators who forced the dictator’s ousters were not the anticipated al-

Qa’ida-led Salafi-jihadi vanguard, but a spontaneous cross-section of the population.

Alliances ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis to secular groups demanded democracy, an end to corruption, and economic progress—not shari’a- based government. Elections installed Islamist governments in Tunisia and Egypt, undermining al-Qa’ida’s claim that the United States would never permit Islamic rule and depriving al-Qa’ida of one of their chief justifications for jihad.

Al-Zawahiri’s response to the Arab Spring in a series of taped statements illustrates al-Qa’ida’s initial unpreparedness for these developments. Two taped statements released in January 2011 made no mention of the protests in Tunisia, which by then had been growing for a month. Al-Zawahiri appears rather to be warning his Egyptian audience against premature attempts to overthrow the Mubarak regime. Al-Zawahiri directs listeners to the perceived U.S. role propping up regimes, urging them, “let us focus our efforts on this American-Zionist hostile enemy and its sponsors” . Lahoud notes “al-Zawahiri’s response reveals a combination of evolution and confusion: his discourse is evolving in the sense that his typical jihadist rhetoric

117 is vague at best, but confused in that he does not have a clear vision of the role the jihadists will play in the changing climate” (6).

Internal al-Qa’ida documents also reveal the group’ initial struggle to respond to the uprisings. Al-Qa’ida general manager ‘Attiyatullah ur-Rehman (true name

Jamal Ibrahim Ishtaywi al-Misrati) expressed concern in April 2011 that Bin Laden had not yet spoken publicly on the demonstrations. ‘Attiyatullah confessed in a

March 2011 communiqué to supporters in his native Libya that “It is true that it is not the best and not exactly as we hoped, but the removal of some evil or much evil is something which pleases to all people. We hope that this is a good step ahead for even more good in the future” (Atiyyatullah 2011, 1).

Both Atiyatullah’s message and letters between Bin Laden and his advisors recovered at Abbottabad reveal the strategists regrouped quickly. Holbrooke (2012) discerned four major themes in al-Qa’ida’s subsequent messaging. First, al-Qa’ida leaders urged Muslims to see the revolutions as merely the first step in the process that would eventually lead to a pan-Islamic caliphate. Bin Laden wrote Atiyyatullah

…(T)hough the Mujahedin have several duties to perform, their main duty now is to support the revolutions taking place… We at the moment should exert our efforts to guide them and to prevent their being represented by the half-solution people such as (the Muslim) Brotherhood, and we hope that the next stage will be the reinstating of the rule of the Caliphate” (Bin Laden 2011b).

Al-Qa’ida’s second dominant theme was to portray itself as the natural vanguard for the uprisings. Zawahiri insisted the revolutions could only have taken place because of al-Qa’ida’s attacks on the United States. “America’s decline and

118 change in its policies to support the titan tyrants… did not happen but as a direct result of the blessed battles in New York and Washington and Pennsylvania… “ . In a March article in al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s magazine Inspire, al-Zawahiri warned followers “there must be an organization and leading change, guiding its progress…” (al-Zawahiri 2011a, 35). Abu Shuhail—probably a pseudonym for al-Qa’ida media director Adam Gadahn--similarly recast al-Qa’ida as the vanguard of the movement. Abu Suhail insisted that the demonstrations proved

“al-Qa’ida’s rage is shared by the millions of Muslims across the world… This is what your brothers in the al-Qa’ida Organizations and other jihadi organizations have been working for: inspiring the people all over the world to rise up for the

Islamic cause…” (Abu Suhail 2011, 44).

The two remaining themes of al-Qa’ida’s response to the Arab Spring focused on the group’s vision for the future. Muslims were warned against succumbing to the attractions of democracy, and assured that al-Qa’ida’s vision of a true Islamic state was the only one capable of delivering true happiness. In his sole public statement on the Arab Spring, posthumously released on May 18, 2011, Bin Laden insisted

this revolution was not one about food and clothes, but a revolution of glory and defiance… Sons of my Muslim umma, you are before a dangerous crossroads and a great, rare and historic opportunity to… be liberated from enslavement to the wishes of the rulers and the man-made laws and the Western domination…. I remind the honest ones that establishing a council that provides opinion and advice to the Muslim people in all the important fields is a shari’a duty, and most significantly one (including) the zealous ones (namely, al-Qa’ida) who have given early advise about the necessity to uproot these oppressive regimes… (in Burke 2011).

119 For Bin Laden and his followers, the root cause of the fallen regimes’ corruption and oppression was their deviation from the true faith. Establishing follow-on regime not based exclusively on shari’a would leave the revolutions “half-complete.”

“Democracy,” al-Zawahiri warned, “in truth is neither principles nor morals nor values… it is (a) religion that stands on worshipping the desire of majority.” (al-

Zawahiri 2011b).

Even as al-Qa’ida leaders recast their public messaging, they sought other opportunities to exploit the uprisings. Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi (2012), surveyed

101 jihadi writings on the Arab Spring, and found al-Qa’ida and its supporters focused on four advantages they expected to gain from the Arab Spring uprisings.

Jihadis noted the release of thousands of jailed militants, weakened governments’ withdrawal from contested areas such as Sinai, , and Yemen’s Abyan

Governorates, and allied capture of stores, especially in Libya. They interpreted the fall of U.S. allies such as Mubarak as defeats for the West. Jihadis also anticipated new opportunities for proselytization and recruiting under follow-on regimes, particularly the Islamist-led governments in Tunisia and Egypt.

One source of al-Qa’ida’s optimism was the escape and release of thousands of supporters, including senior leaders, from jails in Egypt, Syria, Libya and Tunisia.

The released prisoners included several of al-Qa’ida and its affiliates’ most experienced leaders. The precise number of jihadis freed is unknown. In addition to destroyed records, particularly in Libya, there is no reliable data on the number of prisoners radicalized while in prison. New governments also removed thousands of

120 known jihadis from their watch lists, allowing them to travel freely. The cumulative effect of these pardons was to create a vocal Salafi opposition pressing new regimes to implement shari’a while enabling a surge of jihadi activity throughout the region.

Increased crime resulting from the accompanying release of tens of thousands of criminals further added to social stresses and demands on follow-on governments.

The new political openness also allowed al-Qa’ida to follow through on a plan to rebrand the group locally, creating legal front groups able to openly proselytize and advocate the al-Qa’ida program. A letter captured in Abbottabad reveals that a Bin

Laden advisor had suggested changing the al-Qa’ida’s name to one that directly referenced the groups “broader mission to unify the (Muslim) nation” (al-Qa'ida

Member, 2012). Separately, an ideologue writing under the alias Abdullah bin

Mohammed published an internal paper in Spring 2011 that argued al-Qa’ida should exploit the vacuum and turmoil of the Arab spring by altering its image (Holbrook

2012, 12). Bin Mohammed claimed the al-Qa’ida name had been tarnished by

“unprecedented disinformation campaigns,” and should be replaced by local groups using the name Ansar al-Shari’a (“Partisans of Shari’a”). “In order for us not to gamble the chances of our success in the coming phase because of the existence of old ideas in the minds of some… we must enter this phase under a new inclusive name” (Holbrook 2012, 12). In essence, the new front groups allowed al-Qa’ida to create legal political wings to openly recruit and press new governments to adopt its agenda, while continuing its traditional violent activities through existing affiliates.

121 Local al-Qa’ida affiliates and released prisoners quickly followed through on the plan. AQAP founded the first Ansar al-Shari’a group in Yemen in April 2011.

The U.S. State Department determined the new name was “simply AQAP’s effort to rebrand itself, with the aim of manipulating people to join AQAP’s terrorist cause…

(and) to attract potential followers to shari’a rule in areas under the control of AQAP”

(US Department of State 2012). Malka (2013) makes a strong case that the name change also represented an attempt to appeal to the new generation that dominated the

Arab Spring protests. “Rather than relying mainly on armed resistance to further its goals, the new generation sees social and political activity as equally or more important tools. This combination of social action and violence is powerful and appeals to a much broader cross-section of society than al-Qa’ida’s narrow focus ever did” (2). Subsequent defections after these groups’ terror ties became clear suggest many new recruits initially were unaware they were affiliating with al-Qa’ida, but instead were likely attracted by the newly-legal groups’ promises of progress, excitement, and meaning.

The proliferation of Ansar al-Shari’a movements in Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt,

Libya, and elsewhere proved a challenge to the new governments. Rand Corporation databases show the number of Salafi-jihadis doubled between 2010 and 2014, while the total number of known groups increased from 31 to 49 during the same time period (Jones 2014a, 28, 27). The new governments initially refrained from interfering with the groups’ activities, seeking both to differentiate themselves from their predecessors and to woo Salafi votes. Ansar groups in Egypt and Tunisia first

122 focused on proselytization, providing medical and welfare assistance in areas neglected by the governments and gaining thousands of followers in the first year following the uprisings. Both groups were led by known former al-Qa’ida members, but it took time for intelligence services to develop conclusive proof that their ties to terrorism ran deeper (Joscelyn 2013c). Only in Yemen was the link publicly acknowledged. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’s chief religious figure, Sheikh

Abu Zubayr Adil bin Abdullah al-Abab, announced in April 2011 "the name Ansar al-Shari’a is what we use to introduce ourselves in areas where we work to tell people about our work and goals" (Zelin 2012). It is worth noting that al-Abab operated in regions already under AQAP control so he had less need to shield his group’s affiliation.

The shift to front groups also made the al-Qa’ida movement more heterogeneous, with an increased number of younger associates with no direct link to al-Qa’ida core. The amount of direction and funding local Ansar groups received from al-Qa’ida core leadership represents a major information gap. While the groups shared a common ideology and goal--instituting shari’a based governments that would eventually merge to form a caliphate--individual Ansar factions appear focused largely on local concerns (Zelin 2012; 2014b; 2015b). Moreover, local leaders expressed support for al-Qa’ida leaders, but do not appear to have sworn loyalty

(Joscelyn 2014c; Zelin 2014b). This decentralization increased the potential for division over strategy and leadership, particularly after the Islamic State’s declaration of a caliphate.

123 Egypt

The Egyptian prisoner releases included not only the greatest numbers of jihadis released, but also those with the closest relationship to senior al-Qa’ida leaders. Released and pardoned members included men responsible for the deaths of hundreds, with decades of fighting and organizing experience. In addition to the mass releases by the Mubarak Government on January

28, an indeterminate number of additional jihadis were released before the Morsi ouster in July 2013. Many—possibly most—of these releases predated Morsi’s inauguration. While the total number of prisoners released is unknown, credible counts estimate the SCAF released at least 850, primarily jihadis in 2011 alone (Sabry

2015, 138; Bahgat 2014). On March 10, 2011, SCAF chief Field Marshall Husain

Tantawi ordered released Sadat murder conspirators Tarek and Aboud al-Zomor, and former Gama’at chief Refa’i Taha, whom the CIA had rendered to Egypt some time around 2001 (Bergen and Tiedeman 2008). Taha was convicted of directing the 1997

Gama’at attack on tourists in Luxor that killed 62 and named as a co-conspirator in al-Qa’ida’s 2008 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-

Salaam, Tanzania (FBI 1998).

These and subsequent releases appear to have been based on an attempts both to put the Mubarak era to rest and to curry favor with the newly-emergent Salafi electorate. Senior al-Gama‘at al-Islamiyyah and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) leaders had renounced violence while in prison and many of their still-imprisoned followers had signed pledges recanting their earlier support for violent jihad (Drevon 2015). 124 Releasing these prisoners may well have been seen as a comparatively safe way to put the authoritarian past to rest, as well as to score points with the Salafi voters who viewed the prisoners as martyrs. Former Gama’at leader and prominent lawyer

Montasser al-Zayyat explained to reporters that SCAF “was relatively weak when it first assumed power and was facing considerable opposition from revolutionary forces, compared to the harmony that marked its relationship with Islamist movements. The move to release Islamist detainees should, in my opinion, be seen in the context of this harmony” (Bahgat 2014). The Muslim Brotherhood also successfully lobbied SCAF to lift Mubarak era bans on some 50,000 political dissidents exiled abroad (El-Khatib 2011). The resulting rulings facilitated the return of many exiled Muslim Brotherhood members, but also allowed the reentry of Bin

Laden associates such as Mohammad Islambouli, the brother of Sadat’s assassin

(Ahram Online 2012).

