Liberal divisions Jaime Reynolds looks at the electoral impact of a potential Liberal–National Liberal reunion ImpactsImpacts ofof reunification?reunification? The electoral prospects of a reunited Liberal Party in the 1940s
an Hunter’s article on the attempts to reunite the • The national impact: that is the general ‘boost’ ILiberal and Liberal National parties in the mid- that might have been given to the Liberal Party in s prompts the question: what electoral assets did other areas as a result of reunification. the Liberal Nationals have to offer a reunited party? Could reunion have sparked the revival in the party’s electoral fortunes that in fact came a decade later? Local impact What wider political impact might it have had? In the seats they fought, a percentage of the actual As the Liberal Nationals never tested their inde- vote given to Liberal National candidates would pendent electoral strength against the Liberal and have gone to a united Liberal candidate if the parties Conservative parties, it is impossible to gauge with had merged. Assuming that the votes for the Liberal much accuracy how many votes they might have candidate, where there was one, would have gone en been able to swing across to a reunited party. Never- bloc to a united candidate, we can calculate the pro- theless we can get some measure of the range of portion of Liberal National votes that had to transfer electoral potential of a merged party: the minimum in order for the united Liberal to win the seat. and maximum impact that adherence of the Liberal We can exclude all seats where even a % trans- Nationals might have had. fer of the Liberal National vote to the Liberal would Table shows the Liberal Nationals performance have been insufficient to defeat the winning candi- at the elections of the period. However, these figures date. In there were thirty-six such seats (thirty- greatly overstate the number of committed Liberal five Labour and one Communist). In there National voters since they include many Conserva- were thirty-two (all Labour). That leaves thirteen tive-inclined voters in constituencies where a Lib- seats in and twenty-three in where at least eral National was the standard-bearer for the Na- potentially a merged Liberal Party might have gath- tional coalition. In the bald figures are even ered up enough votes to win. more misleading, as the totals include numerous es- If the transfer of Liberal National votes had been sentially Conservative candidates running under below %, only one seat would have been vulner- various joint labels. able to Liberal attack: Denbigh, which was a unique There were also some Liberal National support- two-horse race between Liberal National and Lib- ers in constituencies with no Liberal National can- eral at each election between and . didate, who are thus not included in these figures. Denbigh would have gone to a united Liberal on a However, it is safe to assume that their numbers % shift in and a shift of only % in . were negligible by the mid-s. The Conserva- If % of Liberal National votes had transferred, tives made great efforts in to tap Liberal votes, four more seats would have been won in (St and no doubt they would have run more candidates Ives – %, Huntingdonshire – %, Dumfriesshire under the Liberal National label if there had been – % and Eddisbury – %). Two other seats, South significant concentrations of such voters elsewhere Molton and Fife East, both requiring a % transfer, to target. would have been in the balance. The next most vul- The number of additional MPs a united Liberal nerable seat, Montrose Burghs, would have required Party might have won in and would have a massive transfer of more than %. depended on two factors: In , a % transfer would have secured a • The local impact in constituencies where the maximum of seven more seats. However in only Liberal Nationals were organised and ran can- four of these was the candidate clearly a Lib- didates eral National (Torrington – %, Fife East – %,
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 17 been modest because there were few Table 1: Liberal National performance seats where Liberals were close be- hind the winning party. In a Election Lib Nat vote % vote Candidates Seats won .% swing - if extended into the 1931 809,302 3.7 41 35 Celtic fringe - would have enabled 1935 866,354 3.7 44 33 the Liberals to hold Caithness & 1945 737,732 2.9 49 11 Sutherland (C majority .%) and 195014 985,343 3.4 55 16 Caernarvonshire Boroughs (C major- Source: F.W.S. Craig, British Electoral Facts 1832–1987 (1989) and British Parliamentary ity .%) and gain Orkney & Shet- Election Results 1918-49 (1977) and 1950-70 (1971). land (C majority .%), Leominster (C majority .%), Aberdeenshire West & Kincardine (C majority .%) Huntingdonshire – % and Harwich a reversal of the years of decline and and Roxburgh & Selkirk (C majority – %). In the other three, the Con- disunity. For the Tories it would have .%). In they would have won servative was the dominant partner been much more difficult to lay claim only two extra seats: Dorset North (C (St Ives – %, Angus North and to the Liberal inheritance. majority .%) and Caithness & Mearns – % and Angus South – On the other hand, the Liberal Na- Sutherland (C majority .