Is Pollution Value-Maximizing? the Dupont Case
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES IS POLLUTION VALUE-MAXIMIZING? THE DUPONT CASE Roy Shapira Luigi Zingales Working Paper 23866 http://www.nber.org/papers/w23866 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 September 2017 We thank Asher Schechter for research assistance, John Matsusaka, Cary Coglianese and Effi Benmellech for very useful comments, and participants in conferences and seminars in University of Chicago Booth School of Business, University of Chicago Law School, the American Law and Economics Association, The Society of Environmental Law and Economics Scholars, European Law and Economics Association, Israeli Law and Economics Association, IDC, Case Western University, and Columbia University. Financial support from the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2017 by Roy Shapira and Luigi Zingales. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Is Pollution Value-Maximizing? The DuPont Case Roy Shapira and Luigi Zingales NBER Working Paper No. 23866 September 2017 JEL No. K32,L21,Q52 ABSTRACT DuPont, one of the most respectable U.S. companies, caused environmental damage that ended up costing the company around a billion dollars. By using internal company documents disclosed in trials we rule out the possibilities that this bad outcome was due to ignorance, an unexpected realization, or a problem of bad governance.
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