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The Imperial Policy of Otherness Justinian and the Arianism of Barbarians As a Motive for the Recovery of the West

The Imperial Policy of Otherness Justinian and the Arianism of Barbarians As a Motive for the Recovery of the West

1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 477

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 84/4 (2008) 477-498. doi: 10.2143/ETL.84.4.2033455 © 2008 by Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. All rights reserved.

The Imperial Policy of Otherness Justinian and the of Barbarians as a Motive for the Recovery of the West

Drago≥ MÎR≥ANU K.U. Leuven

It was out of enthusiasm for this liberty that we undertook such extensive wars in and the west, both for right belief about God and for the freedom of our subjects1.

This paper is part of a larger study on the Arian of the “Ger- manic” barbarians of and the early , and is exploring the importance of the “otherness of faith” (orthodoxy/Arian- ism) in the diplomatic affairs of the time. More specifically, it is my inten- tion to investigate here Justinian’s reign (527-565) in order to find out whether this particular Arianism was a major motive, driven by either a sincere or a politically-motivated spirit, for the military campaigns in the West. Whether there existed in the empire, especially in the East, already prior to Justinian, a constant awareness of the of the barbarian invaders, and to what degree this (un)acceptable otherness in terms of Christian belief triggered an imperial response is, I believe, a legitimate question. An investigation of the imperial attitudes toward the Arianism of the barbar- ians before the age of Justinian, i.e. from the beginning of imperial ortho- doxy and the barbarization of the army in the time of Theodosius, to the fall of , to ’s I open policy of “intolerance” toward the Arian heresy answers basically in the negative, as the little evidence that exists seems to point rather to the incidental2.

1. Nov. LXXVIII.4.1 (18 Jan. 539), ed. R. SCHOELL – G. KROLL, Novellae, Dublin – Zürich, 101972, this quotation trans. T. HONORÉ, , London, 1978, p. 18. Full Eng- lish trans. of the Novels by F.H. BLUME, url: http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/blume&justinian/ default.asp (accessed September 15, 2008). 2. I have tried to offer the larger picture in my essay An Orthodox Holy War in Late Antiquity? Imperial Attitudes towards the Barbarian Arianism, in A. LOUTH – D. MÎR≥ANU – M. NEAMT¸U (eds.), Proceedings of the Panel “Christianity and Neighbouring Religions in Late Antiquity”, the Sixth EASR and a Special IAHR Conference (Bucharest, 20-23 Sep- tember 2006), forthcoming. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 478

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JUSTINIAN AND RELIGION: DEALING WITH

The long reign of Justinian is arguably one of the most well documented in Late Antiquity, and this is chiefly on account of the extremely rich reports provided by the historian Procopius of Caesarea and also because of the extensive legislative activity of the emperor3. If we are to decide over the implications of religious otherness in the Justinianic wars, it is imperative to decide first on how and to what degree we shall rely on this crucial evidence. As far as Justinian’s general piousness and preoccupation with is concerned, it appears sincere to me, as it does to most modern schol- ars4. For that as for most evidence one has to deal with Procopius, a man of whom we know to have held a mixed opinion regarding the person and deeds of the emperor. The large amount of information in Procopius gen- erates, for the modern scholar, the irresistible urge to go into detail when dealing with Justinian. One should not forget, however, that relying so much on one man’s opinions can mean embracing a “false” friend. Thus, we need to understand Procopius’ own attitude toward the impli- cation of the religious in the political5. In his Secret History, a bitterly crit- ical work, the historian appears compelled to acknowledge Justinian’s cred- itable habit of fasting and refraining from sleeping long, even though he ends by saying that this austere way of life did not go hand in hand with a good governing morality6. As he finds it “insane folly” to investigate the nature of God and would like that everyone should decide for himself on such matters7, Procopius decries Justinian’s general attitude of persecuting those of a different creed and his use of piety as a pretext for seeing no murder in having people killed on that account8. This necessarily discred- its his praising remarks for Justinian’s action toward religious unity and doctrinal uniqueness in the Buildings9. The historian accuses the ruthless Justinian of spreading terror in peaceful communities (such as those of heretics and other wrongdoers) chiefly in order to be able to confiscate

3. For a brief, informative and balanced treatment of his reign see J. MOORHEAD, Jus- tinian, London – New York, 1994. 4. See for instance C. CAPIZZI, Giustiniano I tra politica e religione, Messina, 1994, p. 32. 5. See for the debate A. CAMERON, The “Scepticism” of Procopius, in Historia 15 (1966) 466-482 and also A. KALDELLIS, Procopius of Caesarea: Tyranny, History, and Philosophy at the End of Antiquity, Philadelphia, PA, 2004, pp. 166-172 and infra. 6. Hist. Arc. XIII.28-33, ed. J. HAURY, included with trans. H.B. DEWING in PROCOPIUS, The Anecdota or Secret History, Cambridge, MA, 1935. 7. Bella V.6-8, ed. J. HAURY, included with trans. H.B. DEWING in PROCOPIUS, The His- tory of the Wars, 5 vols, Cambridge, MA, 1914-1928. However, note here a statement eas- ily recognizable as in accordance with his classicizing historiographic approach. 8. Hist. Arc. XIII.7; cf. , Historiae, I.7, ed. R. KEYDELL (CFHB SB, II), Berlin – New York, 1967, trans. G.D. FRENDO (CFHB SB, II A), Berlin – New York, 1975. 9. De aedificiis I.1.9, ed. J. HAURY, included with trans. H.B. DEWING in PROCOPIUS, Buildings, Cambridge, MA, 1940. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 479

THE IMPERIAL POLICY OF OTHERNESS 479

their estates (though here the bias is rather evident, in that Procopius is voicing the concerns of the rich land-owners against an Illyrian parvenu). Furthermore and on a more general scale, in Procopius’ view, Justinian’s concern with religious matters (“scanning the heavens and developing a curious interest concerning the nature of God”), far from being and asset, had led to a lack of proper political response to serious state affairs10. His preoccupation with theological matters is also expressed in his more neu- tral work, the Wars, where the fact of him sitting down at night and dis- cussing the Scriptures with educated elderly priests is presented (in the mouth of a plotter) as a known habit of a negligent ruler11. Lastly, in the same work the emperor is blamed, though in a less straightforward man- ner than in the Secret History, for having such concerns instead of involv- ing himself personally for the conclusion of the Italian war12. Obviously, this refers to the disputes in the East, but this suspected negligence of the conduct of the war is proof nonetheless that Justinian had a serious, undoubted and perpetual interest in bringing about religious unity, which need not be confined to the East only. To get closer to my subject, one cannot find firm evidence, despite all these general references, as to Procopius’ understanding of, and reaction to, Justinian’s true religious (anti-Arian) commitment behind the launching of the Western wars. Procopius’ text does not contain much help for discerning the genuineness of Justinian’s sentiment of starting a “crusade” in the name of the orthodox faith. I suggest that is because Procopius appreciated more so the honest man of action, (especially as an eye-witness to his cam- paigns but also as a good narrative historian), than the architect who sent him to battle for an added, and rather questionable, religious reason13. How- ever true that pious sentiment was, Procopius does nevertheless confirm that it was used to launch the war and I shall follow the evidence below.

