Daf Ditty Pesachim 71: the Core of Joy

Daf Ditty Pesachim 71: The Core of Joy

at the time of rejoicing, on the Festival itself, and if it was slaughtered on the fourteenth it is not. The mitzva to bring a Festival peace-offering is also not fulfilled, for it is something that is an obligation, as everyone is obligated to bring this offering, and the principle is that anything that is an obligation must come only from that which is unconsecrated, meaning that one cannot bring an obligatory offering from an animal that has already been consecrated for another purpose.

The Gemara proposes: Let us say that a baraita supports him. The verse states:

Seven days shalt thou keep a feast unto the LORD thy God 15 וט תַﬠְבִשׁ ,םיִמָי גֹחָתּ הָוהיַל ,יֶהֱא ,יֶהֱא הָוהיַל in the place which the LORD shall choose; because the LORD ,םוֹקָמַּבּ רֶשֲׁא - רַחְבִי :הָוהְי יִכּ ְכֶרָבְי הָוהְי הָוהְי ְכֶרָבְי יִכּ thy God shall bless thee in all thine increase, and in all the work ,יֶהֱא לֹכְבּ ְתָאוּבְתּ לֹכְבוּ הֵשֲׂﬠַמ ,יֶדָי ,יֶדָי הֵשֲׂﬠַמ לֹכְבוּ ְתָאוּבְתּ לֹכְבּ ,יֶהֱא .of thy hands, and thou shalt be altogether joyful ,ָתיִיָהְו ַא .ַחֵמָשׂ ַא ,ָתיִיָהְו

Deut 16:15

“Seven days shall you celebrate to the Lord your God in the place that the Lord shall choose, for the Lord your God shall bless you in all your produce and in all the work of your hands, and you shall be but joyous”

This verse seems superfluous, as it was already stated in the previous verse: “And you shall rejoice in your Festival.” The baraita expounds: “And you shall be but joyous” comes to include the last night of the Festival.

2 Even then you must make sure there is rejoicing by eating the appropriate peace-offerings. The baraita considers: Do you say that the verse comes to include the last night of the Festival? Or perhaps it comes to include only the first night of the Festival.

Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall be but joyous”; the word “but” restricts this mitzva, meaning that there is not always a mitzva to be joyous.

RASHI

The Gemara clarifies how this baraita supports Ulla: What is the reason that we learn from this expression that it is specifically on the first night that there is no mitzva of rejoicing? Is it not because on the first night he has nothing with which to rejoice? As Ulla said, one cannot fulfill the mitzva of rejoicing with a peace-offering that was slaughtered on the eve of the Festival, because it was not slaughtered at the time of rejoicing. On the last night of the Festival, on the other hand, one can rejoice with a peace-offering that was slaughtered the previous day, i.e., the last intermediate day of the Festival, which is also a time of rejoicing.

The Gemara rejects this support: No, it is not for this reason, but rather for the reason taught in the continuation of the baraita: What did you see to include the last night of the Festival in the mitzva of rejoicing and to exclude the first night of the Festival, a distinction that is not even hinted at in the verse? The baraita explains: I include the last night of the Festival in the mitzva of rejoicing, for there is rejoicing on the days of the Festival preceding it, and I exclude the first

3 night of the Festival, for there is no day of rejoicing preceding it. Thus, no support for Ulla can be deduced from the baraita.

Rav Yosef raised an objection against the opinion of Ulla: It was taught in abaraita with regard to the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth that one fulfills with it the mitzva to bring peace- offerings of rejoicing, but one does not fulfill with it the mitzva to bring a Festival peace- offering. We can ask, why? Surely, according to Ulla, we require that the slaughter be performed at a time of rejoicing, and this requirement is not fulfilled in this case. The Gemara answers: Rav Idi bar Avin said that the baraita is referring here to a case where he delayed and slaughtered it only on the fifteenth, i.e., on the Festival, which is a time of rejoicing.

Rava said: There are two possible responses to refute this. One is that the male goats of the Festivals are eaten raw and are not eaten roasted. Being a non-essential part of the service, roasting the meat is forbidden on Shabbat. Therefore, the meat can be eaten only raw, and there is no rejoicing with raw meat. And furthermore, only the priests eat of the meat of these sin- offerings. With what then do ordinary Israelites rejoice? Rather, Rav Pappa said: In such a situation, one rejoices with clean clothes and old wine.

Summary

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:1

While there is an obligation of “happiness” on the night of Shemini Atzeres, there is no obligation on the day of Shemini Atzeres. The Torah twice indicates on Sukos that the obligation of

1 http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Pesachim_71.pdf

4 “happiness” (which in the time of the Beis Hamikdash is fulfilled by eating korbanos such as the Chagiga) is only for seven days.

According to a braisa, the word “Ach same’ach” - - “just happy” includes the night of Shemini Atzeres as a time when one is obligated to be happy. However, Rashi explains that the braisa holds that being that the Torah otherwise said the obligation is for seven days, it must be that there is no such obligation on the day of Shemini Atzeres.

A shelamim slaughtered before Yom Tov can be used to fulfill the mitzva of “happiness,” but not the mitzva of bringing a Chagiga on the regel.

Rabbi Elazar is the author of this law. He explained that to fulfill happiness one simply must eat the meat of a korban, which does not have to have been slaughtered on the festival. However, the obligation to offer a korban Chagiga for the festival is only fulfilled when the actual bringing of the offering is on the festival itself.

The Gemora states that while there is an obligation of “happiness” on the night of Shemini Ateres, there is no obligation on the day of Shemini Atzeres. Does this apply today when there is no Beis Hamikdash?

Do we say that there is no obligation to drink wine etc. on the last day?

The Poskim do not mention that the last day is any different than any other day of yom tov (or chol ha’moed) where there is an obligation to be “happy.” One possible reason for this is that our Gemora is only referring to the happiness of eating meat of korbanos, which is clearly what is referred to by the Torah. When the verse excludes happiness regarding korbanos, it does not necessarily exclude other kinds of happiness which are substituted for korbanos, such as drinking wine. This is indicated in our Gemora by Rav Papa, who says that if Yisroelim cannot eat meat of korbanos it is possible that they are obligated to have happiness by drinking wine and wearing nice clothes.

