$tttnfr. 39196 1965

THIRD SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF FRIDAY, 6th APRIL, 1951 6? Registered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 12 APRIL, 1951

AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA FROM 1st JUNE, 1944, TO THE OCCUPATION OF RANGOON, 2nd MAY, 1945 NOTE.—A set of maps for this despatch is on separate sale at Is. net. This set of maps also covers the operations described in the other Air and Army despatches of the Burma Campaign from the 16th November, 1943 to 12th September, 1945. The following despatch was submitted to the themselves involved a great effort to maintain, Secretary of State for Air on 16th Novem- without it the campaign could not have been ber, 1945, by AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR successfully fought. Regardless of weather, KEITH PARK, K.C.B., K.B.E., M.C., climate, and distance, the air supply line was D.F.C., Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, Air maintained unhindered by enemy air opposi- Command, South East Asia. tion, which had been driven from the skies. 3. The Burma campaign should make its (PART ONE, mark in the annals of history as a triumph of FOREWORD. air power and air supply and as a feat of endurance of Allied land forces. 1. This Despatch is a review primarily of air operations in Burma during the last year be- COMMAND. ginning in June, 1944. During this period a 4. In June, 1944, the Allied Air Forces in fanatical and over-confident enemy has been South East Asia were under the command of driven back from his foothold in India at Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, K.C.B., Imphal over 800 miles, which included the D.S.O., A.F.C. Upon his relinquishment of complete rout of the enemy's field army in the the appointment on 26th November, temporary open plains of Burma and culminated in the command was assumed by Air Marshal Sir occupation of Rangoon by our forces on 3rd Guy Garrod, K.C.B., O.B.E., M.C., D.F.C., May, 1945. until my arrival on 23rd February, 1945. 2. The primary cause was the defeat of the Japanese Army. This achievement has been The Position in June, 1944. made possible by air power, which not merely 5. Two events mark the beginning of the took an intimate share in the ground attack, period. The major Japanese offensive against but also isolated the enemy's forces in the field. Imphal had been blunted and was in process Confronted by overwhelming air power, the of being broken by means of air supply on a •enemy's air forces withered away, and this hitherto unprecedented scale to the forces cut same air power helped to undermine the off from land communications with their base ; stability of his land forces, so that after their and second, the south-west monsoon was reach- decisive defeat at Imphal, although they made ing its full intensity over the operational areas. a tenacious stand on a number of occasions, It remained to be seen whether air forces could they were no match for our well-equipped field materially influence the land battle in weather "army—well equipped in large measure by the which had in preceding years prohibited their unstinted effort of air supply to provide their effective employment, and whether the enemy daily needs. Though air supply did not and defeat in Manipur was to prove the turning- could not supplant all other means which point in South East Asia strategy which would 1966 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 enable the primary tasks of the Command, the another advance from Imphal to the Chind- re-opening of the land route to China and the 'win and an airborne operation in the clearance of Burma, to be accomplished. vicinity of Wuntho. The furthest penetra- tion that was envisaged was the occupation 6. The dry-weather campaign which was of territory north of a line stretching between drawing to a close had brought few positive Kalewa and Lashio. results. Only in the north-east had any terri- torial gains been made, and here General l(ii) Plan " Y" intended to employ air- Stilwell's forces had cleared the Hukawng borne troops in the seizure of Kalewa, and Valley and were in possession of Myitkyina a second air landing at the point of debouch- airfield. Jn the Fourteenth Army sector, ment into the Mandalay plain to exploit the Imphal was still invested, though 33 Corps was confusion that would be caused. driving the Japanese from the Kohima-Imphal ((iii) Plan "Z" entailed an airborne road, and 4 Corps was attacking the Japanese (assault in strength with all transport aircraft in the Imphal plain. In Arakan, although in the theatre immediately north of Rangoon, one enemy offensive had been frustrated, the to capture the city. Japanese still held the Mayu peninsula and the (iv) General Stilwell's plan was for British rice port of Akyab. The other British forces forces to press forward towards Shwebo- operating on the offensive were the long-range Mandalay, while N.C.A.C.* profited by the penetration groups of Special Force. diversion to occupy Bhamo, whence they /7. The Air Forces, having just completed .could mount an airborne operation to a period of intensive operations, were envisag- capture Lashio. ing some retrenchment, a " reculer pour mieux 10. The part that the Air Forces were to sauter". An extensive programme of re- play in these operations was given in an Opera- equipment was in train which would convert tional Directive in which the order of priorities nine squadrons of Hurricanes to Thunderbolts, was interesting, putting as it did close support the two Wellington squadrons to Liberators, and transport operations very low in the scale. and four squadrons of Vengeances to In the event, a reorientation of tasks took place Mosquitos. The relative sparsity of all- which gave greater emphasis to the work of weather airfields in the forward areas entailed close support and air supply. The results of a withdrawal of these squadrons to bases in such a shift in the centre of gravity to a machine India for their conversion, and the monsoon geared to the classical form of air warfare in- campaign was undertaken with a total of 17 volved changes in organisation, control, supply squadrons out of the line, re-equipping, resting or training. Having regard to the nature of and maintenance which are discussed at more monsoon conditions and of the fighting in pro- length in the appropriate context. gress, the forces remaining in the line were 11. Plans " Y " and " Z " were approved in ample, nor indeed could any more be deployed. principle by the Chiefs of Staff in July and The net result was that the air component con- August, and called " Capital" and " Dracula " ducting tactical operations that culminated on respectively. Jn point of fact, however, opera- all three sectors in the capture of springboards tions in Central Burma progressed more for a dry-weather assault, was a moderate, quickly than anticipated. (Continually out- well-balanced force of experienced squadrons, flanked by Allied forces, to whom the manna versed in the ready identification of jungle of air supply gave an unprecedented degree targets and trained in close co-operation with of mobility, and continually harried by our the formations whom they were supporting. close support aircraft, the enemy was never allowed to consolidate the new positions that he occupied along the line of his retreat. Thus by January, the airborne aspect of " Capital'" Plans for 1944-5 Operations. had been rendered unnecessary, a fact which caused great relief to the Allied Commanders, .8. The broad mission of S.E.A.C. was formu- for it was increasingly evident that the trans- lated at the Octagon conferences as ..." the port aircraft to train for and launch the opera- destruction or expulsion of all Japanese forces tion, scheduled for mid-February, would be in Burma at the earliest date. Operations to difficult to find from existing resources. achieve this object must not however prejudice the security of the existing air supply to China, 12. Operation "Dracula" was to be the including the air staging post at Myitkyina and greatest airborne operation yet conceived, in- the opening of overland communications with volving a fly-in over a distance of 480 miles China ". by some 900 transport aircraft and 650 gliders. The necessity for retaining these forces in .-9. The plans that were prepared to this end Europe, and their high attrition rate in opera- during the monsoon of 1944 envisaged an tions there, precluded their re-deployment in elaborate series of airborne assaults that did this theatre as planned, and in October not appreciate the reliability and self-sufficiency " Dracula" was postponed with the prospect of an army supplied unstintingly from the air. of not being mounted until the winter of Indeed, had it then been suggested that 1945-46. Rangoon could be reached by an army travel- ling overland and supplied largely by air, the 13. The emphasis now lay on Central Burma proposal would not have received serious con- operations. An advance to the Monywa- sideration. The overall strategy can best be Mandalay area was considered to be the judged from the four main plans which were furthest point that could be reached before the formulated during the 1944 monsoon: — 1945 monsoon. Exploitation further south was not thought to be practicable in view of (i) Plan "X" involved an overland the difficulties of supply. In the event, the advance from the Mogaung-Myitkyina area to Katha and Bhamo, co-ordinated with * Northern Combat Area Command. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 1967 advances made exceeded all planned expecta- the premise that large-scale refitting, re- tions. This can be attributed to the following deployment and marshalling of forces is neces- main causes: — sary before the next step is undertaken. The /(i) The magnitude of the Japanese defeat occupation of Rangoon therefore constitutes a tat Imphal, which was not realised until much milestone in the history of South East Asia,, later. marking the end of a well-defined period. (ii) The virtual elimination of enemy air opposition resulting in complete pre- dominance and liberty of action of our offensive and air transport forces. PART Two. .(iii) The steady growth of air supply re- ispurces and improvements in their organisa- THE OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND, tion. JUNE, 1944—MAY, 1945. (iv) The occupation of Akyab and 17. When, on 22nd June, 1944, an overland Ramree, which had been decided upon to junction was effected on the Imphal-Kohimai provide advanced air supply bases. This road between the garrison of the Imphal plain enabled us to reorient and shorten the supply and the relieving ground forces which had. lines in relation to the advance southward advanced from the north, a major crisis had of Fourteenth Army. been resolved, and our land forces, despite the; J4. By February, 1945, the possibilities of monsoon, were able gradually to turn more and a more ambitious plan were becoming evident, more both tactically and strategically to the; and Fourteenth Army and 221 Group sub- offensive. mitted a plan for vigorous exploitation of the favourable set of circumstances then obtaining. 18. The Fourteenth Army, with its head- G.O.C. Fourteenth Army considered that if the quarters beside those of the Third Tactical. enemy elected to stand and fight around Air Force at Comilla, controlled the Allied Mandalay, there was every hope of destroying units on the southern two-thirds of the front. the Japanese Army in the open plains of On its coastal section, 15 Corps held the port Central Burma, thereby opening the route for of Maungdaw and a monsoon line along th& a swift advance upon Rangoon by highly Maungdaw-Buthidaung road; its left flank mobile columns. The plan aimed at encircle- was thinly covered by the Lushai Brigade which" ment of the enemy forces on the Mandalay operated in guerilla fashion over the desolate; Plain to be completed by air attack on such hill country as far north as Haka and the valley lines of communication as remained open to of the Manipur River. In the Imphal Valley,, him. In conjunction with a direct thrust by although 4 Corps had linked up with 33 Corps: 33 Corps towards Mandalay, 4 Corps were to advancing from Assam, the Japanese were still carry out a wide encircling movement directed holding tenaciously to their positions among towards Meiktila which would cut the main the hills east of Palel overlooking the plain; line of communication southwards. Meiktila further to the north-east, however, the position itself was to be secured by a small air trans- was more favourable, and elements of 33 Corps ported force who would consolidate our were pressing forward towards Ukhrul. position athwart this vital route. 19. Beyond the operational area of the Four- 15. This bold plan was highly successful, teenth Army, Special Force, which had been- and as a result the Japanese Army in Burma boldly launched into the heart of enemy held! suffered heavy casualties in a costly and bloody territory in March, was fighting both the killing match to which the Air Forces contri- weather and the enemy in the general area of buted in large measure. Notwithstanding its the railway corridor east and south-east of Lake success, the battle of extermination took longer Indawgyi. It was controlled by the Northern than had been contemplated, and the time-table Combat Area Command under General Stilwell, for the dash to Rangoon by 4 Corps was in and had effected a junction with the Chinese jeopardy. The prospect of a race against a and American forces now investing the reduced time limit caused considerable anxiety Japanese garrison of Myitkyina, where the in the mind of C.-in-C. Allied Land Forces, main airfield had passed into their hands. South East Asia (A.L.F.S.E.A.). Jn his Further still to the north-east, a Chinese army opinion the overland advance by highly based on Yunnan was fighting in the upper mobile forces might not have the necessary Salween valley. impetus to overcome opposition en route, to- gether with the final opposition estimated from 20. The front remained static, dur'ng the- the defenders of Rangoon, reinforced by the period of the monsoon, only in the coastal area. remnants of field formations extricated from On the Imphal sector, 33 Corps—which took Central Burma. (Upon his urgent recom- over from 4 Corps when the latter was with- mendations, the capture of Rangoon before the drawn from the line for four months—remained monsoon was made more certain by the mount- on the offensive. In the course of July the- ing of a modified " Dracula " by sea and air. enemy was finally driven by combined air and ground bombardment from his tenac:ously held1 16. To carry out this operation, it would be positions, on the perimeter of the Imphal plain, necessary to utilise forces which were ear- and with the capture of Tamu in early August marked to seize concurrently with the capture the Allied forces had re-established a foothold! of Rangoon a springboard on the Malay Penin- in the Kabaw Vallev and were ready to push sula. In the event, this modified " Dracula " southwards towards Yazagyo and Kalemyo andi! proved to have been unnecessary, as the eastwards to the Chindwin. following pages will show. Nevertheless the capture of Rangoon entailed such a large 21. On the right flank, a seres of Japanese expenditure of effort and resources that plan- delaying positions on what was euphemistically ning has had to be conducted since then on called the Tiddim Road, was overcome during (68741) A2 1968 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951

August and September, the " Hurribomber" resistance than had been anticipated. Forward again proving itself a most effective weapon for units of 15 Corps reached Foul Point before close support in jungle country, as the wreckage Christmas, and an Allied landing on Akyab along the Tiddim Road testified. Tiddim itself Island on 3rd January was unopposed. fell on 18th October, and the way was now A further landing on Ramree Island open for a double thrust towards Kalemyo from on the 21st met with only slight opposi- the west and north. Japanese resistance in the tion. The core of Japanese resistance was, Kennedy Peak area, albeit grim, iproved no however, met along 'the coastal road from match for the experienced Allied troops and the Myohaung to Taungup, and a number of accompanying air bombardment, and Kalemyo amphibious landings which were effected in fell on 15th November. With the capture of January and February at various points along Kalewa on 2nd December the chapter of moun- the coast provoked fierce fighting (whose tain warfare was closed and the Fourteenth issue was beyond doubt due to -the heavy and Army was ready to debouch upon the plains of accurate air support 'that was given), and Central Burma. gradually the enemy was driven towards the 22. Comparable progress had also been made two routes leading eastwards from An and in the Northern Combat Area Command sector, Taungup towards the Irrawaddy valley. With where the enemy garrison at Myitkyina had the capture of Taungup in -the middle of April been reduced early in August In the railway the coastal campaign was virtually over. corridor, 36 Division, which had replaced 25. The climax of the main battle in central Special Force, made steady progress; it cap- Burma was meanwhile not long delayed. tured Hopin on 7th September and by 10th During December the Fourteenth Army struck December had reached the junction at Indaw. eastwards, and with the occupation of Wuntho A drive southwards from Myitkyina carried by 4 Corps on the 20th, secured its left Chinese units to Bhamo at approximately the flank by laying the basis for a continuous same time. Thus by the end of the monsoon front with the Northern Combat Area Com- period the forces of the Northern Combat mand. The railhead at Ye-U was occupied Area Command were in a position seriously by 33 Corps on New Year's Day, and the to threaten the right flank of the enemy ele- Japanese stronghold at Monywa was finally ments facing the Fourteenth Army. reduced on the 21st, by when 33 Corps had 23. Before the opening of the campaigning reached the general line of the Irrawaddy, •season proper, a certain number of changes on which it was evident -that the enemy had Tiad been made in the organisation of the resolved to make a stand. Bridgeheads had •ground forces facing the Japanese in Burma. however been secured by 20 Division on the "Since with the converging advances of both left bank of the river at Thabeikkyin and the Fourteenth Army and the Northern Combat Singu, and in the great bend of the Irrawaddy Area Command the opening of a continuous the Japanese stoutly defended the approaches front in Central Burma seemed probable in to Sagaing on the right bank. In these two the near future, Lieut.-General Sir Oliver Leese, sectors, where the contending forces were not Bart., K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., was allotted separated by the river, bitter fighting continued command of all the Allied Land Forces in throughout the second hah* of January and Burma. This Headquarters absorbed that of the first half of February. To the north- 11 Army Corps, and was set up at Barrack- east, the Northern Combat Area Command pore outside Calcutta, while an off-shoot was forces were moving southwards across the maintained at Kandy. 15 Corps, operating in Shweli valley and towards Lashio ; Hsenwi was Arakan, was removed from the control of taken on 19th February, and Namtu on the Fourteenth Army and placed directly under 23rd. his command—a step which enabled Head- 26. While these events were taking place in quarters, Fourteenth Army, to move forward the Irrawaddy valley and to the north-east, the and establish itself beside 221 Group on the main strategy of the campaign was beginning Imphal plain. With the return of 4 Corps to take shape. 4 Corps was removed from to the field in early November it thus retained the left flank of the Fourteenth Army as soon command of two army corps, for 33 Corps as the junction with the Northern Combat remained in control of the operations develop- Area Command was assured, and with two ing against Kalemyo. Such was the general divisions was given the task of pushing south- organisation of the ground forces when the wards from Kalemyo along the Gangaw valley new campaign fairly opened in November, towards Tilin and Pauk. The natural obstacles 1944. on this wild route were every bit as great as 24. In the coastal sector, IS Corps had begun those prepared by the enemy, who did not the preliminaries to its offensive at an early appreciate the threat to his left flank that was hour and before the end of October, 81 (West thus being unfolded. His ignorance of the African) Division, supplied entirely by air, situation was due to the fact that his recon- had crossed into the Kaladan valley from naissance aircraft dared not cover the area, and its monsoon quarters at Chiringa and was to his tardy realisation of the new mobility beginning to advance southwards against some of the Allied armies with which air supply opposition. The main offensive was opened endowed them. His defences at Gangaw were west of the Mayu Hills in mid-December; overwhelmed on 10th January after an air its purpose was to secure air bases on Akyab bombardment to which the Army paid full and Ramree Islands, from which support could tribute, and by the 27th the forward units of be mounted for future operations in southern 4 Corps had reached Pauk. Early in February Burma, and also by driving the Japanese from they established themselves on the right bank the coastal strip west of the Arakan Yomas of the Irrawaddy below Pakokku. The stage to liberate the considerable Allied forces they was now set for the crowning blow of the •had contained there. It met with even less campaign. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 1969

