Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C #1 Neri

G.R. No. 192828 November 28, 2011

RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners, vs. HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents.

FACTS - sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002, 5 the respondents filed a Complaint6 for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC). against the petitioners ( Ramon Ching) and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.

In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of action:

First Cause of Action. That repondents are the heirs of Lim San,(Antonio). Respondents Joseph Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes). Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a common-law wife of Antonio.

The respondents averred that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated.

Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the police investigations tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder of Antonio, the former made an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that there were only six real estate properties left by Antonio. The respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally transferred to his name the titles to the said properties. Further, there are two other parcels of land, cash and jewelries, plus properties in Hongkong, which were in Ramon's possession.

Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was sweet-talked by Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit ofP4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and the certificates of title covering two condominium units in Binondo which were purchased by Antonio using his own money but which were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive of the stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue influence, Ramon had convinced them to execute an Agreement8 and a Waiver9 on August 20, 1996. The terms and conditions stipulated in the Agreement and Waiver, specifically, on the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the amount of P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, Lucina was not informed of the execution of the said instruments and had not received any amount from Ramon. Hence, the instruments are null and void.

Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which constitute 60% of the latter's total capital stock, were illegally transferred by Ramon to his own name through a forged document of sale executed after Antonio died. Po Wing owns a ten-storey building in Binondo. Ramon's claim that he bought the stocks from Antonio before the latter died is

1 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also banished into thin air through Ramon's machinations.

Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra- Judicial Settlement of Estate10 adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents. By virtue of the said instrument, new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering eight real properties owned by Antonio were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to the Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to post a Surety Bond conditioned to answer for whatever claims which may eventually surface in connection with the said stocks. Co-defendant Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's behalf.

Sixth Cause of Action. Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co- defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. By reason of Ramon's lack of authority to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate, the conveyances are null and void ab initio.

Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages Antonio's estate. She has no intent to convey to the respondents their shares in the estate of Antonio.

The petitioners (Ramon Ching) filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss12 alleging forum shopping, litispendentia, res judicata and the respondents as not being the real parties in interest. the RTC issued an Omnibus Order13 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.

The respondents filed an Amended Complaint14 dated April 7, 2005 impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank. The Amended Complaint also added a seventh cause of action relative to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to them. Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the pendency of the case.

On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim.15

On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order16 admitting the respondents' Amended Complaint. The RTC stressed that Metrobank had already filed Manifestations admitting that as successor-in- interest of Global Bank, it now possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed willingness to abide by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's deposits. The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail the aforecited Order was denied by the RTC on May 3, 2006.

On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim to the respondents' Amended Complaint.

On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss18 the respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an ordinary court.

2 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order19 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss on grounds:

In the case at bar, an examination of the Complaint would disclose that the action delves mainly on the question of ownership of the properties described in the Complaint which can be properly settled in an ordinary civil action. And as pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to declare the nullity of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly executed by defendant Ramon Ching to defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have translated this action into a special proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended Complaint. With regard [to] the prayer to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of the CPPA and that the same be immediately released to them, in itself poses an issue of ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial evidence. And as emphasized by the plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint was intended to implead Metrobank as a co-defendant.

As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during the Pre-trial of this case, one of the issues raised by the defendants Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties is: Whether or not there can be disinheritance in intestate succession? Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be legally disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the Court, the issue of disinheritance, which is one of the causes of action in the Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on the merits. And at this stage, it has not been sufficiently established whether or not there is a will.20

The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856, raised the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that the Amended Complaint sought to establish the status or rights of the respondents which subjects are within the ambit of a special proceeding.

On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision21 denying the petition for certiorari on grounds:

Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the causes of action of the amended complaint induced us to infer that nothing in the said complaint shows that the action of the private respondents should be threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing that their allegations were substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the alleged fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The private respondents also instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect them from the consequence of the fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him from disposing or alienating the subject properties, including the P4 Million deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that the probate court could not take cognizance of the prayer to disinherit Ramon Ching, given the undisputed fact that there was no will to be contested in a probate court.

