War and Tfie State in Jeffrey

Warand tfieState in JeffreyHerbst Afnica

MIostanalyses assume thatin Africa,as elsewhere,states will eventuallybecome strong. But this may not be truein Africa,where states are developingin a fundamentally new environment.Lessons drawnfrom the case ofEurope show thatwar is an importantcause of stateformation that is missingin Africatoday. The crucialrole that war has playedin theformation of European states has long been noted. SamuelP. Huntingtonargued that "war was thegreat stimulus to statebuilding," and CharlesTilly went so faras to claimthat "war made the state,and the statemade war."I Similarly,two of the most successful CONTEXT statesin the ThirdWorld today, South Korea and Taiwan,are largely"warfare"states that have been molded,in part,by the near constantthreat of externalaggression. However, studies of politicaldevelopment and state consolidationin Africaand manyother parts of the Third World have all but ignoredthe important role that war can playin politicaldevelopment. The roleof war has notbeen examinedbecause thevast majority of states in Africaand elsewherein the worldgained independence without having to resortto combatand have notfaced a securitythreat since independence.2 PROBLEM

I am gratefulto Henry Bienen, Aaron Friedberg,Elizabeth Hart, Dave Rawson, the International Relations Discussion Group at Princeton University,and two anonymous readers for helpful comments.

JeffreyHerbst is AssistantProfessor of Politicsand InternationalAffairs, Woodrow Wilson School, PrincetonUniversity.

1. Samuel P. Huntington,Political Order in ChangingSocieties (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1968), p. 123; and Charles Tilly, "Reflectionson the History of European State-Making," in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formationof NationalStates in WesternEurope (Princeton: Princeton Uni- versityPress, 1975), p. 42. An importantrecent addition to this literatureis Brian M. Downing, 'Constitutionalism,Warfare and Political Change in Early Modern Europe," Theoryand Society, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 7-56. The general literatureon warfare'seffect on societyis voluminous. An early work which concentrateson some of the themes examined here is Hans Delbruck,History of the Art of War within the Framework ofPolitical History, Vol. III, trans.Walter J. Renfroe,Jr. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982). 2. For instance, in Morris Janowitz's classic study of the militaryin the developing world, the political,social, and economic functionsof the militaryare studied extensivelybut the potential effectsof war, or of peace, are not analyzed. Morris Janowitz, The Militaryin the Political DevelopmentofNew Nations:An Essayin ComparativeAnalysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 12.

InternationalSecurity, Spring 1990 (Vol. 14, No. 4) ? 1990by thePresident and Fellowsof Harvard College and ofthe Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

117 InternationalSecurity 14:4 1118

Those scholarswho have analyzedthe military in thedeveloping world have studiedthe armedforces' role in economicand politicalprocesses but have not examinedthe changes that war could potentiallyeffect on a state.3 Studyingthe militaryand studyingwarfare are not the same, especiallyin the area of stateconsolidation, because warfarehas independenteffects on economicpolicies, administrative structures, and the citizenry'srelationship withthe statethat have verylittle to do withthe military.4Finally, beyond the usual problemof tryingto studythe impactof a factorthat is missing, thereis a less excusablenormative bias which has sometimesprevented PROBLEM studentsof politicsfrom examining the effectsof war. The question of whetherit is only possible to createa nationout of "blood and iron" is apparentlyone thatmany analysts find too disturbingto examine.5 Comparisonof the Europeancase withthat of Africais thereforecrucial to understandingwhether the analogy holds. War in Europe played an importantrole in the consolidationof many now-developedstates: war caused the state to become more efficientin revenuecollection; it forced leadersto dramaticallyimprove administrative capabilities; and it createda climateand importantsymbols around which a disparatepopulation could METHODOLOGY unify.While there is littlereason to believethat war would have exactlythe

same domesticeffects in Africatoday as it did in Europe severalcenturies ARGUMENT ago, it is importantto ask ifdeveloping countries can accomplishin timesof peace what war enabled European countriesto do. I concludethat they probablycannot because fundamentalchanges in economicstructures and

societalbeliefs are difficult,ifnot impossible,to bringabout when countries THESIS are not beingdisrupted or undersevere external threat. The nextsection of thisarticle outlines how war affectedstate formation

RESEARCH Q in Europe,with particular attention to twocrucial developments: the creation of centralizedand efficientstructures to collecttaxes, and the development of nationalism.I then comparethe Europeanexperience of state-building throughwarfare to the relativepeace thatAfrica has experiencedsince the 1960s.While Africanstates have benefitedfrom peace, theirdevelopment ROADMAP

3. The literatureis reviewedby HenryBienen, "Armed Forces and NationalModernization: Continuingthe Debate," Comparative Politics, Vol. 16,No. 1 (October1983), pp. 1-16. 4. GabrielArdent, "Financial Policy and EconomicInfrastructure ofModern States and Nations," in Tilly,The Formationof National States, p. 89. 5. A usefulcorrective to theconventional view is providedby John A. Hall, "Warand theRise ofthe West," in ColinCreighton and MartinShaw, eds., TheSociology of War and Peace (London: Macmillan,1987). Warand theState in Africaj 119

has been stuntedby the veryproblems that war helpedEuropean countries to solve. I thenevaluate the possibilitiesthat African states might develop strategiesto solve thesefundamental problems in timesof peace. I conclude thatsome stateswill probablybe unsuccessfulin findingways of building the state in timesof peace and will thereforeremain permanently weak. ROADMAP

Accordingly,the internationalcommunity will have to develop non-tradi- THESIS tionalpolicies for helping a new brandof states:those that will continueto existbut that will not develop. Other states, perceiving that peace locksthem intoa permanentlyweak position,may be temptedto use war as a means GOAL of resolvingtheir otherwise intractable problems of stateconsolidation.