There were additional political pressures to release prisoners beginning in

June 2011, after Gama’at and EIJ leaders released before the Arab Spring embraced the electoral process. Their new political parties, the Building and Development Party and the Safety and Development Party, together with other Salafi groups such as

Nour, won a quarter of the seats in parliament (Kirkpatrick 2011a). In addition to appeasing this bloc, who allied with the ruling Muslim Brotherhood, there are claims

Brotherhood leaders also saw released jihadis as a potential force to be used against their secular rivals. Nageh Ibrahim, Gama’at co-founder, alleges “Khairat al-Shater

(deputy chief of the Brotherhood) saw the militant jihadists as a weapon that would

125 be used against their opponents; they decided to outsource the violent activities to other groups instead of doing it themselves” (in Sabry 2015, 184). Former

Brotherhood member Ahmed Ban claims the Brotherhood sought to accommodate the militants in order to prevent direct opposition.

Egypt is not Gaza, the Muslim Brotherhood doesn’t own and run the military institution like Hamas runs the Qassam Brigades. But they used the same tactics with militant groups: we will allow you the freedom to operate as long as you don’t threaten our bigger project… (Sabry 2015, 184)

Any calculations by SCAF or the Morsi Government that they could use the newly released militants proved misguided. The core group of Gama’at and EIJ leaders committed to the democratic system, but remained vocal critics of Morsi’s failure to implement Islamization. Meanwhile, other released jihadis operated openly as political parties, even as they denounced democracy and encouraged violence.

Ahmed Ashush announced the launch of his Ansar al-Shari’a Egypt (ASE) group on al-Arabiya television less than a month after he had issued a fatwa calling for the actors and directors of the “Innocence of Muslims” film to be killed (Joscelyn 2012d).

Ashush made no effort to hide his group’s links with terror, telling journalists “we are honored to be an extension of the al-Qa’ida organization in its beliefs, principles, and concepts” (Joscelyn 2012a).

Ashush collaborated on ASE activities with another released jihadi,

Mohammed al-Zawahiri, brother of al-Qa’ida leader Ayman. Upon his March 2012 release, Mohammed al-Zawahiri declared his rejection of violence had been forced and defended the al-Qa’ida agenda (Joscelyn 2012d). He told CNN in August 2012

126 “We only try to regain some of our rights that have been hijacked by Western powers throughout history” (M. al-Zawahiri 2012). Al-Zawahiri, Ashush, and Taha Musa are shown together on films released by al-Qa’ida, haranguing Egyptian followers to revolt against Morsi’s “apostate regime” and leading violent demonstrations at the

U.S. Embassy in Cairo on September 11, 2012. (Joscelyn 2012d; Joscelyn 2012b).

Attacks on domestic targets proliferated as Salafi-jihadi groups attempted to cleanse Egypt of what they viewed as un-Islamic influences. The Secretary General of Egypt’s Union of Sufis told reporters in June 2013 there had been more than 100

Salafi attacks on Sufi shrines since the January uprisings (Ammar 2013). The Middle

East Institute expressed concern over “the largest number of concerted attacks on

Copts and other Christians in modern times” with at least 17 Coptic churches and schools torched on a single day in August 2013 alone (Dunn 2013).

ASE leaders also worked behind the scenes to support al-Qa’ida networks. Al-

Qa’ida eulogies described suicide bombers killed in Mali and Yemen as students and associates of Mohammad al-Zawahiri (Joscelyn 2013a; Joscelyn 2014a). U.S. officials allege Mohammed al-Zawahiri put Muhammad Jamal, his subordinate in the

EIJ in the 1990s, back in contact with his brother Ayman after their release from prison (Gorman and Bradley 2012). Mohammed al-Zawahiri maintained close ties with militants in the Sinai, praising Ansar al-Beit Jerusalem (ABM) leader Shadi al-

Menaei as a “defender of Islam who accomplished what the state failed to, repeatedly hit the Zionists, and fulfilled the wishes of all Muslims” (in Sabry 2015, 160).

127 Other released and pardoned prisoners reconstituted old militant groups or established new ones. Ramzi Mahmoud al-Mowafi, an explosives expert who once served as Osama bin Laden’s doctor, joined dissidents in North Sinai upon his

January release or escape from Wadi al-Natrun jail. An unnamed Egyptian General told CNN al-Mowafi had joined members of the Egyptian Takfir wal-Hijra, the Sinai- based al-Qa’ida affiliate behind the Taba and Nuweiba resort bombings in 2004 and

2005. (Fahmy 2011). US officials claimed in 2014 that Mowafi had formally rejoined al-Qa’ida’s hierarchy and was coordinating and financing terror attacks in the Sinai

(US Department of State 2014).

Mohamed Jamal al-, a former EIJ chief, released in March 2011 launched a network of cells and training camps across Egypt and Libya (Gorman

2012). Jamal petitioned al-Qa’ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri to recognize his new network as “al-Qa’ida in Egypt,” according to a letter found on his captured laptop

(Gorman and Bradley 2012). Jamal wrote al-Zawahiri that he had secured funding from AQAP for cells he had created in Sinai. UN documents allege members of

Jamal’s network participated in the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, while Egyptian officials claim he also planned to attack the Interior

Ministry in Egypt (UN 2013; Gorman 2012). The U.S. Government also links Jamal to unnamed terrorists in Europe and claims his camps trained suicide bombers (US

Department of State 2013).

128 Tunisia

The 500-plus prisoners pardoned by the Tunisian transitional government in

February and March 2011 included several al-Qa’ida veterans (Human Rights Watch

2012). Sami Essed had directed al-Qa’ida operations in Italy and plotted to bomb to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Rome (Joscelyn 2012b). Abu Iyad al-Tunisi (true name

Sayf Alla bin Hussayn) planned the assassination of Afghan Northern Alliance leader

Ahmed Shah Massood two days before the September 11 attacks (Zelin 2012).

Hassan Brik ran a safe house in Syria for fighters heading to fight U.S. troops in Iraq

(Zelin 2013c). Together, the group had used their time in jail to plan their new Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia (AST) group. Brik told Italian reporter Sergio Galasso (2012) the group of veteran jihadis “got to know each other in prison, and we began our work from there” (Gartenstein-Ross and Moreng 2015, 13). He expanded in another interview, explaining that the group used communal prayer time to “refine their ideas” for winning popular support. “This is a long-term vision to prepare society,"

Brik explained. "We are for jihad, armed revolution, but we cannot do this if the people are not with us. It will only be possible when everyone is behind the vision”

(Loveluck 2012).

Ansar al-Shar’ia Tunisia (AST) activists launched social welfare campaigns in the poor suburbs of Tunis and the same neglected inland regions--Sidi Bouzid,

Jendouba, Kairouan, and Kasserine—that first rose up against the Bin Ali regime

(Marks 2012). Malka (2015) argues the AST “grew directly out of the revolutionary fervor and political openings of the Arab uprisings,” harnessing the excitement of the 129 revolutionary atmosphere (92). AST neighborhood committees met in cafes, on the streets of poor neighborhoods, and staged revival-style tent meetings in public squares. Between the group’s social programs and street theater, such as costumed reenactment of Taliban battlefield victories, they attracted thousands of new adherents (Abu Rumman and Abu Haniya 2013). Roughly 10,000 people attended an

AST conference in 2012 marking the group’s first anniversary (Malka 2015).

AST leaders encouraged their followers to take over local mosques; by

October 2011, Tunisia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs announced that it had lost control of about 400 of the nation’s 5050 mosques (Wolf 2014, 17). AST demonstrators encouraged by these newly installed imams, demolished liquor stores, movie theaters, and art galleries (Fahmy and Meddeb 2015; Petré 2015a; Marks

2012). Abu Iyad and Bilal Chaouachi, an AST-affiliated imam, instigated a 2012

AST protest of the release of the movie “Persopolis” at the U.S. Embassy in Tunis that killed four people (Petré 2015a; Joscelyn 2012e). Chaouachi also was one of many AST-affiliated imams who urged their followers to fight in Syria. “It is the duty of all Muslims to support the struggle of the Syrian people against despotism," he told journalists in 2012 (Ben Bouazza and Schemm 2012). Chaouachi, who traveled to

Syria after a Tunisian Government crackdown in 2013, later was among the first jihadis to pledge loyalty to the Islamic State (Tunisian Times 2014; Hegghammer

2014).

The Tunisian Government initially made little effort to control the AST.

Before 2013, when AST members sacked the U.S. Embassy in Tunis and, separately, 130 assassinated two leftist members of parliament, the ruling Islamist Ennahda Party tended to view the group as “wayward children” still finding their way (Marks 2013,

113). “We didn't realize how dangerous and violent these Salafists could be …”

President Marzouki later admitted (Beaumont and Kingsley 2013). “They are a tiny minority within a tiny minority. They don't represent society or the state. They cannot be a real danger to society or government, but they can be very harmful to the image of the government." The government banned AST in August 2013 (Petré 2015b). By then the group had established a following in many poor neighborhoods and mosques, particularly in the interior.

Links also emerged between Ansar and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb

(AQIM), which operated a unit, the Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade, in the Chaambi

Mountains near the Algerian border. Then-Interior Minister Laarayedh told reporters the AQIM brigade provided recruits with initial training and screening before sending graduates to “real” AQIM camps in Algeria or Libya (Zelin 2013a).

Syria

Former prisoners also spearheaded the radicalization of the .

Jordanian Major General Fayez Dwairi alleges 46 prominent commanders of al-

Qa’ida’s Syrian branch, Jabhat al-Nusra, had been in Syrian regime custody, including its chief, Mohammad al-Jolani (Sands, Vela, and Maayeh 2014). Another released prisoner, Ayman al-Zawahiri’s close friend Abu Khalid al-Suri, became the al-Qa’ida chief’s personal emissary to the Syrian jihadis (McCants 2015b, 86;

131 Joscelyn 2014b). Other released prisoners included Hassan Aboud, the chief of al-

Qa’ida ally Ahrar al-Sham; Jaish-al-Islam and Islamic Front commander Zahran

Aloush; and Liwa al-Haq leader Abdul Rahman Suweis (Landis 2013; Sands, Vela, and Maayeh 2014; Sherlock and Spencer 2014). Prominent Syrian members of

Islamic State, including the current head of the shari’a court its capitol, Raqqa, also were among those released, according to a former prisoner, who claims to have served time with them in Saidnaya (Sherlock and Spencer 2014).

As in Tunisia and Egypt, jihadi prisoners had been held together, creating a ready-made network upon their release. “When I was detained, I knew four or five or six, but when I was released I knew 100, or 200 or 300 [jihadis]. I now had brothers in , and Homs and Daraa and many other places, and they knew me,” one released prisoner reported. “It took just a few short weeks—weeks—not a month, for us, in groups of two or three, in complete secrecy, to start” (Abouzeid 2014).

The prison experience also may have helped to foster a new jihadi doctrine in

Syria. Many of the prisoners were held with senior al-Qa’ida commander and theorist

Abu Musab al-Suri (true name Mustafa Setmariam Nasar). Al-Suri’s protégés included al-Qa’ida in Iraq founder al-Zarqawi and Anwar al-Alaki, as well as the cells that attacked the and transportation systems in 2004 and 2005. Jabha al-Nusra spokesman Sami al-Oraidi tweeted in 2014 that the group was working to implement Abu Musab’s teachings (Hassan 2014). These teachings included a call for a “third generation” of jihad, driven by and independent cells (what he

132 termed `'). Statements by al-Nusra and Islamic State echo a statement al-Suri made shortly before his May 2006 arrest:

I reiterate my call for mujahidin who are spread in Europe and in our enemies’ countries or those able to go there, to the significance of moving fast to hit... all countries who have a military presence in Iraq, Afghanistan or the Arab Peninsula or to hit their interests in our countries and all over the world. And let all the sleeping cells awaken now because the war is in its peak and the enemy is about to collapse... (Cruickshank and Hage Ali 2007, 12).

Other al-Suri students have encouraged ‘leaderless jihad’ elsewhere, most notably

Anwar al-Alaki with such Inspire articles as “How to Build a Bomb in the Kitchen of

Your Mom.” The emergence of such a strong concentration of proponents of al-Suri’s doctrines among al-Nusra and Islamic State fighters who had been imprisoned with him for years is, however, unlikely to be a coincidence.