JUSTINIAN AND THE LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO BARBARIAN ARIANISM

After being made patricius in 523 and elevated to Caesar in 525, Jus- tinian was proclaimed Augustus on 1 April 527 while the sick Justin was still emperor14. As co-emperors, they jointly decreed that year the important

10. Hist. Arc. XVIII.29. 11. Bella VII.32.9. 12. Ibid., VII.35.11. 13. The exact opposite is , who ignores Belisarius in his in order to give praise to Justinian, his favourite. 14. I see no need to incorporate here Justin’s reign, in spite of Procopius’ interpretation that combines their reigns (Hist. Arc. I.19). Against following his understanding – as done in the past by most scholars, among which E. STEIN, Histoire du Bas-Empire, , 1949, Vol. 2, esp. pp. 222-223 and A.A. VASILIEV, Justin the First: An Introduction to the Epoch 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 480

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law that exempted the Gothic federates from the general persecution against the heretics15. The decision to go to war with the in Africa set a high politi- cal value on the otherness of faith as diplomatic currency, as I will take the time to discuss more extensively not far below. The breakdown and destruction of the Vandal kingdom (534) signified the destruction of the Arian Church in Africa. At the beginning, Justinian’s legislation showed no harshness; on the contrary it was quite conciliatory: it showed the emperor’s desire to permit a smooth transition of the Arian clergy and Arian belongings into the Catholic Church16. In his law aiming at organ- ising Africa as a prefecture (13 April 534)17, Justinian decreed firstly that the Arians should return to the Catholics the sacred vessels they had taken previously, and though it also imposes the restitution of the property to the , this seizure was not to be allowed immediately. The emperor hoped that, by the decision of the Arian clergy to convert to ortho- doxy and, indeed, by their consequent acceptance into the Catholic clergy18, the entire Arian human and material body would integrate flaw- lessly into the Catholic Church.

of Justinian the Great, Cambridge, MA, 1950, esp. p. 102 – see now B. CROKE, Justinian under Justin: Reconfiguring a Reign, in Byzantinische Zeitschrift 100 (2007) 13-56. Con- sequently, it is prudent to avoid picturing Justinian behind the Arianism-related politics under Justin (CROKE, Justinian, pp. 47-49, contra STEIN, Histoire, pp. 253-254 and VASILIEV, Justin, p. 327). On Justin and Arianism see G. GREATREX, and the Arians, in Stu- dia Patristica 34 (2000) 73-83, pp. 78-79, and my own discussion in MÎR≥ANU, Orthodox Holy War (n. 2). 15. Codex Justinianus (= CJ) I.5.12.17, ed. P. KRUGER, Berlin, 1877, trans. F.H. BLUME, url: http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/blume&justinian/default.asp (accessed September 15, 2008). Also spared were the Exakionite Arians from (outside the walls of) , men of considerable wealth and status: MALALAS, Chronographia 18.7, ed. L. DINDORF, Bonn, 1831, trans. E. JEFFREYS – M. JEFFREYS – R. SCOTT (Byzantina Australiensis, 4), Mel- bourne, 1986; THEOPHANES, Chonographia AM 6020 (527 AD), ed. C. DE BOOR, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1883, trans. C. MANGO – R. SCOTT, Oxford, 1997. On Justinian’s attitude toward heresy (CJ I.5.18.4: “all thought and veneration different from that of the Catholic and Apostolic Church and orthodox faith”) and heretics (Nov. CIX, pref.: “separated from the true Christian faith and communion”; “those who are not received in communion by the God-beloved priests”), see in general G. CRONT, La répression de l’Hérésie au Bas-Empire pendant le règne de Justinien Ier (527-565), in Byzantiaka 20 (1982) 37-51. A more ample, albeit somewhat dated, study, is available in Romanian: V.G. SIBIESCU, Împaratul Iustin- ian I ≥i ereziile, Bucharest, 1938. 16. An attitude taken likely because of the fact that all the local energies were sought to be set together against the danger of the . See Y. MODÉRAN, Les Églises et la ‘reconquista’ byzantine: A. L’Afrique, in Charles PIETRI – Luce PIETRI (eds.), Histoire du Christianisme des origines à nos jours: Vol. 2. Naissance d’une Chrétienté (250-430), Paris, 1995, 699-718, p. 702. 17. CJ I.27. 18. Ep. Licet de Sacerdotii (Collectio Avellana 88, ed. O. GUENTHER [CSEL, 35], Vienna, 1895). Agapetus, after being informed by the African Catholic clergy about the impe- rial desire that former Arians might be accepted as priests, wrote to Justinian that this can- not be done, as it contradicted the tradition. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 481

THE IMPERIAL POLICY OF OTHERNESS 481

In the council of the African Church in the following spring, the bish- ops pressed strongly for a restoration of the rights lost during the Vandal domination. The new Pope Agapetus I (535-536) joined the choir of the dissatisfied with the clemency of the emperor. As a result, Justinian gave up and, on 1 August 535 decreed the restitution of all the goods taken by the Arians (and the pagans) to the orthodox faithful in his Novella De Africana Ecclesia addressed to Prefect Solomon of Africa19. Justinian refused the heretics any privilege. No Arian, Donatist or Jew, or any other who did not share in the orthodox religion, would be allowed to partici- pate to the cult of the Church: they would be banished from the churches. They were to have no right to ordain and priests or to baptize peo- ple in their sects, which had been outlawed by the emperor and his pre- decessors20. With concern to the dignified offices, they were rejected from administration or the army, so that they would not be in the position to rule over the orthodox: simply, “they were fortunate enough to be left alive”21. If the Arians chose to be received in the orthodox church, they were to be welcomed22. These harsh measures were obviously meant to provide an answer in a particular context, given the uniquely harsh persecutions that the Arian Vandals had inflicted on the Catholics there. By comparison with these local measures, the general measures against the Arians from the rest of the empire were less drastic. Procopius writes that the clergymen were very rich and Justinian took their fortunes and the large treasures of the churches23. In a novella from 545, they were – for the first time in a uni- versal law – put among the enemies of the orthodox faith. Together with the other heretics, Arians were forbidden to build churches24. The Byzantine armies led by Belisarius entered in 536 and then – after the Ostrogothic recapture in 546 – again in 549 (Rome). The Arian priests were then thrown out of Rome and the Ostrogoth ’s interven- tion had no result. After Italy was regained, the churches taken by the kings of the (since Theodoric) from the orthodox faithful were given back, following the Pragmatic Sanction of 554. The privileges and dona- tions given by , Amalasuintha, Theodatus and Totila were sup- pressed; of course, the Arian clergy were the main losers25. Arian buildings,

19. Nov. XXXVII.3-4. See also C. DIEHL, L’Afrique byzantine, Paris, 1896, pp. 39 ff. 20. Nov. XXXVII.5. 21. Nov. XXXVII.6: “Omnes autem haereticos secundum leges nostras, quas impo- suimus, publicis actibus amoveri, et nihil penitus publicum gerere concedantur haeretici nec aliquam administrationem quibuslibet subire ambitionibus, ne videantur haeretici constituti ortodoxis imperare, quum sufficit eis vivere, non etiam sibi aliquam auctaritatem vindi- care”. 22. Nov. XXXVII.7: “… si ad orthodoxam fidem mente purissima venire maluerint, non respuimus, sed damus eis licentiam hoc faciendi”. 23. PROCOPIUS, Hist. Arc. XI.16.20. 24. Nov. CXXXI, c. XIV. 25. Constitutio Pragmatica, VII.1-5 (Nov., ed. SCHOELL, Appendix VII, pp. 799-802). 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 482

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especially the churches taken from the Catholics by the Ostrogothic kings, were given back26. The , previously driven away by the Arians were allowed to come back to their monasteries27. Beside these, Justinian granted the orthodox hierarchs a significant role in the administration of the provinces28. Having presented Justinian’s legislative attitude towards the Arianism of the kingdoms he fought against, I turn now to analysing the role of Ari- anism as otherness of faith (with regards to the imperial orthodoxy) in Jus- tinian’s effort to recover lost Roman territories in the West29.

