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...... cimera publications

Luigi De Martino AT A CROSSROAD:

...... THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION January 2004 SITUATION REPORT 4 2 ......

cimera SITUATION REPORT 4

...... We would like to thank the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Division IV for its support and encouragement. We also would like to give special thanks to Dr. Parviz Moullajanov, Executive Director of the Public Committee for Democratic Processes in for his constant support and friendship.

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The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIMERA.

Design: David Hakobyan, Andrey Izmalkov Photo: «Camels of Ronkul,GBAO», Albert Longy Printed by Premier Ltd. Print House, Bishkek, C copyright by CIMERA. All rights reserved. ISBN: 2-9700358-9-8 Geneva January 2004 ...... 3

CONTENT

3 Foreword

7 Current Local Government Policy Situation in Tajikistan

16 Tajikistan local self-governance: a potential bridge between government and civil society?

25 Regional government in Tajikistan (centre and regions)

32 Economic aspects of the interrelation between centre and regions in Tajikistan

46 Economic Relations between Centre and Regions: the Case of Sughd

85 Regionalism and its perception by major political and social powers of Tajikistan.

119 From Ambivalence to Ambiguity? Some Paradigms of Policy Making in Tajikistan

151 Tajikistan at a Crossroad: Contradictory Forces at the Heart of the Tajik Political System. 4 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Foreword ......

Reflections from the Praxis Civilian Peace Operations) and in sations who are currently dealing with 2002 the Ministry supported the two such topics as intergovernmental re- In mid-2000, two Tajik non-Govern- Tajik organisations and CIMERA, a lations and local governance. The mental Organisations, the Tajik Cen- Swiss private organisation based in meetings were chaired by a senior tre for Citizenship Education (TCCE) Geneva, in developing a project personality within the Presidential Ad- and the Public Committee for Dem- aimed at providing an informal plat- ministration or the Government. ocratic Processes (PC) approached form for political discussion on the the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs Three meetings have been carried issue of centre-regions relations in with a project proposal. Active sup- out during the period December 02 Tajikistan. The present paper tries to porters of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue - March 03. After this date the prep- retrace and assess some of the ex- Process1 created the TCCE in 1997 arations of the June 22 constitutional periences within the framework of and the PC in 2000. As the official referendum have disrupted some of that project. negotiations moved ahead and final- the project’s activities including the ly to a peace agreement in The project had foreseen to estab- expert meetings. 1997, the TCCE and the members lish three main interlinked discus- Parallel to the Expert meetings the of the Inter-Tajik dialogue felt that it sion platforms: Expert meetings in project has launched several research was not enough to support the Tajik Dushanbe, «Public» Discussion Fo- activities on topics related to region- peace process through unofficial di- rums in Dushanbe and the regions alism and local governance: plomacy. The leaders of the organ- and a Study Tour to . isations identified as a main new chal- A study on fiscal and budget- Starting from December 02, the lenge the need to broaden support ary relations conducted by Dr. project has started inviting on a reg- for peace by including wider circles Avezov at the State ular basis up to 15 experts2 within of citizens and government officials University the Tajik administration, the legisla- into the process and to begin to ad- tive power and international organi- A study on the legal and in- dress the root causes of the conflict. stitutional frame of the rela- Since they considered that «region- 1 The Inter-Tajik Dialogue is a track-two nego- tions between central gov- alism» was one of the main causes tiation process, which accompanied the official ernment and regions con- of the conflict, they started to con- Tajik peace negotiations. Participants were mid- ducted by Mr. Zafar Aliev, duct a series of workshops on this level leaders from the two sides; many of them newly appointed Chairman of topic in different regions of the coun- now in high-level official functions. The process the Constitutional Court. try. was initiated by the Kettering Foundation (USA, Dayton) and the Russian Strategic Research A study on the perceptions This concern was shared by the Swiss Center, , in the framework of the Dart- of regionalism conducted by Federal Department of Foreign Af- mouth Conference. Dr. Saodat Olimova, of the fairs, Political Division IV (Support to 2 Experts: those currently part of the different Sharq Centre. government / parliamentary initiatives aimed at reforming the present situation regulating lev- els of government and local self-governance...... FOREWORD 5

