The Blow-Up Artist: Reporting & Essays: the New
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
What Happened to the Quants in August 2007?∗
What Happened To The Quants In August 2007?∗ Amir E. Khandaniy and Andrew W. Loz First Draft: September 20, 2007 Latest Revision: September 20, 2007 Abstract During the week of August 6, 2007, a number of high-profile and highly successful quan- titative long/short equity hedge funds experienced unprecedented losses. Based on empir- ical results from TASS hedge-fund data as well as the simulated performance of a specific long/short equity strategy, we hypothesize that the losses were initiated by the rapid un- winding of one or more sizable quantitative equity market-neutral portfolios. Given the speed and price impact with which this occurred, it was likely the result of a sudden liqui- dation by a multi-strategy fund or proprietary-trading desk, possibly due to margin calls or a risk reduction. These initial losses then put pressure on a broader set of long/short and long-only equity portfolios, causing further losses on August 9th by triggering stop-loss and de-leveraging policies. A significant rebound of these strategies occurred on August 10th, which is also consistent with the sudden liquidation hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that the quantitative nature of the losing strategies was incidental, and the main driver of the losses in August 2007 was the firesale liquidation of similar portfolios that happened to be quantitatively constructed. The fact that the source of dislocation in long/short equity portfolios seems to lie elsewhere|apparently in a completely unrelated set of markets and instruments|suggests that systemic risk in the hedge-fund industry may have increased in recent years. -
Crises and Hedge Fund Risk∗
Crises and Hedge Fund Risk∗ Monica Billio†, Mila Getmansky‡, and Loriana Pelizzon§ This Draft: September 7, 2009 Abstract We study the effects of financial crises on hedge fund risk and show that liquidity, credit, equity market, and volatility are common risk factors during crises for various hedge fund strategies. We also apply a novel methodology to identify the presence of a common latent (idiosyncratic) risk factor exposure across all hedge fund strategies. If the latent risk factor is omitted in risk modeling, the resulting effect of financial crises on hedge fund risk is greatly underestimated. The common latent factor exposure across the whole hedge fund industry was present during the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis of 1998 and the 2008 Global financial crisis. Other crises including the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 affected the whole hedge fund industry only through classical systematic risk factors. Keywords: Hedge Funds; Risk Management; Liquidity; Financial Crises; JEL Classification: G12, G29, C51 ∗We thank Tobias Adrian, Vikas Agarwal, Lieven Baele, Nicolas Bollen, Ben Branch, Stephen Brown, Darwin Choi, Darrell Duffie, Bruno Gerard, David Hsieh, Luca Fanelli, William Fung, Patrick Gagliar- dini, Will Goetzmann, Robin Greenwood, Philipp Hartmann, Ravi Jagannathan, Nikunj Kapadia, Hossein Kazemi, Martin Lettau, Bing Liang, Andrew Lo, Narayan Naik, Colm O’Cinneide, Geert Rouwenhorst, Stephen Schaefer, Tom Schneeweis, Matthew Spiegel, Heather Tookes, Marno Verbeek, Pietro Veronesi, and seminar participants at the NBER -
Hedge Funds: Due Diligence, Red Flags and Legal Liabilities
Hedge Funds: Due Diligence, Red Flags and Legal Liabilities This Website is Sponsored by: Law Offices of LES GREENBERG 10732 Farragut Drive Culver City, California 90230-4105 Tele. & Fax. (310) 838-8105 [email protected] (http://www.LGEsquire.com) BUSINESS/INVESTMENT LITIGATION/ARBITRATION ==== The following excerpts of articles, arranged mostly in chronological order and derived from the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Reuters, Los Angles Times, Barron's, MarketWatch, Bloomberg, InvestmentNews and other sources, deal with due diligence in hedge fund investing. They describe "red flags." They discuss the hazards of trying to recover funds from failed investments. The sponsor of this website provides additional commentary. "[T]he penalties for financial ignorance have never been so stiff." --- The Ascent of Money (2008) by Niall Ferguson "Boom times are always accompanied by fraud. As the Victorian journalist Walter Bagehot put it: 'All people are most credulous when they are most happy; and when money has been made . there is a happy opportunity for ingenious mendacity.' ... Bagehot observed, loose business practices will always prevail during boom times. During such periods, the gatekeepers of the financial system -- whether bankers, professional investors, accountants, rating agencies or regulators -- should be extra vigilant. They are often just the opposite." (WSJ, 4/17/09, "A Fortune Up in Smoke") Our lengthy website contains an Index of Articles. However, similar topics, e.g., "Bayou," "Madoff," "accountant," may be scattered throughout several articles. To locate all such references, use your Adobe Reader/Acrobat "Search" tool (binocular symbol). Index of Articles: 1. "Hedge Funds Can Be Headache for Broker, As CIBC Case Shows" 2. -
