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Canadian Military History

Volume 21 Issue 4 Article 4

2015

Dieppe The Making of a Myth

Béatrice Richard

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Béatrice Richard

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he of 19 August left operational level of the raid.1 Indeed, which is where the manipulation of Tan indelible mark on . with the exception of the works by information reached new heights, As the first major offensive against Brian L. Villa and Peter Henshaw that with sometimes astonishing results.8 Hitler’s Festung Europa, Operation cover the decision-making process, Jubilee was a severe military setback. most historians have attempted to To Manipulate: Within a few hours, five thousand analyze the operation’s weaknesses a Double-Edged Sword Canadians (over 80 percent of the rather than debate its relevance.2 attacking force) suffered losses The way the planners of Jubilee n the summer of 1942, the Canadian of almost 70 percent. Since that publicized the event, even though the Ipress focused on the battles of fateful day historians have offered episode is etched into our memories, Stalingrad and El Alamein. Except various explanations of the causes has interested historians even less.3 for the attacks by German submarines and consequences of the disaster. It took Timothy J. Balzer’s close look in the St. Lawrence River, the For some, the lessons learned at the communication strategy of war remained a vague concept in contributed to the success of the Combined Operations Headquarters Canada, almost surreal, lived by landings in 1944. Others to conclude that, overall, the story proxy essentially through the media, have argued Dieppe was nothing fed to the newspapers had been newspapers and radio, or the letters more than a useless sacrifice. Rarely written in advance, regardless of sent home by those fighting the has a military operation so polarized the raid’s outcome.4 Just as historian great crusade. It is in that context opinions and intrigued researchers. Paul Veyne reflected on whether that Canadians received news of That said, virtually every study on the ancient Greeks believed in their Dieppe focuses on the tactical and myth, it is worth asking to what Résumé : Tout comme l’historien Paul extent Canadians were duped by the Veyne se demandait si les Grecs de subterfuge. 5 Polling methods during l’antiquité croyaient à leurs mythes, Abstract: As historian Paul Veyne on peut se demander jusqu’à quel the war were largely experimental wondered whether the ancient Greeks point les Canadiens furent dupes de la believed in their myths, one may wonder and therefore unreliable which makes propagande durant la Seconde Guerre to what extent Canadians were the examining a source as volatile as public mondiale, notamment quand vint le dupes of propaganda during the Second opinion a challenge.6 Nevertheless, moment de relater le raid de Dieppe, le World War, particularly with regards to it is possible to get an idea of the 19 août 1942. Cet article tente d’élucider the Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942. la question en analysant la façon popular mood by examining indirect This article attempts to clarify the issue dont les journaux canadiens-français « by analyzing the way French-Canadian sources such as newspapers. If we vendirent » la nouvelle et comment cette newspapers “sold” the news and how agree that, in a democratic society, stratégie de communication aboutit this communications strategy lead to the press is the mirror of tensions au résultat inverse de celui escompté. the opposite result to that intended. and power struggles, an analysis of Ironiquement, en mettant l’accent sur le Ironically, by focusing on the heroic combat héroïque de l’unique régiment this complex medium should help struggle of the only French-Canadian canadien-français – les Fusiliers Mont- regiment involved in the operation – us better understand the story that Royal – et sur les pertes francophones, les Fusiliers Mont-Royal – and on its was “sold” to the public and how la presse francophone québécoise casualties, the francophone press in it was received.7 This article will contribua à façonner le mythe voulant Quebec helped shaped the myth that test this hypothesis on a sample of que les troupes canadiennes-françaises French-Canadian troops were the aient été les principales victimes du principal victims of the disaster. Quebec francophone newspapers, désastre.

Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2015 21, Number 4, Autumn 2012, pp.33-46. 33 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4 Canadian Forces Photo Z-8471-11 Photo Canadian Forces

This iconic photo of Dieppe, taken by the Germans soon after the end of the fighting, captures the death and destruction suffered by Canadians on the beach.

the Dieppe raid. The first press Newspaper accounts evolved raid started, Combined Operations releases confirmed the involvement in three phases: “strategic” (19-20 Headquarters had decided that the of Canadians. On the home front, August) during which a justification operation would be presented as a the war finally became a tangible of the operation was attempted; success, no matter its outcome.9 reality, involving soldiers with which “heroic” (21 August – 14 September), Because media organizations the population could identify. The without doubt the most paradoxical tend to draw from similar sources, public relations service of Combined since the casualty lists were printed the three-phase sequence of coverage Operations Headquarters attempted alongside articles celebrating the can be found in most Canadian to transform a military fiasco into a “exploits” of the soldiers; finally, publications, and it ended with victory with releases insisting that “revelatory” (from 15 September) the same level of bitterness from several objectives had been achieved. that provided the official account of coast to coast. Through the media, For over two months, it would present losses and three days later the release the brutal test of Dieppe tended to the Canadian military debut as a of an official report on the operation. unify Canadians who, at least in turning point in the war, a necessary Was this sequence of coverage the the course of a few weeks, came to sacrifice that would pave the way to result of a specific information share a common understanding of the great invasion of Europe. From strategy? Following a thorough look the raid. The bubble burst at the end these military releases the press of the military archives in Ottawa and of summer, once the extent of the constructed a narrative that various London, historian Timothy J. Balzer disaster was revealed. newspapers adapted according to answered yes to that question. His Surprisingly, the most virulent their particular perspectives. account reveals that, even before the criticisms did not come from French