Indeed, the Avnei Nezer (Orach Chaim #423) makes a distinction regarding the first night of Yom Tov that although one cannot eat from a Chagiga that was slaughtered on yom tov, and he therefore does not have to eat other korbanos either, he still should be obligated to drink wine. It therefore is possible that the Poskim do not differentiate because they hold the Gemora was only referring to happiness of korbanos.

THE "KORBAN SIMCHAH" OF YOM TOV

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:

On every Yom Tov, a person is obligated to offer three types of Korbanos -- the Olas Re'iyah, the Shalmei Chagigah, and the Shalmei Simchah. The Olas Re'iyah and Shalmei Chagigah are offered once during the Yom Tov, and the Shalmei Simchah is offered and eaten every day of the Yom Tov

5 in order to fulfill the Mitzvah of Simchas Yom Tov, experiencing the joy of eating the meat of Korbanos on Yom Tov.

Does the obligation to offer Shalmei Simchah require that one sacrifice a Korban Simchah, or does it require that one eat from the meat of a Shalmei Simchah? If the obligation is to eat from the Korban but not necessarily to sacrifice it, then one may fulfill his obligation by eating the meat of someone else's Korban Simchah. If, however, the obligation is to sacrifice a Korban Simchah, then one must bring his own Korban.

The Gemara says that the obligation of Shalmei Simchah applies even to the night of Shemini Atzeres.2

DEVAR SHMUEL cites an opinion that proves from here that the obligation is to eat the Korban and not to sacrifice it, because one may not offer a Korban at night.

TOSFOS (96b, end of DH Ta'un) indeed says that a person fulfills his obligation of Simchah by eating his friend's Korban, as the ARUCH LA'NER points out (Sukah 48a).

RASHI (70a, DH Yotzei) is bothered by the question of how a person can fulfill his obligation of Shalmei Simchah with an animal that is not Chulin. The rule is that any obligatory Korban (such as the Shalmei Simchah) must be brought from Chulin and not from an animal that is already sanctified to be brought as a Korban (such as Ma'aser Behemah). Rashi answers this question by citing a verse from which we derive that the Shalmei Simchah is an exception, and it does not have to be brought from Chulin.

If the obligation is to eat the Shalmei Simchah, then there is no obligation per se to bring the Korban. Consequently, there should be no requirement that it be brought from Chulin! Something that must be eaten does not need to come from Chulin; only something that must be sacrificed must come from Chulin. From the words of Rashi it seems that there is an obligation to sacrifice a Korban for Shalmei Simchah, and one may not fulfill his obligation by eating from another's Korban. How, though, does Rashi understand the Gemara that says that there is an obligation of Simchah even at night?

The obligation of Simchah requires that one bring a Korban, and it is not possible to bring a Korban at night. It must be that Rashi understands that the Shalmei Simchah is similar to the Korban Pesach in that the entire purpose of the obligation to sacrifice the Korban is in order to eat it.

There is both an obligation to sacrifice the Shalmei Simchah and to eat it.3

On every Yom Tov, every adult Jewish male is obligated to bring three types of Korbanos to the Beis ha'Mikdash: the Olas Re'iyah, the Shalmei Chagigah, and the Shalmei Simchah. The former two are brought once during the Yom Tov, while the Shalmei Simchah are eaten every day of the Yom Tov in

2 and not the following day, according to Rashi here; see, however, Rashi to Sukah 48a, DH l'Rabos 3 RAV SHACH, zt'l, in AVI EZRI, Hilchos Chagigah 2:3, proposes a similar reasoning. See also DEVAR SHMUEL to Pesachim 109a

6 order to fulfill the Mitzvah of Simchas Yom Tov, experiencing the joy of eating the meat of Korbanos throughout the festival.

Does the obligation of offering Shalmei Simchah require that one sacrifice a Korban Simchah and eat it, or does it require only that one eat from the meat of a Shalmei Simchah, even if he did not sacrifice it? If the Mitzvah is only to eat from the Korban but not necessarily to sacrifice it, it is reasonable to assume that one may fulfill his obligation by eating the meat of someone else's Korban Simchah. If, on the other hand, the Mitzvah also requires that one sacrifice a Korban specifically for the Shalmei Simchah, one must offer his own animal and cannot fulfill his obligation of Simchah by eating the meat of someone else's. (ARUCH LA'NER to Sukah 48a, DH b'Masnisin)

Our daf explains that the obligation of Shalmei Simchah applies even to the last night of Sukos, the night of Shemini Atzeres (but not to the day of Shemini Atzeres, according to Rashi; see, however, Rashi to Sukah 48a, DH l'Rabos). The DEVAR SHMUEL there cites commentators who prove from here that the Mitzvah merely requires that one eat the Korban but not that he sacrifices it. Since a Korban cannot be offered at night, and yet the Gemara says that the obligation of Simchah applies at night, it must be that the obligation of Simchah requires only that one eat the meat of the Korban.

TOSFOS in Pesachim (96b, end of DH Ta'un) indeed writes that a person fulfills his obligation of Simchah by eating his friend's Korban.

However, the Gemara Chagiga 8 is bothered by the question of how a person can fulfill his obligation of Shalmei Simchah with an animal which is not Chulin. The Halachah is that any obligatory Korban, such as the Shalmei Simchah, must come from Chulin and not from an animal which is already consecrated as a Korban (such as Ma'aser Behemah or an animal purchased with money of Ma'aser Sheni). The Gemara cites a verse which teaches that the Shalmei Simchah is an exception to this rule and may be brought from Chulin.