Squash Program
Youth Squash Program What is Squash? According to an article published in Men’s Fitness Magazine: You'll need a racquet, an opponent, a ball, and an enclosed court—most colleges and large gyms have them. Alternate hitting the ball off the front wall until someone loses the point. This happens when you allow the ball to bounce twice, or when you whack it out of bounds—below the 19-inch strip of metal (the "tin") along the bottom of the front wall, or above the red line around the top of the court. First one to 11 points wins the game; best of three or five wins the match. It may sound simple, but Squash is a challenging and rewarding game. And no one in South Jersey does it better than Greate Bay Racquet and Fitness. Why should you choose Greate Bay Racquet and Fitness Squash program? Greate Bay Racquet and Fitness is South Jersey's premiere racquet sports facility. Our full-service Squash club features: Four Squash courts o Two International Singles Courts o Two North American Doubles Courts Coaching from our full-time Squash professional Access to our Squash pro shop Lessons and clinics A track-record of successful juniors programs The best amenities for proper training; Locker rooms, Steam Room, Sauna 1 Youth Squash Program Greg Park – Squash Professional Greg Park is the Head Squash Professional at Greate Bay Racquet & Fitness Club. He is a Touring Squash Professional who is currently ranked 10th in the World and 2nd in the United States by the SDA Pro Tour. -
Lbex-Docid 3285232 Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc
FOIA CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED BY LBEX-DOCID 3285232 LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC. Agenda I FOIA CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED BY LBEX-DOCID 3285232 LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC. ,--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ Agenda Agenda • Key Themes • Risk Governance - Our Control Environment - Risk Philosophy - Committee Structures • Risk Management Overview - Risk Management Function - Risk Management Organization - External Constituents • Risk Analysis and Quantification - Risk Management Integrated Framework Risk Appetite Risk Equity Risk Appetite Usage Risk Limits • Risk Exposure • Areas of Increased Focus - Subprime Exposure - High Yield and Leveraged Loans - Hedge Funds • Conclusion • Appendix - Stress Scenarios 3 FOIA CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED BY LBEX-DOCID 3285232 LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC. Key Themes I FOIA CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED BY LBEX-DOCID 3285232 LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC. Key Themes Key Themes Risk Management is one of the core competencies of the Firm and is an intrinsic component of our control system. As a result of our focus on continuously enhancing our risk capabilities, in the current challenging environment, we feel confident that our risk position is solid. • Risk Management is at the very core of Lehman's business model - Conservative risk philosophy- supported by approximately 30% employee ownership - Effective risk governance -unwavering focus of the Executive Committee - Significant resources dedicated -
Grant Trophy: January 13, 1945 the University Club, New York, NY
Grant Trophy: January 13, 1945 The University Club, New York, NY Canada 1 USA 10 Winner Scores Alastair Grant,Montreal,QC David McMullin,Philadelphia,PA USA 15-9,15-11,15-11 Sam Morrison,Montreal,QC William E.Slack,Philadelphia,PA T.Douglas Sinclair,Montreal,QC Clifford Sutter,New York,NY USA 15-10,15-5,15-6 George A.Roberts,Montreal,QC J.Bart.McGuire,Greenwich,CT Clarence Booth,Montreal,QC Neil J.Sullivan,Philadelphia,PA USA 15-8,10-15,15-9,15-6 Dwight Magee,Montreal,QC Roy R.Coffin,Philadelphia,PA Hugh McKay,Montreal,QC M.Donald Grant,New York,NY USA 16-13,15-7,15-4 Johnny Johnston,Montreal,QC John J.Smith,New York,NY George Rattee,Montreal,QC R.D.Jerry Day,Philadelphia,PA USA 15-4,15-5,17-14 Frank Fitzpatrick,Montreal,QC J.Watson Malone,Philadelphia,PA Ray Perrault,Montreal,QC Tevis Huhn,New York,NY USA 15-10,15-11,15-10 Peter Kenrick,Montreal,QC Williamson H.Pell,Jr,New York, Jules E.Lareau,Montreal,QC William E Lamble,Baltimore,MD CAN 15-9,18-17,7-15,15-12 Guy Lefaivre,Montreal,QC John J Morrison,Baltimore,MD Charles Passingham,Montreal,QC Harold S.Tenney,Greenwich,CT USA 15-7,15-6,15-9 Kurt Wiele,Montreal,QC D.Lee Norris,Cedarhurst,LI,NY Henry Johnson,Montreal,QC Seymour H.Knox,Buffalo,NY USA 8-15,18-15,15-11,11-15,15-7 C.A.(Dinny) Dinsmore,Montreal,QC Darwin P.Kingsley Philadelphia,PA Robert B.Bell,Montreal,QC Seymour H.Knox 3rd,Buffalo,NY USA 10-15,15-7,12-15,15-10,15-8 B.Anthony Mallon,Montreal,QC Darwin P.Kingsley 3rd,Philadelphia,PA A.Johnson,Montreal,QC Abraham M.(Sonny)Sonnabend,Boston,MA USA 15-9,17-18,15-12,15-7 R.Christopher -
Standard & Poor's Update on Risk, Liquidity and Capital Adequacy
