32 Reynolds Impacts of Reunification

Liberal divisions Jaime Reynolds looks at the electoral impact of a potential Liberal–National Liberal reunion ImpactsImpacts ofof reunification?reunification? The electoral prospects of a reunited Liberal Party in the 1940s an Hunter’s article on the attempts to reunite the • The national impact: that is the general ‘boost’ ILiberal and Liberal National parties in the mid- that might have been given to the Liberal Party in s prompts the question: what electoral assets did other areas as a result of reunification. the Liberal Nationals have to offer a reunited party? Could reunion have sparked the revival in the party’s electoral fortunes that in fact came a decade later? Local impact What wider political impact might it have had? In the seats they fought, a percentage of the actual As the Liberal Nationals never tested their inde- vote given to Liberal National candidates would pendent electoral strength against the Liberal and have gone to a united Liberal candidate if the parties Conservative parties, it is impossible to gauge with had merged. Assuming that the votes for the Liberal much accuracy how many votes they might have candidate, where there was one, would have gone en been able to swing across to a reunited party. Never- bloc to a united candidate, we can calculate the pro- theless we can get some measure of the range of portion of Liberal National votes that had to transfer electoral potential of a merged party: the minimum in order for the united Liberal to win the seat. and maximum impact that adherence of the Liberal We can exclude all seats where even a % trans- Nationals might have had. fer of the Liberal National vote to the Liberal would Table shows the Liberal Nationals performance have been insufficient to defeat the winning candi- at the elections of the period. However, these figures date. In there were thirty-six such seats (thirty- greatly overstate the number of committed Liberal five Labour and one Communist). In there National voters since they include many Conserva- were thirty-two (all Labour). That leaves thirteen tive-inclined voters in constituencies where a Lib- seats in and twenty-three in where at least eral National was the standard-bearer for the Na- potentially a merged Liberal Party might have gath- tional coalition. In the bald figures are even ered up enough votes to win. more misleading, as the totals include numerous es- If the transfer of Liberal National votes had been sentially Conservative candidates running under below %, only one seat would have been vulner- various joint labels. able to Liberal attack: Denbigh, which was a unique There were also some Liberal National support- two-horse race between Liberal National and Lib- ers in constituencies with no Liberal National can- eral at each election between and . didate, who are thus not included in these figures. Denbigh would have gone to a united Liberal on a However, it is safe to assume that their numbers % shift in and a shift of only % in . were negligible by the mid-s. The Conserva- If % of Liberal National votes had transferred, tives made great efforts in to tap Liberal votes, four more seats would have been won in (St and no doubt they would have run more candidates Ives – %, Huntingdonshire – %, Dumfriesshire under the Liberal National label if there had been – % and Eddisbury – %). Two other seats, South significant concentrations of such voters elsewhere Molton and Fife East, both requiring a % transfer, to target. would have been in the balance. The next most vul- The number of additional MPs a united Liberal nerable seat, Montrose Burghs, would have required Party might have won in and would have a massive transfer of more than %. depended on two factors: In , a % transfer would have secured a • The local impact in constituencies where the maximum of seven more seats. However in only Liberal Nationals were organised and ran can- four of these was the candidate clearly a Lib- didates eral National (Torrington – %, Fife East – %, Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 17 been modest because there were few Table 1: Liberal National performance seats where Liberals were close be- hind the winning party. In a Election Lib Nat vote % vote Candidates Seats won .% swing - if extended into the 1931 809,302 3.7 41 35 Celtic fringe - would have enabled 1935 866,354 3.7 44 33 the Liberals to hold Caithness & 1945 737,732 2.9 49 11 Sutherland (C majority .%) and 195014 985,343 3.4 55 16 Caernarvonshire Boroughs (C major- Source: F.W.S. Craig, British Electoral Facts 1832–1987 (1989) and British Parliamentary ity .%) and gain Orkney & Shet- Election Results 1918-49 (1977) and 1950-70 (1971). land (C majority .%), Leominster (C majority .%), Aberdeenshire West & Kincardine (C majority .