Effectsof War on StateConsolidation: The European Case

It is instructiveto look at war'simpact on Europeansocieties because, as will be noted below,war in Europe helped alleviatesome of the problemsthat affectAfrican countries today. At the mostbasic level,war in Europeacted as a filterwhereby weak stateswere eliminatedand politicalarrangements

thatwere not viable eitherwere reformedor disappeared.Weak statesdo CONTEXT existin Europetoday-Belgium is one example-butthe near-constant threat of war did promptmost states to becomestronger to survive.The contrast betweenthis evolutionary development and thecurrent situation in theThird World,where even states that are largelydependent on foreignaid will continueto exist for the foreseeablefuture, is dramatic.It is, of course, importantnot to generalizetoo muchbecause war had manydifferent effects over time,and even in the same periodstates reacted in a varietyof ways to externalthreats. H owever,war did affectthe ability of European states to increasetaxation and contributedto theforging of national identities in many countries.It is thereforeimportant to examinethe potential impact of external threatto betterunderstand state consolidation in theThird World. ROADMAP

TAXES Perhapsthe mostnoticeable effect of war in Europeanhistory was to cause the state to increaseits abilityto collectsignificantly more revenuewith greaterefficiency and less publicresistance. G iventhe freedom of European statesto attackeach other,those states that could raise money quickly could successfullythreaten their neighbors with a warthat might lead to significant damageor even completedestruction. Richard Bean writes, "Once thepower to taxhad been successfullyappropriated by anyone sovereign,once he had TOPIC SENTENCE InternationalSecurity 14:4 | 120

used thatpower to bribeor coercehis nobilityinto acquiescence, that state could face all neighboringstates with the choiceof being conqueredor of centralizingauthority and raisingtaxes."6 While success in war depends on manyfactors including technology, tactics, and moraleof the troops, raising sufficientrevenue was a necessarycondition to preventdefeat. States that did not raise sufficientrevenue for war perished.As MichaelMann notes, "A statethat wished to survivehad to increaseits extractivecapacity to pay forprofessional armies and/or navies. Those thatdid notwould be crushed on the battlefieldand absorbedinto others-the fate of Poland, of Saxony, ofBavaria in [theseventeenth and eighteenthcenturies]. No Europeanstates were continuouslyat peace. It is impossibleto escape the conclusionthat a peacefulstate would have ceased to existeven morespeedily than the mili- tarilyinefficient actually did."7 Waraffects state finances for two reasons. First, it puts tremendous strains on leaders to findnew and more regularsources of income.While rulers may recognizethat their tax systemis inadequate,a war may be the only thingthat forces them to expendthe necessary political capital and undertake the coercionrequired to gain morerevenue. For instance,in Mann's study of taxationin Englandbetween 1688 and 1815,he findsthat there were six majorjumps in staterevenue and thateach correspondswith the beginning of a war.8The associationbetween the need to fightand theneed to collect revenueis perhapsclearest in Prussia,where the main tax collection agency was called the GeneralWar Commissariat.9 Second, citizensare muchmore likely to acquiesceto increasedtaxation when thenation is at war,because a threatto theirsurvival will overwhelm otherconcerns they might have about increasedtaxation. In fact,taxation fora war can be thoughtof as a "lumpy"collective good: not onlymust the populationpay to get thegood, but it mustalso pay a considerableamount morethan the currentlevel of taxation,because a smallincrease in revenue

6. RichardBean, "Warand the Birthof theNation State," Journal of Economic History, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March1973), p. 220. 7. MichaelMann, "Stateand Society,1130-1815: An Analysisof EnglishState Finances," in Mann, States,War and Capitalism:Studies in PoliticalSociology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1988),

STRUCTURE EMBEDDED IN LANGUAGE p. 109. 8. MichaelMann, TheSources of Social Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 486. 9. MichaelDuffy, "The MilitaryRevolution and the State,1500-1800," in MichaelDuffy, ed., TheMilitary Revolution and theState, 1500-1800, Exeter Studies in HistoryNo. 1 (Exeter,U.K.: Universityof Exeter, 1980), p. 5. Warand theState in Africa| 121

is oftennot enough to meetthe new securitythreat facing the state.10 In this way,taxation for a war is liketaxation for building a bridge:everyone must S pay to build the bridgeand a smallincrease in revenuewill not be enough, because halfa bridge,like fighting half a war,is useless. Thus, war oftencauses a "ratcheteffect" whereby revenue increases sharplywhen a nationis fightingbut does notdecline to theante bellum level whenhostilities have ceased.11Once governmentshave investedthe sunken costs in expandingtax collectionsystems and routinizedthe collectionof new sourcesof revenue,the marginalcosts of continuingthose structures are quitelow and theresources they collect can be used forprojects that will enhancethe ruling group's support. Whileit is not a universalrule, war in othersocieties at othertimes often played the same kind of role thatwar did in Europe. For instance,Joseph Smaldonewrites in his studyof the Sokoto Caliphate (in what is now Nigeria) TOPIC SENTENCE between1500 and 1800:

War was the principalinstrument for the establishmentand extensionof politicalauthority over subject peopte and foreignterritory, and for the organization,maintenance, and reinforcementof that authority.The demands of perennialwar evoked institutionsto subordinatethe sectorsof societycrucial to the interestsof these militarizedpolities. The permanent requirementto mobilizehuman and materialresources for military purposes [i.e., taxation]intensified tendencies toward the monopolizationof power and the elaborationof auxiliaryinstitutions of socialcontrol.12 EVIDENCE Similarly,the South Koreanand Taiwanesestates have been able to extract so manyresources from their societies in partbecause the demandsto be constantlyvigilant provoked the stateinto developing efficient mechanisms forcollecting resources and controllingdissident groups. 13A highlyextractive statealso could cloak demandsfor greater resources in appeals fornational unityin the faceof a determinedenemy.

10. "Lumpy"goods are productswhich are notuseful if only part is purchased.Margaret Levi, OfRule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 56-57. 11. Mann,Sources of Social Power, pp. 483-490. 12. JosephP. Smaldone,Warfare in theSokoto Caliphate: Historical and SociologicalPerspectives (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 139. The same pointis made by RichardL. Robertsin his Warriors,Merchants, and Slaves: The State and the Economy in theMiddle Niger Valley, 1700-1914(Palo Alto:Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 20. 13. JoelS. Migdal,Strong Societies and WeakStates: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in theThird World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 274. InternationalSecurity 14:4 j 122

NATIONALISM Waralso had a majorimpact on the developmentof nationalismin Europe. Indeed,the presence of a palpableexternal threat may be the strongestway to generatea commonassociation between the state and the population. Externalthreats have such a powerfuleffect on nationalismbecause people realizein a profoundmanner that they are underthreat because of who they are as a nation;they are forcedto recognizethat it is onlyas a nationthat theycan successfullydefeat the threat. Anthony Giddens recounts the effects of WorldWar I: "The Warcanalized the development of states'sovereignty, tyingthis to citizenshipand to nationalismin such a profoundway thatany otherscenario [of how the internationalsystem would be ordered]came to appear as littlemore than idle fantasy."'14Similarly, Michael Howard notes the visceralimpact of wars on the developmentof nationalismthroughout Europe: Self-identificationas a Nationimplies almost by definitionalienation from othercommunities, and themost memorable incidents in thegroup-memory consistedin conflictwith and triumphover othercommunities. France was Marengo,Austerlitz and Jena:military triumph set the seal on thenew-found nationalconsciousness. Britain was Trafalgar-butit had been a nationfor fourhundred years, since those earlier battles Crecy and Agincourt.Russia was the triumphof 1812.Germany was Gravelotteand Sedan.15 In Europe therewas an almostsymbiotic relationship between the state's extractivecapacity and nationalism:war increasedboth as the population was convincedby externalthreat that they should pay moreto thestate, and as, at the same time,the populationunited around common symbols and memoriesthat were importantcomponents of nationalism.Fighting wars maybe the onlyway wherebyit is possibleto have people pay moretaxes and at the same timefeel more closely associated with the state.