27. After a few days' pause, a series of con- known to have evacuated two or ihree days; certed crossings at various points of the Irra- earlier. 33 Corps had moved south-west to waddy below Mandalay began on the night Magwe, which was captured on the 18th, and of 12th-13th February. A new bridgehead was thence advanced down the Irrawaddy valley; established by 33 Corps opposite Myinmu, in its forward elements reached the railhead at the teeth of determined opposition on the part Prome on 1st May. Nowhere was the enemy of the Japanese, who took it to be part of a able to bar the advance by a frontal stand. major encircling movement against Mandalay Such were the circumstances when the com- in conjunction with the forces in the Singu bined operation for the capture of Rangoon bridgehead to the north. They accordingly from the south was put into execution at the threw in most of their available reserves to express wish of C.-in-C. A.L.F.S.E.A. combat it. A feint crossing was made far to the south, opposite Seikpyu, while the main 32. As 'already explained, Operation thrust was made a little upstream, opposite "Dracula" met with little or no opposition. Myitche, where 4 Corps was able to establish It was a copy-book operation, and the troops a foothold against comparatively light opposi- advancing into the city from the south partook tion from the enemy, who still underestimated more of the nature of a triumphal procession the threat to his left flank. When this bridge- than an assault force. They were met by the head had been consolidated, a motorised commanding officer of No. 110 Squadron brigade was concentrated behind its lines. R.A.F., Wing Commander Saunders, who on the previous day, perceiving no signs of the 28. On the 23rd, this Brigade moved swiftly enemy at Mingaladon airfield, had decided to eastwards, reaching the railway at Taungtha the land and reconnoitre the city. He took formal next day. It then turned south-east along the possession of Rangoon on behalf of the Allied line towards the junction of Meiktila, a nodal forces. It was fitting.that the vital part the centre in the communications of central Burma, Air Forces had played in the campaign should in the neighbourhood of which there were also be symbolically rounded off by the occupation several good airfields. The enemy was com- of Rangoon by the Royal Air Force. pletely taken aback by this thrust into his rear areas, and although his line of communication troops fought hard, they were unable to do more than delay slightly our advance. By the afternoon of 3rd March, the garrison of Meiktila had been annihilated and 4 Corps had PART THREE. thus placed a brigade, which pur air transport speedily built up into a division, squarely ALLIED AIR DOMINANCE. athwart the main enemy line of communication 33. Until October, 1944, when the enemy from his base at Rangoon to the fighting zone. began to withdraw aircraft from this theatre to reinforce his garrison in the Philippines, the 29. It was in March that the battle which overall strength of the Japanese Air Force in was to decide the fate of most of Burma north this theatre remained at some 450 aircraft in of the Gulf of Martaban was fought. The operational units. Normally about 150 air- Japanese reacted speedily to the major strategic craft, 70 per cent, of which were fighters, were thrust whose significance they had grasped too disposed in Burma and Thailand for imme- late, and hastily moved southwards all their diate use. The majority of the remainder were available forces, in an effort, first, to break retained in Malaya and Sumatra, and com- our stranglehold on their communications, and, prised bombers and floatplanes for shipping when this failed, to withdraw to safety as many escorts and anti-submarine duties, fighters for as they could of their troops in the Mandalay- the defence of the Sumatra oilfields, and Meiktila noose. Mandalay itself fell to our operational echelons refitting or training. With troops advancing from the north by the middle General MacArthur's invasion of the Philip- of the month. pines, when up to 100 aircraft left S.E.A.C., 30. Meanwhile the whole area Mandalay- a steady decline in strength set in, aggravated Myingyan-Meiktila had been transformed into by the constant attrition caused by our fighters, a vast battlefield, in which the Fourteenth for which full replacement was not forth- Army and No. 221 Group attacked from three coming, until in May, 1945, the enemy could directions the disorganized forces of the muster but 250 aircraft in the S.E.A.C. area, enemy, whose casualties were heavy. A num- of which over 100, stationed in Malaya and ber of scattered units made their escape, but Sumatra, were for most purposes ineffective by the beginning of April it might fairly be by reason of their distance from the battle estimated that Japanese military power in areas. Burma had been shattered. In the Northern Combat Area Command sector, the course of 34. Following the sharp lessons he received events in central Burma had helped to quicken between March and May, 1944, the enemy's the pace of the Japanese withdrawal; Lashio warning system became somewhat less was captured by a Chinese division on 8th embryonic, so that it was difficult to achieve March, and the enemy soon broke contact, complete surprise in any part of the theatre. retreating southwards into the Shan States. By listening to Allied W/T and R/T, and by supplementing a skimpy radar system with 31. The Fourteenth Army resumed its large- observation posts and sound locators, a com- scale offensive on 12th April, after a short prehensive albeit somewhat thin warning- period for regrouping its forces. 4 Corps, system had been established around the whole supplied by air, struck along the main of the Western Perimeter, and it was only a Mandalay-Rangoon axis; by the end of the question of time before growing technical pro- month it had covered some 250 miles and had ficiency rendered the task of Allied aircraft in reached the outskirts of Pegu, less than 50 search of all too rare targets, even more miles from Rangoon, which the Japanese were difficult. 1970 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 35. By comparison, the strength and com- establish fighter bases in the area of dropping position of the Allied fighter force was most operations. satisfactory. Spitfires, Lightnings, and latterly 39. On two occasions, therefore, our trans- Thunderbolts and Mustangs, completely trans- port aircraft were victims of enemy sneak formed the situation which had obtained until raids ; on one day in November while dropping November, 1943, when our Hurricanes were along the Tiddim Road, five aircraft were de- outclassed and out-manoeuvred by the enemy. stroyed by the enemy, and on the 12th Janu- Backed by a warning and control system of ary four were shot down while supply dropping high standard, Allied fighters had without fail near Onbauk, an airfield recently recaptured rendered the enemy's incursions into our de- from the enemy which, however, had not by fended areas costly and ineffectual. During the that time been prepared for defensive fighters. eleven months covered iby this despatch 165 Even when during the temporary halt around enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground Mandalay, and Spitfires were able to occupy or in the air, together with 47 probables and the Shwebo and Monywa airfield groups, air 152 damaged. This destruction was achieved supply was proceeding over a hundred and against a total enemy effort, offensive and thirty 'mile front which the four available defensive, of 1,845 sorties. One enemy air- squadrons of Spitfires were hard pressed to craft was destroyed for every eleven sighted; cover in conjunction with their other defensive that the air superiority established before the commitments. It is a lesson of the campaign period of this narrative was well maintained that the air supply of ground forces depends over the year, needs no further proof. on the immediate deployment as far forward as possible of fighter squadrons to patrol the 36. This virtual dominance of the air over Lines of Communication. Had the enemy used Burma was the result of hard work with small his fighters effectively instead of frittering away dividends upon the part of our fighter organ- their effort on infrequent low-level attadks isation. Freed from the necessity of estab- against forward troops, he would have been lishing superiority, the major problems remain- able to do great execution among our Dakotas ing to Allied fighters by the time this despatch and Commandos, thus seriously impeding the opens were the interception of sneak raids, advance. usually undertaken by the Japanese Air Force under the protection of cloud-cover, and the searching-out and destruction of a meagre 40. Since it was not always possible to engage enemy air force dispersed upon a generous net- the enemy in the air, it was necessary to search work of rear airfields. Initially, the greatest out his aircraft on the ground. To this end, danger was to the stream of transports hauling intruder raids were undertaken at frequent supplies to the Imphal Plain, which offered the intervals, and paid a dividend of 80 destroyed, best prey ever presented to any air force. 25 probably destroyed and 78 damaged aircraft Some one hundred unarmed aircraft flew daily on enemy airfields. In October, a series of in and out of the area, and fighter patrols raids were undertaken against the Rangoon laboured under the handicaps of extensive cloud airfields with the additional motive of hinder- conditions and a shortage of P.O.L.* at their ing the 'transfer of units to the Philippines. bases. In this operation, many types of aircraft were employed, including Beaufighters, but, as air- 37. Moreover, the mountainous terrain to the craft resources became more suited to opera- east precluded efficient early ak raid warning, tional requirements, intrusion was progressively and the enemy could at will come un- left to the Mustang squadrons of the Air announced through the valleys. To minimise Commandos, who on more than one occasion the danger, traffic was routed along a corridor in the spring of 1945, made the 1,500 mile from the Khopum Valley to Palel under a round trip to the Japanese base airfields in fighter umbrella. Ground signs were displayed Siam with good results totalling 38 destroyed, en route to indicate the presence of enemy 10 probably destroyed and 21 damaged aircraft. aircraft which was also broadcast by R/T. The sight of a stream of transports flying into 41. The problem of destroying an enemy the Imphal Valley with a screen of Spitfires intent on conserving his forces and possessing circling overhead was a most heartening sight a wide choice of airfields containing many to the garrison, who thereby received con- revetments (Meiktila airfield disposes of over stant assurance that their aerial life-line was a hundred) is not an easy one. In addition, unbroken. The precautions taken and the im- the enemy's skill with light anti-aircraft and potence of the enemy resulted in only two machine-gun fire is well-known, and low-level transports being destroyed by enemy action " strafing " runs are apt to be costly. It was during the whole of the siege, a remarkable found uneconomical to make a preliminary achievement. reconnaissance run to discover which revet- ments were occupied, and often only a quick 38. The danger to transport aircraft per- snap-shot at a target seen late hi the " strafe " sisted during the whole of the advance, since was possible. In view of these factors it will they were continually operating in front of the be seen that the result achieved is more than warning screen, and fighter bases were not creditable. always established as far forward as was tac- 42. Early attempts to ground or destroy the tically desirable. For this there were two main enemy by bombing his airfields were ineffective reasons; in the early stages of the advance and were discontinued in favour of more worth- through hilly jungle no airstrips could be con- while targets. structed near the front, and" second, having debouched on to the plains, the Army were not * * * * willing .to devote supplies and resources to 43. The enemy's offensive effort was so ineffectual as to be hardly worth mentioning * Petrol, Oil, Lubricants. except to recount the losses he sustained. In SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 1971

late September the Japanese Air Force began degree of turbulence which has been the a series of reconnaissances with disastrous of a number of fatal accidents. results. Cover was attempted of the Manipur 47. Despite these many difficulties, the success Road, Silchar, Chittagong and battle areas. of the -air supply operations in the Burma Four Dinahs were destroyed during this brief campaign has been fully testified. It is fair to spell and since then no reconnaissance over say that without air supply the Burma campaign the India border has been attempted. On could never have been fought on its present Christmas night three bombers attempted to lines. It was in fact a decisive factor of the penetrate to the Calcutta area; of these, two land campaign. ^Admittedly mistakes occurred, were destroyed by Beaufighters and the third sometimes due to miscalculation but more often returned in a damaged condition. Enemy due to unforeseen contingencies. Even so the attempts to interfere with shipping off Akyab air supply operations in Burma will probably in January were decisively dealt with by the rank as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, Spitfire squadrons who moved in five days of air supply achievements in this war. after its occupation, No. 67 Squadron destroy- ing five out of six attacking Oscars in one 48. The organisation and operation of air day. supply is a problem which calls for mutual understanding of each other's difficulties by the 44. Thereafter, the enemy effort degenerated respective Services. In this respect it cannot into a series of sporadic and infrequent attempts be too strongly emphasised that it is the opera- to disrupt our forward columns. The tors and not the consumers who determine the ineffectual nature of these attacks was evident most efficient method of delivering the goods. to all who flew over the battlefield and noted, Moreover, it is up to the consumers to state on the enemy side no signs of 'activity, but, precisely what is required, in a given order of behind the British lines, long lines of trans- priority. It is their responsibility also to port moving in uncamouflaged safety, supply- deliver these goods in the required quantities dropping parachutes in use as tents, and all and at the right time to the air supply heads. the apparatus of war left in full view by The swift and uncp-ordinated growth of the troops whose immunity from air attack was air transport organization did not allow of a scarcely ever violated even by fast-flying full appreciation, by either the Army or the Air fighters, for the enemy dared not send a Force, of the importance of the ancillary ser- bomber over the Allied lines by daylight. vices necessary to promote the full effectiveness of the machine. As the campaign advanced, this tendency has been progressively eliminated, 45. It is unnecessary to recount in detail and the situation is now that only a lack of the enormous advantages accruing to both resources prevents the air transport organisa- ground and air forces when the enemy air tion from incorporating all the lessons that have arm is small and misemployed, and when our been learnt, and giving it the full effectiveness own squadrons are superior in performance, with which experience can endow it. From this training and control. It is, however, worth observation, the air supply organization that has pausing to consider the results had enemy air- developed within the area of Northern Combat craft been allowed unrestricted use of the sky. Area Command and Tenth Air Force is The air supply on which the whole land cam- excepted. There, a realisation of the import- paign hinged would have been impossible, the ance of firm backing to the supply system was attrition rate of our close support squadrons, evident from the outset, and resulted in a very which worked with accuracy and effect, would high standard of operating efficiency* have been prohibitive, and the disuption caused by our strategic bombers to the enemy's com- # * * * munications far to the rear could not have 49. In June, 1944, there were in Air Com- been such as to have materially influenced mand eleven transport squadrons engaged on the battle. air supply, four British and seven American. By May, 1945, these figures had risen to nine and sixteen respectively, an increase which still left the air supply force with little or no margin of reserve* The growth of air supply during the PART FOUR. period can well be imagined, TRANSPORT SUPPORT OPERATIONS 50. At the beginning of the period, attention AND DEVELOPMENT. was still centred upon the critical position of 4 Corps besieged in and around the ancient 46. The Burma campaign has proved beyond capital of Manipur. There were still twenty- all doubt that once air superiority has been three days of June to go before the road to achieved, the air maintenance and supply of Imphal was to be re-opened. Working to forces in the field is governed primarily by the supply the garrison and to build a stockpile to availability of airfields and of transport air- exploit the anticipated Japanese retreat, as craft. The supply and maintenance of the much as 700 tons were being flown in on a Army, in the field .and engaged in intensive single day under monsoon conditions. When operations together with a tactical air force in the road was re-opened, effort was not allowed support, is a major problem under most favour- to drop and for the remaining days of June the able conditions. It should be borne in mind, squadrons flew at maximum effort in order to however, that supply bases were some 250 miles build up stocks and ascertain the peak air lift distant, and that the intervening country com- that could be achieved. The wisdom of this prised vast stretches of impenetrable jungle and was doubtful; all concerned were already ex- a formidable mountain barrier rising up to hausted, and experience has illustrated the value 10,000 feet. In addition, weather conditions of retaining a margin of effort in -reserve, and were by no means favourable, and experience of not over-straining a complicated machine bas shown that monsoon cloud develops a without urgent necessity. 1972 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951

