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Bri T a I N and Reg I O N a L C O O P E R a T I O N In - 1 - BRITAIN AND REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, 1945-ftt9 By TILMAN REMME PHD in International History submitted at the London School of Economics Summer 1990 Supervisor: Dr Alan Sked UMI Number: U048287 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U048287 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 - 2 - ABSTRACT This thesis examines efforts by the British Foreign Office between 1945 and 1949 to establish an international, yet British-led, regional system in South-East Asia, initially on the economic level but eventually Including political and defence cooperation as well. Part 1 looks at vain efforts by the Foreign Office in 1945 to use South East Asia Command (SEAC) under Lord Mountbatten as the basis for an international regional commission. It then examines the Foreign Office's appointment in 1946 of Lord Killearn as Special Commissioner in Singapore, and it highlights British hopes that the Special Commission, which organised international action against the acute shortage of rice in the region, would one day become the nucleus for a wider regional organisation. Part 2 looks at the impact of Asian nationalism on British regional policies. By February 1947, the Foreign Office contemplated the eventual inclusion of India and of other fledgling Asian states in its regional plans. Part 3 shows the subsequent decline of the Special Commission after London's decision on financial grounds to merge the organisation with the office of the Malayan Governor-General. It also examines competition by Australia, India and the UN in trying to take the lead on regional cooperation, and it shows how British policies were negatively affected by the hardline policies of France and the Netherlands in their respective South-East Asian colonies. Part 4 looks at the revival of British regional plans towards the end of 1948 following the Malayan Emergency. The Foreign Office convinced the rest of Whitehall of trying to organise regional cooperation as a means of containing communism in South-East Asia. At the same time, it launched a diplomatic offensive to secure Asian cooperation and American financial backing for its regional plans. The thesis ends in November 1949 with the Cabinet's adoption of regional cooperation as official British policy, paving the way for the Colombo Conference in January 1950 and the subsequent Colombo Plan. One of the recurring themes of the thesis is the conflict between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office over regional policies; another one is the Foreign Office's shift from colonial cooperation concepts to the idea of cooperating primarily with the new Asian states. - 3 - CONTENTS ACCTOWLEDGEMEFTS p. 6 ABBREVIATIONS p. 7 INTRODUCTION p. 8 PART I - THE POSTWAR CHALLENGE p.19 1. The state of British planning for South-East Asia in 1945 p. 21 1.1 Burma and Malaya p.21 1.2 The Colonial Office and regional cooperation in colonial territories, 1943-1945 p.24 1.3 Regional defence p.35 1.4 The Foreign Office and South-East Asia p.37 1.5 The proposal for a British Minister Resident in South-East Asia p.42 2. The origins of the Special Commission p. 54 2.1 The dilemma of peace in South-East Asia p.54 2.2 Esler Dening, SEAC and regional cooperation in South-East Asia p.60 2.3 The regional debate at Whitehall, October 1945 until January 1946 p. 68 3. The Special Commission in Singapore p. 85 3.1 The rice crisis p.85 3.2 The work of the Special Commission, 1946-1948 p.93 4. Regional cooperation and regional defence: the 1946 Commonwealth Prime•Ministers' Meeting p. 108 4.1 South-East Asia and Commonwealth Defence p.108 4.2 Bevln'6 economic bait p. 112 4.3 Compromise at Whitehall p. 116 - 4 - PART II -RATIONALISM p.128 5. Foreign Office reassessments of regional cooperation p.129 5.1 Asia's new political spirit: the cases of Burma, Malaya and India p.129 5.2 India and British planning for South-East Asia p.132 5.3 Lord Killearn*s regional plans p. 140 6. Colonial Cooperation put to the test: the case of Indochina p. 147 6.1 French overtures, September-November 1946 p.147 6.2 Conflicting priorities - European or Asian cooperation? p.153 7. The limits of colonial cooperation in South-East Asia, 1947 p.165 7.1 Foreign Office stocktaking: the development of a new regional policy for South-East Asia p.165 7.2 The limits of Anglo-French cooperation p.177 7.3 The limits of Anglo-Dutch cooperation p.181 PART III - REGIORAL COMPETITION p. 190 8. The planned merger in Singapore p. 191 9. Indian and Australian regional ambitions p.202 9.1 India, the Asian Relations