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Strategic Analysis Paper Independent Strategic Analysis of Australia’S Global Interests 19 January 2010

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Strategic Analysis Paper Independent Strategic Analysis of Australia’S Global Interests 19 January 2010 Strategic Analysis Paper Independent Strategic Analysis of Australia’s Global Interests 19 January 2010 The End of Sri Lanka’s Insurgency: Implications - Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe Summary The crushing military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, has set an uncommon precedent in the annals of insurgent warfare, in that it debunks the popular notion that intractable and Source: www.welt.de established insurgencies are unwinnable. The victory over such a formidable organisation as the LTTE has brought Sri Lanka into a new era which provides a historic opportunity for the country to prosper like its Asian neighbours. Although the insurgency is now over, the LTTE overseas network, however, still remains largely intact and continues to sustain the LTTE cause, namely its struggle for a separate Tamil state. Analysis Significance of the Victory Given the nature of the LTTE defeat, it appears to be unlikely that an LTTE resurgence in Sri Lanka remains possible: ‘We have destroyed the LTTE leadership’s first, second and third rungs. The LTTE is over. They may do a bit of hit- and-run tactics, but they are militarily over, stated General Sarath Fonseka, the Sri Lanka Army’s Chief of Defence Staff and former commander. The LTTE lost over 22,000 combatants killed in action; over 9,100 have surrendered; all its bases and 15,000 square kilometres of territory have been overrun. Among insurgent groups worldwide, the LTTE was considered the trend setter in military innovation and development at the organisational and tactical level; it was also the only insurgent-terrorist organisation to field an army, maritime force and air capability. Moreover, according to the US Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) website, the LTTE: ‘Perfected the use of suicide bombers, invented the suicide belt, pioneered the use of women in suicide attacks, murdered some 4,000 people in the past two years alone; and assassinated two world leaders [Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa] – the only terrorist organisation to do so.’ What the FBI does not mention is that the LTTE pioneered and refined the use of suicide terrorism – on land, sea and air – feats that even al-Qaeda has not achieved. In fact prior to the Second Gulf War, the LTTE led the world in the most number of suicide attacks. According to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence, the LTTE participated in a sustained campaign of ethnic cleansing against ethnic Sinhalese and Muslim populations in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, which from 1984 to 2009 saw at least 257 attacks that killed 4,485 civilians, wounded 5,897 and displaced around 150,000-200,000 Sinhalese and Muslims. Additionally, the LTTE insisted that it was the sole representative of the Sri Lankan Tamils and ruthlessly suppressed dissident Tamil voices. According to Sri Dharan, the dissident Tamil leader of the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front-Naba faction (EPRLF-Naba), the LTTE allegedly eliminated somewhere between 13,000-18,000 rival Tamils from 1986-2006 (EPRLF claims to have lost over 1,400 members). In direct terms, the military defeat of the LTTE translates as a victory of a democratic state over an extremist anti-democratic movement inspired by radical Tamil nationalism, or what some commentators have referred to as Tamil fascism. The defeat of a formidable terrorist organisation has also sent a strong message to aspiring insurgent groups in the South Asian region, a point emphasised to The Nation by Narayan Swamy, an Indian Tamil journalist who authored two books on the LTTE: ‘The defeat of the LTTE is a defeat of the politics of no-compromise. It also marks the defeat of arrogance. Having embraced militarism and a mindset that saw every compromise as surrender… The LTTE’s refusal to embrace politics, to compromise, to take some and give some, and its failure to understand that the world would never accept an independent Tamil Eelam led to its demise.’ Crucially, the void created by the LTTE defeat has dramatically altered Sri Lanka’s political landscape and extracted the country from its darkest and bloodiest era, which in turn has offered opportunities and new challenges. Implications for Sri Lanka In Sri Lanka the defeat of the LTTE has given vital space for previously suppressed Tamil democratic parties to engage in the democratic process without fear of assassination, as evidenced recently during the Norwegian-moderated Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of 2002-2006, where over 200 Tamils from rival political parties and groups were killed by the LTTE. Additionally, the defeat of the LTTE has removed its violent dominance over Tamil politics and has enabled the process of reconciliation to start afresh. Aptly, President Mahinda Rajapakse who leads the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition government, (which includes 13 Tamil ministers and four allied Tamil parties) is