The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended complaint and complicates the issue of jurisdiction by reiterating the grounds or defenses set up in the petitioners' earlier pleadings. Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint without regard to whether or not the private respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to recover upon all or some of the causes of action asserted therein. In this regard, the jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend 3 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C upon the petitioners (defendants).22 Hence, we focus our resolution on the issue of jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and not on the defenses pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the subsequent pleadings of the petitioners.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject the action of the petitioners in a special proceeding since the nullification of the subject documents could be achieved in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to evaluate the evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon the issues that it defined during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 02-105251.

The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a Resolution 24 issued on July 8, 2010.

The Issue

Whether or not the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Amended Complaint, and other matters which can only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action.

The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine (a) who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d) whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or the exclusive property of the deceased spouse.26 Further, the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of the contending parties and the respondents' alleged entitlement as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in Metrobank's custody are matters which are more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding and not of an ordinary civil action.

The respondents opposed27 the instant petition claiming that the petitioners are engaged in forum shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos. 17550728 and 183840,29 both involving the contending parties in the instant petition were filed by the petitioners and are currently pending before this Court. Further, in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,30 the SC declared that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides, the petitioners, having validly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC and having actively participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped from challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint.31

The Court's Ruling

We resolve to deny the instant petition.Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents that the petitioners engaged in forum shopping and are already estopped from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when the latter participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition is still in order. Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. 32 A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 33 It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 34 To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.

4 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the pendency of the case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and not on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized that the respondents were parties to the execution of the Agreement35 and Waiver36 prayed to be nullified. Hence, even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonio’s estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon . In the event that the RTC will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a) Opposition to the respondents' Motion to Admit Substitution of Party;38 and (b) Manifestation39 through counsel that they will no longer file a reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.

#2 Sale Fernandez vs Maravilla 10 SCRA 589

FACTS:

Maravilla sought the probate of his late wife’s will. The siblings sought denial of probate on the ground that it was not signed on each and every page by the decedent. They likewise prayed for the appointment of their brother as special administrator in lieu of the husband to protect their interest and also due to the failure to file an inventory. The probate of the will in the meantine was denied and to this, the husband appealed. Consequently, the brother was appointed as administrator. The husband filed a petition for certiorari and for preliminary injunction, praying therein the annulment of the brother as co-administrator and the prohibition of the probate court from proceding in his removal as administrator. The petitioners moved for the certification of the same to the SC as the amount involved exceeds the jurisdiction of the CA. Nevertheless, the CA decided in favor of the husband.

ISSUE: WON Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition since the probate case is not on appeal before it.

5 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C

HELD:

Under Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an order of a probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or value involved or in the controversy therein is that of the entire estate. Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate, considering that the amount involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which are merely incidental thereto.

Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing respondent as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of the whole estate in controversy. It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.

#3 Neri

G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000 RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.

FACTS - Petitioner RufinaLuy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim RufinaLuy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner".

Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system.

Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion6 for the lifting of lispendens and motion7 for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent.

In an order8 dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court, granted the private respondents' twin motions. Subsequently, RufinaLuy Lim filed a verified amended petition which contained that the late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following abovementioned businesseslikewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and in other banks whose identities are yet to be determined.

3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business with the public as corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were however, personally owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and officers appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the above business entities were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late Pastor Y. Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him during the existence of his marriage with petitioner.

6 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion issued an order directing ROD to reinstate the annotation of lispendens in case said annotation had already been deleted and/or cancelled.Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123, 236256 and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant petition.

On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special administrator11 and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of administration were accordingly issued.

In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private respondents' motion for exclusion, in this wise:

The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the corporations are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim, Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of the corporate veil, a matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and not the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by the regular court was whether the corporation involved therein was the mere extension of the decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the assets of the corporation are also assets of the estate.

A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the SEC's exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is simply a suit to settle the intestate estate of a deceased person who, during his lifetime, acquired several properties and put up corporations as his instrumentalities.

SO ORDERED.

On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by petitioner, issued an order13 the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under enumerated are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to produce and submit to the special administrators, through this Honorable Court within (5) five days from receipt of this order their respective records of the savings/current accounts/time deposits and other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-mentioned, showing all the transactions made or done concerning savings/current accounts from January 1994 up to their receipt of this court order.

SO ORDERED.

Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14, with an urgent prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court.