51. However, by the end of the month, the was such as to clog any air supply machinery enemy was in retreat, and food and munitions no matter how well-planned, and second, were available to speed his withdrawal. The there were crippling deficiencies of personnel in threat to India and to the China life-line had such ancillary bodies as Staging Posts and been removed, and a grim defence, sustained Casualty Air Evacuation Units. solely by air supply, was becoming a vigorous 55. On December 20th, the first strip for offensive, whose progress was also fed from landing-on of supplies was opened at Indaing- the air. From July until November, 33 Corps gale. Others followed in quick succession, (fought its way eastwards to the Chindwin, Taukkyan near Kalemyo, Kawlin and Indaw southwards along the Kabaw valley and down trans-Chindwin as soon as the river had been the Tiddim Road, provided entirely with crossed, and Kan in the Myittha Valley where munitions and food by our transport squadrons. Until the end of the monsoon, supply was 4 Corps had returned to the line, replacing carried out under conditions of unbelievable the Lushai Brigade and representing another difficulty. In July the commander of 33 Corps and growing commitment to our transport sent the following signal to No. 194 Squadron: forces* "Your unflagging efforts and determination 56. Thus, by January, the increasing de- to complete your task in spite of appalling mands of mobile warfare, which did not accord flying conditions are worthy

efficiency eliminated a multitude of small tonnage to be hauled in its execution decided. delays; these ancillary organisations worked The maximum lift was assessed at 1,887 tons with the industrial efficiency of a large com- per day between 20th March and 1st April and mercial factory. 2,075 tons per day between 1st May and 15th 59. A comparison between the American May. I emphasised that these figures would packing loading agencies at Dinjan and the entail a very high rate of effort from the R.I.A.S.C. Air Supply Companies at Hathazari squadrons involved, and would entail consider- reflected no credit on the British ground organi- able retrenchment during the monsoon to pay sation. Here it should be emphasised that no off the mortgage in maintenance and overstrain reflection is intended on the personnel in- we would have contracted in its achievement. volved ; British Officers and Indian Other 64. Meanwhile, the air lift was still increas- Ranks were strained to breaking-point, and ing. In February, C.C.T.F. hauled 51,210 short often had to work seventy-two hours at a tons of supplies into the operational area. In stretch to complete their tasks; the fault lay addition, at the end of the month, a small in the fact that the importance and nature of though vital airborne operation took place to the work demanded a much more generous consolidate the capture of Meiktila, which had scale of personnel, facilities, and organising been seized following an armoured dash from ability than could be allotted by the Army. their bridgehead on the Irrawaddy by 17 Divi- sion. 65. Troops were landed to reinforce the fly- i60. An examination of the data gathered on ing column which had seized the airfield and Air Marshal Garrod's tour brought to light the was now being fiercely attacked on all sides by differences of organisation and procedure •the enemy. Transport aircraft landed and dis- between the two air supply systems, and re- charged their loads under fire, many suffering vealed a crying need for improvement in the damage while so doing. One aircraft taking organisation operated by C.A.A.T.O. and on wounded for its return journey had a shell C.C.T.F. Too numerous to recount here, these explode inside it, causing further injuries to points did have the effect of initiating action to the casualties who were already emplaned. improve the operating procedure. Meanwhile, Thus, within very few days, landing became Air Command was pressing for the speedy impossible, and it was necessary to resort to development of the recaptured bases along the the less economical practice of dropping, which Arakan Coast at Akyab and Ramree whose still further increased the load on our transport employment would shorten the haul into Cen- squadrons. tral Burma. Journeys from the established 66. The Meiktila operation was a success, bases at Chittagong, Comilla and Tulihal were and a captured Japanese Staff officer assessed now becoming so long that in order to com- it as the turning point in the battle for Burma. plete three trips in a day, aircraft had to take It was not accomplished without mistakes, how- off at first lieht and perhaps not finish until ever, which rendered it far more hazardous after dark. The strain on technical mainten- than it might otherwise have been. It should ance, flying and loading personnel can well be be established that aircraft will not land until imagined. the possibility of the airfield 'being subjected 61. It was in (February that an overland to heavy fire is ruled out. Planning should be advance to Rangoon supplied entirely by air carried out on this premise. Secondly, the was first put forward as a serious proposal. R.A.M.O. that was established on the airfield Fourteenth Army prepared a plan which was pitifully inadequate, the officer in charge envisaged two parallel drives southwards along having to guide aircraft to unloading points the axes of the River Irrawaddy and of the instead of being free to organise their quick Mandalay-Rangoon railway, while a large force turn-around under fire. In a critical opera- from 33 Corps, of up to three and a half divi- tion, such points might make all the difference sions, struck east to Takaw with the object of between success and dismal failure. They containing and destroying all enemy forces cut merit much greater consideration in combined off north of Meiktila. planning than has hitherto been accorded them. 62. Air Command reactions to the plan were * * * * (i) a re-orientation of supply lines, using 67. By the beginning of April, Meiktila was Akyab and Ramree as advanced air supply again safe for landing, although shells were heads which would result in substantial re- still bursting less than 200 yards from the duction in length of the air supply line as strips. Preparations were immediately com- the force advanced south of Mandalay. menced to build up stocks to maintain Four- teenth Army in the final dash which was to (ii) We doubted the soundness of the plan carry them 250 miles southward in the second which aimed at a total destruction of the half of the month. On the 20th, the main enemy in addition to the capture of Rangoon airfield at Lewe was captured and speedily if the former necessitated a drive eastwards prepared for light aircraft and gliders, which to cut off and destroy the enemy in the hills. began landing on the morning of the 21st. This would inevitably involve a supply Toungoo, 50 miles further south, was occupied problem in that direction in addition to on the 22nd and, in spite of bad weather, over sustaining a main advance southwards. 100 Dakotas and Commandos landed on the 63. A study of the situation after the fall of 24th. Within five days, Pyuntaza, another Rangoon shows that these reactions were fully airstrip 70 miles further south, was also receiv- justified. Apart from this, the plan had many ing supplies, and a battalion group was flown advantages, and at a major conference in in to cut the enemy escape route eastwards Calcutta on 23rd February which heralded my from Pegu. The enemy was still active on arrival as Allied Air Commander-m-Chief, it both sides of the narrow strip along the was approved in principle and the target for Mandalay-Pegu railway which had formed our 1974 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951

corridor, and while the capture of Rangoon Conclusions on Air Transport. was left to an assault from the south, transport 72. The first essential for air supply is good squadrons continued with unabated activity ground organisation. One weak link in the the supply of Fourteenth Army, who but for chain can vitiate the work of the aircrews and these outstanding efforts would not have been maintenance personnel, the estimates of the able to hold the ground they had won. planners and the efforts of the fighting troops. It is worth outlining some of the faults that have occurred in order that they may be avoided in the future. Casualty Evacuation. (i) Dropping Zones should always be located 68. Throughout the period, the saving of where a drop is feasible. This might sound a lives, the morale of the fighting troops and the platitude to anyone who has not flown on mobility of our ground forces has been supply-dropping operations in Burma and materially assisted by the work of light air- found dropping areas continually located in craft and Dakotas flying out sick and wounded narrow valleys whose negotiation after each from the battle areas. The total of men thus run is a major hazard. saved from avoidable pain and suffering, from many days' journey by sampan, mule and (ii) The system of communicating informa- ambulance, and from dying for lack of hospital tion on dropping areas, on the composition facilities was formidable. of loads, on changes of location, on enemy interference and all other aspects of air 69. The flexibility of air power, by no means supply must be such that the one small and lessened when used in the interests of vital item of knowledge which might make humanity, was well illustrated by a unique the difference between a successful or an operation carried out by Sunderlands of abortive sortie is available at all links in the No. 230 Squadron, which landed on Lake chain. Indawgyi behind the enemy lines and flew out (iii) The British Army-Air" supply system 537 wounded men of Special Force, whom in South-East Asia has been continually General Wingate's columns would otherwise marred by the failure to provide for have been forced to abandon to the mercy of meticulous organisation in a sphere where the Japanese. great efforts can be rendered nugatory by 70. This operation was, however, exceptional. inaccuracy in minor details. The normal procedure was for light aircraft of the R.A.F. Communication squadrons and The following are some of the lessons the U.S.A.A.F. Liaison squadrons to bring in learnt:— the sick and wounded from extemporised land- (a) Adequate distributing facilities must ing strips to grounds where Dakptas and Com- be made available by the land forces at mandos were discharging their cargo, and landing grounds to ensure that perishable whence they would take them to base hospitals goods are quickly distributed when un- on return journeys. It was proposed at one loaded from aircraft. time to attach light aircraft to the transport (6) Aircraft should not be detailed to squadrons, and form one co-ordinated flying convey food to areas in which the same unit to undertake the whole process of casualty commodities can easily be obtained by evacuation, but such a scheme would either local purchase, have unpaired the mobility of the light aircraft components or would have left them continu- (c) Packing of goods must be strong ally detached from their parent squadrons with enough to ensure that containers do not no administrative or domestic backing for the burst in transit. difficult conditions under which they live and (d) Adequate facilities must be provided operate. Accordingly, as the American light for feeding and resting aircrews engaged on aircraft are withdrawn from this theatre and this arduous flying, as they are often absent the R.A.F. take on the whole of the work, •from their bases for as long as ten hours it is proposed to form independent self- at a time. sufficient flying units to reinforce the Group {e) An efficient supply of re-fuellers and Communication Squadrons in casualty evacua- facilities for night maintenance must be tion. The resultant organisation will be suf- arranged, otherwise aircraft which could ficiently elastic to cover the whole front and yet otherwise be making an effective contribu- be capable of concentration where casualties tion to the battle will be grounded. are heavy. (iv) Forward airfield commanders and fly- 71. Casualty evacuation has been a regular ing control personnel took a long time to part of the Air Forces' work in this theatre realise that air supply traffic is as vital as any since the middle of 1943. It is unfortunate that other, Cargo aircraft should not be kept with the increase in traffic which intensified circling an airfield while tactical aircraft take operations have caused, there has been insuf- off on a routine operation whose delay by ficient parallel growth of resources. Nursing half an hour is immaterial. Orderlies are 11 per cent, below establishment, and the buildings and accommodation for the (v) Each part of the planning and assess- reception of wounded at base airfields are not ment of air lift must be carried out by the of the standard which good hygiene and Service in whose province it lies. Much con- humanity demand. If the Royal Air Force is fusion has been caused here by the Army to maintain the high reputation it has built in attempting to quote and work on flying hours this sphere, far more generous scales of equip- per aircraft with -no knowledge of the impli- ment and personnel must be authorised. cations of U.E. and I.E.*, aircraft serviceable * U.E. = Unit Equipment. I.E. = Initial Equipment. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 1975

or aircraft on strength. Moreover it was con- The second exception was provided by the sistent practice for the Army to require full Thunderbolt squadrons of 905 Wing, for which, data on the performance of our aircraft and owing to administrative reasons, there was no explanations for any short-fall that might room east of the Lushai Hills and which were occur, while never giving equivalent informa- therefore located in Arakan under 224 Group. tion upon their own short-fall in overland 76. In this connection the very difficult or inland water transport, problems of administration confronting 221 73. Air supply depends on so many agencies, Group must be recalled. Its wings and squad- and is affected by so many imponderables, that rons operated from bases covering a front of the allocation of resources and good brains to some two hundred miles, and a depth which ensure efficiency, speed and good liaison can at the beginning of the campaigning season in never be too generous. The campaign in November was no less, and which by the end Burma would have been rendered easier had of April had expanded to some six hundred the engineering resources that were poured into miles, from the Mosquito wing at Khumbigram less profitable projects been directed towards to the fighter squadrons on forward strips near timely building of forward airfields, more effi- Toungoo. Most were on a highly mobile basis, cient supply depots and stronger lines of com- with personnel reduced to the minimum; the munication to the air haulage centres. The separation of squadrons from servicing Ledo Road, for example, is surely the longest echelons which was generally effected towards white elephant in the world. Had the wealth the end of 1944 contributed materially to the of ability and material that went to its building mobility of units in the group. Fighter squad- been employed in strengthening the air supply rons moved forward in pace with the advancing system, the recapture of Burma could probably front as quickly as the army were able to have been advanced by an appreciable period. prepare landing grounds and forego air trans- port for them ; the squadrons of 906 Wing, for instance, were operating from airfields near Ye-U by the middle of January, a fortnight after the occupation of the district by 33 Corps, PART FIVE. and before the end of April no less than nine TACTICAL SUPPORT OF THE fighter squadrons were located at Toungoo, GROUND FORCES. which had not been captured until the 22nd, and another four at Magwe, which fell on the The Organisation of Tactical Support. 18th, in preparation for the assault upon 74. Air forces operating in tactical support Rangoon. These moves were effected with the of the Allied Land Forces in Burma comprised aid of transport aircraft, overland communica- Nos. 221 and 224 Groups R.A.F. and 10th tions being almost non-existent. There was, U.S.A.A.F. all under the command of Head- however, some feeling among the squadrons quarters, Eastern Air Command. Each worked that in the matter of motor transport and in close association with a corresponding army indeed of supplies generally the army was at headquarters—the Tenth U.S.A.A.F. with the a distinct advantage. Northern Combat Area Command, 224 Group 77. The enormous area over which the with 15 Corps and 221 Group with 33 Corps squadrons of 221 Group were scattered, together and 4 Corps, and finally from the beginning with the meagreness of communications by of December onwards with the Fourteenth land and telephone, also precluded the whole- Army. 221 Group and Fourteenth Army sale adoption, for the operational control of remained together at Imphal only until the fighter aircraft hi close support, of the organiza- end of December, when the latter moved for- tion which had been evolved in the European ward to Kalemyp, being accompanied by the theatre of war for army-air co-operation. The A.O.C. and his air staff.'The two headquarters former system of Army Air Support Units were again united fully at Monywa from 9th was replaced in the closing months of 1944 February until the middle of April, when they by the establishment of Air Support Signals moved to Meiktila, their final staging post Units with Visual Control Posts (V.CPs.), Air before Rangoon. The mobility of 221 Group Advisers being also provided for both corps headquarters had a less active counterpart in and divisional headquarters. A Combined that of 224 Group, which remained with the Army/Air School for training V.C.P personnel headquarters of 15 Corps first at Cox's Bazar was set up at Ranchi, and it was soon found and later at Akyab. In both cases the close that the greatest difficulty in the establishment relationship of the headquarters of the two of Visual Control Posts was the provision of Services was an essential element in their personnel, particularly of Controllers, who it successful co-operation. was agreed must be chosen from experienced 75. In the campaign in central Burma, just junior officers of the General Duties branch. as all the ground forces came under the Ten teams were however operating by the Fourteenth Army, so all the aircraft engaged end of 1944 and by the beginning of May, in close, as distinct from tactical, support of 1945, their number had risen to thirty-four. the former were controlled by Headquarters, The special value of the V.C.Ps lay in the 221 Group. There were however two excep- extra flexibility and accuracy which they lent tions. The two Air Commando Groups to air operations planned hi conjunction with operated directly under Eastern Air Command, the ground situation; the former device of and the Mustangs of the Second Air Com- indicating targets by smoke shells, always mando Group, which played so important a liable to inaccuracies in both place and time role in the operations of 4 Corps which led as well as to counterfeiting by the enemy, to the seizure of Meiktila, were for the crucial was now needed only when 'the target lay period of these operations controlled by an in flat jungle country, invisible from the ah* advanced headquarters of the Combat Cargo and not determinable in relation to any obvious Task Force located with 4 Corps headquarters. feature of the landscape. 1976 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951

