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Web Report 2020 1 WEB REPORT 2020 Global Data At Risk State of the Web Report 2 Summary 2020 has been an extraordinary year. This report is offered during a time of Many of you may read this report unprecedented change that is transforming the way we work, shop, do business or because you’ve realized you access healthcare and financial services. The have Magecart risk. You do. COVID-19 pandemic has changed everything However, this report is intended - and provided a more extensive threat vector to shed light on the fact that for cybercriminals to exploit. This report, the problem is significantly conducted by analyzing the architecture bigger than Magecart. After all, and integrations of the 1000 most frequently what’s at stake is significant, requested websites from Alexa 1000, is as continued attacks risk intended to shed light on how vulnerable the erosion of the most websites and web applications are today. important ingredient that The key findings of this year’s Global Data at powers e-commerce and digital Risk - 2020 State of the Web Report suggest transformation: trust. there’s a lot of room for improvement. As expected, the data illustrates an increased reliance on JavaScript integrations to Data, the most significant driver of the power websites. Surprisingly, security digital economy, is at risk. efficacy has declined. Key findings from the Global Data at Risk - 2020 State of the Web Report highlight the scope of vulnerability and that the majority of global brands fail to deploy adequate Just 1.1% of websites analyzed security controls to guard against client- were found to have effective side attacks: security in place - an 11% decline from 2019. While deployment Despite increasing numbers of high-profile volume went up, effectiveness breaches, forms, found on 92% of websites declined more steeply. expose data to an average of 17 domains. Attackers have the upper hand This is PII, credentials, card transactions, and mainly because we are not medical records. Tala’s analysis shows that this playing effective defense. data is exposed to nearly 10X more domains than intended. Nearly one third of websites studied expose data to more than 20 domains. 3 COVID-19 has increased reliance on for continuous PII leakage monitoring digital experience. 58% of the content and prevention, similar to DLP for that displays on customer browsers web applications. This has significant is delivered by third-party JavaScript implications for PII leakage and, by integrations. This website supply chain extension, GDPR and CCPA. leverages client-side connections that operate outside the span of effective No attack is more widespread than Cross- control in 98% of sampled websites. The site Scripting (XSS) but 97% of websites client side is a primary attack vector for are using dangerous JavaScript functions website attacks today. that could serve as injection points to initiate a DOM XSS attack. Over 99% of websites are at risk from trusted, whitelisted domains like Google The average website in the Alexa 1000 Analytics. These can be leveraged to creates 10 connections to the user’s exfiltrate data, underscoring the need browser - a 21% increase on 2019. ADS ANALYTICS CDN CONTENT CUSTOMER SUCCESS HOSTING MARKETING SOCIAL TAG MANAGERS UTILITY VIDEO OTHER 99% of websites globally include multiple client-side vulnerabilities, making them attractive targets for attackers 4 Introduction The good, the bad, the to cookies and storage. And, as a recent unpredictable manipulation of Google Analytics has shown, without constant monitoring, even legitimate, whitelisted applications are vulnerable to data The global pandemic has driven an exfiltration and leakage. Increasingly, data unprecedented increase in online privacy mitigation will involve answering the transactions and e-commerce. By mid- question: “Do you have a handle on the data April alone, US retailers’ online YoY revenue your third-party integrations are collecting?” growth was up 68%, with a 146% growth in all online retail orders1. As millions of For e-commerce, the switch in purchase people worldwide are affected by stay- drivers presents a real opportunity for at-home orders, we’re beginning to see excellence in online experience. With more a dramatic shift in consumer behavior online shoppers than ever, site performance, towards everything-online. While many frictionless transactions and security have observed that the digital disruption can become key differentiators, not least in commerce is inevitable, this crisis has because attackers view this crisis as a great accelerated that trend. opportunity: Enterprise websites have long been a major target for attackers in search of Magecart attacks on online credit card data, PII, credentials, healthcare retailers and banks increased