On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents, rendered the assailed decision15, the decretal portion of which declares:

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent court on July 4, 1995 and September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The impugned order issued by respondent on September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as petitioner corporations" bank accounts and records are concerned.

ISSUE: Whether or Not a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?

RULING - Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner RufinaLuy Lim now comes before us with a lone assignment of error16:

The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower court which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals 7 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the petitioner, from performing her duty as special administrator of the estate as expressly provided in the said Rules.

Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.

In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued by the probate court which were subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals. Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction over probate proceedings is indeed in order.

Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent.

As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on the principle that a probate court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory.

In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend its probing arms in the determination of the question of title in probate proceedings.

This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held:

. . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS19:

. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.

Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE21, We made an exposition on the probate court's limited jurisdiction:

It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the Torrens system and registered in the name of private respondent corporations should be included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the probate court of whether these properties should be included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not conclusive and subject to a final determination in a separate action brought for the purpose of adjudging once and for all the issue of title.

Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID 24 is of great essence and finds applicability, thus:

It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, 8 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. . . .

. . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. . . .

A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree", proscribes collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:

Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand undisturbed.

Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.

By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter.

It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.28

Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it.

Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK vs.COURT OF APPEALS29, We enunciated:

. . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. . . .

Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.30

The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where 9 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught.31

Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil".32

Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.33

Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and LaniWenceslao is unavailing considering that the aforementioned documents possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.

As to the order36 of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate court had no authority to demand the production of bank accounts in the name of the private respondent corporations.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.

#4 Macansantos

Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis G.R. No. 133743 (February 6, 2007)

Facts: The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis, who was previously the governor of the Province of Laguna. During the lifetime of Felicisimo, he was married to three women. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit who predeceased Felicisimo. The second marriage was with Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen, who later obtained a decree granting absolute divorce before the family court of Hawaii. The third marriage was with the respondent, Felicidad Sagalongos, who he lived with for 18 years up to the time of his death. After the death of Felicisimo, the respondent sought for the dissolution of their conjugal assets and the settlement of the estate. A petition for administration was then filed before the RTC of Makati City. The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) venue was improperly laid since the petition should be filed in Laguna where Felicisimo was the elected governor; (2) Respondent does not have legal capacity to sue because her marriage with Felicisimo is bigamous and the decree of absolute decree is not binding in the Philippines. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

Issues: Whether venue was properly laid. Whether the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

10 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C Held: Venue was properly laid. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate should be filed in the RTC of the province in which he resides at the time of his death. In the case of Garcia Fule v. CA, we laid down the rule that for determining venue, the residence of the decedent is determining. Residence for settlement of estate purposes means his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence of place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. It is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another. The divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee Corwin, which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as the surviving spouse. However, the respondent was not able to provide sufficient documentation to prove the decree of divorce obtained in Hawaii. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties acquired during their cohabitation. The case is therefore remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.

Chat Conversation End

Sent from Messenger

#5 Asadil

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS VS JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, GR NO. L-55509 April 27, 1984

FACTS: Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila died in Makati Medical Center on 27 November 1997. He was survived by his 2nd wife Maxine and 2 children Edward and Linda as well as by his children Juanita and Ethel of his first marriage. He executed 2 wills in 23 January 1959 in San Francisco, California. One of the wills disposed of his estate in Philippines and the other outside the Philippines. In both wills, the second wife and 2 children were favored. The two children were given their legitimes in the will disposing the estate found in the Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Grimm on March 7 1978 in the third district court of Utah. Maxine admitted that she received notice of an earlier intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and codicil. In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm’s Philippine estate. It was also stipulated that Maxine’s one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Sta Mesa Manila. The agreement indicated the computation of the “net distributable estate”. It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent’s four children “shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate” and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12 ½ % of the total of the net distributable estate and marital share can be deleted. Meanwhile, the intestate proceeding 43 days after Grimm’s which was filed by Ethel at Br 20 of CFI Manila, named Ethel as special administratrix. Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm’s will. She also moved that she be appointed special administrator, she submitted to the court a copy of Grimm’s will disposing of his Philippine estate. The intestate court in its order through a new lawyer, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record. The 3 administrators submitted an inventory and with the authority and approval of the court, they sold propertied including the so-called Palawan Pearl Project for 75,000. Juanita and Linda allegedly conformed to the sale. It turned out that the buyer Makiling Management Co was incorporated by Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts and lawyer Limqueco. On September 8, 1980 Rogelio Vinluan of Angara Law office in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda filed a petition praying probate of Grimm’s 2 wills that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letter of administration be revoked and that Maxine be

11 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition approved in an intestate proceeding by CFI Br. 20 be entertained by Branch 38 after a probate in the Utah district court?