78. Of the general success of the V.C.P. (B.25) had already been employed for this pur- system there can be no doubt, from both air pose in the 1943-4 campaign, but the four and ground points of view. It contributed squadrons of the Twelfth Bombardment Group- materially to that close and efficient co-opera- were now withdrawn from the Strategic Air tion of ground and air forces which was so Force and placed under the operational control marked a feature of the campaign of 1944-45. of first 224 Group and later 221 Group, so that It led however to a tactic of less unquestion- their work might more simply be dovetailed able value in the employment of the " cabrank " into the general tactical pattern. They oper- method,- by which aircraft patrolled con- ated sometimes independently, 'but in close- tinuously over selected areas, maintaining touch support more frequently in conjunction with all the time with the V.C.P., who as oppor- fighter-bombers, and added greatly to the tunity offered would call them down to attack weight and effectiveness of large-scale close any fresh target revealed by the progress of support operations ; the term " Earthquake "" the battle. This tactic was very popular with which was ultimately taken into official use our own troops, as the continued presence to describe these concerted attacks upon overhead of our own air support had excellent Japanese bunker positions originated among morale effect. Furthermore, air support was these 'Mitchell squadrons, who earned for them- available to engage any target at a moment's selves the name of "the Earthquakers." notice. It was however wasteful of flying 82. An outstanding " earthquake " operation,, hours and reduced petrol stocks, in that the for instance, was the air contribution to the aircraft were liable to be kept waiting and combined army and air attack directed on targets could not always be provided, while 10th January against the enemy stronghold at it diminished the weight of air attack, since Gangaw in the Kabaw Valley, where an ex- in order to maintain a continuous patrol the tensive and well-defended system of bunkers aircraft could seldom operate in more than and gun emplacements was holding up the pairs. If the army requires direct air support advance of 4 Corps southwards in its vital to be available at such short notice, it is con- thrust against the Japanese left flank. Four sidered that their desires could more Mitchell squadrons participated in this opera- economically be satisfied by providing the air tion, as did some thirty-four " Hurribombers,"' forces with airfields as close behind the front defensive cover being supplied by Spitfires and. line as the reasonable security of the ground Thunderbolts. It turned out to be a highly installations will warrant. successful day; the 'bombs were dropped at approximately 1430 hours and within ninety minutes five out of the six main Japanese posi- Close support of the Fourteenth Army. tions were in Allied hands. The subsequent 79. The aircraft employed in close support withdrawal of the enemy from the whole neigh- operations were of various types. In June, bourhood during the next few days was 1944, there were still four squadrons of attributed toy 4 Corps to be due in great Vengeances operating, two on the Imphal and measure to a lowering of his morale as a result two on the Arakan front; they had done of this air attack. But the participation of so- excellent work in the 1943-44 campaign, but large a number of aircraft in a single operation- had soon to be withdrawn. In September, the was not usual, and as the campaign wore on first R.A.F. Thunderbolts began operations; it was realised that Mitchells operating in num- Thunderbolts had already been in use for some bers as low as two or three could do effective time with 'the Tenth U.S.A.A.F. which had work in accurately winkling out small enemy also occasionally employed its Lightnings parties from their lairs. (P.38) in close support work. As the new cam- 83. Heavy bombers of the Strategic Air Force paign developed, and it became clear that the were also employed on "earthquake" opera- enemy was in no position seriously to chal- tions from time to time, mainly in support lenge the Allied air superiority, Spitfires were of the Fourteenth Army during the battle for increasingly diverted to the ground-attack role, the bridgeheads in January and February, 1944, particularly in the Arakan sector. though they also intervened effectively in sup- 80. But the backbone of direct air support port of 15 Corps during the struggle for the was always provided by the Hurricane, with or possession of the coastal road at Kangaw at without bombs. The " Hurribomber " had well the end of January. But well-marked targets proved its worth in the 1943-4 campaign, and suitable for their employment in direct co- some in particular of the " Humbonnber " operation with the ground forces were of squadrons enjoyed an immense reputation for necessity few, owing to the Japanese skill in their accurate pin-pointing of "targets within a camouflage, and the heavy bombers were there- comparatively few yards of our own positions. fore of most assistance to land operations in Their value in this was particularly evident their attacks upon targets not in the immediate during the period of mountain warfare that battle-zone. ended at the beginning of December, 1944, and subsequently in the interval of semi-static fight- ing that was marked by the battle of the Indirect Support of the Fourteenth Army. bridgeheads in late January and February, 84. On numerous occasions the ground' 1945. In conjunction with fighter-bombers as forces requested the help of the Strategic Air well as independently, ground-attack fighters Force, and nominated targets some distance also frequently operated in close support, doing behind the battle area though still in the particularly effective work in attacks upon gun tactical zone of land operations. These sites and patrols over areas in which enemy targets were, in the main, supply centres or artillery was suspected to be located. nodal communication points or built-up areas 81. 'Heavier aircraft were also taken into in which the enemy was believed to be living. service in support of ground attacks. Mitchells A notable attack of this type was mounted on SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 1977

13th January against Maudalay, the keystone which Lightnings and Vengeances were respon- of the whole Japanese defensive system in sible. In all, over 75 motor transport units central Burma and directly threatened in two were successfully attacked in this area during directions by the advance of the Fourteenth the month. These operations, though invisible Army. Fifty-four aircraft attacked the to the army, were controlled with the military Japanese-occupied district and a further 12 the situation always in view, and evidence was sub- suburb of Sagaing on the opposite side of the sequently forthcoming in plenty from captured river, the operation being preceded by attacks diaries of enemy officers and men of their effec- by Thunderbolts upon anti-aircraft gun sites tiveness in hindering the passage of supplies in the neighbourhood, and accompanied by and the movement of personnel, and in aggra- fighter sweeps over the airfields at Aungban vating the conditions of disease and under- and Meiktila. Photographic evidence con- nourishment under which the Japanese ground firmed the destruction of some 70 major build- forces laboured. ings in the Japanese quarters, while intelligence reports variously estimated Japanese casualties 88. In August the tactical picture on the alone at 600 and a 1,000, in addition to those Fourteenth Army front came to centre round inflicted upon Burmese puppet troops. the Chindwin river, which for two or three weeks became of considerably enhanced im- i85. Such operations undertaken at the portance as a supply route. It had long been request of the Allied land forces reached their in use by the Japanese as a line of communi- zenith in February, during which month nearly cation, and the riverine ports, particularly two thirds of the total number of sorties flown Monywa and Kalewa, were active points of by Liberators of the Strategic Air Force were supply. The still worsening military situation directed against targets in or near the battle- continued to impose upon the enemy the neces- front as requested by the Fourteenth Army. sity for emergency movements of men and sup- These included, for instance, the stores dumps plies behind the Manipur sector of the front. near the railhead at Madaya, from which the Since the capacity of the Sagaing—Ye-U rail- enemy forces fighting to contain the Singu way had been greatly reduced by air action, bridgehead were supplied, which was attacked and the other overland routes were more or by forty-five heavy bomber aircraft, and the less unusable owing to the monsoon, they were garrison districts at Yenangyaung, which were forced to have increased resort to the Chind- attacked by 50. OLater in the month, heavy win as a line of communication. bomber targets included objectives designated by the Army at Myittha, Mahlaing and 89. Early in the month the toll of rivercraft Myingyan—all towns lying on or close to the successfully attacked began to increase and it path being followed by the armoured columns became apparent that something was afoot. of 4 Corps in their thrust towards Meiktila. The Spitfires and Hurricanes which had hitherto To take a final example, the climax of the air been covering the river were reinforced by a attacks upon the potential stronghold of detachment of Beaufighters from 224 Group. Toungoo, where the enemy was expected to " Hurribombers " were joined by Wellingtons, make a serious effort to stop the drive of and later by Mitchells, in a series of attacks 4 Corps southwards towards Rangoon in the upon riverside targets. In addition, mines, both second half of April, was supplied by over 40 magnetic and ordinary, were laid in the Chind- Liberators, which bombed the garrison area win by Mitchells so as to catch traffic attempt- there on the 21st, when the nearest Allied ing to move under cover either of cloud or troops were already within striking distance, darkness. The total number of rivercraft suc- and indeed entered the town the following day. cessfully attacked on the Chindwin during the month was not far short of five hundred, and 86. Very effective operations against targets included seven launches ; of this total the Beau- in the immediate rear of the enemy were fighters accounted for slightly over half, carried out by ground-attack fighters through- together with five of the launches. out the period; their most vulnerable objec- 90. Attacks upon road transport vehicles con- tives were to be found along the lines of tinued throughout the campaign, their effective- communication, where animal and motor trans-. ness being increased with the advent of better port units were carrying to his troops in the weather at the close of the monsoon. In par- field, and also along the waterways where mis- ticular, the periods during which a major Allied cellaneous rivercraft served the same purpose. advance was in progress and the battlefront was In these operations varied aircraft were em- therefore fluid, were marked by the presence ployed, from Hurricanes and Spitfires to of transport targets in otherwise unusual quan- Beaufighters, Lightnings, Thunderbolts and tity. This was. so during the advance to the Mosquitos, while Mitchells also participated, Irrawaddy in December, the thrust towards particularly by night. Armament included Meiktila "during late February and early in rocket projectiles and bombs, as well as 40 mm. March, and above all during the final advance cannon, also guns of lesser calibre. of 4 Corps towards Rangoon in the second half 87. Some small foretaste of the weight and of April. Ox-carts belonging to the local popu- pattern of this tactical support of the army lation had long been habitually pressed into was given in July, when the enemy was service by the Japanese, and were attacked at endeavouring to withdraw from the perimeter all times. But lorries moved mainly under of the Imphal plain, and good toll was taken cover of darkness, and the Beaufighters which of his transport forced to brave the open road lit upon a convoy of forty to fifty vehicles to Tiddim and the other routes eastward to travelling westwards along the road from the Chindwin. Direct attacks upon vehicles, Meiktila to Kyaukpadaung on the afternoon of mainly by Hurricanes, were varied by success- February 5th and successfully strafed them made ful efforts to block the Tiddim road by causing an exceptional discovery. But it was probably landslides, and to break the bridges both along no coincidence that on the night of February it and in the Kabaw Valley—achievements for 15th/16th, just after the Fourteenth Army had 1978 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 made its decisive crossing of the Irrawaddy their component parts generally 'being camou- below Mandalay, another Beaufighter located flaged and dispersed until sunset with the loco- some fifty vehicles all moving eastwards along motives hidden in specially constructed shelters, the Chauk—Meiktila highway. often at the end of long sidings deep in the jungle. All obvious railway targets were 91. A little later, on the night of the guarded by efficient anti-aircraft defences, 27th/28th, a Mitchell on intruder patrol dis- dummy or derelict locomotives being placed to covered a convoy of over a hundred vehicles, decoy the aircraft into traps or at least to draw together with some armoured cars and six their fire. Nevertheless, some three hundred tanks, travelling northwards along the road and ten locomotives were successfully attacked from Taungdwingyi to Myothit, doubtless to by day, Beaufighters accounting for one hun- be thrown into the attempt to stem the advance dred and eighty-seven. Most of the remainder of the Fourteenth Army. The aircraft delivered were claimed by Mosquitos, Mustangs, attacks by both bombing and strafing for the Lightnings and Thunderbolts. space of an hour. It then attacked another smaller group of vehicles some distance to the 95. Of the number of rolling stock destroyed south-east, after which it returned to the large it would be unsafe to give any estimate, but convoy and was able to observe that some forty in any case there were always more than units had been knocked out by its previous enough waggons available in Burma to satisfy attacks; finally it delivered one more strafing Japanese military needs—in contrast to the attack, setting three more vehicles on fire. position in regard to locomotives, which, as a result of past Allied air attacks were always 92. In the second half of April, with the final in short supply, the Japanese going so far as to stages of the advance southwards in progress, import them from Siam and to use petrol- such targets became unprecedentedly plentiful. driven cars to haul railway waggons. Water- A Hurricane squadron, for instance, caught towers always presented a vulnerable target, over forty vehicles on the 19th standing nose difficult to hide, and thirty-nine were holed to tail, heavily loaded and camouflaged, off the during the period. It should be noted that these road a little south of Pyinmana, and was- sub- day attacks by ground-attack fighters reached sequently able to count seventeen in flames and as far as the northern extremities of both the many more severely damaged. The same Burma-Siam and the Bangkok-Chiengmai rail- squadron located an even larger number near ways. the site of the bridge over the Sittang at Mok- palin on the 30th, when a total of forty-three 96. A further one hundred and twenty-two lorries finally was counted in flames. Both locomotives were put out of commission as a Mustangs of the Second Air Commando Group result of night attacks, thirty-seven being con- and Beaufighters of 224 Group had each al- tributed by Mosquitos and thirty-seven by ready made a haul similar in size and nature in Mitchells. These attacks were of course this escape corridor on the 26th. In all, during delivered upon trains in full employment, and this second half of the month, approximately were not infrequently accompanied by spectacu- three hundred and fifty motor vehicles were lar results, with engine boilers exploding, successfully attacked behind the enemy's lines trucks aflame and a series of secondary .ex- throughout Burma. The analogous figures for plosions. They may be reckoned as having the whole period covered by this despatch may inflicted greater material injury upon the enemy conservatively be assessed, on the basis of vis- than a numerical comparison between the ible evidence, at 3846 M.T. vehicles. numbers of locomotives damaged by day and by night would suggest. 93. One operation in tactical support of the Fourteenth Army is worthy of special mention, 97. Concurrently with attacks upon locomo- namely the achievement of a Hurricane IID tives, key points in the Burmese railway system, squadron, firing rocket projectiles, which on such as the junctions at Thazi and Pyinmana, February 19th—in the course of a single day— were bombed, mainly by Mitchells and Light- put out of action twelve tanks which the Japan- nings. But the main weight of attack con- ese were about to -throw into the battle for the fanued jo be directed (upon bridges, which bridgehead opposite Myinmu. These belonged were so numerous that it was impossible to to the single tank regiment of which provide anti-aircraft defences for more than the the Japanese forces in Burma were known to most important. The enemy pursued his estab- dispose, and it was a measure of the importance lished policy of erecting by-pass trestle bridges attached by the enemy to the outcome of the to serve as temporary substitutes for the per- struggle in the Myinmu bridgehead that he now manent structures wrecked or menaced by air sought to commit them in the field for the first attack. time since they had been withdrawn from the Imphal front in the previous June. They were, 98. In all, about three hundred bridges were however, destroyed before they came within ' put out of commission by medium, light and range of infantry weapons, their destruction fighter bombers ; of this total, one hundred and being shortly afterwards verified by advancing twelve were railway bridges. So great, how- Allied troops who inspected their remainsj ever, was the success of the bridge destruction policy, that in connection with the unexpectedly 94. Somewhat different in character from the rapid advance of the Fourteenth Army it pro- harassing of Japanese road communication was voked the query whether we were not destroy- the interdiction of the railways used by the ing our own future land line of communication enemy in supplying his troops in Burma. in advance, and agreement was reached by Already, before the opening of the period cov- which, from February onwards, the indis- ered by this despatch, the operation of ground- criminate destruction of bridges was abandoned attack fighter aircraft over these lines had in favour of a policy of keeping specified become a difficult and expensive undertaking. major bridges unserviceable. When, in course Trains had practically ceased to run by day, of time, the sites were occupied by Allied SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 1979