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Canada, even though, as its rejection to release in the press portraits of of conscription in the plebiscite of French Canadian soldiers with whom 1942 demonstrated, it remained it was assumed the francophone hostile to any unlimited military public were more likely to identify. commitment to the war. Instead, the The Dieppe operation was a golden most damning critiques first appeared opportunity to promote their valour in the Conservative Anglo-Canadian in combat, however, because of press. Operation Jubilee was used to the outcome of the raid, the result further pressure the government on proved disappointing. Ironically the the question of overseas conscription communication strategy backfired and attack the Liberals’ management and persuaded many French of the war, in particular their Canadians that they had largely been determination not to antagonize sacrificed in this fatal foray. Three the French Canadian electorate. examples illustrate what became a In this regard, the government’s deep-rooted myth in the collective communication strategy, which memory of French Canada. consisted of providing information Vice Admiral Louis Mountbatten, chief In the history of the Stanislas of combined operations, was the overall tailored to French Canadians, College, the two founders of the commander of the Dieppe Raid. He 10 heightened tensions. For example, attempted to control the spin of the raid institution, Jeannette and Guy the coverage of the raid led to a almost as soon as it was over. Boulizon, write that “the ill-fated skirmish between the Toronto Star raid on Dieppe [was to] result in (Liberal), which spoke glowingly of the raid. Mountbatten personally over 2000 victims in several hours, the French Canadians’ participation, intervened to water down an honest essentially French Canadians.”17 and the Globe and Mail (Conservative) document. This deception discredited During an interview, Jeannette which took offence that French the Canadian government. Even Boulizon explained that “the French Canadians received so much the most moderate critics accused were absolutely shocked [to see] that attention. The Star subsequently the government of concealing its Quebecers were sent to the beaches misunderstood the Globe and Mail’s responsibility for the fiasco.13 of Dieppe to get killed, while the criticism, which was explained by Le The francophone press drew from English [Canadians] were taking Devoir: “the Star forgot that the Globe the same sources as its Anglophone it easy…Senior officers remained and Mail believes it can tarnish M. counterparts, making use of reports in …all the young French King’s record by targeting the Star.”11 from war correspondents and Canadians, all of them, went to Unfortunately for the Liberal official releases, while following their deaths!”18 Also during an government, the Combined the directives from the censorship interview, François-Albert Angers, Operations Headquarters’ authorities.14 As a result, dissenting an eminent economist offered a information strategy missed points of view were expressed in similar interpretation: “My reaction its target. The gap between the editorials and in the treatment of was that, overall, French Canadians triumphant rhetoric and the failure the news. Nevertheless this criticism had been sacrificed; experiments had of the operation was too wide. The steadily diminished. From May 1942, been conducted with our soldiers, Canadian high command would censorship was reorganized and the by sending them on an impossible later plead for the release of a more Department of National Defence mission.”19 A Quebec history realistic version, however Vice used the opportunity to control more textbook from the 1980s stated the Admiral Louis Mountbatten, chief closely the dissemination of military same thing: “French Canadian troops of Combined Operations, vigorously information in the written press suffered a resounding defeat. They objected, with his communication and on radio.15 Moreover, in July lost 2753 men, killed, wounded or services reasserting control over the government information service taken prisoner.” 20 How is it possible the information released by British decided to primarily use newspapers that educated and well-informed newspapers.12 The British pressures to transmit their message. Indeed, people could believe such falsehood? were all the more obvious when its new director, Charles Vinning, Could part of the answer be found the Canadian Army’s official felt that newspapers were more in the media hype surrounding historian, C.P. Stacey, planned, efficient than the propaganda posters Jubilee? This article seeks to test this in mid-September, on publishing and pamphlets already in wide hypothesis by analyzing a sample the army’s first official report on circulation.16 This led to the idea of four significant francophone

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became the focus of the tragedy in Quebec. On 19 August 1942, the raid on Dieppe made the headlines everywhere. The newspapers unanimously hailed a costly, yet necessary victory. The official story was a virtual reproduction of the reports released by Combined Operations Headquarters. Within a few days, the story of Dieppe appeared set in stone. With the tragedy barely over, all the key elements, as well as the justifications – still emphasized by many today – grabbed the headlines. Like the other dailies, Le Devoir included Canadian Press releases announcing that Canadian troops had managed to land “on all the selected spots” and “took the beach by storm” after sustaining “a particularly violent resistance on their left flank while they landed tanks at the centre and the right flank quickly reached its objective.”21 In an editorial, Georges Pelletier moderated such enthusiasm by pointing out that the raid was nothing more than “test” like so many operations before.22 As for La Presse, it concluded that Dieppe was a complete success, comparing the landing to the raid against St. Nazaire when the Germans had been caught by surprise and sustained “very heavy casualties.”23 Turcotte, Le Canada’s editorialist, insisted the raid was a precursor to a greater invasion of continental Europe: “a dress rehearsal for the day when British forces throw aside Nazi titles, La Presse and La Patrie, two francophone unit involved, the fortifications.”24 mainstream daily newspapers of Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR). The Apart from the exact toll in human Liberal sympathies, Le Canada, the stories focused on figures like their life, the sequence of events was made voice of the Liberal Party of Canada, chaplain, Major Armand Sabourin, public less than 24 hours after the and Le Devoir, the voice of the French and their commander, Lieutenant- end of the operation. The main Canadian nationalist elite. Colonel Dollard Ménard, as the justification for the raid was strategic: “heroes of Dieppe.” Their advocates, Dieppe was a “dress rehearsal for the To justify the operation: the war correspondents and in launch of a Second Front in Europe.”25 the strategic phase particular Ross Munro, who gave The operation also resulted from a well-publicized presentation in operational imperatives: Canadian rom the four newspapers Quebec, were added to this group. Military Headquarters in London Femerges a common narrative, Despite the FMR’s secondary role insisted on the raid’s “experimental” almost mythical, featuring the only in the Dieppe Raid, the unit soon nature, congratulating itself for https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/436 4 : Dieppe The Making of a Myth