A study on the economic re- rums, the project should have ad- phase out the project by end of lations of Soghd con- dressed relevant topics trough se- August 03, no forum has been car- ducted by Dr. Boymatov in ries of round tables first in Dushanbe ried out. Khudjand as a case study of and then in the regions. The imple- As for the last platform, the study the economic relations be- mentation of the PDF has suffered tour to Switzerland, the project tween centre and regions. delays from the original schedule signed a Memorandum of Under- (foreseen for February 03). The main A study on the political cul- standing with the Institute for Feder- responsible for the delay was the is- ture of Tajikistan conducted alism at the University of Fribourg sue of finding the right «political» by Dr. of the French CNRS (IF). IF would organize and imple- moment when to organize such and Marc Bloch University in ment the study tour for a Tajik dele- meetings is a cumbersome process Strasbourg. gation to Switzerland. The tour was in Tajikistan. The preparations of the originally scheduled for October The role of these papers was two- 22 June 03 constitutional referendum 2002 but then postponed to April fold: on one hand they would rep- have once more caused problems 03. Unfortunately, in March 03 the resent one of the elements for the for the implementation of the Tajik Government has decided a trav- preparation of the other project’s project. Many of the officials at all el ban for all high-ranking officials un- initiatives and would also give im- levels were unavailable for meetings til the completion of the June 03 ref- portant information for understand- and / or other activities not related erendum. As a consequence, the tour ing what is the «margin of manoeu- to the referendum. could not be implemented before vre» for decentralisation in the coun- At the same period, other interna- the conclusion of the project in Au- try. On the other hand, the second tional organisations such as the UI gust 03. paper would provide important in- were sending international experts to sights on the perception that politi- This represented a major blow for Tajikistan to work with the govern- cal and regional leaders have of the the project since we were planning ment WG on local governance in issue of regionalism in the country. to use the occasion of the travel to order to speed up the drafting of During the course of the project we Switzerland to: the new legislation. have decided to increase the num- Enlarge the discussion start- ber of research papers in order also Due to this situation and while dis- ed with the Experts Meetings to better consider the fiscal and cussing an eventual extension of the to a more political group of economical as well as the political project, the donor requested not to interlocutors. dimension. start this line of activity until the ref- erendum in June 03 and a decision Provide inputs to the ongo- After having reached a certain level had been taken on the future of the ing discussion process on of trust with our government part- project. As the donor decided to reform of the local gover- ners, in February 2003 we decided nance legislation through that the conditions were given to learning the Swiss experi- open the discussions to a larger and 3 The term «public» means «enlarged», the Fo- rums were targeting a public that goes beyond ence in dealing with centre- more political public. Through the in- the participants to the Expert Meetings but are region-local government re- strument of «Public3» Discussions Fo- not open to the general public. The idea was to lations reach specific relevant political and social per- sonalities concerned by the project’s themes. 6 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Experiences and Lessons Learned In terms of strategy, the chosen ap- The experts meetings have proved proach (using the experts meetings to be a valuable tool for increasing The fact that the project could oper- as «entry point» to the central gov- exchange of information and trans- ate «at full speed» only over a peri- ernment) still seems to be adapted parency in the domain of initiatives od of three to four months shows to the situation in Tajikistan though it supporting local governance. On the clearly that timing is essential in a contributed to create a (mis)-percep- other hand a longer input in terms of short-term political initiative such as tion of the project being a technical time and energy by at least one main this one. In our case, timing was assistance initiative and to frame the actor (in this case was CIMERA) was favourable since it could use the new discussion from a technical-juridical needed in order to sustain these re- opportunities created by the gov- perspective. At the same time the sults. After only three meetings they ernment willingness to discuss issues project should have tried earlier to could not be continued without ex- of «decentralisation». At the same reach more political personnel espe- ternal support. time the holding of the referendum cially at the regional level. of June 03 has been a major source The expert meetings could not play of disruption for the project4. In a context where decisions are tak- the role of forum for developing new en by a centre in top-down and non- ideas for reform. On one hand the The time factor was in this situation participatory way, reaching the right margin for reform was very tight, important also from another perspec- political personnel is fundamental. The and on the other the external expert tive. Originally planned for 12 project tried to multiply its chances inputs from other organisation such months5, the project could not ab- by using three different platforms for as the UI came after the meetings sorb the «shock» of the disruption discussions. In a situation where me- had stopped. caused by the referendum. Given dia7 seem to play a secondary role the fluidity of the environment, the The two other platforms (PDF and in forming the opinion of the elite, need for establishing trustful relations study tour) could have plaid an inter- the project put the development of with the government, political actors esting role in enlarging the debate cooperation with media as a second and other international organisations to a more political public if the condi- priority. in order to discuss sensitive issues, a tions would have allowed to continu- 6 period of 18 to 24 months for 4 Which also shows that when the groups in ing with their implementation. In gen- project implementation would have power are dealing with the consolidation of eral the four instruments of the been more appropriate. their position all the rest becomes of secundary project (PDF, study tour, expert importance. meetings and research) have a lot In a context that lacked transparen- 5 Then extended to 15 months in order to of potential though they demand an cy, the project adopted an approach allowing phasing out and completion of the on- important amount of internal coordi- of a «pilot or learning initiative», try- going activities such as research and publica- nation and risk to be affected by ing to adapt to a changing situation. tions. changes in the environment (as it This approach has demanded from 6 At the time of project approval, the donor happened in our case). the local project partners, CIMERA could legally committ resources for more than and from the donor an important in- 12 months. The results of three out of the four vestment in terms of communication instruments depend on the availabil- 7 Though according to certain analysts, in the and flexibility. case of the press, the number of copies sold is ity of well-prepared and competent not a good indicator of the public reached by a publication. Newspapers seem to be read (and discussed) in a group. More research would be needed in this sector...... FOREWORD 7