HELD:

The court ruled that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss. The court ruled that the estate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed. The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died intestate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned o the estate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

#6 Sale

CUENCO VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-2474; October 26, 1973

53 SCRA 360

FACTS:

Upon the death of Senator Cuenco, leaving his widow and 2 minor children, letters for administration of the estate was filed by respondent in Cebu City, alleging therein that the deceased died intestate and that his last known residence was in Cebu City. In the meantime, the widow filed in Quezon City, wherein the deceased has died, petition to admit probate of the last will and testament of the decedent. Upon learning of the pending petition in Cebu City, she filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of the respondent.

The Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the CFI ourt of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probateproceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.

Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964,opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue. In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in said order that theresidence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows: On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident 12 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others. 5 Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied. On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence. As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law; (b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit; (c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto. 6 The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated. Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q- 7898. On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that: Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death. Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court. The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special 13 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge. The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows: ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the CFI of Quezon City should be refrained from the testate proceeding because an intestate proceeding was first instituted in Cebu City over the estate in question.

HELD:

The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over “all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates.” On the other hand, Rule 73 of Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among tje different courtd which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that “the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.”

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the testate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that “the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.” A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co- ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.

14 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

#7 Barroca

#8 Macansantos intestate estate(utulo v pasion)

Facts: Juan Garcia sanchez died intestate, leona pasion vda de garcia was , the survivkng spouse was appointed judicial administrator. Juan predeceased his legitimate children Juan garcia jr, patrocinio and luz all surname d garcia, who are presumptive heirs together with the widow. luz married the applicant Pablp Utulo and during pendency of admin proceedings she died without legitimate descendants her only forced h eirs were leona her mother and her husband . the latter commenced judicial admin of the property of his deceased wife.

Issue: was the judicial admin filed by pablo utulp proper? who has better right?

Held: there is no weight in the argument adduced by appelle tp the effect that his appointment as jud admin is necessary so that he may have legal capacity tp appear on the intestate of a deceased Juan Sr.. as he would appear in said intestate by right of representation. no need tp file for jud admin since his interest as a usufruct forced heir of his deceased wife, who un turn would be forced heir and interested partu if she would be living.

#9 Ali MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES, TIMBOL, ERLINDA REYES- VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II, EMELINA and EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother,MARIA VDA. DE REYES, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and ROSARTO MARTILLANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991

Facts:

During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.

 In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. 1A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares.  In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole property-OCT No. 255-was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-inlaw of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.  On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters, more or less, to private respondent DalmacioGardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No.1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The 15 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. I-A-14. The vendee immediately took possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.  In 1967, the surviving heirs gave effect to the subdivision plan created on 1936. They formally partitioned the property. Therefore, the heirs received their share of this land. Including Rafael Reyes, Jr. Son of Rafael Sr. TCTs were issued to him representing the land which should have been received by his father.  Now, the heirs of Rafael Jr. sued Gardiola, saying that they are the true owners of the land, as shown by the torrens title over the land.  Gardiola’s defense was that he bought the land from Rafael Sr. and that Rafael Jr. could not have inherited this land for it was disposed of by his father way before he inherited it.  The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.’s heirs. Stating that there was no evidence that the Gavino’s children had a written partition agreement. CA reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA correct in reversing the trial court?

Held:

No.

The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.24 In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid. Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance. Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811.25

But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partitio executed in 1936 was not valid for some reason or another, we would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-own, era of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the succession.are transmitted horn the moment of death of the decedent,26 The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co- owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co- ownership.

In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent DalmacioGardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs- petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.

The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino. Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a right in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case, 28 it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he never had any title of right

16 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr, The latter cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.

There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in- interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private respondents the owner. ship and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question. And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and onehalf (13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.

