Downloaded by [New York University] at 07:14 14 August 2016 the Animal Mind

Downloaded by [New York University] at 07:14 14 August 2016 The Animal Mind The study of animal cognition raises profound questions about the minds of animals and philosophy of mind itself. Aristotle argued that humans are the only animal to laugh, but recent experiments suggest that rats laugh too. In other experiments, dogs have been shown to respond appropriately to over 200 words in human language. In this introduction to the philosophy of animal minds Kristin Andrews introduces and assesses the essential topics, problems, and debates as they cut across animal cognition and philosophy of mind. She addresses the following key topics: • what is cognition, and what is it to have a mind? What questions should we ask to determine whether behavior has a cognitive basis? • the science of animal minds explained: Classical ethology, behaviorist psychology, and cognitive ethology • rationality in animals • animal consciousness: what does research into pain and the emotions reveal? What can empirical evidence about animal behavior tell us about philosophical theories of consciousness? • does animal cognition involve belief and concepts; do animals have a “Language of Thought”? • animal communication • other minds: do animals attribute “mindedness” to other creatures? • moral reasoning and ethical behaviour in animals • animal cognition and m emory Extensive use of empirical examples and case studies is made throughout the book. These include Cheney and Seyfarth’s vervet monkey research, Thorndike’s cat puzzle boxes, Jensen’s research into humans and chimpanzees and the ultimatum game, Pankseep and Burgdorf’s research on rat laughter, and Clayton and Emery’s research on memory in scrub jays. Downloaded by [New York University] at 07:14 14 August 2016 Additional features such as chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary make this an indispensable introduction to those teaching philosophy of mind and animal cognition. It will also be an excellent resource for those in fi elds such as ethology, biology, animal studies, and psychology. Kristin Andrews is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Director of the Cognitive Science Program at York University, Canada. She is the author of Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology (2012), and co-editor of the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Animal Cognition. This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 07:14 14 August 2016 The Animal Mind An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition Kristin Andrews Downloaded by [New York University] at 07:14 14 August 2016 First published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2015 Kristin Andrews The right of Kristin Andrews to be identifi ed as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifi cation and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Andrews, Kristin, 1971- The animal mind : an introduction to the philosophy of animal cognition / Kristin Andrews. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Cognition in animals. 2. Animal behavior. 3. Cognition--Philosophy. I. Title. QL785.A69 2015 591.5’13--dc23 2014021202 ISBN13: 978-0-415-80957-3 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-80960-3 (pbk) ISBN13: 978-1-315-77189-2 (ebk) Typeset in Franklin Gothic by Saxon Graphics Ltd, Derby Downloaded by [New York University] at 07:14 14 August 2016 Contents Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 1 Getting to know other minds 4 1.1 Mind and cognition 5 1.2 Historical views 7 1.3 Arguments for other animal minds 8 1.3.1 Arguments from analogy 9 1.3.2 Arguments from evolutionary parsimony 10 1.3.3 Inference to the best explanation arguments 11 1.3.4 Direct perception arguments 14 1.4 The calibration method 15 1.4.1 Describing behaviors 16 Downloaded by [New York University] at 07:14 14 August 2016 1.4.2 Explaining behaviors 17 1.5 A case: explaining monkey alarm calls 19 1.6 Chapter summary 22 Notes 22 Further reading 22 VI CONTENTS 2 The science of other minds 23 2.1 Anecdotal anthropomorphism 25 2.1.1 Problems with the fi rst step in anecdotal anthropomorphism 27 2.1.2 Problems with the second step in anecdotal anthropomorphism 29 2.2 The rise of animal psychology as a science: Morgan’s Canon 31 2.3 Learning principles: associations and insight 34 2.4 Anthropomorphism and Morgan’s Canon revisited 39 2.5 The rise of ethology and kinds of explanation 44 2.6 New directions in animal cognition research 48 2.7 Chapter summary 50 Note 50 Further reading 50 3 Consciousness 51 3.1 What is consciousness? 