Cuba After Fidel: Economic Reform, Political Liberalization and Foreign Policy (2006–2014)
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University of Denver Digital Commons @ DU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 1-1-2016 Cuba After Fidel: Economic Reform, Political Liberalization and Foreign Policy (2006–2014) Arturo Lopez-Levy University of Denver Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Latin American Studies Commons Recommended Citation Lopez-Levy, Arturo, "Cuba After Fidel: Economic Reform, Political Liberalization and Foreign Policy (2006–2014)" (2016). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1212. https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1212 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. Cuba after Fidel: Economic Reforms, Political Liberalization and Foreign Policy. (2006 – 2014) A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy by Arturo Lopez-Levy August 2016 Advisor: Aaron Schneider ©Copyright by Arturo Lopez-Levy 2016 All Rights Reserved Author: Arturo Lopez-Levy Title: Cuba after Fidel: Economic Reforms, Political Liberalization and Foreign Policy (2006-2014) Advisor: Aaron Schneider. Degree Date: August 2016 Abstract This dissertation discussed Cuba’s processes of economic reform and political liberalization, and their impact on Cuba’s foreign policy’s adaptation to the post-Cold War. The first part of the dissertation explains economic reform and political liberalization from the perspective of partial reform equilibrium as a result of the Cuban Communist Party’s focus on domestic stability and international legitimacy. The second part of the dissertation focused on Cuba’s foreign policy dynamics associated to the domestic reform, the changes in the international system after the end of the Cold War and the asymmetric conflict between Cuba and the United States. ii Contents Chapter I: Introduction 1 Chapter II: Economic Reform 48 2.1 Introduction 48 2.1.1 The starting intellectual and 56 political point of the economic reform 2.1.2 The Dual track System 63 2.2 Tracing economic reform as a 70 political option for the Cuban Communist Party (CCP) 2.2.1. Fidel Castro’s two tracks strategy 70 in defense of the Command Economy 2.2.2 The economy under Raul Castro 79 before the VI Congress of the CCP in 2011. 2.2.3 The FAR: an army for Raul 89 Castro’s reform 2.3 The VI Congress of the CCP: A 96 change of strategy within the dual track system 2.3.1 Towards the end of the dual track 107 system: a mixed market oriented economy 2.4 Uncertainties and Political 120 Challenges of the Economic Reform Chapter III: Cuba’s Political 127 liberalization. 3.1 Introduction 127 3.1.1 The political and institutional 132 balance of power behind Raul Castro’s rise to the presidency. 3.1.2 The starting point of the political 152 reform in 2006 3.2 Defining political liberalization in the 165 iii Cuban context 3.2.1 Challenges of Cuba’s political 165 liberalization 3.2. 2. Institutionalization 173 3.2.3. A less vertical State-Society 182 relationship: Social decompression and expansion of civil rights 3.2.3.1. Regular and institutionalized 182 consultation between the state and civil society organizations 3.2.4. The expansion of some civil, 188 economic, social and cultural rights 3.2.4.1 The Migration Reform: A short 190 case study 3.3. Liberalization and Democratization: 192 Is one the road to the other? 3.4. International models and promoters 200 of political liberalization Chapter IV: Cuba’s change of leadership: Sources, Actors and challenges of atransition from hybrid 203 domination (Charismatic-institutional) to an institutionalized Leninist rule 4.1 Introduction 203 4.1.1 A hybrid regime with two types of 208 leadership 4.2 Change of leadership, intra- 221 generational and intergenerational transition 4.2.1 A unique intra-generational power 221 transition 4.2.2The inter-generational transition that 232 already took place: The role of the Organization Department of the CCP 4.3 The preparation for an 248 intergenerational transition at the top iv Chapter V: A world safe for reform: 260 How domestic process of economic and political liberalization shapes Cuba’s insertion in the post-Cold War world and viceversa. 5.1 Introduction 260 5.1.1 Cuba’s foreign relations and the 267 dynamics of partial reform 5.1.2 Ideas and policy frontiers of Cuba’s 277 foreign policy elites 5.1.3. Cultures of interaction: The 285 prevalence of Hobbesian Culture 5.2 A social perspective of change in 291 Cuba’s foreign relations 5.2.1 Asymmetric Interdependence 300 5.2.2 Homogeneity 309 Chapter VI: Cuba’s foreign policy 326 strategic adaptation to the Post-Cold War world: Changes in identity and interests. 