#10 Asadil

MARIA VDA DE REYES VS CA

FACTS: During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens system of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been issued him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property. In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino’s heirs. In the subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot BNo. 1A-14, were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavinos’s children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares. On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate based on the aforesaid subdivision plan, the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes Sr. who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his son and heir. Rafael Reyes Jr. Private respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in representation of her mother Marta Reyes one of the children of Gavino Reyes. As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, was cancelled and in lieu thereof several transfer certificates of the title covering the subdivided lots were issued in the names of the respective adjudicates. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes Jr covering Lot No. 1-A-14. The case was dismissed but Candicio Hebron who was in possession of the tile was ordered by the trial court to deliver to the heirs concerned all the transfer certificates of the title in his possession. ISSUE: Whether or not property of the late Gavino Reyes was partitioned only in 1967 by his grandchildren after discovery of the existence of OCT No. 255 and that no actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedent’s children.

RULING: The partition made in 1936 although oral was valid. The requirement in Article 1958 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification of extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public instrument is only for convenience and not for validity or enforceability as between the parties themselves. The subsequent execution by the heirs of the Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did not alter the oral partition as in fact the share pertaining to Anguitia Reyes corresponded to that previously assigned to her father. Considering that Angel Reyes sold this property to Basilio de Ocampo who, in turn, sold the same to respondents, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the latter lawfully acquired the property and are entitled to ownership and possession thereof.

#11 Almocera

G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006

JOSEPH CUA, petitioner, 17 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C vs.

GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS,

EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.

FACTS:

A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac,Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, anotarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among PaulinaVargas heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo,Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas,partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of themgetting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however,did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosariosigned it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the CatanduanesTribune for three consecutive weeks.

On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was againexecuted by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the samesharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signedthe document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold toJoseph Cua, petitioner herein.Respondents argue that said Extra Judicial Settlement cannot bind them for it wasexecuted without their consent and participation.

ISSUE/S:

WON said Settlement would bind the respondents who did not give their consent?

HELD:

No. It would not bind them. The Supreme Court gave the following reason. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that hasbeen sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

#12 Almocera

SPOUSES BENATIRO vs HEIRS OF CUYOS

FACTS:

Spouses EvaristoCuyos and AgatonaArroganteCuyos had nine children, namely: Francisco,Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud. Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28,1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu.Before 18 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C the CFI, after filing a petition to have herself appointed administrator, and after filing anopposition thereto, Gloria &Fransisco, assisted by their corresponding counsels, agreed tohave Gloria appointed as administratrix of the estate&letters of administration of the estate ofthe late EvaristoCuyos were issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria CuyosTalian after posting a nominalbond of Pl , 000.OO. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner toeffect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition. In his Commissioner’sreportdated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented bytelegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon,Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive atan agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyosfailed to attend. He reported that those who were present agreed not to partition the propertiesof the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P-40,000.OO& divide the proceedsequally. Columba bought the properties. The CFI appointed Lope Cus (Cuyos) as the newadministrator of the estate based on Gloria’s absence & change of residence. The Courtordered the Administratrix to execute the deed of sale afterthe payment of the sum ofP€6.000which shall remain in custodialegis, then divided among the heirs after payment of necessarytaxes.

Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the six parcels of land in favor of Columba for aconsideration of the sum of 36,OOO.OO.Original Certificates of Titles were issued in favor of thelatter.

In Feb 1998,Gloria, Patrocenia , Numeriano, Enrique &Salud filed with the CA a petition forannulment of the order of the CFI of Cebu, alleging that the CFI’s order was null and void and ofno effect, the same being based on a Commissioner’s Report, which was patently false andirregular: that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share oftheir father’s estate, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of theirproperty.

The CA granted the petition and declared the CFI order & the Certificates of Title issued in thename of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro null & void, hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON extrinsic fraud edsted in the case at bar serving as a suffiaent ground to annulthe CFI’s order,

HELD: The Court held that the CFI:s order should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsicfraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, buton the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due process.

#13 Makintan

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT

19 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.

FACTS:

On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner (Maria Elena R. Pedrosa-the adpted child) and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.

On November 21, 1972, private respondents (Rodriguezes) filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants.

On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.

On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.