%) Huntingdonshire – % and Harwich a reversal of the years of decline and and Roxburgh & Selkirk (C majority – %). In the other three, the Con- disunity. For the Tories it would have .%). In they would have won servative was the dominant partner been much more difficult to lay claim only two extra seats: Dorset North (C (St Ives – %, Angus North and to the Liberal inheritance. majority .%) and Caithness & Mearns – % and Angus South – On the other hand, the Liberal Na- Sutherland (C majority .%). %). A transfer of over % would tionals were not an impressive force. have been required in order to win They included few ‘big-hitters’ by any further seats. Lord Simon was seventy-three Conclusion Even in a seat with a strong Liberal and increasingly detached from the Table summarises the likely range of tradition and a good candidate, a trans- party. Only Ernest Brown, their leader, electoral impacts of reunion. It is un- fer of % of the votes would have been was of senior ministerial rank. The ca- likely that the direct electoral dividend a considerable achievement. For exam- reers of the few other well-known fig- for the Liberals of merger would have ple, Edgar Granville, elected as a Liberal ures such as Leslie Burgin and Leslie been any greater than this. Only if re- National for the Eye Division of Suf- Hore-Belisha, were clearly past their union had had a mould-breaking im- folk in and stood as a Liberal, peak or had a new focus, as in the case pact would they have been able to es- with CnÓ{ervative and Labour oppo- of Clement Davies who had already cape the electoral constraints in which nents, in . Granville retained % joined the Liberals. The party was they found themselves by –. of his vote and was re-elected. ageing: almost half of its MPs in There were simply not enough Liberal This probably represents the best-case were in their sixties or seventies. The near-misses to deliver major gains. At scenario: Granville was a popular and Liberal Nationals were also tainted by best the merged party might have re- hard-working constituency MP with a their long association with an un- turned about the same number of in- significant personal vote. In more aver- popular Tory party and the appease- dependent Liberals as in . An im- age constituencies, the level of transfer ment policies of the s. Their ad- probably large swing would have been might well have been much less. What herence to the Liberal Party might needed to start regaining the ground little evidence there is does not suggest even have weakened its appeal to the lost by the split. For the Liberal Na- much inclination by Liberal and Liberal radical mood of . By the tionals the prospects were decidedly National voters to join hands. Liberal Nationals had even less to offer unfavourable. Without their Con- in terms of front-rank politicians. servative lifeline most faced almost Even if one assumes a substantial, certain defeat. The electoral arithmetic National impact positive and uniform national swing was thus heavily loaded against the re- A reunited Liberal Party would also to the Liberals of, say, .% the gains union project. have expected to make a stronger na- this would have produced would have However, the political impact of re- tional impact and thus gain further seats outside the Liberal National strong- holds. What general ‘boost’ to a united Table 2: Potential impacts of reunion Liberal Party might adherence of the Liberal Nationals given? Actual Lib seats won Potential gains from reunion It seems safe to assume that reunion 1945 1950 1945 1950 would have given some boost to the Limited impact credibility of the Liberals at both gen- (<25% local transfer of Lib Nat votes, 1215 943 eral elections. The size of the Parlia- 1% national swing to Libs) mentary party would have trebled in the run-up to the election, and Significant impact (50% local transfer of Lib Nat votes, 10–12 6–9 doubled before the election. 2.5% national swing to Libs) Reunification would also have marked 18 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 32 Autumn 2001 union - or indeed any factor increas- ing the Liberal vote slightly - would Table 3: Potential impact in 1950 have been considerable in , and Lib vote Swing Con to Lab Con seats lost Labour Commons majority potentially huge in . It would have allowed Sir Archibald Sinclair to From swing Adding effect hold the seat in Caithness & Suther- of 20% Lib Nat shift to Lib land that he lost very narrowly in shift to Lib and , and Jo Grimond would have +1.0% 0.10% 6 to Lab,1 to Lib16 17 25 entered the Commons in instead +2.5% 0.25% 5 to Lab17 27 35 of . Frank Byers would have held his seat in . This would have strengthened the Liberal parliamen- ship and the Bevanite Left would any- technically it would have fallen on a 44% trans- tary party significantly and opened the way have engulfed the Labour govern- fer.

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