moderators able to facilitate the dis- the results of the research sponsored by Freizer and Abdullaev on the cussion platforms in a local language. by the project8. Too often reports issue of local governance that we developed within the frame of inter- think are complementary to the The study tour is an interesting in- nationally supported projects are not project’s research reports. In a last strument to help breaking down bar- shared with a larger public. paper I will try to present my own riers of mistrust and allowing the dis- analysis of some aspects of the Tajik cussion to take place in an environ- The report of Aliev deals with the political situation and of the perspec- ment outside the usual constraints of legal and institutional perspective of tives for the future. (political) life. On the other hand, it the relations between centre and can bring the expected results only regions, the papers by Avezov and At the end of these few pages I if inserted in a longer-term process. Boymatov try to illustrate these re- would like to express my deepest lations from the budget /fiscal and thanks to all those who made this The project’s instruments and expe- economic perspective (using the project possible and supported it. riences are relevant for similar work case of the economic relations of Special thanks go to Jean-Nicolas Bit- in Tajikistan or other countries with Sughd Oblast). ter at the PDIV, to Parviz Moullojan- similar situation though the issue of ov at the Public Committee for Dem- the interest in reform from the ac- The report by Olimova is a first-hand ocratic Processes in Dushanbe and tor’s perspective is as always essen- research that presents the percep- at all his team, to Gulya Nazarova at tial for the success of political initia- tions of «regionalism» by established the Tajik Centre for Citizenship Edu- tives. In our case, the interest of the political and social leaders and by a cation, to Gisela Nauk at the UN Of- central authorities seems to be more group of university students. As for fice for Peace-building in Dushanbe related to the possibility of access- the article by Dudoignon, it consti- (UNTOP), to Arne Seifert and ing WB lines than to the rec- tutes the results of a four months Stephane Dudoignon, to Cathrine ognition that another type of rela- work in Tajikistan looking at the log- Widrig at the Federalism Institute in tion between centre and regions ics of the Tajik political system as it Fribourg, to Andre Loersch at CI- would be beneficial for the country. has been working since the signa- ture of the peace agreement be- MERA and to the team of the in tween the Rahmonov government Dushanbe. Publishing the Research Results and the then United Tajik Opposition. luigi De Martio,

At the end of almost 15 months Moreover, we also have added to CIMERA work, we have decided to publish the present publication two papers

8 A sister publication exists in Russian. 8 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Current Local Government Policy Situation in Tajikistan ...... Abdullaev Kamoludin Independent Scholar, Tajikistan

The emergence of independent Tajiki- sence of free competition for lead- upwards, avlod would give its loyal- stan out of the USSR is one of the ership positions, cause disproportion ty to region-based groupings, then most painful state building attempts in terms of distribution of power to local ruler and/or monarch. For of modern Central Asian history. Dur- among regions. The control of the generations, this avlod system pro- ing last twelve years, this country official central government is unsta- vided survival, autonomy, and adapt- has experienced bloody civil war, the ble. In result sub-national loyalties and ability to its members, serving tradi- UN-sponsored reconciliation, return- foreign countries exert great influ- tionalism and sustainability of the so- ing of opposition and Islamic fight- ence. ciety. Yet avlod loyalties had some- ers, and re-distribution of power. times questioned ultimate ruler’s pow- This paper briefly evaluates the local Born in crisis and chaos, the current er and authority, the representative government policy situation in Tajiki- Tajikistan’s political system assimilat- government and the concept of pop- stan. It argues that although current ed deep seated traditional political ular sovereignty, are not among political system of Tajikistan prevents loyalties, Soviet standards and recent dominant features in Tajik political effective political mobilization and rational-legal requirements. Beyond culture. In the Soviet era (1917- good governance, there is a poor the facade of Western patterned 1991) the avlod system was consid- ground for optimism. During last legal arrangements, in Tajikistan hides erably eroded, yet existed as a par- twelve years gained far richer a remarkable blend of secular and allel - to a quasi-national government experience then other Central Asian traditional features that can poorly - system of power. Exactly this com- nations. Hopefully, political learning connect civil and political society, munity-oriented identity and clan to pay its crucial role in the strength- promote the perceived interests of network determined political loyalty ening of local self-government over individuals and different solidarity during the civil war in 1992-1993 and time. groups. Quasi-democratic rule is be- later. ing built on a highly fragmented soci- The totality of political power and ety with yet declared, but unabled command over resources in Tajiki- Traditional Institutions protection of civil liberties. This foun- stan belongs to a limited number of of Power and Civil Society dation feeds growing violence, and ruling elites who run governmental corruption in society and govern- The basic unit of traditionally seden- and legal institutions, as well as econ- ment. The instability of political sys- tary Tajik society and dominant insti- omy to serve their private interests. tem has been worsening by a se- tution of power was avlod - an as- Current Tajik power structures are vere economic crisis that discredits cent patriarchal extended family that rooted in a regionally-balanced coa- the present regime. Non-inclusive sometimes can be developed into a lition between capital-based elites character of the government, ab- clan based on partilineage. Further, with the president on the top- who ...... CURRENT...... LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICY SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN 9