having acquired “vital experience in became a part of the story. Of all the as not to attract retaliation / Heroism the employment of troops in large newspapers, Le Devoir was the most of a chaplain / Nazis murder their numbers in an attack as well as an alarmed about this news. “There is French Canadian prisoners and had experience in the transport of their concern that Canadian losses were others stripped naked, but could heavy equipment during combined heavy at Dieppe. Here, we wait for not prevent their return with their operations.” Finally, the operation the lists, especially as they relate to wounded.30 was part of a comprehensive effort the Fusiliers Mont-Royal,” read the to test German defences in raids on headline. Such wording suggests La Presse saluted on its cover page places such as St. Nazaire, Spitzberg that the myth of Dieppe, the idea that “the excellent conduct of our Fusiliers and Iceland.26 According to the French Canadians had been primarily at Dieppe…under intense enemy Allies the objectives were partially sacrificed during the fighting, began fire.”31 Echoing La Presse, La Patrie achieved through the destruction to take shape as soon as the raid stressed the “heroism of the Fusiliers of a battery of six guns and its was announced, at least among Mont-Royal and their chaplains at ammunition magazine, a radio nationalists. Alerted by the reports Dieppe.”32 station and an anti-aircraft battery. from the war correspondents, Gérard Combined Operations used these Pelletier feared the worst: Over the next two days, small successes to justify the usage the dispatches almost always of their communications plan written The news already available on Dieppe presented the Canadian soldiers before the raid took place. Ironically, make us anticipate long lists of dead as “commandos,” with the effect the same newspapers published and wounded, as well as missing. of magnifying their exploits. German communiqués that described All the correspondents who give an Newspapers, including Le Devoir, did the operation as a “crushing defeat,” account of what happened at Dieppe not question this metamorphosis from an “enterprise planned by amateurs” and in the vicinity point out that simple soldiers into super heroes. for political rather than military the fighting was intense, the losses The first headlines distinguished gains.27 Contradictions between considerable and, if the victorious clearly the “English commandos” Allied and enemy information added soldiers returned to England, many from the “Canadian infantry.” Such to the confusion and helped plant the remained in or will be sent to distinctions soon disappeared from seeds of unease – some Allied sources German prison camps. We should the accounts. Instead, the editors claimed 15,000 troops participated in have expected that.29 stopped differentiating infantry and the raid. commandos by emphasizing that the In the immediate aftermath of Other newspapers, the raid only Gérard Pelletier of Le albeit more Devoir guessed the participation of enthusiastically, also the FMR and openly questioned the implied that the FMR fate of French Canadian soldiers: did all the work, thus “it is believed that among those helping forge the myth who participated in the raid at of the French Canadian Dieppe were troops belonging to sacrifice at Dieppe. In the francophone Montreal regiment this regard, Le Canada’s

known as the “Fusiliers Mont-Royal” headline captures the ZK 28 Photo Canadian Forces as well as other French Canadian sentiment: units. We must wait for details and the lists of wounded and missing The “Fusiliers Mont-Royal” will allow us to better assess the did us proud in Dieppe / part played by our soldiers in the French Canadians carried raid on Dieppe.”28 It was not until propaganda pamphlets the second phase of coverage, on 21 and posters asking the August, that the Fusiliers Mont-Royal French to remain neutral so

Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Ménard, the commander of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal at Dieppe, was hailed in the press as one of the heros of the failed operation.

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John Grierson (left), chairman of the Wartime Information Board, meets with Ralph Foster, head of graphics, National Film Board of Canada, to examine a series of posters produced by the National Film Board of Canada. One of the posters produced in the Men of Valor series highlighted the actions of Lieutenant-Dollard Ménard at Dieppe. This poster can be seen in the background between the two men. Library and Archives Canada PA 179108 Canada PA Library and Archives with the release of a first official account of Jubilee. Meanwhile, the Army’s public relations unit continued to feed the press with stories from war correspondents and testimonies celebrating FMR soldiers. Both were heavily exploited by Quebec newspapers, no matter their political leaning. For example, Le Devoir printed a Canadian Press cable which gave the prominent role in the raid to the French Canadian unit: “The Fusiliers Mont-Royal and their comrades valiantly received their baptism of fire in combat. The level of violence was comparable to what their fathers had experimented during the Great War. They saw a number of their comrades fall under enemy fire, others collapse covered soldiers “fell under the command of Dieppe.”36 The term “commando” with wounds, and others captured Combined Operations.”33 The most disappeared from official accounts as by the Germans.”37 striking headline belonged to La early as 22 August, yet it continued The FMR were again portrayed Patrie: “The commandos left Dieppe to be used by newspapers. Editors as elite soldiers: “Because of their in ruins.”34 The Fusiliers Mont-Royal continued to use “commando” in energy, combat skill and composure soon shared in this glory; they were the captions accompanying pictures while going through preliminary characterized as “commandos” as of soldiers at Dieppe, a sign that the exercises in England, those French soon as their participation in the term was firmly entrenched in the Canadians were chosen for the raid was announced. Canadian vocabulary of the raid. operation against Dieppe, the first Press correspondent William Stewart of a series of great operations aimed maintained that they had been To “embellish” the carnage: at preparing the invasion of the “trained” as such and he also claimed the Heroic Phase European continent.”38 A similar that he had accompanied them in point of view, written by William their training.35 A similar claim can be uring the “heroic phase,” the gap Stewart, was published in La Presse. traced to Le Canada: “the Fusiliers had Dbetween a triumphant narrative He stressed “the excellent conduct of long been trained in the tactics used and the lists of victims published our Fusiliers” in “the hell of Dieppe.”39 by commandos” - and in Le Devoir daily by newspapers became more Le Canada was equally hagiographical which depicted the Fusiliers “as apparent. It explains the “uneasiness” in emphasizing the central role commandos from Quebec specially J.L. Ralston, the minister of National played by the FMR as well as their trained…for the historic raid on Defence, attempted to dissipate enthusiasm for battle: “From the