%). %). A transfer of over % would tionals were not an impressive force. have been required in order to win They included few ‘big-hitters’ by any further seats. . Lord Simon was seventy-three Conclusion Even in a seat with a strong Liberal and increasingly detached from the Table summarises the likely range of tradition and a good candidate, a trans- party. Only Ernest Brown, their leader, electoral impacts of reunion. It is un- fer of % of the votes would have been was of senior ministerial rank. The ca- likely that the direct electoral dividend a considerable achievement. For exam- reers of the few other well-known fig- for the Liberals of merger would have ple, Edgar Granville, elected as a Liberal ures such as Leslie Burgin and Leslie been any greater than this. Only if re- National for the Eye Division of Suf- Hore-Belisha, were clearly past their union had had a mould-breaking im- folk in and stood as a Liberal, peak or had a new focus, as in the case pact would they have been able to es- with CnÓ{ervative and Labour oppo- of Clement Davies who had already cape the electoral constraints in which nents, in . Granville retained % joined the Liberals. The party was they found themselves by –. of his vote and was re-elected. ageing: almost half of its MPs in There were simply not enough Liberal This probably represents the best-case were in their sixties or seventies. The near-misses to deliver major gains. At scenario: Granville was a popular and Liberal Nationals were also tainted by best the merged party might have re- hard-working constituency MP with a their long association with an un- turned about the same number of in- significant personal vote. In more aver- popular Tory party and the appease- dependent Liberals as in . An im- age constituencies, the level of transfer ment policies of the s. Their ad- probably large swing would have been might well have been much less. What herence to the Liberal Party might needed to start regaining the ground little evidence there is does not suggest even have weakened its appeal to the lost by the split. For the Liberal Na- much inclination by Liberal and Liberal radical mood of . By the tionals the prospects were decidedly National voters to join hands. Liberal Nationals had even less to offer unfavourable. Without their Con- in terms of front-rank politicians. servative lifeline most faced almost Even if one assumes a substantial, certain defeat. The electoral arithmetic National impact positive and uniform national swing was thus heavily loaded against the re- A reunited Liberal Party would also to the Liberals of, say, .% the gains union project. have expected to make a stronger na- this would have produced would have However, the political impact of re- tional impact and thus gain further seats outside the Liberal National strong- holds. What general ‘boost’ to a united Table 2: Potential impacts of reunion Liberal Party might adherence of the Liberal Nationals given? Actual Lib seats won Potential gains from reunion It seems safe to assume that reunion 1945 1950 1945 1950 would have given some boost to the Limited impact credibility of the Liberals at both gen- (<25% local transfer of Lib Nat votes, 1215 943 eral elections. The size of the Parlia- 1% national swing to Libs) mentary party would have trebled in the run-up to the election, and Significant impact (50% local transfer of Lib Nat votes, 10–12 6–9 doubled before the election. 2.5% national swing to Libs) Reunification would also have marked
18 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 union - or indeed any factor increas- ing the Liberal vote slightly - would Table 3: Potential impact in 1950 have been considerable in , and Lib vote Swing Con to Lab Con seats lost Labour Commons majority potentially huge in . It would have allowed Sir Archibald Sinclair to From swing Adding effect hold the seat in Caithness & Suther- of 20% Lib Nat shift to Lib land that he lost very narrowly in shift to Lib and , and Jo Grimond would have +1.0% 0.10% 6 to Lab,1 to Lib16 17 25 entered the Commons in instead +2.5% 0.25% 5 to Lab17 27 35 of . Frank Byers would have held his seat in . This would have strengthened the Liberal parliamen- ship and the Bevanite Left would any- technically it would have fallen on a 44% trans- tary party significantly and opened the way have engulfed the Labour govern- fer. In fact the sitting MP was a Tory standing un- der a ‘Conservative and Liberal’ label in a seat possibility of more effective leadership ment and prevented it from surviving with a weak Liberal tradition. under Sinclair and Grimond in the pe- a full term. But even another year or 4 He had been MP since 1929. As Labour candi- riod - than Clement Davies two in office would have brought it date for Eye in 1955 and 1959, he secured much of the previous Liberal vote. was able to provide. the benefit of the economic upturn 5For example in the double-member constitu- The election was so evenly and the possibility of prolonging La- ency of Southampton in 1945 single Con- balanced that a few more Liberal votes bour rule. servative, Liberal National and Liberal candi- could have altered the result and po- For the Liberals this scenario would dates stood for the two seats. Only 7% of Lib- eral National voters shared their votes with tentially the course of politics in the have given them vital time to recover the Liberal and under 2% voted only for the s. Labour won the election with a from the election with a consider- Liberal National, whereas 88% also voted for majority of only five seats and called a ably strengthened leadership and parlia- the Conservative. Amongst Liberal voters, 44% voted only for the Liberal, 19% cast Lib- new election in . The Conserva- mentary party including Sinclair, Byers eral/Liberal National votes, 20% joint votes tives won (despite winning fewer and Megan Lloyd George (who lost her with the Conservative and 17% with Labour. votes), beginning a sequence of gov- seat in ). It is