Confidential Presentation to: Standard & Poor’s Update on Risk, Liquidity and Capital Adequacy August 17, 2007 FOIA CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED BY LBEX-DOCID 2031705 LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC. Introduction In October 2005, S&P upgraded Lehman Brothers to A+. Since then, we have continued to grow and broaden our franchise, while maintaining our hallmark expense, risk, and capital discipline. We believe that our size, diversity, and franchise indicate significant credit strength. In 2006 and 2007, we achieved record growth and profitability – Since 2005, our revenues and net income have grown by 44% and 50% respectively, with ROE increasing from 21.6% to 25.8%. The growth has been broad-based, with non-US regions and non-FID segments growing faster than the overall portfolio This performance was achieved despite a more challenging environment than in prior years and without compromising our commitment to the Firm’s creditors – Reflects the power of the Firm's franchise and diversification – Continued on the same strategic path, building customer-oriented and diversified businesses Discipline in risk-taking is a major contributor to our success. It is also one of our core competencies – Effective risk reduction through syndication and securitization of our exposure (we are in the moving business not storage business) – Active hedging of positions using both traditional and innovative products – Reliable liquidity, sufficient to meet all of our funding obligations in all market environments – Comprehensive, multi-tiered risk management, capital management, and liquidity management frameworks 1 FOIA CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTED BY LBEX-DOCID 2031705 LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC. Agenda Overview and Key Themes Today, we are going to cover three areas: Risk Management, Liquidity, and Equity Adequacy 1. -
A SPAC-Tacular Distraction: Compelling Opportunities in “Other” Event-Driven Investments | P2
A SPAC-TACULAR ALTERNATIVES INSIGHTS DISTRACTION Compelling Opportunities in “Other” Event-Driven Investments EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Doug Francis and Sam Klar | March 2021 The combination of record-level SPAC issuance and a flood of non-SPAC M&A has created a supply-demand imbalance A Wild Year in the event-driven asset class. With It’s certainly been an interesting 12 months in the event-driven asset class. From soft SPACs garnering most of the limelight, catalyst event situations upended by the onset of COVID in Q1 2020, to the March 2020 we believe investors are missing an “Arbageddon” widening in merger arbitrage spreads, to countless instances of hedge excellent opportunity to deploy capital into fund repositioning causing atypical volatility in typically boring share class arbitrage. “other” event-driven investments, most It’s been a truly wild ride. prominently merger arbitrage. The combination of Q1 2020 performance challenges for the asset class and slow-to- recover new merger volume last spring and summer led to the perception that there was “nothing to do” in event-driven. The record issuance of SPACs in 2020 and early 2021, accompanied by some high-profile bouts of outperformance in former SPACs like Nikola, amended that narrative slightly. Recent commentary has been willing to stipulate that there was nothing to do in event-driven, apart from SPACs. The Current Opportunity As experienced event-driven investors, we’ve often chafed at the notion that event- driven’s attractiveness waxes and wanes as much as commentators would suggest. Indeed, our team mantra is “there’s almost always something to do,” and our historical results have supported this claim’s veracity. -
The Panic of 2007+
The Panic of 2007+ Gary Gorton Yale School of Management and NBER* Prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole Conference, August 2008 This version: August 4, 2008 Abstract How did problems with subprime mortgages result in a systemic crisis, a panic? The ongoing Panic of 2007 is due to a loss of information about the location and size of risks of loss due to default on a number of interlinked securities, special purpose vehicles, and derivatives, all related to subprime mortgages. Subprime mortgages are a financial innovation designed to provide home ownership opportunities to riskier borrowers. Addressing their risk required a particular design feature, linked to house price appreciation. Subprime mortgages were then financed via securitization, which in turn has a unique design reflecting the subprime mortgage design. Subprime securitization tranches were often sold to CDOs, which were, in turn, often purchased by market value off-balance sheet vehicles. Additional subprime risk was created with derivatives. When the housing price bubble burst, this chain of securities, derivatives, and off-balance sheet vehicles could not be penetrated by most investors to determine the location and size of the risks. The introduction of the ABX indices, synthetics related to portfolios of subprime bonds, in 2006 created common knowledge about the effects of these risks by providing centralized prices and a mechanism for shorting. I describe the relevant securities, derivatives, and vehicles and provide some very simple, stylized, examples to show: (1) how asymmetric information between the sell-side and the buy-side was created via complexity; (2) how the chain of interlinked securities was sensitive to house prices; (3) how the risk was spread in an opaque way; and (4) how the ABX indices allowed information to be aggregated and revealed. -