controlled the state apparatus - and (a group of nohiyas and three nomically advanced province local power holders. This personified veloyats): in Tajikistan. Sughd’s territory patron-client connection provided the is 26,100 square kilometers, 1. Nohiyas of Republican illusion that links between local com- and the population in 1999 Control (NRC) Nohyiahoi munities and the government exist- stood at 1,870,000 (includ- Tobei Jumhuri situated in ed. In fact, the civil society has al- ing 531,100 urban dwellers), central part of the country ways been disconnected from poli- mainly Tajiks, with an Uzbek with Dushanbe as its center tics in Tajikistan, allowing political elites minority of around 30 per- and including the Qarategin to use and corrupt traditional avlod/ cent. Sughd includes 14 nohi- valley, and the clan social structures and safety net- yas, 8 towns of provincial sig- area and the Hisar valley. It work. These kinds of alliances will in- nificance and 20 settlements. has 13 nohiyas (districts), 4 evitably lead to a type of nation build- Surrounded by towns of republican signifi- ing that is characterized by a weak and Kyrgyzstan, the province cance, 8 settlements and 91 and corruptive state without civil so- is separated from the rest of rural jamoats (village centers). ciety, political parties, and free mar- the country by the mountain The NRC stretches over ket. ranges of , Zarafs- 28,000 square kilometers. As hon and . The Trans-Tajik of January 2002 the total Railway -Dushan- population of the NRC stood Administrative Structure be runs through Uzbekistan, at 1,900,000 (with 174,700 connecting the province with The territory of Tajikistan is divided urban population), including central and southern Tajiki- in a descending hierarchy into: the capital Dushanbe stan. Sughd’s economic veloyats ( or (562,000). Unlike veloyats, weight facilitated its political in Russian), the NRC is not united admin- prominence in the republic. istratively. Each nohiya is di- nohiyas (districts or rayons in Traditionally representatives rectly subordinate to the Cen- Russian), from Leninobod headed the tral government in Dushanbe. Communist Party of Tajikistan. towns of republican signifi- Four NRC municipalities are Rahmon Nabiev was the last cance, administrated separately by Leninobodi to lead Tajikistan, city administrations: Dushan- towns of provincial signifi- until September 1992 when be, (former Kofarni- cance, he was forced to resign by hon), Rogun and . towns of district significance, opposition. From 1991 to 2. Sughd (former Leninabad) 1998 Sughd was considered settlements (or posioloks, in veloyat with Khujand city as as an aspirant for indepen- Russian), and its center. Sughd covers the dence, even secession from qyshloqs (villages) Zerafshan valley and western the rest of Tajikistan. Howev- part of the Ferghana valley. er, these trends have weak- Administratively Tajikistan is present- Sughd, also known as North- ened after the defeat of the ly divided into four territorial regions ern Tajikistan, is the most eco- 10 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Colonel Khudoberdiev’s anti- 42 rural jamoats. The majori- 4. Khatlon Veloyat. This south- governmental and pro-Uzbek ty of the population belongs western province is the most mutiny in 1998. Imposed by to the Ismaili branch of , populated part of Tajikistan. Islam Karimov restrictions to and follows Aga Khan. The It was formed at the end of the movements of the Tajik MBAV also contains compact 1992 after the merging of citizens to Uzbekistan and the pockets of Tajik Sunni popu- and of the Tajik-Uzbek lation in the three nohiyas of veloyats. Its territory is 24, border have also contributed Darvoz, Vanch and Ishkash- 600 square kilometers, and into decline of the pro-Uzbek im. Six percent of the MBAV population in 2002 stood at feeling all over Tajikistan. In population is Sunni Kyrgyz liv- 2, 151, 000 (401,400 ur- result, the integration of Tajik ing in . Inhabitants of ban). Khatlon is the country’s North into the country’s eco- Badakhshon speak Shughni, most ethnically diverse prov- nomic and political environ- Rushani, Yazgulami, Wakhi ince. It is populated by Tajiks ment is growing. Neverthe- and other dialects of the East- (Kulabis, Gharmis, Badahksho- less some frustration concern- ern Iranian languages, distinct nis, Leninabadis), ing the decline of political in- from West Iranian Tajiki-Far- (from Ferghana valley and fluence of the North in cen- si, but use Tajik as their inter- local tribes), Tajik-and Uzbek- tral government in compari- communal and state language. speaking Arabs, as well as son with its economic power The MBAV is the least eco- Russian, , etc. The prov- remains among Northern nomically developed region ince composed of 24 nohiyas, elites. of the republic. Since 1925 five cities of provincial signif- 3. Mountainous Badakhshon when it was given autono- icance, one city of district sig- Autonomous Veloyat mous status, Tajik Badakhshon nificance, 18 settlements, and (MBAV). Veloyati Mukhtori depends on supplies brought 128 rural jamoats. This region Kuhistoni Badakhshon in in by two motor roads. Bada- had suffered the greatest Tajik (Gorno-Badkhshanskaya khshon possesses a distinct shock during the civil war in Avtonomnaya Oblast in Rus- socio-political and cultural iden- 1991-1997 caused by peo- sian). The MBAV is most geo- tity from the rest of Tajikistan. ple displacements, refuge graphically isolated part of the Following the collapse of the flows, inter-ethnic clashes and country. It covers a territory USSR, calls for Badakhshon’s mass killings. Since 1993, of 63,700 square kilometers independence from Tajikistan there has been a wide-spread and accounts for 44.5 per- heightened. Since he second opinion in Tajikistan that Ku- cent of Tajikistan’s territory part of the 1990s, however, lob - the native region of the but only three percent of its this separatist tendency has acting president enjoys par- population (206,000). fallen. Currently, the Badakhs- ticular attention of the capi- MBAV’s center is the city of honi elites acknowledged their tal. However, seemingly, the ; the province con- fidelity to Dushanbe and the expectations of the “victori- sists of 5 nohiyas, one city and Tajik nation-building project. ous” Kulob were not satisfied, ...... CURRENT...... LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICY SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN 11