by information, malicious ad injection, session 20% during the pandemic.4 hijacks and re-directs and more. With e-commerce sales projected to grow, client- side web vulnerabilities pose a unique, global Web applications were involved threat to consumer data security - and the in 43% of breaches in 2019 ; 37% businesses associated with any breach: used or stole credentials.5 A data breach can wipe as much as 7.2% off a company’s share price: around While the pandemic has seen cybercriminals £8.8m for UK-listed companies or up to adapt to take advantage of changing $32.3m for US companies.2 circumstances, this analysis indicates that owners of the world’s top websites have been The average cost of a breach in 2019 slower to respond to the accelerating threat was $3m per organization, with lost landscape. business accounting for 36% of the cost - consistently the largest cost factor, Last year, Tala Security’s analysis of the Alexa driven by an average customer turnover 1000 websites revealed that only 2% of the rate of 3.9%.3 world’s leading websites were using security controls and standards capable of mitigating From a data privacy and protection client-side risks. perspective, increasing use of vulnerable forms or unmanaged third/fourth/fifth+ One year later, very little has changed; if parties can bring additional challenges anything, it seems security is headed in the for businesses seeking to comply with wrong direction. This is a particularly troubling regulations like GDPR or CCPA. Many third- finding given that website owners will be party integrations collect and re-purpose increasingly driven to improve user experience customer data collected from your site and enhance website richness in response to - anything from geolocation information the dramatic shift towards online commerce. 1CC Insight: US retailers see online growth YoY in April similar to recent holiday season. 2Data Economy: Data Breaches Wipe 7.2% off Average Company Share Price 3IBM: Cost of a Data Breach Report 2019. 4Wired: Online Credit Card Skimmers are Thriving During the Pandemic 5Verizon: 2020 Data Breach Investigations Report 5 2019 June May April • Quest Diagnostics • Mirrorthief • AeroGrow & LabCorp • Picreel & • Atlanta Hawks Alpaca Forms • Puma Australia • Cleor • Forbes • Leicester City FC July August September • The Guardian • Everlast • Garmin SA • Pelican • National Baseball • SEPTA Hall of Fame • Fragrance Direct • Poker Tracker December November October • Smith & Wesson • Macy's • Sesame Street • Sweaty Betty • Mission Health • Rooster Teeth • Umbro Brasil Productions • First Aid Beauty • Missoma • American Cancer Society 2020 January February March •WhatsApp • EuroTickets2020 • NutriBullet vulnerability • OlympicTickets2020 • Tupperware • Hanna Andersson • Truefire • Focus Camera • Blue Bear • Australian Bushfires • Donation Website June May April • Fitness • Paramo • Robert Dyas Depot • EasyJet • Claire’s • Intersport 6 Website Client-side security risks One vector, every sector Modern web applications and websites have user’s data; by compromising a widely undergone key architectural shifts, with used third-party component, attacks like important security implications. Today’s these can ‘mug’ multiple users on as many websites integrate code and resources from different sites as they wish, all exploiting dozens of third-party service providers, the same vulnerability. But that’s not even including user analytics, marketing tags, the whole story: there are many different CDNs, and third-party JavaScript libraries. ways hackers can exploit JavaScript to These integrations provide a rich, dynamic access sensitive data - and many types web experience, compelling content and of data they can steal, from personal data enhanced capabilities. Unfortunately, they to geolocation information. From a data also introduce critical vulnerabilities that privacy and compliance perspective, even enable client-side website attacks. legitimate third-party integrations can In the absence of correct vetting, this third- have unintended negative consequences party executable content can potentially be if they gather and share your customers’ compromised or malicious. These attacks information without your knowledge. typically involve credential theft, PII or It doesn’t matter what sector you operate credit card details, stolen via a ‘skimming’- in, JavaScript vulnerability impacts all type attack - widely known as ‘Magecart’ websites globally. It’s incumbent on website attacks. It seldom happens in a single owners to secure the user experience on the ‘mugging’ incident involving an individual browser sessions presented to end users. This ‘under the hood’ view of a typical enterprise website’s composition illustrates the large number of integrations,
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