THE EVIDENCE FOR RELIGIOUS OTHERNESS AS A MOTIVE TO LAUNCH THE WESTERN WARS

In order to be able to understand how Justinian or, for that matter, impe- rial foreign policy used the otherness of faith, it does not suffice to rely on products of politics. Of course, it is necessary to describe firstly the scene from the angle of Constantinople: to see whether the desire of liberating Catholics from persecution was a sincere motive in itself for the imperial decision to go to war and, in relation to this, whether the call for freedom came from the persecuted Catholics themselves. Further, it must be decided in what terms was imperial propaganda conducted for that mat- ter. The picture may gain fuller definition if one looks also from the other side, at those who were affected by such propaganda, i.e. mainly Catholic subjects but also their Arian masters. Firstly, did the Byzantines really conduct their war of reconquest of Africa as a war carried on in the name of orthodoxy (against Arianism) and for the sake of the orthodox Romans ruled by heretical masters?

26. Constitutio Pragmatica, VII.8 ff. There were organized ceremonies to celebrate the repossession of the churches from the Arians, e.g. in (566-570) or Rome (towards 592). See J. ZEILLER, Étude sur l’arianisme en Italie à l’époque ostrogothique et à l’époque lombarde, in Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire de l’École Française de Rome 25 (1905) 127-146. 27. Constitutio Pragmatica, VII.17. 28. Ibid., VII.12. 29. Despite the fact that hardly any modern researcher will fully agree with older accounts that give strong credit to the religious reasons that animated Justinian’s foreign political play – to the extent of depicting it as a veritable crusade, e.g. DIEHL, L’Afrique (n. 19), p. 15 and infra –, most of the scholars seem to agree here with the role of the “Orthodoxy/Arianism” other- ness. For instance Averil CAMERON, though refusing Arianism as a sincere impulse for Recon- quista (The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity A.D. 395-600, London, 1993, p. 44), has to admit that the war of reconquest was actually, or at least was portrayed as, a holy war (’s Laughter: The Case of Byzantine Africa, in F.M. CLOVER – R.S. HUMPHRIES [eds.], Tradition and Innovation in Late Antiquity, Madison, 1989, p. 175). There exist, nevertheless, voices that refuse to this otherness any real contribution to fuelling the Renovatio Imperii, e.g. K. SCHÄFERDIEK, L’arianisme germaniques et ses consequences, in M. ROUCHE (ed.), Clovis his- toire et mémoire: Vol. 1. Clovis et son temps, l’événement, Paris, 1997, 185-198, p. 194. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 483

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While it is obviously necessary to keep in mind that the legislation was a vessel for carrying out official propaganda, it is nevertheless important to point to the relevant laws. Moreover, looking at it first has the advan- tage of making one aware of the correct time frame, as one would expect there was an interest to offer an official line of thought promptly after the final victory in Africa, before any other interpretation should arise. It is important to note that all these references are part of a post-event legiti- mating effort, which allows for the assumption that the unexpectedly quick victory in Africa boosted Justinian’s level of confidence in completing his grand operation (in the mid and late ). We have no solid proof that the religious motive was revealed before the outbreak of the war. Thus, the restoration of the liberty in Africa was first made known already in the preface to the Institutes (dated 21 November 533), where it is stated that the victories granted by heaven over the barbarian nations brought back Africa and other provinces under Roman rule30. In a law dated 13 April 534, Justinian offers the official picture of the event31. God has rewarded him with the help he did not offer the previous emperors, as they did not deserve it. Not only were they incapable of recovering the lost province of Africa, they even legitimated the rule of barbarians over Romans. Benefiting from such divine blessing, in contrast, Justinian was able to free the Romans in Africa from the captivity of the barbarians, which affected both body and soul. The otherness of faith is obviously made an issue for triggering imperial reaction, as the persecution of the Catholic Church was intrinsically part and parcel of this maltreatment. Churches were being destroyed; holy men were being sent into exile. The message of God to such injustice was revealed in miracles such as the growing back of the cut-off tongues of the confessors of faith. The orthodox faith is to be proclaimed again in a land where dignity has been restored. A reflection of these ideas is clearly present in a letter addressed by the bishops of Africa to Pope John II where they expressed their ineffable joy at being liberated from a hundred years of violenta captivitas32. Strong emphasis is laid on the captivity of the Catholic Church by the Arians33. A law of 18 January 539 expresses best how this war was doubly legit- imated as a holy and just war of liberation, “both for right belief about God and for the freedom of our subjects”34. Beside Justinian’s laws, several other sources have to be further con- sidered in order to see how this legitimization worked for other observers of the time.

30. Institutiones, Proemium, ed. P. KRUEGER (Corpus Iuris Civilis, 1), Berlin, 1954. 31. CJ I.27.1, esp. I.27.1.1-8. 32. Ep. Optimam consuetudinem (Avellana 85.1). 33. As it is portrayed mostly in VICTOR VITENSIS, Historia Persecutionis Africanae Provinciae, ed. with Fr. trans. S. LANCEL, Paris, 2002, a work very much known in Con- stantinople. 34. Nov. LXXVIII.4.1. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 484

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To follow the chronological order, we will have to start with the evi- dence provided by the Chronicle of Marcellinus Comes, the second edi- tion of which appeared soon after the victory in Africa, in 534. Accord- ing to the chronicler, Africa was liberated from the Vandals volente deo35. The gratitude of the author due to the emperor36 possibly devalues his statement to a mere pro-Justinian expression of triumphal joy and a mir- roring of the official version already present in the legislation. Further reflection on the imperial line is noticeable in John the Lydian, who wrote in c. 550 that “God made Gelimer a prisoner for our empire”37, and in , who wrote using the same words as Justinian did in his laws, about the liberation of Africa achieved with the help of God38. Later in the , Procopius says that the Justinianic triumph in Africa and Italy (“through the General Belisarius”) had been depicted in a mosaic in the of the imperial palace. The emperor, the empress and the rejoice after submitting the Vandal and Ostrogothic kings39. The scene was, according to Corippus, embroidered on his funeral vestment and depicted on vessels40. One might also take into consideration a narrative about a prophecy revealed to Justinian by the holy man Sabas (d. 532) when coming to the imperial court in 53041. This testimony is potentially unique, as it would suggest that a certain plan for the recovery of the “West of Honorius” existed prior to that year and also would offer a religious foundation for the two justifying accounts mentioned above42. While asking Justinian for help to improve the hard life of the Christians in Palestine, Sabas is said to have assured the emperor of divine benevolence as to his plans of recovering the lost parts of the empire, especially when touched by impious :

35. MARCELLINUS COMES, Chronicon s.a. 533-534, ed. T. MOMMSEN (MGH, Auct. Ant. XI, CM 2), Berlin, 1894, 37-104. Included with transl. in B. CROKE, The Chronicle of Mar- cellinus: A Translation and Commentary, Sydney, 1995. 36. As he was a former employee; see B. CROKE, Count Marcellinus and his Chroni- cle, Oxford, 2001, pp. 31-32 and infra. 37. JOANNES LYDUS, De magistratibus 2.2.5, ed. with Fr. trans. M. DUBUISSON – J. SCHAMP, Paris, 2006. 38. JORDANES, 172 (XXIII), ed. F. GIUNTA – A. GRILLONE, Rome, 1991. 39. PROCOPIUS, De aedificiis I.10.16-18. 40. CORIPPUS, In Iustinum I.276-93 and 3.121 f, ed. and trans. A. CAMERON, London, 1976. 41. CYRILLUS SCYTHOPOLITANUS, Vita Sabae 171.26-179.25, ed. E. SCHWARTZ (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, 49.2), Leipzig, 1939, pp. 85- 200. Trans. R. PRICE, Lives of the of Palestine, Kalamazoo, MI, 1991, pp. 181-188. 42. Caution is required when taking into consideration the date of composition and the character of the work. Written in the mid-550s, it may possibly reflect the feeling of that time, of deriving prophecies from known events. It is admittedly difficult even in the case of PROCOPIUS’ Wars to consider the conversations recorded as genuine and to rely on their content, let alone in the case of a spiritual work such as CYRIL’s Life of Sabas. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 485

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I believe that God, in return for these five acts of yours pleasing to him, will add to your empire Africa, Rome and all the rest of the empire of Honorius, which were lost by the emperors who reigned before Your all-pious Seren- ity, in order that you may extirpate the Arian heresy, together with those of Nestorius and Origen, and free the city of Nestorius and Origen, and free the city and the Church of God from the bane of the heresies43.