If the Mitzvah is to eat the Shalmei Simchah, then there is no obligation per se to sacrifice an animal as a Korban Shalmei Simchah, and, consequently, the animal should not need to come from Chulin! If the Mitzvah requires only that meat be eaten to provide Simchah, then the meat obviously may come from any Korban. Only when the Mitzvah requires that an animal be sacrificed must the animal be brought from Chulin and sanctified for its designated purpose. The Gemara here implies that the Mitzvah requires that one sacrifice a Korban for Shalmei Simchah, and thus one may not satisfy his obligation of Shalmei Simchah by eating the meat of another's Korban. (It is unlikely that the verse teaches that one is not required to sacrifice, but only to eat, a Korban for Simchah. Rather, the verse teaches that even Nedarim and Nedavos may be eaten as the Korban Simchah.4

This is also evident from the ruling of Rebbi Elazar in Pesachim (70b) that one fulfills the Mitzvah of Simchah only when he eats a Korban slaughtered on the festival. If the Mitzvah involves only eating meat of a Korban, what difference does it make if the Korban was slaughtered on Yom Tov or before Yom Tov? It must be that the Mitzvah involves offering the Shalmei Simchah as well as eating it.

4 as an exception to the normal rule, and not that the Mitzvah of Simchah is merely to eat, but not to offer, a Korban. This is the implication of Rashi to Pesachim 70a, DH Yotzei. See, however, Rashi here on 7b, DH Af Min ha'Ma'aser

7 However, if the Mitzvah of Simchah requires that one offer the Shalmei Simchah, why does the Gemara in Pesachim say that the Mitzvah of Simchah applies even at night? The Mitzvah requires that one offer a Korban, but a Korban cannot be offered at night.

It must be that the Mitzvah of Shalmei Simchah is to eat an animal which one has sacrificed as a Korban (and, according to Rebbi Elazar, the animal must have been sacrificed on the festival). (Apparently, the Simchah must come from a festival-related Korban.) In this sense, offering a Korban is obligatory. However, it is not obligatory to bring a Korban on every day of the festival, and certainly not on the last night of the festival. In fact, it may not even be obligatory to bring a Korban on the festival altogether. Our Daf cites opinions that one fulfills the Mitzvah of Simchah even by eating a Korban slaughtered on Erev Pesach (in contrast to the opinion of Rebbi Elazar cited above); as long as the animal is his Korban, it makes no difference whether it was offered on the festival itself or before the festival. The Mitzvah requires only that each person eat from his Korban every day (and night) of the festival.

Tosfos also seems to be in doubt whether one fulfills the Mitzvah of Simchah with another's Korban. In Sukah (47a, DH Linah), Tosfos asks the same question he asks in Pesachim (how a person can avoid bringing a Korban of some sort every day of the festival), but he does not suggest the simple answer which he proposes in Pesachim, that one may eat from another's Korban Simchah.

“And you should be happy” comes to include a Mitzvah of being happy on the last night of Yom Tov…Perhaps this only teaches a Mitzvah of simcha on the first night of Yom Tov?5

That is why the verse says “ach” to qualify the verse.

Our Daf explains two reasons why there is no Mitzvah of simcha on the first night of Yom Tov. According to Ulah, one cannot fulfill his obligation of “simcha” with the Korban Shelamim which he brought on erev Yom Tov. Therefore, on the first night of Yom Tov, he has nothing with which to rejoice. Ravin, however, holds that one can indeed fulfill his obligation of “simcha” with the Shelamim he brings on erev Yom Tov. The pasuk would therefore exclude the mitzvah of simcha on the first night of Yom Tov. It is more reasonable to say that the requirement of simcha is on the last night of Yom Tov, in the context of preexisting simcha, when simcha has already taken place for the entire festival, rather than the first night, when no simcha has yet been celebrated.

The aforementioned discussion applied in the times of the Beis HaMikdash, when the mitzvah of simcha was fulfilled through the eating of the meat of the Korban Shelamim. Nowadays, there is a difference of opinion how one fulfills this mitzvah.

5 https://dafdigest.org/masechtos/Pesachim%20071.pdf

According to the Shagas Aryeh (1), even nowadays the mitzvah of simcha on the first night of Yom Tov is only a rabbinic command. This is based on the reason of Ravin discussed above. However, there are those (2) who hold that Ulah’s limitation only applied when the Shelamim of Simcha were brought. However, nowadays, when we fulfill the mitzvah of simcha through other means3, there is a Biblical obligation of simcha even on the first night of Yom Tov. Either way, there is certainly a rabbinic obligation of simcha on the first night. Based on this, women can begin wearing their new Yom Tov dress on the first night of Yom Tov (3), and children may also enjoy the treats which they received for Yom Tov, even on the first night.

The Command to be Joyous

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:6

From the pasuk (Devarim 16:15) of ve-hayita akh same’ah – “and you shall be altogether joyful” – we learn that there is a commandment to be joyous on the three major holidays of the year – Pesah, Shavu’ot and Sukkot.

One of our daf’s concerns revolves around the question of how we can joyously celebrate the first night of the holidays, when any korban that had been brought prior to the Yom Tov cannot be considered part of the joy of that holiday, yet there has not yet been an opportunity to sacrifice the korban Chagiga for the holiday!

This question is of such concern to the Gemara, that it considers the possibility that the command to be joyous on Yom Tov that appears in the above passage, does not apply to the first night of the holiday; the word akh is understood to possibly limit the obligation to the rest of Yom Tov.

The Gemara’s question is based on the assumption that the mitzva of simcha – of joy on the holiday – is defined, at least during Temple times, as partaking of the sacrifices, and eating the meat

6 https://steinsaltz.org/daf/pesahim71/

9 associated with them. According to this view, other activities that bring joy to a person are simply not included under the specific definition of the word simcha as it is used in this context.

The conclusion of the Gemara rejects this approach, however, by suggesting that after the destruction of the Temple the joy of Yom Tov can be had by wearing freshly laundered clothing, special colorful clothing for women, by drinking wine, etc. Once the Gemara suggests this view, apparently it accepts the possibility that even while the Temple was standing and fully operational, these activities could legitimately be considered participation in simchat ha-hag – the joyousness of the holiday.

Therefore, we can conclude that even on the first night of Yom Tov there is an obligation of simcha.