Practical Speculation
nied_a01fm.qxd 1/24/03 10:40 AM Page i Practical Speculation VICTOR NIEDERHOFFER LAUREL KENNER John Wiley & Sons, Inc. nied_a01fm.qxd 1/24/03 10:40 AM Page i nied_a01fm.qxd 1/24/03 10:40 AM Page 1 More Praise for Practical Speculation “Practical Speculation distills an unusual breadth of hard-won (and costly) ex- perience and insight into an immensely readable and instructive book. Bulls and Bears are drawn and quartered alike by the authors’ exquisitely honed quantitative scalpel.” Stephen M. Stigler Professor of Statistics University of Chicago “In my judgment, Victor Niederhoffer is the single most insightful speculator in the world. This new book displays Victor’s unique gift for recognizing the subtle confluence of seemingly disparate events. Although this book is par- tially a guide on investment strategy, it is principally a remarkable explanation of market function.” Herbert London John M. Olin Professor of Humanities, New York University President, Hudson Institute “Whatever Victor Niederhoffer writes is worth reading—not once but at least twice. His analysis of markets is as brilliant as it is unorthodox. Readers will discover a host of nuggets in Practical Speculation that will stretch their minds and tease their imaginations.” Lawrence S. Ritter John M. Schiff Professor of Finance Emeritus New York University “Victor Niederhoffer outdoes himself beginning with the first paragraph of the introduction. Victor and Laurel uniquely see the interrelationships and de- pendencies among the complex factors that are daily life and are able to inter- pret observations in terms of how people will react to the sequences of events. -
LBEX-AM 067167 Agenda I + Overview Chris O'meara
:' Q.) ': ·QJ ~ ~· ···e.•:'~ •" LBEX-AM 067167 Agenda I + Overview Chris O'Meara +Risk Madelyn Antoncic - Recent Market Stress Exposure to Key Products/Markets - Risk Appetite Usage and Counterparty Credit Exposure· .. t-' Global Stress Tests F j ,• ~~ ~: ~· '.,.' + Liquidity ·Paolo Tonucci ,,. ' ,.·~ - Funding Framework ~ I - Funding Update - ·Contingent Liquidity Risk + Capital Management and Balance Sheet Paolo Tonucci - Equity and Balance Sheet Growth - Equity Adequacy rm m Credit Ratings >< )> - Share Repurchases s 0 ......en ....Jo. en LEHMAN BROTHERS 1 co Overview I 2007 has seen a significant amount of risk, financing and capital activity, driven by business growth generally and high levels of activity in specific businesses + Risk appetite usage increased from $2.12 billion at the end of 2006 to $3.27 billion, but remains within the established risk limits. The Firm's credit portfolio remains very high quality, and 97.8% of our counterparty exposure is to investment grade names + Our risk management stress test results for both the Subprime Mortgage and the Leveraged Lending business showed that the losses we actually incurred were consistently within the range predicted by our management models + While the funding markets have become more difficult to access, this has had a limited impact on our liquidity. The liquidity pool has increased to $36 billion at the end of the 3rd quarter from $25.7 billion at the end of the 2nd quarter, and the cash capital surplus has increased to $8.1 billion from $2.5 billion + Common stockholders' equity growth has been significant with full year growth projected to be around $3.6 billion, up 20% vs. -
Taleb Turned the Inevitability of Disaster Into an Investment Strategy
April 22 & 29, 2002 DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE Blowing Up How Nassim Taleb turned the inevitability of disaster into an investment strategy One day in 1996, a Wall Street trader named Nassim Nicholas Taleb went to see Victor Niederhoffer. Victor Niederhoffer was one of the most successful money managers in the country. He lived and worked out of a thirteen-acre compound in Fairfield County, Connecticut, and when Taleb drove up that day from his home in Larchmont he had to give his name at the gate, and then make his way down a long, curving driveway. Niederhoffer had a squash court and a tennis court and a swimming pool and a colossal, faux-alpine mansion in which virtually every square inch of space was covered with eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American folk art. In those days, he played tennis regularly with the billionaire financier George Soros. He had just written a best-selling book, "The Education of a Speculator," dedicated to his father, Artie Niederhoffer, a police officer from Coney Island. He had a huge and eclectic library and a seemingly insatiable desire for knowledge. When Niederhoffer went to Harvard as an undergraduate, he showed up for the very first squash practice and announced that he would someday be the best in that sport; and, sure enough, he soon beat the legendary Shariff Khan to win the U.S. Open squash championship. That was the kind of man Niederhoffer was. He had heard of Taleb's growing reputation in the esoteric field of options trading, and summoned him to Connecticut.