The Communist Refoundation and the United Front in Gramsci
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chapter 3 The Communist Refoundation and the United Front in Gramsci 1 The Influence of the Theoretical Regression on the Political Actions of the Communist International The process of the political scission and the theoretical regression had a great impact on the evolution of Comintern policy. Its effects were amplified by the defeat of the revolutionary initiatives in Europe and always led to a form of organisation that was more centralised. On the other hand, the repercussions of the defeats at the end of 1923, especially in Germany, were felt by the rkp(b), the Comintern and various other communist parties. Radek’s return to the ussr in December of that year, along with his support to demands made by Trotsky and others for a broader ‘workers’ democracy’ – as opposed to the growing bureaucracy – aggravated Zinoviev’s and the ecci’s ini- tial criticism of the responsibilities of the kpd leadership group regarding the failure of the October insurrection. Since Radek was formally associated with the Brandler-Thalheimer leadership, his support for Trotsky penalised those German militants who were identified as the ‘right wing’ of the Comintern and who had been conducting the application of the united front policy even though they had basic disagreements with the ecci’s representative regarding the theoretical-practical status of the united front policy.1 Then there was an unusual rapprochement between the trends more to the right of the Comintern, those that had more deeply identified with the united front policy – leaders from the kpd, the kpp (Poland’s Communist Party) and the ksc (Czechoslovakia’s Communist Party) – with some of Trot- sky’s political demands in the ussr. Even though Brandler and Thalheimer, whose position was already delicate, tried to dodge any such involvement, it is undeniable that they were the principal knock-on victims of the Comin- tern’s turn to the left, which entailed a new interpretation of the united front policy. 1 There is a large bibliography, for the most part strongly ideological, on the history of the Communist International. Given the spirit of the present book, a couple of titles deserve mention, as they partially provided its basis: Hajek 1975 and Agosti 1974–9. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004304185_005 the communist refoundation and the united front in gramsci 105 As president of the Comintern and one of the most important leaders of the ussr, Zinoviev attempted to find a balancing-act position in the ongoing debate. As he realised that the left of the kpd, which opposed the united front policy proposed by the Comintern, was becoming stronger in the wake of the October defeat, and that the right could associate itself with Trotsky, Zinoviev tried to find support in the old majority, now gathering around Hermann Remmele. The faltering progress of the political formula of the united front was deeply shaken by the meeting of the ecci Presidium which took place in December and January, with the purpose of discussing the question of Germany. Karl Radek (with Trotsky’s and Piatakov’s support) defended the continuity of the policy of a united front with social democracy. The left opposed the united front policy as a whole, believing that it had caused the defeat. With Zinoviev’s support, the position that came to prevail understood that the united front should only come ‘from below’, namely with the purpose of attracting and exposing the social-democratic leaders, who were now increasingly presented as a ‘wing’ of fascism. Thus the slogan of the ‘workers’ government’ or of a ‘worker-peasant government’ would be nothing other than an agitational slogan aiming at the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.2 The process by which the leadership of the kpd distanced itself from the leadership of the Comintern, which was deeply affected by the rise of a new opposition within the rkp(b), led to the substitution of Brandler and Thal- heimer, and to the smoothing of the way for the victory of the left at the April 1924 kpd congress. Thus arose the concrete possibility of an international artic- ulation of leftist communism with the purpose of emptying out the united front policy which had been developing since the Comintern’s Third Congress. But even though such an articulation did not establish itself, the pressure of the left was enough to disfigure the foundations of the original formulation. The intermediate formula of a united front ‘from below’, the content of which was uncertain, also won a consensus in the pcf and kpp, and had obvious con- nections with the internal dispute of the rkp(b), which opposed most of the leadership to Trotsky and his allies. 2 It must be noted that the March 1921 and the October 1923 defeats had opposite meanings: the first strengthened the united front policy, while the latter weakened it. It is also possible to see that Trotsky’s support to Radek over the German question came as reciprocation for Radek’s support on the Russian question, as months later (as seen above) Trotsky would cite the military occupation of the Ruhr as marking the end of the validity of maintaining a united front with social democracy..