As Sabas’ requests were granted:

God gave the emperor an infinite recompense by fulfilling the prophecy of the old man. For the emperor erected two trophies a short time later by being crowned with two victories such as had never been achieved by any of his predecessors; he recovered Africa and Rome from the rule of usurpers and saw the two kings, Witigis [Vitigis] of Rome and Gelimer of Africa, brought to Constantinople. Thus in a short time he recovered for the the half part of the land and the sea; and after liberating all the west from slav- ery to the said usurpers who were Arians, he issued imperial decrees that the Churches of the Arians should everywhere be destroyed, following the orders or at least the prophecy of the godly old man44.

It is obviously a matter of faith to attribute Justinian’s victories to the prophecy come true. One has to take special notice of the justification of war as “liberation from to the Arian usurpers”. Cyril’s words may of course simply reflect a law such as, for instance, the Novella of 539. As little reliable as it may be as a source, it is still illuminative of the kind of retributive justice Justinian and his age saw at work during and, possi- bly, prior to, the wars. At the very least, this may be taken as the voice of the spiritual and certain ecclesiastical circles. It is important to underscore once more that, for all their general rele- vance, these pieces of evidence coming as they all do from texts written after the victory in Africa, cannot be used to infer in all certainty that the religious otherness was internal to the planning of the war in the West. We now have to get closer to the event. Having recently sealed a “” with the (Septem- ber 532)45, Justinian got just enough breath to turn his eyes towards the West. He had indeed more than one reason to go to war in Africa: the hope of recovering some lost territories46, the urging of the Roman African

43. Vita Sabae 175.19-176.1. All emphases are mine. 44. Vita Sabae 178.21-179.4. 45. PROCOPIUS, Bella I.22.16. 46. Though it is impossible to say how early he actually developed the concept of the restitutio imperii, we generally know that he was thinking of the preceding Christian emper- ors as lax and without ambition, and openly expressed his desire to act differently and justly (esp. through the law, which was entrusted to his care, and needed in melius restaurandum) and thus to win the favour of God (e.g. Nov. VIII.11; cf. Nov. VI pref.: a ruler is as con- nected to God as a priest; Nov. XIV.1: everyone should live virtuously in Constantinople and on the Roman soil everywhere, esp. in the lands that God gave lately as a gift to the 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 486

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landowners47, and of Eastern merchants with interests in Africa48, and, finally, his personal feelings born from Gelimer’s usurpation of the Van- dal from his friend, King (in 530)49. Nevertheless, Justin- ian’s counsellors did not show the same enthusiasm towards the plan of attacking the Vandal kingdom50. Facing serious opposition, coming especially from the exhausted mili- tary men that had just battled the Persians, Justinian started to question the soundness of his plan to conquer Africa. However, we are solidly informed that what shifted the balance in favour of going to war after all were the reli- gious considerations. There are two accounts of miraculous interventions in support of Justinian’s holy war. First, Procopius of Caesarea speaks of a from the East who rebuked the emperor in the name of Christ whom he had seen in a dream, for not helping the Christians in Africa51. Secondly, Justinian himself is credited by the Chronicle of Bishop Victor of Tunnunna with a dream in which the African Bishop Laetus of Nepta, martyred by the Vandals in the time of , had urged the emperor to intervene for the liberation of the Catholic Africans52. The different details of the two stories may reflect – as it has been noticed – how Byzantine “propaganda” intended

empire, so that such grace would not be lost). Idle as the previous emperors were, they did not deserve divine help to recover Africa or to avoid the by the hand of the Vandals, and were forced instead to make shameful arrangements: “Quod beneficium dei antecessores nostri non meruerunt, quibus non solum africam liberare non licuit, sed et ipsam romam viderunt ab eisdem vvandalis captam et omnia imperialia ornamenta in africam exinde translata” (CJ I.27.1.6, AD 534). 47. ZACHARIAS RHETOR, Hist. Eccl. IX.17, trans. F.J. HAMILTON – E.W. BROOKS, The Syr- iac Chronicle Known as That of Zachariah of Mytilene, London, 1899, p. 262; for the African refuges to Constantinople, said to have joined the expedition against the Vandals: PROCOPIUS, Bella IV.5.8. 48. PROCOPIUS, Bella III.20.6. 49. Justinian legitimated openly his war on account of this offense, PROCOPIUS, Bella III.1.9, i.e. aiming to “restore” the lawful Vandal dynasty, as one can read in his letter to the Vandals, PROCOPIUS, Bella III.13: “Neither have we decided to make war upon the Van- dals, nor are we breaking the treaty of , but we are attempting to dethrone your tyrant, who … has imprisoned your king”. 50. The least enthusiastic voice belonged to the praetorian prefect John the Cappadocian: PROCOPIUS, Bella III.10.8-17. 51. PROCOPIUS, Bella III.10.19-21: “When he met Justinian, he said that God had vis- ited him in a dream, and bidded him go to the emperor and rebuke him, because, after undertaking the task of protecting the Christians in Libya from tyrants, he had for no good reason become afraid. ‘And yet’, He had said, ‘I will Myself join with him in waging war and make him lord of Libya’”. 52. VICTOR TUNNUNNENSIS, Chronicon 114 (AD 534): “Iustinianus imperator uisitatione Leti episcopi, ab Hunerico Vuandalorum rege martyre facto, exercitum in Affricam Bele- sario magistro militum duce contra Vuandalos mittit”. Procopius’ classicizing style could suggest that his narrative is simply a mirroring of the Xerxes episode in HERODOTUS, His- toria VII.8-13 (H. BRAUN, Die Nachahmung Herodots durch Prokop, Nuremberg, 1894, 46-47). Nevertheless, the existence of a second mention, in the Chronicle of Victor would suggest that the story was not merely a result of Procopius’ desire to emulate the classical historians. Instead, they both reported, at the least, on an actual rumour. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 487

THE IMPERIAL POLICY OF OTHERNESS 487

to legitimize imperial intervention, in the eyes of the Byzantines, in the for- mer case, and in the eyes of the Africans, in the latter53.