TheAbsence of Interstate War in theModern Era

Whiletrying to studythe chaos caused by administrativedisintegration, the forcefulcrushing of ethnicchallenges, and large-scalehuman rights abuses,

14. AnthonyGiddens, The Nation-State and Violence, vol. II ofA ContemporaryCritique of Historical Materialism(Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1985), p. 235. 15. MichaelHoward, War and theNation State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 9. Emphasis in theoriginal. Warand theState in Africa1 123

manyscholars have generallyassumed thatpoor countriestoday face even moreexternal challenges than Europeanstates did in theirformative peri- ods.16In fact,since the end of theSecond World War, very few Third World stateshave foughtinterstate wars of the typethat affected the evolutionof Europeanstates. The few ThirdlWorld interstate wars thathave occurred (e.g., India-Pakistan,Iran-Iraq, China-Vietnam) have obscuredthe factthat thevast majority of Third World states most of the time do notface significant externalthreats. States like Israel,South Korea,or Taiwan,where national survivalhas been a real considerationin nationalpolitics, are exceptional and even thesecountries have survivedintact. Even in Africa,the continentseemingly destined for war giventhe colo- nially-imposedboundaries and weak politicalauthorities, there has notbeen one involuntaryboundary change since the dawn of the independenceera in thelate 1950s,and veryfew countries face even theprospect of a conflict withtheir neighbors. Most ofthe conflicts in Africathat have occurredwere not, as in Europe,wars of conquestthat threatened the existenceof other states,but conflictsover lesser issues thatwere resolved without threatening the existenceof anotherstate. For instance,Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979to overthrowIdi Amin,not to conquerUganda. Similarly,the war in theWestern Sahara is a colonialquestion, not a conflictbetween independent states.Even South Africa'sdestabilization efforts against its neighborsare primarilyattempts to influencethe policiesof the majority-ruledcountries, not to change the bordersof the region.Lesotho or Swazilandwould not existtoday if South Africahad any real territorialambitions. In the few conflictsthat did have the potentialto threatenfundamentally the existence ofstates-Somalia's attempt to invadeEthiopia in the 1970sand Libya'swar againstChad in the 1970sand 1980s-the aggressordid not succeed.17 Africanstates have seldom foughtinterstate wars and the continenthas not witnessedsignificant boundary changes, because independentleaders

16. See, forinstance, Joseph LaPalombara, "Penetration: A Crisisof GovernmentalCapacity," in Leonard Binder,et al., Crisesand Sequencesin PoliticalDevelopment (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1971), p. 222. 17. In 1977 Somalia,as part of its irredentistproject to create"Greater Somalia," invaded Ethiopiain the hope of annexingthe Ogaden; the Ethiopians,with significant help fromthe SovietUnion and Cuba, defeatedSomalia in 1978.David D. Laitinand Said S. Samatar,Somalia: Nationin Searchof a State(Boulder, Colo.: Westview,1987), pp. 140-143.In 1973Libyan forces invadedChad by movingforces into the disputedAozou strip.The Libyanmilitary presence graduallyexpanded until a dramaticseries of conflictswith the Chadian government (heavily supportedby Franceand the UnitedStates) in 1987forced the Libyansto agreeto an end to hostilities.John Wright, Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara (London: Hurst, 1989), pp. 126-146. InternationalSecurity 14:4 1124

have continuedthe system of boundary maintenance that the colonial powers firstdeveloped to regulatethe scramble for Africa in thelate 1800s.18African leadersrecognized in theearly 1960s that a potentiallylarge number of groups would wantto secede fromthe states they are presentlyin, to join othersor createentirely new ones. In orderto preventthe continent from being thrown into the chaos of large-scaleboundary changes in whichthe stabilityand integrityof any statecould be threatened,they created a systemof explicit norms,propounded by the Organizationof AfricanUnity in 1963,which declaredany changein the inheritedcolonial boundaries to be illegitimate. Most of the continenthas, accordingly,refused to recognizeboundary changes(e.g., Biafra,Eritrea) even wherethe principle of self-determination mighthave led themto do so. Thissystem has been successfulin preserving Africannational boundaries and has so fardeterred almost all countriesfrom initiatingthe kind of conquestwars that were so commonin European history.The systemthat maintained the inheritedborders as inviolatewas strengthenedsomewhat inadvertently, because two of the largeststates on the continent(Nigeria and Zaire),which could conceivablyhave threatened theirmuch smaller neighbors, faced significant secessionist threats (from the Ibo and Kataganese respectively)and thereforeworked resolutelyto strengthenthe normthat the borders should not be changed. The stabilityof new states,especially in Africa,is a remarkabledevelop- mentgiven that the vast majorityof the overone hundredcountries in the ThirdWorld that have gainedtheir independence since 1945 are poor,have weakadministrative structures, and consistof populations that are splintered alongregional or ethniclines. In otherwords, they are preciselythe kind of statesthat before 1945 were routinelyinvaded and takenover by stronger statesin theirregion or by externalpowers. Yet, very few states in theThird World,despite their evident military and politicalweaknesses, face any sig- nificantexternal threat. In contrast,Tilly estimates, the "enormousmajority" of statesin Europe failed.Peace was theexception and longperiods with no majorfighting were almostunknown, as forcenturies weak stateswere routinelydefeated and populationsregularly absorbed by foreign rulers.19 The psychologyof Europe in its formativecenturies, where state survivalwas a very real issue of

18. Thisargument is developedin JeffreyHerbst, "The Creationand Maintenanceof National Boundariesin Africa,"International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Fall 1989),pp. 673-692. 19. Tilly,"Reflections on theHistory of European State-Making," p. 38. Warand theState in Africa1 125

constantconcern to leaders,is so differentfrom the outlookfacing Third Worldleaders today as to suggestthat there has been a fundamentalchange in the survivalprospects of weak statesand thatcontrol of territoryis no longercorrelated with military power.20