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start, they were assigned to a most Quebec Premier Adélard Godbout but systematically presented the difficult sector, one that required had felt it necessary to explain in photographs of Anglophone officers. all their courage: German weapons the legislature: “yesterday’s vote La Patrie followed the same approach, fired on the landing beach, in front on the plebiscite, in the province of even though it had a lot less space to of the city; the Montrealers fought Quebec is not the refusal to make do so.50 like all the others, with heroism, and sacrifices for the defence of our Whatever the approach, the result returned to their base with many country. We, French Canadians, was the same - a disproportionate missing.”40 are no less loyal than the others.” focus on francophone victims. That However, the attempts to Hailed as icons, the Fusiliers were was not surprising since newspapers idealize the heroism ran headlong thus used to justify a controversial targeted francophone readers. Such into the stark reality of the casualty position and promote the advantages over-representation helps explain figures. The constant reminders of of voluntary service.48 In this context, the origin of the myth surrounding the Canadians’ bravery in combat the lists of fallen soldiers sanctified Dieppe; French Canadians were paralleled the various homages to the francophone regiment and among those who had suffered the fallen – burials in England,41 and discouraged open criticism, even the most. This was not necessarily a religious service in Montreal.42 from Quebec nationalists. Le Canada the fault of the newspapers. The During that period, two events, the avoided altogether the question – it government’s own information release of a preliminary report on only published the first casualty services, by seeking to reach the raid43 and the conference held by list, on 22 August, and thereafter francophone audiences, may have Ross Munro, offered the opportunity focused on triumphant rhetoric and contributed to this distorted view. to recapitulate and justify the raid,44 promoting national unity. The other Dependent upon official sources, ten days before the official tally francophone newspapers, including and monitored as they were by the of total losses was released, on 15 Le Devoir released the casualty lists censorship, newspapers presented a September. From 21 August to 4 but did not comment on the losses. stereotyped story, one that was not, September, official lists naming those Throughout the “heroic phase,” in the end, very credible. killed were published almost daily the newspapers differed only slightly Ross Munro’s press conference by newspapers, sometimes several in in approach. Le Devoir explicitly in Montreal on 5 September, ten days one day, in the midst of enthusiastic emphasised “the names articles hailing the performance of the of French Canadians Canadians at Dieppe.45 or Montrealers.”49 The This almost schizophrenic editors clearly selected representation of the raid was far French Canadian less favourably received in the surnames, regardless of Anglophone press than by French where the person came Canadian newspapers. The Ottawa from or whether they Journal lost patience: “Can we be were officers or from expected to know the truth and act the non-commissioned upon it if those who are leaders keep ranks. Only then the facts from us and try to feed us were the surnames on sugar-coated stories.”46 Two days of Anglophones from later, the Globe and Mail was even Montreal mentioned, more to the point: “Despite official and only those of protestations that the raid on Dieppe officers. Meanwhile, was a startling success, there is little La Presse focused evidence to justify that conclusion.”47 more on Montrealers, No such criticisms can be found making no distinction in the francophone press, proud as in language. Unlike it was of “its” Fusiliers’ sacrifice. Le Devoir, the editor Could it be because the exploits of the published photos of the famous regiment, no matter the cost casualties, including paid, offset the insults against French French Canadians Canadians for rejecting conscription? of all ranks and in In the aftermath of the plebiscite, no particular order,

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the courage of his troops despite overwhelming odds. Tailor-made Three soldiers of the for the French Canadian public, the Fusiliers Mont-Royal remarks were in fact not truthful. The aboard a transport ship taking them to correspondent presented himself as England, April 1942. an eyewitness to the exploits of the French Canadian regiment while, in fact, he had landed in Puys with the Royal Regiment, some three August,53 Munro’s kilometres of the Fusiliers Mont- story was much Royal.56 How could he claim to have toned down. Was it witnessed the French Canadians in

Library and Archives Canada PA 211307 Canada PA Library and Archives censorship? Bodies action? In essence, Munro became a shredded by artillery propagandist working on behalf of had given way to the war effort and his story mirrored heroes identified the Army’s press releases. Some and made to seem historians have since denounced such invulnerable. In an approach.57 front of a crowd of 8,000 people, Revealing the losses: Munro rightly French Canadian sacrifice hailed the heroism of the Fusiliers Mont- n 15 September 1942 the Royal’s chaplain, OCanadian public learned what Captain Armand had long been feared - more than Sabourin, and half the troops landed at Dieppe had their commander, been lost: a disaster. This did not Lieutenant-Colonel stop La Presse from celebrating the before the disastrous tally of casualties Dollard Ménard.54 Munro presented operation: “Canada’s total losses at was revealed, likely strengthened the an almost superhuman portrait of the Dieppe reached 3,350 dead, wounded conviction that the French Canadian FMR’s commander: and missing. It, so far, one of our troops had suffered unduly heavy most glorious feats overseas” – even losses. The war correspondent Colonel Ménard had taken the lead though the compiled casualty lists traveled across Canada to discuss and was ready to launch an assault occupied two full pages.58 Le Devoir Dieppe and maintain the patriotic on the enemy when he got hit while could not help but make an ironic fervor.51 In effect, he adapted his story climbing over the seawall. Enemy fire comment: “Alas! There is no war to the public in Montreal, making was very heavy and originated from without a cost.”59 the Fusiliers the centre point of his houses where they had taken shelter, Once the official tally was known, narrative. He declared: but also from the cliffs overlooking Canadian newspapers reacted the beach and the city. differently and not necessarily The flotilla that transported the Despite his injuries, Colonel Ménard according to their political affiliations. Fusilier Mont-Royal was positioned remained at his post and, with the For example, John Collingwood Read at the centre [emphasis added] of the help of his officers, kept directing his from The Globe and Mail questioned expedition…on its left, traveled the men. Mixed with the regiments from the relevance of the operation and Royal Regiment of Toronto. A little Toronto and Hamilton, they fought the competence of those in charge ahead, there were the flotillas carrying with courage and nerve for hours.55 and argued that the benefits were the Essex Scottish of Windsor and the not worth the cost. Other newspapers Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. On Munro insisted: “nothing could denounced the lack of transparency the right, other craft carried the South have stopped the French Canadians from military officials. The Liberal Saskatchewan Regiment and the – go forward was the order given Regina Leader-Post lamented the Cameron Highlanders of Winnipeg.52 and go forward it remained.” All the excessive appeal to heroism at the ingredients of an adventure story expense of truth.60 The other Liberal Compared to his first account, were there: a brave, young French dailies remained quiet on the issue published in the aftermath of 19 Canadian officer who galvanized or accepted the official version.61 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/440 8 : Dieppe The Making of a Myth