The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered 14 parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina.

Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein by virtue of Deed of Sale.

On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. CA dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and her daughter were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.

Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed."

Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed

The RTC dismissed the complaint. Petitioner appealed to the CA. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the TC. Petitioner filed a MR, which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. WON the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed;

2. WON said deed is valid; and

20 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C 3. WON the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers.

HELD:

1. NO. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.

Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.

The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:

[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.

Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, the court holds that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.

2. The Deed of extra Judicial settlemet of estate and partition is Invalid.

Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states:

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.

A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.

21 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof

To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid

3. Given the circumstances in this case, it is constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid

#14 Makintan

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA, G.R. No. 155733

FACTS: This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and JosefaDelgado. The claimants to the estates of Guillermo heirs of Josefa , consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo , particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, andGorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio[12] with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.

THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADO

Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado[17] but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. . They maintain that Guillermo and Josefa were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife for 50 years until the death of Josefa.

22 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun- ampunan.

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child,the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise.

The RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates. Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals partially set aside the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Who should be issued letters of administration.

HELD: An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co- administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here. It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgadovda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

#15 Marcera

#16 Marcera

#17 Barroca

#18 Bemida

RALLA vs. UNTALAN, G.R. Nos. L-63253-54

FACTS: 23 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C

This petition seeks to nullify the order of respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan, excluding fromthe probate proceedings 63 parcels of land, as well as the Orders issued by respondent JudgeDomingo Coronel Reyes, denying the petitioner's motions for reconsideration of the sameorder of Judge Untalan.

In 1959, RosendoRalla filed a petition for the probate of his own will in the CFIof Albay docketed as SP No. 564. In his will he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo, leavingnothing to his other son, Pedro.In the same year, Pedro filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, PazEscarella, docketed as Civil Case No. 2023.In the course of the hearing of the probate case (SP No. 564), Pablo Ralla filed a motion todismiss the petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer interested in the allowanceof the will of his late father, Rosendo, for its probate would no longer be beneficial andadvantageous to him. The motion was denied, and the denial was denied by the Court of Appeals. (The latter court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that, indeed, the petitionerstood to gain if the testate proceedings were to be dismissed because then he would not becompelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo 149 parcels of landfrom which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion andprejudice of his brother, Pedro, who was deprived of his successional rights over the saidproperties. The denial of this motion to dismiss was likewise affirmed by SC (in G.R. No. L-26253). On November 3, 1966, the petitioner reiterated his lack of interest in the probate of thesubject will.

Consequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho, declared Pedro and PabloRalla the only heirs of Rosendo who should share equally upon the division of the latter's estate,and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.Meanwhile, the brothers agreed to partition the 63 parcel of land forming the estate of theirdeceased mother, Paz Escarella, and these were amicably divided between the two of them. Thisproject of partition was approved by Judge Grageda.On November 3, 1966, the probate judge converted SP 564 into an intestate proceeding.

On February 28, 1978, a creditor of the deceased filed a petition for theprobate of Rosendo's will in SP 1106, which was heard jointly with SP 564. On August 3, 1979,the order of November 3, 1966 was set aside.On June 11, 1981, the private respondents filed a "Petition To Submit Anew For Considerationof The Court The Exclusion of 63 Parcels of Land Subject of The Project of Partition In CivilCase No. 2023." In his order of July 16,1981, Judge Untalan reconsidered his earlier order,to wit: The Project of Partition should, therefore, be respected and upheld. Hence, the 63 parcels referred to therein should be excluded from the probate proceedings and,likewise, from the administration of Special Administrator TeodoricoAlmine, Jr.Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order but the samewas denied by respondent Judge Reyes, to whose sala Special Proceedings No. 564 and No. 11 06 were apparently transferred. Still, a second motion for reconsideration was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial partition of the 63 parcels made after the filing of the petition forthe probate of the will, and before the said will was probated, is NULL considering that such wasalready decided by this Court in the case of Ernesto M. Guevara, vs. Rosario Guevara et al.,Vol. 74 Phil. Reports, there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will had beenprobated.