as the North appeared to both (!) executive (as a head of hu- Local grass root activity below ja- maintain a higher economic kumat) and representative (as a chair- moats (mahalla councils etc.) is not position. person of Majlis) authority. As high covered by legislation. The mahalla administrator, the president has ex- does not have administrative func- The Tajik war was not a primitive war clusive authority to appoint heads tions. In some regions mahallas co- of ethnic and regional groups. Rath- (chairpersons) of veloyats (provinc- operate closely with state institutions, er, this was a war of regional politi- es), nohiyas (regions), and towns, and sometimes even merge with lo- cal entrepreneurs and newborn “field thus providing for a strong vertical cal state bodies. In many cases, chair- commanders” who succeeded to of the executive, and, in fact, rep- persons of mahalla receive salary various degrees in securing popular resentative powers. from hukumat. support in respective areas. Today there is almost zero open expres- In 1994-1996 the former villages sion of antagonism between com- Soviets have been replaced by ja- Problems and Needs Assessment munities of different regions and eth- moats (groups of neighborhoods), Within existing legal framework, lo- no-confessional origin. Yet some ex- mahallahs (local communities) and cal government serves as a reliable perts argue that the Tajik peace is a their leadership. Each nohiya is sub- agent of central government, respon- result of the short-term balance of divided into jamoats. A jamoat there- sible for the social and economic interests of sub-national leaders and after, comprises a varying number development of the region, realiza- wartime grievances and revenge of kolkhozes (collective farms) and tion of the Constitution, laws, and impulses soon or later could cause a sovkhozes (farms based on state acts of Majlisi Oli and the president. new war. form of ownership), which are made To a lesser extent, it desires to en- up of several qyshloqs (villages) or courage political education, partici- Local Government Structure smaller villages (deha in Tajik) each. pation, assessing needs and protec- tion local interests. There is an ur- Jamoats are rural self-governing or- The local representative authority in gent need, therefore, to help local ganizations arranged on a territorial regions, towns, and districts is the government to build relationships with basis. They derive their financial re- Majlis (assembly) of people’s depu- the center not in terms of client-pa- sources from public budget funds al- ties, which is chaired by the chair- tron politics, but in terms of respon- located by town, regional Majlises person. In Tajikistan chairperson of sible partnership of free democratic and donations. According to the province, district, and town is a key institutions. Unfortunately, yet Tajik «Law on Local Self-government in element of local government, and society has maintained the strong Towns and Villages» passed in De- president’s main client. The province, sense of communal identity, local cember 1994, jamoats have a wide town and nohiya have a local branch communities remain politically pas- of the hukumat (government) which range of competencies and duties. sive. Tajikistan rural communities is the central administration. Execu- They adopt decisions on current is- failed to develop and support tradi- tive and representative powers in all sues by open vote. The chairperson tions of participatory politics. these locations are vested in the of jamoat is selected by the chair- Strengthening of jamoats and mahal- chairperson of hukumat. According person of the town or nohiya and las as rural self-governing bodies to the constitution, chairperson heads approved by the jamoat. should be in the center of the re- 12 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