troops, Bailey bridge sections flown in by confirmed, when two prisoners of war agreed transport aircraft were available to mend the that they had been most terrifying, and stated broken thoroughfare. that one bomb had destroyed thirty-four motor 99. Attacks on watercraft in Burma were vehicles parked under shelter, and that another pressed home by ground-attack fighters of all had landed in a trench in which some thirty types throughout the campaign, particularly Japanese were sheltering, killing all the along the Irrawaddy, always an important occupants. Japanese line of communication, and also on the Arakan coast and the waterways of south- west Burma, though, as along the land routes Tactical Support of 15 Corps. so on the waterways, the enemy moved mainly by night. A rough estimate of the total number 102. Tactical support of 15 Corps followed of inland or coastal watercraft in enemy use lines closely parallel to those on which air successfully attacked is 11,822 of which 302 support was furnished to the Fourteenth Army. were power-driven units. Towards the end There were, however, certain special charac- of the campaign, the Irrawaddy tended to teristics which deserve mention. After the become less a line of communication for the initial advance down the Kaladan Valley, the Japanese than a hindrance to their lateral major forward moves of the ground forces mobility, so that boats collected for ferrying were marked not by overland offensives leading rather than supply craft provided the main to a break-through by mechanised formations, targets. At the same time, air reconnaissance but iby a series of amphibious landings at half- and attack was maintained at a high rate over a-dozen points on the coast. Of the three the Bassein-Henzada district in order to dis- island landings, those on Akyab and Cheduba courage the enemy division located there from were completely unopposed, while that on moving eastwards to reinforce the main battle- Ramree met only with slight opposition; few front in central Burma. In the course of April, or no targets presented themselves and the air the motor launches supplying this garrison support on these occasions was therefore akin (formation were successfully attacked on a to a peace-time exercise. The mainland land- number of occasions, notably on the 25th, ings each achieved tactical surprise, but were when their hiding-place south-west of Rangoon all followed shortly by bitter fighting when the was located and bombed and strafed with enemy entrenched himself in characteristic rocket projectiles by a mixed force of twenty- fashion and attempted to prevent the exploita- seven Beaufighters and Mosquitos. tion of the initial landing. Fierce battles then developed on the same general pattern as those 100. A word must be added in connexion for the Irrawaddy bridgeheads. with the patrols flown by Beaufighters to inter- cept enemy shipping in the Gulf of Martaban. 103. Two developments confined to opera- Owing to the reduction through air attack of the tions by 224 Group deserve mention. The first carrying capacity of the overland routes of was the use of Spitfires in the fighter-bomber entry into Burma, the Japanese had increasing role. The second was the employment .from resort during 1944 to the shipment of goods February onwards, of airborne Visual Control northwards along the Tenasserim coast and Posts, whose success was undoubted. From a thence westwards across the Gulf of Martaban light aircraft they were able to discern targets to Rangoon, employing for this a number of in the coastal jungle that were well concealed coasters of wooden construction eighty to one from ground observation, and so to pass hundred and twenty feet in length. A daily directions to the aircraft waiting to attack. patrol was maintained by Beaufighters, whose Two of these teams were operating by the end base at Chiringa lay not far short of five of the campaign. hundred miles distant from the Gulf at its nearest point, and resulted in the sinking of 104. Indirect support of 15 Corps centred twenty-eight coasters, many of which were largely around the maintenance of air attacks destroyed at dawn or dusk soon before ships upon the long supply line on which the reached or after they had left the nooks in Japanese depended for the- existence of their which they hid during the day. troops in Arakan. Its forward end among the coastal waterways and along the parallel road 101. Attacks by all types of aircraft likewise southwards to Taungup was covered by ground- continued, throughout the campaign, to be attack fighters of all types, while the eastward directed against enemy bivouac and barrack track from An to Minbu—whose existence had areas and against storage points from small been established by Beaufighters on recon- stacks of petrol drums near the front line to naissance—and the mountain road from the great dumps north of Rangoon mentioned Taungup to the railhead at Prome, also yielded elsewhere in this despatch. Despite the un- valuable targets. Stress was laid by the army doubted accuracy of operations against this in March and April, 1945, upon the need for type of target, more particularly by Lightnings, maintaining a continuous interdiction of the Mosquitos and Mitchells, difficulties of terrain latter road by cratering its surface or pre- often forbade the assessment of results, even cipitating landslides by bombing, even at the with the aid of photographs, and in default of cost of denying ourselves the future use of the subsequent occupation of the target area a much needed supplementary land line of by our own troops it has often only been a communication to the Irrawaddy valley, and reference in a Japanese diary or an intelligence fighter-bombers and also heavy bombers of report which has arrived weeks or even months the Strategic Air Force were accordingly later which served to clinch the evidence of diverted to this purpose. Targets along the success. To take one instance out of many, Prome-Rangoon railway were attacked as it was not until several weeks after the event elsewhere in central Burma; in this, the that the full success of the heavy raids of destruction of its bridges by Lightnings of the 8th February on targets at Yenangyaung was 459th Squadron in February was especially 1980 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 notable. The stores areas at Taungup and (109. The factors of climate, topography and Prome were watched and bombed from tune the occupation of large areas of China com- to time. bined to make the Japanese grip on Burma one which, it was early realised, the Allies would have great difficulty in prising loose. Tactical Support of the Northern Combat Area Notwithstanding his seemingly inviolable front, Command. the enemy possessed an Achilles' heel in his poverty of natural resources and his consequent 105. On the north-eastern sector of the front, dependence on seas that he has never actually direct air support to Special Force and later to controlled. A high percentage of everything Thirty-six Division together with the Chinese upon which his industry thrives must cross the divisions and the American Mars Task Force sea in crude form to be processed in the home- further to the east, was provided by the P.47s., land ; thence it must recross the seas to arrive P.38s. "and also by the B.25s. of the Tenth at the fighting line. From Japan to Burma U.S.A.A.F. The general principles of army/ the sea lanes stretch for some 4,000 miles, of air force co-operation were as on other sectors which more and more were open to attack by of the front, the Visual Control Post being Allied bombers as strength, experience and air known as the " air party ". There were, how- bases developed. The railways which carried ever, two directions in which the technique his supplies thence to the front were at the of close air support as practised by the Tenth mercy of Allied bombers to an even greater U.S.A.A.F. was more advanced than on the degree. 221 and 224 Group sectors. The first was in the more highly developed signals methods 110. Communications by sea were not dis- used in R/T communications between the " air puted during 1942 and much of 1943. It was party" on the one hand and the attacking simple to follow the normal channels of com- aircraft and also the light aircraft—L.5s.— merce to the ports of Siam and Malaya in the used for observation on the other. east, Singapore in the south, and Mergui, Tavoy, Ye, Moulmein and Rangoon in the 106. The second lay in the special use made west. But Japan herself had proved by the in' the N.C.A.C. area of photography foi sinking of the "Prince of Wales" and tactical operations. Photographs of all sorts " Repulse " that control of the sea demands were used—low level verticals, reconnaissance control of the air above the sea. In her early strips, obliques and pin point shots. A simple victory lay the seeds of her own defeat, for method was worked out by which a common Allied aircraft disputed with her, and won, photograph grid was accepted by both ground control of the air over all her lines of com- and air forces for marking photographs; this munication in Burma and Siam. was all the more necessary in that the country through which the N.C.A.C. forces were 111. From the nodal ports, the railways of advancing consisted of an expanse of jungle- Burma and Siam constitute a system of strate- clad hills with few natural features by gically connected lines with a total length of reference to which a target could be simply approximately 5,000 miles. From Phnom identified. The effectiveness of close , air Penh, north-west of Saigon, the railway goes support was acknowledged by the ground forces west and north-west through Bangkok, Pegu in this sector no less than elsewhere, despite and Mandalay, where it forks into two lines the considerable obstacles offered by the wild terminating at Lashio and Myitkyina with terrain to .an exact collaboration. branches to Rangoon, Bassein, Kyauk- padaung, Myingyan and Ye-U. (The tactical 107. It was no doubt in part the very suc- importance of all these railheads was reinforced cess of air support operations in the N.C.A.C. by their strategic positioning on the lines of area that led to their comparatively early supply. Their function was not only to feed cessation. The country through which the forward material from Japan, but to shuttle land forces advanced with a continually grow- within the occupied territories the natural re- ing momentum offered few or no sites for the sources whose employment would ease the load construction of forward landing-grounds, and on Japanese shipping—rice, tungsten, oil, tin the leading army units tended more and more and rubber. It has been estimated that at to draw away from the available air bases least 50 per cent, of the Japanese Army's as a consequence. Enemy opposition also requirements in Burma were produced locally. dwindled, and, from the end of March onwards, contact was lost with the Japanese. Thence- forward, the air effort was thus inevitably 112. In JuAe, 1944, the Strategic Air Force restricted to long-range attacks upon the underwent changes in organisation and com- transport routes, supply centres and bivouac position that materially reduced its strength points along the enemy line of retreat through and effectiveness during the monsoon months. the Shan States southwards into Siam. The Twelfth Bombardment Group, comprising four squadrons of Mitchells, was transferred to Third Tactical Air Force, a step for which. {PART SIX. Air Marshal Baldwin had long pressed, and the Seventh Bombardment Group of four STRATEGIC AIR FORCE. squadrons of Liberators was diverted to haul 108. Operations by heavy bombers in this petrol to China. This was considered more theatre were conditioned by the restricted remunerative employment for them than the nature of the targets available and by the conduct of bomber operations under active vulnerability of the all-important Japanese lines monsoon conditions. Strategic Air Force of communication. To understand the pattern therefore retained only its British component, of attack, and to assess its results, demands totalling three Liberator and two Wellington some knowledge of these circumstances, which squadrons, excluding the Special Duty and Air are discussed in some detail hereunder. • Sea Rescue element, dn consequence of the SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 1981 reduction in strength, and with the monsoon at the Pakchan river, housing the newly con- its height, a change in policy was necessary, structed port of Khao Huagang, was heavily and a new Operational Directive (No. 10) de- mined and the flow of coastal traffic seriously clared that objectives would be 'tactical targets disrupted. Similar operations against Bangkok, best calculated to assist Fourteenth Army; Goh Sichang and Tavoy followed. In October communications, shipping and railways, with a remarkably successful flight was carried out particular attention to the Martaban—Pegu, to the inner approaches of Penang harbour. Pegu—Mandalay and Bangkok—Nampang Fifteen Liberators each laid four 1,000 Ib. mines sections. " precisely in the positions ordered ", with no )113. In October, the Seventh Bombardment mishap or failure although the round trip was Group returned to Strategic Air Force, and in over three thousand miles. Such operations the following month, Nos. 99 and 215 Squad- continued throughout the campaign against all rons returned to the line having been re- ports and anchorages along the Tenasserim equipped from Wellingtons to Liberators. With Coast and from March onwards against those one more accession to its strength (No. 358 in the Gulf of Siam. Mining was the special Squadron formed within the Command and and exclusive province of No. 159 Squadron operating by January), Strategic Air Force R.A.F. who throughout the period laid the im- reached its full power for the vital six months pressive total of 1,953 mines at ranges which a to follow. Its operational function was accord- year before would have been considered im- ingly expanded from October onwards to in- possible. The following results were observed clude all the duties of strategic bombers, from reconnaissance: including mining, and the Force was ready for (i) Jap launch and passenger steamer sunk the decisive campaign which lay ahead. near Victoria Point (February). (ii) 3,000 ton tanker Kuisho Maru sunk at Bangkok (January), .114. Operations fell into well-defined cate- gories, the first of which was the effort against (Hi) 200 ft. M.V. sunk at Bangkok shipping and harbour installations ; the second, (March). and most important, was the interdiction of the overland supply routes into Southern Burma; (II) The Interdiction of the Southern Burma and the third the destruction of the enemy's Supply Routes. powers of resistance in Burma by disorganising 118. If the anti-shipping effort was intangible his internal communications, razing his dumps, in effect, that against railways was spectacular, and denying him the use of his airfields and and its results immediately apparent. By far military installations. the greatest attention was paid to the Bangkok- Moulmein railway on which an overall total of (I) Attacks against Shipping and Harbours. 2,700 tons of bombs were dropped. With the .115. Although the main weight of attack interdiction of nearly all alternative routes, this fell upon railways, some effort was directed railway was of paramount importance to the towards the furtive and well-camouflaged ship- Japanese to supply and maintain their forces ping which plied the coasts, seldom moving in Burma. Approximately two-thirds of the by day and never venturing far within the railway pursues a winding course in jungle hill- radius of action of strike aircraft. Such opera- covered country, and it is not suitable for low- tions were carried out with the purpose of level attack, in addition to providing first-rate deterring the enemy from committing his sup- concealment. But as the strength and efficacy plies to the perils of the sea rather than of of the bomber force grew and the Burma—Siam sinking the ships en route. It was a policy railway became more vital, techniques were of denial rather than of destruction. This developed for its neutralisation. No precise choice was necessary since shipping was never date can be given for the introduction of these frequent enough to justify intensive search for methods. A modus operandi was hammered it, and the most remunerative targets were out and in use before it became a doctrine, but therefore harbours, docks and port facilities. Of its broad principles were as follows: — these Mergui, Martaban, the new port of Khao (i) Bridges were the best targets because Huagang, and Bangkok were most often they were the most vulnerable and the most attacked, and considerable destruction achieved. difficult to repair. A typical intelligence report on a raid against (ii) The underlying motive was to isolate Bangkok in March, for example, was—" Con- segments of the line, and then to destroy at centrated and successful attack causing destruc- greater leisure the rolling stock and locomo- tion of forty per cent, of the storage units; tives stranded thereon. sixty Japs lolled". (iii) Diversity of attack was necessary to 116. Accepting that enemy shipping was hard confuse the enemy. to search out, Strategic Air Force had resort to the policy of hindering what it could not (iv) Close photographic reconnaissance was destroy. Mining was already proved by photo- maintained to detect any abnormal build-up graphic reconnaissance as being a profitable at sidings or stations which would repay method of delaying the passage of supplies, for attack. in harbours already mined there had been a 119. These principles were followed to such serious curtailment of Japanese shipping, and good effect that between January and April the such craft as continued to approach the har- average number of bridges unserviceable at one bours anchored outside so that cargoes had to time was 9.2 over the stretch of railway from be lightered ashore. Pegu to Bangkok. It has been estimated that 117. Thus from August onwards plans and this reduced the traffic from 700-800 tons to technique for very long-range mining were 100-200 tons a day, The value of the attacks developed and soon bore fruit. In September needs no further emphasis. (68741) B 1982 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951

