Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337

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Ecological Economics

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Surveys Elephant poaching & ivory trafficking problems in Sub-Saharan Africa: An application of O'Hara's principles of political economy

Andrew John Brennan a,⁎, Jaslin Kaur Kalsi b a Economics Department, Curtin University. Senior Research Fellow, Global Political Economy Research Unit, Australia b Research Associate, Global Political Economy Research Unit, Australia article info abstract

Article history: This paper examines the complex social problem of African elephant decimation using a political economy Received 28 November 2013 approach. This paper applies five principles of O'Hara's political economy (POPE): historical specificity; circular Received in revised form 27 July 2015 and cumulative causation; uneven development; heterogeneous agents; and contradiction. POPE provides a Accepted 18 August 2015 practical tool for scrutinising the interdependent aspects of a problem. The culture of conspicuous consumption Available online 18 November 2015 for ivory is a key historical driver of demand. Yet a core, integrated factor that helps explain the current crisis Keywords: relates to the principle of uneven development. The role of uneven development can be indirect, through lack fl Elephant poaching and ivory trafficking of human development causing high crime and corruption rates, weak policy frameworks and con icts in land Sub-Saharan Africa ownership. Further, heterogeneity of agents adds to the complexity of the networks engaged in the decimation Political economy of elephants. Linked to the poaching–trafficking circuit of heterogeneous agents, this paper identifies two specific O'Hara's principles elephant contradictions between the market forces of durable fixed capital and environment-elephant capital. Conspicuous consumption This study contributes to the literature by analysing the interlinking, cumulative processes of elephant poaching Contradiction and ivory trafficking networks, which previous studies in the economics literature tend to ignore. © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Elephants are not beetles, not simply because they do not look like the predicament on his visit to Africa, Jeffery Gettleman, an investigative beetles, but because they do not behave like beetles. journalist working for the New York Times, wrote several touching [Poole and Thomsen 1989:189] pieces on the poaching problems in Central Africa and Kenya. Else- where, regular and perceptive blog contributions can be found on the National Geographic website under the ‘AVoiceforElephants’. Countless 1. Introduction daily e-news stories on the topic have been circulated, thanks to Melissa Groo's service from Save the Elephants. Numerous studies from the bio- Significant numbers of species are being lost to wildlife poaching logical sciences have been written on elephant ecology and human–el- and trafficking, and in recent years the trafficking has become more ephant conflict in leading journals such as Conservation Biology, organised and commercialised than ever before. The magnificent Pachyderm, Phil. Trans. of the Royal Society of London B, and PLoS ONE, African elephant is one of the key species under serious threat. It PNAS, and so on. And several fascinating papers study the economics would be hard for us to imagine what a future would look like dispos- of the ivory trade (e.g. 't Sas-Rolfes et al., 2014), albeit the proposed sessed of such majestic creatures roaming the beautiful landscapes of market solutions are not without controversy (Nowak, 2014). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The good news of late is that there is an active Yet only a few papers in the literature study the African elephant presence in the international community of enthused people from poaching–trafficking problem from the approach of political economy. diverse perspectives–conservation biologists, ecologists, economists, Political economy is useful to provide a deep and applied analysis of journalists–that are attempting to get to the root of the problem of real world problems. The particular contribution of this paper is to African elephant decimation. examine the complex issue of elephant poaching and ivory trafficking To name a few, Elephants in the Dust — The African Elephant Crisis in SSA using Phillip O'Hara's principles of political economy. Principles (2013) produced by the United Nations Environment Programme of O'Hara's political economy (POPE) provides a practical tool for (UNEP) et al. is a critical 80-page report detailing the “greatest crisis scrutinising the interdependent aspects of a problem. O'Hara has in decades”, due to surges in poaching, the illegal ivory trade and accel- provided a broad understanding of the related problems of crime and erating habitat and range loss. Interviewing human agents entangled in ecological destruction. An objective of this study is to provide valuable political economy insights into the specific problem of the decimation ⁎ Corresponding author. of African elephants.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.08.013 0921-8009/© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 313

This paper focuses on the species decimation of African elephants complex social problems from a holistic perspective, which consist of and the crime and corruption associated with it. Elephant poaching multiple cumulative factors acting simultaneously.3 and ivory trafficking are complex social problems that deal with a Other studies have recognised the complex characteristics of some het- number of different aspects. Interactions are not merely limited to erogeneous agents (e.g. rural people vs. government officials; consumers demand and supply factors. Due to the complicated and multi- and poachers) involved in the “elephant crisis”. Moore (2010) focuses dimensional nature of the problem, other variables need to be studied on the perceptions of rural populations and Fischer (2004) focuses on as well—such as human consumption habits, levels of development, the final consumers of ivory products. Agents are not homogeneous; mul- elephant social distinctiveness and so on. POPE framework provides a tiple actors are involved with cumulative impacts. While these studies are structured approach that helps to delineate the key multi-facets of the good at capturing the complexity of some socioeconomic factors and ad- African elephant problem. The paper is divided into four sections. The dressing the role of asymmetric information; they are limited to studying contributions of the existing economics literature and of O'Hara's ap- the interactions of only one or two actors involved in the process. These plied analyses are succinctly reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 applies studies are excellent at stressing the important role of asymmetric infor- five of O'Hara's principles to the African elephant problem. Some policy mation; yet they do not offer a holistic account of the multiple cumulative prescriptions are put forward in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the factors and actors involved in the process. While all these studies provide paper. important foundations, most fail to recognise the multiple interrelated factors that are involved in the predicament. Political economy provides an alternative approach to interpret a 2. A Short Survey of the Economics Literature on Ivory Trade and complicated world. Between the 1960s and 1970s the postwar era O'Hara's Approach to Political Economy boom began to dissolve, this then directed an evolutionary view of growth and development within the historical context of capitalism. We delimit the scope of the literature survey to ten (selected) Core problems had surfaced which required broader visions to study journal articles in 1995–2010 on the economics of elephant poaching the key processes that were involved. Consequently, scholars sought and ivory trafficking. The relevant literature seems to fit broadly into to come up with a holistic social science to examine these major prob- the following key themes: effectiveness of the ivory ban; expected lems (O'Hara, 2012a,b,c,d). Various schools of thought began to emerge utility derived from poaching; implications of property rights; and or develop further, including post-Keynesians, neo-Marxists, social imperfect knowledge. Note, prior to 1989 international trade in economists, institutionalists, radical feminists and environmentalists. ivory and other African elephant specimens was regulated but Economic theories based on socio-historical methods were proposed legal. In 1990 a ban on trade in ivory was imposed at the 7th Confer- where political economists assigned dominant roles to history, institu- ence of the Parties (CoP) to the Convention on International Trade in tions and the interaction between social classes. Political economy Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). CITES is a global digs deep to examine all the levels of economic activity including the treaty, and it was agreed at the 7th CoP to list the African elephant on relationships between macroeconomic factors, as opposed to the view ‘Appendix I’, which prohibits trade in ivory products.1 A key focus of dis- of individualism that neoclassical economics tends to apply. cussion in the literature is on the association between CITES policy and Fred Lee [1949-2014], Marc Lavoie, Tony Lawson and Phillip O'Hara trends in illegal ivory trade.2 While some scholars are inclined towards are key scholars who have attempted to link the various heterodox supporting the CITES ban, others argue that the ban does not have a schools of economic thought using different methods. Lee (2009) brought major impact on deterring poachers as illegal markets will continue to social and environment scholars together. In Lavoie's (1992) technical proliferate. analysis of aggregate demand, money and uncertainty, closer links be- Several environmental economists have attempted to evaluate tween post-classical scholars were made. Similarly, Lawson (2006) no- the effectiveness of the CITES ivory trade ban: Khanna and Harford ticed the ontology of realism between schools. Furthermore, O'Hara (1996); Bulte and van Kooten (1999a,b); van Kooten (2008). These stud- came up with a set of principles to link these schools. O'Hara (2012a:2) iesareimportantaseachstudytendstofocusspecifically on one or two states that “the main differences between the four authors relates to inter- aspects of the problem (e.g. property rights and political instability). national, environmental and development political economy”.Hegoeson What is lost in such analyses is an appreciation of the complexity of the to explain the fact that Lavoie and Lee ignore these trends, whereas historical processes of ivory trade. Several traditional economists Lawson and O'Hara try to link some of the core themes of the different (McPherson and Niewsiadomy, 2000; Messer, 2000) have applied eco- schools of thought to the political economy paradigm. nomic theory to the “elephant problem”, but they make several strict as- The major authors of political economy that primarily influence sumptions when modelling the possible outcomes. Some of the O'Hara are Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, John Keynes and Joseph economic models utilised are based on several contentious assumptions Schumpeter; plus their followers; feminism; and so on. For instance, such as the notion of ‘optimality’, and operate on the norm of separating O'Hara's principles of ‘historical specificity’ (including culture) and dependent from independent variables. For example in McPherson and ‘contradiction’ are based on Marx, Veblen, Keynes, Schumpeter and Niewsiadomy (2000), results of their study determine that while holding Polanyi. His other main influence is contemporary heterodox political “all” other factors constant, countries that have property rights economists. Hence, there are a number of sub-principles, or concepts; programmes experience a 19% higher annual elephant population such as habit, institution, instincts; economic surplus, rate of profit, growth rate compared to countries that do not. This ceteris paribus as- accumulation; class, gender, ethnicity; uncertainty, innovation, waves, sumption is somewhat useful but not realistic for understanding cycles and so on. Above all, O'Hara is influenced by the problems of the real world and the need to scrutinise them holistically, in an evolu- tionary fashion and through institutions. His core general principles are 1 In 1997 at the 10th CoP, there was a change in the CITES listing of the elephant popu- synthesised in an original manner so that they are coherently used to lations in Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The three Southern African nations were explain phenomena. now listed on ‘Appendix II’, which allows limited international trade in elephant ivory. This down listing was extended to include South Africa in 2000. O'Hara's development of a core set of principles is a pragmatic tool in 2 The other area of focus relates to the licensed one-off sales of ivory. Have changes in helping to analyse real world problems. He develops these principles in the one-off ivory sales had an impact on elephant poaching? The answer is controversial. richer detail (O'Hara, 2007c). Specifically, principles of O'Hara's political Conservationists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Save the Elephants and the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), argue that one-off sales stimulate ivory demand and elephant poaching (Nowak et al., 2013; Rice, 2012). However, Stiles 3 Other authors raise limitations, e.g. Stiles (2004:315) explains that “none of the formal (2004:309, 2012) believes that there is little evidence to support these claims. Orenstein economic modelling exercises have captured the complexities and vagaries of the real (2013:ch.17) provides an overview of the contested issues. world of elephant killing, ivory ownership, ivory trading and consumer behaviour”. 314 A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 economy (POPE) have been effective in analysing complex problems together. Lastly, the principles of heterogeneous agents and contradiction from a broader viewpoint. POPE provides a solid methodological tool in contribute to an understanding of the various roles played by individuals understanding, for instance, ecological destruction, AIDS, crime and injus- and the consequential effects on elephants. To further direct this study a tice, the subprime crisis and holistic love. A summary of his application of key statement is developed at the beginning of each subsection with an five (selected) principles of political economy from selected studies is pre- appropriate title heading, as presented below: sented in Table 1 below: O'Hara's political economy is a useful when the inquiry centres on the study of historical and uneven processes, circular and cumulative factors, 3. Elephant Poaching and Ivory Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa: An the role of heterogeneous agents, and the opposing forces that make up Application of Five Principles of O'Hara's Political Economy the contradictions. On these grounds, this paper will apply the core prin- ciples of O'Hara's political economy (POPE) to give greater insights into 3.1. Principle of Historical Specificity complex social problem of African elephant decimation. In this study as an ‘entry point’, five principles from the POPE frame- Historical specificity provides insights into the recent phases of evolution work are applied to the African elephant poaching and ivory trafficking of African elephant decimation. problems in SSA. Firstly, the principle of historical specificity helps analyse past trends and provides insights into the highly debated question; are we heading towards another “ivory holocaust”? Next, the principles of circu- The principle of historical specificity is the root of political economy. lar and cumulative causation and uneven development are discussed Studying historical and institutional foundations of a society is a pre- requisite to attain broader visions of the social problem being studied. Marx, Veblen, Keynes, Schumpeter and Polanyi always imbedded his- Table 1 Summary of O’Hara’s Application of Five Principles of Political Economy. torical contexts in their approaches. More recently, Hodgson (2004) also emphasises the importance of the need to understand history. Study by O’Hara and Year Principles Comments on Selected (*) Key O'Hara (2012a) explains that historical specificity is necessary to pro- Examined Theme vide an understanding of the dynamics of a problem—and that in the The Global Spread of AIDS 1*, 2, 4, 5 History reveals that four stages of absence of history, political economy would lack operational, social (2007a) the AIDS virus exist: i) the transfer of the virus from and organisational contexts. monkeys to humans; ii) a period Historical specificity matters. For instance, Polanyi [1886–1964] in The of rapid social change; iii) a Great Transformation (1944) shows that for the vast majority of societies period of epidemic; iv) a period of in human history, the ‘economy’ is mostly unseen. The economy had a declining incidence of the virus. very secondary and incidental role in pre-capitalist formations, “markets Sub-Saharan Africa is yet to undergo stage four. were merely an accessory feature of an institutional setting controlled The Political Economy of Crime 1, 2*, 5 Circular and cumulative causal and regulated more than ever by social authority” (Polanyi, 1957:67). and Injustice (2009c) factors are at play, each of which However, according to Polanyi, the idiosyncrasies of the social economy need to be considered when matured in the nineteenth century as markets were extended to all as- considering a micro view of crime. These multiple factors include pects of cultural life. During this present stage of history, economic activ- levels of income and wealth, ity is apathetic to social obligation and unregulated by the moral context discrimination, education and that governs social life in general. This is known as the ‘disembedded skills, employment and economy’. personality plus individual traits. It is also worthwhile having a historical perspective of the decima- Political Economy of Climate 1, 2, 3*, 5 Natural environments have been Change, Ecological Destruction depleting at an increasing rate in tion of African elephants. Although the Greek and Roman empires fell and Uneven Development recent decades. Uneven in the fifth century they had already exploited North Africa's elephants (2009b) distributions of environmental and led them to extinction in the region by 600AD. From 600AD to 900s, injustices exist where peripheral the supply of ivory routing from Africa to Europe fizzled out. But there nations have to deal with environmental degradation, as a was a revival of the ivory trade in Medieval Europe (e.g. ivory workshops result of heavy industry’s thrived in Paris and Soissons); the 960s marked a new chapter. Europe migration from core nations. experienced an influx of genuine elephant ivory from East Africa as in- The Global Securitized Subprime 1, 2, 4*, 5 Several heterogeneous agents were ternational trade passages had developed further (Håkansson, Market Crisis (2009a) part of the circuit leading up to 2004:565). Håkansson (2004:566) embeds historical contexts in his the financial crisis. High levels of asymmetric information between study of the ivory trade in East Africa. He emphasises the fact that various agents contributed to ivory trade begins with elephants, which are considered a renewable declines in social capital, resource since they reproduce (albeit very slowly); and yet they can particularly among the ethnic also be driven to extinction. Elephant populations at a certain point in minorities. – Holistic Love, Nurturance Gap and 1, 2, 5* Egotistical aspirations are highly time are mainly the result of past human ecological relationships. Relational Instability: The dominant in the disembedded It is of interest to political economists to identify the significant Intimate Contradictions of economy, which is contradictory. patterns of change that take place over real historical time. The principle Neoliberal Political Economies There is an increasing tendency in of historical specificity also considers the historic phases or stages (2010) the West toward individuation, of evolution for an economy. The greatest political economists saw independence and individual ‘rights’ and the style and the economic system as being potentially unstable, with recession constitution of the family has (or depression) as likely as sustained periods of output growth. But few changed significantly in the papers written on the decimation of African elephants link it to specific – 1970s 2000s. Disembeddedness phases of evolution. Poole et al. (1992:5) believe that overlapping phases is so pervasive that it is penetrating the very foundations can explain the story of elephants, yet the authors do not elaborate much and functioning of a social on this idea. This study examines the phases of evolution of African ele- economy. phant decimation from about the nineteenth century in the context of Key: 1 = Historical Specificity, 2 = Circular and Cumulative Causation, 3 = Uneven Devel- long waves of growth and accumulation for the world and for particular opment, 4 = Heterogeneous Agents, 5 = Contradiction nations or areas. A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 315