Problemsof State Consolidation in Africa

Africanstates face numerous problems in theirefforts to consolidatepower. They are poor, shortof trainedmanpower, and confrontsocieties that are oftenfragmented and have littleorientation to the stateas a whole. Many otherThird World nations face these same problemsalthough they are often mostextreme in Africa,given the povertyof the continentand the fragility of the states. Elites can come to power but, given the precariousnessof controlin countrieswhere rules governing leadership and successionhave notbeen institutionalized,they may be displaced.Once theylose power,or are preventedfrom gaining it, ambitiouspoliticians have no otheropportu- nityto accumulatewealth or powerbecause thestate controls the badges of statusand manyof thefree-floating resources in theeconomy, such as they are.21Even when theydo controlthe apex of the state,elites may feelthat because of theircountry's vulnerability to exogenousshocks (e.g., sudden sharpdrops in the priceof theirraw materialexports) and the presenceof sophisticatedmultinational enterprises and well-connectedminority groups (e.g., Lebanesein WestAfrica, Indians in East Africa),they are notreally in controlof their own destinyand thereforeare vulnerable.As a resultof their grossinsecurities, these "lame Leviathans"' trydesperately to controlever- greaterparts of societythrough outright ownership or regulation.However, sincethey are weak,their efforts are almost inevitably clumsy, heavy-handed, and authoritarian. Therefore,although the average state in Africacompared to otherstates is small (as measuredby governmentspending as a percentageof gross do-

20. Ibid.,p. 81. 21. Richard Hodder-Williams,An Introductionto thePolitics of Tropical Africa (London: Allen and Unwin,1984), p. 95. 22. ThomasM. Callaghy,"The Stateand theDevelopment of Capitalism in Africa:Theoretical, Historical,and ComparativeReflections," in Donald Rothchildand Naomi Chazan, eds., The PrecariousBalance: State and Societyin Africa(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1988), p. 82. InternationalSecurity 14:4 1 126

mesticproduct [GDP]),23 it appearsto be too largebecause its clumsy extrac- tiveefforts cause so muchdamage compared to thebenefits that it delivers. Thus arises the image of so many Africanstates as "overdeveloped"or "swollen."24The problemsconfronted by statesin Africacan be illustrated by comparingtheir experience with European states in two areas wherewar had a significantimpact: the state's ability to extractresources through taxes, and the degreeof nationalismin thecountries south of the Sahara. A classicexample of how weak statepower causes the stateto institute desperateand self-defeatingeconomic policies is in the area of government revenue.Government revenue poses a majorproblem for all Africanstates and manyothers in the ThirdWorld. These statesare desperatelyshort of revenueto fundeven minimalstate services (e.g., pay nurses'salaries, buy books forschools, supply transport for agricultural extension services) that theirpopulations have long been promised.In additionto these recurrent costs,Third World countries are in need ofmore extensive and moreefficient taxsystems because the processof developmentrequires large expenditures on infrastructureto promote economic activity throughout the countryand to handle the ramificationsof development,especially the large expenses incurredby urbanizing countries.25 W. ArthurLewis estimates that the public sectorin ThirdWorld countries should be spendingon theorder of 20 percent of GDP on services,exclusive of defenseand debt repayment.26However, when defense(2.5 percentof GDP) and debt repayments(3.4 percentof GDP) are subtracted,the averageAfrican country spends only15.7 percent ofits GDP on all governmentfunctions.27 While these figures are onlyrough estimatesgiven the problemsassociated with Africaneconomic statistics, theydo illustratethe extentof thefiscal crisis facing African states. Due to the weaknessof administrativeand statisticalstructures in Africa, manygovernments rely on taxationof foreigntrade, because importsand

23. The shareof totalgross domestic product of sub-SaharanAfrican states is smaller,at 21.6 percent,than the developingcountry average of 25.5 percent.(Both figures are from1984.) InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), GovernmentFinance Statistics Yearbook 1988 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1988),p. 94. 24. See, forinstance, Larry Diamond, "Class Formationin the SwollenAfrican State," The Journalof Modern African Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (December1987), pp. 592-596;and Nzongola- Ntalaja,"The Crisisof the Statein Post-ColonialAfrica," in Nzongola-Ntalaja,Revolution and Counter-Revolutionin Africa (London: Zed Books,1987), p. 85. 25. W. ArthurLewis, The Evolutionof theInternational Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1978), p. 39. 26. W. ArthurLewis, Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy (New York:Harper and Row,1966), p. 115. 27. Calculatedfrom IMF, GovernmentFinance Statistics Yearbook 1988, pp. 58, 74, and 94. Warand theState in Africa1 127

exportsmust physicallypass througha relativelysmall numberof border posts thatcan be easilymanned. Thus, the averageAfrican state depends on revenuefrom tariffs for 20.5 percentof totalrevenue, compared to all developingcountries which, on average,gain 12.9 percentof theirrevenue fromtariffs, and industrializedcountries where tariffs account for only 1.3 percentof totalrevenue.28 Unfortunately,funding the statethrough indirect taxes on foreigntrade damages nationaleconomies because leaders are compelledto erectever- greateradministrative controls on imports.These tariffspromote corruption, smugglingand, mostimportantly, over-valued exchange rates, because gov- ernmentsgrow to relyon administrativecontrols rather than the marketto regulateimports. Overvalued exchange rates in turnlead to wide-spread damagewithin poorer economies as exportersare universallyhurt, the pop- ulationis encouragedto become dependenton importedfood, and black marketsquickly develop to takeadvantage of distortedprices.29 Beyond the immediatedamage caused by a tax systemdependent on importsand ex- ports,this typeof tax systemis particularlyinappropriate for Third World countries.These countriesneed guaranteesof slow and steadyincreases in governmentrevenue above the rateof economicgrowth in orderto accomplishthe taskscrucial to development:build transport and communications systems,establish utilities, and createeducational systems.30 Anothermajor problem facing leaders in Africais the absenceof a strong popularidentity with the state. The lackof a popularconsensus over national purposeboth aggravatesthe state'sclumsy efforts to extractresources and is itselfexacerbated by an insecure,authoritarian elite. Indeed, the picture ofAfrican societies widely accepted today is ofpopulations trying desperately to escape the clutchesof the state,rather than becoming more involved in it,and certainlynot willing to pay moretaxes to it.31Twenty-five years after "thenationalist period," there are few signsof nationalismin mostAfrican countriesdespite the now proforma exhortations from propaganda organs to engage in state-building.Indeed, the majorityof statesstill have difficulty creatingviable symbols to attractthe loyalties of theircitizens.