THE WAR IN AFRICA

We learn from Procopius about some religious practicalities already at the beginning of the campaign, in the spring of 533. The moment Belis- arius’ fleet was ready to set sail for Africa, a ceremony took place at the imperial palace. The general was blessed by Patriarch Epiphanius, who also “put on the ships one of the soldiers who had lately been baptized and had taken the Christian name”54. This was meant, first and foremost, to validate the campaign in the eyes of the Byzantines, especially of the army55. On the ground, in Africa, on the other hand, it was Belisarius who was entitled to decide about the weight that religious otherness should carry. The general, a severe military figure and a balanced leader, was aware that he had under his command one thousand Arian warriors. Furthermore, he probably had no intention to emphasize religious otherness as long as the imperials hoped to have the Vandals deserting King Gelimer (530-534)56. Of course, Belisarius hoped for the support of Catholic Africans, but it is significant that he declares to his soldiers the imperial aim to liberate them because they had been Romans, not because they share in the same faith57; they are there to recover what is their own and, since they have justice on their part, God is with them58. There is no explicit mentioning of the reli- gious difference, but at the same time this may only reflect Procopius’ reluctance to make too much mention of the religious factor in his histo- ries, written with a classicizing key as it were. After Gelimer’s defeat at Ad Decimum, Procopius informs us, neverthe- less, that the Catholics took back an Arian church that had been prepared

53. W. KAEGI, Arianism and the in Africa 533-546, in Traditio 21 (1965) 23-53, p. 26. KAEGI remarks also (ibid., n. 12) on the lack of mention of religious beliefs as reason for starting the war in ZACHARIAS’ Hist. Eccl. IX.17. 54. PROCOPIUS, Bella III.12.2. In conjunction with Hist. Arc. I.16, the soldier might have been the former Eunomian adopted by Belisarius and his wife Antonia. See KAEGI, Arian- ism (n. 53), p. 27 n. 18. If that is the case, it might be that it was deliberately used in view of the religious otherness the Byzantines were to face in their campaign. There is also the possibility that it was simply a moral boost for the Christian soldiers to bring aboard a newly converted to Christianity, without any specific sectarian connotation. 55. The story is probably accurate, as I see no need for Procopius to fabricate it for his audience. The Wars being published around mid-century, that is, while still at war in Italy but long after the start (and end) of the Vandalic war, the readers had been exposed already to enough triumphal imperial “propaganda” to need one more pious justification from our historian. 56. As Justinian’s “open” letter to the Vandals shows. PROCOPIUS, Bella III.16.13-14. 57. Ibid., III.16.3-4. 58. Ibid., III.19.5. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 488

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for the festival of St. Cyprian in . St. Cyprian’s temple had been taken by Arians during Huneric’s reign (477-484) and, since then, St. Cyprian was said to have appeared to many in their dreams, prophesising that the Arians would be overcome. Procopius says that the Catholics saw in the present events – the defeat of the Vandals and the flight of the Arian priests – the fulfilment of Cyprian’s words59. To include this story in his his- tory, the otherwise ambiguously Christian Procopius must have been com- pelled by the popularized recognition around him that the Byzantine army enjoyed divine favour. While it is probable that Belisarius did not act towards emphasizing the difference of faith, primary because of the Arians under his command, it is true that, from the acts of the opposite side, the reality of this otherness appears much more clearly. First, the flight of the priests leads to the sup- position that they expected retaliation. Furthermore, Gelimer tried, though without succeeding, to win over to his cause the Arian contingents of Belis- arius’ army60. The importance of the presence of the 1,000 Arians in Africa came up eventually. Since they did not give in to Gelimer’s proposals, it was sup- posed that there existed no serious reason to fear that their further presence in Africa would create any problem afterwards either. However, at the time of the beginning of the Reconquista campaign in Italy, Justinian, as we have seen above, abandoned his moderate attitude towards the Arian- ism of the barbarians and issued harsh laws against the Arians. The fact that the Arians were forbidden to worship and to have their children bap- tized could not be acceptable to the Arian soldiers. Incited by Vandal priests and indeed by Vandal women that had become wives to many in the meantime, the Arian soldiers of the empire, joined also by a number of four hundred “Vandals of Justinian” who had escaped from being sent to fight Persia, rose in mutiny during the spring of 53661. It must be said that economic reasons – e.g. desire for land – contributed very much as well62, mostly after the start of the mutiny, since from the total number of 9,000 mutineers that were counted later63, only 2,000 were Arians: half of them were the barbarian contingent of the Byzantine army and half Van- dal soldiers. For launching the mutiny, nevertheless, we could convinc- ingly credit the Arians. A final point can be made here of Gelimer being taken to Constantino- ple and consequently granted an estate in Galatia and permitted to live with his family there. It is of some significance that Procopius informs us

59. Ibid., III.21.21. 60. Ibid., IV.2.4; KAEGI, Arianism (n. 53), p. 35 n. 59. 61. PROCOPIUS, Bella IV.14.7-42. 62. See for the social reasons DIEHL, L’Afrique (n. 19), p. 73; J. TEAL, The Barbarians in Justinian’s Armies, in Speculum 40/2 (1965) 294-322, p. 321; KAEGI, Arianism (n. 53), pp. 46-47. 63. PROCOPIUS, Bella IV.16.3. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 489

THE IMPERIAL POLICY OF OTHERNESS 489

that “Gelimer was by no means enrolled among the patricians, since he was unwilling to change from the faith of Arius”64. Not only does the refusal confirm the seriousness of the late Vandalic religious policy, but the confrontation itself suggests that a request was made to that end, reflecting Justinian’s similarly resolute expectations65. The picture outlined so far allows me to conclude that the religious difference was, most of the time, an important issue in Justinian’s campaign to reconquer Africa. The fact that we cannot evaluate its importance in precise terms is partly due to Procopius’ reluctance already noted above. Justinian employed the oth- erness in his diplomatic moves: that is certain. The moment Africa had been conquered, he tried to downplay the differences on the local level, most probably in an attempt to channel all the available resources towards meeting the menace of the Moors. However, the Catholic Church hardly understood Justinian’s policy, as we can read in the letter the bishops sent to Rome after the synod of Carthage in May 535. The answer from the new pope66 may be connected already with the political developments between Constantinople and Ostrogothic Italy.

THE WAR IN ITALY

If the persecution in Africa offered political and religious grounds for legitimating a holy war, the situation in Italy did not really offer anything quite as powerful. Justinian launched the using the pretext that the new King (534-536) had assassinated an ally of the empire, Queen Amalasuintha (524-536). At least this is the reason that we learn from Procopius67. However, there are certain signs that relations between the Catholics and the Arians also have played a role, if not in the outbreak (or, better said, continuation) of the war, at least it did in entertaining it along the way. In the line of Theoderic’s celebrated words “I cannot command your faith, for no one is forced to believe against his will”68, Theodahad had criticised Justinian for not being “tolerant” in a letter sent in 535, by con- trasting his attitude with the way a ruler should behave: he, Theodahad, will not dictate the religion of his subjects against their own will69. Justinian is

64. Ibid., IV.9.14. 65. A second case of this propensity might be found a few years later during the Ostro- gothic war, when Vitigis was similarly brought by Belisarius to the capital but, in that case, was given the rank of . See further below. 66. Ep. Iamdudum quidem (Avellana 86). 67. PROCOPIUS, Bella V.5.4. 68. , Variae II.27: “religionem imperare non possumus, quia nemo cogi- tur ut credat invitus”, ed. T. MOMMSEN (MGH AA, 12), 1894, trans. (partial) S.J.B. BAR- NISH, The Variae of Marcus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator (Translated Texts for Historians, 12), Liverpool, 1992. 69. CASSIODORUS, Variae X.26.4. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 490