In Quebec, the same dynamic took openly critical. Eustache Letellier de eager to demand conscription. At place. La Presse’s editorialist took Saint-Just questioned the good faith that stage, it was less the failure of notice of the tally but insisted that it of those who had sponsored the raid: the raid that preoccupied Liberals did not diminish the achievement: than the way it was exploited for Now the truth is known, we do not political reasons. To highlight the It is now very clear that the Canadian believe public opinion in Canada losses put greater pressure on the “commandos” accomplished their will be satisfied with the official government to act. The editor of mission under circumstances where explanation that the raid on Dieppe La Patrie thought it was cause for before the attack every detail had was instrumental in obtaining concern: “In the light of what we now been considered, but the men did not crucial information on the defensive know about the organisation of the know that the gains would come at organization of the enemy. If the Dieppe raid, it would be a profound a heavy cost. It did not matter! They expedition’s only goal was to survey mistake to invoke the losses the were given a task to complete and coastal defences, one wonders why Canadian army sustained to stir up they would accomplish it without the same result could not have been the agitation over conscription.” As considering the risks and dangers. achieved with a smaller deployment for Le Soleil, its editorialist criticized They approached their task proud, of troops.64 the Tory press for pushing aside the brave and with an admirable attitude real reasons behind the disaster and in the tradition of our Dominion’s The concern expressed by this debating instead the benefits of future officers and soldiers during the column, not to mention the discretion recruiting: Great War. of the other Quebec newspapers, had a lot to do with the conscription In short, he wrote, the failure of Then, using the official discourse he crisis. For the underlying issue these two operations [Hong Kong added: “Their sacrifice was not in remained conscription. That could and Dieppe] have been costly for vain: it will help us prepare for the explain why in the beginning the Canada, but it is certainly not the day we can defeat the enemy and Liberal press emphasized the role of fault of Colonel Ralston [minister restore peace in the world.”62 French Canadians at Dieppe which of National Defence] or [Prime so irritated many Conservative Minister] Mackenzie King…They More surprising was the absence newspapers. Once the final cost was know full well that the political of immediate reaction from Le Devoir. known, Liberal dailies appeared agitators are careful not to directly The editorial of 15 September did not hesitant to openly criticize the attack the federal cabinet. They elaborate on the official numbers. operation, for fear of giving the do not blame him for the poor Gérard Pelletier did not address debate over conscription a new preparations or the sacrifice of so the issue until the following week impetus. Any wasteful usage of much vital energy, but they insist when Ralston presented his report. troops, as Dieppe proved to be, on finding out from the government Even then, he reiterated the Globe only fueled a conservative press what measures it will take to replace and Mail’s “very sensible” question. How could it be that an operation that depended on the element of surprise was continued after German ships intercepted the Allied convoy? Ironically Le Devoir and the Toronto newspaper agreed on one thing: the responsibility of defence minister Ralston in an affair still wrapped in questions that was “very costly, with positive results that remained to be determined.”63 Only La Patrie was

Soldiers from the Fusiliers Mont-Royal 177145 Canada PA Library and Archives wade ashore from a landing craft during a training exercise before the Dieppe Raid, 26 February 1942.

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A German photograph of a group of Canadian soliders captured at Dieppe. It is believed that these men are from the Fusiliers Mont-Royal based on their shoulder patches.

two regiments lost in fifteen days the operation was not postponed of Dieppe ended the cycle of media [at Hong Kong] or the thousands of when the element of surprised was coverage of Jubilee.70 As usual, Le men sent to their death in five hours lost? The newspaper attributed 67 Devoir emphasised French Canadians, [at Dieppe].65 percent of all losses to this mishap. pointing out that 27 of their soldiers In Le Devoir, Georges Pelletier was had been “decorated for bravery” On 18 September 1942, Ralston quick to chime in: “the ‘Globe and and “the FMR had the largest number got the last word when he released Mail’ of Toronto (19 September) is [of decorated soldiers].” Two weeks to the press the first official report asking a question that makes great later, a large rally held at Parc on Jubilee.66 It proved increasingly sense…No doubt Mr. Ralston might Lafontaine in honor of the “heroes” difficult to hide the fact that the consider dispelling any confusion of Dieppe was aimed at promoting strategy behind the raid, except for over a very costly affair, as positive the sale of Victory Bonds. The a few minor successes - Varengeville results have yet to be determined.”68 announcement made all the dailies’ and Pourville - failed. The details From then on, to give a favourable headlines, except for Le Devoir which were damning, even for an impetus to various Victory Bond published an account the following uninformed reader: the tanks were campaigns, the focus was to be on day on page three.71 The grand rapidly immobilized under enemy the “exploitation” of Dieppe. The return of the heroes was carefully fire and reserve units were landed, in minister invoked the context of the orchestrated. Louis Saint-Laurent, particular the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, war and remained vague on the the minister of Justice, C.G. Power, despite the obvious traffic jam on the “lessons of Dieppe”: “the value minister of National Defence for Air, beach. In spite of the use of hyperbole of the Dieppe expedition will be Adélard Godbout, the premier of such as the “magnificent support explained at a later time. For now, it Quebec, and Brigadier-General Panet offered by the Royal Navy,” the is impossible to publicly analyze the presided over the event. The evening report failed to convince the press of lessons of the raid without offering ceremony began with a procession the value of the raid.67 information to the enemy.”69 and the singing of “O Canada” and The first reaction came from The In early October, the awards ended with “God Save the King.” The Globe and Mail which wondered why ceremony conducted for the “heroes” government ordered that all radio