28. Calculatedfrom ibid., p. 54. 29. See World Bank, AcceleratedDevelopment in Sub-SaharanAfrica: An Agendafor Action (Wash- ington,D.C.: WorldBank, 1981), pp. 24-30. 30. Alex Radian, ResourceMobilization in PoorCountries: Implementing Tax Policies(New Brunswick, NJ:Transaction Books, 1980), pp. 13-17. 31. See Rothchildand Chazan, The PrecariousBalance. InternationalSecurity 14:4 1128

Not surprisingly,therefore, there are todayvery few attempts in African countriesto forgea nationalconsensus on majorissues, much less a national identity.For instance, most formulas to decreaseinter-ethnic tension concen- trateonly on amelioratingthe negativeaspects of ethnicconflict by accom- modatingit throughdecentralized government structures and preferential policies.32However, formulas such as federalismoften are inappropriatein countrieswhere nationalinstitutions are not strong.Federalist solutions brokedown in Sudan and Uganda, amongother places, because theincen- tivesfor leaders to attemptto gain totalcontrol were much greater than the barriersposed by recentlyadopted institutionalarrangements.33 Moreover, no matterhow well accommodationistformulas of intra-societalconflict work,almost everyone in Africaand elsewherein the ThirdWorld would agreethat a morebasic nationalloyalty by all societalgroups would stillbe desirable.However, the means by which to induce a disparatesociety to identifymore with the nation-stateare unknownin Africaand few in the currentera are even attemptingto speculateon how to develop a national consensus.

DifficultiesofState Consolidation without War

War in Europe played such an importantrole in the evolutionof the state mechanismand society'srelationship with the statebecause it is extraordi- narilydifficult, outside times of crisis,to reformelemental parts of the gov- ernmentalsystem, such as the means of taxation,or to effecta real change in nationalidentity. For instance,since taxesare so consequentialto every businessdecision, the tax system over time reflects a largenumber of political bargainsmade by the state with different interest groups. Often governments findit too politicallydifficult to providedirect subsidies to thosethey want to favor,so the tax systemis a convenientbackdoor to aid politicallyimpor-

32. See, forinstance, Donald L. Horowitz,Ethnic Groups in Conflict(Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1985), pp. 563-680. 33. Bugandahad a degreeof autonomywhen Uganda gainedindependence and theKabaka, the traditionalruler of the Bugandapeople, was the country'sfirst president. However, this arrangementfell apart in 1966when thenPrime Minister Milton Obote overthrewthe Kabaka and invadedBuganda. Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of WisconsinPress, 1976),pp. 149-156.In 1983,President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri of the Sudaneffectively abrogated the Addis Ababa agreement which had givenautonomy to Southern Sudan. The Sudan has been embroiledin a civilwar eversince. Mansour Khalid, Nimeiri and theRevolution of Dis-May (London: KPI, 1985), pp. 234-240. Warand theState in Africa1 129

tantgroups without incurring opprobrium. The politicalbargains that con- stitutethe tax system develop a momentumof their own becauseindividuals and businessesbase theirfuture economic decisions on the incentivesand disincentivesin the existingtax code. Indeed,Joseph Schumpeter called the fiscalsystem "a collectionof hard,naked facts"and claimedthat "the spirit of a people, its culturallevel, its social structure,the deeds its policymay prepare-all this and more is writtenin its fiscalhistory, stripped of all phrases."3 Therefore,even minorchanges such as alterationsin thelevel of taxation or shiftsin thetax burden, as theUnited States and mostWestern European countrieshave made in the last few years,engender tremendous political battles.Not only the previouslyfavored political groups but all those that simplyfollowed the signalssent out by governmentwill forcefullyoppose fiscalreform. Greater changes in thenature of the tax system are even more difficult.Edward Ames' and RichardRapp's conclusionthat tax systems "last untilthe end of the governmentthat instituted them" and thattax systems in someEuropean countries survived "almost intact" from the thirteenth and fourteenthcenturies until the late eighteenth century may be an exaggeration, but theirconclusions suggest just how muchinertia a particularsystem for collectinggovernment revenue can developover time.35 Other than war, no typeof crisisdemands that the stateincrease taxes with such forcefulness, and few othersituations would impelcitizens to acceptthose demands, or at least not resistthem as stronglyas they otherwisemight have. It is thereforehard to counterTilly's argument that "the formationof standing armiesprovided the largestsingle incentiveto extractionand the largest singlemeans of state coercion over the long run of European state-making."36 Domesticsecurity threats, of the type African countries face so often,may forcethe stateto increaserevenue; however, these crisesare almostnever as graveas the typeof externalthreat the Europeanstates had to confront, because theydo not threatenthe veryexistence of the state.In addition, domesticconflicts result in fragmentationand considerablehostility among differentsegments of the population.As a result,the statedoes not neces- sarilyachieve the greater revenue efficiency gains engendered by an external

34. JosephA. Schumpeter,"The Crisisof the Tax State,"in Alan T. Peacock,et al., eds., InternationalEconomic Papers, No. 4 (London:Macmillan, 1954), pp. 6-7. 35. EdwardAmes and RichardT. Rapp, "The Birthand Deathof Taxes: A Hypothesis,"Journal ofEconomic History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March1977), p. 177. 36. Tilly,"Reflections on theHistory of European State-Making," p. 73. InternationalSecurity 14:4 j 130

crisis.Indeed, in a civilwar-as in Nigeriain the late 1960s-partsof the stateare fightingagainst each other,which hardly promotes efficiency in tax collection.Public acceptanceof tax increases,a crucialfactor in allowing Europeanstates to extractgreater resources in timesof war,will be a much morecomplicated issue in civildisputes. As Mann notes,"the growth of the modernstate, as measuredby finances, is explainedprimarily not in domestic termsbut in termsof geopoliticalrelations of violence."37 The obstaclesposed by largepeasant populations,significant nonmone- tarizedsectors, and widespreadpoverty are, of course,important contrib- utorsto therevenue crisis of theAfrican state. However, these problems do notfully explain why poor states do notextract greater resources from society in a mannerthat is less economicallyharmful. Factors such as politicalwill, administrativeability, and the population'swillingness to be taxed-issues thatcan be affectedby the decisionsof politicalleaders-are also crucialin understandingwhy statesare unable to achievetheir potential level of taxationin a benignmanner.38 For instance,Margaret Levi successfullyshows thatin such diversecases as republicanRome, France and Englandin the Middle Ages, eighteenth-centuryBritain, and twentieth-centuryAustralia, levels of taxationwere affectedprimarily by politicalconstraints faced by rulers,despite the factthat most of these economiesalso posed significant barriersto increasedtax collection.39 Nor has therebeen any success in developingmeans to cause the popu- lationto identifymore with the state, other than fighting a war. Nationalism, whichwas nevernearly as strongor widespread (especially outside the major cities)in Africaas manyhad thought,was palpablein thelate colonial period because therewas a "relevantother"-the colonialists-who could be easily identifiedas oppressorsand aroundwhich a nominalnational identity could be built.40However, since independence in mostAfrican countries, there has been no "relevantother" to oppose, so it has been extremelydifficult to createnation-wide symbols of identity.There has thereforebeen no way of generatinga nationalidentity in Africasuch as wars forgedin Europe.