120. Operations similar in concept but less lines. The effort for the preceding comparable in intensity were maintained against the period resulted in 34 tons of stores and 35 Bangkok—^Ghiengmai line, the Kra Isthmus bodies being parachuted in. railway, and the Bangkok—Singapore line. In 124. One of the major results of the great all cases, the enemy reacted by placing the effort involved was the prevention of the strongest A.A. defences he could muster along Japanese Fifteenth Army from taking any part such a dispersed network of lines, by rebuilding in the defence of Toungoo during our advance, and repairing bridges with beaver-like zeal, and and rendering unnecessary the major battle by constructing as many as four by-pass struc- which Fourteenth Army anticipated in front tures at one crossing to counter or anticipate of the town. Other guerillas killed up to our attack. seven hundred Japanese, including a General, in the Toungoo-Rangoon area alone. (Ill) Destruction of the Enemy's Powers of Resistance within Burma. 125. From 'the Air Force point of view, the great value of the Special Duty effort flown (121. To sever the external supply routes was by Strategic Air Force was the provision of not enough, for the enemy held at least six targets for the tactical Groups. During the months' reserves of supplies that were contained final fortnight of April almost 'the whole of. in vast dumps, mainly dispersed in the Rangoon the long-range Fighter-Bomber resources of area. Therefore, during March and April, No. 224 Group were employed on Force 136 systematic destruction was initiated on the targets. Troop trains were caught at rest and Rangoon Dumps in conjunction with XXth a pagoda reported as a petrol/ammunition Bomber Command. Their destruction was vital, dump blew up with a huge explosion. since with the stores contained therein the 126. Special Duty operations in -this theatre enemy might have been able to delay our ad- are of vital interest to the Air Forces in view vance and even halt it above Toungoo. The of the difficulty of locating targets without Dumps contained about 1,700 storage units well the help of informants. Thus the diversion of dispersed in revetments, and of these, photo- effort to secret work has not been grudged, graphic evidence alone showed 524 destroyed, and current developments, foreshadowed in and ground observers reported that well over the R.A.F. Airborne Commando, will make 50 per cent, destruction was achieved. the information supplied by operators 122. The attacks on Japanese Headquarters behind the lines of even greater value. and concentration areas can be illustrated by It is emphasised that parties should a strike on 29th March against the Japanese be thoroughly briefed in the limitations Burma Area Army Headquarters located in and potentialities of air strikes and that Rangoon. Reports indicate that four hundred they should develop a speedy and accurate Japanese, with a high proportion of officers, method of reporting if a full harvest is to be were killed. News of the attack spread to the reaped from the information whose garner- Allied prisoners in Rangoon, and was the ing depends so much upon the operations cause of considerable encouragement to them. of our S.D. squadrons. The enemy's evacuation of the city a month later is much more understandable in the light of these attacks, which made Rangoon such a dangerous area even before ground forces were within striking distance. Mandalay had PART SEVEN. already suffered such attacks, notably one in PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE. January when it was reported by agents that 127. At the opening of the period, photo- six hundred Japanese were killed. The part graphic reconnaissance was carried out mainly played by such air blows in persuading the by the aircraft of the Photographic Recon- enemy to abandon his strategic positions earlier naissance Force commanded by Group Captain than anticipated must surely have been great. S. G. Wise, D.F.C. These included the Spit- fires, Mosquitos and Mitchells of 681 and 684 Squadrons, R.A.F., operating from Alipore, and the Mustangs, Mitchells and Liberators of " Special Operations." three U.S.A.A.F. squadrons, the last of which 123. Air operations in connection with specialised in mapping. A fourth U.S.A.A.F. intelligence and guerilla raising activities in squadron flying Lightnings, began to operate this theatre have increased greatly during the in September. past year. From a strength of two squadrons ,128. The dense cloud banks habitually totalling 15 U.E. aircraft hi June, 1944, shrouding the operational area of South East resources were increased by the end of April, Asia during the period of the monsoon inter- 1945, to three squadrons and one flight totalling fered greatly with photographic reconnaissance, 61 U.E. aircraft. The dividend that has been but advantage was taken of the northward paid definitely justified the effort involved. passage of the monsoon in August to procure From a handful of informants supplying skimpy the first large-scale and survey cover of information at great risk, the organisations northern Sumatra by Mosquitos detached to grew, by the end of the campaign, into a operate from Ceylon. Other detachments were powerful force capable of exerting a consider- later sent eastwards to operate with the for- able influence on the course of the battle, ward tactical air force headquarters from and the air effort to support them reached Tingawk Sakan (where at the beginning of a total of 372 sorties in the lunar month September an American tactical reconnaissance 18th April to 17th May. Between November, squadron was placed under the P.R. Force), 1944, and May, 1945, over 1,350 sorties were Imphal, Comilla and Chittagong in preparation flown, in which 2,100 tons of stores and 1,000 for the forthcoming campaign, and these were liaison officers were dropped behind the enemy later reinforced and moved forward in step SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 1983 with the ground forces. From the beginning responsible, for instance, for all the workaday of September onwards, a considerable measure survey and mapping required by the Fourteenth of decentralisation in the planning and conduct Army. As the Officer Commanding, No. 11 of operations was introduced, with the purpose Indian Air Survey Liaison Section, R.E., of giving squadron commanders more latitude reported in February, 1945, 684 Squadron, in the allotment of sorties. R.A.F. alone had achieved, in twelve months, 129. With the return of fair-weather con- three-quarters of the basic cover for the whole ditions in October, the effort of the photo- campaign and 1/30,000 cover for maps, photo- graphic reconnaissance squadrons rose to its maps and artillery block plots over the battle former level, and during this month the daily lines from Dimapur nearly to Rangoon and average of sorties represented over a third of Moulmein. The work of photographic recon- the total aircraft available in the whole force. naissance in general in this theatre has, of The methodical cover of enemy airfields, com-' course, been of all the greater importance owing munications and other targets was resumed, to the comparatively meagre intelligence avail- survey photographs being supplied as required able from ground sources; for air force pur- by Headquarters Air Command, and Head- poses alone it provided an indispensable factor quarters Allied Land Forces, South East Asia. in the maintenance of Allied air superiority by In proportion with the increased flying, the providing speedy evidence of the location of photographic work of the photo sections of the enemy aircraft, while the work of the Strategic P.R. Force was expanded, nearly 354,000 Air Force would have been unprofitable with- prints being produced during January, 1945, out the coverage of targets it furnished. the peak month. Technical photographic developments included the introduction of the moving film camera on operational sorties, and the fitting into Mosquito aircraft of forward PART EIGHT. facing oblique cameras. The latter were first used on 14th February, when a set of stereo- GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE. scopic pairs covering the Bunna-Siam railway was thereby secured. 133. As the period under review opened, a deal of uncertainty existed as to whether the 130. An exceptionally valuable photographic Indian Ocean U-boat warfare would be inten- reconnaissance of the Burma rice areas was sified by the arrival of long-range German carried out by Squadron Leader C. Fox during U-boats. Such a possibility was not im- 1944. The results shown by an analysis of probable, and had the contemplated threat the pictures were subsequently checked up on materialised then, all General Reconnaissance the ground, and were found to be correct air power in this theatre would have been within 5 per cent. harnessed under the co-ordinating and super- 131. The main hindrances to the operations vising control of IOGROPS.* of the P.R. Force continued, even in the 134. The period from June to August wit- campaigning season, to be factors inseparable nessed a decided increase in enemy U-boat from flying in the tropics rather than the oppo- warfare, although at no time can it be said sition of the enemy, which remained slighter that the threat reached alarming proportions. than was usual in other theatres of war. During these three months the enemy (operat- Successful cover of the waterfront at Akyab, ing with considerable wariness) sank thirteen for instance, was secured in November, 1944, ships of the medium-sized merchant vessel by two Spitfires flying at from 50 to 200 feet, class, and, in turn, suffered the loss of one at neither of which a shot was fired. But submarine as a result of a combined attack by the lengthening range of Mosquito sorties aircraft and Naval Force 66. month by month bore witness to the mastery 135. In July, a concentration of enemy units of climate and terrain. It was in December, in and around the shipping lanes to the east 1944, that the first cover of Puket Island was of the Maldives—resulting in the loss of five obtained, in the course of a flight involving ships—portended a possible menace. In this a round trip of 2,100 miles, which marked the connection it is worthy of comment that furthest penetration to be made in this area. Catalina aircraft employed on rescue searches This record was, however, eclipsed by another co-operated in the location and eventual rescue aircraft which in January flew 2,431 air miles of 244 survivors. in eight hours and 20 minutes to cover Moulrnein and the railway from Bangkok to 136. Having regard to the amount of ship- Phnom Penh. Finally on 22nd March a ping in the Indian Ocean, and the fact that Mosquito XVI broke the long distance record during August there were possibly five German for this type of aircraft in any theatre of war units operating in these waters, the enemy's with a flight of 2,493 air miles in eight hours achievements might be considered singularly forty-five minutes, covering the Bangkok- paltry. This is a tribute to the constant vigi- lance of General Reconnaissance aircraft in Singapore railway to a point south of the the flying of anti-U-boat sweeps and patrols. Malayan frontier. It was thus that the Such a policy might not have produced many Mosquito made amends for the structural sightings and kills—a consideration of the defect which had seriously curtailed its use immense expanses of ocean to be guarded will during November and December, 1944. clearly show the difficulty of locating enemy 132. The work of the P.R. Force was co- units—but it kept U-boats submerged and out ordinated at one end with the short-range of range of our shipping. photography of the tactical reconnaissance 137. With September came a falling-off in squadrons, while at the other end, long dis- U-boat operations, and this was continued tance survey work over Malaya was undertaken during October and November. A slight in- by the Superfortresses of XXth Bomber Command, U.S.A.A.F. The P.R. Force was * Indian Ocean G.R. Operations. 1984 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951