Nations or areas are subject to differential economic growth patterns during most of these downswing years; and Botswana has likely been in relation to their structural and dynamic place in the changing regime in a long wave upswing yet elephant poaching has declined in this nation. of accumulation (O'Hara, 2012b). The established long wave theory/em- Theresultsaremorevalidandinteresting when juxtaposing long waves pirics tends to study capitalism as a series of phases of evolution, often di- with the dominant institutional, cultural and technological factors. vided into 40–60 year waves of change. There are no major crises or deep While the Egyptians were one of the earliest users of elephant ivory, recessions when a long wave upswing is in motion. In advanced capitalist the ideologies portraying ivory as a symbol of wealth and prestige are nations (US, UK, Germany etc.), average annual growth rate as measured still true in the recent phases.6 A historical driver of ivory demand is the by real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita would need to be above culture of conspicuous consumption, and this tends to be when there is a 2.5 to 3.0% for a long wave upswing to be in motion (see O'Hara, 2012d). long wave upswing. The culture of conspicuous consumption for ivory When a long wave downswing is in motion the opposite occurs; there are (CoCCfI) is a social problem that affects elephants. With clever foresight, major financial crises, periodic deep recessions/depressions and histori- Thorstein Veblen [1857–1929] noted early on that “ecological problems cally low rates of growth and accumulation (average annual real GDP are social problems” (cited in Boles, 1998:155). Veblen (1899, 1923) percapitagrowthrateisless1%).The“long wave” type motion used by was a critical theorist of conspicuous consumption and wasteful extrac- O'Hara is associated with institutions, technology and culture.4 O'Hara's tive processes of natural resources.7 Conspicuous consumption is regarded method is not deterministic, i.e. not rigid in terms of periodicity, ampli- as the consumption of goods principally to make a statement to others tude or wave-length. Each wave of growth and accumulation is relatively about one's accomplishments or class. It is an outer-directed process distinct, yet not deterministic. done to impress others in society—a symbol of high status that exem- There is very limited data on elephant population estimates5 in plifies the upper, predatory class (à la Veblen, 1899).8 In recent phases, continental Africa (especially prior to the late 1970s); nonetheless, a the CoCCfI is prevalent among Western Europeans, North Americans, socio-historical account from late nineteenth century of the evolution of the Japanese and the Chinese. elephant decimation is put forward in Tables 2a and 2b. This study iden- Elephant numbers tend to deplete at a faster rate during intense tifies five particular phases, Phase 1 (1790–1840s), Phase 2 (1850–1913), periods of capital accumulation in particular regions or nations. During Phase 3 (1914–1940s), Phase 4 (1948–1980s), Phase 5 (1990 onwards); the long wave upswings in Phases 2 and 4 elephant decimation height- and stages (if any) which further divide each phase. Table 2a shows the ened, parallel to the strong cultures of conspicuous consumption for five phases divided into various stages, which correspond to the ampli- ivory in parts of Europe, the US and later in Japan. Phase 2 (1850–1913) tude and duration of the long wave for the world (most areas). Table 2b and Phase 4 (1948–1980s) are characterised as periods where elephants is an accessible historical narrative on the exploitation of African ele- were over-exploited, i.e. elephant populations declined significantly. Illicit phants for ivory trade, and the salient link (if any) to amplitude of the trading of ivory has augmented in the long wave upswing for China in long wave for world and for specificnations. stage II of Phase 5 (2005–present). The principle of historical specificity provides trends and stylized facts On the other hand, a key counteracting tendency working against which help comprehend the problem under investigation. Based on the elephant decimation is the environmental institutions that help to data in Table 2a and other information, Table 2b introduces two stylized protect elephants. Elephants are under-exploited by the system, and this facts. Stylized fact one categorises historically the rate of elephant exploi- tends to happen during long downswing for world when elephant popu- tation. An arbitrary and rather crude scaleisintroducedasaproxyforthe lations do recover. The rate of exploitation of elephants is low during the rate of exploitation of elephants, specified as follows: 0 = under- long wave downswing of Phase 1, stage II (1810–1849) and during the exploited; 1 = exploited; 2 = over-exploited; or 3 = mass-exploited. A whole of Phase 3 (1914–1940s). Globally depressed economic conditions value of ‘0’ implies elephant populations are healthy and growing. A and/or intervention efforts to protect the species are beneficial to the ele- value of ‘1’ means that humans are harvesting the creatures at the same phant cause. Also, global intervention efforts to protect the species tend to rate of their reproductive capacity. A value of ‘2’ or ‘3’ suggests an curb declines in elephants—such as the CITES trade ban in force since overharvesting of the species, i.e. the rate of killings exceeds the natural 1990, which had a restricted effect in stage I of Phase 5 (1990–2004). population growth rate of the elephants. Stylized fact two gives an assess- Perhaps, the fate of the African elephants can be linked to Polanyi's ment of the location and period of a prevailing culture of conspicuous (1944) interpretation of the ‘double movement’. According to the consumption for ivory (CoCCfI) and other dominant institutions. Both disembedded economy, capitalism requires certain institutions to mod- stylized facts need to be seen vis-à-vis amplitude of the long wave for erate the tendency for destructive forces. Polanyi's “double movement” world or aspecific nation/area. Thus, the phases of elephant exploitation comes into play: that certain institutions, contracts, and governance are linked to the economy's connection to ivory, elephant protection ef- systems, rules, and conventions are needed by market society to provide forts, and long waves. system functions or “services” for the continuum of the economic We make the following preliminary observations from Table 2b before process. The fictitious commodity of ‘land’ (for example) necessitates explaining each phase in more detail. Long wave upswings (for world) a system of property rights and title holdings, the protection of en- tend to be associated with decreases in elephant numbers/increasing dangered species, provisions against pollution to enable sustainable poaching. And long wave downswings tend to be associated with in- development, and rules to prevent atmospheric change and ozone creases in elephant numbers/declining poaching; or significant reduc- destruction. Without these “services” the system would be prone to tions in decline in elephant numbers/poaching rates. However, there are major systemic instabilities and conflicts that question the operation obvious exceptions and complexities to these tendencies. For some of of market society (Stanfield, 1986: ch. 4). the years when East Asia (China) was in long wave upswing, the world (most areas) was in long wave downswing. Also of note but not shown 6 Throughout history people have been lured by ivory, seeing it as a status of wealth, in Tables 2a and 2b, SSA has been in long wave downswing (i.e. 1970s– dating back to the Egyptians (3000BC), Greeks (5th to 3rd century BC, then to 600AD), Ro- 2010s) yet this is where the elephant decimation has been happening mans (3rd to 1st century BC, then to 600AD), Arabs and Persians (1st century AD), Medi- eval Europeans (600AD–1400), Portuguese (1400s–early 1600s). 7 For example, Veblen (1923) examined the complex mechanisms responsible for the 4 Kondratieff, on the other hand, had a broad empirical method but a deterministic the- rise and decay of social and ecological organisations. He identifies particular agents with ory of waves: based on the life of durable fixed capital. vested interests who did not rightfully own the land, yet exploited natural and human re- 5 Elephant population estimates tend to give mixed signals of the extent of the problem, sources for financial gain (e.g. see Veblen 1923:186-201). A socioeconomic system based and need to be supplemented with other data. For more accurate evaluations on the status on absentee owners who are “converting all public [including natural] wealth to private of elephant populations it is necessary to know the dynamics of the populations (see gain” (Veblen 1923:168) is simply not sustainable and is thus a contradictory process. Douglas-Hamilton, 1979b). Thouless et al. (2008:3) explain that under natural conditions 8 The obsession for ivory as a status symbol has been practised down the ages, leading to in an ‘ideal world’ mortality rates should be constant and low and elephant populations periods of intense decimation of elephants in certain regions of Africa (see Meredith, should be increasing at an annual rate of about five percent. 2003:7-9,23-6,36,44,50-2,59). 316 A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337

Table 2a Recent phases of evolution of African elephant decimation and long waves.

Amplitude of Stages and Estimated ‘rate of elephant long wave turning Estimated population population change’ (LW), upswing Duration of Periodicity points of of elephants in (start and end point of or downswing, long wave, and length phase Africa phase/stage)* for world** for world**

Stage I, 1790–1809 n/a n/a LW1 up 1790 to early–1810s Phase 1790–1840s 1 [59 years] Stage II, 1810–1849 <27 million [1814]a from –0.025% to –0.015% LW1 down mid–1810s to 1840s

Stage I, LW2 up 1850 to 1860s 1850–1889 n/a from –0.015% to –0.020% LW2 down 1870 to 1880s Phase 1850–1913 2 [63 years] Stage II, ~12 million from –0.020% to –0.030% LW3 up 1890 to 1913 1890–1913 [early 1900s]b

Phase 1914–1940s 3–5 million 1914–1947 from –0.030% to 0.000% LW3 down 1914 to 1940s 3 [33 years] [1930s/1940s]c

Stage I, 1948–1969 n/a from 0.000% to –0.025% LW4 up 1950s to 1960s

Phase 1948–1980s 4 [41 years] 1.3–2.5million [1979]d,e Stage II, 750,000 [1987]f LW4 down from –0.025% to –0.085% 1970s to 1980s 1970–1989 600,000 [1989]g (first–half)

Stage I, 660,000–680,000 n/a 1990–2004 [2002]h Phase 1990 onwards LW4 down 1990 to 2010s 5 [25+ years] (second–half) Stage II, 423,000 – 658,000 n/a 2005–? [2012]i

Source: Authors' own assessment of the evidence (n/a = data or evidence not available). ⁎ Based on Milner-Gulland and Beddington (1993:35, Fig. 7) to estimate the ‘rate of elephant population change’ (growth per annum), which was run using Parker's best guesstimate and is based on several assumptions. Phase 5 estimates based on inferences of PIKE data. Estimates for continental populations prior to the late 1970s are considered crude, and there are great variations within areas (e.g. West and Central Africa vs. Southern Africa). ⁎⁎ Based on O'Hara (2006b:ch.1). a Milner-Gulland and Beddington's (1993:30) estimate is based on having a pristine carrying capacity for elephants. Authors like to thank Ashley N. Coutu for pointing out this source. b Scully (2013). c WWF (2013). d Douglas-Hamilton (1979a). e Meredith (2003:207). f UNEP (1989:19). g van Aarde and Jackson (2006). h Blanc et al. (2007:23). i AfESG (2013).

In the first stage of the system, when left alone without adequate reg- fizzle out and elephants are again under threat. The evolutionary ulation or the willingness to embrace substitute activities, markets tend to contradictions within the economy lead to necessary changes, and over-exploit ivory of African elephants. A market system left unhindered through time, socioeconomic pressures tend to emerge for more tends to promote rent opportunities for pecuniary gain with little regard disembedded processes. This is linked to the “policy wave hypothe- for social and environmental degradation. But there is a second stage of sis of embeddeness and disembeddedness” that O'Hara (2012a) al- the system that consists of a “double movement”. Control and political su- ludes to. For instance, the methods to curtail the illicit trade in pervision is imposed in order to safeguard elephants—i.e. suitable protec- ivory seem less effective over time, due to the rise of the CoCCfI in tion measures are developed. Protective à la ‘embedded’ responses involve the Japanese and Chinese long wave upswings. That is to say, greater the safeguarding of socio-ecological existence against the imperatives of elephant decimation is observed in stage II of Phase 4 (1970s–1989) the spreading markets. This was possibly the case in Phase 3, and to and stage II of Phase 5 (2005 onwards). Especially in recent years, some extent leading into stage I of Phase 4 in the 1950s and 1960s in market participants and insurgents are innovating to find ways areas of Southern Africa when several countries enforced restrictions on around the embedded institutions to exploit African elephants, as hunting and privatised national parks. It is also could be argued that the discussed below. “double movement” is recognised in Phase 5 (1990s onwards) when Conspicuous consumption for ivory is a little less obvious in the first the CITES ban was implemented after stage II of Phase 4 ‘ivory holocaust’ long wave of capitalism. With the introduction of firearms in mid-1600s period. to mid-1700s elephant numbers depleted at a more rapid rate, but the While increased political supervision of “conservation” projects technology was not fully developed and efficient enough to cause may initially be beneficial to elephant populations, after a certain pe- mass extinction (at this stage). The late-1700s marks the beginning of riod of time the ‘embedded’ pro-environmental responses somewhat Phase 1 (stage I, 1790–1809). Ivory was an important source of income A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 317

Table 2b Socio-historical account of the five phases of African elephant decimation.

Stages and Stylised Fact 1: Stylized Fact 2: Salient link (if any) to turning rate of exploitation Culture of conspicuous consumption amplitude of long wave Periodicity points of of elephants, for ivory (CoCCfI) and other (LW) for world or and length phase scale of 0, 1, 2, or 3* dominant institutions specific nations/areas

Stage I, locals (called ‘trekboers’) together with LW1 up for world, 1790–1809 exploited = 1 European explorers went hunting 1790 to early–1810s Phase 1790–1840s 1 [59 years] Stage II, LW1 down for world, 1810–1849 under–exploited = 0 global (esp. UK) economic depression 1815–1848

Stage I, CoCCfI of Tippu Tip, “Ivory Rush” LW2 up for world, 1850–1889 exploited = 1 CoCCfI of Belgian King Leopold II 1850–1860s Phase 1850–1913 2 [63 years] low shipping costs (first phase of Stage II, LW3 up for world, over–exploited = 2 globalisation), 1890–1913 CoCCfI in Western Europe and US 1890–1913

environmental protection measures for Phase 1914–1940s LW3 down for world, 1914–1947 under–exploited = 0 elephants, world wars & 3 [33 years] global economic depression 1914–1940s

Stage I, LW4 up for world, 1948–1969 exploited= 1 CoCCfI in US, Western Europe 1950s–1960s Phase 1948–1980s 4 [41 years] Stage II, Asian (Japanese) LW up, 1970–1989 mass–exploited = 3 CoCCfI in Japan, “Ivory Holocaust” 1970s–1980s

“double movement” of embedded Stage I, under–exploited = 0 protection measures for elephants 1990–2004 (vs. CoCCfI in parts of Asia) Phase 1990 onwards Asian (Chinese) LW up, “resistance movements”, 5 [25+ years] 1990–? Stage II, low shipping costs, CoCCfI and 2005–? over–exploited = 2 speculative investments in China (vs. environmental protection measures)

Source: Authors' own assessment of the evidence. ⁎ Phases 1 to 4 based on the estimated populations of elephants in Africa and estimated rate of elephant population change, Phase 5 based on estimated population of elephants in Africa from Table 2a.