Simchat Yom Tov

Harav Aharon Lichtenstein writes:7

The Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim (108b) states:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of the Shemuel: These four cups [of wine drunk on Pesach] must contain enough [undiluted wine] for a proper cup [after it is diluted with water]. If one drank them undiluted, he has fulfilled his obligation. If he drank them [the four cups] all at once, he has fulfilled his obligation. If he gave from his cup to his children and family to drink [such that he did not drink the complete cup], he has fulfilled his obligation. 'If he drank them undiluted, he has fulfilled his obligation' - Rava said: he has fulfilled his obligation of wine, but he has not fulfilled his obligation of 'cherut' [to conduct oneself in a manner reflecting freedom]. 'If he drank them all at once' - Rav said: he has fulfilled his obligation of wine, but he has not fulfilled his obligation of four cups.

The Gemara claims that drinking undiluted wine fulfills one's "obligation of wine." Rashi and Rashbam explain, "he has fulfilled his obligation of wine - for he drank four cups of wine." Meaning, in such a case one fulfills his obligation to drink four cups on a certain level, though not completely. This is even more explicit in the Rif's text of the Gemara, which reads, "he has fulfilled his obligation of four cups," rather than, "he has fulfilled his obligation of wine." Regarding the case of one who drinks four cups all at once, however, the Rashbam explains, "He has fulfilled his obligation of wine - [as required] because of [the mitzva of] rejoicing on Yom Tov, as we learn later [109a]: 'You shall rejoice on your festival' - with what does one

7 https://www.etzion.org.il/en/mitzvot-festivals-part-1-simchat-yom-tov

10 rejoice? With wine.'" In this instance, one does not fulfill the obligation to drink four cups of wine on Pesach eve, but only the obligation of rejoicing on Yom Tov. Tosefot (s.v. "yedei") explain more fully: "Meaning - the obligation of rejoicing on Yom Tov. One would have thought that once they [Chazal] instituted the drinking of four cups, one fulfills the obligation of rejoicing on Yom Tov only if he fulfills the obligation of drinking four cups." The Sha’agas Aryeh (68) challenges this explanation based on an explicit beraita which establishes that the obligation of simcha (rejoicing on Yom Tov) does not apply on the first night of Yom Tov:

'You shall be only joyous' - this includes the final night of Yom Tov. Perhaps this includes the first night of Yom Tov? When it says, 'akh' ['only'], it distinguishes [between the first night - when no obligation of simcha applies - and the last night - when the obligation does apply]. Why do you include the final night of Yom Tov and exclude the first night of Yom Tov? I include the final night of Yom Tov which has simcha before it [as the obligation of simcha applies even before the final evening of Yom Tov], and I exclude the first night of Yom Tov which does not have simcha before it [as there is no obligation of simcha before the first night of Yom Tov]. (Sukka 48a; Pesachim 71a)

Although the beraita speaks about the first and final nights of Sukkot, the reason it gives for distinguishing between them applies equally to the first and final nights of Pesach, as well.[1] How, then, can the Rashbam speak of a mitzva of simcha on the first night of Yom Tov? True, the text of this beraita in the Yerushalmi (Sukka 4:5) and Sifrei (Re'ei, 89) is reversed, such that the obligation of simcha applies only the first night of Yom Tov and not the final night.[2] Presumably, however, we would expect the sugya in Masekhet Pesachim to accommodate the text of the beraita as cited in the Talmud Bavli; thus, the Rashbam's comments indeed require explanation.

The Sha’agas Aryeh raises a similar difficulty against the position of the Rif in Masekhet Berakhot (10a in the Rif's glosses) concerning the laws of aveilut (mourning). According to the Rif, Yom Tov disrupts and cancels the period of aveilut already on the first night, even according to the view that the observance of mourning on the first night after the relative's death constitutes a Biblical requirement. Now in general, Yom Tov cancels the observance of aveilut because the communal obligation of simchat Yom Tov overrides the individual requirement of mourning. On the first night, however, as we have seen, no mitzva of simcha applies. How, then, can the observance of aveilut be overridden already on the first night of Yom Tov? The Sha’agas Aryeh

11 thus establishes that although the Biblical requirement of simcha does not apply on the first night of Yom Tov, a rabbinic obligation in fact applies. He attempts to draw further proof from the various sugyot in Masekhet Beitza[3] which allow certain activities in the interest of simchat Yom Tov, without alluding to any distinction between the night of Yom Tov and the daytime. In this manner he suggests resolving the difficulty he raised on the Rashbam's comments. Clearly, however, this does not answer the question against the Rif, and even the straightforward reading of the Rashbam implies that he speaks on the level of Torah law, rather than rabbinic enactment. Further explanation is thus required to resolve these difficulties.

It seems that we must distinguish between two aspects of simchat Yom Tov. In a famous essay, the Sha’agas Aryeh (102) inquires as to whether this mitzva applies on Rosh Hashanah as it does on the three "regalim" (Pesach, Shavuot and Sukkot). He concludes that this obligation in fact does apply on Rosh Hashanah, for otherwise, he argues, the Torah would not have permitted "melekhet okhel nefesh" (normally forbidden activity for the preparation for food) on Rosh Hashanah. This position - though independent of the Sha’agas Aryeh's proof - is also reflected in the Rosh Hashanah liturgy according to one view, accepted by several Geonim and early Ashkenazic authorities. This view maintains that we include in our Rosh Hashanah - and even Yom Kippur[4] - service the standard, Yom Tov text, "ve-hasienu" as well as, "va-titen lanu… mo'adim le-simcha chagim u-zmanim le-sasson" - which explicitly speak of simcha. And it stands to reason that even those who maintain that we do not recite these passages agree that the obligation of simcha nevertheless applies on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. They simply argue that we cannot define these festivals as specifically designated for this purpose. Moreover, this issue appears to hinge on a dispute among the tanna'im in the mishna in Masekhet Moed Katan (19a) as to whether or not Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur cancel aveilut. As we accept Rabban Gamliel's ruling, that "Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are like regalim [the three pilgrimage festivals - Pesach, Shavuot and Sukkot]" with respect to aveilut, we may deduce that according to the final halakha, the simcha obligation indeed applies on these festivals. At first glance, however, such a notion seems untenable, as the expressions of this mitzva do not apply on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur: the "Shalmei simcha" offerings are not brought, there is no requirement to partake of the sacrificial meat of "shelamim"; and on Yom Kippur we obviously cannot speak of an obligation to eat meat, drink wine - or even eat or drink at all.