crease during November was considered as a theatre where the scene of operations might be parting shot of little weight and trifling import- constantly and rapidly changing (with a conse- ance. As an explanation of this it is reasonable quent paucity of adequate land-bases) then to assume that American aggressiveness in the a mobile flying boat base would be an invalu- China Seas and the Pacific was absorbing the able asset. If this situation did not develop, attention of Japan, as was the European war then the inherent mobility of such a unit could the attention of Germany. Thus the expected be usefully adapted to the requirements of Air threat did not develop but rather declined, and Sea Rescue and Transport operations, where, as a consequence the need for an over-all as always, the lack of immediate land-bases centralised control as vested in the organisation establishes a major problem. of IOGROPS diminished with the declining U- boat threat. 143. The period closed on an encouraging note. General Reconnaissance had already struck a worthwhile blow at enemy shipping, and plans were in hand for an intensifying Offensive General Reconnaissance. of these operations in the months to come. In 138. The second half of the twelve months considering the strategic plan of anti-shipping under review opened with No. 222 Group "still sorties, mention should be made of the invalu- 'being primarily concerned in supplementing the able contribution of those General Recon- hunting and striking .powers of the East Indies naissance Liberator and Mosquito aircraft Fleet in -anti-U-boat warfare. But it was be- based on Ceylon, in their day and night photo- coming apparent 'that the U-boat threat no graphic reconnaissance over the Andamans, longer existed. Therefore, in the due con- Nicobar Islands, Northern Sumatra and parts of sideration of alternative employment was con- Malaya. Meteorological flights were also flown ceived the undertaking of an offensive role. The regularly, and materially assisted weather fore- mining of enemy waters in the Malacca Straits casts for aircraft flying over vast expanses of and the Chumphorn, Singora, Padang, Singa- water. pore areas; anti-shipping operations to deny the waters of the Andaman Sea to enemy ship- ping—this was to be the future employment of General Reconnaissance aircraft. 139. Mining operations were the first to PART NINE commence, on the 21st January. From that ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER date until 3rd May, 1945, 833 mines have been ASPECTS carried to enemy waters by No. 160 Squadron, the high percentage of 86.9 being successfully (I) Administration. laid. The success of these operations, although 144. Administrative development of Air not immediately apparent, will be revealed with Command, South East Asia, during the year the broadening of the operational scene in this was dictated by the following factors: — theatre. i(i) The move of Command Headquarters 140. Only a short period of training was ito Kandy. necessary to prepare No. 354 Squadron for its new assignment of low-level anti-shipping (ii) The need for identifying group ad- strikes, which were commenced early in Febru- ministrative areas inside India with the ary. A second Liberator squadron—No. 203— geographical boundaries of the Indian Army began to augment the anti-shipping effort in Command. March. A statistical summary of the material (iii) The traditional problem of adminis- damage inflicted as a result of these operations tering units spread over vast areas with in- proves that these two squadrons played no sufficient resources. small part in complicating the enemy's acute (iv) The desirability of removing from problem of shipping shortage. operational formations extraneous adminis- trative burdens. (v) The necessity for providing operational The Development and Control of Offensive units with greater mobility. General Reconnaissance. (vi) The planning of the administrative 141. The last four months had seen General network to sustain and control units advan- Reconnaissance changing the nature of its cing into Burma. operational function with deftness and adapt- (yii) The formation of new units in antici- ability. The reinforcement and development of pation of future operations, while hardly this new offensive role was envisaged during meeting present commitments with existing March, when No. 346 Wing was formed at resources in manpower and material. Akyab, to provide escort for " forward area " ((viii) The development on an unpre- convoys and to make easily available a strik- cedented scale of air supply for the Allied ing force against enemy shipping off the Arakan forces advancing into Burma. and Burmese Coasts. 142. One squadron of Sunderland aircraft 145. The primary British interests in South •based on the depot ship S.S. " Manela " consti- East Asia were the re-conquest of Burma, the tuted a significant part of 346 Wing. This Federated Malay States and Singapore, the vessel ultimately proceeded from Colombo to Netherland East Indies, Thailand and French Rangoon via Akyab, and her advent to these Indo-China. British air responsibilities in South waters was an important milestone in offensive East Asia also included the ah* defence of General Reconnaissance. Should a situation India and of Allied shipping hi the Indian develop wherein it was necessary to conduct 'Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Ben- anti-shipping and similar operations in a gal. With these somewhat diverse objectives SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 1985 and geographical vagaries in mind it was essen- control and policy, he considered, must in the tial to evolve an administration covering Royal first instance, be held firmly at Air Command Air Force commitments which would effectively in order to effect perfect co-ordination with the meet the situation in South East Asia. Air Commander-in-Chief and the operational ,146! The extensive re-organizations which branches at Kandy. Beside, the geographic took place during 1944-45 were effected against factor was an important consideration, for Delhi a background of strict and cumbrous control of was fifteen hundred miles from Kandy. expenditure by the Government of India, and 151. A new scheme which would more effec- of dependence upon India through the organiza- tively meet the situation once re-organisation tion known as the War Projects Co-ordination was established and yet ensure the retention and Administrative Committee for the provi- of higher administrative control at Air Com- sion of resources. There was, too, a crippling mand, was brought up for consideration during shortage of manpower in precisely those trades the visit of Air Vice-Marshal Goddard to which make for good administration—non-fly- London in July, 1944. This revised project ing officers (notably signals and maintenance was, in the main, largely adopted when,* at the staffs), clerks G/D., equipment assistants, cooks beginning of October, Headquarters Air Com- and the like. Moreover, the growing body of mand moved to Kandy and Headquarters Base Air Command continually bumped its head Air Forces was formed at New Delhi. against the Command manpower ceiling. It 152. The essence of the new arrangement is not intended to infer that the R.A.F. in lay in the retention at New Delhi of an admin- South East Asia was badly served in relation istrative staff competent to deal with all ques- to other commands, for it was well under- tions, save the important policy matters, direct stood that the allocation of manpower had to with the analogous departments of General be assessed in relation to theatre requirements. Headquarters, India, and the Government of Nevertheless, it was considered that perhaps India. This ensured adequate Air Force the incidence of and the remedies for the grow- representation at the centre of political power ing pains experienced were not fully recognised in India and, at the same time, avoided the at home. creation of a duplicate headquarters under Ak Command for which neither the men nor the means were to hand. The administrative ser- The Move of Headquarters, Air Command, to vices, whose heads remained in Delhi were, Ceylon. nevertheless, represented at Kandy by re- sponsible and independent skeleton staffs under 147. The move of the Command Head- a senior officer competent to inform and advise quarters to Kandy was compelled by the in- on his own specialist topic as required, so that sistence of the Supreme Allied Commander that broad policy might properly be formulated at his Commanders-in-Chief should work beside the Headquarters of Air Command. him. It was, however, rendered the more 153. During October and November, 1944, acceptable to Air Command on account of the there persisted a considerable amount of uncer- growing need for divorcing operational and tainty as to the basis on which the administra- higher administrative control from the exten- tive machinery would ultimately rest. For sive and complicated negotiations necessary instance, as matters of high policy were decided with the Government of India and with G.H.Q., at Kandy, it was decided by the Air India, relative to administrative services, which Commander-in-Chief that he must have by his had tended to hamper the primary tasks of the side the head of the service primarily con- Allied Air Commander-in-Chief. cerned. This applied successively to the 148. The institution of H.Q. Base Air Forces Principal Medical Officer, the Command at New Delhi, had, therefore, many advantages. Accountant, the Command Welfare Officer and It liberated the Air Commander-in-Chief and the Command Catering Officer, and finally to his staff from direct day to day responsibilities the Air Officer in charge of Training. for developing India as a base, and thus 154. The situation was finally crystallised enabled him to address his attention more and clarified in October, when a re vised'direc- closely to the general problems of planning tive was issued to the Air Marshal Command- and policy control. ing Base Air Forces. For all day to day 149. Before Base Air Forces was established matters affecting administrative services, the and re-organisation was under consideration, it heads of those services were solely responsible was generally supposed that a vertical split to the Air Marshal Commanding Base Air between the Air Staff and Administrative Forces. But when matters of administrative Branches offered the best solution to a com- policy affecting the Command as a whole arose, plex problem. This meant that operations then the heads of the administrative services sections of the staff would move with the Air were responsible to the Allied Air Commander- Commander-in-Chief- to Kandy while the in-Chief through the Air Officer (Administra- administrative sections remained at New Delhi.- tion) (A.O.A.), Headquarters, Air Command. It was intended that administrative representa- Similarly, when matters of new Command tion at Kandy should be effected by the pro- policy came under discussion and the agree- vision of small cells or projections of the ment of the Government of India was required, administrative branches concerned, which the heads of the administrative services con- would work in an advisory and liaison capacity. cerned were empowered by the Air Com- This at the time, was broadly the view of Air mander-in-Chief, through the A.OA. Air Com- Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse. mand, to deal with their opposite numbers in 150. Difficulties ahead if such an administra- G.H.Q. India, on behalf of the Air C.-in-C. tive set-up was adopted at New Delhi as 155. As a corollary to this arrangement, the suggested, were foreseen by Air Vice-Marshal staff officers under the A.O.A., Air Command at Goddard. The reins of higher administrative Kandy were not established as mere liaison (68741) C 1986 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 officers. Their allegiance and responsibility would have meant that the Air Marshal Com- was towards the A.O.A. Air Command, who manding, Third Tactical Air Force, would looked to them for staff work, for records and have been administratively subordinated to the for facts. They were not, however, his the Ak Vice-Marshal, A.O.C. Bengal. advisers in the formulation of new policy— 159. It was therefore decided to propose these continued to be the heads of the services the disbandment of Headquarters, Third in New Delhi, who might if they wished send Tactical Air Force. For such a course their own staff officers from Delhi or come there were other good reasons outside themselves to make representations to the the administrative sphere—operationally, the A.O.A., Air Command, on matters of Com- title was now a misnomer, since in June, 1944, mand policy external to the responsibility of the Tenth U.S.A.A.F. had been reconstituted the Air Marshal Commanding, Base Air Forces. as an independent formation under Eastern This was not a normal system. But the separa- Air Command, and the Headquarters of the tion of -the Supreme Allied Commander and the Fourteenth Army was due after -the opening Headquarters of his Commanders-in-Chief from of the new campaign to move forward to the seat of the Government of India and duality Imphal, where Headquarters, No. 221 Group of channels to the United Kingdom Govern- had long been established, leaving XV Corps ment—either through the Government of India in 'the Arakan to operate independently under or direct—constituted an abnormal situation. the G.O.C.-in-C., Allied Land Forces. 156. The value and effectiveness of the base Authority for the disbandment of Head- organisation thus created was endorsed by the quarters, Third Tactical Air Force was given Air Member for Supply and Organisation in October, 1944. (A.M.S.O.) during his visit in February, 1945. 160. The disbandment of Third T.A.F. Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Courtney involved also the expansion of Headquarters, was impressed by the extent of the negotiations No. 221 Group and the allotment to Eastern which were necessary in New Delhi with the Air Command of direct operational control of numerous organisations concerned with the all its subordinate operational formations. The conduct of the war from India, He counselled date of this further re-organisation was timed a progressive decentralisation of functions to to synchronize with the move of Headquarters, Base Air Forces and its gradual endowment Fourteenth Army to Imphal beside Head- with a greater measure of autonomy ; .this was quarters, No. 221 Group, and the establish- of course in keeping with the original scheme ment of Advanced Headquarters, Allied Land and was accordingly pursued* Forces, alongside Eastern Air Command at Calcutta. This move took place on 4th December when the Air Marshal Commanding, Third Tactical Air Force, became Deputy Air Disbandment of Third Tactical Air Force and Commander, Eastern Air Command and Air Formation of H.Q., R.A.F., Bengal-Burma. Marshal Commanding, R.A.F., 'Bengal-Burma. .157. Eastern Air Command, from its forma- 161. Headquarters, R.A.F., iBengal-Burma tion in December, 1943, onwards, was an ex- was the name given to the administrative clusively operational Headquarters with no formation now brought into existence to com- administrative responsibilities. When its Head- bine the functions of R.A.F. Bengal and the quarters moved to Calcutta in March, 1944, administrative responsibilities previously administrative services for the area of Eastern wielded by Third T.A.F. Geographically, its (Army) Command were being provided by responsibilities covered both the base area of Headquarters No. 231 Group, and this Head- Bengal and the more easterly marches, bit by quarters also administered the R.A.F. element bit being extended into Burma with the of Eastern Air Command. But it was clearly advance of the Fourteenth Army. The military anomalous that a Bomber Group engaged in suzerain of the former was G.H.Q., India, and active operations should continue to be saddled of the latter, Headquarters Allied Land Forces. with the wide responsibilities for administra- Headquarters, Bengal-Burma was accordingly tion which were of no concern to the Strategic built up on a dual basis commensurate with Air Force* the existence of two sets of army authorities 158. This, and other considerations pointing with .which it would have to deal, and also towards a re-organisation of the groups in with an eye to future development whenever India, was discussed with the A.M.S.O. in the reconquest of Burma should compel it. August, 1944. The logical course would have This stage was reached in. February, 1945, been to confer administrative responsibilities when it became possible to carry out the upon the R.A.F. (Element of Eastern Air Com- anticipated divorce between Bengal and Burma mand and to form a new Group Headquarters components of the Air Marshal Commanding's under it to exercise them. But owing to the province. R.A.F. Bengal was then expanded manpower shortage it was impossible to create into Headquarters, No. 228 Group and a new headquarters altogether distinct from returned to Base Air Forces, though the filling Headquarters, Eastern Air Command, and it of its establishments proved a slow process. was therefore agreed that H.Q. No. 231 Group should give up its extraneous administrative responsibilities, and that the administrative staff so released should be reconstituted as Air Administrative and Training Groups. Headquarters, Bengal. At the same time, the 162. In order to ensure better co-ordina- Deputy Air Commander, Eastern Air Com- tion of administrative services, to facilitate mand, was to become Air Officer Commanding, combined •training, and to ensure close liaison Bengal, with administrative responsibilities on internal security measures, the groups in extending eastwards as far as the Brahmaputra. India underwent a rationalization of their areas They could not be further extended, since this 'to coincide with those of the army formations. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 1987

This measure was brought to its logical con- 167. In June, 1944, the establishment and clusion by the formation of No. 228 Group strength of the Command for ground British in February, 1945, to provide functional and/ personnel were as follows: — or administrative control of all units of Base Establish- Strength Shortage Air Forces within the area of Eastern (Army) ment Command, and to provide R.A.F. administrative services within that area. As Eastern, (Army) Officers ... 6,277 5,170 1,107 Command extends its boundaries to the Burma Other tanks ... 88,636 80,967 7,669 frontier, the area of responsibility of No. 228 Group will expand. R.A.F. India is thus split 94,913 86,137 8,776 up between four administrative and training groups. The deficiency of 18 per cent, in ground officers was concentrated principally in such important branches as Admin. G., Tech. (E), Code and Cypher and the like. The airman Introduction of Wing H.Q. and Servicing deficiency of 9 per cent, more seriously affected Echelon Organisation. the clerical trades. 168. By May, 1945, the position had 163. In the Far East more than in the changed, but not improved, as the following metropolitan air force, the administrative figures and illustrations will show: — problems confronting junior operational com- manders are such as to hinder them in the Establish- Strength Shortage performance of their primary tasks. In recog- ment or nition of this and to improve the mobility and Surplus flexibility of the wing organisation, it was Officers ... 8,103 7,573 530 decided to introduce the principle of wing Shortage headquarters and servicing echelons for single- Other ranks ... 105,470 110,459 4,989 engined and light twin-engined aircraft. The Surplus scheme came into effect by the end of Sep- tember, 1944, with the wing headquarters based Total 113,573 118,032 4,459 on certain major airfields, and the servicing Surplus echelons became responsible for the upkeep of the squadron aircraft. The squadrons were 169. The 6£ per cent, deficiency in ground thereby relieved of the responsibility for their officers affects principally the following own administration and most of their first-line branches, Admin., Code and Cyphers, Tech. maintenance. (E), Catering, etc. The shortages in the 164. In anticipation of a more mobile kind Technical Branch have caused particular of warfare, it became necessary in December, difficulty. The overall 5 per cent, surplus in 1944, to remove the geographical restriction airmen does not give a true picture of the implied by naming the wing according to its situation, for there are very serious deficiencies current location. The wings were accordingly in clerical and domestic personnel which are given numbers, and their attitude to mobility hampering the development of the Command. thus greatly enhanced, as evidenced by the Clerks G/D are below establishment by no advance of No. 906 Wing from Imphal to less than 36 per cent., Equipment Assistants by Rangoon in six months, in a series of well- 29 per cent, and Cooks by 28 per cent. The organized moves. The scheme has been surplus was concentrated in the technical successful, and its principle has been extended trades and amounted to 7.100. Such a surplus to other squadrons in order to centralize control was more of a liability than an asset, since it of resources and administration and to created additional work for the already over- economise in overheads. burdened administrative and domestic per- sonnel and could not be used to offset the -165. Perhaps one factor has marred full shortages elsewhere. advantage being taken of the inherent mobility and flexibility which the organisation would 170. Since February, 1945, very strenuous afford. The provision of more servicing efforts have been made to disband redundant echelons than squadrons would allow of peak units and prune such establishments as can periods of operational effort at very short conceivably be reduced. The diminishing air notice from advance airfields, for an additional threat to the east coast of India and Ceylon servicing echelon could be flown in to supple- has made it possible to thin out the early warn- ment the existing maintenance personnel. This ing Radar system, and considerable economies lesson was learned at Akyab where the provi- have been effected. Much has been done to dential presence of a servicing commando distribute the shortages where they could more allowed of a much higher rate of effort from easily be borne, and it was Command policy the island during the early days of the occupa- to make the strongest where it was most tion than would otherwise have been possible. effective, that was nearest to the enemy.