to locals. Locals (called ‘trekboers’) together with European explorers known as the “great contraction”, affecting most nations such as the (primarily bounty hunters) were used to hunt for ivory in Cape Town old industrial areas of England and France. Nonetheless, in 1879, Belgian to such an extent that it lead to the first mass decimation in the area King Leopold II built a private empire in the Congo with the main since Roman times.9 But in stage II of Phase 1 (1810–1840s) elephant intention of utilising ivory for conspicuous wealth. By the 1890s the populations probably recovered in continental Africa. Where data ‘ivory rush’ began to wane, forcing Leopold II to turn his attention to are available, elephant population annual growth rates were negative, gain fortunes in wild rubber with the invention of tyres (Meredith, yet generally rising during 1810s–1840s (c.f. Table 2a). This period 2003:97-104). roughly corresponds to the first Kondratieff long wave downswing of During stage II of Phase 2 (1890–1913), mass consumption for 1815–1848: economic activity, profit and wages declined and financial worked ivory products (i.e. carvings) flourished in the US and European crises became worse, culminating in the depression of the 1830s and markets, which is mostly in line with the “first wave of globalisation” 1840s (O'Hara, 2006b:8). The first long downswing perhaps best (1880s–1913). 1880s onwards was a period of technological revolution explains the smaller decline in elephant populations. in transport and communications which reduced the costs and time to In Phase 2 between the latter part of the 19th century and the early ship commodities (Crafts and Venables, 2003:365). The rise of financial 20th century (1850–1913), elephant decimation intensified over two and oligopoly capitalism marks the ‘third Kondratieff upwave’ in the stages. Stage I (1850–1880s) marks the era of the ‘ivory rush’.Tippu 1890s to 1913, an intense period of financial innovations and the global Tip, a powerful Zanzibari trader, established a new empire of control expansion of markets and control of colonies (Veblen, 1923). Ivory based on ivory and slaves in the 1870s. From the 1870s to 1890s ivory carvings became progressively more popular during this time: China became an even more important export than slaves, with Zanzibar sup- became recognised for its chess sets and carvings with intricate fretwork plying three-quarters of the world's trade in ivory. This is interesting that grabbed attention from ivory fans in the UK and US (Martin and from the view of economic history. The 1870s through to mid-1890s is Stiles, 2003:55). Japan's ivory imports continued to grow each year (Lucy Vigne and Martin, 2010:46). Production of conspicuous ivory objects, such as billiard balls and combs in European countries, reached an all-time high (Martin and Stiles, 2005); and also demand for American pianos with ivory keyboards peaked (Martin and Stiles, 9 In 1830, elephant hunting was banned in response (i.e. a double movement) to rapidly declining populations in the Cape colony, but this was not enough to prevent an extinction 2008:13). Increased ivory demand was attributable to the fact that of elephants in this region (Meredith, 2003:62). ivory gained a reputation for being a fashionable (conspicuous) 318 A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 commodity to own. Moreover, the increased trade was accompanied by 600,000 in 1989 to about 680,000 in 2002. But there are regional varia- the introduction of modern firearms; huge quantities of tusks became tions. Fig. 1 to 1d illustrate these rather uneven trends from 1979–1989 available worldwide as Arab and European hunters and traders con- (i.e. Phase 4) to 1991–2007 (i.e. Phase 5). tinually exploited the resource in Africa. Southern and East Africa experienced elephant population gains (on During the long wave downswing (for world), Phase 3 (from 1914 to average, at least in the 1991–2007 period).10 Yet, West and Central 1940s) showed relatively large increases in elephant numbers in Africa Africa continued losing their elephants in Phase 5, Central and West (with exception of the short upswing of the Roaring Twenties). During Africa still face declining elephant numbers.11 the Great Depression era of the 1930s and while people were preoccupied There is a possibility that many more elephants are being killed each in the world wars, elephant populations probably on average recovered year than the population estimates suggest. Using alternative sources of (except in West Africa). Spinage (1973) explains that elephants entered data, we ascertain that a second stage of phase five began, in about a phase of exponential population increase. The world wars (World War 2005. As a supplementary measure, we use the proportion of illegally Iof1914–1918, World War II of 1939–1945) had dampened ivory de- killed elephants (PIKE) among the carcasses encountered by patrols.12 mand from East Asia, Europe and USA. Several countries instituted laws The cause of death of all carcasses found within the reserves and those to indirectly conserve elephants—i.e. likely another ‘double movement’. of known individual elephants found outside the reserves are collated New game regulations were put into place in some African countries to derive PIKE in the monitored sites. PIKE = #Illegally Killed/Total (e.g. a licensing system in Kenya, Poole et al., 1992:6). Initiatives to estab- Carcasses, and it is simply an indicator of poaching.13 APIKEvalueof0.5 lish game reserves came about too, e.g. Kruger National Park in South or above is considered a net population decline of elephants (Blanc and Africa and Tsavo in Kenya (Meredith, 2003:128). Elephants could roam Burnham, 2011:5). The PIKE value in Africa as a whole is about 0.5 during in these protected areas in a less stressful way because they are less 2005–2011, meaning that about half the elephant carcasses encountered prone to poaching pressures and habitat destruction. on patrol in MIKE sites were reported as illegally killed. Data also show During Phase 4 (1950–1980s) elephant populations began to decline generally increasing poaching levels within each region. Furthermore, in two stages. The long wave upswing of the 1950s to 1960s in advanced there is unevenness in the PIKE data between the regions. When compar- capitalist nations saw a (likely) reduction of elephant populations. ing the four regions in SSA, for example, Central Africa has the highest Nonetheless, ivory businesses in the US faced setbacks. The profits of PIKE levels with an average of 0.75 between 2005 and 2010, yet during American piano companies fell because of US government restrictions, the same period Southern Africa had the lowest average PIKE levels at which made it difficult to import certain materials due to the Korean 0.22. West Africa shows a varying picture, with unstable PIKE data.14 War. Alongside Japan's technical advancement, Japanese pianos came As poaching levels are on the rise across most regions in Africa, ivory into the market resulting in serious competition with American compa- seizures are also increasing. The illegal trafficking in elephant specimens nies. Another factor that lowered demand for pianos in America was the can be analysed using the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS). new-found lure for other forms of entertainment, such as televisions ETIS is an information system which tracks illegal trade in ivory and and automobiles (Martin and Stiles, 2008). Despite the fall in the US's elephant products. More seizures do not necessarily directly equal ivory imports, Asian markets continued to be a threat to elephants. In more poaching says TRAFFIC's Tom Milliken (in Russo, 2012a). Still, the case of Japan, post-war reconstruction created an increase in office the frequency and scale of large-scale ivory seizures (100+ kg raw jobs. Japanese office workers began making expensive purchases that ivory class) continues to increase. The large illegal ivory shipments required official contracts. To conclude the business transactions, the from Africa are bound for mainland China. A pronounced upward contracts were required to be sealed by ivory made hankos. The rapid trend in illicit ivory trade transactions–increasingly done online using need for hankos amplified ivory demand. social media platforms (Gao and Clark, 2014:26)–is particularly evident Elephant populations were hit even harder in the stage II of Phase 4 from 2007 onwards (see Milliken et al., 2012:7). But, according to CITES (1970s to 1980s), which is often referred to as the ‘ivory holocaust'. (2012:13), the year 2005 was the key turning point in the trend of Despite the economic transition to a long wave downswing for the elephant decimation, after which PIKE levels began to steadily increase world, elephant populations experienced a massive drop (c.f. Table 2a). up to the present. It is surmised that a stage II in Phase 5 probably began By the 1970s Japan was in a long wave upswing, and the largest con- in the mid-2000s. sumer of ivory in the world (Martin and Stiles, 2003:11). There was an In stage II of Phase 5, the main consumers are middle-aged business- unprecedented rise in ivory exports and prices, particularly during men in China who flaunt their riches by purchasing expensive ivory the early 1970s. Douglas-Hamilton (1987:19) suggests that the rise in carvings and sculptures (Nuwer, 2012; Shoumatoff, 2011). The Chinese price may be due to “investors” holding ivory as a store of wealth culture of conspicuous consumption for ivory (CoCCfI) has a long histori- (much like for precious metals) in times of high inflation. Elephant cal legacy. However, the demand for luxury ivory consumption was populations were further hindered by the revival of the Chinese ivory held only by the upper classes of society during the Ming dynasty industry after the 1966–1976 Cultural Revolution. Since 1978, major (1368–1644). “Over time, a burgeoning merchant class sought to market-oriented reforms in China have been made to encourage compe- possess ivory in an effort to gain social standing and emulate the tastes tition, investment, and private property relations, and open up the country to foreign trade and capital flows (O'Hara, 2006a:399). This results in increased incentives for poachers to kill more elephants, 10 In a more recent study by Wittemyer et al. (2014:3) the illegal killing of elephants in- adding to the predicament. creased markedly after 2008 across East (particularly in Tanzania and Mozambique, 2009– 2014) and Southern Africa, but the declines in elephant populations were more apparent In a response to the significant declines during the ivory holocaust in Central Africa. The illegal killing was correlated strongly with the local black market ivo- years, Phase 5 (1990 to present) involved the environmental move- ry price and increased seizures of ivory destined for China. China is the main destination ments undertaking active campaigns to protect African elephants. For for illegal ivory based on seized ivory shipments. instance, the 7th CoP to CITES agreed to various restrictions of interna- 11 Fig. 1d portrays a “fanciful” and “rosy” trend suggesting that West African elephant tional trade in elephant ivory. In an attempt to safeguard African populations were on the rise pre-ban: Adams and McShane (1992:74) explain that al- though this may advocate that West Africa undertook successful conservation measures, elephants, the ban on the trade of ivory in 1990 is a clear example of it is highly unlikely to be the case. Instead this is an indication of the difficulties involved Polanyi's ‘double movement’. The US's ivory market collapsed due in conducting animal counts. to the heightened awareness of elephant killings for tusks. The interna- 12 PIKE is the standard monitoring metric for the Monitoring of Illegal Killing of Ele- tional ban had affected East Asian markets too. Ivory craftsmen phants (MIKE) sites, a program set up in 2002 to assess the relationship between legal ivo- ry trade and illegal killing of elephants (CITES, 2011). decreased from around 2200 in 1989 to less than 300 in 2002 (Martin 13 Many elephants die in places where their carcasses will never be discovered. – 14 and Stiles, 2003:5). In the stage I of Phase 5 (1990 2004), African Blanc and Burnham (2011:7) explain that this is probably due to poor reporting rates elephant populations–in contrast to Phase 4–were increasing, up from in the region. A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 319

a. Elephants in Southern Africa, b. Elephants in East Africa, 1979–1989 (Phase 4) to 1991–2007 (Phase 5) 1979–1989 (Phase 4) to 1991–2007 (Phase 5) 400,000 600,000

350,000 500,000 300,000 400,000 250,000

200,000 300,000

150,000 200,000 100,000 100,000 African Elephant Population Elephant African 50,000 Population Elephant African

0 0 1979 1989 1991 1995 1998 2002 2007 1979 1989 1991 1995 1998 2002 2007

c. Elephants in Central Africa, d. Elephants in West Africa, 1979–1989 (Phase 4) to 1991–2007 (Phase 5) 1979–1989 (Phase 4) to 1991–2007 (Phase 5) 600,000 20,000

500,000 15,000 400,000

300,000 10,000

200,000 5,000 100,000 African Elephant Population Elephant African Population Elephant African

0 0 1979 1989 1991 1995 1998 2002 2007 1979 1989 1991 1995 1998 2002 2007

Fig. 1. African elephant population numbers in various regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: Adapted from Stiles (2004) and Blanc et al. (2007). Population numbers were rounded to the nearest 100, and are not necessarily comparable over time. For 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2007 definite, probable, possible and speculative classes were combined to provide estimates. Blanc et al. (2007) explain that the method of adding all four classes to compare populations over long periods of time may reduce the problem of misreading short period variations.

of the literati” (Koon, cited in Yoo and Traywick, 2012). The merchant levels of localised incidents of elephant poaching (Stoddard, 2014).16 class is now China's emerging middle-upper class. China's bao fa hu Local governments' power or resolve to enforce poaching laws is prob- (‘suddenly rich’) purchase ivory to satisfy their conspicuous consump- lematic when incomes are paltry. Hence, incentives for locals to keep tion, and can continue to do so in a long wave upswing. laws are low when remunerations are non-existent, and if there is an ac- There is also evidence of increased investment demand by criminal tive world market for elephant products. In short, there are complex and organisations and other speculators. As 't Sas-Rolfes et al. (2014:65- multiple factors involved in the predicament. The circular and cumula- 6,69) argue, “as long as ivory rises in value sufficiently year-on-year, it tive factors are studied in the next section below: remains profitable to stockpile and sell only small quantities, at great profit, as needed”. Speculators thus believe that stockpiling of ivory is a viable investment.15 A critical motivation for this type of speculation 3.2. Principles of Circular and Cumulative Causation and is for anticipated future demand, either by carvers or by intermediaries. Uneven Development In other words, these ‘investors’ are having faith on a continued CoCCfI in China and weak environmental protection measures (e.g. these Uneven development is a critical factor in circular and cumulative agents act strategically and think about the future and what effect law causation to explain the African elephant poaching and ivory trafficking enforcement is going to have). problems in Phase 5. Moreover, the ongoing efforts to protect African elephants from illicit ivory market forces are often met with resistance by various social actors. This is especially prevalent in stage II of Phase 5 (2005 onwards). The principle of circular and cumulative causation (CCC) is a vital one Often the effects of political supervision tend to fade away due to what for political economy. CCC incorporates multiple factors of social change Polanyi (1944) refers to as ‘resistance movements’, which are thought to and examines the extent to which these factors interact. Additionally, it be the second movement of the double movement. Well-connected and assesses the degree of cumulative forces of variables. This method of organised criminal syndicates and other insurgent organisations have CCC was developed by Gunnar Myrdal (1968) and Nicholas Kaldor formidable resources with which to resist such changes (e.g. Braun, (1972). Myrdal applied it to the ethnic inequality problem, underdevel- 2012)—syndicates are adaptively more efficient than conservationists. opment and monetary issues. Kaldor applied the principle to regional African locals may also be part of the resistance movements, as they performance, growth as well as to alternative methodologies for politi- are responding to numerous disincentives such as maldevelopment cal economy. O'Hara (2012c:21) describes this multifactor approach to (poverty, lack of education) or other political concerns such as corrup- assessing problems as more realistic, rather than being deterministic tion. Areas where child mortality and poverty are worst also see higher and of narrow focus. CCC is disregarded as an equilibrium model assum- ing ceteris paribus between variables. CCC realises that social issues

16 Consistent with CITES (2012:10-4) human infant mortality is positively related to PIKE; and livestock density and crop occurrence is negatively related to PIKE. The data im- 15 The authors note that the illegal stockpiles being hoarded are privately held and clan- ply that in and round MIKE sites, higher levels of elephant poaching occur when there is destine (their location and extent is not known). higher levels of poverty and lower levels of food security. 320 A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 require analysing the system along with many of its interacting factors whichinturncauseoverallmagnified impacts on the system. For instance, Gunnar Myrdal observed in An American Dilemma (1944) and Asian Drama (1968) the need for a theory providing a multifarious picture of the complex subject matter. He analysed “Negro race relations” as well as their well-being in the US, and found that to get to the root of the problem we must examine all interrelated factors (such as education, wages, health/nutrition, dis- crimination, stereotyping, cultural traits—and understand the inter- dependencies) in order to impede further rising ethnic inequalities. With CCC, there are tendencies for positive feedback changes in values to have a significant and non-linear impact on the system as a whole. CCC is based on the holistic method—that the ‘whole’ is not only greater than the sum of the parts, but that the parts are related in such a way that their functioning is conditioned by their relation- ship to each other (see O'Hara, 2000). CCC is not limited to social studies based on capitalism. Problems Fig. 2. Process of circular and cumulative causation (CCC) relating to the African elephant such as crime and injustice and the AIDS epidemic are complex and con- crisis, stage II of Phase 5 (2005 onwards). sist of various interplays and aspects. O'Hara (2009c) used the political economy approach in examining the issue of crime and injustice. Typi- cally five interrelated factors exist. The primary factor is profit motives. development impacts on climate change. Capitalist core economies Class, ethnic and gender divisions, relative income and conspicuous such as the US and European Union are the top contributors to green- consumption, uneven development and competition are also drivers house gas emissions since accumulation and growth are positively cor- of crime. The principle of CCC can assist in not only identifying the key related with emissions. On the other hand, SSA and other periphery variables that lead to a particular social problem such as the African areas have low absolute and per capita level of emissions. However, elephant crisis, but also particular patterns of development and anomalies the social costs of climate change are being felt disproportionately in within the economic system. the periphery. According to O'Hara (2009b) the severest forms of cli- Often a first mover advantage and cultural modernity are better than mate change are experienced around the tropics and sub-tropics. For the disadvantage of not making the first effort at change. As O'Hara this reason, less developed countries are impacted the most. The fact (2006b:xviii) argues, uneven development is thus a necessary part of that periphery nations are less able to cope with climate change catas- the motion, whether (for example) caused by colonial and imperial trophes and rising sea levels makes them worse off. Furthermore, envi- dislocation and oppression, the excessive pace of change, or a lack ronment destruction by the core leads to ecologically unequal forms of of social or human capital. The ‘core’ has a first mover advantage exchange, injustices and various forms of metabolic rift (O'Hara, 2009b). and enjoys a high income elasticity demand from high-technology The principle of uneven development has implications for environ- manufactures—which tend to promote uneven patterns of income, ment–elephant destruction too. As long as there is a world market for productivity and quality of life. The ‘periphery’ lags behind as poverty, ivory artefacts, it will have value. Poole and Granli (2013) believe that lack of human capital and inadequate investment generate underdevel- as long as ivory has value, it will be a resource controlled by people opment. While neoclassical economics suggests convergence between with power. For many centuries, ruthless elites (e.g. Tippu Tip, King core and periphery nations, and while this is true from time to time, Leopold II) and prosperous nation-states have plundered African political economy establishes that in most cases often divergences elephants of their ivory for pecuniary gain. In stage II of Phase 5 (2005 tend to arise (O'Hara, 2012c:28). Thus, there are path-dependent CCC onwards), large pecuniary gains are stirring the rise of resistance move- processes that help explain the relative success of ‘core’ versus ‘periph- ments. They are taking advantage of SSA's relative low levels of power, ery’ and the reinforcement of inequality between them. growth and development and the relative high levels of corruption. SSA To a large extent, past empirical work has backed this principle of un- is in the periphery of the world economic system. China has a ‘core’ like even development. Some key scholars who have contributed to this prin- status in relation to SSA in the world-system.17 For example, China's ciple include Raul Prebisch (1950) and Hans Singer (1950) and Amitava presence in Africa is an extractive, non-inclusive form of globalisation, Dutt (1988). Political Economy embeds world-system processes such as rather than an inclusive, productive and transformative form of global- industrial development, asymmetrical influence of geography and cul- isation (Carmody and Hampwaye, 2010:90-5). This core-periphery tural factors. Some economies develop hegemonic trends while others relation entails that power relations between China and SSA are tend to have less political–economic power. These hegemonic trends imbalanced. are often an attribute of power and accumulation through history: for There are stark regional differences in poaching levels and elephant example, Dutch hegemony evolved to British hegemony followed by numbers within SSA as well, which may indicate that uneven develop- US hegemony. Current trends are pointing towards Chinese hegemony ment and underdevelopment are significant historical processes. This due to major industrial transformations (O'Hara, 2009b:228). On the study argues that uneven development is one of the key underlying other hand, most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) continue to CCC variables to explain the African elephant poaching and ivory traf- struggle to make sustainable advancements. Moreover, the Prebisch– ficking problem. In a circular and cumulative way, the role of uneven Singer thesis states that a developing country's terms-of-trade (price of development contributes to all other factors in the ongoing African exports relative to imports) tended to deteriorate over the long run, elephant crisis. The linkages between five key inter-related forces that and an increased reliance on primary exports such as agricultural contribute to the crisis are illustrated in Fig. 2. goods is subject to greater output volatility. In the global system, such The problem is initiated by conspicuous (current and expected) rapid changes leave many nations especially in SSA comparatively back- demand for ivory. Culture plays a role in imbedding beliefs that idolise ward as they struggle to keep up with the rest of the world. or perceive ivory as status of wealth (and health). Furthermore, uneven O'Hara's (2009b) study on the political economy of climate change development allows core-like nations to continually exploit elephants and ecological destruction utilises the principle of uneven development well to examine the relationships between core and periphery within 17 China does not fit the pattern of either core or periphery, particularly in its relationship the world-system. He provides a critical discussion on the uneven between SSA (Maswana, 2008:5). A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 321