Libya

As in Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria, jihadi veterans of battles in Afghanistan and

Iraq lead the Salafi-jihadi movement in Libya. Libya is unique, however, in that these veterans’ freedom cannot be attributed to the Arab Spring. The founders of both

Libyan wings of the Ansar al-Shari’a--Abu Sufyan Ibrahim Ahmed bin Qumu in

Derna and Mohammed al-Zahari in Benghazi—were reportedly released in 2010 as part of a regime “reform and repent” program (Black 2011; Fitzgerald 2012). Bin

Qumu, who spent more than five years imprisoned at Guantanimo Bay before being transferred to Libyan custody, al-Zahari, and other former prisoners have driven much of the post-revolution violence. The scheduled release of 110 LIFG members on February 16, 2011—the day before the Libyan uprising began— suggests this

133 release might have added to the growing anti-Qadhafi movement. The destruction of prison records during the uprising would complicate any effort, however, to determine the identities of this group of prisoners or the precise link between the two events. (Pargeter 2011; Black 2011).

The greatest impact of the Arab Spring releases and escapes in Libya appears to have been, instead, to increase the law-and-order crisis facing the new government following Qadhafi’s ouster. Most of the 16,000 prisoners released were reported to be criminals, rather than political prisoners (Lacher and Cole 2014, 19). In addition to militia activities, escaped criminals, often operating in well-armed gangs, remained a significant continuing threat to law and order, with murders, kidnapping, carjackings, burglaries, and other violent crimes daily occurrences. While many of these criminals likely had no agendas beyond personal enrichment or revenge, their activity undermined government control and increase popular support for the local militias that promised protection from the escalating violence.

Awash in Weapons

The increased availability of military-grade weapons provided a second new factor in Salafi-jihadi gains after the Arab Spring. The flood of weapons, first from looted Libyan Army warehouses and later from captured stores in Yemen’s Abyan governorate, the Sinai, and rebel-held Syria permitted groups to fight off rivals and government forces. A United Nations panel of experts warned in February 2013 that

Libyan arms were fueling conflicts in at least 12 countries, concluding

134 the increased availability of weapons has empowered a variety of non-State actors in conflict with national authorities. A particular concern is that extremist armed groups, being the best financed among the non-State actors, are well placed to purchase weapons, thereby strengthening their positions (Raad et al. 2013, 12).

The report linked smuggled Libyan weapons to Salafi-jihadi activity in Gaza, Sinai,

Mali, Chad, Syria, Tunisia, and elsewhere. A Libyan diplomat told the New York

Times in June 2013 that Libyan militias had been shipping weapons to Syrian rebels for more than a year. “They collect the weapons, and when they have enough they send it,” he said. “The Libyan government is not involved, but it does not really matter” (Chivers, Schmit, and Mazzetti 2013).

Many arms recipients made little effort to hide their arms acquisitions. Mali- based AQIM leader told the Mauritanian news agency in

November 2011, “We are one of the main benefactors of the revolutions in the Arab world. As for our requisition of Libyan armament, that is an absolutely natural thing”

(Judy 2014, 33). Egyptian journalist Muhanned Sabry (2015) reports that locals nicknamed a market in Rafa “Misrata Market,” after it was flooded with Libyan vehicles and materiel. “By May 2011, half of the Rafa market’s merchandise was weapons coming from Libya,” Sabry reported (81). Oversupply drove the price of antiaircraft missiles down from $10,000 to $4,000 by October 2011 ((Sabry 2015;

Fadel 2011). “We’ve intercepted more advanced weapons, and these weapons aren’t familiar to the Egyptian weapons markets; these are war weapons,” an Egyptian brigadier general said in October 2011 (Fadel 2011). Local arms dealers and

135 tribesmen told journalists they were buying up weapons as a hedge against Egyptian

Government attempts to regain control of the Sinai (Fadel 2011; Sabry 2015).

Libyan arms also played a key role in the Syrian rebellion. UN documents and press reports detail transfers by air and cargo ship from Libya of up to 400 tones of materiel per delivery, including SAM-7 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) (Raad et al. 2013; Antakya 2012). Even before the

U.S. and other states began air missions against jihadi targets in Syria, such weaponry would have been vital to contesting the Syrian regime’s air superiority. Meanwhile,

Tunisian President Marzouki told Television January 2013 that Tunisia had turned into a corridor for armaments sent from Libya to other areas of conflict such as

Mali (Marzouki 2013). Since then, Tunisian security has documented the use of

Libyan-sourced arms in battles with the military in the Chaambi Mountains and in the terrorist attacks on Bardo Museum and the Port El Kantoui Beach massacre (Zelin

2015c; Spencer 2015).

Safe Havens and Jihadi Emirates

A third area where the Arab Spring fostered instability, creating an opening for the Islamic State, was the spread of “ungoverned spaces”—areas outside of the actual control of the state. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper listed ungoverned spaces as one of the three most threatening results of the Arab Spring in

2013, telling the Senate Armed Services Committee

The struggles of new governments in places like Tripoli and Sanaa to extend their writs, as well as the worsening internal conflict in Syria, have created

136 opportunities for extremist groups to find ungoverned space from which to destabilize the new governments and prepare attacks against Western interests” (Clapper 2013, 14).

Fearon and Laitin (2003) found in their seminal study of 161 civil wars that state weakness, combined with economic failure and the presence of “a territorial base of operations separated from the state’s center” were better predictors of than religious or ethnic divisions (81). “What matters is whether active rebels can hide from government forces and whether economic opportunities are so poor that the life of a rebel is attractive to 500 or 2,000 young men” (88).

Arsenault and Bacon (2015) expanded this definition by noting that many safe havens emerge with the tacit concurrence of the central government. “A focus on central government capacity overlooks the reality that even where central governments are absent, few, if any, spaces remain truly ‘ungoverned’—alternative structures rise to govern these spaces by design or with the tacit consent of the central government” (98). Where governments lack the capacity or will to enforce their writ in an area, they may thus ally with local powers to preserve a modicum of influence.

Arsenault and Bacon’s insight captures the confluence of events following the Arab

Spring in which weak new governments, local civilians, and Salafi-jihadi factions combined to foster the creation of multiple areas outside government control. Khalaf

(2015) applies earlier research to the Syrian case, finding consistent efforts across civil society and resistance groups of all ideologies to fill the governance vacuum in the regions under their control. Al-Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadi factions have

137 disproportionately benefited from this process, due to their access to outside sources of personnel, weaponry, and funding.

The collapse of government authority in the wake of the Arab Spring dramatically expanded the opportunities for terrorists to build safe havens, transforming their movements into active insurgencies. Counterterrorism expert

David Kilcullen’s (2009) description of al-Qa’ida and associated jihadi groups’ entry into “remote, ungoverned, or conflict-affected areas” is salient (34). As militants move into a new region, they build links with local residents through social services, new businesses, prosthelyzation, and marriage, gradually coming to challenge and supplant traditional tribal leaders. Heavy handed interference from central governments risks driving more locals to support the jihadis, who position themselves as the locals’ protector against alien domination. Fearon and Laitin (2003) similarly found heavy-handed government attempts to regain control of an area played a significant role in strengthening civilian support for insurgents.

Militants’ presence in poorly-governed areas soon leads to political influence as well. Baylouny (2010) writes of social entrepreneurs—“gangs, militias, thugs, local men of influence, and religious political parties (136) who emerge in areas of weak state control. “These actors and their authority are not traditional or longstanding; they are newly successful, self-made leaders. They establish authority through services to the community and legitimate it in terms of religion, identity, or violence.” These new rulers may enforce their writ with brutality, as we see with the

Islamic State or predecessors such as the Taliban or Zarqawi’s al-Qa’ida in Iraq. At

138 the same time, though, they provide protection from outside marauders and basic services, such as arbitration, social welfare, and employment. Traditional tribal and other local authorities either contest this growing influence, often at a disadvantage, or throw their weight behind the new powers. There are several precedents for the rise of post-Arab Spring proto-governments. Many Afghans welcomed the Taliban, who promised to replace the rapacious competing warlords with honest government

(Rashid 2000). Somalia’s Islamic Courts provides an additional model for a jihadi group that, at least temporarily, gained popular acceptance from many war weary locals (Revkin 2013).

Hearts, Minds, and Shari’a: Yemen and Syria

Like al-Zarqawi’s first attempt to rule in Iraq in the mid 2000s, the AQAP’s short-lived ‘emirate’ in southern Yemen demonstrated the possibilities and limits of

Salafi-jihadi groups’ ability to govern. AQAP forces seized territory in April 2011, while the Sana government was preoccupied with both the Arab Spring uprisings and a rebellion by the minority Zaidi sect known as the Huthis. Over the next several months, it took control of Yemen’s Abyan, Marib, and Shabwa Governorates, declaring three Islamic emirates. Militant forces initially met little resistance in the area, which had long been on the edge of anarchy. Civilians remembered earlier

AQAP-sponsored welfare programs providing health care and helping dig wells.

(Dorsey 2010). Soldiers guarding U.S.-supplied warehouses of U.S.-supplied weapons at a base in Zinjibar fled without a battle. “(T)he army leadership is rotten and corrupt,” one defecting soldier later explained. Why would a soldier fight if the 139 army is split in Sana'a?” (Abdul-Ahad 2012). AQAP use of fighters recruited locally further strengthened their appeal in regions that previously had been patrolled by government troops from ‘foreign’ tribes from the north (al-Shishani 2011). AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi was, himself a native of Abyan.

During the fourteen months the AQAP ruled its southern Yemeni emirates, the AQAP leaders boasted of their accomplishments. “People come to us from parts we don't control and ask us to solve their problems," an AQAP-affiliated judge claimed. "The shari’a justice system is swift and incorruptible. Most of the cases we solve within the day” (Dorsey 2010). Western intelligence agent Morton Storm

(2014) described the town of Jaar as “transformed” (282). “Al-Qa’ida was handing out food, digging wells and storage , driving water trucks around, bringing in free electricity to areas that had never known it, and providing other services that the central government in Sana’a had neglected for decades.” AQAP leaders portrayed their movement as the natural answer to Arab Spring demonstrators’ demands. “The model of al-Qa’ida is very perfect in comparison with the model of the Saleh regime.

In addition to the unprecedented security stability, the organization presents some services to the citizens, especially (in terms of) livelihoods…” (al-Shishani 2011).

The AQAP emirates were short lived, however. Popular support waned as heavy-handed attempts to implement al-Qa’ida rule led to brutal punishments such as crucifixions and summary executions of suspected spies and witches (Amnesty

International 2012, 48). Widespread destruction of local graves and shrines clashed with local mores, while rebel looting of banks and businesses undercut the group’s 140 claim to be establishing law and order (Abdul-Ahad 2012; al-Shishani 2011).

Meanwhile, U.S. and Saudi airstrikes pounded AQAP positions. Local tribal leaders, seeing AQAP rule as a threat to their authority, switched sides to support a Yemeni military offensive to regain control of the territory (McGregor 2011). Amnesty

International accused both sides of “horrific human rights abuses” in the battle for control of Abyan and Shabwah, documenting jihadis’ use of civilians as human shields and the military’s “reckless” use of indiscriminate airstrikes and fire on civilian neighborhoods (Amnesty International 2012, 26).

Al-Qa’ida affiliates learned from AQAP’s experience and applied these lessons to governing other safe havens in Syria and North Africa. After al-Qa’ida had surrendered the territories to advancing government forces, al-Wuhayshi wrote to

AQIM leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar in Mali

Try to win them over through the conveniences of life. It will make them sympathize with us and make them feel that their fate is tied to ours… You have to be kind. You can't beat people for drinking alcohol when they don't even know the basics of how to pray... Try to avoid enforcing Islamic punishments as much as possible, unless you are forced to do so... We used this approach with the people and came away with good results (Callimachi 2013).

Droukdel apparently took al-Wuhayshi’s advice to heart, urging his own followers to slow their efforts to impose shari’a punishments in newly-captured Timbuktu. “We must not go too far or take risks in our decisions or imagine that this project is a stable Islamic state. It is too early for that, God knows…” (Droukdel 2013).

Former U.S. ambassador to Yemen, Stephen Seche, noted that al-Wuhayshi’s letter demonstrated an evolution in al-Qa’ida affiliates’ perception of their role in 141 society. "These guys are no longer in the business of just trying to take out Western targets. They are in the business of establishing themselves as legit alternatives to governments that are not present in areas on a daily business" (in Callimachi 2013).

This effort to determine the proper balance between enforcing Salafi-jihadist goals, particularly the full implementation of shari’a, and winning popular support has increasingly dominated jihadi debate. The creation of multiple safe havens since the

Arab Spring has allowed al-Qa’ida affiliates and rivals, such as the Islamic State, to make continued experiments in governing.