My father-in-law, Rav Soloveitchik zt"l, would often explain - and even in writing[5] - that we must view the simcha obligation as a mitzva in which the "kiyum" (essential

12 fulfillment) and "ma'aseh" (concrete action/s required) stand apart from one another. The kiyum is an emotional one, the realization of an emotional experience bearing a specifically defined quality. The mandated actions - the consumption of meat and drinking of wine, or donning colorful clothing - serve merely as the external medium intended to trigger the creation of this experience. It thus turns out that even though we define the specific mediums as Biblical imperatives, and one is obligated - when possible - to use them and carry out these activities, they are not necessarily indispensable to the fulfillment of the basic mitzva. On Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, when there is no possibility of executing the central requirement of eating "Shalmei simcha," the mitzva can still be observed through other means, so long as one achieves the emotional kiyum.

"These words are worthy of the one who said them," but clearly they are valid only according to those who view the Biblical obligation of simcha as binding even in the absence of shelamim. Tosefot (Moed Katan 14b, s.v. asei), however, hold that the Biblical imperative, "ve- samachta" refers only to the offering and consumption of shelamim; the other requirements are rabbinic in origin - a view that may have a source in the Yerushalmi.[6] According to this view, the requirement of simcha can override aveilut only because the latter, too, constitutes but a rabbinic obligation. Likewise, liturgical references to simcha on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, if Tosefot accepted these references in the prayer service, relate only to the level of rabbinic enactment.

We may, however, suggest a different distinction, one which would resolve our difficulty even on the level of Biblical obligation, and even according to Tosefot. It would appear that the mitzva of simchat Yom Tov involves two different halakhot. The first is the mitzva required because of the festival and exists within its framework, similar to taking the lulav and eating matza. On the other hand, this obligation is not merely an isolated act performed within the confines of the festival, but rather an activity that occurs on the Yom Tov and is meant to leave its impression on it, to cast certain qualities upon it, and to deepen its character as a Yom Tov. Just as the halakhot included under the category of "mikra kodesh" - be it the prohibition against melakha (forbidden activity), or eating, drinking and wearing fine clothing, or observing a day of Torah and prayer[7] - seemingly involve shaping the essence of the day and determining its nature, the same holds true concerning simcha. While one may wish to argue that this element comprises not a second aspect of the mitzva of simcha, but rather an additional component of "mikra kodesh," it appears that this is not the case; indeed, simcha itself features two facets, as we may prove from

13 Shabbat. Although the Torah (Lev 23:3) explicitly includes Shabbat in its list of "mikra'ei kodesh," several Rishonim maintain that no obligation of simcha whatsoever applies on Shabbat, and for this reason it counts towards the required period of aveilut.[8]

It seems clear that these two perspectives may differ in their form and parameters; the level and time of their fulfillment need not be identical. As for the form of simcha, it certainly stands to reason that the first halakha will make more precise and stringent demands than the second. Fulfilling a specific mitzva will likely entail clearly defined details, whereas to lend a general character to the day a broader requirement, through which a certain seal is stamped onto the festival, would suffice. We may thus establish - as opposed to the theory posited by my father- in-law zt"l - that to fulfill the specific mitzva of simcha, one requires "Shalmei simcha" or at least meat, wine and the like. Establishing the character of the festival, however, can be achieved through other means, even without eating or drinking at all, such as on Yom Kippur. Regarding their parameters, we may find certain festivals in which the mitzva of simcha as an independent halakha does not apply, while they still require simcha as shaping the essential quality of Yom Tov.

Thus, if we consider the possibility of simcha on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, we may arrive at a very simple answer. The first halakha, of an independent mitzva that applies on a given festival, do not apply on these holidays, as it is instituted only with regard to the three regalim: the verses explicitly introduce this mitzva in the context of Shavuot and Sukkot, and we derive from there the obligation of simcha on Pesach, as explained by the Yereim.[9] The second halakha, however, of establishing the character of the day as a festival, relates to all festivals. This is the meaning of the teshuva written by Mar Sar Shalom Gaon, cited by several Rishonim:

On Rosh Hashanah we recite in both settings - tefila and kiddush - "mo'adim le-simcha chagim u- zemanim le-sasson et Yom ha-Zikaron ha-zeh," for "These are the festivals of God" (Lev 23:2) marks the beginning of the unit [of the festivals in Lev, 23], and the end of the unit - "Moshe spoke of the festivals of God" (Lev 23:44) - closes the entire unit, including Pesach, Shavuot, Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, Sukkot and Shemini Atzeret. They are all associated with one another to be referred to as, "the festivals of God, sacred occasions." (Ravya, vol. 2, p.230)[10]

With this background, we can easily explain the dispute between Rabban Gamliel and the Chakhamim regarding the disruption of aveilut by Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. Possibly,

14 they do not argue at all as to whether or not simcha applies on these holidays. According to all views, it does not apply as an independent mitzva, but rather as establishing the character of the day as a joyous festival. They argue as to what precisely cancels the observance of mourning - the very nature of the day as a time of joy, which exists as well on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, or the specific mitzva of simcha, which applies only on the festivals.

This dispute itself can be understood in two ways. They may have argued about the significance and strength of this aspect of simcha, of establishing the character of the day. Alternatively, they may have agreed on this point, and their debate surrounds the cancellation of aveilut by a Yom Tov. According to the tanna kama in the mishna in Masekhet Mo'ed Katan (19a), although one does not observe mourning practices on a festival, the festival does not cancel the period of aveilut. If the mourner observed two days of mourning prior to the festival, this view maintains, then he completes the term of aveilut after the Yom Tov. We, however, follow the view of Beit Hillel, that so long as the mourner observed even one moment of aveilut before the onset of the festival, the aveilut is canceled. According to this view, either simcha operates as a positive determinant that uproots and shatters the aveilut, or this view accepts the tanna kama's premise that the Yom Tov annuls only the observance of mourning on the festival itself. However, Beit Hillel requires a contiguous period of aveilut. Once it has been disrupted by the festival, it cannot be resumed after Yom Tov. According to our approach, this very point may lie at the heart of the dispute between Rabban Gamliel and the Chakhamim. We may suggest that in order to uproot and dissolve the observance of aveilut, a full-fledged mitzva of simcha is required. In order to simply override its application on Yom Tov, however, even the definition of the day and the establishment of its character as a time of joy suffices; the aveilut is then automatically annulled. Thus, the Chakhamim likely accept the first approach, and the necessary level of simcha does not apply on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. Rabban Gamliel, by contrast, adopts the second position, and this aspect exists even on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. In any event, regardless of how we explain this detail, this dispute can be very well understood on the basis of our general approach.