a. Correlation Between PIKE and b. Correlation Between PIKE and Chinese Demand, 2002–2010 Japanese Demand, 2002–2010 0.8 0.4 0.8 2

0.6 0.3 0.6 1

0.4 0.2 0.4 PIKE PIKE change 0 0.2 0.1 0.2 Japanese private consumption % consumption private Japanese Linear (PIKE) Linear (Private Consumption % Change) Linear (PIKE) Linear (Private Consumption % Change)

0 0 % change consumption private Chinese 0 -1 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Fig. 3. Consumption and PIKE trends for China and Japan. Sources: Adapted from Blanc and Burnham (2011:5) and World Bank Statistics (2011). in the periphery. Factors such as high violent crime and corruption rates, culture of conspicuous consumption vis-à-vis the African elephant prob- habitat loss due to unsustainable land cultivation by humans and weak lem can be broken down over time. However, in stage II of Phase 5 regulatory frameworks tend to be characteristics of countries in periph- (2005 onwards) we are in the midst of an African elephant crisis, as ery. These multiple factors in Fig. 2 are complex, as each of the variables there is a strong CoCCfI. interact and generate a cumulative process. The ‘African elephant crisis’ is more so a crisis for particular regions The cumulative process begins with the culture of conspicuous con- within SSA. And the regional differences in poaching in part corre- sumption for ivory (CoCCfI) products such as for raw polished ivory or sponds to what types of regulatory measures have been in place to safe- worked ivory (statues and other carvings). Europe, the US and Japan guard elephant.19 As the evidence suggests the extent to which ivory is were major consumers of ivory in previous phases; now in the Phase accessible in countries affects the degree of poaching in the region. To 5 (1990 onwards), the crisis is being fuelled by China. O'Hara (2011:6) attain a better understanding of how weak regulatory frameworks add explains that conspicuous consumption is a fundamental aspect of cul- cumulatively to the elephant crisis, one should be able to distinguish ture. The rise of China has seemingly increased its appetite for symbols between “regulated” and “unregulated” ivory markets. Lemieux and of status/prestige by its nouveau-riche. This explosion of riches con- Clarke (2009:454) explain that “regulated” markets are permitted by tinues to enhance the manufacture of traditional delicacies, ornaments CITES to sell off ivory stockpiles on certain occasions, e.g. to transfer el- and medicinal ingredients, which has resulted in the decline in popula- ephant populations listings from Appendix I (total ban on international tions of many species across the world, including sharks, seahorses and trade) to Appendix II (restricted trade). After the 1989 ban, four South- of course elephants (Anderlini, 2009). As journalists report, Chinese ern African countries (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe) locals are to some extent uninformed and believe that elephants need have been allowed to auction off their ivory. The reasons are that “some not be killed for ivory (Shoumatoff, 2011:129). Hence ‘asymmetric of their elephant populations were healthy and well-managed” and that information’ partly explains the demand side of the legal and illegal “income from limited ivory sales would bring benefits to conservation ivory trade problem—e.g. buyers are more ignorant than sellers of the and to local communities” (CITES, 2007). Hence, these four countries realities of butchering elephant's for their tusks.18 are said to have a “regulated” market. Furthermore, a country can decide To study the relationship between levels of poaching and ivory to have an “unregulated” market within its borders.20 However, demand, PIKE data are analysed against private consumption for China “unregulated” markets are often problematic as they not only provide and Japan, as shown in Fig. 3a,b. Recall, PIKE is an estimate of the prob- for tourist ivory demand but also provide ivory for wholesalers who re- ability that a carcass encountered by patrols was illegally killed. When sell the ivory throughout Africa and Asia (Lemieux and Clarke, trade in ivory is illegal, it is impossible to determine demand for ivory 2009:454). based on trade data. For this reason, general demand for goods and ser- The current crisis should be understood in historical context, from vices (private consumption) is used as a proxy for the conspicuous de- stage II of Phase 4 (1970s–1980s) moving forward to Phase 5 (1990 on- mand for ivory. Using a simple linear trendline, it is evident that PIKE wards) to represent the complexity of the uneven endogenous process. is positively correlated with Chinese consumer spending (Blanc and In many countries the 1990 CITES ivory ban helped revive elephant pop- Burnham, 2011:16). Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) data ulations. However, some countries continued to lose their elephants. continue to confirm that China has been the world's top importer of Fig. 4a to d provide a more specific representation of elephant popula- ivory since 1995 (EIA, 2007:10), corresponding to China's long wave up- tions in three selected (representative) countries within each region swing during this period. And large-scale seizures are escalating and are in Phase 4 (1979, 1989) and Phase 5 (2007).21 Notably, Southern and not one-off events; it is now a common scenario in SSA (e.g. Kirkwood, East Africa benefited from the 1990 ban. All these countries do not 2011; Neale and Burton, 2011). have an “unregulated” market within their border. Furthermore, West Demand for ivory in Japan in Phase 5 has an ‘inferior’ characteristic and Central African countries continued to face declines in elephant (Blanc and Burnham, 2011:6). Despite Japan being the world's largest market for ivory in stage II of Phase 4 (1970s to 1980s), private con- sumption and PIKE data are negatively correlated. A long deep recession and stagnation in Japan (1990 onwards) and changes in fashion help 19 Here are a few examples of embedded institutions put forward during phase 5: The reduce ivory demand. Japanese consumers (especially younger people) African Elephant Action Plan was adopted by all range States in 2010 at the 15th CoP in Qatar, recognising that the threats faced by the African elephant must be addressed imme- are losing interest in ivory (IFAW, 2008:4), possibly because they do not diately. The Plan seeks to address “the situation on the ground” and has identified eight want to be associated with illegal products as they feel guilty about it priority objectives (see CITES, 2010). Implementing DNA testing in tracing large-scale (Lucy Vigne and Martin, 2010:46,51). Hence, when people have a seizures of contraband ivory was agreed at the 16th CoP in Bangkok, March 2013. 20 more informed consciousness on environmental–animal rights, the Each country can set out laws and policies determining whether elephant poaching or ivory trade is permitted within the country. 21 Elephant populations may have peaked in 2007/2008 and since then declined (at least 18 However, campaigns are on the rise in recent years to reduce misinformation and en- until the end of 2014), e.g. Kenya's elephants are dying faster than they are being born hance China's conservation efforts (e.g. see Hance, 2013). (New Scientist, 2012). 322 A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337

a. Rising Elephant Populations in 3 Southern b. Rising Elephant Populations in 3 East African African Countries, 1979 & 1989 (Phase 4) to 2007 (Phase 5) Countries, 1979 & 1989 (Phase 4) to 2007 (Phase 5)

200,000 350,000 300,000 150,000 250,000 200,000 100,000 150,000 50,000 100,000 50,000

0 Population Elephant 0 Elephant Population Elephant 1979 1989 2007 1979 1989 2007 South Africa 7,800 8,200 18,507 Kenya 65,000 19,000 31,636 Botswana 20,000 51,000 175,487 Tanzania 316,300 80,000 167,003 Namibia 2,700 5,000 19,103 Uganda 6,000 3,000 6,559

c. Declining Elephant Populations in 3 Central d. Declining Elephant Populations in 3 West African Countries, 1979 & 1989 (Phase 4) to 2007 (Phase 5) African Countries,1979 & 1989 (Phase 4) to 2007 (Phase 5) 140,000 5,000 120,000 4,000 100,000 80,000 3,000 60,000 2,000 40,000 20,000 1,000 0 0

1979 1989 2007 Population Elephant

Elephant Population Elephant 1979 1989 2007 Sudan 134,000 4,000 300 Ivory Coast 4,000 3,300 965 Chad 15,000 3,100 6,435 Nigeria 2,300 3,100 828 CAR 63,000 19,000 3,334 Niger 1,500 800 102

Fig. 4. African elephant population numbers in selected countries within various regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: Adapted from Lemieux and Clarke (2009:469). populations.22 The countries in these two regions with the exception of elaborate further, consider the case of Kenya. Of the wildlife zones in Chad (and Niger) have “unregulated” markets within their borders. Kenya only 10–30% are protected (Kahumbu, 2011). The local communi- Lemieux and Clarke (2009:455) summarise that “regulated” and ties usually settle at the interface between non-protected and protected “unregulated” markets play opposing roles. “Regulated” markets tend areas. In the subsistence economy, landowners have livestock; in the to reward countries for their protection of species; and the one-off event whereby their cattle roam into protected zones they are faced sales from state-held stockpiles of ivory–accrued from natural deaths with fines. However, the reverse movement is not addressed. Often ele- and confiscations from poachers–may help fund conservation projects. phants wander into unprotected zones and trample on the communities Conversely, “unregulated” markets tend to increase incentives to crops. For poor local land owners, elephants are oftentimes considered poach and trade ivory domestically and internationally. Regions with asaburdenmoresothanablessing(Kabiri, 2010:430). less developed regulations and poor governance have unhealthier With human populations growing in SSA, villagers are struggling to elephant population, and the inverse tends to be true. keep up with the increased demand for food. The question over whether Polanyi (1944) believed that problems of land as a quasi-commodity land is needed more for the locals or wildlife is often raised. In one year cannot be solved through ‘unregulated’ markets, as this would lead to alone at least 200 families in Tanzania lost all their crops from elephant disembedded processes with overexploitation of resources and species. damage. Moreover, in early 2009, six elephants were killed in West He therefore supported the fact that policy measures need to be taken to Kilimanjaro. Thousands of local people stood by and cheered. The inci- protect species and the environment. For instance, Botswana is more de- dent was quietened down to avoid adverse publicity which would veloped than other areas in SSA, and Botswana has a relatively large and dampen tourism (Mutch, 2009). This is a precise example of how growing number of elephants (cf. Fig. 4). Botswana appears to be more elephants are considered as pests to the indigenous populations. There- shielded from the ‘ivory holocaust’ era than any other Southern African fore, underdevelopment and abject poverty trends within SSA may nation: elephant populations increased from 20,000 (1979) to 51,000 contribute to higher levels of poaching in some regions. (1989), and again to 175,487 in 2007. O'Hara (2012d) argues that There appears to be a close relationship between levels of develop- Botswana is the only nation in SSA to have sustained a long wave upswing ment and corruption and rates of poaching, as depicted in Table 3.The during the past six or so decades. Interestingly, the government of Human Development Index (HDI) is a widely recognised composite Botswana also has strong regulatory measures in place to protect ecolog- index, which consists of three basic measures of human development: ical capital—e.g. the attempt to promote less destructive forms of wildlife adjusted wealth (income per head), education attainment (adult litera- tourism (Boyes, 2012). Another critical reason for healthy elephant num- cy and educational enrolment of children), and life expectancy at birth. bers is that there is no evidence of an ingrained culture of conspicuous con- HDI is used as a proxy to provide comparisons of levels of development sumption for ivory in Botswana.23 Much can be learned from Botswana's between the regions in SSA. Averages for the three selected countries in experience for other areas in SSA (e.g. see van Wyk, 2013). each region are used as representative of each region. Southern and East Political economy recognises the importance of analysing all the Africa have the highest HDI at 0.612 and 0.430, respectively. On the interrelated factors that contribute to a complex problem. ‘Habitat loss’ other hand, West and Central Africa have a lower HDI at 0.360 and vis-à-vis the human–wildlife conflict is a commonly studied factor. 0.339, respectively. Southern and East Africa have relatively lower Often the high level of poverty in range states is not consistent with the PIKE values (roughly half) in comparison to West and Central Africa. economic benefits of conserving wildlife for the purposes of tourism. Thus, there is a positive relationship between low levels of development Kabiri (2010:425) explains that this suggests a paradox; wildlife may in and increased poaching activities. fact be contributing to higher levels of poverty in these regions. To Among these levels of low human development and high poverty, SSA has been plagued with several civil wars—which relates to the ‘crime and corruption’ factor in the CCC process in Fig. 2. Transparency 22 Ivory poaching has become increasingly militarised since the last report, affecting the International defines corruption as “the misuse of entrusted power for whole African continent. For example, Chad was subject to endemic violence, hence, ele- private gain”. Like all social problems, the inclination of individuals to phant numbers decreased considerably over a short period of time: 3000 in 2006; 1000 in 2008; 450 by the end of 2012 (Gettleman, 2012c; Lombard, 2012). participate in lawlessness is a circular and cumulative process. Levels 23 Namibia also has a relatively strong set of ecological protection institutions. of crime are based on the degree of control that legal systems impose A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 323

Table 3 Regional PIKE and levels of market regulation, development and corruption.