Al-Qa’ida associates in Syria sought to replicate and improve on AQAP’s model, but needed first to build far more capacity. Salafi-jihadi groups were “virtually non-existent” in Syria in 2010, according to a Rand Corporation study (Jones 2014a,

92). The groups that did exist were closely monitored by the Syrian Government and focused on supporting the insurgency in Iraq. Damascus permitted the “jihad highway” into Iraq, but identified and eliminated potential jihadis who might threaten their domestic control (Hénin 2015). The University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism

Database illustrates the Assad regime’s monopoly of violence before 2011, documenting only seven terror attacks between 1990 and 2010, with only one attack

—a 1990 bombing in Aleppo—conclusively linked to a jihadi faction (START 2015).

The critical elements in al-Qa’ida’s ability to develop the strength to establish a presence strong enough to capture and defend territory were the released prisoners and foreign volunteers.

142 Where first the Assad regime lost territory to tribal, ethnic, and other non-

Salafi militias, over time the Salafi-jihadis grew to become the most powerful factions. ‘Islamic’ governments soon followed. Al-Qa’ida affiliate Jabha al-Nusrah made a deliberate effort to apply al-Wuhayshi’s advice in the areas that came under its control. Press accounts detailing Jabha al-Nusrah and Ahrar al-Sham’s 2013 takeover of Raqqa contrast the city’s clean streets and functioning utilities with those in most of the country (Enders 2013). Jabha al-Nusra funneled overseas donations into a social wing, Qism al-Ighatha (The Relief Department), which distributed bread, gas and blankets, while encouraging local civil servants to return to duty (Benotman and Blake 2013, 5; Abouzeid 2013). al-Nusrah leaders also initially denied any connection to al-Qa’ida and publicly pledged to respect the rights of minorities in an attempt to avoid alienating rebel supporters in the West (Burke 2015, 119-120). Local

Aleppo leaders praised al-Nusra soon after the group took power for “their honesty on the battlefield and the fact that they are not interested in looting (Sly 2013).” By the end of 2013, al-Nusra had established itself as the most powerful rebel force, claiming to govern millions of Syrians. “We started with eight fighters and now can talk about entire liberated regions,” al-Nusrah leader al-Jolani boasted in an al-Jazeera interview (in Burke 2015, 120).

Libya’s ‘Jihadi Factory’

Salafi-jihadi militias such as the two Ansar al-Shari’a Libya (ASL) factions used the chaos in Libya after Qadhafi’s ouster to establish themselves as protectors of

143 their local communities. The result is what Wehrey (2014) describes as a “hybrid security order.” Rather than concede that the state lacks the power to act in a region,

“formal” forces of the army and police empower more powerful “informal” local militias, preserving a façade of government presence. With as many as 100 vigilante groups competing for street power in Tripoli alone, the presence of a single militia capable of enforcing local control provided both residents with a modicum of stability

(Lacher and Cole 2014, 31).

Local residents strengthened Islamist militias’ control by turning to them for protection, justice, and social services. Benghazi civilians’ relationship with the local

ASL group illustrates the importance of the services local militia groups provide to local life. After the September 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate, local citizens rose up against the group, temporarily shutting down its operations (Graff and Shennib

2012). Within weeks, however, many of those same citizens demonstrated in the street to demand resumption of the group’s services. “Desperate times call for desperate measures,” explained a local leader (Hauslohner 2013). Doctors at the local hospital walked off the job until ASL militia returned to provide them protection.

“We would prefer it if the Interior Ministry was protecting life here,” one surgeon told . “But the only solution is to go with Ansar al-Shari’a because they’re the only realistic option right now (Hauslohner 2013).” ASL provides food, free health clinics, schools, drug rehabilitation programs and jails to local residents, as well as scarce jobs repairing roads, bridges, and other war-torn infrastructure. (Zelin 2014a). 144 Both ASL factions support al-Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadi activities inside

Libya and throughout the region. Senate investigations into the threat facing U.S. diplomats in Libya found multiple intelligence reports detailing that Ansar al-Shari’a was not only running terrorist training camps and hosting al-Qa’ida affiliates, but actively involved in terrorist attacks (SSCI 2014, 24). A declassified CIA study,

“Libya: Al-Qa’ida Establishing Sanctuary,” reported

Al-Qa’ida-affiliated groups and associates are exploiting the permissive security environment in Libya to enhance their capabilities and expand their operational reach. This year, Muhammad Jamal’s Egypt-based network, al- Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have conducted training, built communication networks, and facilitated extremist travel across north Africa from their safe haven in parts of eastern Libya” (SSCI 2014, 10-11).

Tunisian officials told Jamestown scholar Ludivico Carlino (2014) that dozens of

Tunisians and Algerians carrying fake Libyan passports arrive in Benghazi for military training every week, facilitated by ASL operatives employed at Benghazi airport (4). Tunisian Ansar al-Shari’a leader Abu Iyad’s June 2015 death in Libya in a

U.S. airstrike targeting AQIM leader Mokhtar al-Mokhtar is further evidence of the

Ansar al-Shari’a’s international links with al-Qa’ida affiliates and associates (Gall and Schmitt 2015). At its height in 2013-2014, ASL delivered aid to flooded areas outside of Khartoum, neighborhoods in Gaza hit by Israeli airstrikes, and aid packages to Syria (Zelin 2014a). In addition to the groups’ stated interest in proselytization, these aid deliveries further demonstrate ASL’s perception of itself as part of a larger region-wide network.

145 The multiplicity of safe havens produced by the Arab Spring simplified recruitment, even in areas outside jihadi control. In earlier years, a young jihadi who sought military training either had to travel to distant hot spots such as Afghanistan,

Iraq, or Bosnia or settle for limited covert training abroad. Both options risked alerting security services to the individual’s radicalization, often inviting torture and lengthy prison sentences. Today, residents of the Tunisian city of Kasserine, on the border with Algeria, need only slip into the neighboring Chaambi Mountains to train with local militants or be smuggled to Libya and onward to Syria. Not surprisingly, the town—one of the first to launch demonstrations during the Arab Spring—has sent thousands of jihadi fighters to Syria (Maktabi 2011; Elbagir 2015; Moore 2015).

Yemen, Libya, and Syria also provide locals with not just fighting experience, but the chance to study with top-level explosives experts, such as the AQAP’s Ibrahim al-

Asiri, without traveling far from home (Johnsen 2013). Meanwhile, the multiplicity of groups involved in the Syrian and Libyan fighting also allows would-be jihadis to choose groups according to language, nationality, and personal networks as well as ideological outlook.

The significant amount of movement among safe havens increases the threat that jihadi hot spots pose to regional stability. Jones (2014a) found that each of the five leading jihadi groups controlling territory in Libya also maintained a presence in at least one other country (31). Weakened government border controls increase the danger that a terror safe haven in one country or region will enable attacks in another or allow fighters to regroup after losses. AQIM militants ousted from Mali in a 2013

146 French offensive quickly regrouped inside Libya. “"Now, we must avoid similar risks from materializing in northern Niger and parts of Chad,” French Defense Minister

Jean-Yves Le Drian observed (Entous, Hinshaw, and Gauthier-Villars 2013).

Tunisian investigators found the jihadis who attacked the Bardo Museum in Tunis trained in the Chaambi Mountains, while the gunman who massacred tourists on Port

El Kantaoui in June 2015 trained in Libya (Joscelyn 2015b). Another militant allegedly hiding at Chaambi, al-Qa’ida in Iraq veteran Boubaker El Hakim, reportedly mentored attackers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi . Meanwhile, former Gama’at al-Islamiyyah leader Nageh Ibrahim claims many of the militants conducting attacks in Cairo and Giza “went to Syria before returning to the country, while others were trained in the Sinai or Gaza” (Mustafa 2014).

Crossroads of Africa and the Levant: The Sinai Peninsula

The situation in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula provides yet another example of how the power vacuum left in the wake of the Arab Spring leads first to the creation of local jihadi power bases and later to the spread terror to surrounding areas. After the withdrawal of local police forces in late January 2011 (see chapter 3), escaped prisoners—including violent criminals, smugglers, human traffickers, and jihadis— began to compete with local tribal leaders for authority. When then-Secretary of State

Hilary Clinton expressed concern over al-Qa’ida and other extremists’ presence in the

Sinai to newly-elected President Morsi in July 2012, he allegedly assured her the

147 jihadis would soon voluntarily end their campaigns since an Islamist government had power (Clinton 2014, 473).

In the absence of police protection, residents soon turned to self-appointed

Salafi judges—many released prisoners who had educated themselves while in jail— for protection against local warlords driving a surge in gang kidnappings. Meanwhile, other released prisoners established new jihad groups and began to carve out territory.

The new network of Salafi judges, many linked with jihadi factions or local vigilante groups, established a set of local courts in Sinai to enforce shari’a rule.

“Ideologically, the difference between the Sinai shari’a judges and the takfiri elements is almost nonexistent,” Gama’at founder Nageh Ibrahim assessed in 2013

(Sabry 2015, 123). Ibrahim, who renounced violent jihad while in jail, described the

Sinai judges as among “the most radical” of his fellow prisoners (123). One prominent judge, Sheikh Abu Faisal, reports he learned Islamic jurisprudence, probably from fellow militants, while serving a sentence for his involvement in the

2004 attack on the Sharm al-Sheikh resort (Revkin 2013).

While al-Qa’ida’s allies in the Valley focused on exploiting the new political openness to agitate for shari’a law and obfuscated ties to al-Qa’ida central, in

Sinai they used violence from the start to establish their control. Shadi al-Menaei, a former human smuggler who had been radicalized in jail, and Tawfik Muhammad

Freij Ziyada (a.k.a. Abu Abdullah), formed the Sinai-based Ansar Beit-al Maqdis

(“Partisans of Jerusalem) in February 2011. Unconfirmed reports claim the two had met in prison (TIMEP 2015). By late 2012, analysts judged ABM, which initially

148 focused on Israeli-linked targets, responsible for most terrorist attacks in the Sinai

(Zeiger 2012; NCTC 2014; Dyer and Kessler 2014).

The ABM was only one among a plethora of competing or overlapping jihadi factions in Sinai. Surviving members of the Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (“Monotheism and Struggle”) stockpiled weapons, provided paramilitary training, and launched a series of attacks on Israeli targets (Ashour 2012). A number of other groups and coalitions, including al-Shabaab al-Islam (The Youth of Islam), al-Qa’ida in the

Arabian Peninsula, Army of Islam, Ansar al-Shura, and the Mujahedin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem claimed attacks in the Sinai between 2011 and 2014

(McGregor 2012; Dyer and Kessler 2014; Barnett 2012). Additionally, Gaza-based

Palestinian groups often attack Israeli targets from the Sinai, while press reports allege Sinai groups host foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Sudan,

Libya, Algeria, Somalia, Saudi Arabia (Dyer and Kessler 2014, 16).

Conclusion

Together, the combination of the release of thousands of committed jihadis, the retreat of governments from multiple contested areas, and the increased availability of weaponry eroded stability in the Levant and North Africa. These results of the Arab Spring provided ready openings for al-Qa’ida and other Salafi- jihadis to exploit. Where al-Qa’ida groups previously had focused on developing a revolutionary vanguard to lead a violent struggle, now they expanded their programs.

Salafi-jihadis created new legal organizations, launched local and international social

149 welfare programs, and made deliberate efforts to sell their program to the general public. In many areas, they substituted themselves, at least temporarily, for the central government and strove to provide equivalent or better services to the local populations.

Al-Qa’ida’s central leadership was the initial driving force behind these efforts to capitalize on the Arab Spring, but its control over the increasingly diverse movement grew weaker as new local groups proliferated. Leaders of new factions such as Ansar al-Shari’a and Jabhat al-Nusra increasingly collaborated amongst themselves without seeking approval from al-Qa’ida’s central leadership (Burke

2015). New recruits often had no direct connection to al-Qa’ida, nor had their leaders sworn allegiance to al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. What they did have was the heady experience of active jihad in Syria, Libya, or elsewhere. Increasingly, these youths also had the experience of governing lands under their control and working to implement their shari’a-based system. Where Bin Laden had envisioned the caliphate as a long-term goal, perhaps generations away, these fighters—many of whom already had toppled their leaders at home—saw it as within their grasp. Al-Zawahiri and al-Qa’ida affiliates were hard-pressed to maintain control of this new, more diversified movement once an aggressive challenger arrived on the scene.

