The Origin of Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program
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The origin of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program: Technical reality and Western hypocrisy by Suren Erkman, Andre Gsponer, Jean-Pierre Hurni, and Stephan Klement Independent Scientific Research Institute Box 30, CH-1211 Geneva-12, Switzerland ISRI-05-09.11 20 October 2008 arXiv:physics/0512268v4 [physics.soc-ph] 21 Oct 2008 2 Abstract This report is based on a series of papers written between 1980 and 2005 on the origin of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, which was known to one of the authors in the late 1970s already, as well astoa number of other physicists, who independently tried without success to inform their governments and the public. Itis concludedthatatno pointdidtheWestern governmentseffectively try to stop Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, which suggests that its existence was useful as a foreign policy tool, as is confirmed by its use as a major justification to wage two wars on Iraq. i ii Dedicated to Roy Adrian Preiswerk (1934–1982). Professor at the University of Geneva Graduate Institute of Interna- tional Studies (IUHEI), creator and first Director of the Institute of Development Studies (IUED), founding member and first President (1980–1982) of the Directing Committee of the Geneva International Peace Research Institute (GIPRI). Author of: Ziele und Mittel schweizerischer Friedenspolitik auf internationale Ebene, in: Urs Altermatt, Roy Preiswerk, und Hans Ruh, Formen schweizerischer Friedenspolitik (Iustitia et Pax und GIPRI, Fribourg, 1982) 7–66; translated in French as: Les objectifs et les moyens d’une politique internationale suisse pour la paix, trad. Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff avec la collaboration de Gilbert Rist, in: Gilbert Rist, editeur,´ A` Contre-Courants : l’Enjeu des Relations Interculturelles (Editions´ d’en bas, Lausanne, 1984) 61–146. Contents Abstract i Preface: From 1979 to 2005 ix 1 Atomic Bomb: Iraq Went through CERN 1 1.1 NUCLEARWEAPONS—AResearcherBlewtheWhistle! . 1 1.2 Geneva:CradleoftheIraqiBomb . 2 1.2.1 JafarDhiaJafar’sConnections . 3 1.2.2 ProliferantTechnology . 3 1.2.3 TheCalutronsAreConfirmed . 5 1.3 “To protect ourselves from the threat of nuclear proliferation, we willhavetouseforce” ....................... 6 2 Iraq’s calutrons : Electromagnetic isotope separation, beam technol- ogy, and nuclear weapon proliferation 9 2.1 Abstract............................... 9 2.2 Introduction............................. 10 2.3 Principleand state ofthe art in calutron technology . ..... 12 2.3.1 Enrichmenttechnologiesinperspective . 12 2.3.2 Basic principleand main characteristics of EMIS . 13 2.3.3 SourcesofinformationonEMISandcalutrons . 17 2.3.4 EMISintheUnitedStates . 18 iii iv 2.3.5 EMISintheSovietUnion . 20 2.3.6 EMISintheUnitedKingdom . 22 2.3.7 EMISinFrance....................... 23 2.3.8 EMISinChina ....................... 24 2.3.9 EMISinIndia........................ 25 2.3.10 EMISinIsrael ....................... 25 2.3.11 EMISinJapan ....................... 26 2.3.12 EMISinothercountriesandatCERN . 27 2.4 Iraq’scalutronprogram . 28 2.4.1 Spring1979atCERN . 28 2.4.2 Jafar Dhia Jafar and the origin of Iraq’s calutron program . 29 2.4.3 TheNA10magnetasacalutronmagnet . 34 2.4.4 Iraq’scalutrondesign. 36 2.4.5 Thedifficultiesofpublishing. 43 2.5 Implications for the proliferation of nuclear weapons . ...... 48 2.5.1 Beam technologies and nuclear weapon proliferation . .. 48 2.5.2 EMISforplutoniumpurification . 50 2.5.3 UN resolutions 687 and 707 and their implications for a haltofallproliferationpronenuclearactivities . 52 2.5.4 Intelligence failure or staging for counter-proliferation?. 55 2.6 References.............................. 58 3 UN Security Council resolutions 687, 707, and 715, and their impli- cations for a halt of all proliferation prone nuclear activities — a technical and legal assessment 67 3.1 Introduction............................. 67 3.2 Technicalassessment . 68 3.3 Legalassessment .......................... 70 3.4 Conclusion ............................. 72 v 3.5 Notesandreferences . .. .. .. .. .. .. 73 4 Iraq’s calutrons: 1991 - 2001 77 4.1 Introduction............................. 77 4.2 Suren Erkman’s article in Le Journal de Geneve` of 22-23 April 1995 79 4.3 “Iraq’s Calutrons” report [ISRI-95-03] and its reviewing ..... 81 4.4 Attempt to present a paper at the EMIS-13 conference and spon- taneouscontributionofDr.I.Chavet . 84 4.5 Attemptstopublisha paper [ISRI-96-06] onthe legalimplications oftheUNSCresolutionsrelatedtoIraq . 85 4.6 ThelossofcontactwiththeIAEA . 86 4.7 Additional technical papers and sources of information ...... 87 4.8 Independent confirmation of Iraq’s early interest in EMIStechnology 90 4.9 Independent confirmation of Iraq’s use of CERN as a source of information ............................. 