Corruption Proportion of Illegally Regulated Unregulated Human Development Perceptions Killed Elephants Ivory Ivory Index (HDI), 2010 Index (CPI), 2010 (PIKE), 2005–2011* Market, Market, (0 to 0.999, higher value (0 to 10, higher value (0 to 1, higher value means 2009 2009 means more development) means less corruption) more poaching)

Southern Africa

South Africa Yes No 0.597 5.8 Trend: PIKE Botswana Yes No 0.633 4.5 Increasing Namibia Yes No 0.606 4.4

Southern Africa Average Yes No 0.612 4.90 0.35

East Africa

Kenya No No 0.470 2.1 Trend: PIKE Tanzania No No 0.398 2.7 Increasing Uganda No No 0.422 2.5

East Africa Average No No 0.430 2.43 0.30

Central Africa

Sudan No Yes 0.379 1.6 Trend: PIKE Chad No No 0.326 1.7 Increasing CAR No Yes 0.315 2.1

Central Africa Average No Yes 0.339 1.80 0.68

West Africa

Ivory Coast No Yes 0.397 2.2 Trend: PIKE Nigeria No Yes 0.423 2.4 Increasing Niger No No 0.261 2.6

West Africa Average No Yes 0.360 2.40 0.60

Sources: ‘Regulated’ and ‘Unregulated’ Ivory Markets as of 2009, based on Lemieux and Clarke (2009:470). HDI from UNDP (2011), data based on 2010 results. CPI from Transparency International (2011), data based on 2010 results. PIKE from CITES (2012:11). The significance of the bold and italics in the table represents the average of a particular region of Sub-Saharan Africa. ⁎ A weighted average for each SSA region as a whole (where data are available) is taken to avoid any data reporting discrepancies over the stage II of the Phase 5 (2005 onwards).

on people (see O'Hara, 2009c:17). Civil wars result in weakened protec- wars, which cause havoc for species (especially elephants) and can tion and rule of law. For example, during the war in Rwanda, rebels generate funds from the sale of their ivory. began to occupy many areas. Many conservation institutions collapsed, The illicit ivory trade is facilitated by sophisticated schemes. Shoumatoff several park guards were killed and before long wildlife authorities lost (2011:132) exclaims that often PIKE data are underestimated, since control of elephant protected areas (Beyers et al., 2011:7). Human governments like to portray a picture that they are doing a good job in armed conflict tends to disturb the ecosystem causing severe losses of conserving elephants but are in fact involved in the whole catastrophe. biodiversity. Outsiders who question the governments are often put at risk of being Militarisation of elephant slaughter is befalling parts of Africa in re- thrown out of the country. Many questions arise as to what happens to cent times. The Congolese army, Ugandan military, Sudan's Janjaweed the tusks that have been confiscated from seizures. It is a high possibility militias, and several other non-state armed groups are participating that seized ivory does not even make it to the storage rooms or just disap- in the killings (Russo, 2012b). Regional militias i.e. ‘resistance move- pears to provide for the black market in 'white gold'. ments’ compete to gain control over many resources including ivory. The high levels of corruption correlate well with elephant poaching, Ivory and elephant meat can be used to bribe insurgents and generate as illustrated in Table 3 above. Southern Africa (on average) is among funds to promote expansion of resource takeovers. For instance, illegal the cleaner economies (also with more regulations) and has lower elephant killings by the Congolese army continue unabated, doing PIKE values. Comparatively, Central Africa is the most corrupt and un- whatever they can to make money. Lacking discipline and paid a pit- stable and is losing a lot of its elephant populations to poaching. Since tance, it is ‘easy money’, writes Jeffrey Gettleman (2012a), for govern- China is highly involved in the current elephant crisis, its CPI is also ment soldiers to be involved in elephant poaching. Moreover, SSA has worth mentioning. China has a CPI (in 2010) of 3.5 suggesting more cor- generally been experiencing a long-wave downswing over the past ruption than some SSA countries. According to Christy's (2012) investi- six decades (see O'Hara, 2012d:24-6). Conceivably, these low levels of gations, China National Arts and Crafts Group Corporation is the world's growth and high levels of poverty spur criminal behaviour and civil largest ivory purchaser, carver, and retailer, and is expanding its ivory 324 A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 consuming capacity at the time of investigation. Nowak et al. (2013) the US Ambassador to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger, proclaimed that argue that “[d]emand is exacerbated by the hoarding of ‘legal’ ivory by areas surrounding Chinese labour camps were in fact the worst hit by the Chinese government and weak enforcement mechanisms that poaching (McConnell, 2011:46). allow illegal ivory to be laundered into the legal domestic market to Furthermore, a weak regulatory framework alongside the human– such an extent that illegal ivory now represents up to 90% of sales”.Gov- elephant conflict also constitute towards uneven development. East ernment stocks of ivory suddenly go missing and end up in trade. Evi- Asian asymmetric power may exploit uneducated locals who face ele- dently, a cocktail of corruption and lack of cooperation historically (at phant conflict, providing them with minimal funds to go out and kill least up to 2014) from the Chinese government has contributed to the an elephant. Yet, ivory is worth up to ten times more when sold in the African elephant crisis. Asian market ('t Sas-Rolfes et al., 2014:68). At a world-system level, There is a more indirect impact of uneven development between SSA it will be difficult for SSA to break away from this core-periphery and China vis-à-vis the implications on African elephants. China's boom relationship with China. Path-dependence signifies that growth and has doubled its energy consumption. This increased consumption development outcomes depend on a particular sequence of events has outstripped domestic energy production. Furthermore, China's in relation to building institutions, macroeconomic and environmen- industrialisation has led to a global overproduction crisis (linked to a tal policy and technological and human development as historically lack of effective aggregate demand). But Chinese firms continue to cap- determined. An extractive, non-inclusive form of globalisation that ture new export markets for their manufactured goods. To satisfy its ap- has taken place in SSAfrom Chinaover thepast decade sets uparath- petite for resources and export markets, China has turned to Africa. er grim scenario for African elephants in the foreseeable future. In Africa is rich in oil and gas, metal ores and cotton. Overtaking Saudi short, along with China's conspicuous consumption and speculative Arabia, Africa is the largest exporter of crude oil to China. Chinese market for ivory, these multiple factors accumulate endogenously firms continue to influx Africa as their investments in infrastructure, towards draining SSA's species. telecommunications and agro-business continue to increase. Yet, most Several long-term policy implications can be raised from the princi- SSA countries continue to struggle to make advancements. The main ples of CCC and uneven development. Firstly, while most conservation- reason for this is based on colonial heritages where unnatural elites, ar- ists seem to be caught up in evaluating the CITES ban and the net tificial borders, lack of public social infrastructures, ethnic conflicts and benefits of legalising ivory trade, more emphasis should be put on solv- corruption have continued to be a problem (O'Hara, 2012c:17). ing the associated ‘resistance movements’ that are attributable to factors The issues of unevenness in development among China and SSA in such as high levels of corruption and poverty. Rural locals are inclined the context of the elephant crises arise from various aspects. Firstly, in towards lawless behaviour given that they need money to buy food relation to metabolic rifts, China continues to gain from SSA periphery for their families. Therefore, perhaps African governments can reduce countries. Metabolic rifts is what Marx refers to as an ecological crisis poverty levels by offering food at subsidised prices. Governments due to poor exchange between social systems and natural systems must also provide education to populations of lower ethnic groups; (Foster, 1999). Scholars question the nature of China's expansion into this will allow them to attain better jobs and higher incomes leaving Africa (Maswana, 2008:10; Taylor and Xiao, 2009:109). For instance, them less inclined towards criminal activities such as poaching. previous South African President Thabo Mbeki gave warnings that the It is important for policy makers to promote anti-corruption move- continent may be replicating the historical relationship with former co- ments and enforce stronger law systems, which would disrupt ivory lonial powers. Some say China's venture into Africa, may be the start of trafficking networks. In relation to regulatory frameworks, given that Chinese “colonization”. China carries on exhausting the periphery countries with “unregulated” markets have declining elephant num- through exhaustion of minerals and energy. In turn, China continues bers, all countries should strictly enforce domestic laws to help elimi- to boom. The nature of the problem is cumulative, the riches and wealth nate ivory smuggling across country borders. Furthermore, limits need that arise from this investment increases the East Asian desire for con- to be put in place on the potential disruption of SSA's ecosystems by for- spicuous items such as ivory. As shown earlier, the illegal activity of eign investors. The exchange of minerals for infrastructure between poaching is amplifying as Chinese expenditure increases. Essentially, China and Africa seems like a poor agreement, considering that SSA China's increased development based on conspicuous consumption for will be left with exhausted mineral deposits and potential biodiversity ivory exacerbates the decimation of Africa's elephants. losses. But is this a fair price to pay for roads? Moreover, the ecological Prebisch–Singer hypothesis acknowledges In summary, the role of uneven development can be indirect, that periphery countries suffer negative social and ecological costs of through lack of human development causing high crime and corruption soil degradation, deforestation as well as biomass depletion of fish, rates, weak policy frameworks and conflicts in land ownership. More- cattle and wildlife (O'Hara, 2009b:230). Shandra et al. (2009:302) pro- over, uneven development directly contributes to species destruction vide empirical evidence to support the fact that poor nations that export through metabolic rifts and asymmetric information. The several agents raw materials to core economies suffer from higher threats to mammals involved in the circular and cumulative causation processes are towards extinction. On the other hand, core nations tend to have lower analysed in the next section. levels of threatened mammals. To elucidate further, in 2009 Sinohydro Corporation Limited, a Chinese owned company based in Africa, began 3.3. Principles of Heterogeneous Agents and Contradiction setting off heavy explosives in a wildlife concentrated area to begin extraction of an illegal rock quarry. The quarry was situated within a crit- 3.3.1. Principle of Heterogeneous Agents ical wildlife corridor from Amboseli to Tsavo, which had potential risks to the livelihood of the wildlife (African Wildlife Foundation, 2009). The in- creased pressure on biodiversity from foreign investors indirectly has had Applying the principle of heterogeneous agents will provide a more some negative impacts on elephants (see Starkey, 2013), particularly in in-depth analysis of the complexities involved in ivory trafficking net- the Congo Basin (Central Africa). works at the local and international level. The cumulative nature of the problem suggests that levels of corrup- tion essentially contribute to the unevenness. As China and Africa swap Individuals play different roles associated within the process being roads and railways for raw materials, the presence of Chinese workers investigated. For example, major roles include that of workers and cap- and businessmen in Africa is increasing and so is illegal poaching. italists, industrialists and financiers, men and women, buyers and Previous Kenya Wildlife Services director, Julius Kipng'etich, explained sellers, and various ethnic groups. The principle of heterogeneous agents (in 2011) that ninety percent of people who are apprehended with ille- is of the view that operators act through diverse social roles and are in gal trafficking of ivory are Chinese. A leaked embassy cable written by fact not homogenous in the economy. O'Hara (2012a) argues that ueosstudies. numerous 5. Fig. ici fhtrgnosaet nArcneehn ocigadioytraf ivory and poaching elephant African in agents heterogeneous of Circuit

Asymmetric Information Flow ..Benn ..Kli/Eooia cnmc 2 21)312 (2015) 120 Economics Ecological / Kalsi J.K. Brennan, A.J. fi kn.Suc:Aatdfrom Adapted Source: cking. tls(2011a:70,72) Stiles – 337 n uhr'onassmn fteeiec from evidence the of assessment own authors' and , 325 326 A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 holistic interpretations require a study of all the major factors that con- greater knowledge and funds to bribe government officials and the tribute to the problem, ensuring a more accurate explanation of pro- local authorities to permit the movement of ivory down the commodity cesses. He emphasises that individuals operate within the contexts of chain. Middlemen act as intermediaries between ivory suppliers and institutional settings comprising of family, friends, tribes, communities, consumers. Few women are implicated in the circuit. Characterised by health systems, polity and schools. O'Hara (2012a) stresses the impor- “pure greed, deceit and corruption”, the middlemen are usually rich tance that these institutional factors have on an individual's habits male officials, United Nations personnel and/or government diplomats which develop in the course of time. Simply put, the environment in (Stiles, 2001:17). The middlemen provide funds for the hunting party, which an individual is brought up is highly influential on his or her per- extensive forms of firearms, food and other supplies (see Randolph sonality, motivations and patterns of behaviour. and Stiles, 2011:36). For example, in Cameroon men who finance For this study, the indirect and direct roles of the various actors in poaching activities are referred to as ‘white collar poachers’. the complex circuit of African elephant poaching and ivory trafficking Furthermore, transporters are hired (paid) by middlemen and hunters gives rise to the principle of heterogeneous agents. Operators act to facilitate the movement of ivory from point-to-point. Ivory is through diverse social roles in the economy or ecology for that matter. transported to the arranged destinations by various concealed ways Local rural farmers and foreign investors usually play indirect roles in (EIA, 2010:9). Milliken and Sangalakula (2012:90) state that “[t]he the circuit. Local rural farmers can destroy natural habitats, as they lack of effective law enforcement follow-up allows agents the opportu- expand their agricultural farmlands into the elephant range. Foreign in- nity to adapt quickly and continue carrying on with their criminal vestors who generate profit from extractive activities can also induce onslaught against elephants”. This shows the extent to which corrup- unregulated human access to elephants and habitat loss. We must not tion, lack of alternative sources of income, and poor law enforcement overlook the elephants, which can be a powerful force of destruction aid ivory smuggling. too, exacerbating local wildlife conflicts. There are approximately ten key individual agents who play a direct part in the circuit of hetero- 3.3.1.3. Local Consumers (and Urban Vendors) of Worked Ivory geneous agents, as shown in Fig. 5. Once the ivory is received by the middlemen, the majority of it is smuggled to overseas markets. A small fraction is sold to local urban 3.3.1.1. Subsistence and Commercial Hunters of Elephants vendors and then onto tourists who buy small ivory souvenir items Two distinctive types of hunters exist, subsistence hunters and such as figurines, bangles and necklaces (see Randolph and Stiles, commercial hunters. Subsistence hunters primarily kill animals for 2011:45). It is rare for local Africans to purchase ivory items, as has their own consumption, mainly in order to buy food and provide been the case historically. Africans who buy ivory for personal uses are for their family. Cultural factors and the local community's way of usually government officials and wealthy businessmen, namely for gift life come into play here. Subsistence hunting is unavoidable and giving or for display in their homes. African traders also buy ivory items the scale of these activities is not necessarily a threat to wildlife bio- such as signature seal blanks, chopsticks and jewelry, and then personally diversity. Commercial hunting is driven purely by rent seeking be- carry the pieces to international markets (Stiles, personal communication haviour. Commercial hunters primarily hunt elephants as a way of 2011). In Cameroon, ivory buyers in Douala shops were found to be 60% life to sell wildlife products (Stiles, 2011b:24), but they are part of Chinese, 20% European and 20% African. Furthermore, some of the locally awider“network”. Often the small to large-scale organised (and worked ivory is delivered to an international middleman who smuggles highly adaptable) crime syndicates facilitate commercial poaching the items to satisfy foreign consumer and investor demand. along the whole commodity chain (Bennett, 2014). Usually, organised hunting schemes include a party of between two 3.3.1.4. Main Players in the Global Ivory Trafficking Network: International and fifteen individuals, together with hunters, porters and occasionally Middlemen, Vendors & Buyers of Poached Elephant Tusks/Worked Ivory ivory middlemen. The hunt can be as short as two days or as long as a The process of trafficking comes into play when middlemen engage in month (Randolph and Stiles, 2011:28). Some tribes are known for white collar crime and move ivory to foreign markets. The ‘international their hunting skills and often methods of poaching are passed down middlemen’ (businessmen, influential government or military officers, through generations (for instance, Pygmies in Congo, see Latour, diplomats) have access to lots of money and influence, making it easy 2011:19). Conceivably, rich middlemen take advantage of poverty- for them to pay bribes to government officials and local authorities and stricken locals who would even risk losing their lives for extra earnings get the illegal work done (Stiles, 2011b:28).24 Thesemajorcrimesyndi- (e.g. Gettleman, 2012b). Locals may team up with the poacher to help cates use intricate methods of smuggling the ivory into foreign markets. conceal him in return for money or food. For example, it costs very little The strategic agents who ship a lot of ivory (over 1000 kg) in shipping- to hire poor Africans in East Africa, about US$100 to do the actual killing containers are sensitive to shipping costs. Yet, shipping has become signif- of elephants. Poachers take advantage of huge areas of wilderness left icantly cheaper after the 2008 global financial crisis (Moyle, 2014:260). unpatrolled and bring several clips of ammunition with them on their Milliken says such large-scale ivory operations require masses of money hunts. Compared to drug trafficking, the risk involved seemed to be and organised planning to be able to connect to the whole supply chain minimal and the potential profitveryhigh(WWF, 2012:15). (cited in Russo, 2012a). Chinese nationals and increasingly East African A vital point to acknowledge about locals who partake in the role of nationals are playing crucial roles in the ivory supply chain. When a ship- commercial hunting is that of ethnicity. O'Hara (2007b:111) explains ment leaves Africa it rarely goes directly to the final destination, it normal- that minority groups tend to be disadvantaged as they have lower educa- ly passes through various transit points, airports and seaports. These trade tional opportunities and smaller incomes. These groups tend to have routes are constantly changing to avoid detection. Many seizures have higher incidences of crime, particularly because it may be their only been associated with China, but multiple transit-hub countries (e.g. means of earning a reasonable income. Similarly, if an individual is Hong Kong, Malaysia) are involved in the movement of illegal ivory. brought up around crime he/she will resort to similar tendencies, This highlights the transnational nature of ivory trade crime. influencing newer generations. Hence, the role of ethnicity of heteroge- Major crime syndicates continue to capitalise on the growing neous agents plays a critical part in explaining the types of individuals demand for illegal ivory, low prosecution risks, increased trade who are involved in the poaching of elephants. liberalisation and very low shipping costs, making it easier to move large volumes of contraband (Wasser et al., 2009:69). Poaching gangs 3.3.1.2. Local Middlemen, Bureaucrats and Transporters of Ivory Tusks (groups of up to 20 or so people) use military-issue machine guns and Most elephant hunters are subsidised by commanditaires,andthere- lationship with the hunter involves reciprocity (Stiles, 2011a:68). These 24 Shoumatoff (2011:128) reveals that, on many occasions, government diplomats easily ‘ivory middlemen’ are possibly from higher ethnic groups and have smuggle ivory when travelling to foreign markets as their bags are hardly ever checked. A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 327

Table 4 Female elephant glucocorticoid levels according to adult relative presence (or absence) and level of poaching risk.