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thus working against God, since he tries to impose one religion where the Deity allows more than one to exist. Another letter from 535 that the senate addressed to the emperor – which is in fact a royal petition, since it is almost certain that King Theodahad was behind it –, contains a few significant elements that concern our dis- cussion here. Justinian is addressed as if the Eternal City appeals to his sympathy. The plea has clear references to the religious state of affairs, a fairly clear sign that the otherness of faith had been employed as a reason for attacking Italy. The senate of Rome (or, for that matter, Theodahad) reminded Justinian that “my religion, which is your own, is known to be flourishing: Why then do you try to do more for me?” and that, while the situation in Africa called for the imperial intervention, that is not the case with Italy, for “it is cruel for me to lose a freedom which I have always been seen to possess”70. We understand that the lack of freedom in Africa is a direct allusion to the Vandal persecution of the Catholics, when we continue our reading of the text. Furthermore, the Catholic Church of Apostles Peter and Paul herself is said to have joined the plea to the emperor, confessing her freedom under the previous and current masters. In 535-536 the See of Rome was occupied by the determined Pope Agapetus I, who represented a new papal viewpoint with respect to the place of religious otherness on the political stage71. He had no apprecia- tion of Arianism and thought to embark together with Constantinople on a mission to fight it and rebuild an orthodox empire. Actually, he found Justinian’s measures in Africa to be too mild72. By doing that, he initi- ated a period of unrest for the papacy and the entire Catholic clergy in Italy, with regards to their Arian Gothic masters. His travel to Constan- tinople on behalf of Theodahad, who thought of making things straight about the assassination of Amalasuintha73 did not mean of course that Justinian changed his mind about making war74. It had been started already while the pope was still in Constantinople, and the Catholic clergy found themselves, more and more, in the awkward situation, of choosing between a tolerant heretic barbarian leader and an orthodox, yet auto- cratic, emperor.

70. Ibid., XI.13.3 and 5: “quid enim pro me nitaris amplius agere, cuius religio, quae tua est, cognoscitur sic florere?”; “Nam si Libya meruit per te recipere libertatem, crudele est me amittere quam semper visa sum possidere”. 71. For what concerns the papacy I follow P. AMORY, People and Identity in Ostro- gothic Italy, 489-554, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 224-229. 72. Ep. Licet de Sacerdotii (Avellana 88). 73. Liber Pontificalis, Agapetus I [I:287], ed. L. DUCHESNE, 2nd ed. C. VOGEL, 3 vols., Paris, 1955-1958. 74. Once in Constantinople, Agapetus found himself concerned with the question of the day there, which was not Arianism, but the enduring . He was disconcerted with Justinian’s deep preoccupation with theology and thought the pope should dominate the emperor in matters religious. Needless to say, Justinian “learned” his lesson, as one can see from the way he dealt with the future . 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 491

THE IMPERIAL POLICY OF OTHERNESS 491

Agapetus’ successor, Silverius (536-537) inherited this uneasy situa- tion. Besides the obviously difficult situation at home, with an Arian master under pressure, he found it impossible to reconcile with Con- stantinople on account of the existence of Monophysite circles supported by Empress Theodora. Hesitating too long before choosing a side, he was removed from his see by Belisarius and replaced with Vigilius, for the alleged reason that he was to surrender Rome to Vitigis (536-540) in 53775. Consistent with my chief interest with the imperial attitude, I should note that it is only at this point, during the short pon- tificate of Silverius, that one can take as a fact that an imperial plan was in place to have the bishops of Rome active in the line of the reconquest. While during the time of Agapetus we cannot say the initiative came from Constantinople, such a plan came to be evident only under Vig- ilius (538-555). He strived to secure the support of the Catholic bishops in the West against Arianism (which was a religion “for the barbarians”) and at the same time tried to support Constantinople in every way possible. The support is visible on two occasions. The first is connected to the episode of Vitigis submitting to the emperor, which I already mentioned. While we are not solidly informed if the elevation to the rank of patrician required his conversion to orthodoxy, this can be reasonably assumed in light of the Gelimer episode. It may have happened already before being taken to Justinian, at the same time with his oath of capitulation in Rome’s Iuliae, under the eye of and of Belisarius76. Con- version or not, Vigilius’ role in this episode of imperial policy seems cer- tain, unless we are not ready to accept an account included in a praising work such as the Liber Pontificalis. More significant even are the letters from 545-546 to the bishops of that are proof of his work in the direction of supporting the alliance between the Catholic crowned heads, between Constantinople and the Catholic Frankish King Childebert I (511-558)77. In a letter sent in 555 from Constantinople to Bishop Aurelianus of Arles, the pope sought the intercession of Childebert to Totila, fearing that the lex aliena of his

75. For these intricacies see AMORY, People (n. 71), pp. 226-227. 76. Vitigis made a patrician: JORDANES, Getica, 313 (LX); cf. Liber Pontificalis, Vigilius [I:296]: capitulation in Rome, then a patrician and count; PAULUS DIACONUS, Historia Romana XVI.19, ed. H. DROYSEN (MGH: SRG, 49), Berlin, 1979. The two cases of Gelimer and Vitigis were obviously of similar notoriety: PROCOPIUS, Bella II.21.28; CYRIL S., Vita Sabae 178.24-26. The conversion is deemed as probable in E.A. THOMPSON, Romans and Barbarians, Madison, WI, 1982, p. 96. 77. Epp. Sicut nos pro (Arelat. 41, ed. W. GUNDLACH, Epistolae arelatenses genuinae [MGH: Epistolae 3: Epistolae Merowingici et Karolini aevi I], Berlin, 1892 = PL 69, cc. 27-28); Quantium nos divina (Arelat. 40 = PL 69, cc. 29-30); Licet fraternitati (Arelat. 42 = PL 69, c. 29); Administrationem (Arelat. 44 = PL 69, cc. 37-39); and Admonet nos loci (Arelat. 43 = PL 69, cc. 39-40). 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 492

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might lead to the destruction of Catholic churches in Rome78. This concern for the destruction produced by the Roman-Ostrogothic war was serious enough to ask the help of the allied Catholic barbarian, but his allegiance to Constantinople did not allow him, then again, to go so far as to work toward putting an end to the conflict itself79. Beside the clergy, there was the mass of Catholic whose reac- tion to the Byzantines’ coming could tell us more about the religious impli- cations of the Reconquista, at the local level. Nevertheless, Procopius’ account is not very helpful here. What is fairly clear is that the Italo- Romans had been treated well by the Ostrogoths, and there was no real rea- son to be enthusiastic about the coming of the imperial armies80. It is obvi- ous that they concerned themselves with what would have resulted for them, had the Byzantines been defeated. All in all, it must be stated that, presumably, the Catholics inclined to favour to a certain degree the Byzan- tines, due to all they represented, but feared the Gothic reaction and that the latter concern prevailed in most cases, as we can see from the case of the inhabitants of Bruttium and Lucania. From the words of a local leader allegedly quoted verbatim by Procopius, it was the lack of consideration from the part of the East Romans and the fear of the Gothic troops that forced the people to concede to the Arian Barbarians:

For it was not by their own will that they had yielded to men who were both barbarians and Arians, but because they had been placed under most dire constraint by their opponents, and had also been treated with injustice by the emperor’s soldiers81.