150 Chapter 5: Counterrevolution and the Islamic State

The Arab Spring neither created the Islamic State nor the conditions that first made young Egyptians, Tunisians, and other Arabs susceptible to terrorist recruitment. What it did do was shift the operational dynamics in three primary directions. First, the Arab Spring created a physical space where the Islamic State and other jihadi groups could hold territory. The retreat of government control from areas in Syria, the Sinai, Libya, and Yemen allowed jihadis to take control. Second, it created an operational opening in Egypt and Tunisia that allowed previously jailed militants to establish new groups and openly organize and recruit. In Syria, the Sinai,

Libya, and Yemen, groups that eventually joined the Islamic State seized territories that had largely been abandoned by the central states, using these lands and their inhabitants as basis for further expansion. Finally, counterrevolution, economic decline, and civil war in the aftermath of the Arab Spring polarized societies along sectarian, ideological, ethnic, and generational lines. An expanded pool of disillusioned youth became vulnerable to the call of a violent totalitarian movement that manipulated religious symbolism to underpin its promise of a utopian state.

Opening the Door to Jihad

The first and most direct way in which the Arab Spring enabled the spread of the Islamic State beyond its native Iraq is by reducing or eliminating Damascus’s control over broad swaths of Syrian territory. Before the 2011 uprisings, the Syrian

Government maintained a monopoly of violence in the country. Thomas Friedman

151 coined the term “Hama Rules” to describe the Assad regime’s response to opposition after it leveled Hama, the city at the epicenter of the uprising, killing between 10,000-

25,000 Hama residents in the process (Friedman 2001).

Even as the Syrian Government collaborated with al-Qa’ida during the Second

Gulf War, channeling militants through its territory to attack U.S. troops in Iraq, it retained tight control over their activities (Lister 2015; Weiss and Hassan 2015, 270;

Hénin 2015; Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami 2016, 262). Captured al-Qa’ida in Iraq personnel records show that every one of the listed 606 foreign fighters—Saudis,

Libyans, Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis, and others—had entered Iraq through Syria

(Felter and Fishman 2007, 6).

Internal al-Qa’ida discussions reveal a healthy respect for the Syrian regime’s control over its territory. Bin Laden cited the Syrian destruction of Homs as examples of the dangers of precipitous action at least twice in letters to AQAP leader Nasir al-

Wuhayshi, later captured in the 2011 raid on Abbottabad. “The Syrian Muslim

Brothers got themselves in trouble, especially in Himah (Hama), when thirty years ago the event shocked the people,” he wrote in one letter (Bin Laden 2016). In the second, Bin Laden lamented how, by challenging Damascus’s power, the Syrian

Brotherhood

lost an entire generation, which it could have wisely deployed for jihad work under better conditions and times. After the Hama experience, the Jihad work had totally stopped, and for twenty years (Bin Laden n.d.)

152 Al-Qaida operations chief Atiyatullah (using the pseudonym “Mahmud”), wrote Bin

Laden in April 2011 suggesting dispatching Syrian “brothers” to take advantage of the uprising. Atiyatullah implicitly recognized Syrian control, commenting “this is going to require the Syrian brothers to wait until the revolution succeeds and the

Assad regime falls and the country turns into chaos” ("Mahmud" 2015). Bin Laden agreed in his response that travel to Syria should be delayed until the Damascus regime threat was removed (Bin Laden 2011a).

The transformation of the Syrian demonstrations from nonviolent protests to civil war took many months, while the radicalization of the took even longer. Islamists played a minimal role, at best, in the initial 2011 protests

(Lister 2015; Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami 2016; Hasan 2011). Substantial circumstantial evidence and regime defector accounts suggest Assad encouraged the emergence of the hardline Salafi-jihadi movement in order to polarize the conflict, force minorities to support his regime out of fear, and discourage the West from supporting Islamic terrorism. Such accounts may be self-serving -- most can be sourced to rival rebel groups -- but it is true that militant jihadi activity in Syria can be traced to the March 2011 Saidnaya Prison releases.

Whether Damascus actively created worked with al-Qa’ida associates to create the factions that became al-Nusra and the Islamic State, its policies fostered radicalization. Peaceful demonstrators were rounded up, tortured, and killed. Gangs of pro-regime thugs attacked civilians, raping and killing at will. Regime artillery attacks on civilian neighborhoods killed children in schools and families asleep in

153 their homes (Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami 2016; Lister 2015). Civilians under fire first took up arms to protect themselves and only later organized to overthrow the regime. Exiled Syrian activist Yassin Swehat recalls, “It was no choice. Look at

Homs. When thousands are praying in a square, peaceful, unarmed, and they are shot at, murdered—what do you expect to happen next?” (in Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami

2016, 79).

The situation was ripe for al-Qa’ida’s exploitation. While the secular Syrian demonstrators who first rose up against Assad had no interest in jihad, their successors had great need of armed, experienced fighters. Islamic State in Iraq leader

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent his representative, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, into Syria in August 2011 to lay the groundwork for establishing an Islamic State on both sides of the border (Abouzeid 2014). Al-Jolani founded al-Nusra with many of the former

Saidnaya prisoners, while al-Baghdadi revived old foreign fighter recruiting and funding networks to support the effort. The group reportedly cooperated well with the nationalist initially, but grew more militant as it gathered strength

(Abouzeid 2014). Al-Jolani split with the Islamic State in April 2013 in a dispute with al-Baghdadi over supremacy over the movement. The Islamic State took the lion’s share of the territory, fighters, and resources. In rejecting al-Qa’ida’s authority, al-

Baghdadi and his followers also renounced the last restraint on their brutal tactics to impose their version of shari’a on the local population, including the elimination or enslavement of non-Sunni residents of the territories they conquered. In June 2014, al-Baghdadi declared the lands under his control the revived Islamic caliphate,

154 announcing it was every Muslim’s duty to support its spread throughout the world (in

McCants 2015, 123).

Through 2013 and 2014, al-Nusra and later, after the groups split, the Islamic

State drew extensive defections from other fighting groups. Judging from fighters’ statements, the primary reasons for many defections were material: the Islamic State was gaining ground and had more money to pay. “Fighters feel proud to join al-Nusra because that means power and influence," a Free Syrian Army (FSA) brigade commander commented after 3,000 of his comrades defected to the al-Qa’ida faction.

"Al-Nusra fighters rarely withdraw for shortage of ammunition or fighters and they leave their target only after liberating it” (Spencer 2013).

When the Islamic State split from al-Nusra and al-Qa’ida in 2014, it took many of these al-Nusra fighters with it. “The cycle of success is amplifying for ISIS:

They gain more ground, get more publicity and more recruits,” noted counterterrorism scholar Aaron Zelin (in Prothero 2014). Leading al-Nusra commanders, the 1,000-strong ad-Duwud Brigade, and many more, including

“moderate” fighters reportedly trained by the CIA defected to the Islamic State.

(Prothero 2014). “If you see us on the side with ISIS, you should not blame us,” one former FSA fighter told reporters. “If you are injured, then no one cares for you. I would rather live in an ISIS area. In 15 days I will go back and give them “baya'a"

(an oath of allegiance) (Daymon 2015). A survey of 31 captured Islamic State fighters provides an additional snapshot of local fighters’ motivations for joining the group.

Twenty-one of those interviewed claimed to be fighting primarily for the money or 155 because they needed employment and four were seeking revenge, while only three claimed to be fighting because they supported the Islamic State’s philosophy

(Quantum 2015, 17).

Al-Nusra’s and, later, the Islamic State’s ability to supply material benefits also is critical to its ability to hold territory and coopt local support. An estimated

8,000,000 to 10,000,000 people live in lands the Islamic State carved out of Syria and

Iraq, an area roughly equivalent to the size of the (Mecham 2015).

The collapse of government services and emergence of local warlords gives populations who cannot or will not flee a strong incentive to support the group best able to ensure their security.

The example of early popular support for Taliban rule suggest that even such grudging support may strengthen a terror group’s hold on its territory, at least so long as the ‘Leviathan’ provides populations with comparative safety. Many Syrian civilians initially welcomed the Islamic State’s arrival as an improvement over the abuses by the Assad regime or other factions (McCants 2015b; Jones 2014b; al-

Aqeedi 2015). As in Qandahar after the Taliban’s 1995 takeover and in the Sinai after the January 2011 uprisings, jihadi courts provided a “budding civilian societal structure” with a “small semblance of relative law and order” (Zelin 2013, 10).

Boylan (2015) observes that even coerced or contingent civilian support to a terrorist group expands that group’s capabilities. The Islamic State draws what

Boylan classifies as “impelled support,” in which locals actively support the group in return for a reward, through its control over resources, including food supplies (60).

156 Vetted locals teach schools, run clinics, trade goods, handle Islamic State banking, repair oil rigs, and otherwise provide the necessary underpinnings to maintain the façade of a state.

The Islamic State preferentially provides money, fuel, and food to its supporters, particularly local tribal leaders (McCants 2015b, 136). “Daesh controlled everything,” one former Raqqa resident recalled. “The wheat, the mills, the bakeries”

(Ciezadlo 2015). While the World Food Program and the FAO estimate about 10 million Syrians are “food insecure,” the Islamic State provides daily bread rations to populations under its control (Ciezadlo 2015). “There is no work, so you have to join them in order to live,” one former Raqqa resident told reporters. “So many local people have joined them. They were pushed into Daesh by hunger” (Arcement 2015).

One study found that 77 percent of the captured ‘internal’ (Syrian and Iraqi) IS fighters interviewed claimed to be fighting primarily for the money (Quantum 2015,

18).

Much other civilian support for the Islamic State could be classified as either compelled support, in which individuals actively provide services to the terror group out of fear, or deterred support, in which members of a population avoid action of any kind out of fear (Boylan 2015, 663-665). The limited and filtered information available about life under Islamic State rule suggests these categories reflect most local citizens’ relationship with the group, particularly as months under IS rule stretch into years (McCants and Revkin 2015; Sullivan 2015).

157 This passive and grudging support increases the Islamic State’s vulnerability in the long term, should it either lose the ability to provide minimum sustenance or so overplay its hand that civilians reevaluate their options. That said, even coerced and contingent support allows the Islamic State access to the population which underpins its claim to legitimacy, as well as the majority of the “brides” it uses to attract foreign fighters. The Islamic State also uses its control over the populations in Syria, Libya, and other territories to reinforce its ranks and propagate its ideology among society’s most vulnerable group: the children.

The Islamic State, like the Assad regime and other Syrian rebel groups, recruits and drafts children throughout its territories. IS’s extensive use of children as full participants in fighting, torture, espionage, and suicide attacks, however, poses additional risk for Syria’s long-term prospects. A 2016 review of Islamic State fighter obituaries identified 89 children or youths among the 203 dead, or 43.8 percent of the total (Bloom, Horgan, and Winter 2016, 30). The obituaries revealed the children had served as foot soldiers (51 percent), suicide bombers (43 percent), and propagandists embedded in fighting units (6 percent); in short, in the same capacities as adult fighters (Bloom, Horgan, and Winter 2016, 30).

“Caliphate Cubs” training camps teach boys to kill, with pupils as young as 10

—or 8, according to one report--killing prisoners for IS propaganda films (Paton

2015). While many students attend with their parents’ blessings, others are seized from their families or orphanages for indoctrination (Bloom 2015). “The aim is to prepare a new, stronger, second generation of mujahidin, conditioned and taught to be 158 a future resource for the group,” wrote former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group leader

Noman Benotman (in Townsend 2016). Benotman, who now designs counter- extremist programs, believes the Islamic State’s “Caliphate Cubs” training camps reflect a deliberate effort to reproduce Nazi youth indoctrination programs.

The current generation of fighters sees these children as better and more lethal fighters than themselves, because rather than being converted into radical ideologies they have been indoctrinated into these extreme values from birth, or a very young age (in Townsend 2016).

Meanwhile, younger children are encouraged to attend executions, practice beheading dolls, and earn their way to “Cub” status by informing on their parents and neighbors and recruiting other children (Bloom 2015).

The “Five Star Jihad”

By May 2012, Western observers noted “credible reports of foreign fighters attempting to infiltrate Syria, including a number reportedly affiliated with jihadist movements” (Fishman 2012, 4). This initial flow appeared to draw heavily from the same recruiting pools seen in al-Qa’ida recruiting records captured in Iraq in 2007, including Derna in eastern Libya and prisoners released from Egyptian jails in 2011

(Zelin 2013b, 9-10). The foreign fighter flow soon expanded to include a surge of fighters from Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab Spring countries and then an unprecedented global population from more than 80 countries (Zelin 2013b, 7-10).