According to this, we can easily resolve the difficulty raised by the "Sha’agas Aryeh" against the Rif. The "Sha’agas Aryeh" claimed that as simcha does not apply on the first night of Yom Tov, the Biblically mandated practices of aveilut must be observed until morning. Clearly, however, that which we said regarding Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur pertains as well to the first night of Yom Tov. Although the mitzva of simcha as an independent requirement does not

15 apply on the first night, the Yom Tov certainly begins already at nighttime, thus giving rise to the requirement of simcha as establishing the nature of the festival. Since we follow Rabban Gamliel's ruling, that Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur cancel aveilut, for in this respect it is a festival of simcha that clashes with aveilut, and no specific action of simcha is required, aveilut ends already at nighttime.

Correspondingly, the Rashbam's comments regarding the case of one who drank four cups of wine all at once on Pesach, fit perfectly into our approach. In light of what we have discussed, we may interpret the Rashbam's comments - "He has fulfilled his obligation of wine - [as required] because of [the mitzva of] rejoicing on Yom Tov," even though we speak of the first night of Yom Tov - to mean that he has fulfilled the obligation to establish the character of the festival as a time of joy, which applies even at night. Granted, however, the individual has not fulfilled the independent mitzva of simcha required as a result of the festival. Although the Rashbam here requires wine and refers in this context to the Gemara in Pesachim 109a - "'You shall rejoice on your festival' - with what shall one rejoice? With wine" - this is only because he believes that even establishing the character of the festival requires wine. This view runs counter to our understanding earlier of several Geonim and Rishonim with regard to Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. But with regard to the fundamental distinction between the two halakhot of simcha, and the difference between them with regard to the time of their application, we may certainly explain the Rashbam in this light. No difficulty thus arises from the principle established by the Gemara in Sukka that simcha does not apply on the first night.

Notes:

[1] At first glance, we may perhaps wish to distinguish between Pesach and Sukkot in this regard: concerning the korban pesach - and, according to Rabbi Yehuda, concerning as well the prohibition against eating chametz and perhaps even that of possessing chametz - the festival of Pesach begins already at midday on Erev Pesach. Clearly, however, this does not affect the application of the simcha obligation before nightfall of the fifteenth of Nissan. The Gemara (Pesachim 71a) explicitly posits that according to the view requiring the sacrifice of the festival offerings "bi-sh'at simcha" - when the simcha obligation applies - one cannot fulfill the obligation of simcha by partaking of the meat of the korban Chagiga offered on Erev Pesach. It thus emerges that the simcha obligation does not apply at all before nightfall of the first night of Pesach.

[2] The Vilna Gaon emends the text of the Sifrei to read like the Bavli's citation of the beraita. The commentary of Rabbenu Hillel, however, accepts the text as it appears in our versions of the Sifrei, though he does make reference to the continuation of the Gemara's citation - "Why do you include the final night… " - which does not appear in the Sifrei or Yerushalmi.

[3] Primarily Beitza 9b-10a.

16 [4] See "Machzor Vitri," pp. 360-361.

[5] See Shiurim le-Zekher Abba Mari z"l, vol. 1, pp. 188-190.

[6] See Yerushalmi, Chagiga 1:4; Shut Torat Refael 92.

[7] See Mekhilta, Parashat Bo - parasha 9 (on Shemot 12:16); Ramban, Lev 23:2.

[8] See Tosefot, Moed Katan 23b s.v. "mann"; Sheiltot, Parashat Chayei-Sara 15 (and the Netziv's "He'amek She'eila" 7, 10); Behag, Hilkhot Avel (p.25 in Hildesheimer edition, p.42b in Traub edition); Meiri, Moed Katan 19a. Talmid Rabbenu Yechiel mi- Paris discusses this at greater length: "A reason must be given as to why Shabbat counts [towards the required period of mourning] and does not disrupt [the observance of mourning], whereas the opposite is true regarding regalim. Shabbat is not called a day of simcha, but rather a day of oneg (delight), that one must enjoy the delights of eating, drinking and fine clothing… and these are all permitted for a mourner, only he will be mournful and downhearted and will not rejoice - he may do this, too, on Shabbat. See also the Ramban's "Torat ha-Adam" (Kitvei ha-Ramban, Rav Chavel edition, vol. 2, p. 223), who cites this explanation from the Sheiltot and Behag, alongside a different approach that he prefers to accept.

[9] See his comments in chapter 427, where the Yereim raises two possibilities as to the source of simcha on Pesach: "We find a 'gezeira shava' [comparison based on textual association] in Masekhet Shabbat… where we derive [a 'gezeira shava' from the common phrase] 'the fifteenth' - 'the fifteenth' from the festival of Sukkot [to the festival of Pesach]. Alternatively… whenever there is a Chagiga [offering] there is [a requirement of] simcha."

[10] See sources cited in Aptovitzer's notes ad loc.

Simcha (Joy) on Shabbat

Rav Binyamin Tabory writes:8

"There are four things which were said in connection with Shabbat – two of Biblical origin, and two mi-divrei soferim, which were described by the prophets. The Torah said zakhor (remember)

8 https://www.etzion.org.il/en/simcha-joy-shabbat

17 and shamor (observe), while kavod (honor) and oneg (enjoyment) were described by the prophets.

Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat 30:1

The two rabbinic laws of kavod and oneg apply not only to Shabbat, but to Yom Tov, as well (see Rambam, Hilkhot Yom Tov 6:16). However, on Yom Tov there is also a Biblical obligation of simcha – to rejoice: "You should be happy on your holiday" (Devarim 16:14). Is there a mitzva of simcha on Shabbat, as well?