37. Mann, Sourcesof Social Power,p. 490. 38. Raja J.Chelliah, "Trends in Taxationin DevelopingCountries," International Monetary Fund StaffPapers, Vol. 18,No. 2 (July1971), p. 312.On thepossibility of changing fiscal arrangements in Africa,see Dennis Anderson, ThePublic Revenue and EconomicPolicy in AfricanCountries, World BankDiscussion Paper No. 19 (Washington,D.C.: WorldBank, 1987), pp. 14-15. 39. For instance, see Levi, Of Rule and Revenue,p. 105. 40. The importanceof the "relevantother" concept in developinggroup cohesion is explored by Young, The Politicsof CulturalPluralism, p. 42. Warand theState in Africaj 131

AnthonySmith writes, "the central difficulty of 'nation-building'in muchof Africaand Asia is the lack of any sharedhistorical mythology and memory on whichstate elites can set about'building' the nation. The 'nation'[is built up] fromthe central fund of culture and symbolismand mythologyprovided by sharedhistorical experiences. "41 The resultis theanomie in mostAfrican countriestoday. It could be arguedthat the lack of nationalism simply reflects the fact that Africancountries are artificialgroupings of disparatepeoples and therefore are not reallynation-states. However, no "natural"nation-states are mature at birthwith populations that have readilyagreed to a centralidentity. Rather, thegoal of thosewho wantto createthe nation-state is to convincedifferent groupsthat they do, in fact,share a commonidentity. This is why even in Europe,which today seems to have nation-statesthat are more "natural" thanAfrica's, war had such a crucialrole to play in the forgingof common identities. Indeed, the symbioticrelationship that war fosteredin Europe between tax collectionand nationalismis absentin Africa,precisely because thereis no externalthreat to encouragepeople to acquiescein the state'sdemands, and no challengethat causes them to respond as a nation. Instead, the Africanstate's clumsy efforts at greaterextraction are metby popularwith- drawalrather than by a populaceunited around a commonidentity. Of course,not all wars led to the strengtheningof administrativeinstitu- tionsand greaternationalism. For example,Joseph Strayer notes thatthe HundredYears War "was so exhaustingfor both sides thatit discouraged thenormal development of the apparatus of the state. There was a tendency to postponestructural reforms, to solve problemson an ad hoc basis rather than [to create]new agenciesof government,to sacrificeefficiency for im- mediateresults. "42 However, the HundredYears War was exceptionalbe- cause of its lengthand it thereforedid not allow rulersto consolidatethe gains usually achieved afterfacing a shortperiod of externaldanger. Yet overall,the historicalrecord suggests that war was highlyefficient in pro- motingstate consolidationin Europe, and that it would be much more difficultfor states to accomplishthe same tasksin peacetime.

41. AnthonyD. Smith,"State-Making and Nation-Building,"in JohnA. Hall, ed., Statesin History(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 258. 42. JosephR. Strayer,On theMedieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1970), p. 60. InternationalSecurity 14:4 1132

AreThere Peaceful Routes to StateConsolidation?

SinceAfrican and otherThird World countries need to transformimportant partsof their governmental systems, including their fiscal arrangements, and to promotenationalism, but do nothave thetraditional avenue of war to aid them,the immediatequestion is whetherthey can followa path otherthan that adopted by Europe to consolidatestate power and to develop new nationalidentities to reducethe divisionsbetween society and the state. Once again it is interestingto focuson governmentrevenue because the issue is so decisivein its own rightand because taxsystems are such a good reflectionof the basic bargainsin society.In an age withreduced levels of interstatewar, Africancountries are faced with the problemof tryingto increasethe capacityof the statewithout being able to use wars to "ratchet up" thestate's extractive ability. Given the evidence of European fiscal inertia, it is clearthat it willbe even moredifficult to institutemajor reforms when statesare operatingin normalcircumstances. The one clearchance African countriesdid have to institutemajor reforms was at independence,because at thatmoment political arrangements were in suchflux that significant new initiativescould be undertaken.Indeed, some Africancountries (e.g., Moz- ambique,Angola) did makemassive changes in theirpolitical economy (e.g., nationalization,collectivization); unfortunately, these particular reforms were economicallyruinous because their socialist policies distorted economies even morethan in mostAfrican countries. Once independencebecomes the nor- mal situation,as it has in Africancountries, it becomesextraordinarily difficultfor leaders to makebasic reforms of political arrangements, such as fiscal systems,which might hurt powerful groups. As PeterBachrach and Morton Baratznoted in the contextof Americanpolitics, dominant values, myths, rituals,and institutionsquickly ossify so thatcrucial issues, such as fiscal reform,are not even on the agenda.43There appears to be no impetusfrom inside Africancountries to disruptthe currentfiscal arrangements signifi- cantly.Indeed, much of the argumentthat there is currentlya significant economiccrisis in Africa,and thatthis crisis was caused by malfunctioning governmentpolicies, came fromoutside the continent.44

43. PeterBachrach and MortonS. Baratz,"Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4 (December1962), p. 950. 44. For instance, the World Bank's report, AcceleratedDevelopment in Sub-SaharanAfrica, was crucialin notingthe dimensionsof Africa'seconomic crisis; it set the agenda forreform of Africaneconomies. Warand theState in Africa1133