The Arab Spring not only created the physical opening for the Islamic State’s spread, but also played a significant role in luring an unprecedented number of jihadi recruits. A comparison between foreign fighter data between the Iraqi conflict, 2003-

159 2007, and Syria is illustrative. Al-Qa’ida in Iraq personnel records captured in 2007, show Tunisia provided 33 of the 595 fighters listed, the sixth largest contingent of foreign fighters. Table 1 illustrates the substantial changes seen between the demographics of the foreign fighters who traveled to support the Islamic State’s earlier incarnations against U.S. forces in Iraq (2003-2007) and those who have traveled to Syria between 2011 and 2015.

As of October 2015, Tunisia has provided the largest number of fighters to the

Syrian conflict of any country other than Syria itself, some 6,000 individuals (Barrett

2014a, 9). United Nations experts found in July 2015 that 1,000-1,500 additional

Tunisian fighters were in Libya, 200 in Iraq, 60 in Mali, and 50 fighting in Yemen

(OHCR 2015). Egypt’s share of the foreign fighters also increased from 0.67 percent of the total in 2007 to 2.00 percent. Libya’s decreased share, from 18.82 percent to

2.00 percent, most likely reflects fighters’ decision to take part in the “jihad” at home, rather than traveling abroad. (Interestingly, in a 2013 tally, Zelin, Kohlman, and al-

Khouri found Libyans then made up 5 percent of the total. Libyans’ declining share of the total may reflect the growing share of new nationalities, especially Westerners, or be evidence of the return of experienced fighters home to Libya).

Early Arab volunteers to Syria served as “de facto role models for future foreign fighters, “one of the most powerful forms of propaganda” (Skidmore 2014,

72). Islamic State fighters in the field made extensive use of social media to publicize their activities, encouraging others to follow in their footsteps. Early surveys of foreign fighter numbers find the influx of Westerners lagged Arab fighters (Zelin, 160 Kohlmann, and al-Khouri 2013). Arabs continue to make up about 70 percent of

Islamic State’s foreign volunteers, as well as some 40 percent of its total fighting

force, according to a December 2015 study by the International Centre for Counter-

Terrorism (3).

The foreign fighter contingent initially was distributed among several jihadi groups but consolidated with the Islamic State in 2014. In addition to the estimated 40 percent of the foreign fighters who were affiliated with the Islamic State in January

2014, when the Islamic State split with al-Nusra, between 60 to 70 percent of the foreign fighters with Jabhat al-Nusra and 30 to 40 percent of Ahrar al-Sham’s contingent defected to the group by the end of 2014 year (Barrett 2014b, 24). These volunteers come from throughout the Arab world, but the expanded role Tunisians,

Egyptians, and Libyans played in boosting the numbers of fighters and publicizing 161 their activities helped to create the sense of momentum that helped the appeal of the

Syrian jihad go global.

The appeal of the Syrian jihad was the product of the opening provided by the

Arab Spring uprising, the subsequent humanitarian disaster created by the Assad regime’s response, jihadis’ media blitz, and the Islamic State’s physical control of

Syrian territory. IS holdings include key border crossings from Syria, giving it physical access to new arrivals. More importantly, the Islamic State’s control of land and population buttress its claim to statehood and sets it apart from its parent, al-

Qa’ida. The Islamic State in Iraq attracted foreign fighters when U.S. troops were in

Iraq, but neither with such numbers nor with such excitement. It was the reach across the border, “demolishing the Sykes-Picot borders” and exploiting the Syrian regime’s atrocities, that won the Islamic State a new and expanded audience (al-Dabiq 2014a,

18).

Finding a Reason to Fight

Civilian suffering in Syria proved a useful tool for jihadi recruiters in Egypt and Tunisia, who operated openly during the 2011-2013 timeframe. Scholars consistently have found that most individuals radicalized into terrorism see their own motives as altruistic and themselves as potential heroes and heroines. The daily images and stories from Syria of children murdered, Muslim women raped, and elderly civilians driven into exile spurred would-be saviors, playing into the radicalization process. “If you talk to terrorists themselves, they portray themselves as altruists—they see themselves as fighting on behalf of others,” observed British 162 counterterrorism expert Andrew Silke. “The weight of the science suggests that most people become involved in terrorism as a result of relatively ordinary pro-social factors” (Weaver 2015). Zimbardo (2007) recounts the experience of French filmmaker Pierre Rehov, who interviewed failed Palestinian suicide bombers in

Israeli jails. “Every single one of them tried to convince me it was the right thing to do for moralistic reasons” (292).

Former U.S. State Department Special Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Alberto Fernandez acknowledged the attraction of the appeal to altruistic violence.

“ISIS’s message,” he said, “is that Muslims are being killed and that they’re the solution. There is an appeal to violence, obviously, but there is also an appeal to the best in people, to people’s aspirations, hopes and dreams, to their deepest yearnings for identity, faith, and self-actualization” (Cottee 2015). There is often an element of naiveté or wishful thinking in young Islamic State “fanboy” perceptions of the movement. “The Islamic State is a true caliphate, a system that is fair and just, where you don’t have to follow somebody’s orders because he is rich or powerful,” one young Tunisian insisted (Kirkpatrick 2014).

The psychological processes involved in radicalization also increase individuals’ vulnerabilities in situations, such as the economic failure and renewed repression that followed the Arab Spring. Crenshaw (1981) posits three conditions for terrorism in her seminal study, “The Causes of Terrorism”: concrete grievances among an identifiable group, blocks to political participation or other reasonable means of resolving those grievances, and a precipitating event. She noted

163 “Government use of unexpected and unusual force in response to protestor reform attempts often compels terrorist retaliation” (385). This study posits that the counterrevolution following the Arab Spring, particularly the Egyptian military coup in July 2013 (below), constituted just such an event.

Less dramatic processes and trends also can contribute to radicalization.

Kruglanski et. al (2014) identified the trigger that begins the process as a

“significance loss,” which could include personal failure or humiliation “as well as political, economic, and social anomie, wherein the individual feels a lack of means to pursue her or his ends (79-80). Louis (2009) traces the decision to turn to violence to two beliefs: that terrorism can force social change, and that alternative, non-violent means of seeking change do not work. “The tendencies to focus on a single value to the exclusion of others, to use morally unacceptable means to address genuine grievances…are common among religious terrorists all over the world,” noted Stern

(2003, xxvi-xxvii).

The radicalization process includes a narrowing of perceived options as individuals become convinced that only violence can solve their problems or help them achieve their goals (Stern 2003; Crenshaw 1981; Kruglanski et al. 2014; Sarangi and Alison 2005; Louis 2009, 125-153). Counterrevolution and economic downturn in the wake of the Arab Spring contributed to this process. As Dahlia Fahmy observed in 2015, since Mubarak’s ouster,

…Egypt has seen the dismissal of a parliament, the removal of Egypt's first democratically elected president, the increased politicization of the judiciary, the bloodiest massacre of Egyptians at the hands of the state, increasing media

164 censorship, the incarceration of over 40,000 political prisoners, mass death sentences, the banning of protests… and most critically, the establishment of a social environment that suffocates any public political discourse (in al-Jazeera 2015).

Egyptian Salafi groups expressed betrayal over Morsi’s failure to institute shari’a rule, but many were caught up in the backlash that followed his ouster (Zelin 2015b).

Jihadis seized on events as evidence that non-violent change was impossible. “The

Muslim Brotherhood government strove to please America and the secularists as much as it could, but they were not satisfied with it," al-Qa’ida leader Zawahiri claimed. “"What happened is the biggest proof of the failure of democratic means to achieve an Islamic government” (Telegraph 2013). Within two days of the coup, jihadis in the Sinai seized the governor’s office in al-Arish, the provincial capital, and launched attacks on Egyptian military positions (Sabry 2015, xxiii). “We’re another

Afghanistan,” a local mayor told reporters. “Now that they see our democracy is a sham, they will trust in bullets again (Economist 2013). “I want to say to El-Sisi, beware!” warned one Muslim Brotherhood activist in a viral YouTube statement.

“Know that you have created a new Taliban and a new al-Qa’ida in Egypt” (in Stack and El-Naggar 2013).

The military’s campaign against the Brotherhood and its supporters also fueled the jihadi narrative in other ways. Security forces attacked Brotherhood sit-ins on August 14, 2013, killing some 638 civilians and injuring at least 4000 (Kirkpatrick

2013). These killings, the imprisonment of thousands more, and a ban on Muslim

Brotherhood activity both created an incentive for revenge and eliminated the Muslim

165 Brotherhood as a legal political movement in Egypt. Mass trials led to apparently indiscriminate convictions. “Authorities ‘scoop’ up people, like throwing a big net into the sea, and fishing out what they can,” reported a former Amnesty International researcher (Nader 2016). In February 2016, an Egyptian court sentenced Ahmed

Mansour Qurani to life in prison for four murders, eight attempted murders, and vandalism—all crimes Qurani allegedly committed before his second birthday

(Chokshi 2016). In another case, three young men—later executed—were arrested before their alleged crime took place (Nader 2016).

Overnight, a party that had been a social and political force for 80 years was driven underground. By the end of 2013, the Egyptian Government had frozen all assets belonging to the Brotherhood and some 1,055 other charitable organizations

(Fahmy 2015). In the process of fulfilling the new President Sisi’s pledge that “there will be nothing called the Muslim Brotherhood during my tenure,” his government closed Brotherhood-affiliated groups that treated the poor, educated children, subsidized youth marriages, repaired houses, linked slums and villages to power and sewer systems, and gave young adults a social outlet (McCrummen 2013; Brooke

2015a; Brooke 2015b). The ripple effects of these closings encompass a far wider circle of Egyptians than just the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters. The absence of a comparatively moderate alternative for youth seeking greater religious structure also appears to have channeled youth towards the more extreme underground alternatives (Ahram Online 2014).

166 Meanwhile, Brotherhood leaders—jailed or exiled—lost control over younger members who question the party’s continued commitment to peaceful struggle. In the

2015 party elections, held in exile, young party members calling for revolution staged an unprecedented upset, winning 65 percent of the party leadership positions (al-

Jazeera 2015). In January 2014 an announcement on the Brotherhood’s Arabic website Ikhwanonline—quickly removed and possibly unauthorized—announced,

“We are at the beginning of a new phase where we summon our strength and evoke the meaning of jihad... “(We) prepare ourselves, our wives, our sons and daughters, and whoever follows our path for relentless jihad where we ask for martyrdom” (in

Willi 2016). Egypt specialist Abdullah al-Arain observed “a strong belief among a significant contingent of the Muslim Brotherhood members that its failures have been a result of the organization's unwillingness to embrace revolutionary politics” (in Al

Jazeera 2015).

The Muslim Brotherhood leadership continues to insist the movement is nonviolent, and there is no evidence that more than a fraction of the group’s members have actively turned to terrorism. That minority has, however, swelled the membership of the Ansar Bayt-al-Maqdis, now known as the Islamic State’s “Sinai

Province,” and created new terror factions such as Amjad Misr, or the “Egyptian

Army,” and a violent Brotherhood splinter group (Gold 2015a; Perego 2014; Awad

2016). “I used to believe in the motto, ‘Our peacefulness is more powerful than bullets,’” said one former Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood member. “But when bullets started being directed at us and we were accused of being terrorists, I started to 167 believe only in force to preserve my beliefs and establish the Islamic State in Egypt”

(Aman 2014).

Many Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood youth traveled to Syria. “We will not be able to change the situation in Egypt from inside, but Egypt is to be opened from abroad,” wrote “Younes,” who took part in the 2011 Egyptian demonstrations, but now fights in Syria for the Islamic State (Ahram Online 2014). “The Islamic Nation

(of Egypt) is now broken,” said another. “(The Islamic State) is raising the nation’s head, it is acting in God’s will, and is terrorizing the enemy of God” (Aman 2014).

Egyptian Islamic Jihad founder Kamal Habib claims the Islamic State offers such disillusioned activists hope.

They think the Islamic State will give them the respect they don’t get as nationals of their own countries. It gives them structure and a place where they can search for meaning. It’s an alternative to the failed states we see now (Cunningham 2014).

