Palestinian National Authority (PNA) Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas is scheduled to address the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on Friday, the same day he has stated that he will submit to the UN a letter of intent for Palestine to become the international organization’s 149th member. He plans to return to the West Bank on Saturday. The Palestinians will still not have their own state by then, and nor will they have one after the UN Security Council (UNSC) votes on the application, whenever that may be. There will be demonstrations that will break out in the Palestinian Territories (and the rest of the Arab world) as a result of this entire process, but the question is when (if ever) they will be particularly severe.
For months leading up to the current gathering of the UN General Assembly in New York, “the September UN vote” has been causing headaches for the Israelis and the U.S. in particular. But it has also created stress for the ruling military council in Egypt and the leadership of Islamist militant group Hamas that rules the Gaza Strip. None of these four actors want to see Abbas and the PNA herald in the creation of an independent Palestine at the moment, and all for different reasons.
Israel
Israel is the most obvious party that is opposed to a Palestinian bid for UN statehood. The irst reason is simple: Israel does not want to be left out of the process, as this would deny it leverage in negotiations. If there is ever going to be a Palestinian state, Israel would prefer to be integral to the process that leads to its formation. The second reason is also rather clear-cut: it will create the possibility for instability in the Palestinian Territories. Israel has not had to deal with a Palestinian intifada in over a decade, and it would prefer not to have to do so now. This is especially true during an already unstable period in the Middle East.
Israel is quite secure in the knowledge that for now, there will be no Palestinian state recognized by the UN, but it fears nonetheless what the reaction will be within the Palestinian Territories and the wider region following Abbas’ delivery of the letter of intent. The fact that the PNA has said that it will not place pressure on the UNSC to vote on the matter quickly is good for Israel as it indicates that the PNA is not seeking to create an immediate crisis, but Israel sees a crisis as a distinct possibility looming farther down the horizon. It is inevitable that Palestinian protests will take place; it’s just when, and how severe. They are likely to be the most severe whenever the UNSC votes on the application, however, because it will be shot down - either by a U.S. veto, or due to the failure to attract the support of nine of the council’s 15 members.
United States
The U.S. is the only permanent member of the UNSC that has said publicly it will use its veto to kill a Palestinian request for statehood. Its position is based upon the domestic political constraints placed upon President Obama. Though he came into of ice with a professed goal of helping bring about an independent Palestinian state before the expiration of his irst term, Obama found out early on the pitfalls of wading into the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and according to some polls, has actually seen the U.S.’ image in the Islamic world sink to a level even lower than the position held during the nadir of the George W. Bush administration. Obama now wants to get reelected, and knows the importance of securing the support of the Israeli lobby. With the campaign season around the corner, he is not prepared to take the risk of taking the Palestinians’ side on an issue of this magnitude.
Washington believes that “peace will not come through statements and resolutions at the U.N.,” to quote an Obama line delivered during his address before the General Assembly on Wednesday. If it comes to a vote in the UNSC, the U.S. will follow through with its vow to veto. Obama would prefer that it not reach that point, however, as the resulting demonstrations in the Palestinian Territories and elsewhere in the Arab world would then take on a markedly anti-American tone. He has thus tried in vain to convince Abbas to avoid the UNSC altogether by seeking to merely elevate Palestine's position in the UN to a status which does not quite reach that of of icial statehood. This would require Abbas to apply for a resolution in the wider UNGA, where the Palestinians enjoy widespread support, and which would not put the U.S. in a position to block a full membership application.
Fatah
Abbas rejected this American proposal to eschew the full statehood path (which was also publicly enunciated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy) because of the domestic political constraints he, too, is under. Abbas represents the PNA, but is also the leader of Fatah, the Palestinian organization that controls the West Bank. Fatah's no. 1 adversary is not Israel, but actually Hamas, the Islamist group that runs the Gaza Strip. The West by and large does not want to deal with Hamas, however, due to the group’s refusal to recognize Israel's right to exist, and its proclivity to use violence to express that view. Fatah already has more legitimacy than Hamas in the eyes of most of the international community, and it has cemented its image as the representative of the Palestinian people in many countries’ eyes even further during the drive for statehood. Fatah has also been able to develop additional credibility in the eyes of the Arab world during the same process, as Arab states are all under pressure from their citizens to support a push for Palestinian statehood.