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stations broadcast the tribute. The Vimy, Courcelette, Passchendaele policy, especially when they preach climate of distrust did not stop French and Ypres: “We knew we could not mindless attachment to colonial ties Canadians from attending the event be less brave than those who fought and openly advocate for overseas in great numbers and applauding the other war.” He concluded his conscription. In truth, is this really their “heroes.” According to Le speech with an overt call to support the role of a servant of the Church? Canada, a cheering crowd of 25,000 the war effort by promoting the third And, what do we gain at aggravating, people attended the ceremony.72 Victory Bond campaign: in so many ways, the emotions of our More sober, Le Devoir confirmed that youths? the crowds prevented many among Those over there who risk their lives the public from getting close enough for you have the right to count on According to Groulx, the to their idols. Kept at a distance, your support at all times. Through archbishop promised to silence many had to resign themselves to your hard work and your money, Sabourin, without much result as listening to the speeches through you are the ones who come up it turned out, as the higher clergy speakers.73 with the weapons that will give us supported the Canadian government’s The rally offered a good victory. Without those weapons, the war policy.79 Commentary on the raid opportunity to recapitulate the most admirable heroes will remain faded from the newspapers. stereotyped account of the raid powerless. I have learned today that and launch the third Victory the government is launching a third Bond campaign.74 The day of the war loan. Allow me to ask you to be Epilogue ceremony, interviews with Dollard generous. Those who do not lend Ménard, Armand Sabourin and their lives must donate.77 as the tragedy been forgotten other veterans were published in Hfor all that? In postwar Quebec, La Presse. Ménard recalled the raid We do not know the impressions small reminders of the raid could be in strategic terms – “Dieppe was left by Ménard’s words on the French found in the press. However, it was a necessary operation,” read the Canadian public, but we do know not until the 1960s that the event headline, whereas Father Sabourin that the words of Father Sabourin reappeared in the collective memory praised the heroism of the Fusiliers scandalized the nationalist elite. of the province. A curious transition – “Brave men! All of them were Unlike Ménard, Sabourin was from one generation to the next brave.”75 Ménard chose to stick to his political. In numerous radio and appears to have taken place with the soldiers’ performance: “Dieppe was a newspapers interviews the FMR more progressive elements adopting necessary raid where the Canadians chaplain, repeatedly and bitterly the same criticisms the Conservatives were successful!” He hedged his targeted the anti-conscriptionists. had used to frame the outcome of the comments, claiming that he only “The ones who stood up were those raid in the immediate aftermath. This wished to share his impressions and who stormed Dieppe” and not those evolution is obvious in the newspaper what he had observed.76 However, who oppose the war effort overseas, articles published following the 20th the next day, his speech clearly took claimed Sabourin.78 Even though anniversary of Dieppe.80 As much on a propagandistic tone: such strong words did not appear in as it was accommodating in 1942, Le Devoir, or any other newspaper, the La Presse, consistently expressed Our arrangement complete, he whole affair shook up the Church’s the painfulness of the memory. declared, we had time to reflect hierarchy. In his memoirs, Lionel For over thirty years, La Presse on the night of 18 August. We Groulx recalls that, at the time, journalist Pierre Vennat remained thought of France, oppressed under the archdiocese of Montreal was the most faithful guardian of that German rule. We thought of women, “bombarded” with letters and calls memory. Son of Lieutenant André desperate mothers, children deprived of protest. In a letter to Archbishop Vennat, who was killed at Dieppe, of food by the Nazis; we thought Charbonneau, Groulx himself the journalist, commemorated the of the French who had become complained about the incident: raid and remembered his father in slaves; we thought that the price of the columns of the daily newspaper capitulation is infinitely greater than Our people accept when the clergy of the rue Saint-Jacques. Writing the price of victory. reminds them of their duty in on important anniversaries, Vennat wartime; they do not understand combined individual and collective The lieutenant-colonel did not when priests become outspoken memory. Though the narrative of hesitate to reference the Great War and and provocative propagandists on his articles remained consistent from the battles that had inspired his men: behalf of the government’s war one commemoration to another, it is

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possible to discern over the years the public opinion. The examination Combined Operations Headquarters growing revolt of a son against his confirms the theory of Henry and played a central role in creating a father’s sacrifice. This personal revolt Tator that the content of the press potent symbol of colonial oppression came to symbolize that of an entire can be reflective of the interaction which lingered for decades in French generation against the oppression of multiple schools of thought in a Canadian interpretations of the raid. the previous generation had endured. society.82 Despite censorship of the The study of the French Canadian A similar attitude towards the press, contrasting opinions which collective memory of the Dieppe raid participation of French Canadians sometimes go beyond partisan lines confirms a persistent resentment in can be seen in a number of media, are apparent. The majority of the Quebec. Contrary to English Canada, history textbooks and literature. In Liberal francophone dailies very where emotions were channelled this regard, the statement in Le petit clearly supported the Canadian through detailed historical analysis, manuel d’histoire du Québec appears all government’s war policy, though that the raid did not inspire critical the more significant: did not prevent some editorialists studies on the francophone side.83 from severely questioning the Instead the memory of the event [By saying no to the 1942 plebiscite relevance of the raid. Le Devoir, against was transmitted primarily through on conscription] Quebecers refused all odds, demonstrated a surprising literature and textbooks.84 French to wear the uniform and be sent sense of caution. Meanwhile, the Canadians never seriously debated overseas to be used as English Conservative Globe and Mail used the Operation Jubilee. Two reasons can be cannon fodder. raid’s failure to criticize the Liberal surmised: the absence of institutions That feeling was confirmed on 19 government. On the other hand, Le able to support the growth of the August with the Dieppe disaster. Canada, regularly denounced those francophone military historiography The British Chiefs of Staff want who criticized the raid. Overall, and the difficulty of identifying with to find out whether the Germans newspapers had little choice but to British military tradition which was are properly defending the French relay the information fed to them perceived as foreign. For francophone coastline. To verify the obvious, by the official press services. For Quebecers, the political aspects of the they sent 6,100 soldiers, four-fifths obvious political reasons including raid took precedence over military of those Canadians, to the French the challenge of conscription, the considerations. With the rise of coast in 253 ships. The poor fellows information shared with French Quebec nationalism in the 1960s, fell upon a German convoy some Canadians was grossly manipulated. the event resurfaced and became three miles away from the coast The only francophone unit involved a symbol of colonial oppression. and the massacre began. When in Operation Jubilee was placed at the The essence of that discourse can they managed to land near Dieppe, heart of the raid and those in charge be summed up in a single sentence: German machine guns mowed of communications manufactured Canadians, particularly French them down like rabbits. After two heroes in order to seduce susceptible Canadians, were sacrificed in the hours [sic] of this bloody butchery, readers. No doubt the intention name of British interests in a war the Chiefs of Staff understood that was to stimulate volunteering for that did not concern them. The the Germans defended the coastline service and to erase accusations details of the raid have faded, but well. Orders were given to evacuate. of cowardice born out of a nearly the resentment that fuelled the myth Of 4,963 Canadians, 2,752 [sic] were unanimous rejection of conscription remains strong. killed by the Germans. The colonized in the province. The attempted are always used as cannon fodder by manipulation of the story proved all those who colonize them.81 the more clumsy when the almost Notes daily releases of casualty lists were Claiming a circulation of 125,000 published alongside the triumphant 1. On this subject, see the historiographical copies at the end of the 1970s, this discourse celebrating the “heroes of review: Béatrice Richard, “70 ans après, le raid de Dieppe revisité,” Revue historique essay confirms the evolution of Dieppe.” Ironically, the relentless des armées 266, 2012 (accessed 21 July that period. heroes appears to have backfired. 2012). 2. Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action: Once the full extent of the disaster Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid (Toronto: Conclusion was revealed in mid-September, Oxford University Press, 1994, 1989); Peter French Canadians created a new J. Henshaw, “The Dieppe Raid: A Product of Misplaced Canadian Nationalism?,” newspaper analysis of the Dieppe story with the FMR as the main Canadian Historical Review 77, no.2, (June A raid offers an impressionistic, yet victims of the raid. The “Heroes 1996), pp.250-266. revealing image of French-Canadian of Dieppe” that were crafted by https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/444 12 : Dieppe The Making of a Myth