form of the local government. Tradi- ber1991 led to the struggle of the Party got only 2, 1 per cent. Simul- tional institutions of power should opposition coalition of Islamic groups taneously, a bi-cameral parliament serve as a counterbalance to the coupled with newborn secular dem- replaced the national uni-cameral personified power of central and re- ocratic movements versus old Sovi- parliament. Since March 2000, the gional leaders who habitually corrupt et elites. Debates turned into open Majlisi Oli consists of two chambers: these communal structures to pro- armed confrontation in 1992. Politi- Majlisi Namoyandagon (assembly of mote their individual and group in- cal antagonism pro and contra com- representatives, or lower chamber) terests. These traditional institutes and munism was gradually overpowered and Majlisi Melli (national assembly, networks, long-lasted erosion not- by the region-based group discord. which acts as the upper chamber or withstanding, are likely to remain In November 1992, a government senate). Majlisi Namoyandagon con- central to Tajik politics. Such issues led by Emomali Rakhmonov had re- sists of 63 members elected direct- as role of communities and govern- gained control, backed by and ly in a half-mixed basis (65 % as sin- ment in human rights protection, tra- Uzbekistan. In November 1994, gle member district candidates and ditional institutes of power and their Emomali Rakhmonov (by this time a 35 % according to party lists), for a role in civil society, partnership with chairman of parliament) was elected five-year term. The upper house - mahallas and hukumats, reform of the . Current Con- Majlisi Melli is elected indirectly for a legislative base of local government, stitution of the Republic of Tajikistan five-year term and consists of 33 training of chairpersons of mahallas was adopted on 6 November 1994 members, elected by local majlises in the area of leadership, social part- after a nation-wide referendum. It (parliaments). The remaining eight nership and market economy should replaced the Soviet Constitution that deputies of Majlisi Melli are appoint- be given special attention. Creation had been in effect since 1978 and ed by the President. These election and supporting of accountable and amended after independence. Ac- laws, codifies simultaneous plurality effective Tajik institutions of local self- cording to it Tajikistan is a sovereign, and proportional representation rac- democratic, law-governed, secular, governance to promote participatory es. The aim of lawmakers here was and unitary state with separated ex- democracy as well as traditional con- to undermine traditional patron-client ecutive, legislative, and judicial pow- cepts of self-help, volunteerism, and networks and provide for presiden- ers. The supreme legislative body, a community mobilization is crucial for tial system balanced by strong legis- parliament, is Majlisi Oli (Supreme sustainable social and economic de- lature. However, growing presiden- Council) of the Republic of Tajikistan. velopment in Tajikistan. tial authority challenges the autono- Amendments to the Constitution, my of legislature from executive adopted in general referendum on System of Power: Towards Strong power. The post of prime minister is 26 September 1999, sanctioned that Presidency and Weak Institutions rather nominal as according to the the president is elected directly for Constitution, the president is both a Tajikistan, following other USSR re- one seven-year term (instead of head of the state and the govern- publics’ example adopted declara- maximum of two five-year terms). ment. tion of state independence and de- In November 1999 presidential elec- clared a presidential system of gov- tions, Emomali Rakhmonov won 96, Most of political power is concen- ernment in September 1991. The 91 per cent of votes, while his op- trated in the presidential office, which presidential election of Novem- ponent from the Islamic Renaissance during last four years has consider- ...... CURRENT...... LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICY SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN 13