Conclusion. The Manpower Situation. 171. The administrative network covering 166. The Command has been continually the vastness of India is now as complete and hampered by an ill-balanced allotment of man- rational as present resources allow. It cannot power, whereby shortages have been concen- be said, however, that the administrative trated in certain vital trades, rendering the problems of the Command are now solved. As administrative machine extremely difficult to the armies advance, the area to be controlled operate efficiently. grows, and the net is in many places thin.. 1988 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951

This is particularly so in those areas vacated by the site. Surface movement back to India the advancing tactical groups, and extra pro- was restricted to a minimum, since damage to vision must continually be made to administer an aircraft during transit in this part of the those formations left in the backwash of the world is normally so great that it is beyond advance. It has even been necessary to graft economical repair on arrival at its destination. additional administrative responsibilities on to On occasions, damaged fighter aircraft were the air supply group in the forward areas dismantled and flown back to India, the (No. 232), for lack of personnel to set up the servicing .personnel becoming so expert that requisite administrative framework. The con- they were able to pack the whole of a fighter flicting factors of function and distance have aircraft and its components into one Dakota called for an organization far more complex fuselage. than would be the case in a more compact 174. Owing to the speed and intensity at theatre. For this the only solution is a realiza- which the campaign was being fought, and the tion at home that additional personnel and vital need to capture the strategic base of transport facilities to maintain India as a base, Rangoon before the onset of the monsoon, I and conduct an energetic campaign in Malaya decided that all the normal rates of effort must and beyond, must be allotted on a more be exceeded, and all our Air Force resources generous scale than previously. were thrown into the battle. During one month of 1945, no less than 700 aircraft passed through the Aircraft Storage Units and Reserve Aircraft Pools in order to provide (II) Maintenance. replacements for the 75 squadrons operating 172. The maintenance organisation in South east of Calcutta. During the early stages of East Asia embraces supply, servicing, repair the campaign, the small number of combat and salvage of all air force material in India, losses introduced a major maintenance com- Ceylon and Burma ; an area approximately the plication, since low wastage rates, giving air- size of Europe. It was realised at an early craft a long life, placed upon the repair stage that it was impossible to have the same organisation a storage commitment which had maintenance system operating throughout the not been foreseen. A further strain was Command, since the extensive topographical caused by severe deterioration owing to diversities encountered necessitated that the climatic conditions, such as to subject aircraft ultimate systems adopted be dictated by the to monsoon rains accompanied by sudden geography of the country. Broadly speaking, bursts of sunshine. This had an adverse effect therefore, one system applies in Ceylon and upon the timber, fabric, rubber and electrical India as far eastwards as the Brahmaputra, parts of aircraft. In the autumn of 1944, for and an entirely different one was evolved to instance, Mosquito aircraft had to be grounded operate throughout Assam and Burma. In as a result of such defects, until extensive re- the former area conditions are more or less pairs had been effected. static, the ground communications, although greatly inferior to those of Europe, are reason- 175. The maintenance organisation in the ably good with no considerable land or water forward areas consisted of the Repair and Sal- barriers. 'Here, a large and efficient base vage Units (R. and S.U.) supporting squadrons maintenance organisation has been built up at their airfields, and taking on all work which which provides adequate backing for the air the flying units could not complete within forty- forces far beyond the Brahmaputra; it is in eight hours. Air Stores Parks held sufficient this base area that the Base Repair Depots, stocks of spares and equipment for three Equipment Depots and Aircraft Storage Units months supply, and the Forward Repair Depots are to be found. In Assam and Burma, how- which were located far enough forward to ever, the situation bears a vastly different undertake major inspections and repairs beyond appearance, parsimonious communications R. & S.U. capacity. In addition Motor Trans- from Calcutta to the railhead at Dimapur and port Light Repair Depots were deployed in thence by road over the Naga and Chin Hills the forward areas, and the importance of their to Central Burma prohibited the use of a main- work can be measured by the fact that in traver- tenance organisation which was possible in sing the tortuous line of communication from England and which, to a limited degree, has Calcutta through Dimapur and Imphal to also been found possible in India. central Burma, mechanical transport vehicles had expended the major part of their useful 173. From the time of the siege of Imphal lives before reaching then* destination. Thus to the capture of Rangoon, air lift, the prin- a great deal of ingenuity and inventiveness on cipal means of supply to our combat Army and the part of M/T servicing personnel was neces- Air Force formations, was restricted to essen- sary in order to keep vehicles running, vehicles tial needs and could not be provided to support which in base areas would have been scrapped. avoidable maintenance at forward airfields. As a result, a policy was agreed of flying air- 176. The maintenance effort in Burma can craft back to India for comparatively simple best be summarized as a triumph of improvisa- servicing requirements such as periodical tion to overcome bad climate and worse ter- inspections and engine changes. This obviated rain, the paucity of spares, tools and equipment the necessity for flying spare engines and to which was designed for the European theatre some extent, equipment and spares, into the of war and not designed to be flown over, forward areas; at the same time it increased driven through or manhandled in the cruel the mobility of squadrons and reduced their country of Assam and Burma. The overload- maintenance personnel requirements. Aircraft ing of home production, and the overriding which crashed away from airfields' had need to finish off the western war first, were normally to be written off charge, while those adequate reasons for this situation, and the which . crashed on airfields, provided the maintenance effort during the period which cul- damage was not too great, were repaired on minated in the capture of Rangoon was very SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 1989

largely dissipated in a desperate struggle to vital arteries of South-East Asia Command keep the units of the maintenance organisation shall remain open. The mobility of the staffs, abreast of the operational flying units. That the despatch of urgent freight, close contact this was achieved speaks volumes for the" tena- with the battle areas, and the building up of city, skill and loyalty of the maintenance India as a base, must always be a prime con- personnel. sideration when assessing priorities for air transport resources in this theatre. Not only is the work of all three services dependent upon (Ill) Interned Air Lines. speedy communication over long distances ; it 177. The growth of air routes during the past is on the air routes that the Air Force can year is best illustrated by the following reap a dividend from the transport aircraft which are so frequently operated for the benefit figures:— of others. The R.A.F. should also use the speed Passengers Freight Mail and flexibility of its transport squadrons to May, 1944 2,103 166,313 Ibs. 99,435 Ibs. improve the efficiency of its own organisation. April, 1945 11,514 1,579,119 Ibs. 777,944 Ibs. 182. Air Command has derived great benefit i!78. This rapid increase was attributable to from the Transport Groups allotted to this a greater intensity of operations, and better theatre, which has made possible a closer study planning followed somewhat tardily by a of transport problems and a more effective growth of resources. At the beginning of the supervision of this specialised type of flying. campaign, one squadron (No. 353) shouldered The improvement in operating standards is well the whole burden while still largely equipped illustrated by the accident rate. In October, with Hudsons. In July, 1944, No. 52 Squad- 1943, there were 49 accidents per 10,000 hours ron was formed, and by flying 19,000 hours of transport and ferry flights. By April, 1945, without an accident, speedily gained an excel- the rate had been reduced to 9 per 10,000 lent reputation for its high standard of operat- hours. Such an improvement reflects the ing and freedom from accidents over routes greatest credit on all concerned and demon- that include the hazardous flight over the Hump strates the close co-operation which has been to China. In April, 1945, a flight of No. 232 achieved- between South-East Asia and Trans- Squadron, equipped with Liberator C-87 air- port Command. craft, began to operate on the longer routes, forming the most recent addition to a force the strength of which has grown to two and a half squadrons. (IV) The R.A.F. Regiment. 179. Parallel action to build up a ground 183. Until mid-1944 the strength of' the organisation to handle greater traffic and more R.A.F. Regiment was deployed to the extent complex problems was necessary. To this end, of rather more than two-thirds in machine gun static transport wings have been established at anti-aircraft units, and the remainder in field Delhi, Karachi and Calcutta; that at Delhi squadrons designed for an infantry role. Events was intended eventually to move to Rangoon. then "forced a fundamental revision of the part Located at nodal points on the trunk routes, for which the R.A.F. Regiment in South East these wings also gave advice on all matters Asia was cast. It had become apparent that affecting air transport and ferrying to the group advanced airfields, radar sites and other air in whose area they were located. When their force installations would not necessarily be establishments were fully implemented, 229 guarded if their locations did not happen to Group Headquarters was relieved of a great fit into the tactical schemes adopted * by the deal of day to day work in administering some local army formations, and that unless the air sixty units spread over India. forces were to withdraw everything to a safe 180. Even now, internal air communications distance behind the front lines they would within the theatre are not adequate. This fact themselves have to provide the necessary de- cannot be fully realised by anyone who has not fence force. For this purpose the R.A.F. Regi- appreciated the vastness of India from a rail- ment during the later months of 1944 was way carriage or travelled over roads on which expanded and re-organised into ten wing head- the twentieth century has barely left its mark. quarters, twenty field squadrons, three Moreover, in a sub-continent whose urban armoured (holding) squadrons and ten anti- centres are so distant from one another, it is aircraft squadrons, so as to provide tactical often necessary to plan an operation eight defence for air force units as "required. The hundred miles from its mounting base, while balance of functions in the Regiment as the allocation of resources may be effected from between air and ground defence was thus com- another centre which may be fifteen hundred pletely reversed. miles from the controlling headquarters. 184. The wisdom of this re-organisation was Furthermore, the major base for the prosecu- abundantly proved in the course of the 1944-45 tion of a campaign in southern Burma, Malaya campaign. As has already been explained, the or Java, is still India, and the need for swift essence of the tactics by which the re-conquest communication between base and combat area of Burma was achieved lay in the rapid ad- is another continually growing commitment for vance of mechanised units thrusting through or squadrons who serve an area ranging from around enemy positions, the strength of which Karachi to Kunming and from Peshawar to had been weakened by air bombardment. The Ceylon. fighter bombers which provided the backbone 181. At times, local operational tasks have of the latter, and also the fighters required for made the diversion of aircraft from internal air defence, could only operate effectively from routes to air supply a tempting solution to a airfields close behind the advanced army units. pressing problem. This temptation has always The supplies on whose delivery the mainten- been resisted, and it is a first principle that the ance of the Army's advance depended were 1990 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951

likewise landed at airstrips as close as possible Army commanders of the relative efficacy of to troops in the line. Allied transport aircraft certain types of air attack against the varied were often being unloaded on captured airfields objectives. A more scientific application of within a few hours of their being seized. But the fire-power afforded by ground-attack air- as the army units advanced, it frequently proved craft might have led to an economy of effort impossible, despite the presence of enemy thus made available to apply to other targets. troops lurking in the neighbourhood, to leave Whether the attack by twelve fighter-bombers garrisons behind to protect the airfields they against a well-camouflaged single machine-gun had overrun. The defence of the latter thus is' justifiable, must always be a moot point fell to the squadrons of the R.A.F. Regiment. until machinery is devised to assess the debit On their shoulders there thus rested the defence and credit side of the picture. It is not diffi- of the army lifeline and also of the air bases cult in a staff study to deduce that the effort indispensable for air support and defence, and is unprofitable, but the same point of view they were accordingly moved forward step by may %not be held by the troops making the step with the progress of the campaign, some- actual assault. The results of the air bombard- times by air. ment may be just what was needed to make the 185. The main airfield at Meiktila for in- action successful. It is certain that the high stance, was occupied early in March, 1944, and standard of accuracy developed in our tactical was speedily transformed into a forward base squadrons during 1944-45 has had an enormous for the supply of the Fourteenth Army, whose effect upon enemy resistance. units had forged ahead both southwards and 188. The low incidence of casualties during eastwards, leaving numerous organised parties assaults by our own troops also bears this of the enemy in their rear. The defence of the out, as do the unvarying tributes paid by airfield thus fell mainly upon two field squad- battalions and divisions to the work of the rons of the R.A.F. Regiment, which went into squadrons who supported them. Recently, action on a number of occasions against further evidence has come to light from Japanese parties attempting to dig themselves in informants on the efficacy of attacks. With within the airfield perimeter. For a short the co-ordination of Visual Control Post teams period indeed, the landing strip used to change and other sources, an even more efficient direc- hands twice daily, the enemy infiltrating by tion of fire-power on to targets and better •night only to be expelled the next morning observation of results will be possible. If when, as soon as all was clear, the transport analysed, the plans "compiled from these sources aircraft would begin to land. The Regiment would provide valuable proof of the decisive casualties in the course -of these engagements part that can be played by close support included two officers and twelve other ranks squadrons properly trained and handled. killed. II. Planning. 189. The amount of planning that has been necessary to bring the campaign to a close has been large, due in part to some misappreciation PART TEN. of Japanese intentions and to frustration im- posed by non-arrival of resources. There was CONCLUSIONS, RESULTS, AND LESSONS a tendency also on the part of ground forces LEARNED. to formulate a plan of operations without I. Operations. consulting the Air Commander in the early 186. One of the major difficulties under which stages of planning. In consequence, much an Air Force works, is the impracticability of effort was expended in the recasting of opera- ever drawing up a full balance-sheet which will tional plans to take advantage of the striking give in detail the full results of air action. Un- power of air forces. less a detailed examination of enemy records is 190. Much of this could have been avoided made, air forces must rely upon the dis- had the Army Commander been able to re- jointed accounts of the ground forces, the re- main alongside the Supreme Commander and ports of informants, and photographic recon- the Allied Air Commander-in-Chief instead naissance, for an assessment of their results. of having to base himself at an Advanced This has been particularly the case in Burma, Headquarters in Calcutta. Not only was where so much of the effort has been expended proper liaison at C.-in-C. level impossible, but upon fleeting targets, reported troop concentra- the full flow of information and views between tions, or objectives obscured by thick jungle. the staffs was rendered difficult. The Burma Notwithstanding the vagueness of the informa- campaign proved that -no plan of operations tion, it is certain that the number of casualties is complete unless it represents the views of inflicted upon the enemy as a direct result of the air as well as of the ground forces at all air action has undoubtedly been large, the stages. isolation of the battlefield by the interdiction of the supply lines has been almost complete, and prevented the enemy from deploying his full strength in every major engagement that III. Maintenance. has taken place, while the new mobility given 191. South East Asia Air Forces have a to armies by the unstinting use of air transport background of three years' development under has undoubtedly been the major factor in the trying conditions with insufficient resources. expulsion of the enemy from Burma. The organisation became vast and was spread 187. There have at times been grounds for a over a wide area. The first phase for which belief that the effort of our close support this organisation was designed is now com- squadrons has not been used to full advantage pleted ; the flow of supplies has become secure, because of a lack of experience on the part of and the necessity for tying down large numbers SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951 1991 of men and stocks of essential equipment in rudiments of active campaigning. In so doing India has decreased. A more fluid and they have made the best use of local resources economical base organisation should be pos- to achieve that standard of morale and well- sible as the war progresses. being which are the prerequisite of good dis- cipline. The posting of a squadron com- 192. Energetic action has been taken, now mander from a well-established bomber base that the pipe line is secure, to reduce the reserve at home to an overseas appointment with no holdings of aircraft and equipment which clog preliminary training in his changed circum- the machinery of supply and absorb so much stances cannot but have an adverse effect upon of the Command resources in manpower and the well-being of the Unit. The setting-up of storage space in India. An extensive re- Junior Commanders' Courses within the organisation to undertake more maintenance theatre is the best immediate remedy, but the in the field is contemplated, and, it is hoped, problems of accommodation, and the time will do much to avoid the bottlenecks to which absent from units, rendered it little more than centralised maintenance is prone. Such a a palliative in this theatre. reorganisation is only possible if the scales of ground equipment, hand tools and other servicing facilities are adequate and fully main- tained. For un Air Force working in the field a generous scale of equipment is essential, and V. Air Transport. the lack of it was largely responsible for the 195. Finally, the Air Forces, having given a uneconomical base maintenance organisation new-found mobility to land warfare, must also which events forced upon South East Asia in take advantage of it. When assessing bids its early stages. The saving in man-hours that for air transport and air supply, the highest results from a generous scale of Aground equip- priority should be given to the rapid movement ment is vast. This should always be taken of spares, personnel, and indeed whole R.A.F. into account in campaigns in tropical countries units, in order to keep the force working at where .sickness and lack of communications maximum efficiency. It is bad economy to militate against units possessing their full keep the 15 serviceable out of 20 available air- establishment. craft supplying the ground forces when the diversion of one aeroplane to collect A.O.G.* spares would raise the serviceability rate to 18. If full advantage is taken of air transport, the IV. Administration. striking radius of the Air Force can be still 193. The standard of unit administration in further extended, and the application of air the operational areas was not high. With power to any situation made more rapid and formations spread over wide areas, and more decisive than hitherto. deficiencies in ground officers also in the majority of vital trades, notably among clerical K. R. PARK, and signals personnel, much of this has been inevitable. Nevertheless a very real need Air Chief Marshal. exists for the indoctrination of service per- Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, sonnel in overseas theatres of war with the South East Asia, principles of self-reliance and better improvisa- tion. Kandy, Ceylon. 194. The principles of mobility and self-help October, 1945. have only resulted from the perception of those on the spot to train personnel in the * Aircraft on Ground. 1992 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951

Tashkent

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