6.1 Introduction 326 6.1.1 The legacy of the Cold War as 339 processed by Cuban foreign policy elite in the redesign of the national interest and roles: nationalism and internationalism. 6.2 Two different discourses about 352 Cuba’s relations with U.S. allies during the Cold War: From Peaceful coexistence to ideological pluralism. 6.3. Balancing revolutionary identity in 361 Foreign Policy 6.4 Strategies of adaptation to changes in 368 v the balance of power and normative structures of the international system. 6.4.1 Challenges to Cuba’s identity in the 368 Hemispheric System: 6.4.2 Cuba’s Post-Cold War foreign 372 policy adaptation strategies 6.4.2.1 Buffering. 375 6.4.2.2 Beleaguering and transcending 383 conflict 6.5. Conclusions 398 Chapter VII: U.S - Cuba Asymmetric 400 Relations: Breaking the Stalemate. 7.1 Introduction 400 7.2 Brief historical review: From the 410 beginnings of the Cuban Revolution to the fall of the Communist Bloc 7.3 American hegemonic presumption 422 and Cuban nationalism in the context of post 1991 Cold War inertia 7.3.1 Washington’s three false narratives 432 about revolutionary Cuba 7.3.1.2 Washington as a unilateral 438 “community of judgment” of Cuban sovereignty 7.3.1.3 Second false premise: the CCP 447 regime as transitional and temporary 7.3.1.4 Third false narrative: The Cuban 453 regime as an isolated and repudiated threat to international society 7.3.1.5 How these three American 455 narratives matter? 7.3.2 Cuban narratives of revolutionary 460 resistance and solidarity: Another obstacle to AFD solutions? 7.3.2.1 What changed with the end of the 472 vi Cold War in Cuba’s narrative? 7.4 Setting the Analytical Framework for 475 stabilization (normalization) and Acknowledgement for Deference solution (Normalcy) 7.4.1 Normalization and Normalcy 486 7.4.2 Hostility, stability and cooperation 500 within an asymmetric conflict structure 7.5 Normalization, normalcy, and 511 stabilization within the paradigm of Acknowledgments Conclusions 517 Bibliography 550 vii Chapter One: Introduction “Ultimately this transfer won’t work” – Thomas Shannon, U.S. undersecretary for Hemispheric Affairs commented about Cuba’s presidential succession in the summer of 2006- There is no political figure inside of Cuba who matches Fidel Castro…You have to understand that authoritarian regimes are like helicopters. There are single fail point mechanisms. When a rotor comes off a helicopter, it crashes. When a supreme leader, disappears from an authoritarian regime, the authoritarian regime flounders…And I think that’s what we’re seeing at this (Shannon 2006) Undersecretary Shannon’s words expressed a conviction about post-revolution Cuba that was dominant in Washington at the time when Fidel Castro fell sick. Not only the United States Administration but other governments, even those with a close relation with the island-nation such as Spain under Aznar in Europe, and Mexico under the administration Fox-Castaneda in the Americas subscribed this point of view. The central premise of such vision was that Cuba’s political system was dependent on Fidel Castro’s charisma. According to it, the Cuban Communist Party was a simple addendum to Fidel Castro’s appeal; the ideology of the Cuban revolution and its appeals to nationalism and Leninism, a simple mantle for Castro’s interests; the command economy, one of Fidel’s caprices in his communist zealotry. On a typical pathology of asymmetric relations, sub-attention within the great power, the United States, characterizes its approach towards the smaller side, Cuba. This 1 sub-attention was sporadically broken by the personalization of the conflict in the figure of Fidel Castro, a tool that help to simplify and mobilize public opinion about the issue. Rather than a policy towards Cuba, the United States have a policy towards Castro. Since Fidel Castro was- in the dominant view- the system’s corner stone, Cuba’s regime collapse was a matter of time. Fidel would eventually die, and as “a single fail point mechanism”, the post-revolution political order would end. It is not the first time history proved wrong those who underestimate the Cuban socialist resilience. In addition to the explanations based on Fidel Castro’s centrality, different theories about why communist regimes failed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union served to build consensus about Cuba’s regime’s pre-ordained replacement by a capitalist market economy and multiparty democracy (Oppenheimer 1992). A system of state socialism with a command economy and a Leninist vanguard party cannot survive- according to this logic- ninety miles off the shores of Florida in the post-Cold War age of globalization.