Conference and inter-Aslan cooperation p.202 9.2 Australian regional initiatives p.206 10. Regional rivals: ECAFE and the Special Commission p. 221 10.1 The UN and regional cooperation p.221 10.2 London's re-appraisal of ECAFE p.234 10.3 The end of the Special Commission p.248 11. Western Union and South-East Asia p.255 - 5 - PART IV - COXMUHISX p.273 12. London*b search for an anti-communist strategy In South-East Asia p.275 12.1 British perceptions of communism In Asia p.275 12.2 The colonial powers and anti-communist cooperation in South-East Asia p.278 12.3 An OEEC for Asia? p.286 13. Regional cooperation and regional containment p.294 13.1 The 1948 Commonwealth Prime Xinisters' Meeting p.294 13.2 London's official rejection of Western Union cooperation in South-East Asia p.297 13.3 The Cabinet paper on China p.304 13.4 Britain's three-pronged initiative p.308 14. From planning to diplomacy, January - April 1949 p.324 14.1 The Delhi conference on Indonesia p.324 14.2 A Marshall Plan for South-East Asia ? p.330 14.3 American reluctance on South-East Asia p.336 14.4 Washington's policy review p.341 15. Commonwealth cooperation in April - May 1949 p. 353 15.1 France's exclusion fjorm British plans p. 353 15.2 The failure of lehru's’regional plans p.355 15.3 Proposals for a Pacific pact p.356 15.4 The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in April 1949 p. 358 15.5 Interdepartmental agreement, May 1949 p.369 15.6 Continuing speculation about a Pacific pact p.373 16. The final stages of regional planning p.378 16.1 Economic surveys p.378 16.2 The PUSC papers on regional cooperation p.381 16.3 Anglo-American negotiations, July-Movember 1949 p.393 16.4 The PUSC papers go to the Cabinet p.397 COMCLUSIOV p. 403 BIBLIOGRAPHY p. 411 - 6 - ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to the British Council, whose financial support from 1985 to 1988 enabled me to research and write this thesis. I would also like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Alan Sked, for his help, advice and guidance. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr. Ralph B. Smith and the members of his special seminar on South-East Asia at SOAS for their helpful advice and criticism, and for giving me the opportunity to present some of the ideas developed in my thesis. I would also like to thank Edward Lucas, the late Dr. Roger Bullen, Richard Aldrich, Dr. Taka Tanaka, Dr. Xlchael Leiffer and Shams Ul-Alam for their advice and encouragement and for giving me inspiration. Thanks also to the staff at the LSE's International History Department and at the Public Record Office in Kew. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Ernst Holte, Professor Xlchael Erbe, Professor Hellmut Becker and Professor Wolfgang Justin Mommsen in Germany for their support during the preparation of my project. Last but not least, I would like to thank Sir Kenneth Christophas and Sir Paul Grey, formerly of the Foreign Office, as well as Dr Kenneth Robinson, formerly of the Colonial Office, for discussing their Involvement in post-war South-East Asia with me. This thesis is dedicated to my wife Fiona, without whom it would never have come about. - 7 - ABBREVIATIONS AFPFL Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, Burma ALFSEA Allied Land Forces, South East Asia CO Colonial Office COS Chiefs of Staff CRO Commonwealth Relations Office CPU Civil Planning Unit DO Dominions Office DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, United Nations ECE Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations ECOSOC Economic and Social Council, United Nations ESCAP Economic and Social commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation, United Nations FO Foreign Office IEFC International Emergency Food Council IOLR India Office Library and Records JPS Joint Planning Staff LOM Liaison Officers' Meetings, Singapore MoD Ministry of Defence PHP Post-Hostilities Planning Staff PRO Public Record Office RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RAF Royal Air Force SACSEA Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia SEAC South East Asia Command UMNO United Malaya National Organisation UNNRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Admi ni strati on - 8 - INTRODUCTION In October 1949, the Attlee government endorsed a Cabinet paper which made the creation of a regional association in South-East Asia an official aim in British foreign policy (1) The decision paved the way for the Colombo Conference in January 1950 and Asia's first international economic development scheme, the Colombo Plan, which eventually included some 23 Asian and Western countries.
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