. 3 Béatrice Richard, La mémoire de Dieppe. 20. Gérard Cachat, André Donneur, À la août 1942, pp.1, 3, 46, 49; 24 août 1942, Radioscopie d’un mythe (Montréal, VLB recherche de mes racines (Montréal, Lidec, pp.3, 26; 25 août 1942, pp.3-4, 6; 26 août éditeur, 2002). 1984), pp.577, 578. 1942, pp.3, 26; 30 août 1942, pp.1, 26, 53; 4. Timothy J. Balzer, Selling Disaster: How 21. Le Devoir, 19 août 1942, p.2, 3. 4 septembre 1942, p.7. Le Canada, 22 août the Canadian Public was Informed of Dieppe 22. Georges Pelletier, Le Devoir, 19 août 1942, 1942, p.1. (master’s thesis, University of Victoria, p.1. 46. Ottawa Journal, 25 August 1942, p.10, cited 2004); Timothy J. Balzer, The Information 23. Manchette, “Débarquement à Dieppe/ in Balzer, The Information Front, p.159. Front: The Canadian Army, Public Relations Le tiers de ‘expédition est formée de 47. John Collingwood Read, “Dieppe’s and War News During the Second World War Canadiens/Des commandos anglais, lessons being Studied,” Globe and Mail, (Ph.D dissertation, University of Victoria, des fantassins canadiens, des rangers 26 August 1942, p.3, cited by Timothy J. 2009); Timothy J. Balzer, “‘In Case the américains, des Français, attaquent sur 60 Balzer, p.159. Raid is Unsuccessful…’: Selling Dieppe milles des côtes,” La Presse, 19 août 1942, 48. La Patrie, 29 avril 1942, p.4. to Canadians,” Canadian Historical Review p.1. 49. Le Devoir, 25 août, p.3. 87, no.3, (September 2006), pp.409-430. 24. Le Canada, 20 août 1942, p.2. 50. Nickname often given to La Presse. 5. Paul Veyne, Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leur 25. Ibid. 51. The advertisement stated: “M. Munro mythe? (Paris, Seuil, 1983). 26. Le Devoir, 20 août 1942, p.1. est revenu au Canada en aéroplane à la 6. Claude Beauregard, Edwidge Munn 27. Ibid., p.1; La Presse, 20 août 1942, p.21. demande de la ‘Canadian Press’ afin de and Béatrice Richard, “Portrait d’une 28. Gérard Pelletier, Le Devoir, 20 août 1942, dire au peuple canadien comment ses division,” introduction à Wilfrid Sanders, p.1. soldats se sont comportés lors de cette Jack et Jacques, L’opinion publique au Canada 29. Gérard Pelletier, Le Devoir, 21 août 1942. attaque épique sur une forteresse de pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale 30. Le Canada, 21 août 1942, p.1. l’Axe,” Le Devoir, 4 novembre 1942, p.6. (Montréal, Comeau et Nadeau, 1996), 31. La Presse, 21 août 1942, p.1. 52. Reported in Le Devoir et La Presse du 22 pp.9-19 32. La Patrie, 21 août 1942, p.5. août 1942. 7. Frances Henry and Carol Tator, Discourses 33. La Presse, 19 août 1942, p.1 53. “Vingt minutes sous un feu foudroyant,” of Domination: Racial Bias in the Canadian 34. La Patrie, 20 août 1942, p.1. La Presse, 21 août 1942, p.2. English Language Press (Toronto, 35. William Stewart, “La belle conduite de 54. “Le raid de Dieppe/Causerie d’un University of Toronto Press, 2002). nos fusiliers,” La Presse, 21 août 1942, p.1. journaliste qui en fut témoin - Le rôle des 8. This article offers a detailed and updated 36. “Les ‘Fusiliers Mont-Royal’ nous ont Fusiliers Mont-Royal - Résultats du raid,” version of these aspects which were fait honneur à Dieppe,” Le Canada, 21 Le Devoir, 5 septembre 1942, p.9. previously discussed in chapter 3 of août 1942, p.1; “L’exploit de Dieppe. Les 55. “Le raid de Dieppe/Causerie d’un Richard, La mémoire de Dieppe. Fusiliers Mont-Royal ont joué un rôle de journaliste qui en fut témoin - Le rôle des 9. Balzer, The Information Front, p.143. premier plan,” Le Devoir, 21 août 1942, Fusiliers Mont-Royal - Résultats du raid,” 10. William R. Young, “Le Canada français p.3. Le Devoir, samedi 5 septembre 1942, p.9. et l’information publique pendant la 37. “L’exploit de Dieppe. Les Fusiliers Mont- 56. The full text of Ross Munro’s conference Seconde Guerre mondiale,” Bulletin Royal ont joué un rôle de Premier plan,” may be found in La Presse, 5 septembre d’histoire politique 3/4 (printemps/été Le Devoir, 21 août 1942, p.3. 1942, p.39. 1995), pp.227-241. 38. Ibid., p.3. 57. “Such an attitude has important 11. Le Devoir, 28 août 1942, p.1. 39. William Stewart, “La belle conduite de implications,” writes Claude Beauregard. 12. Balzer, The Information Front, p.156. nos Fusiliers,” La Presse, 21 août 1942, Ross Munro “was one of the few 13. Ibid, pp.166-177. p.1; William Stewart, “Les Fusiliers Mont- correspondents to participate in the 14. On propaganda, see: William Robert Royal ont bravé l’enfer,” La Presse, 22 août Dieppe Raid (19 August 1942). His Young, Making The Truth Graphic: The 1942, p.11; “Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, first article on this operation gives the Canadian Government’s Home Front héros canadiens français de l’épopée de impression that the raid was a success. Information Structure and programmes Dieppe,” La Presse, p.45. Yet he had to realize that it was a During World War II (Ph.D. dissertation, 40. “Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal nous ont fait monumental disaster. But censorship University of British Columbia, 1978); honneur à Dieppe,” Le Canada, 21 août was at work.” Beauregard, pp.182-183. On censorship, see: Claude Beauregard, 1942, p.1. Similarly, Bob Bowman of Radio Canada, Guerre et censure, l’expérience des journaux, 41. The front page has a solemn photo of also at Dieppe, reported that the raid was des militaires et de la population pendant the burial of 11 Canadian soldiers killed a success: “Without this experience, a la Deuxième guerre mondiale (Ph.D. “glorious Dieppe commando raid” second front would have been suicide.” dissertation, Université Laval, Québec, at Brookwood Canadian Cemetery in LAC, fonds Bushnell, MG 30, E250, vol.1, 1995). England. La Presse, 25 août 1942, p.1. dossier 17, Bob Bowman, “Canadians 15. Young, Making The Truth Graphic, p.172. 42. La Presse, 2 septembre 1942, pp.3, 10; La at Dieppe, an Eyewitness Account,” 20 16. Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Patrie, 2 septembre 1942, pp.3-4, Le Devoir, August 1942, cited by Beauregard, p.183. Mackenzie King Papers, J4 series 2 septembre 1942, p.3. 58. Ibid., pp.2, 11. additional, vol.414, file 3990, n.p., 43. La Presse, 15 septembre 1942, pp.1, 9 ; 59. Le Devoir 15 septembre 1942, p.1. Charles Vining, “Canadian publicity in La Patrie, 15 septembre 1942, p.3, 26 ; Le 60. Balzer, The Information Front, p.163. U.S.A. Report to the Prime Minister,” Devoir, 15 septembre 1942, p.3 61. Ibid., pp.167-170. 10 July 1942, pp.2-7. Note that the 44. Coverage of the entire conference may 62. La Presse, 16 septembre p.8. Bureau of Public Information, created be found in La Presse, 5 septembre 1942, 63. Le Devoir, 21 septembre 1942, p.1. on 8 December 1939, was replaced p.53, La Patrie, pp.19-48-50; and extracts 64. “Les leçons de Dieppe,” La Patrie, 16 in September 1942 by the Wartime in Le Devoir, 5 septembre, p.9. septembre 1942, p.10. Information Board, under the authority 45. Le Devoir, 24 août 1942, pp.3, 10; 25 août 65. Cited by Léopold Richer, Le Devoir, 29 of the prime minister. 1942, p.3; 26 août 1942, p.6; 27 août 1942, octobre 1942, p.10. 17. This incident was reported in Le Devoir, p.3; 28 août 1942, p.3; 29 août 1942, p.3; 66. Le Devoir, 18 septembre 1942, p.3; La 28 août 1942, p.1. 31 août 1942, p.3; 3 septembre 1942, p.4; Presse, 18 septembre 1942, p.17; Le Canada, 18. Jeannette et Guy Boulizon, Stanislas, un 8 septembre 1942, p.6. La Presse, 24 août 19 septembre 1942, p.3. journal à deux voix (Montréal, Flammarion, 1942, p.1; 25 août 1942, p.2; 26 août 1942, 67. Le Devoir, 18 septembre 1942, p.3; La 1988), p.143. Interview with Jeannette pp.2, 25; 27 août 1942, p.2; 29 août 1942, Presse, 18 septembre 1942, p.17. and Guy Boulizon, 6 October 1995, pp.30, 47; 31 août, p.25; 1 septembre 68. Le Devoir, 19 septembre 1942, p.1. Outremont. 1942, pp.1, 9; 2 septembre 1942, p.26; 4 69. La Presse, 18 septembre 1942, p.18. 19. Interview with François-Albert Angers, septembre 1942, p.2; 10 septembre 1942, 15 September 1995, HEC, Montréal. p.30. La Patrie, 21 août 1942, pp.1, 3; 23