51 3.2 Are other animals conscious? 54 3.3 Non-inferential arguments for animal consciousness 55 3.4 Inferential arguments for animal consciousness 56 3.5 A representationalist challenge to animal consciousness 58 3.6 Neural correlates of consciousness arguments for animal minds 62 3.6.1 Fish pain 63 3.6.2 Evaluating animal pain 65 3.6.3 Other analogical features 67 3.6.4 Learning and consciousness revisited 68 3.7 Self-consciousness 70 3.7.1 Mirror self-recognition 70 3.7.2 Mental monitoring 73 3.7.3 Episodic memory 75 3.8 Chapter summary 78 Notes 79 Further reading 79 4 Thinking: belief, concepts, and rationality 80 Downloaded by [New York University] at 07:14 14 August 2016 4.1 What is belief? 81 4.1.1 Representational views 82 4.1.2 Non-representational views 83 4.1.3 Eliminativist views 84 4.2 Requirements for having beliefs 85 4.2.1 Attributing content and concepts 85 4.2.2 Having concepts 90 4.2.3 Systematicity in propositional thought 96 4.2.4 Logical reasoning and rationality 99 4.2.5 Metacognitive capacities 105 CONTENTS VII 4.2.6 Animal logic 107 4.3 Chapter summary 109 Further reading 109 5 Communication 110 5.1 What is communication? 112 5.1.1 Biological accounts 112 5.1.2 Information-based accounts 113 5.1.3 Intentional accounts 115 5.2 Meaning in intentional communication 123 5.2.1 Reference 124 5.2.2 Expressivism 126 5.2.3 Content vs. attention-getting signals 128 5.3 Evolution of language 129 5.3.1 What is language? 129 5.3.2 Gestural origins of language evolution 131 5.3.3 Teaching animals language 135 5.4 Chapter summary 138 Further reading 138 6 Knowing minds 139 6.1 Mindreading (or theory of mind) 140 6.1.1 Is nonhuman mindreading empirically tractable? 142 6.1.2 The “logical problem” 145 6.1.3 Do we need to solve the logical problem? 149 6.1.4 Benefi ts of mindreading 150 6.2 Understanding intentional agency 153 6.3 Understanding others’ emotions 155 6.4 Understanding perceptions and attributing personality traits 158 6.4.1 Research on perceptual mindreading in animals 161 6.4.2 Research on personality understanding in animals 163 6.5 Chapter summary 163 Further reading 164 Downloaded by [New York University] at 07:14 14 August 2016 7 Moral minds 165 7.1 Moral status 165 7.1.1 Utilitarian accounts of moral status 167 7.1.2 Rights-based accounts of moral status 168 7.1.3 Social accounts of moral status 169 7.2 Moral subjects and near-persons 170 7.3 Moral agency 173 7.4 Psychological properties and morality 177 7.5 Moral differences 181 VIII CONTENTS 7.6 Chapter summary 184 Further reading 185 Glossary 186 Bibliography 190 Index 219 Downloaded by [New York University] at 07:14 14 August 2016 Acknowledgments I’ve been teaching the Philosophy of Animal Minds at York University for over ten years, and I’ve learned much about how to present this material from all the students who have passed through my classroom. Some of them read draft chapters of this book, some of them saw slides that I turned into text, but they all helped shape the book you are looking at now. First thanks to all of them. I wasn’t planning on turning my class into a textbook but one day Tony Bruce from Routledge showed up in my offi ce and asked me to writeThe Animal Mind. It sounded like a great idea. During the next two years I was lucky enough to have lots of eyes on drafts. In particular, I’d like to thank those who gave me comments on part or all of the manuscript: Laura Adams, Jacob Beck, Rachel Brown, Devin Curry, Grant Goodrich, Bryce Huebner, Brian Huss, Imola Ilyes, Georgia Mason, Irina Meketa, Edward Minar, Anne Russon, Sara Shettleworth, Elliott Sober, Olivia Sultanescu, and anonymous reviewers for Routledge. I’d also like to thank members of the GTA Animal Cognition Group for helpful discussions about many of these issues. Olivia Sultanescu and Brian Huss deserve extra thanks for their work proofreading, and Downloaded by [New York University] at 07:14 14 August 2016 thank you Olivia for drafting the glossary, and for cleaning up and putting together the pieces that make up this book.

Load more