Log Glucocorticoid Level of levels Level of Stress Poaching Adult Elephant Level of (ng/g dry weight) for Female Elephants Risk Area Relative Kin Social Bonds <1.50ng/g = stress is low (based on (low or high) (absence or presence) (low or high) >1.50ng/g = stress is high glucocorticoid levels)

Low Absence Low 1.46 Low Low poaching

risk area Low Presence High 1.48 Moderately Low

High Absence Low 1.57 High High poaching

risk area High Presence High 1.5 Moderately High

Source: Adapted from Gobush et al. (2008:6).

adopt military-style techniques such as security patrols to guard their are overinflated then a speculative bubble for ivory could exist, where camps (Look and Eagle, 2012). The gangs employ all sorts of methods by prices exceed the ‘fundamental value’. But the very nature of a spec- to avoid detection as well (e.g. crates of ivory strapped underneath ulative bubble entails that prices must burst. shipping vessels to escape customs). Ehrenberg (2008:6) explains that The process of elephant poaching and ivory trafficking is so complex, typically only one percent of shipping containers are inspected by making it difficult to determine ivory prices. At each stage of the process customs. If caught, fines issued for elephant poaching crimes have his- the various heterogeneous agents pay different prices for ivory.25 The torically constituted a sum much less than the value of ivory. So long average local wholesale African raw ivory prices in US dollars for a as crime and corruption (e.g. readily accepting of bribes) is not taken se- poacher in various areas of Kenya were $33 (2008), $38 (2009), $43 riously and the risk-costs associated with ivory smuggling are much (2010), $67 (2011). Given the 103% increase in ivory prices from 2008 lower than the economic rents reaped, then the predicament will con- to 2011 the income rural locals receive from partaking in poaching tinue (Nuwer, 2012). activities is relatively higher in comparison with the incomes received After the trafficking process, international vendors sell ivory prod- from other activities such as farming. For instance, in the Samburu pop- ucts to international buyers. There are two types (i.e. market segments) ulation (Kenya), at current local prices the ivory of the largest male ele- of buyers in the international markets, namely international consumers phant poached is equivalent to 15 years' salary for an unskilled worker andinvestors.Someoftheconsumers may be subject to imperfect or 1.5 years' salary for a wildlife ranger (George Wittemyer et al., knowledge about the whole process—such as not knowing much 2011:282). Even so, poachers get paid lower African wholesale raw about the entailments of the blood ivory trade (i.e. there is information ivory prices due to asymmetric information. The average international asymmetries). At present, it is relatively easy to buy ivory without prop- wholesale African raw ivory prices per kg in US dollars were $358 er certification at one of the state-approved ivory shops in a number of (2008, Thailand), $278 (2009, Japan), $750 (2010, China). There is a Chinese cities. This implies that such ivory markets are not particularly large differential between prices in local and international markets, as constrained by social obligation or moral oversight. Furthermore, illegal can be seen when comparing data. International middlemen and inter- ivory is continually smuggled into China to provide for China's “sudden- national vendors charge higher prices for raw ivory based on profit ly wealthy” businessmen (as pro-consumers). For the Chinese elite, motives, transport costs and the lower risks associated with ivory traf- ivory is bought to display upper-class statuses. The recognition of social ficking (Stiles et al., 2011c:22).26 class is important in political economy. Societies are segmented into clas- ses based on income, occupational power and social positions O'Hara 3.3.1.5. Poached Elephants (Patriarchs, Matriarchs, Calves) (2007b:111). While individuals move up the social class ladder, easier Elephants–not by their choice–are the main agent implicated in the promotions, greater income and more power result in more conspicuous circuit. After periods of heavy poaching, elephant populations need at consumption for ivory and speculative investment opportunities. least 20 to 30 years to recover. Poole and Thomsen (1989:190-4) discuss International agents who purchase ivory are driven by different mo- several important biological parameters that affect the livelihoods of el- tives, since there are various drivers of demand. Lucy Vigne and Esmond ephants. They explain that elephants reproduce very slowly; on average Martin (2014) suggest that investors are key agents in recent years buy- a female will reproduce one calf every five years. Furthermore, elephant ing plain polished tusks from the retail outlets as an investment, or for tusk growth is strongly sexually dimorphic. Males have larger tusks speculation purposes buying raw tusks before they reach the factories than females, making them prime targets for poaching. The result is (i.e. in the black market). In both cases, they are relying on continued usually a highly skewed population towards females. Ehrenberg rises in the price of ivory. From 2002 to 2014, black market raw ivory (2008:6) says that researchers have found that lack of patriarch role prices have risen by about 1,000 per cent. Whole, uncarved tusks of both elephant and mammoth ivory are increasingly seen as the most 25 Data are adapted from selected prices collected by Stiles et al. (2011c:21). These prices valuable and prestigious items. Some so-called investors of ‘white are used as a proxy to give an idea of the increasing domestic and international ivory price gold’ (à la African elephant ivory) are even betting on the demise of trends. 26 The consistent rise during 2008–2011 in African raw ivory prices is a disconcerting the African elephant species (Johnston, 2012); even if this is wishful trend. Wittemyer et al. (2011:282) state that “local black-market ivory prices around thinking, but this drives up ivory prices further. Investors hope the Samburu (Kenya) have more than doubled since 2007, and are an order of magnitude prices for 'their' raw ivory will continue to rise significantly. If prices greater than in 1990”. 328 A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337

Table 5 Contradictions: durable fixed capital or environment-elephant capital.

Ecological African Elephant Markets: Redistribution: If ecological Problem Durable Fixed Environment-Elephant If market (DFK) forces redistribution (EEK)

Capital (DFK) Capital (EEK) dominate… forces dominate…

lack of accumulation of mass reductions in genetic First Elephant Economic Rents and consumption for Protection of Species diversity; and lost tourist Contradiction from Ivory Trade ivory; collapse of craft revenues industries

extensive damage to local villages including livestock Second Elephant degraded wildlife Production Elephants and farmland; lack of Contradiction corridors growth of extractive industries

Sources based on O'Hara's (2007b) specification on the particulars of contradictions; Polanyi's (1944) thesis of the disembedded economy; O'Connor's (1998) second contradiction of cap- italism linked to Brennan's (2008:14-6) political economy of the disembedded system; and the authors' own assessment of the African elephant literature and evidence from numerous studies. models leads to major psychotic challenges, such as heightened [and that] [r]eal change happens when it comes from within the elephant-on-elephant aggression and the killing of rhinoceroses by group”, argues Bryan Christy (2013). There is a strong community-led young male elephants. Moreover, calves less than two years old cannot conservancy movement in Kenya, which may explain a less decimated survive without their mother (Poole and Thomsen, 1989:196). population of elephants in East Africa (namely Kenya) vs. Central Poachers target old female elephants since they also have reasonably Africa. As Agatha Ngotho (2013) remarks, there has been a much limit- large tusks. The decline in numbers of old matriarchs causes major dis- ed attempt to bring communities into benefiting or understanding con- turbances to elephant population groups due to their intricate social servation in Central Africa. Esmond Martin echoes a similar call, “African networks. Gobush et al. (2008:2) conducted a study using Tanzania's el- governments have not heard from their own people […] by restricting ephant populations to determine the correlation between elephant the role of Africans to being just field assistants, we are doing just as group structure and levels of physiological stress. The analysis was much damage as the poachers and traffickers” (cited in Morrison, 2014). undertaken by measuring hormone levels in females known as Building trust between communities and enforcement authorities is also glucocorticoids—a proxy for measuring stress levels. Their results con- important. Local community involvement that is participatory and non- cluded that elephants in areas of high poaching had higher glucocorti- alienating is thus a key peer-based solution to avert poaching. coids than those in low poaching risk areas, as shown in Table 4. In summary, the principle of heterogeneous agents evidently demon- Elephants in highly poached areas tend to have higher levels of strates the complexities involved in the network of elephant poaching stress, which in turn causes weak immunity and reproductive health and ivory trafficking. Elephants are highly social animals, and the losses (Gobush et al., 2008:3,6,9). The long-term impacts of historical of family members have profound negative psychological effects. The in- poaching in the 1980s on socially complex, matriarchal species have creased ivory trade in stage II of Phase 5 (2005 to present) has reached a hurt the social relationships of elephants. As poaching intensifies into magnitude that is destroying the foundations of elephants' society, in par- stage II of Phase 5, the future of African elephants is looking bleak. ticular regions of SSA. Various agents contribute to the predicament based on several characteristics. The upper-class Chinese who perceive ivory as 3.3.1.6. The Local Community's Role in Conserving Elephants a symbol of wealth initiate the process, while speculative investors rein- International conservation efforts have stepped up in recent years to force the process. Hunters tend to be a part of lower ethnic groups who help fight the African elephant crisis. To name a few, innovative high- are poorly educated, and hence get involved in criminal activities for pur- end technologies such as aerial drones with thermal cameras, DNA poses of a “livelihood”. Furthermore, international middlemen, government tracking of tusks, WildLeaks for linking suspects to specificcrimesand officials and local authorities are simply in it for rent-seeking (pecuniary providing information on where a tusk came from. In addition to having gains). Local active community involvement is a critical part of the solution. greater access to more advanced equipment and technologies, more All the social actors involved in safeguarding elephants should be aware of military training is being provided for rangers to tackle the criminal the contradictions associated with the economic rents from ivory and forces gangs. Yet militarisation or enforcement campaigns have their limits; of production, which are discussed in the following section. a multifaceted response is required (see Challender and MacMillian, 2013:5-8). When there is rent seeking along the entire ivory supply 3.4. Principle of Contradiction chain, militarised efforts to stamp out poaching do not work, as Stiles (2013) argues. A core issue at present is that the motive for gain, i.e. seeking rents to get African elephant ivory is intense. There are two specific contradictions between durable fixed capital Radical institutional reforms are therefore required to break the and environment-elephant capital in Sub-Saharan Africa. poaching–trafficking circuit of heterogeneous agents, and it is not strict- ly limited to changing the attitudes towards ivory possession. A major There are forces operating within an economic system that often paradigm shift is needed (Saunders, 2014). Reformed poachers are lead to instabilities, conflicts and problems. A contradiction is an endog- great examples (Morrison, 2013). Those who were ruthless poachers enously generated force that is usually both necessary for the generation have been ‘converted’ and now work for fighting to prevent elephant of the system under question and which periodically leads to problems in poaching (Oliver Poole, 2014). Radical long-term measures also need the reproduction of an economic system (O'Hara, 2012c:14-21). O'Hara to be undertaken at a local and regional level. “All conservation is local (2006b) discusses that capitalism moves between complex systems and A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 329

) Key: K Z Social Elephant Wealth= YZ Z CA bounded by limits of LZ and LY WA LZ bar limit = Crisis LY bar limit = Crisis

Destruction of EA Elephants CA = Central Africa WA = West Africa SA EA = East Africa SA = Southern Africa Elephant Recovery

Y

L Unattainable Area Force of Durable Fixed Capital (DF Capital Fixed Durable of Force

Force of Environment-Elephant Capital (EEK)