However,it could be arguedthat structural adjustment, pressed on African countriesby the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), the WorldBank, and bilateraldonors, could servemany state-making functions. As externalactors dedicatedto fundamentalreforms of the economyand of the way the state operates,the IMF and otherdonors are notsubject to thesame rigiditiesthat paralyzedomestic reformers. The IMF and otheractors who insiston fun- damentalreform could pressure African states for significant changes in their tax system.Demands froman externalactor are similarto war, in thata leadercan legitimatelyargue to itspopulation that it has no choicein asking themto make verydifficult sacrifices because it is undertoo muchexternal pressure. It would be a majormistake, however, to taketoo farthe analogy between pressurefrom actors such as the IMF and the effectsof war. For instance, war producedsuch spectaculargains in governmentalefficiency because the stateitself felt threatened. The IMF, or any otheractor, cannot produce that feeling;indeed, structuraladjustment has been least successfulwhen it has triedto address the issues of how the stateitself operates in areas such as public enterprisesor fiscalarrangements.45 The cost to the state itselfin failingto adopt a structuraladjustment program can be severe,but fallsfar shortof what war would threaten.The IMF will never cause a state to disappear.At worst,a statecan simplyopt forthe high cost of breaking off relationswith the IMF. Nor does externalpressure of the type the Fund exerts produce any change in nationalidentity. While leaders can occasionallyrally people againstthe externalthreat posed by "imperialists,"these sentiments usually are not long- lastingbecause the populationmay be unable to distinguishbetween inter- nationalactors supposedly draining away thenation's funds during a structuraladjustment exercise, and thosenational leaders who led theircountry intosuch a spectaculareconomic debacle. While Europe's leaders in previous centurieshardly treated their populations well by modernstandards, it was usuallyunambiguous that people would be betteroff if theywon the war thanif they lost. The prospectsof structuraladjustment fostering some kindof nationalism based on resistingforeigners is also limitedbecause the IMF is not reallya

45. JeffreyHerbst, "Political Impediments to EconomicRationality: Why ZimbabweCannot Reformits PublicSector," The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March1989), pp. 67-85. InternationalSecurity 14:4 1134

"relevantother" to a largelypeasant population, and cannotinduce changes in nationalconsciousness of the typethat wars in Europeproduced. Unlike a war where the entirepopulation was threatenedbecause of its national identity,structural adjustment will help certaingroups unambiguously (e.g., peasantswho growexport crops), clearly hurt some (e.g., the urbanpopu- lationdependent on importedfood), and have ambiguouseffects on many others.Further, the intensityin shared experiencethat a war generates simplycannot be replicatedby, say, protractednegotiations over the IMF's ExtendedFund Facility.

TheLikelihood of War in Africa

Ifinternal reform seems improbable and thereis no otherexternal threat that can performquite the same role as war, the questionbecomes whether at some pointin the futureAfrican leaders will begin to see war as a potential avenuefor state-making. Some leadersmay look to war simplybecause they are trulyconcerned about the fateof the nationand see no otheroption. Othersmay not be concernedparticularly with nation-building, but may find that theircountries have sufferedeconomic decline for so long that the possibilitiesfor their own personalenrichment have become severely limited, and thereforewill seek to seize the assets of othercountries. So far,the systemthat has preservedthe continent'sboundaries has not been signifi- cantlytested because mostleaders considered it obvious that they were better offwith theirinherited boundaries than theywould be in a chaoticwar situationwhere sovereignty or considerableterritory might be lost.However, especiallyin the contextof decades of economicdecline, it is possiblethat some Africanleaders may recalculate the benefits of a peace thatlocks them intoperpetual weakness. Instead, they may tryto increasetheir state's ex- tractiveability and diverttheir citizens from inter-ethnic squabbles by seizing upon themultitude of provocations, always present, to provokea fightwith neighboringstates. Paul Colinvauxpresents the extremecase forthe prospectsof interstatewar in Africa:

Africaholds the greatestpossibilities for the aspiring general.... That there willbe battlesbetween African nations as theybuild their African continent in a new imageis as certainas anythingin history.For each countrythere must come times when wealth, hopes, ambitions,and numbersall rise Warand theState in Africa1 135

together.It thenneeds onlyaccess to high-qualityweapons for an aggression to be an attractiveundertaking.46 Ifsignificant interstate wars break out whenprovocations are smallbut elites realizewhat war could do forthe stateand the nation,it would not be a strikinglynew development.Rather, increased interstate warfare in Africa would simplybe a returnto the Europeannorm. Whether war in Africa todaywould actuallybring about the same kind of changesthat it did in Europecenturies ago is unclear,but the possibility that leaders might become so desperatethat they try in some fundamentalway to alterthe political rulesunder which their nations function should not be ignored. Many are the possible provocationsthat could bringabout significant interstatewar in Africa.Certainly, there are plentyof borderdisputes and fragmentsof ethnicgroups that need to be rescuedfrom "foreign domina- tion"to provideenough rationalization for hostile action against other African countries.Conflicts between language blocs (e.g., Englishversus French),47 disputesover controlof crucialrivers and railroads(especially given the numberof land-lockedcountries), or the simpleneed to have moreland for populationsthat double everytwenty years provide many other potential reasonsfor war in Africa.More thana fewAfrican leaders might someday agreewith Bismarck, a brilliantconsolidator of a "new nation,"on the only realway to unitea fragmentedpeople: Prussia. . ., as a glanceat themap willshow, could no longerwear unaided on its long narrowfigure the panoplywhich Germany required for its security;it mustbe equally distributedover all Germanpeoples. We should getno nearerthe goal by speeches,associations, decisions of majorities; we shouldbe unable to avoid a seriouscontest, a contestwhich could onlybe settledby blood and iron.18 AlthoughAfrican countries had moreor less equal defensecapabilities at independence,the growingdifferential in forceprojection capabilities have led some to suggestthat Africa will experiencemuch greater resort to force in the future.Inventories of tanksand otherarmored vehicles as well as

46. Paul Colinvaux,The Fates of Nations: A BiologicalTheory of History (London: Penguin, 1980), pp. 219-220. 47. Ibid.,p. 219. 48. Otto, Princevon Bismarck,Bismarck, the Man and theStatesman: Being the Reflections and ReminiscencesofOtto, Prince von Bismarck, Written and Dictatedby Himself after his Retirement from Office,translated under the supervisionof A.J. Butler, Vol. I (New York:Harper and Brothers, 1899),p. 313. InternationalSecurity 14:4 1136

artillery,jet fighters,and naval crafthave increasedconsiderably throughout the continent.For instance,just in the periodbetween 1966 and 1981,the numberof countriesin sub-SaharanAfrica with tanks increased from two to eighteen,the numberwith field artillery went from seven to thirty-six,the numberwith light armor went fromthirteen to thirty-six,and the number possessingjet aircraftwent fromsix to twenty-one.49Countries such as Nigeriaand Zaire have developed militarycapabilities that are fargreater than theirneighbors'. So far,the assuranceof stabilitythat is the central advantageof the currentAfrican state system has almostalways been more attractivethan whateverreasons Africanleaders may have had to begin conflictwith theirneighbors. However, as PresidentNyerere of Tanzania showed when he invadedUganda to depose Idi Amin,even strongpropo- nentsof African norms can be drivento interstateconflict if they believe that the costs of not actingare highenough. In the future,African leaders may findthat, despite all theirefforts, economic reform cannot progress and they cannotget theircitizenry to unitearound national symbols; it is conceivable thatthen the deterrentvalue of the normsof sovereigntymay seem much less powerfulthan they do now. Ifthese norms no longerprovided protection to a large numberof states,they would lose all meaningthroughout the Africancontinent. While the timing of these wars is notpredictable, it should be obvious thatthe incentivesthat African leaders have to incitewars for thepurposes of state-makingare significantand maybecome much stronger in the futurewhen the futilityof domesticreform during times of business as usual, thatis, peace, becomesclear.