HELD:The above argument is obviously flawed and misleading for the simple reason that theaforementioned partition was made in the civil case for partition of the estate of Paz Escarella,which is distinct from, and independent of, the special proceedings for the probate of the will ofRosendoRalla.Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has beenprobated. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the sameproperties embraced in the will. Thus, the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance wherethere are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No.564 originally for the probate of a will), each involving the estate of a different person (PazEscarella and RosendoRalla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.

24 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C

#19 Ali

Fernandez v. Dimagiba

G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967

RULE 76

Facts: Ismael Dimagiba filed a petition for probate of the will of Benedicta de los Reyes. Such petition was opposed by Dionisio Fernandez, et al. the court ruled in favor of probate. Fernandez et al appealed, but it was beyond the reglamentary period. They argued that they were entitled to await the other grounds for opposition before appealing.

Issue: whether the probate of the will become final for lack of appeal

Ruling: Yes. A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of the will. As such, probate order is final and appealable. They do not have to await the resolution of its other oppositions since the Rules of Court enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.

#20 Bemida

G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

REMEDIOS NUGUID

, vs.

FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID

Facts: Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, andsix (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto. Remedios Nuguid, herein petitioner, prayed for the probate a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her death, and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. The will instituted Remedios as universal heir and omitted Felix and Pazcompletely. The CFI held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of thedeceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

Issue: Whether or not the will should be allowed probate.

Held: YES. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. Onthe contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justifiable controversy crying for solution.

25 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C

#21 Tabor

SPOUSES AJERO v. CA, G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

Facts: The testator named as devisees petitioners Ajero, private respondents Sands and Arong. Petitioners instituted a petition for the allowance of the will. PRs opposed the petition on the grounds that neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The TC allowed the probate of the will. The CA reversed the decision. It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law?

Ruling: No. The court held that the holographic will was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810).

#22 Tabor

De Aranz v. Hon. Galing, G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988

FACTS: On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R- Infante y G-Pola The petition specified the names and ad- dresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees. On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era”, newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared thus, moved to 12 May 1986, on which date, the probate court issued an order admitting private respondents evidence ex-parte, allowed the latter to place Arturi Arceo as one of the testamentary witnesses, and appointed private respondent as executor. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May 1986 alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the will. Probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent and the reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will.

HELD: Yes. Under Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, the notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, 26 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. — The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

#23 Calixton

Facts: On October 14, 2000 Gerardo Tan died, leaving no will. Private respondents, who are claiming to be the children of the deceased , filed with the RTC on October 31,2001 a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition. Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim, be appointed as the special administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim, be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private respondents they are not residing in the country, that the co-petition Vilma C. Tan acting as the de facto administratrix and that the court appointed issued a directives to the latter to comply in her capacity. A year later Vilma has not complied with the given directive given another ten days. Again no compliance has been made. On June 20, 2003, RTC issued an Order appointing Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate, the motion for the appointment of a special administrator is hereby GRANTED. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix. Respondent RTC Executive Judge, issued an Order denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin Romualdo from entering the estate and acting as special administrator thereof.

Issue: WON romualdo is qualified as administrator to the estate of the deceased?

Held: Private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the court-appointed commissioner. In the defense of the petitioner it is clearly specious and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilma’s non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income, petitioners should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the court’s orders. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on

27 Special Proceedings Consolidated Cases LLB 3C Certiorari is DENIED, whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator of the estate of Gerardo.

#24 Calixton

Facts:

Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain, left properties both in Manila and Negros. The alleged natural son of Don Juan, Vicente Uriarte, filed petition for settlement of Intestate Estate of Don Juan before the Negros Occidental court. However, said petition was opposed by the nephews of Don Juan stating that there is a valid will left by the deceased in Spain, a copy of which is being requested. Then, the nephews filed a settlement of the estate in the court of Manila, on the basis of the alleged will of the deceased. Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement of estate in the court of Manila stating that the court of Negros has already acquired original jurisdiction over the case. The opposition of Vicente was dismissed together with the intestate settlement in the CFI of Negros.

Issue:

Whether or not the intestate settlement was properly dismissed?

Held:

Yes. The court ruled that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is proper. Under the Rules on the Settlement of estate of the deceased person, testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. Therefore, in case intestate settlement was filed prior to the finding of the will of the deceased, then the intestate proceedings shall be dismissed to give priority to the testate proceeding.

28