Fig. 6. Durable fixed capital or environment-elephant capital — regional overview of the African elephant problem, Phase five (1990–onwards). Sources: Contradiction framework adapted from O'Hara (2007b, 2012a:12); and authors' own assessment of the evidence. hence requires interventions by institutions in order to moderate de- destructive effects on the quantity and quality of land, water, air, ecosys- structive forces. The principle of contradiction helps to explain the critical tems, forests and so forth. This results in withdrawals of current and fu- positive and negative forces emerging within a system. ture use values, leading to major problems of maintaining global Contradictions are based on a dialectical logic, a ‘both and’ method biodiversity and reproducing a well-functioning economy. The major often employed by neo-Marxists in their analyses of a particular contradictory link between environmental destruction and businesses problem. O'Hara (2012a:10-2) explains that contradictions tend to in- are the unpaid opportunity costs. On the other side, if environmental volve a number of opportunity costs or trade-offs. A classic contradic- protection measures are so strongly enforced then businesses would tion of capitalism is between capital and labour. In varying degrees, not be financially viable to expand production, and so there would be capitalists and workers are both necessary for the production of fewer consumer goods available for society. Nature would be under- consumer-commodity capital, yet they have opposing interests e.g. exploited due to the high level of respect for flora and fauna. This be- with regards to the profit share of income and control over workplace comes a problem when profit, investment and growth are restricted decisions. When one of the core interests dominates the other, problems more than any critical mass needed for long-term interests of business can emerge that negatively affect productivity and production, raising and employment. Under these situations, where profit, investment and opportunity costs. A solution to such anomalies often require coopera- growth are restricted, it is not likely that market capitalism could increase. tion between the two opposing forces such as having durable agree- With respect to the African elephant problem, contradictions exist ments (about pay, working conditions etc.) between capital and labour. between durable fixed capital and environment-elephant capital in The main contradiction of contemporary capitalism is that of the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Durable fixed capital in this study is the disembedded economy. The contradiction of disembedded economy is long-lasting material structures required for the poaching, transporting, based on Polanyi's (1944) thesis that capitalism has a tendency towards trading, and storing of ivory such as vehicles, trucks, warehouses, destructive-creation. A completely free market system could not survive weapons, boats, shipping containers, ivory workshops, emporiums in the long run because there would be destructive forces attacking the so- and so on—the structures exist because of an expected final sale on cial economy from all sides. Everything would be priced according to cur- the legal and illicit markets for ivory. It also includes the production rent supply and demand conditions. Market prices would rule. There and use of durable assets and infrastructure (including livestock, land, would be no institutions to protect society and ecology from the ravages roads) for sale on the market that generate incomes for small-scale ag- of price and production fluctuations. Ecological capital would be destroyed riculture, mining and other extractive industries. Environment-elephant as successive markets collapse through stocks of resources (e.g. fishes, old- capital consists of the entire stock of elephant species e.g. matriarchs, growth forests, elephants) being decimated. The vast majority of contradic- patriarchs, savannah elephants, forest elephants, as well as the tions of contemporary capitalism work under the canopy of the biosphere where elephants roam and cycles of nature. Inextricably disembedded economy (see O'Hara, 2007b).27 linked to this force are the local and international institutions that The African elephant problem is a subset of the “second contradiction offer protection for elephants and other species' natural habitats. of capitalism” (à la O'Connor, 1998) i.e. the profit–environment nexus. If There are two relatively distinct contradictions in the African ele- the profit motive is too strong, then production and accumulation have phant problem. The first contradiction: market forces that generate eco- nomic rents (including profits of ivory craft industries, international intermediaries, vendors, and so on) for various human agents perhaps 28 27 Various other contradictions exist, for example, finance vs. industry and individual vs. implicated in the poaching–trafficking circuit are in opposition to the society. To date, O'Hara is the only political economist who has examined multiple contra- dictions in great detail. He has developed the concept and applied it to issues such as crime and injustice and ecological destruction. In the case of crime and injustice, several contra- 28 N.B. elephants do not have to be illegally killed for there to be trade in ivory. It is dif- dictory forces may contribute to leading people towards anti-social behaviour. The contra- ficult to argue the claim that possession of ivory from natural deaths per se is an illegiti- diction of disembedded economy relating to capitalism and insufficient income or mate activity. However, while China maintains a legal ivory market, this is clearly unemployment often leads to crime (O'Hara, 2009c). overwhelmed by illegal ivory markets (Vigne and Martin, 2014). 330 A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 forces of ecological redistribution vying for various protections of species elephant capital. In this static diagram, the allocation of resources be- and their habitats. The second contradiction: the market forces that gen- tween the force of durable fixed capital (DFK) and the force of erate income from production (e.g. farming, mining, forestry) are in op- environment-elephant capital (EEK) is shown by concave bar YZ; the position to elephants per se, and other forces that bid specificprotection bow in the bar represents a trade-off between the two types of capital. measures for the betterment of wild elephants. The literature would relate The economy is functioning within the areas bounded by the ‘destruc- a part of the second contradiction as ‘human–elephant conflict’ (HEC). The tion of elephants’ and ‘elephant recovery’ on the YZ bar.33 Consider two distinct contradictions and their respective problems that occur when bar YZ as ‘social elephant wealth’, which consists of the stock of knowl- one force dominates the opposing force are shown in Table 5. edge and other collective resources available and used between the two In the both cases, there are trade-offs to consider. Trade-off means opposing forces within the economy. Thick bars are utilised to indicate a that resources are being redistributed from one side of a contradiction degree of indeterminacy, because there is never an equilibrium in the to the other, e.g. from environment-elephant capital to durable fixed economy.34 Bars LZ and LY represent the limits of the system. The capital, if market (DFK) forces dominate. We will now assess the evi- centre-split position is when the contradiction is in balance: one force dence for each contradiction. is not dominating the other. An area-specific, regional approach to the first contradiction is more An economy is dysfunctional within the LZ and LY bars in the figure. suitable in SSA from a ‘strong sustainability’ view. A concern for strong When the economy reaches these bars, crisis sets in, negatively affecting sustainability entails maintaining a certain minimum number of all the potential productive capacity of markets and the quality of social types of elephants. There are multiple types of African elephants: South- and familial bonds shared within the elephant groups. As the economy ern and East African savannah elephants; West and Central African sa- moves deeper into the LZ or LY crisis bar the social resources available vannah elephants; and forest elephants in the Congo Basin (Central for humans and elephants are heavily depleted. For instance, if DFK is Africa) (see Gross, 2007). Each elephant species (or subspecies) plays too powerful compared to EEK then the economy will move towards important roles in specificecosystems.29 A continental approach to the LZ crisis bar, reducing the social elephant wealth. That is, both types the first elephant contradiction would only be suitable from a ‘weak sus- of capital may decrease in unison, by varying degrees, to their respective tainability’ view. Yet it simply would not matter from a weak standpoint limits. As history has recorded the path of elephant decimation, resources if, for instance, West and Central African elephants decline as Southern are unlikely to be fully transferred to EEK.Hence,an‘unattainable area’ ex- and East African elephants recover. A national approach is not fitting ei- ists simply because elephants cannot work together and accumulate du- ther from the perspective of strong sustainability. Elephant movements rable fixed capital to destroy human beings, systematically. Force of DFK are across country borders, and are ‘meta-populations’ that span several goes to the vertical axis because elephants can be totally exterminated/ countries (Nowak, 2012).30 Hence, a regional analysis from a strong sus- made extinct. Moving resources from the force that is dominant to that tainability view is most appropriate. which is less dominant can enhance the position of the system. The region of Southern Africa (as a whole) has relatively efficient The limit of bar LZ is the most significant; the species is critically management of wildlife and natural habitats.31 Southern African na- endangered.35 Within this limit, ecological systems have undergone tions (except for Zimbabwe) tend to have stronger regulatory frame- irreversible damage. For example, forest elephants are an “ecosystem en- works, higher levels of development with lower levels of crime and gineer” species. Via dung, they provide an important ecosystem service of corruption. In contrast, East Africa is worse off, with low-medium levels dispersing seeds. Their main diet consists of eating fallen fruits, which are of human development, high crime and corruption, yet relatively stable readily available in Africa's tropical forests. They consume more fruits and policy frameworks. East Africa may be headed towards crisis, especially thus disperse more seeds, which ensures reproduction of the fruit-bearing due to the surge in gang poaching in recent years. Central Africa and tree species—a process known as megafaunal dispersal syndrome. Ac- West Africa are continually losing their elephant populations, likely cording to Blake et al. (2009:466), forest elephants disperse more seeds due to the past practices of poor wildlife management and law enforce- and over much larger distances than any other vertebrate in African for- ment, very high levels of crime and corruption, and very low levels of ests. In their study of elephants in the Ndoki Forest (Congo Basin), 82% human development. The seeking of economic rents is the most power- of seeds dispersed by elephants were greater than 1 km from the parent ful force in these two regions, conceivably due to the fact that “ivory de- tree, and they consistently move seeds greater than 5 km. However, the mand and prices have reached a point at which poachers are willing to poaching of forest elephants decreases adult tree diversity, disrupting eco- target well-protected, closely monitored populations” (Wittemyer et al., logical systems (Beaune et al., 2013:116). Durable fixed capital may also 2011:282).32 Despite holding strong to the international ban of ivory, decline, as Africa's forests supply for many human needs such as food, tra- incentives for economic rents from high ivory prices in recent years ditional medicine, fuel, fibre, timber production, and so on. have had major impacts in Phase 5 (1990 onwards) for most regions Elephants only make up a portion of the ecosystem: alas, an econo- of SSA. my without a particular species of elephants is possible in the very long Fig. 6 plots the position and path of each region in SSA for the first term. For example, the Roman Empire's thirsty demand for ivory-made contradiction between durable fixed capital and environment- thrones, birdcages, beds and so on resulted in North African herds close to extinction by 77AD, and yet with zero elephants the economies in Northern Africa continue to function today. As history shows from ele- 29 Bouché et al. (2011:1–2) explain that genetic evidence suggests ‘savannah elephants’ phant extinctions of the past, it is possible in the very long-run for there in West African and Central Africa are different to ‘savannah elephants’ found in East and not to be a complete demolition of durable fixed capital; note the place- Southern Africa. ment of ‘L’ in Fig. 6. Nevertheless an extinction of elephants would be 30 For instance, the Congo Basin is shared among six nations, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo (ROC), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), soul-destroying, as Matthew Scully (2013) makes the cogent remark, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. It has the second largest rainforest block on earth (after “[h]abitat without animals is just backdrop, quiet of life and morally the Amazon) and is home to great apes and the forest elephant (Loxodonta africana meaningless”. cyclotis). Exceptional biological diversity is a key feature, and the area holds globally im- portant reserves of high quality timber, minerals, and other natural resources. There are many pressures from the exploitation of these natural resources. 31 However, this does not imply that Southern Africa is permanently safe in the efficient spot of the social elephant wealth bar. For example in Namibia's case, Moore (2011) is crit- 33 We can think of the ‘economy’ as a sphere structurally related to all other spheres, in- ical of the perceived medium- to long-term benefits of neoliberalising elephants under the cluding ecological system (see Brennan, 2008). CITES Appendix II agreement. The economy is always on a knife's edge. 34 And the bars means that qualitative processes take time and considerable effort to be 32 There is wide variation of poaching trends within West Africa. Moreover, there needs approximated through statistical data. to be a distinction made between small vs. large elephant populations (see Bouché et al., 35 The Red List criterion for listing a species as ‘Critically Endangered’ is when that spe- 2011:6). cies has declined by N80% in ten years, or three generations, whichever is the longer. A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 331