ThePermanently Weak State: A NewDevelopment

Muchof this discussion has focusedon thepotential opportunities for African statesthat, in a European-typestate system, might have engagedin battle, won (or at leastnot lost too badly),and therebyused warin orderto further statebuilding. However, it shouldbe recognizedthat another class of states

49. WilliamG. Thom,"Sub-Saharan Africa's Changing Military Capabilities," in BruceE. Arling- haus and Pauline H. Baker, eds., AfricanArmies: Evolutionand Capabilities(Boulder, Colo.: Westview,1986), p. 101. See also WalterL. Barrows,"Changing Military Capabilities in Black Africa," in William Foltz and Henry Bienen, eds., Armsand theAfrican: Military Influence and Africa'sInternational Relations (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1985), p. 99 and p. 120;and HenryBienen, "African Militaries as ForeignPolicy Actors," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall1980), p. 176. Warand theState in Africa1 137

in Africais directlyaffected by the currentabsence of war: thosestates that wouldhave lostbadly and would have been absorbedby thewinners. These statesrange from those thatare just geographicanachronisms left by colo- nialism(e.g., The Gambia,Djibouti), and verysmall states in the shadow of giants (e.g., Benin and Togo, close to Nigeria,or Rwanda and Burundi borderingZaire), to those thatsimply lack significantresources for devel- opmentor defense(e.g., Mali, Mauritania).In Europeduring the formative centuries,disintegration of weak stateslike these was a regularoccurrence. Weak statesthat were defeatedthen became the poorerregions of richer countries,but at leastthey had a chanceto sharein therevenue and resources of a viable state. Yet the absence of a trulycompetitive state system that penalizesmilitary weakness means that even thosestates that have no other prospectsthan long-termdependence on internationalaid will survivein theircrippled form for the foreseeablefuture. Perhaps the only task of state consolidationthat these otherwise weak statescan accomplishis to physically capturetheir populations within the stableboundaries of the Africanstate system.50 The presenceof permanentlyweak statesthat will not be eliminatedis a new developmentin internationalrelations and one thatposes novel devel- opmentchallenges. All theoreticalwork on developmentso far,no matter what the ideologicalpredisposition of the authors,has implicitlyassumed thatsomehow the nation-statesas theycurrently exist are viable arrange- mentsfor development, if only they follow the proper strategies and receive enoughhelp fromthe international community. This assumption was appro- priatefor the European context where centuries of war had eliminatedstates thatsimply were not viable. However, for Africa, whose stateshave notbeen testedby an internationalsystem that severely punishes political weakness, thereis littlereason to believe thatmany of themwill be able to have a favorableenough geographicposition, control adequate naturalresources, gain the supportof a significantportion of theirpopulations, and construct strongadministrative structures to ever develop. In the long term,these statesmay disappear if interstate wars finallydo breakout in Africa. In the meantime,what is to be done with statesthat exist but cannot develop?It is fartoo earlyto writeoff any state'sprospects. We have been wrongabout the development prospects of many states both in Africa(where

50. See JeffreyHerbst, "Migration, the Politicsof Protest,and StateConsolidation in Africa," AfricanAffairs, forthcoming. InternationalSecurity 14:4 1138

scholarswere too optimistic)and elsewherein theworld, such as EastAsia.5' It would also be morallyunacceptable simply to allow these countriesto graduallyslide fromthe world'sview into a twilightof perpetualpoverty because natureand historyhave been unkindto them.However, thought mustbe givento nontraditionalalternatives for aid to statesthat in previous timeswould simplyhave been defeatedand absorbedby strongerneighbors in a war.For instance, the international community might consider rewarding those countriesin the ThirdWorld that have takenin economicmigrants fromnon-viable states.52 The Westcould considerproviding additional aid to thosecountries willing to engagein some kindof regionalintegration to mitigatethe problemsof unchangingboundaries, much as countriesthat have adoptedmore rational economic policies have attractedgreater aid from donors.The worldmay simplyhave to recognizethat a certainnumber of countriesare lockedinto non-viable positions, and developa long-termap- proachto theirwelfare rather than acting surprised every time the inevitable famineor ecologicaldisaster occurs.

Conclusion

It is importantnot to glorifywar. The warsthat Europe went through caused immensesuffering for generations and wholesaledestruction of some societies. Yet it is undeniablethat out of this destructionemerged stronger politicalarrangements and moreunified populations. No one wouldadvocate war as a solutionto Africa'spolitical and economicproblems, where the costs of interstatewar could be even higherthan in Europe. It is doubtful that,if Africancountries do startfighting wars, theywill undergoexactly the same processesof stateconsolidation that war engenderedin Europe. However,it should be recognizedthat there is verylittle evidence that African countries,or manyothers in the ThirdWorld, will be able to findpeaceful ways to strengthenthe stateand develop nationalidentities. In particular, the prospectsfor states that will not disappear,but simplycannot develop, mustbe examined.At the same time,we mustrecognize the possibility that

51. In the 1950sAmerican administrations debated whether South Korea could achieveany increasein livingstandards and if Americanaid shouldbe devotedto simplypreventing the countryfrom getting poorer. Clive Crook, "Trial and Error,"The Economist, September 23, 1989, p. 4. 52. See JeffreyHerbst, "Migration Helps Poorestof Poor,"Wall Street Journal, June 15, 1988, p. 12. Warand theState in Africa1 139

some Africanleaders in the futuremay come to believe thatthe costs of peace-limits on reformpossibilities and a fragmentedpopulation-are so highthat war may not seem like such an undesirablealternative. If African leadersdo indeed make thiscalculation, the sufferingthat Africa has seen in thelast twenty-five years may only be a preludeto muchmore dangerous developments.