Other former Arab Spring activists also formed a recruiting pool for the

Islamic State, including several who originally belonged to secular groups (who also have been targeted by regime security forces). A 2015 longitudinal survey of Arab- language Twitter users who expressed support for the Islamic State found that most previously had supported—and later expressed disappointment with—the Arab

Spring (Magdy, Darwish, and Weber 2015). Interviews of former activists who have joined the Islamic State—or their survivors—present a similar picture. Former April 6 activist Omar Mustafa died fighting for Islamic State in Libya, three years after helping to organize the demonstrations at Tahrir Square. His friends pinpoint the

168 moment of change to the violent, SCAF-supported demonstrations against Morsi leading up to the coup (Atkinson 2014). Tahrir Square activist Adam al-Darawi, who ran for parliament and lobbied for Interior Ministry reforms, left Egypt after the military coup to become an Islamic State suicide bomber (Ali 2014b; Cunningham

2014; El-Gundy 2015). Mourad, a 28-year old Tunisian who works in construction, despite holding a Master’s degree, had not yet left for jihad in 2014, when he told a reporter the Islamic State was the region’s “only hope for social justice” (Kirkpatrick

2014).

Individuals also join terror groups seeking adventure, self-esteem, power, or a sense of belonging. “Global Islamist terrorists see themselves as warriors in pursuit of fame and glory,” Sageman wrote after surveying data on 500 terrorists (80). Stern, who has interviewed hundreds of terrorists, observes that most shared “the desire to forge a new identity and find a source of dignity,” but that “they are also seeking adventure and a more glamorous life” (2015). Islamic State fighters’ many posts on social media showing off their weapons, thus serve a double purpose. Not only do these posts attract new followers, they allow the recruits themselves to star in their own drama, showing off their weapons, strength, or brutality before a worldwide audience.

Sex also factors in the Islamic State’s appeal. Hudson and Den Boer’s (2002) discovery of a robust and persistent link between a shortage of females and violence appears salient in this context, too, where economic conditions limit access to marriage. Luis (2009) finds “the appeal of extreme terror groups may be increased… 169 (when) traditional paths to adulthood, love, occupational success and establishing a family are no longer successful…” (126). The Islamic State’s promise of women— both wives and slaves—and portrayal of supporters’ happy family lives under its rule plays directly to these needs. Press accounts of young men who left their homes to fight include many that cite this promised access to women as a motivating force.

Mohammed Ibrahim reportedly sought his own Kurdish women as spoils of war when he left his $200 a month construction job in Tunisia to fight for the Islamic State in

Syria (Kuntz 2015). Islam Yaken, killed fighting for Islamic State in 2014, earlier told his friends he wanted a “hot girlfriend.” “I can’t bury my head forever to not see women. What am I supposed to do?” Yakin asked on a video, shortly before leaving for the Islamic State (El-Naggar 2015).

New York Times journalist David Kirkpatrick found in the course of dozens of interviews in and around Ettadhamen, Tunisia, that local unemployed or working- class men were convinced that the Islamic State offered a higher standard of living.

“Many insisted that friends who had joined the Islamic State had sent back reports over the Internet of their homes, salaries, and even wives” (Kirkpatrick 2014). “They live better than us!” insisted Walid, who mused about a jihadi friend’s “truly nice, comfortable life” under the Islamic State. The high salaries, $980-$1000 a month for experienced fighters, have been substantially cut over the past year, but the perception that the Islamic State offers economic opportunity survives (Haaretz 2014; al-Gharbi

2014; al-Muhajir 2015). Meanwhile, Gambetta and Hertog (2016) demonstrate a significant correlation between Muslim university graduate unemployment and 170 graduates’ involvement in terrorism, concluding that “frustration with the personal and collective consequences of failed economic development seems to be the catalyst” driving radicalization (69-70).

Islamic State propaganda played to youth trends in the Arab Spring countries, as well as to targeted groups in the West. Promises of adventure, brides, work with meaning, and a chance to participate as a full and active citizen in building something meaningful—all found an audience in countries such as Tunisia, where youth alienation ran high. Brutal “war porn” images of beheadings attracted one group of angry youth, but other propaganda themes enticed different audiences. A 2015 survey of Islamic State propaganda videos found nearly half highlighted the Islamic State as an attractive place to live: jihadis provided health care, justice, and good governance to smiling citizens. The Islamic State portrays itself as a fair, impartial, and just government, with a fully engaged citizenry that transcends ethnic and racial boundaries. This edited view of life in IS territories appeals most to those who not engaged in their own societies, looking for a place, a cause, or structure for their lives. New York Times journalist David Kirkpatrick found, in fact, that dozens of

Tunisian youth who were attracted to the idyllic portrayals of life in the Islamic State dismissed the reports of mass killings or beheadings as Western propaganda

(Kirkpatrick 2014). Youth appear to selectively find what they sought in Islamic State propaganda and deny alternative evidence, even when it appeared in the pages of the same al-Dabiq magazine.

171 A 2015 survey of captured Islamic State fighters illustrates both the range of motivations among the fighters and sharp differences between the motivations of the external Arab fighters and their local and Western peers (Quantum 2015). No motivation predominated among Arab foreign fighters, with 23 percent claiming they were fighting to correct injustices, 22 percent saying they sought to gain status or material benefit, 22 percent wanting thrills or adventure, 11 percent seeking revenge against oppressors, and a final 11 percent deliberately seeking to die (14). This makes a sharp contrast to Western fighters, who overwhelmingly were seeking belonging

(67 percent), while, as we saw earlier, most local fighters were sought income, status, or revenge.

Despite substantial Islamic State propaganda promoting the virtues of martyrdom, only foreign Arab fighters explicitly stated they sought death. While the sample is small, this result may well be an extension of the increased suicide rates seen throughout the post-Arab Spring states (see chapter 3). Radicalization theory and empirical evidence suggest an overlap between an impulse towards suicide (violence towards oneself) and an urge to strike out at others. Zimbardo (2007) lists “anger, revenge, and outrage at perceived injustice” as triggers for either reaction (291).

Kruglanski et al. (2014) argue it is a mistake to define radicalization as limited to terrorism. Instead, they define it as a spectrum of radical behaviors including

“substance abuse, severe crime… self-immolation, (and) suicide… While serving a given end, they undermine other goals that matter to most people” (70).

172 The Islamic State’s promises of a millennial utopia also play to a young public steeped in contemporary Arab culture. Filiu (2011) details how the September 11,

2001 attacks, subsequent local regime oppression in concert with the Global War on

Terror, and U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 combined to feed a new genre of Arabic- language apocalyptic literature. “An obsessive style of paranoid interpretation,” drove these novels and pseudo-scholarly studies, which interpreted current events in an attempt to “make sense of a world in which hostile and infidel forces ran wild” (Filiu

2011, 260). Early products such as Dawud’s 1991 Beware: The Antichrist Has

Invaded the World from the Bermuda Triangle were supplanted by increasingly sophisticated radical messianic literature that drew from both Islamic tradition and contemporary Western memes (Filiu 2011). As early as 2002, Hisham Muhammad

Abu Hakima’s The Antichrist and the Battle of Armageddon described the polarization of the world between “the camp of faith and the camp of godlessness,” with the Islamic forces “found in Syria…” (in Filiu 2011, 113).

This apocalyptic literature both shapes and reflects popular discourse. Sixty- seven percent of Tunisians and 40 percent of Egyptians polled in 2012 said they expected the return of the Mahdi, the Muslim savior, during their lifetimes (Bell

2012, 65). Egyptian demonstrators during the Arab Spring speculated that Mubarak was the Antichrist (McCants 2015b, 99). Others swore they saw the Mahdi walking among them at Tahrir Square, or saw Mubarak’s fall as a sign the end was near (Fathi

2011). The Islamic State played to this audience, citing—and reinterpreting— prophecies to boost their appeal. Through the prophetic lens, they were more than a 173 ragtag group of fighters, or even one new state among many others. The Islamic State became the culmination of history, and the war it fought was the great battle at the end of days. Sasha Havlicek, director of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue notes,

“Brand Caliphate has done more for recruitment than anything else. It is about building the utopian vision, not just fighting” (Bennhold 2015). The Islamic State’s narrative offered an explanation for the problems of the age, as well as a solution.

A survey of al-Dabiq, the Islamic State’s online magazine shows the group’s use of apocalyptic themes places it well within the pattern set by earlier totalitarian movements. Like Stalin, Hitler, and Pol Pot, the group identifies and dehumanizes its enemies. Members of non-Sunni sects—Shi’a, Druze, Ismaili, and Alawi—are “the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the scorpion of deception and malice, the prowling enemy, the deadly poison,” who are “to be killed wherever they are found,”

(al-Dabiq 2016, 41; 2015a, 9). Just as the actual faith of a Jew was irrelevant to his fate under Nazi rule, the conversion of a Shi’a is “not to be accepted” (al-Dabiq 2016,

41). Children are urged to rebuke parents who “pray poorly” and to “admonish and advise” parents who sin (al-Dabiq 2015c, 16-17). Wives must abandon husbands not loyal to the State (al-Muhājirah 2015, 43). Slavery and rape are glorified as

“worship,” a sign of God’s grace, and proof of the impending millennium (al-

Muhājirah 2015, 42-49; al-Dabiq 2014b, 14-17; Callimachi 2015). Only the select few, wielding “religion’s sword” will enjoy a world of peace and justice:

174 ...(E)ven if you were to plant a seed on a stone, it would spring. There will be no rivalries, no envy, no hatred... The Earth will be filled with peace just as a jar is filled with water… (al-Dabiq 2015b, 24).

Becoming A Member

Group dynamics also play a critical role in the radicalization of foreign fighters into this totalitarian ideology. Milgram (1974) found “profound alterations” in the willingness of ordinary individuals to commit violence when placed under strong outside authority (133). Snow and Machalek’s 1984 study of religious conversion appears salient, particularly given the nominal religious background of most Islamic State recruits.

Conversion concerns not only a change in values, beliefs, and identities, but more fundamentally and significantly, it entails the displacement of one universe of discourse by another or the ascendance of a formerly peripheral universe of discourse to the status of primary authority (170).

In his study of 500 terrorists, former CIA psychologist Marc Sageman (2008) found

“social bonds play a more important role in the emergence of the global Salafi jihad than ideology,” as veterans entice new recruits and inculcate them into group norms

(178). Littman and Paluck (2015) found groups removed psychological obstacles to violence “by increasing members’ motivation to engage in violence, particularly through group identification (80). “Over and above the various personal motivations that brought individuals into a violent group, their identity as members of the group motivates them to perpetrate violence as they seek to become prototypical group members and to serve the group’s mission” (89). Whitehouse and Lanman (2014),

175 too, found “rites of terror” produced a sense of kinship among individuals that made them more willing to sacrifice or commit violence for perceived group interests (678).

Arendt’s (1951/1968) observation that the masses supporting totalitarianism “grew out of the fragments of a highly atomized society” remains true for the youth who find belonging with the Islamic State (317).

The context of the Syrian civil war aids these dynamics. Unlike previous where the beleaguered Muslims in need of rescue faced oppression by foreign, non-Muslim foes—Soviets in Afghanistan, Serbs in Bosnia, U.S. forces in Iraq—in

Syria, the oppressors were members of minority Muslim sects: Alawis and Shias.

This dynamic feeds the Islamic State’s sectarian narrative, leading even youth from countries such as Egypt and Tunisia with a minimal Shi’a presence to identify with calls for Sunni solidarity. Norwegian terrorism expert Thomas Hegghammer speculated in 2013 that the spread of anti-Shiite rhetoric among Syrian foreign fighters represented a post facto rationalization of a military project undertaken for other reasons. (Hegghammer 2013). Shi’a are, after all, almost nonexistent in North

African countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya and thus not previously a focus of significant concern (El-Ghobashy and Morajea 2015). It is telling, though, that even Islamic State defectors who decry the group’s attacks on rival Sunni groups, make no complaint against the same acts committed against Shi’as, Alawis, or others identified as “non-Muslims” (De Freytas-Tamura 2015; Neumann 2015, 10).