ably widened its authority and turned ministries, plus the General Prosecu- lamists have been closely attached into a sort of “super government”. tor Office, Council of Justice, Com- to ethnic nationalism, and to the Tajik This process of the shift of execu- mittee on Radio and TV, the Nation- state building project, since the first tive power from the cabinet to the al University, and other key positions. days of independence. In 1991- presidential office has started after The mayor of Dushanbe and chair- 1997 they had allied with the official the General Peace Agreement of man of Majlisi Melli, the official num- clergy, nationalist-minded secular 1997, according to which the Unit- ber two in Tajikistan, is also from democrats and the country’s non- ed Tajik Opposition was given a 30% Kulob. Sunni (Ismaili) minority. Likewise, they quota in the governing structures. In could form coalitions with secular that time representatives of the op- forces during the next parliamentary Multipartism? position filled mostly governmental and presidential elections (in 2005 and posts, not presidential office. The lat- In the 1990s eleven parties (in addi- 2006). The firm pressure of the Gen- ter has remained beyond of any kind tion to existed previously Commu- eral Peace Accord’s international of control from the side of parlia- nist party of Tajikistan) were formed sponsors forced the Government to ment. The Office of State Finance in Tajikistan. As of autumn 2003, six legalize the IRP, and accept a 30% Control under the president of Tajiki- political parties were registered in power sharing agreement with the stan, formed in January 2001 as- Tajikistan. In addition to the most in- IRP. However, this imposed power- fluential presidential People’s Demo- sumed exclusive responsibility to sharing arrangement has not result- cratic Party (PDP), the Islamic Re- control all finances , state property, ed in the formation of the coalition naissance Party (IRP), Democratic and money flows (including foreign government and institutionalization of Party (DP), Communist Party (CP), and humanitarian aid), tasks opposition. Most of United Tajik Socialist Party (SP) and Social Demo- traditionally performed by the Minis- Opposition (UTO) nominees, joined cratic Party (SDP) operate. Tajikistan try of Finance. In result, the presi- to the party of power as soon as differentiates itself from other CIS they took governmental posts. Some dential office increased its size and countries as the right to form a party members of the Government were responsibilities, even duplicating the on the basis of religious ideology is still opposite to the IRP’s inclusion and structure of the cabinet of ministries. enshrined in the Constitution. This is, assert that the party’s members are In addition, the judiciary was becom- however, rather confusing as secu- closely linked to terrorists and Islam- ing more open to influence by the larism remains principal point of the ic extremists. Escalation of persecu- presidential office as indicated in the acting Constitution. tion of IRP members and supporters in the scope of sphere of the Coun- and excluding them from legal polit- cil of Justice. Through this Council, The most active oppositional political ical process could lead to a rapid rad- the president consumes exclusive party in Tajikistan is the IRP. Born from icalization of Tajikistan’s political Is- power to nominate and control a clandestine militant religious move- lam and transformation of IRP back courts. Finally, as a leader of the most ment in the 1970s, today’s IRP tries to militant religious movement. powerful regional grouping of Kulo- to survive in the modern world of bis, the president enjoys mighty sup- participatory politics. IRP has never The Communist Party of Tajikistan port of regional elite and militaries. openly pleaded for an Islamic state. inherited a relatively developed So- Officials from Kulob fill four power Despite their Islamist ideals, Tajik Is- viet time administrative infrastructure 14 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