91 4.10 Conclusions............................. 92 4.11 Acknowledgementsand invitationfor comments . ... 94 4.12Letters................................ 94 4.12.1 FromC.LlewellynSmith,CERN,25April1995 . 94 4.12.2 FromJ.Steinberger,CERN,27April1995 . 96 4.12.3 ToM.Zifferero,IAEA,5May1995 . 97 4.12.4 ToM.Zifferero,IAEA,8November1995 . 98 4.12.5 FromM.Zifferero,IAEA,15November1995 . 98 4.12.6 ToM.Zifferero,IAEA,20November1995 . 99 4.12.7 To B. Al-Tikriti, Mission of Iraq, 20 November1995 . 100 4.12.8 FromMissionofIraq,16January1996. 101 4.12.9 ToM.Zifferero,IAEA,22January1996 . 101 4.12.10 ToJ.D.Jafar,IAEC,22January1996. 102 4.12.11 FromM.Zifferero,IAEA,26January1996 . 105 vi 4.12.12 From R.F. Mozley, CISAC, 28 February 1996 . 106 4.12.13 ToP.J.Persiani,ANL,17June1996 . 107 4.12.14 To G. Munzenberg,GSI,19June1996¨ . 108 4.12.15 FromI.Chavet,SOREQ,25June1996 . 109 4.12.16 ToI.Chavet,SOREQ,1July1996 . 110 4.12.17 ToM.Zifferero,IAEA,1July1996 . 111 4.12.18 FromM.Zifferero,IAEA,2August1996 . 112 4.12.19 FromI.Chavet,SOREQ,6August1996 . 113 4.12.20 FromI.Langermann,ICLQ,28August1996 . 116 4.12.21 ToM.Zifferero,IAEA,30December1996 . 116 4.12.22 From A. McDermott, Security Dialogue, 20 May 1997 . 117 4.12.23 ToR.Hooper,IAEA,21November1997. 118 5 Iraq’s calutrons: 2002 - 2005 121 5.1 J.D. Jafar’s aborted visit to Geneva during the 2003 invasion of Iraq122 5.2 Comment: “Farewelltoafellowwhistle-blower” . 127 5.3 J.D.Jafar’sbook:“TheAssignment”. 128 5.4 SixtyyearsafterHiroshima. 132 Postface: Nuclear weapons and Western democracy 135 Appendix 1: Annex 1 of UN Security Council document S/22872/Rev.1 141 Appendix 2: Original of Paper 1 Bombe Atomique: L’Irak est passeparleCERN´ 145 List of Figures 1 NA10magnetatCERN....................... x 1.1 PosterannouncingpaperonIraq’scalutrons. ... 2 1.2 “Atomicbomb:IraqwentthroughCERN.” . 4 1.3 “Geneva,cradleoftheIraqibomb.”. 5 2.1 J.-P.HurniandA.A.Gsponer,circa1995. 11 2.2 TrajectoriesofU-235andU-238ions. 14 2.3 Trajectoriesofionsofthesamemass. 15 2.4 SpectrometerofexperimentNA10.. 30 2.5 Frontpageofreference[49]. 32 2.6 Frontpageofreference[50]. 33 2.7 SectionthroughtheRisøspectrometer. 35 2.8 Pre-machined Iraq’s alpha calutron iron core. ... 38 2.9 FinaldimensionsofIraq’scalutronironcore. ... 38 2.10 SchematicofIraq’salphacalutrontrack. ... 40 2.11 Alphacalutronchamberonitsside. 41 2.12 Crushedbetacalutronchamber.. 42 5.1 J.D.JafarinJanuary2005. 129 5.2 Affiche annonc¸ant l’article sur les calutrons irakiens. .......146 5.3 “Bombe Atomique: L’Irak est passeparleCERN.”´ . 148 vii viii 5.4 “Geneve,berceaudelabombeirakienne.”` . 150 Preface: From 1979 to 2005 The existence of this report is due to a simple event: The visit to CERN (the European center for nuclear research) in Spring 1979 of a few Iraqi engineers who showed a considerable interest in the construction details of a unique large magnet, which at the time was the key component of the NA10 experiment at CERN, in which Andre Gsponer was working as a physicist. Because of his unexpected discovery one year earlier of the relevance of particle accelerator technology such as developed at CERN to classified particle beam weapons research, which led him to study a lot of technical papers on the military implications of particle accelerator technology, Gsponer immediately understood that the only plausible explanation for Iraq’s interest in large magnets was to use them as “calutrons,” i.e., as electromagnetic isotope separators, to enrich uranium in view of making an atomic bomb — just like the American did in 1945 to produce the U-235 of the Hiroshima bomb. Following this shocking realization of the crucial (but untold) importance of particle accelerator technology to the proliferation and further development of nuclear weapons, Gsponer left CERN in 1980 to work on technology assessment withthe hopeof contributingtonuclear disarmamentby publishinghis conclusions on the feasibility of calutrons, particle beam weapons, antimatter weapons, etc. This report consists of five papers and a postface, presented in the order in which they were published or released. They are authored by one or several people whose names are mentioned on the title page of this report, but whose responsibility extends only over those papers which bare their name. Paper 1 by Suren Erkman is a newspaper article published in Le Journal de Geneve` of 22-23 April 1995. It briefly explains the relation of CERN to the origin of Iraq’s calutron program and announces the forthcoming publication of a comprehensive technical report on this subject, i.e., Paper 2. Erkman’s article is in French and it is expected that an English translation will be available for a future edition of this report. ix x Preface Figure 1: The magnet of the NA10 experiment at CERN is one of which Iraq took inspiration to design its electromagnetic