Abbas cannot bend to outside pressure at this point and turn back. He has put too much time and political capital into the “September UN vote” over the past few months; it would be risking political suicide and a complete loss of legitimacy at home for Fatah to abandon the push now. Even in the face of threats by Israel to withhold the tax revenues it distributes to the PNA as per one of the agreements forged in Oslo in 1993, or some calls by American lawmakers to also withhold funds to the PNA for its insistence on moving ahead, Abbas is under too much political pressure to stop. Few people (in the Palestinian Territories or elsewhere) actually think they can obtain statehood in this manner, but it is about being seen as standing up for the rights of Palestinians at this point, not actual statehood. This is especially important for Fatah, as for years Hamas has railed against the group for being too quick to compromise with Israel and the West.
Hamas
Hamas opposes the UN bid for a simple reason: it will bene it its archrival Fatah. Hamas’ stance on this issue places its interests in line with Israel, which is ironic and slightly awkward for an Islamist militant group whose raison d’etre is Israel’s destruction. This places Hamas in a dif icult situation. Clearly it cannot be seen as agreeing with Israel to prevent the emergence of a Palestinian state.
Hamas has thus hedged in its public position on the issue. The head of the Hamas government in Gaza, Ismail Haniyeh, said on Monday that while Hamas opposes the UN bid, it would never do anything to harm the aspirations of the Palestinian people. On Thursday, however, another Gaza-based Hamas of icial, Mahmoud Zahar, said bluntly that if Palestine were to be recognized at the UN, it would mean Hamas could no longer ight Israel, implying that this alone was a reason to oppose the bid.
Hamas' legitimacy in the eyes of its supporters lies in its determination to ight Israel, and the risk it takes in standing by and watching Fatah push forward with the application to the UN is allowing its rival to be seen as doing the same thing via diplomacy. Hamas may quietly feel that this is actually a good thing, as the inevitable failure of the Abbas government to actually come away with a Palestinian state creates a potentially embarrassing situation for Hamas’ rivals. But if Hamas views the situation in a different light, it could always try to throw a wrench into the entire process by doing what it often does: launching attacks against Israel, either directly or by proxy. Hamas' main aim is to prevent Fatah from taking the mantle of Palestinian resistance to Israel, but this fact alone does not necessarily dictate how the group will respond.
Egypt
The military council currently ruling Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), does not want a Palestinian statehood bid at the UN because of the potential effects it could have on its own population. The SCAF is committed to its decades-old peace treaty with Israel for strategic reasons, and is not going to abandon the alliance. This rubs against the expectations for change amongst many Egyptians, who are increasingly coming to the realization that there was never a true revolution in the country - Cairo's relationship with Israel simply serving as one example of how things have not changed.
The Israel issue, though, is an emotional one for Egyptian people. Most Egyptian people do not like Israel, and loathe the fact that their government is willing to entertain such good relations with it. The anti-Israel mood in the country is growing, too, especially following the death of Egyptian security forces following the Aug. 18 Eilat attacks and the subsequent attack on the Israeli embassy in Cairo in September.
If and when Palestinian demonstrations break out in Israel as a result of the UN push, there will be demonstrations in Egypt as well. This will put additional pressure on the SCAF. Though the SCAF has been able to handle the demonstrations in its country fairly well up to now, the military's concern is that this issue could be one that especially galvanizes the Islamist segment of society, which thus far has not been as active in protesting. Even worse, the SCAF fears that this could be an issue that unites the Islamist and non-Islamist opposition, and snowballs into much larger demonstrations than it has seen before.