That the simple people could have been aware of the glorious motives that led to Justinian’s war is unlikely. In fact, the local concern was probably always dominant and, only at those times when the imperial victory seemed more likely to be achieved, can we decipher more reli- gious implications. It seems reasonable to say that the Italo-Romans, the Hispano-Romans, and, indeed, even the African Romans – as already

78. Ep. Fraternitatis vestrae litteras (PL 69, c. 42): “ut quia Gothi cum rege suo in civ- itate Romana perhibentur ingressi, hoc eis dignetur scribere, ne se in Ecclesiae nostrae praej- udicio, quippe velut alienae legis, immisceat, et aliquid faciat, aut fieri qualibet ratione per- mittat, unde catholica possit Ecclesia perturbari”. 79. The pro-Eastern viewpoint that he shared with the other Catholic clerics may appear in the works written at this time, such as the second edition of the Liber Pontificalis and the chronicle known as Anonymus Valesianus, as the importance of the otherness of faith is unmistakably present in them. See for details AMORY, People (n. 71), p. 229. 80. See THOMPSON, Romans (n. 76), pp. 100-109 for a good overview and reflections on the “Italian civilian loyalties” and the “Gothic treatment of Italians”. A social and eco- nomic interpretation will read that the wheat of – conquered by the Byzantines –, would have been available again. 81. E.g. PROCOPIUS, Bella VII.18. All emphases are mine. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 493

THE IMPERIAL POLICY OF OTHERNESS 493

noted –, put little value on the otherness of faith and acted mostly according to their local interest. This judgment of the modern historian comes partly from common sense and partly, alas, from the little num- ber of sources. After having noticed how the provincials saw the issue, I should give the perspective of the Ostrogoths themselves, for we have Procopius’ account of an embassy to Belisarius that tried to emphasize the full toler- ation that the orthodox Italo-Romans enjoyed under the Gothic rule:

And we have so scrupulously guarded for the Romans their practices pertaining to the worship of God and faith in Him, that not one of the Italians has changed his belief, either willingly or unwillingly, up to the present day, and when Goths have changed, we have taken no notice of the matter82.

It is important to remark that, apart from the peculiarity of mentioning Goths converting to the orthodox church, we have here an attempt from Goths to present themselves entirely inclined towards peace and mutual understanding: with respect to losing members of their own kin, they “have not taken notice of the matter”! The religious discrepancy meant very little given the higher goal of maintaining peace in the realm, the embassy affirmed. Of course, no one will take the assertions of an embassy as fully reflecting the real situation, in that they obviously expressed an official position held for a larger purpose. Nonetheless, we can get out of it at least a picture of Ostrogothic ideology in Italy, which is fully con- firmed by other sources, as we have seen83. In sum, the attitude of the people in the conquered areas is an indirect proof that Constantinople did indeed play the otherness of faith as diplo- matic currency.

A FEW OTHER BITS OF “”: , LONGOBARDS, AND

In addition to what has been said, I can support further this conclusion by referring to two other passages in Procopius’ History of the Wars that speak more specifically about the reality of the politics of otherness. First, there is a direct reference in Justinian’s letter to the leaders of the Franks, where the oneness of faith is played as motive enough for the Franks to ally with the Orthodox empire:

82. PROCOPIUS, Bella VI.6.18. 83. A letter sent to Constantinople by Totila through Deacon Palagius makes no refer- ence to religion, only to the “peace and prosperity” of the reigns of Anastasius and Theoderic (PROCOPIUS, Bella VII.21.18-25). 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 494

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The Goths, having seized by violence Italy, which was ours, have not only refused absolutely to give it back, but have committed further acts of injus- tice against us which are unendurable and pass beyond all abounds. For this reason we have been compelled to take the field against them, and it is proper that you should join with us in waging this war, which is rendered yours as well as ours not only by the Orthodox faith, which rejects the opinion of the Arians, but also by the enmity we both feel toward the Goths84.

Thus, the war with the Goths is, amongst others, also the war of ortho- doxy against Arianism. Being orthodox compels one. It is true that the Franks were in reality far from being true Christians, since they continued to act in the most pagan way85, but for the diplomatic relationship the appearance, of the “official state of affairs” was enough. A single fact was crucial; both Justinian and the Franks knew that the latter were not Arians (and felt enmity toward the Goths) and this made all the difference for the alliance to be sealed86. The second passage of relevance here is the report on Justinian’s impli- cations in the wars between the Longobards and the Gepids. Procopius informs us that, in 548, a Longobardic embassy sent by King (546- 565) played on the oneness of faith between the Longobards and the

84. PROCOPIUS, Bella V.5.8-9. All emphases are mine. 85. Despite the fact that Agathias says about the Franks that “they are all Christians and adhere to the strictest Orthodoxy” (Historiae II.2.4) – a portrait painted obviously by way of opposing the pagan Alamanni (for a commentary see A. CAMERON, Agathias, Oxford, 1970, p. 54), Procopius reports on the human sacrifices and “other sacrifices of un unholy nature” performed on the banks of the river Pô (Wars VI.9-10). Agathias’ assertion, how- ever circumstantial, could suggest that at least some groups in Constantinople had a good opinion of the non-Arian and Chalcedonian Christianity of the Franks, who were seen as the closest in every way to the Romans. 86. Procopius suggests elsewhere that it was simply an appearance, when he speaks of the secreted alliance between the Ostrogoths and the opportunistic Franks: “Theudibert, the leader of the Franks, sent him [Vitigis] at his request ten thousand men as allies, not of the Franks themselves, but , in order not to appear to be doing injury to the emperor’s cause” (Bella VI.12.38). Nevertheless, the appeal to, and reply of, the Franks on account of commonness of faith continued to be of importance later in the century, espe- cially in Italy (which was facing the pagan and Arian Longobards), as we can see in a let- ter by Pope Pelagius II to a Frankish bishop from AD 580 (MGH, Epistulae 3) and in a let- ter from AD 585 by the Frankish King Childebert II (575-586) to a refugee in (Byzantine) Genoa, Bishop Laurentius of (Epistulae Austrasicae 46). On the Byzantine-Frankish volatile alliance against the Longobards between 484-491 (the interests of the Catholic hier- archy in Italy included), see I. DUJCEV, Bizantini e Longobardi, in La civiltà dei Longob- ardi in Europa, Rome, 1974, 45-78, pp. 73-75; and W. POHL, The Empire and the Lom- bards: Treaties and Negotiations in the Sixth Century, in W. POHL (ed.), Kingdoms of the Empire: The Integration of Barbarians in Late Antiquity, Leiden, 1997, 75-134. Elsewhere, commonness of faith with the Frankish kings Gunthram and Childebert II was invoked by the Catholic Visigothic King Reccaredus in order to contract a marriage alliance (although Visigothic Arianism had not been an issue hitherto): “Post haec Richaredus legationem ad Gunthchramnum atque Childeberthum regem direxit pacis gratia, ut scilicet, sicut in fide se adserebat unum, ita et caritate se praestaret unitum” (GREGORIUS TURONENSIS, Historiae IX.16.25, ed. B. KRUSCH – W. LEVISON [MGH SRM, 1.1], 21951). 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 495

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Romans that would justify the empire in opposing the Gepids, who were being “different”:

… the Romans will justly take sides with us, seeing that we have been in agreement from the first as regards religion, they will stand in opposition to our opponents for the simple reason that they are Arians87.