In Parashat Beha'alotekha, the Torah lists the days on which the chatzotzrot (trumpets) must be sounded in the Temple, including "on your days of simcha, on your designated holidays and on the New Moons… " (Num 10:10). Inasmuch as the "designated holidays" are also days of simcha, what does the Torah add with the phrase, "days of simcha"? Ibn Ezra (ad loc.) explained that this refers to days of celebration that we must declare when we emerge victorious in war. It seems that in his view, days such as Chanuka and Purim, though halakhically treated as rabbinic obligations, actually have a Biblical source. One may conjecture how this might apply to Yom Ha’atzma’ut and Yom Yerushalayim. In any event, the Sifrei, in our standard edition, presents a different explanation of the phrase, “days of simcha," claiming that it refers to Shabbat. The variant text of the Vilna Gaon, as cited in the Netziv's edition of the Sifrei, says that "the day" – rather than the complete phrase, "days of simcha" - refers to Shabbat. Quite possibly, these two versions differ on the question of whether there is an obligation of simcha on Shabbat.

Many other sources indeed indicate that such an obligation exists. The Bahag enumerated the mitzva of Shabbat as "the simcha and oneg of Shabbat." It should be noted that the Bahag most likely refers here to rabbinic obligations of simcha and oneg, as he is wont to count rabbinic laws in his list of mitzvot.

The Sefer Ha-Manhig records that the custom in France and Spain was to omit tachanun every Friday afternoon, despite the fact that Spanish communities had the practice of reciting tachanun on the afternoon before Rosh Chodesh. He explains this custom on the basis of the fact that Shabbat, unlike Rosh Chodesh, is a day of "feast and simcha," and he cites the aforementioned comment in the Sifrei, that "days of simcha" refers to Shabbat. The Shibbolei Ha-Leket (section 82) also cites the Sifrei and mentions that Rabbi Avigdor Kohen Tzedek viewed this Sifrei as the source for the recitation of "yismechu bemalchutekha" ("They will rejoice in Your kingship") on Shabbat. He also makes reference to a text, "All the lovers of Your name will rejoice," which some recite on Shabbat.

The Yerushalmi (Megilla 1:4) establishes that if Purim falls on Shabbat, the Purim feast should not be held on that day. It explains that the Megilla instructs us to "make" Purim a day of simcha and feast. Inasmuch as Shabbat is automatically a day of simcha, there is no way or need to "make" it a day of simcha.

Tosafot (Ketubot 7b) ruled that although generally we recite sheva berakhot at a meal during the first week of marriage only in the presence of "panim chadashot" (someone who has not yet taken part in the wedding celebration), this condition does not apply on Shabbat. They explain that Shabbat itself constitutes "panim chadashot," as we always observe Shabbat as a more festive day through simcha and feast. Though one might claim that Tosefot here do not refer to a halakhic obligation of simcha, but merely observe common practice, on the other hand, this might indicate that an obligation of simcha does exist.

A well-known halakha establishes that although a mourner does not observe mourning practices on Shabbat, the day of Shabbat nevertheless counts towards the seven days of mourning. Yom Tov, by contrast, cancels mourning altogether: if a person passes away on Yom Tov, mourning does not begin until after Yom Tov. The Yerushalmi (Mo'ed Katan 3:5) discusses the reason for this distinction and says that if Shabbat would cancel mourning, there would never be a seven-day week of mourning. The Yerushalmi appears to hold that fundamentally, both Shabbat and Yom Tov are days of simcha and should cancel mourning. It is only due to a technical problem that we count Shabbat as a day of mourning.

On the other hand, other sources seem to indicate that no obligation of simcha applies at all on Shabbat. Tosafot (Mo'ed Katan 23b), for example, write explicitly that Shabbat counts towards the seven days of mourning because simcha is not mentioned in connection with Shabbat. Only Yom Tov, which features an obligation of simcha, cancels mourning entirely.

The Shita Mekubetzet (Ketubot 7) quotes an opinion that one may not get married on Shabbat because doing so violates the prohibition against mixing together two types of simcha ("ein me'arvin simcha be- simcha"). However, this opinion was rejected by the argument that there is no law of simcha on Shabbat.

The Maharil (end of Hilkhot Yom Tov) forbids fasting on Yom Tov, as it is a day of simcha, but permits fasting on Shabbat, on which there is no obligation of simcha.

19 The Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 529:4) writes that we should wear nicer clothing on Yom Tov than on Shabbat, and the Magen Avraham (ad loc.) explains this ruling based on the fact that Yom Tov, unlike Shabbat, is a day of simcha.

The Tashbetz (298:2) goes so far as to suggest the possibility of allowing eulogies on Shabbat. He says that inasmuch as Shabbat is not called a day of simcha and one observes some mourning laws (in private, though not in public) on Shabbat, perhaps we could permit eulogies, as well.

We have thus encountered different opinions regarding this issue. It is possible that traces of this discussion can be found in variant texts of the siddur.

On Friday night, we say (or sing) "Lekha Dodi" as we welcome Shabbat. The last stanza of this poem reads, "Come in peace, crown of her husband, in simcha and good cheer." The Ari substituted the word "rina" in place of "simcha." When, however, Shabbat and Yom Tov coincide, the Ari recited "simcha" instead of "rina." Apparently, he felt that the idea of simcha applies only to Yom Tov, and not to Shabbat.

On the other hand, the Ari had the practice of reciting "yismechu" during all the Shabbat prayers, as opposed to custom of Nusach Ashkenaz, to recite it only at musaf. Including this paragraph in every prayer would imply that simcha applies to Shabbat, whereas limiting it to musaf would suggest that there is no law of simcha per se on Shabbat. Rav Soloveitchik zt"l explained that the verse in our parasha cited by the Sifrei as the source for an obligation of simcha on Shabbat refers only to the actual time when they brought the sacrifice (musaf). There is an obligation of song and simcha when the sacrifice was brought, and therefore the Ashkenazic custom is to recite "yismechu" only at musaf.

Regardless of the dispute we have seen concerning this issue, it is worth recalling the last words of Shulchan Arukh Orach Chaim. In a totally different context, the Rama writes, "One should fulfill all opinions by making a greater feast and a good-hearted person will always feast."