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70. Le Devoir, 2 octobre 1942, pp.3, 6; La Presse, than 400 veterans. The ceremony was also 2 octobre 1942, p.15; Le Canada, 3 octobre attended by the veterans affairs ministers Beatrice Richard is an associate professor, 1942, p.2. of Canada and France. Le Devoir, 11 août chair of the department of Humanities 71. La Presse, 15 octobre 1942, pp.1, 3, 19; 1962, p.2. and social sciences at the Royal Military La Patrie, 15 octobre 1942, pp.1, 3, 26; Le 81. Léandre Bergeron, Petit manuel d’histoire College Saint-Jean, Quebec and affiliated Canada, 16 octobre 1942, pp.1, 3. du Québec (Montréal, VLB Éditeur, 1979), to the History Department of Royal 72. Le Canada, 16 octobre 1942, p.14. p.198. Military College of Canada, Ontario. 73. Le Devoir, 16 octobre 1942, p.3. 82. Henry and Tator. She specializes in cultural studies of 74. La Presse, 19 octobre 1942, p.14. 83. The francophone studies of Dieppe are warfare with a specific interest in French 75. La Presse, 15 octobre 1942, p.1. essentially the work of French (from Canadians’ attitude toward armed 76. Ibid., pp.1, 19. France) authors: René Abaudret, Dieppe: conflicts and military institutions. She 77. Ibid., p.15. le sacrifice des Canadiens, 19 août 1942 was awarded the C.P. Stacey Prize 78. Le Canada, 26 octobre 1942, p.12. (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1969); Claude-Paul 2004 for her book La Mémoire de Dieppe: 79. Lionel Groulx, Mes mémoires, tome 4 Couture, Opération “Jubilee”: Dieppe, 19 radioscopie d’un mythe (VLB éditeur, 2002) (Fides, Montréal, 1974), pp.250-251. août 1942” (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, and the 2011 best article prize for her 80. This resurgence is particularly evident at 1969); Jacques Mordal, Les Canadiens à paper in The Journal of Canadian Historical the unveiling of a monument to the FMR Dieppe (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1962). Association: “Quelle guerre raconter? Le at Dieppe on 18 August 1962. Lieutenant- To this list may be added the translation of dilemme du légionnaire Paul Caron.” Colonel Ménard, former commander of the English book by Brereton Greenhous, Personal website: http://www.cmrsj- the regiment is at the forefront. This is Dieppe, Dieppe (Montréal, Art Global, 1992). rmcsj.forces.gc.ca/cp-fs/brichard/pp- the first major official commemoration 84. On this topic, see: Richard, La mémoire de pp-richard-eng.asp of the raid that brought together more Dieppe, p.99-139.

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