Central Africa is in the worst position: excessive economic rents scenario should be acknowledged. Conservation policies often promise from the ivory trade are a very serious concern for survival of the forest reimbursement or benefits to landowners for clearing out land or elephants. There is a low-level of ecological redistribution as the protec- cooperating in living alongside elephants. These benefits can be in tion of species area is weak in many parts of Central Africa. Forest ele- forms of compensation for wildlife damages (from elephants) or returns phant populations declined by 62% over nine years (2002–2011). on wildlife investments. However, in reality these payments hardly ever According to the calculations by Maisels et al. (2013:8) based on popu- get to the local communities due to bureaucratic bottlenecks (de Klerk, lation reduction and current and projected levels of exploitation, the 2013), corruption (Kabiri, 2010:430), and other political motives status of forest elephants in the Congo Basin (Central Africa) should be (Hoare, 2012:68). up-listed to ‘Critically Endangered’. Currently, they are listed as ‘Endan- The macro aspect of the second elephant contradiction relates to the gered’ under the IUCN (2013) red list criteria. Amid the other problems market forces that generate income from farming and extractive indus- plaguing Central African economies (corruption, civil strife etc.), there try production against the ecological redistribution of resources for ele- are too few wildlife guards. The authors' univariate models predicted phants. Given that local communities rely on agriculture for food that dung density (a proxy for the number of forest elephants) de- production and income, for them elephants may be more of a liability creased by 89% as hunter-sign frequency increased from zero to four rather than an asset in economic development.39 Conversely, conver- per km, and 85% when guards were absent (Maisels et al. 2013:6,3).36 sion of land for an income may be more of a liability rather than an This means that elephants occur where people do not. Resources for asset to elephants' habitat. In Jones' et al. (2012:467-71) study, conduct- Africa's rangers are low, and they lack the training and skills necessary ed between 2005 and 2010 of a major corridor link between western to confront well-armed poachers (Orenstein, 2013:47-8; Smith, 2013). and southern wildlife communities in south-central Tanzania, greater There are inadequate and under-resourced levels of protection especial- farming and more livestock (e.g. cattle) led to greater fragmentation ly for forest elephants. of the wildlife corridors.40 However, land conversion is having a rela- A core problem of the first contradiction is not only the mass reduc- tively small (yet negative) effect. Forests are declining from land con- tions in genetic diversity but also lost tourist revenues. Asocial capital version activities. The rate of net deforestation in tropic Africa was agents are a dominant durable capital force in stage II of Phase 5 0.50% per year in 1981–1990 (FAO, 1993:25), 0.16% annual average in (2005 onwards). These resistance movements include the commercial 1990–2000 and 0.10% annual average in 2000–2010 in Congo Basin hunters (and commanditaires) who poach elephants for their tusks. (Mayaux et al., 2013:6). However, the slower rate of deforestation They may use modest methods such as poisoned darts/spears or bush over time suggests protection measures are working to moderate the fires or more sophisticated techniques such as using firearms, night- second contradiction. vision goggles, helicopters and so on (e.g. Smith, 2013). As Gettleman The direct impact of foreign investors in extractive industries on for- (2012d) notes, illegal wildlife trade fuels crime, corruption, instability est habitats is also relatively low. Phase 5 (1990–onwards) saw the rise and inter-communal fighting. Systematized criminal gangs in collision of forest management under the “sustainable development paradigm”, with government officials hinder the development of local incomes for example in the Congo Basin the enacting of many revisions of most and legitimate forms of businesses such as tourism (Whitehead, forestry laws (see Nasi et al., 2012:105). Extractive industries, at least 2015). Fewer elephants from poaching equates to a smaller number of for logging operations per se, are not hurting elephants and their tourists. East of Africa has a lot at stake, for example, the tourism sector habitats—due to practices of sustainable forest management. There in Kenya contributes to about 12% of GDP (Njoroge and Mutai, 2013). seems to be good protection measures in place for the forest canopies Lost tourist revenues are becoming more of a problem in recent years per se, where underneath Loxodonta africana cyclotis roam. The paradox for the first elephant contradiction. is that forest canopy protects poachers from detection (Levin, 2013). For the second contradiction, there is a micro and macro aspect to it. The absolute size of areas protected is not the key aspect. Illegal killing The micro relates to human–elephant conflict (HEC). The coexistence of of elephants tends to concentrate close to roads, particularly those humans alongside elephants can lead to conflict. While human popula- that are afforded no protection.41 tions continue to grow, the need for land resources increases. Too much Consequently, allocations of land to road infrastructure for the ex- protection elephant may in fact result in minimal land availability for traction of energy resources have a more significant yet indirect effect local farming and therefore increase poverty among rural populations. to elephants' habitats (Abernethy et al., 2013:6). Access to Central The nature of HEC is environmentally spatial rather than numerical Africa's natural capital requires a greater rate of increase in public and (see Hoare, 2012:62). A herd of wild pachyderms can cause extensive private roads construction and rail infrastructure to supplement river damages to local villages: destroying maize plantations, banana and transport. The rise of commercial forestry, mining, and petroleum oper- sugarcane crops as well as ruining homes, demolishing trees and dam- ations leads to an increase in unprotected roads, settlements and aging fences and boreholes.37 Such activities amount to significant mechanised transport, which leads to a reduction in areas of remote costs to local rural farmworkers (Gakio, 2011), sometimes leading to a wilderness. The extent and expansion of logging roads in the Northern famine. It could be a relatively small number of elephants that lead to Republic of Congo for instance has increased from 156 km annual aver- localised (micro) problems. HEC can be reduced “but never eliminated” age in 1976–1990 to more than 660 km annual average in 2000–2003 (Hoare, 2012:65-7). An assortment of different measures will help mit- (Laporte et al., 2007:1451). Roads were built to facilitate extractive in- igate HEC, and thus balance the contradiction.38 dustry, to access mine quarries or to aid timber transportation. The dis- Moreover, urban-based political elites who benefit from wildlife tribution of forest elephants is continually changing with increased road conservation and tourism exploit local rural farmworkers. While tour- ism has led to the establishment of protected wildlife areas, communi- 39 Based on Moore's (2010) analysis, it is important to note that often human percep- ties are faced with additional problems. Certainly, Duffy's (2010) tions towards elephants are misrepresented. While some rural people consider elephants argument that conservation does not always provide a win–win as pests, others realise the intrinsic value of them in relation to traditional and cultural factors. 40 Elephants are known to have long memories and may remember old migration routes 36 The authors use a natural log ‘index of elephant abundance’ (based on elephant dung many years after being denied access to them. The authors argue that restoration and encounter rate per 100 km) and ‘hunting intensity’ (grouped by the presence/absence of maintaining ecological connectivity between the protected areas is possible. Effective wildlife guards). community-based solutions can thus moderate a part of the elephant contradiction, en- 37 For concrete examples in Uganda, Zimbabwe and Kenya, see Heuler (2012), Maponga hancing the position of the economy. (2012) and Mukami (2014), respectively. 41 In the Congo Basin, forest elephant density in and around protected areas is deter- 38 Effective elephant deterrents to moderate HEC include community protection fences mined by the area of roadless wilderness (Blake et al., 2008). In the 1,893,000 km2 of po- (if maintenance is kept up), using beehive fences and chilli-based olfactory repellents (el- tentially available forest elephant habitat in the Congo Basin, some 1,229,173 km2 (64.9%) ephants do not see well and have a very sensitive nose). is within 10 km of a road (Blake et al., 2007:950). 332 A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 networks and the associated production, such as logging towns, saw- culture and influence its consumers into making ‘ivory’ that once mills, clinics, and so on. The evidence and research is very robust: that belonged to African elephants a less attractive option. elephant abundance is lower near roads.42 How might we effectively tackle the Eastern, middle-upper class cul- In précis, too much road building and unfettered access for foreign ture of conspicuous consumption for African elephant ivory? In re- investors is leading to a drain on ecological resources. But, we must con- sponse, promoting more awareness to the future generations about sider both sides of the contradiction. A complete ban on foreign invest- poached ivory, and raising the risk of getting caught in the demand and ment in extractive industries and road building could significantly supply chain. Wealthy consumers are much less likely to want to reduce capacity for production, and therefore economic prospects of ‘show off’ their collection if possession of ivory products was illegal many remote areas. Overall, the second contradiction is also imbalance, and socially unacceptable. According to Huang (2013),the“Chinese yet mainly limited to the Congo Basin and due to the indirect effects are very risk-sensitive. Based on the nature of Chinese culture, it is from extractive industries' production. easy for them to take advantages of loop-holes in the law, but not easy to become serious life-threatening criminals. Most of them would tell “ ā ā 4. Some Policy Prescriptions — Reforming the Culture of Conspicuous you: c bi nqiú(in grey area of law) is ok, but we don't want to commit ”” Consumption for Ivory: Balancing the First Elephant Contradiction acrime . The panda is a good case in point. Local Chinese citizens place asignificant existence value on a panda's life. Poaching the animal in its Delivering a set of workable institutions to reverse the negative cu- natural habitat is taboo and a severe crime. It is simply too risky of a ven- fi 45 mulative processes is a key to slow down the rate of elephant decima- ture to escape the serious rami cations of poaching a panda. fi tion. In this study, five core, interconnected factors explain the African Attitudes towards ivory can be signi cantly changed and reformed, elephant crisis in stage II of Phase 5 (2005 onwards). Broadly, we need as it was the case in the West and Japan, and conceivably for China as to challenge the culture of conspicuous consumption for ivory (CoCCfI), well. A combination of efforts to raise public awareness and the enforce- impose stronger regulatory frameworks to prevent further losses to ment of the law at the 7th Conference of the Parties (CoP) to CITES are wildlife corridors, discourage agents that act corruptly, and promote perhaps some of the reasons why younger consumers in Japan are not sustainable growth and development in SSA. The task may seem insur- keen to buy anything made of ivory. That it is culturally shameful to mountable: the African elephant problem is multi-faceted and path de- buy ivory products is perhaps the main reason why a large number of pendent, as certain institutions become ‘locked in’. Yet we can build Japanese lost interest in buying a product from an endangered species. upon existing conservation efforts to help save the African elephant Old traditions are not too powerful to reverse (Kiser, 2013). However, from extinction. Many policy prescriptions can be raised vis-à-vis for particular social classes there is no moral shame felt in owning 46 fl the Principles of O'Hara's Political Economy (POPE) framework used in worked ivory. In uencing the hearts and minds of Chinese young peo- this paper, but we delimit the scope and focus on reforming the culture ple vis-à-vis the CoCCfI is critical. of conspicuous consumption and balancing the first elephant contradiction. Part of the problem is that people tend to lack critical information about the urgency of wildlife protection. Using confronting messages from emotional, legal and moral angles are helpful to inform a mass au- 4.1. Reforming the Culture of Conspicuous Consumption for Ivory dience about the stark reality of the African elephant crisis. Public and high profile acts have the capacity to influence the ivory consumers of A crucial variable in this paper's analysis is the norm of conspicuous the world. Such campaigns on billboards and commentary in social consumption. Iain Douglas-Hamilton (2013), the founder of Save the media by conservationists are already in motion.47 The advertisements “ Elephants, argues that the root of the problem lies in excessive are designed to remind people that the ivory trade could lead to prose- ” demand; attempts to save the elephants will fail unless it is tackled .A cution. They are effective in reducing the asymmetrical information gap source of excessive demand is the culture of conspicuous consumption between the end-consumer and the slaughtered elephant. But when for ivory (CoCCfI), which is driven in part by the rising real purchasing consumers or local suppliers/vendors are quite certain they are not power of the wealthy in the East. China after all has been experiencing going to be harassed by authorities, the campaigns are less effectual in a long wave upswing (1990-present). African elephant ivory does not the long-term (due to cā biān qiú). Excess consumer demand will still have an addictive quality to it, other than that of admiration for its be there: the risks of sentencing are relatively low for possession of ille- 43 lavishly smooth characteristics. Possession of worked ivory in the gal ivory art by buyers and for local suppliers as well. East conveys status and prestige. Behavioural economics teaches us that the risk of getting caught de- ‘ ’ Another key driver in recent years is the speculative or investment ters criminals more than the size of the penalty. When there is a high 44 demand for illegal raw ivory by über-elites (Moyle and Conrad, 2014). probability of getting caught (from poaching, selling or buying illicit This type of demand is based on an expected (future) consumption de- ivory), there is a low probability of getting away from the penalties.48 mand for poached ivory tusks; otherwise, the accumulation of polished In Botswana, people are frightened by the risk of engaging in illegal ac- ivory would be a futile exercise. In other words, investors of these items tivities. The high level of certainty of punishment and an effective as an asset class are depending on high ivory prices (i.e. value apprecia- tion) and a buoyant long-term CoCCfI. Therefore, it is critical to change a 45 With ivory, we must also be mindful of the norm of Guanxi in Chinese society, defined as a distinctive social relationship with someone in a position of authority. Guanxi can be 42 Blake et al. (2007:946) found a significant positive correlation between the probability used as leverage to avoid the law such as from paying fines or serving a sentence. With of presence of elephants and increasing distance to the nearest major road in the Congo Guanxi, it is easier to possess and sell ivory in legal and illicit markets when the buyer Basin. In the sites surveyed over the 2003–2005 period, the encounter rate of poached el- or seller can evade or rationalise their way to escape a life-threatening sentence. However, ephant carcasses decreased with increasing distance from the nearest major road (Blake Guanxi in Chinese society works against the African elephant when there are no serious et al., 2007:947). Laurance et al. (2006:1257) find that forest elephants responded nega- criminal connotations associated with possessing ivory. tively to roads in rainforests of southern Gabon during the 2004 dry and wet seasons. Clark 46 84% of Chinese middle and upper-middle class consumers surveyed plan to buy ivory et al. (2009) also suggest high negative correlations between proximity to roads and the goods in the future, according a survey (targeted sample size of 600) in Bredar (2013).The abundance of elephants. data suggest (at the time of the survey) that the expected future demand for ivory is 43 Also, there is less interest in its perceived medicinal benefits, unlike the case for rhino strong. Yet, the survey results suggest that we can deter people from buying ivory “for rea- horn. Vigne (2012), CEO of Ol Pejeta Conservancy, states, “[w]hilst ivory [from African el- sons of prestige” when making ivory “illegal to purchase under any circumstances”,espe- ephants] is used primarily for decorative purposes, the market dynamics of rhino horn are cially “if underpinned by a strong recommendation of a government leader”. critically different.” It is beyond scope of our paper to incorporate a discussion of the 47 E.g. see the IFAW pitch of “Give Peace to Elephants, Say No to Ivory Gifting” (Gabriel, African rhino horn crisis. 2014). 44 Moyle and Conrad (2014) argue that the legal trade is simply not able to absorb the 48 Kenya, for example, introduced a Wildlife Act in 2013, which is about creating stiff tonnes of ivory being smuggled from Africa. According to their research, the speculative punishments for offenders when they are caught (Sitati, 2014). Having significant penalties market in raw ivory dominates the other markets. in place (when caught) are seen as a vital deterrent. A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337 333 reporting system in Botswana are an effective deterrent from poaching Lorraine Moore's (2011) words, we have a “neoliberal elephant”. elephants (Gao, 2014). Yet if corruption in the form of bribery (for ex- Thankfully, Polanyi's ‘double movement’ comes into play: ivory markets ample) is ubiquitous, then having larger fines and stronger penalties forces can slow down when environmental institutions are set up to will not be enough to inhibit poaching. Corruption ensures favourable protect the elephant species such as the safeguarding of wildlife parks. odds of getting away with being caught (Kahumbu, 2013). With high Wild African elephants prefer to live in safer, protected areas and become corruption, commercial poachers–such as lowly paid rangers willingly stressed when they leave them (Tingvold et al., 2013). Ivory demand accepting bribes–might continue to take the risks no matter how high can also fall when mass efforts are diverting the social resources away the penalty. As shown in our study in the poaching–trafficking circuit from conspicuous wants for ‘white gold’, e.g. via public awareness cam- of heterogeneous agents, corruption is rife at virtually every level of paigns against ‘blood ivory’. government. Therefore, in Polanyi's thesis of the disembedded economy vis-à-vis The low-risk and high-profit nature of the illicit ivory trade also the African elephant problem, there are two main opposing forces at makes it attractive to criminal gangs targeting whole herds in certain work. For the fictitious commodity of elephants, self-regulating market areas (Lam, 2013). Smuggling large-scale ivory is a very profitable busi- forces are providing the opportunities for immense economic gain for ness because there is a low likelihood of heavy punishment by law. investors in and production of raw ivory, to satisfy a CoCCfI (carvings, There is even less hope in trying to influence change at the supply end polished tusks etc.). On the other side, countermovements (such as a when prices of ivory are rising. Ammann and Kaglan (2013) argue ‘double movement’) may arise spontaneously to protect the economy that the trade will increasingly move agents into organised criminal from the intrusion of the illicit ivory market, and thus help to protect el- gangs who cannot be ‘staked out and arrested’. The only concern for ephants. Thus, the two main forces are markets and the countermove- them is the potential detection and loss of a shipment at the consumer ments that attempt to secure measures of protection for elephants. In end, not capture and prosecution. Business appears very profitable this study, these two opposing forces relate to the sub-contradiction of along the whole of the supply chain, especially in an environment of the disembedded economy: durable-fixed capital or environment- low shipping costs.49 The positive net rents (profit minus loss) are elephant capital. made possible when there is a low probability of capture and prosecu- The ivory trade debate is highly politicised and there are trade-offs tion; and if seized by authorities, there is the small cost to bear for detec- to consider. For instance, an all-inclusive ban to existing legal sources tion, the loss of shipment at the consumer end. of ivory in China would likely lead to a decline of the (in 2013) 37 li- Those who have little faith in a functioning market system for ivory censed ivory carving factories and 145 retail outlets.50 There are vested tend to argue that the real issue is to close down the legal ivory market interests in China that want to keep the local ivory craft industry alive in China. In China, a ‘legal’ supply of worked ivory co-exists along with for some time (Walker 2013). The Chinese government is a major illicit markets. Prominent conservationists such as Mary Rice, Zac Gold- consumer of ivory, as the investigations of Bryan Christy (2012) reveal. smith, Katarzyna Nowak argue that there should be no outlet for the Thus, the role of preserving the cultural heritage of ivory production and legal possession of ivory, as is the case in some parts of the East (e.g. consumption are in a direct opposition to the conservation measures of see Elephant Voices, 2014). “The simple lesson is that if a [complete] shutting down ivory crafting factories. At the time of writing, the ban [in China] is honoured and implemented, demand drops and people Chinese government plans on implementing an improved certification stop buying ivory.” (Vidhi, 2014). However, economists such Daniel card system for vendors, so consumers are to be made aware of the dis- Stiles (2015) argue that it is actually not that simple; “banning the tinctions between ‘legal’ and illegal sourced ivory. DNA forensic analysis legal ivory trade will not stop poaching”. The investigations by Moyle could be used to show domestic ivory markets are operating legally and Conrad (2014) reveal that the legal ivory system in China is rela- (Wasser, 2015). Such policy measures might be attempting to balance tively small and has a slow output cycle—the process is still artisanal the two sides of the first elephant contradiction, by still allowing eco- and the carvings are not produced in an assembly line. The larger nomic rents to be generated from “legal” ivory sales. black market dominates the smaller legal market. In any case, econo- A certain balance and cooperation is therefore required to distribute mists and conservationists alike must be mindful of the elephant con- the stock of social-elephant wealth between the two forces of durable tradictions, especially the first one identified in this study. fixed capital and environment-elephant capital. But the way forward to do this is such a highly contested issue. Would, for instance, the intro- 4.2. Balancing the First Elephant Contradiction duction of a regulated system of ivory markets resolve the first elephant contradiction? In the past, prior to the 1989 international ivory ban, Conservationists discern that elephants are not commodities per se. there was in place a regulated trade in elephants by a quota system. They are not beetles or diamonds or as echoed by Iain Douglas-Hamilton However, the legal trade in ivory did not prevent the illegal killing of (2013), “elephants cannot be manufactured. Once they're gone, they elephants. Alternatively, is Dan Stiles' case for a limited legal trade in cannot be replaced”. In simple terms, ivory is elephant teeth. But as ivory likely to help elephants more than the current prohibitionist re- Phylls Lee (2014) puts it, this “[illegally-sourced] ivory represents a gime? As pointed out by Nowak et al. (2013) “‘sustainable trade’ as- tusk hacked, at the point of death, from the poached elephant, a cogni- sumes that it is possible to establish balance between ivory supply and tively and socially complex creature”. demand.” The conjecture ignores the underlying principles of popula- In The Great Transformation, Polanyi (1944) alludes to the expansion tion biology and ecosystem functioning (Nowak and Jones, 2013).51 of the self-regulated market to fictitious commodities of ‘land’, ‘labour’ From the view of Polanyi's disembedded economy thesis, it makes and ‘money’. ‘Land’ is ‘nature’ as in ‘elephants’. Land, i.e. the elephant, sense to regulate the market where possible. But it is a very complex is obviously not a commodity. Yet, under the market system, it is exactly issue for the African Elephant and accounting for population biology upon this fictitious ground that the “[o]rder in the production and distri- has to be embodied in the conceptual-policy analysis. bution of goods is ensured by prices alone” (Polanyi 2001:72). African elephants are seen by the disembedded economy as a commodity. In 50 In contrast, in 2004 there were 9 factories and 31 authorised retail outlets (Vigne and 49 Business is profitable along the circuit of poaching-trafficking among heterogeneous Martin, 2014:6). agents for two reasons: a) increasing or historically high prices of ivory per kilogram; 51 A large-bodied, long-living, slowly reproducing species that moves across country and b) increasing or historically large excess surplus rents. “As long as the tons of ivory borders—i.e. the African elephant—is exposed much more to exploitation than smaller, which successfully arrive at their destination still find buyers willing to pay the ever in- rapidly reproducing species. “Elephants reproduce very slowly and levels of sustainable creasing prices, and with no arrests or confiscations to speak of taking place at the consumer exploitation are likely to be very low, even when their populations are at healthy levels end, there will always be gangs of suppliers lining up” (Ammann and Kaglan, 2013,em- of abundance. Too little population biology is incorporated into discussions about the eco- phasis added). nomics of the ivory trade” (see Nowak and Jones, 2013). 334 A.J. Brennan, J.K. Kalsi / Ecological Economics 120 (2015) 312–337

A key capitalist process of the disembedded economy is destructive- international markets need to cooperate and perhaps regulate the sale creation. Biotechnology offers the possibility to create synthetic substi- of ivory, albeit this is a contentious issue. Perhaps it is wise to go to ex- tutes that are genetically identical to real ivory. It might help if there tremes by imposing hefty fines and penalties (such as a prison sen- were agents proactively selling and marketing such viable substitutes. tence) to deter people from buying and possessing illicitly traded But there is an uncertain result to it, the market could react even more ivory. Either way, a more sustainable set of environmental institutions forcefully to seek and destroy real elephants for real ivory. Grace Ge is needed urgently to save the fate of the African elephant. Gabriel believes that “[s]eeking alternatives to shift demand away is ” good, but the alternatives have to be completely different from ivory Acknowledgements (cited in Swain, 2015). Is it still possible social prestige can be trans- ferred to other types of ivory or comparable synthetic resins? Jaslin is especially grateful to her family for their unconditional guid- In the US, Europe and Japan, a culture of conspicuous consumption is ance and support throughout her research endeavours around Kenya to still there but for positional goods other than ivory, e.g. luxurious hous- meet Esmond Martin, Daniel Stiles and Julian Blanc, who were so kind in ing and cars, designer-label clothing and accessories, career aspirations, providing much valuable information and data sources. Andrew would and so on. A fresh set of institutions are required to destroy the founda- like to thank Phil O'Hara for his excellent comments on previous drafts tions of Chinese CoCCfI and create new forms of conspicuous wants that of this paper. And we are indebted to the two anonymous referees for are less destructive of species. But this is up against a long history of their patience and critical comments which have helped to improve African elephant decimation, tradition, and cultural heritage. More re- the paper. flection is required. Conservation agencies should be working together with a small team of social, ecological and institutional economists to References enrich the policy solutions to African elephant crisis. 't Sas-Rolfes, Michael, Moyle, Brendan, Stiles, Daniel, 2014. The complex policy issue of 5. Conclusion elephant ivory stockpile management. Pachyderm 55 (January–June). Abernethy, K.A., Coad, L., Taylor, G., Lee, M.E., Maisels, F., 2013. 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