unlikely that they This suggests that the great bulk of the Lib- eral National vote was Conservative-inclined, ernments that lasted until , ben- would have suffered the near-collapse and that many Liberal voters were disinclined efiting from the world economic of – and they would have had to vote for a Liberal National who in this case boom which took off in the early less lost ground to recover when their had strong Liberal credentials. s. The Liberal band of nine MPs fortunes improved. They were tantalis- 6 Burgin retired in 1945, and Hore-Belisha, who had left the Liberal Nationals in 1942 to sit as an was caught in the intense Labour– ingly close to this prospect. Independent, was defeated. To ry struggle in the - parlia- The Liberal Nationals chose the 7 In the long years of Tory government that fol- ment that cruelly exposed its political slow death of maintaining their alliance lowed, among the Liberal Nationals only J.S. Maclay made the cabinet as Secretary of State divisions and weak leadership. The with the Tories instead of the suicide for Scotland in 1957-62. Sir David Renton and Liberals were unable to contest the most of them would have faced by Niall Macpherson became Ministers of State. election of effectively so soon af- joining the Liberals. But in doing so 8 Denbigh is excluded from these figures. 9A swing of 5% would have produced six more ter the great effort they had made in they may have played an important part gains in 1945 (Bodmin, Camborne, Barnstaple, , and lost three more seats as their in securing their principal goal: to en- Mid-Bedfordshire, Gainsborough and Berwick- share of the vote slumped to .%. The sure that Britain in the s was not on-Tweed), and one in 1950 (North Cornwall). party was brought to the brink of ex- governed by the Labour Party. This excludes Middlesbrough West in 1945 and Western Isles in 1950, where Liberals had tinction and only began to recover in straight fights with Labour and so presumably earnest in the late s after Jo Dr Jaime Reynolds studied politics at LSE, already had the full anti-Labour vote. Grimond became leader. and has a long-standing interest in Liberal 10 Sinclair suffered a serious stroke in 1951. Jo Grimond was then aged thirty-eight and might A shift of Liberal National votes to Democrat and electoral history. He works for have been judged too young to assume the the Liberals in would have ena- the Environment Directorate-General of the leadership. If Grimond had been elected in bled Labour to win a few Conserva- European Commission. 1945, however, he would already have had the same length of parliamentary experience as he tive seats. In addition, an increase in had when he was actually elected leader in the Liberal vote nationally would have 1 Strictly speaking the label ‘Liberal National’ was 1956. Megan Lloyd George might have been a helped Labour because Liberal votes used only until 1948, after which the label ‘Na- contender for the leadership as well as Clement tional Liberal’ was adopted. For the sake of clar- Davies. were drawn more heavily from the To- ity, and for consistency with other articles, ‘Lib- 11 A shift of 20% of Liberal National votes to Liberal ries than Labour. Table illustrates the eral National’ is used throughout. in 1950 would have given Labour four more probable effect. This would have 2A few Liberal Nationals were opposed by Con- seats, enough to increase its Commons majority servative candidates in 1931, but none by Liber- given Labour a working majority in from five to thirteen. The vulnerable seats were als. After 1931 Liberal Nationals sometimes Luton, Bradford North, Renfrew West and Nor- the Commons at least equal to that faced Liberal opponents, but never Conserva- folk Central. enjoyed by the Conservatives between tives, with the one exception of a by-election in 12 D.E. Butler, The British General Election of 1951 1946 in the wholly untypical constituency of -. It is possible that the devel- (1952), pp. 270-71, concludes that generally Combined Scottish Universities. ex-Liberal voters from 1950 split in favour of the oping divisions between the leader- 3 Sheffield Hallam has been excluded although Conservatives in at least the proportion 60:40 in
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 19 1951. Assuming that an increased Liberal vote 13 The Liberals would have secured 2.5% more 15 Includes Gwilym Lloyd George. in 1950 would have drawn votes from the two votes if they had simply maintained their opin- 16 Spelthorne (C majority 0.0%), Stroud & other parties in the same proportion, it would ion poll rating (12%) at the start of the 1950 elec- Thornbury (0.1%), Pudsey (0.1%), York (0.1%), have produced the swings from Conservative to tion campaign through to polling day. Shipley (0.1%), Dorset North (0.2%) and Labour illustrated in the table. In addition if a re- 14 1950 figures refer to candidates categorised by Woolwich West (0.2%). vived Liberal Party had fought more seats in F. W.S. Craig as National Liberal and Conserva- 17 Bexley (0.3%), Chislehurst (0.3%), Bromsgrove 1950, their intervention might have tipped the tive. These ran under a variety of labels: Na- (0.3%), Peterborough (0.4%) and Glasgow balance in favour of Labour in three more seats tional Liberal, National Liberal and Conserva- Scotstoun (0.5%). where the Conservatives won narrowly in tive, Conservative and National Liberal, Liberal straight fights: Glasgow Craigton (if the Liberal and Conservative, and Conservative and Lib- vote had been above 3%), Eastleigh (above 7%) eral. See Times Guide to the House of Com- and Burton (above 9%). mons, 1945, 1950.