Thinking about how halacha can actually legislate simchah or joy leads us to the Chassidic dimension and revolution with joy at its core.

It is as if the correction Chassidus brought to Yiddishkeit was an inner need to release joy beyond its Halachic constraints.

The Core of Joy

20 Shloma Majeski writes:9

Simchah, joy, is one of the most essential elements of the Chassidic way of life. Indeed, in the early stages of the Chassidic movement, before the name chassidim was coined, one of the temporary names used to refer to chassidim was di freilicha, meaning, “the happy ones.” How could you define and identify a chassid ? By seeing if he was b’simchah — happy and joyous. The Rebbeim, the leaders of the Chassidic movement, would always emphasize the importance of happiness and would urge their followers to strive to eradicate all traces of sadness and depression. R. Shlomo of Karlin would say that depression is considered the threshold of all evil. On another occasion, R. Shlomo said that although the 365 negative commandments do not include a commandment not to be depressed, the damage that sadness and depression can cause is worse than the damage that any sin can cause. The Baal Shem Tov1 would say that there are times, when the yetzer hora (the evil inclination) tries to persuade a person to commit a sin, that it does not care whether or not the person will actually sin. What it wants is that after sinning, the person will become depressed and overcome with sadness. In other words, the depression that follows the sin can cause more spiritual damage than the actual sin itself. The Chassidic emphasis on joy has its roots in the teachings of the Kabbalah. In that vein, the AriZal (see glossary) notes that the Torah2 tells us that several harsh punishments will come “because you did not serve God with happiness and a glad heart.” Other commentaries3 explain that the intent of the verse is that the punishments will come because the people did not serve God in a time of pleasantness and joy. The AriZal explains,4 however, that the verse should be understood simply. What is the reason for the punishments that will befall our people? Their Divine service lacked simchah; they lacked the vitality, energy, and connection to God that joy contributes to Divine service.

9 https://www.sie.org/templates/sie/article_cdo/aid/2346989/jewish/Chapter-1-Understanding-The-Core-of-Joy.htm

21 When a person is depressed or sad, his energy is drained; he becomes weak and it is possible that his evil inclination will overpower him. By analogy: If two people are wrestling each other, and one of them is stronger, he will be able to overpower the weaker one. If, however, the stronger person is depressed and lacks vitality, and the weaker person is full of energy, the weaker person will be able to overcome the stronger person.5 To refer back to the analogy: When a person is happy and full of energy, he can overcome his evil inclination. But even if he is spiritually strong, when a person is sad and his energy is drained, his yetzer hora can easily overcome him. One might ask: Why are such teachings identified with Chassidic thought? Seemingly, these concepts would be accepted by people from all sectors of Jewish thought. Indeed, if they were extended slightly, they could be understood and accepted by secular thinkers as well. So why are they identified with Chassidism? The answer6 is that the theoretical basis that enables a person to translate these ideals from the abstract into the actual is inherent to Chassidism. Chassidism teaches that the vitality, and indeed the entire existence, of the world depends totally upon God. Every element of creation is one with God. Without this Divine energy, nothing could exist. This leads to the appreciation of hashgachah pratis, Divine Providence. Everything that transpires, not only what happens to people, but also everything that happens to inanimate objects, comes as a direct result of God’s will. Not only does every entity in the world exist by virtue of God’s life- force; every event that occurs in the world takes place because God causes it to happen.7 The awareness of these concepts leads directly to simchah. For a person who is aware that everything that happens to him is controlled by God will surely be happy. Indeed, when a person lacks such happiness, he is implying, Heaven forbid, that what is happening is not connected to God, or that God is causing it to happen, but that, Heaven forbid, God is not good. This is a direct denial of God. If one believes that God is responsible for everything that happens, and believes that God is good, then naturally everything that happens is good.

22 If a person got up and made a declaration that everything that happens does not come from God, he would be denying God’s oneness. Even when one refrains from making such statements, but acts in a way that implies so — for example, if he is sad — the implication is the same.

Indeed, actions speak louder than words. So, by being sad, a person is denying the oneness of God. He is denying the fact that everything in the world is constantly connected to God, and everything that happens is controlled by Divine Providence.

This is why Chassidism, which stresses so clearly and so powerfully the connection between the creation and God, places such an emphasis on simchah. In addition to the contribution of simchah to our Divine service — for as above, when a person is sad, he becomes weak and vulnerable, and his evil inclination can overpower him — something far larger than one’s individual self is involved. Happiness and its opposite depend on whether or not one is aware of God’s oneness and His constant providence. In this context, we can understand a unique concept taught by our Sages. Our Sages state8 that a person who loses his temper is considered as if he worshipped idols. What is the connection between losing one’s temper and idol worship? Losing one’s temper is obviously undesirable. It reflects a lack of self-control; it is socially unacceptable; but how is it connected to idol worship? The answer is that when a person loses his temper, he, in essence, is denying that what has occurred is coming from God. If he believed that everything that happens comes from God, that God is good and whatever God does is good, there is no room for losing one’s temper, just as there is no room for depression and sadness.

A person once came to R. Dov Ber, the Maggid of Mezeritch, and asked him, “Rebbe, our Sages tell us that we must bless God when something good happens, and in the same way, we should bless God when something negative happens.9 How can this be actualized?” The Maggid of Mezeritch told him, “Go to my student, R. Zushya. He will explain it to you.” When he found R. Zushya, by looking at his face and his clothing he could easily see that he had not had much to eat, and that he did not have the money to buy decent clothing. Everything about

23 him bespoke privation, but his face radiated happiness. “This is surely a person who can answer my question,” he said to himself.

So, he told R. Zushya that the Maggid had sent him to him to explain how a person could bless God in the face of adversity.

R. Zushya looked at him in puzzlement. “I do not know how to answer this question,” he replied. “This question should be answered by someone who has suffered. I have never experienced suffering in my life.”

R. Zushya was telling him that everything that happens comes from God and is controlled by Divine Providence. He knew clearly that God is completely good. Therefore, it was as clear as day to him that everything that happens is good. And so, R. Zushya never experienced any suffering in his life.