176 Bringing the Islamic State Home

Youth from the Arab Spring states are not only traveling abroad to support the

Islamic State; increasingly they are launching Islamic State affiliates in their home nations. The pattern of both Islamic State waliyat (provinces) and IS-sponsored attacks once again mirrors the pattern of locations where government control was weakened by the events of the Arab Spring. Territories inside Libya, the Sinai, and

Yemen where al-Qa’ida-linked groups gained a foothold now support Islamic State waliyat. Splinters from the Ansar al-Sharia groups established in Tunisia, Libya and

Egypt after the Arab Spring provided manpower and an existing infrastructure for

Islamic State operations throughout North Africa.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s June 2014 announcement that the Islamic State had restored the caliphate spurred realignments within the many al-Qa’ida affiliates. The impact was greatest among the local groups created after the Arab Spring. Senior leaders of established groups, such as al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) mostly remained loyal to al-Zawahiri, while many junior officers pledged support for Islamic State (Milton 2015, 3). In

Libya, Islamic State partisans seized control of some Ansar al-Sharia factions by assassinating their pro-al-Qa’ida leaders (El-Amrani 2016). The al-Qa’ida-Islamic

State split thus took on a generational flavor, with the Islamic State making the strongest showings in the areas where al-Qa’ida’s influence had most recently arrived: the Sinai, Tunisia, and Libya. Members of Islamic State feeder-groups such as Ansar al-Sharia al-Tunisia tend to be younger, recruited after the Arab Spring.

177 They are more comfortable with social media, more exposed to the Islamic State’s brand of apocalyptic millennialism and violence, and lack the personal ties to the sexagenarian al-Zawhiri or other al-Qa’ida central leaders.

Competition between al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State for preeminence, as well as an increased numbers of jihadis, is driving an unprecedented increase of violence in the Arab Spring states, as shown in Table 2. Data drawn from the National

Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global

Terrorism Database illustrates the trend. In Tunisia, fifty-six of the 73 attacks listed between 1979 and 2014 occurred after the Arab Spring. The attacks also grew more deadly. Between 1979 and 1010, 105 people were killed in terrorist attacks in Tunisia.

Between 2011 and 2015, the total was at least 141. These tallies do not include the estimated 51 additional people killed during an Islamic State incursion from Libya in

March, 2016.

Egypt experienced an even greater escalation in attacks. Between 1995 and

2010, 164 people were killed in 454 terrorist attacks, most of which occurred between

1995 and 1998. Between 2011 and 2014, 648 people were killed in 721 attacks. The date of President Morsi’s ouster, July 3 2013 is, moreover, an inflection point in the violence. In the 31 months between the January 2011 uprisings and Morsi’s ouster in

July 2013, terrorists stated 97 attacks in which 83 were killed. The majority of these incidents occurred in the Sinai Peninsula and involved military targets; only 4 were in

Cairo. In the 17 months following Morsi’s ouster, 632 attacks killed 565 people.

Seventy-two of these attacks were staged in Cairo. Bayt-al-Ansar/Sinai Province’s

178 attack on Russian , killing all 224 aboard, was outside the scope of this data set. The airplane bombing represented yet a further escalation in the group’s activities following its pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi, indicating a further expansion of the group’s targeting to reflect Islamic State’s global agenda.

(Gold 2015b, 19-22).

Data on attacks in Libya before Qadhafi’s fall are limited and unreliable. The count of 16 attacks killing 27 people between 1979 and the end of 2010 is probably incomplete. Most notable in Libya’s case, however, is a surge in terror attacks that began in April 2012—eight months after Qadhafi’s fall—and continues to escalate.

Most of these attacks appear to have been associated with Islamic State efforts to expand the territories of its “province” of Cyrenaica in eastern Libya. Increasingly, however, the group is targeting government-associated assets, such as oil fields, in an effort to undercut the government’s ability to fund its operations (El-Ghobashy and

Morajea 2015). Syria and Yemen are excluded from this analysis because the high number of unattributed attacks makes it difficult to sort Islamic State activity from actions by pro-regime militias or third-party actors, such as the Shi’a Huthis.

Equivalent increases in terrorism did not take place in the three North African states where no significant demonstrations or regime change took place during the

Arab Spring. Since 2011, terrorist attacks have decreased in Algeria and remained relatively constant in Morocco. While terrorist activity in Sudan surged in the 2008-

2014 period, a closer look reveals only a single recent incident--a 2014 attack on a journalist—that can be linked to jihadi terror. Morocco’s 1,200 fighters in Syria make

179 up one of the largest national contingents, suggesting the increase in domestic terrorism reflects more than the influence of Syrian veterans. The pattern all three countries, but especially Egypt, suggests that the escalation is, instead, linked to the

Arab Spring.

Inadequate and conflicting data prevents any overall determination of the

Islamic State’s share in the increased violence. The three major attacks in Tunisia in

2015 illustrate the complexity of sorting out Islamic State and al-Qa’ida activity. The

Islamic State claimed responsibility for the March attack on the Bardo Museum in

180 Tunis, June massacre of European tourists on a beach in Sousse, and November on members of Tunisia’s National Guard (Withnall 2015). Tunisian investigators attributed all three attacks to Ansar al-Shari’a and Okba Ibn Nafaa, both known al-Qa’ida affiliates with Islamic State offshoots (see chapter 4). The leading suspect in the 2013 killings of two Tunisian leftist politicians, then attributed to the

Ansar al-Sharia, now claims he carried out the killings for Islamic State (Zelin

2015a). Possible explanations for the conflicting attributions include that defecting al-

Qa’ida members “reattributed” their earlier actions to reflect their new allegiances; that attacks were conducted by al-Qa’ida and Islamic State members in concert, that the Islamic State attempted to win credit for al-Qa’ida operations, or that the Tunisian

Government was mistaken. What is clear from the volume and number of attacks that 181 are taking place is that the Islamic State’s presence in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt is growing in size, activity, and risk.

Conclusion

The Arab Spring did not create the root causes of radicalization in the Middle

East and North Africa. Stifling authoritarian rule, corruption, injustice, and economic decline predate the Arab Spring by decades. A-Qa’ida and other jihadi groups were active and recruiting long before Bouazizi’s self-immolation spurred the first protest march in December 2010. Generational splits within the Muslim Brotherhood and al-

Qa’ida-led jihadi movements may well have spurred defections even had the Arab

Spring not taken place. Many Muslim Brotherhood youth strained against party discipline in Egypt. In Eastern Libya, too, a younger generation expressed frustration with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s truce with the Qadhafi regime. Al-Zarqawi fed foreign youths’ aggressions with his brutal campaign in Iraq as early as 2003.

What the Arab Spring did do was to raise hopes, only to dash them. Hundreds of thousands of young men and women risked their lives to protest on the streets of

Tunis, Sana’a and Damascus, to stand in Tahrir Square or bear arms against

Qadhafi’s mercenaries. Their fight wasn’t for an Islamic State, but for dignity, a say in their government, political freedoms, and economic opportunity. The activists failed in their goal of social revolution, the “rapid and basic transformations of their societies’ state and class structures” (Skocpol 1979, 4). Even in Tunisia, which has successfully transitioned to an electoral democracy, the pre-revolution elite has

182 largely regained control over government policy while the schism between rural and urban groups has widened.

In the wake of the failed Arab Spring revolutions, societies are more polarized than before. Polarization between sects, ideologies, tribes, classes, regional interests and generations undermine social cohesion. Weakened governments are unable to deliver social and economic progress, and instead rule through violence and fear.

Fragmented and war-torn societies make easy prey for charismatic leaders with ideologies that promise redemption, a return to greatness, and a license to transcend normal rules of morality. Revolution, counterrevolution and civil war, created an opening for the Islamic State to break out of its Iraqi homeland and spread to neighboring Syria and beyond. As Hannah Arendt wrote in 1951 to describe an earlier era of totalitarian rule:

What proved so attractive was that terrorism had become a kind of philosophy through which to express frustration, resentment, and blind hatred, a kind of political expressionism which used to express oneself, which watched delightedly the publicity given to resounding deeds, and was absolutely willing to pay the price of life for having succeeded in forcing the recognition of one’s existence… (Arendt 1951/1968, 332)

183 Conclusion

There will come a people from the east, young men with shaved heads and foolish ideas, who recite the Quran without it penetrating beyond their throats. Their speech will be attractive, but they will shoot through religion without any of its [beneficial] effects upon them. Wherever you find them, fight them Hadith (Attributed to the Prophet Mohammed) (Sahih Bukhari)

Revolutions have long been recognized as violent cataclysmic and transformational events. Even failed revolutions lead to further violence as both restored elites and their defeated opponents maneuver to ensure their own future safety. The term terrorism itself dates to the aftermath of the French Revolution.

Scholars have long noted that revolutionary uprisings inevitably include a utopian element, as individuals seek to “begin the world over again” (Paine 1776). The spread of terrorism in the post-Arab Spring states is thus, in part, consistent with a historical pattern in which violent outcomes are more likely than not. The comparatively blood- free color revolutions following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 were an aberration, rather than the norm. Witness, for example, the decades of regime and insurgent violence that followed failed revolutions in El Salvador (1979), Guatemala

(1944-1954), or Chile (1970-1973). What is unusual about the aftermath of the Arab

Spring is thus not that violence increased, but the global spread of that violence.

The presence of an international terrorist group able to exploit the opening provided by failed social revolutions, together with new social media tools that expanded the reach of its message thus adds a new layer of complexity to our understanding of the revolutionary process. The expansion of the Islamic state was a highly contingent process. Had the United States not invaded Iraq in 2003, had the

184 Maliki government not attempted to exclude Shias from power in post-withdrawal

Iraq, had Assad been ousted or stepped aside before Syria slid into civil war, the

Islamic State in Iraq would likely either never have existed or would not have recovered from its 2006 collapse. Al-Qa’ida and, later, the Islamic State’s regained momentum were thus the product of their ability to exploit opportunities as they arose. Had peaceful and successful transitions to electoral democracy in Egypt, Libya,

Yemen, and particularly Syria taken place--however unlikely--Islamic terrorism would almost certainly be a far weaker and isolated force than today’s Islamic State.

The role of the Arab Spring in providing these openings suggests the value of exploring the role of path dependencies in the development and spread of terrorist groups. Just as democracy scholars teased out key factors in the path to democratization by breaking the process down to a series of pacts between ruling and opposition elites, a focus on the different stages of a terrorist group’s growth and the enabling factors which permit it to exploit new opportunities might prove enlightening (Rustow 1970; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Guo 1999; Crescenzi

1999).

A second interesting set of questions center on the role of youth culture in steering young and alienated youth towards terrorism. Scholars have long known that terrorists of all ideologies are primarily young. Earlier waves of terrorism such as the leftist movements of the 1970s were strongly shaped by youth culture. Sageman’s

(2008) arguments that most terrorists are radicalized by their social networks remains salient, although these social networks have now expanded to include a web of social

185 media activists operating across national boundaries. Hegghammer’s (2015) work exploring jihadi culture dovetails with ethnographic findings in Egypt, Tunisia, and

Morocco that youth identified both with secular activist groups, such as and the April 6 movement, and with Salafism as an explicit rejection of their elders’ corrupt society (Schielke 2015; Spiegel 2015; Onodera 2015).

Preliminary work assessing the Islamic State as representative of a new, “fifth wave” of terrorism suggests there are, indeed, differences between the current generation of youth joining the Islamic State and previous generations of terrorists.

Recruits to the Islamic State are younger, better educated, and more likely to be female than previous waves of Islamic jihadis (Atwan 2015, 256; Weiss and Hassan

2015; Stern and Berger 2015). What is most interesting for future research are early findings suggesting youth from different contexts tend to have different motivations for joining the Islamic State. Counterterrorist scholars have long noted that there is no single profile for a terrorist. Interviews of captured terrorists correlating their national backgrounds with their stated motivations (Quantum 2015) or noting different patterns in education (Gambetta and Hertog 2016) suggest there is value in analyzing empirical patterns. Such analysis may well suggest new directions for counter- radicalization programs, including analyzing how paths to terrorism vary by nation or region.

In the end, the lesson gained from analyzing the links between the Arab

Spring and the rise of the Islamic State is that opportunity and self-determination matter. Individuals from all contexts become terrorists, but oppression remains the 186 driving force behind the overall rise of jihadi terror. Corruption, arbitrary rule, human rights abuses, and lack of a political voice or economic opportunity offer jihadi recruiters a powerful platform. Democratization alone is not the answer; Tunisia’s success in transitioning to an electoral democracy demonstrates that voting alone is insufficient to giving young citizens a perceived stake in their own government. Nor can democracy be imposed from abroad, as was proven by the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In today’s globalized and interconnected world, however, the continued repression in one region feeds worldwide instability, as opportunist jihadis spread their nihilistic message across borders and cultures.

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