Research in Progress If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other information — or if you know anyone who can — please pass on details to them. Details of other research projects in progress should be sent to the Editor (see page 2) for inclusion here.
The party agent and English electoral culture, c.1880 – c.1906. The Crouch End or Hornsey Liberal Association or Young Liberals in the development of political agency as a profession, the role of the 1920s and 1930s; especially any details of James Gleeson or Patrick election agent in managing election campaigns during this period, Moir, who are believed to have been Chairmen. Tony Marriott, Flat and the changing nature of elections, as increased use was made of A, 13 Coleridge Road, Crouch End, London N8 8EH. the press and the platform. Kathryn Rix, Christ's College, Liberal foreign policy in the 1930s. Focussing particularly on Liberal Cambridge, CB2 2BU; [email protected]. anti-appeasers. Michael Kelly, 12 Collinbridge Road, Whitewell, Liberal policy towards Austria-Hungary, 1905–16. Andrew Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim BT36 7SN Gardner, 22 Birdbrook House, Popham Road, Islington, London N1 The Liberal Party and the wartime coalition 1940–45. Sources, 8TA; [email protected]. particularly on Sinclair as Air Minister, and on Harcourt Johnstone, The Hon H. G. Beaumont (MP for Eastbourne 1906–10). Any Dingle Foot, Lord Sherwood and Sir Geoffrey Maunder (Sinclair's information welcome, particularly on his political views (he stood as PPS) particularly welcome. Ian Hunter, 9 Defoe Avenue, Kew, a Radical). Tim Beaumont, 40 Elms Road, London SW4 9EX. Richmond TW9 4DL; [email protected].
Edmund Lamb (Liberal MP for Leominster 1906–10). Any Clement Davies – research for the first full biography. Of particular information on his election and period as MP; wanted for biography interest are the activities of government departments where of his daughter, Winfred Lamb. Dr David Gill, Clement Davies worked in the First World War, including Enemy [email protected]. Activities in Neutral Countries, Economic Warfare and Trading with the Enemy; also the period 1939–42, after Davies left the Liberal Joseph King (Liberal MP for North Somerset during the Great War). Nationals but before he rejoined the independent Liberals, and his Any information welcome, particularly on his links with the Union relationships with MacDonald, Boothby, Attlee and Churchill. Alun of Democratic Control and other opponents of the war (including Wyburn-Powell; [email protected]. his friend George Raffalovich). Colin Houlding; [email protected] The Unservile State Group, 1953–1970s. Dr Peter Barberis, 24 Lime Avenue, Flixton, Manchester M41 5DE. The political life and times of Josiah Wedgwood MP. Study of the political life of this radical MP, hoping to shed light on the question The Young Liberal Movement 1959–1985; including in particular of why the Labour Party replaced the Liberals as the primary relations with the leadership, and between NLYL and ULS. Carrie popular representatives of radicalism in the 1920s. Park, 89 Coombe Lane, Bristol BS9 2AR; Paul Mulvey, 112 Richmond Avenue, London N1 0LS; [email protected]. [email protected]. The revival of the Liberal Party in the 1960s and ‘70s; including the Recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative Party, 1906–1935. relationships between local and parliamentary electoral Aims to suggest reasons for defections of individuals and develop performance. Access to party records (constituency- and ward- an understanding of changes in electoral alignment. Sources level) relating to local activity in London and Birmingham, and include personal papers and newspapers; suggestions about how interviews with key activists of particular interest. Paul Lambe, to get hold of the papers of more obscure Liberal defectors University of Plymouth; [email protected]. welcome. Cllr Nick Cott, 1a Henry Street, Gosforth, Newcastle- The political and electoral strategy of the Liberal Party 1970–79. upon-Tyne, NE3 1DQ; [email protected]. Individual constituency papers, and contact with members of the Liberals and the local government of London 1919–39. Chris Fox, Party’s policy committees and/or the Party Council, particularly 173 Worplesdon Road, Guildford GU2 6XD; welcome. Ruth Fox, 7 Mulberry Court, Bishop’s Stortford, Herts [email protected]. CM23 3JW.
20 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001