It would be obviously exaggerated to say that due to this argumenta- tion Justinian took sides with the Longobards88. Procopius actually remarks that is was a “long” deliberation. If one considers the support that Justinian later offered the Gepids against the Longobards (the for- mer winning a victory over the latter in 565), it seems that, from the imperial point of view, it was much more important to smartly play off one side against the other and not to favour a particular side on account of a commonness of faith. Nevertheless, it remains a significant fact that the Longobards knew that the argument would work to their advantage: the otherness of faith was an element of the diplomacy of war89. Fur- thermore, it proves that it was well known even beyond the boundaries of the empire that Justinian was giving a strong religious flavour to his wars in the West. Finally, there is no doubt that the war of the Eastern Romans in His- pania was an appendix to the wars in Africa and Italy. While it was thus unmistakably a part of the grand plan of restoring lost provinces, the inter- vention, that started in spring 552 in support of a rebellion by the Arian , could hardly have been driven by religious concerns. It was

87. PROCOPIUS, Bella VII.34.24. 88. PROCOPIUS, Bella V.34.40. If the Longobards could be really Orthodox or not at that time has been a bone of contention, but this matters little for our purpose here; see, for instance, S. FANNING, Lombard Arianism Reconsidered, in Speculum 56 (1981) 241-252, pp. 247-249. 89. For Catholicism or Arianism as political and economic options for the Lombard rulers, see W. POHL, Deliberate Ambiguity: The and Christianity, in G. ARM- STRONG – I.N. WOOD (eds.), Christianizing Peoples and Converting Individuals, Turnhout, 2000, 47-58. The chief attractions of the fifth century are two-fold. Firstly, there is the inva- sion of in 568 and the possibility of Arianism helping to legitimate the newcomers as heirs to the Ostrogothic rule. Secondly, ’s ban of Catholic baptism for the chil- dren of his Lombard subjects was probably an answer to the growing Catholic influence of the Italian bishops and probably at his own court, after marrying Theodolinda. It is proba- ble that these moves were for the most part only an expression of local policy than piece of a universal rhetoric, though one can agree that both cases are, at least in part, reacting to the resilient interest and continuous, if delegated, involvement of the Eastern Empire in Italy. At the beginning of the seventh century, Arianism ceased to be an issue as an element of otherness in the Longobardic relations with Constantinople, as the question of the “Three Chapters” gained importance and replaced the former dispute. For an insightful, general portrayal of the religious affairs in Longobard Italy, see S. GASPARRI, Culture bar- bariche, modelli ecclesiastici, tradizione romana nell’Italia longobarda e franca, in Reti Medievali 6/2 (2005), url: http://www.storia.unifi.it/_RM/rivista/saggi/Gasparri.htm (accessed September 15, 2008). 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 496

496 D. MÎR≤ANU

in all probability only caused by the outbreak of a during the reign of the Arian King (549-554). As the war with the Ostrogoths was not over and therefore Justinian was not in the position to spare a large contingent, his deal to help Athanagild was nothing more than an opportunistic move to get a foothold in , in the hope that once relieved of duty in Italia, the army could continue the mission to recover this province too. Realizing that the Eastern Romans had their own agenda (in the light of the previous wars in Africa and Italy and especially because in 555 the Ostrogoths had just been defeated), the adherents of Agila gave credit to his adversary and killed their sovereign, joining Athanagild as the new Visigothic king (555-567). It is probable that the Byzantines found local support among the Roman elite in Baetica (which may even be credited, at the limit, with the call for help) and that is why they managed to organize a good settlement on Cartagena and on the coast. There is no sign of Byzantine engineering of the uprising but it can be presumed that the civil war worked in favour of Justinian at the ruin- ing of the military strength of the Visigoths, and that is why the support was given to Athanagild, even when there was little armed force to spare, in 55290. While there is little sense that the Catholics should fight to replace the Arian Agila with another Arian, Athanagild, as Thompson says, one should not discard the possibility that the Catholics supported the civil war not in view of such substitution, but for its own sake, so that the empire could gather more force in the and eventu- ally recover Hispania91. If that was even remotely true during the reign of Justinian, it seems that in time the Byzantines became more and more alienated from any Catholic ideal or at least were regarded as such, as the battles carried against them by the newly converted Reccaredus (586-601) prove92. An earlier episode that happened under King Leovigild (573-586), involving the Catholic con- version of his rebel son, Hermenegild, does not call attention to a possi- ble role of the otherness of faith in the imperial diplomacy pursued by Emperor Mauricius (582-602), safe for the travel to Constantinople by the rebel’s ecclesiastical advisor, Bishop Leander of Seville93. No source reveals any evident interposition from Constantinople in this local affair, but one can theorize that Leovigild could have feared, as a result of this connection, Byzantine intervention and therefore was compelled to act

90. A.E. THOMPSON, The Goths in , Oxford, 1981, pp. 324-326. 91. Ibid., pp. 328-329. 92. Note, in addition, the anti-Roman attitude of the Spanish Catholic authors of the time, such as Isidore of and John of Biclarum; see e.g. ISIDORUS HISPALENSIS, His- toria de regibus Gothorum, Vandalorum et Suevorum 54, ed. T. MOMMSEN (MGH: AA 11, Chronica Minora, 2), Berlin, 1894, pp. 267-303. 93. The need to travel to Constantinople may be taken as proof of the weak leadership of the Byzantines in Spain. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 497

THE IMPERIAL POLICY OF OTHERNESS 497

against his son94. Reccaredus’ conversion in 589 put an end to the use of the otherness of faith as an element of Byzantine diplomacy. Instead, the Byzantines apparently switched to emphasizing to their Hispanic subjects in the southernmost provinces of the peninsula that the Visigothic rulers (although now converted to Catholicism), remain essentially barbari and thus strangers to the Hispano-Roman tradition of government, which was only to be carried on by a Roman(-Byzantine) administration95.

CONCLUSION

All in all, there are enough reasons to say that the war of reconquest was to a certain degree a holy war of the Catholic empire against the Arian bar- barians. Was it entirely sincere, i.e. can we credit the otherness of faith as a genuine motive for its launch? After considering all the relevant evi- dence, it is still not possible to decide in all certainty whether it was not just one more pretext to wage war, used to convince simple people and especially the military. In my opinion, the religious personality of Justin- ian suggests that it was sincere, although, true, only as a last-minute addi- tion to build a stronger casus belli. Given the scarcity and opacity of our sources and the spiritual quality of the matter in question, the persistence of a certain degree of uncertainty at the end of my research was to be expected and is, hence, acceptable. On the bright side, by taking notice of Justinian’s legislative measures and their application in the re-conquered areas, of the attitude of both the affected barbarians and Romans there and also by remarking the other few instances where the otherness of faith was employed as diplomatic cur- rency, I think I have managed to bring out the significant role of the Ari- anism of the barbarians in Justinian’s imperial diplomacy.

K.U. Leuven Drago≥ MÎR≥ANU Faculty of Theology Sint-Michielsstraat 6 B-3000 Leuven Belgium

94. On further complexities see W. GOFFART, Byzantine Policy in the West under Tiberius II and : The Hermenegild and Gundovald (579-585), in Tra- ditio 13 (1957) 75-118. See also R. COLLINS, Visigothic Spain 409-711, Oxford – etc., 2006, pp. 56-52. 95. As a contemporary inscription on a marble plaque from Cartagena shows: CIL II, 3420. See on that M. VALLEJO GIRVÉS, Commentiolus, Spaniae missus a Mauricio Augusto contra hostes barbaros: The Byzantine Perspective of the Visigothic Con- version to Catholicism, in Romanobarbarica 14 (1996-1997) 289-305. 1749-08_ETL_2008-4_06_Mirsanu 08-01-2009 16:27 Pagina 498

498 D. MÎR≤ANU

ABSTRACT. — This paper asks whether Justinian's attempt to recover the West during the sixth century was, and to what extent, an orthodox “holy war”. It is beyond a doubt that the decision to go to war with the Arian Vandals in Africa placed high value on the “otherness of faith” as diplomatic currency. While we cannot credit, in the strictest sense, the Arianism of the barbarians as the (main) motive for the launch of the Roman Reconquista, I will argue that it was certainly a motivating factor in a holy war. The paper explores Justinian's legislative measures and their application in the re-conquered areas, the attitude of the barbarians and, respectively, Roman provin- cials, and also a few instances where we can see how the otherness of faith was employed as diplomatic currency.