scheduled next year after Sri Lanka’s presidential elections to deliberate on the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) recommendations to negotiate a political settlement with Sri Lanka’s Tamil community. Furthermore, a newly formed and special committee has been appointed composed of seven Tamil political parties to examine the grievances of the Tamil community (out of 16 registered Tamil political parties, six have parliamentary representation). Recently, the UPFA held two elections in August, 2009, namely the Vavuniya Urban Council and Jaffna Municipal Council elections which were the first democratic elections held in the Northern Province in almost a decade. Although voter turn out was low, these local elections were seen as a necessary step to foster the culture of democracy to pave the way for the much larger Northern Provincial Council election (likely to be held early next year), which will lead to the election of the province’s first ever Chief Minister. In the Northern Province, the Sri Lankan government intends to emulate its experience in the Eastern Province. For example, after the military recaptured the Eastern Province in July 2007, the reintroduction of democracy saw the Batticaloa Municipal Council election held in March 2008 followed by the Eastern Provincial Council election in May 2008. In both elections, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), formerly the breakaway LTTE eastern faction emerged victorious allied with the UPFA. As such, two former LTTE commanders are now key ministers. Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan (alias Pillaiyan), the incumbent TMVP leader was appointed the first ever Chief Minister of the Eastern Province and Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (alias Karuna Amman), who was recently appointed the non-cabinet Minister of National Integration and Reconciliation and also a Vice-President of the SLFP. Such appointments reflect the major political changes in Sri Lanka, especially in co-opting former LTTE leaders into the democratic mainstream. On the other hand, while the LTTE is critically weakened in Sri Lanka, its immense supporting infrastructure overseas still remains largely intact and will continue to present a threat. ‘The LTTE can be revived. They can take all their activities outside Sri Lanka and build up the diaspora. It can also encourage the few remnants of the LTTE back home,’ affirmed Senaka Walgampaya, Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner to Australia in an interview with ABC News . As such, although the LTTE has lost practically all of its experienced frontline commanders and fighters, there is still the 2 potential for it to reignite militancy among elements of the hundreds of LTTE fighters and operatives that have fled, largely undetected, to the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, and also among the 9,100 former LTTE combatants currently interned in Sri Lanka, which could disrupt the process of reconciliation and hinder the prospect of a political solution between ethnic Sinhalese and Tamils. Hence, Sri Lanka has indicated the importance of dismantling the LTTE global network as emphasised by Dayan Jayatilleka, who until recently was the former Sri Lankan Ambassador to the United Nations: ‘The pro-Tiger Tamil Diaspora has emerged as a highly organised, mobilised and lavishly funded formation which has to be taken seriously as an adversary … as the most important element within the separatist terrorist cause.’ Ramifications for the Diaspora Even though the defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka means that the achievement of a separate Tamil state is no longer plausible, LTTE supporters within the Tamil diaspora will not easily relinquish the struggle, inculcated by decades of LTTE ideology. This was seen at the end of Sri Lanka’s insurgency, where many violent incidents were perpetrated by LTTE supporters in Western countries, notably against dissident Tamils and elements of the Sinhalese expatriate community. According to Dr. Rajasingham Narendran, a dissident Tamil activist: ‘The propaganda of the LTTE abroad is so powerful. The diaspora is suffering from a syndrome. As a result they are unable to forget the past. They are ready to swallow whatever is told to them. Any story you tell about the Sri Lankan Government or the Sinhala people, they believe. It is very difficult to bring out from their present mind set. So if we take the stance of the diaspora, 40 percent are fully committed [to the LTTE], another 40 percent stand in the middle and 20 percent are totally convinced that the LTTE is not the way forward.’ Presently, the LTTE functions through dozens of front organisations in over 30 countries worldwide, which continue to serve as its base of support and platform for its operations, as confirmed by a US Department of Justice press release in January 2008: ‘The Tamil Tigers relies heavily upon supporters throughout the world to raise and launder money, acquire intelligence and purchase military use technology.’ The crucial support from the estimated 800,000 strong Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora was the single biggest factor which sustained the LTTE war effort all these years.
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