all over the country, considerable with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan be- ing control on the totality of non-state estate, and enjoyed the support of came frontline states in Operation actors. In result, the main beneficia- the part of Tajik masses dreaming Enduring Freedom. Tajikistanis hoped ries of the war on terror are the cen- about restoration of the USSR. How- that along with US assistance and at- tral government, not localities and ever, the CP having no patrimonial traction of foreign investment, their civil society actors. Sadly, the US in- guardianship from outside patrons, country could move towards the volvement indirectly gave impetus and an effective support from re- opening of political process, liberal- to anti-democratic tendencies. Par- gional elites and armed structures, ization, fighting corruption, drug traf- ticularly, not capable to resolve prob- almost lost mass-elite linkages and ficking, etc. Their expectations were lems arising from Islamist mobilization real influence upon politics. met partially. Indeed the US military and driven by Soviet-time authori- presence has stopped activities of tarian impulses the Tajik government Generally, all parties lack institution- militant Islamists, like the Islamic is hardening its position vis-a-vis Is- alized ties between voters, leaders, Movement of Uzbekistan. It also lamists and seeking to strengthen its candidates, and activists. They are contributed in combating drug traf- control over the clergy and elitist in character, have an amor- ficking along the Tajik-Afghan bor- .1 phous mass base, and lack solid in- der. Together with this there were frastructure. Both pro-governmental The main threat to the Central Asian other more negative consequences and opposition parties poorly articu- security however is not in radicaliza- of the US involvement in Central late issue-based political programs or tion of Muslim policies and terrorism Asia. platforms. Despite the relative suc- but in general failure of political and cess of the Tajik peace process, Since the civil war of 1992-1997 economic transformation, non-inclu- political dialogue yet has not become Tajikistan has a negative image of an sive government and widespread a normal attribute of Tajikistan’s po- highly unstable region with a gov- corruption. The lack of cooperation litical reality. In general, all political ernment unable to rule the country between Central Asian governments parties remain outside of the real effectively. For that reason despite and rapid militarization of the region political process. The President pre- its geographical closeness to Afghan- further deteriorates the situation. fers contracting and patronage of real istan, the US did not pay much at- and potential opponents to direct tention to Tajikistan (comparing to The June 2003 Referendum competition and open debate. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). To at- and its Significance tract the US interest Tajikistan partic- ularly assigned itself the task to com- The national referendum held in June War on Terror and its plete the consolidation of state au- 2003 obtained popular support for a Ambivalent Implications thority by spreading executive pres- package of 56 Constitutional amend- In the aftermath of the September idential power in all regions and tak- ments. Amongst these is an amend- 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade ment of Article 65 of the Constitu- Center and the Pentagon, Tajikistan tion, which previously limited the 1 In July 2002 the president of Tajikistan during has officially declared it will cooper- President to one seven year term in his visit to (Sughd) accused IRP in connec- ate with the US-led campaign to com- office. Three (DP, SDP and IRP) out tion with Al-Qaeda terrorists. Subsequent state- bat terrorism. Soon Tajikistan together lead de-registration of mosques and re-attes- of six political parties expressed, in tation of imams led to the firing of tens of imams and refusing to grant new licenses to several mosques...... CURRENT...... LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICY SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN 15

different ways, their objections with Some may think that Tajikistan merely exist in Tajikistan. This political and regard of the referendum. The Dem- followed suit of some of CIS leaders regional elite’s fragmentation would ocratic Party of Tajikistan had boy- that legally guaranteed their life-time continually weaken the existing Tajik cotted the referendum totally. While non-alternative leadership. Howev- presidency. IRP, the most powerful opposition er, ensuring the succession of pow- Another factor undermining Rakh- party, having cautiously disagreed er that may occur in Tajikistan would monov’s presidency is his failure to with the idea of referendum refrained not stabilize the situation and lead to meet challenges of a rapidly chang- from boycotting and . The the strong presidential power. Three ing world. The current government Social Democratic Party hoped till the main reasons could confirm this pre- of Tajikistan lacks autonomy and re- last moment that Parliament will diction - the first is the relatively spect in the international sphere. The change its decision and accept a weak (comparing to other Central persistent and non-effective depen- SDP’s proposal to return to public Asian states) national cohesion, elite’s dence on Russia comes in addition discussing of the amendments. These fragmentation on domestic level and to the failure of privatization and re- objections and constructive propos- lack of autonomy in international are- structuring of economy, growing als, however have not been taken na. The IRP, which de facto sup- poverty and wide-spread corrup- into account by the government. Si- ported Rakhmonov in June 2003, re- tion. Apparently the current gov- lent disagreement of UN and OSCE mains out of governmental control ernment opted for balancing be- and cautious objection of domestic and it may at any moment change tween Russia and USA interest in opposition notwithstanding, a 51- its position and become a real oppo- maintaining minimum security pres- year Emomali Rakhmonov has sition. Second, the growing secular ence of both actors in this part of cleaned a path for another two sev- opposition (DPT and SDPT) whose . This would allow act- en-year presidential terms after the opinion has been explicitly ignored ing president to keep lowest level expiration of his recent term in 2006. has nothing to do but to take in a of required Western legitimacy. In Tajikistan few doubt that Rakh- post-June Tajikistan a hard opposition Surely this minimalist formula would monov, having in his command pow- stance. In addition to the above po- not be able to ensure sustainable erful administrative recourse, may litical competition, inter-regional development and attract significant succeed in staying in power till 2020. grievances have never seized to inflow of investments. 16 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Addendum Table 1 Tajikistan’s administrative structure

TTyerritory NNfumberofNNfumberofNfNumberofNfNumberofRlRural PnPopulation PPerovince thousand noniyastownssettlementsjamoatsvillages thousands km2

NNCRC 13 5 1 91 1225 1.900 28.6

SdSughd 14 10 20 93 654 1.870 25.4

MMVBAV 7 1 0 42 396 206 64.22

KnKhatlon 24 7 17 130 1528 2.151 24.8

TTLOTAL 58 23 47 256 2803 6.127 143.1

Tajikistan’s executive power at the local level

Central Government

Hukumats of MBAV, Khatlon, Sughd veloyats, Hukumats of Nohiyas of Republican Control and city of Dushanbe (NRC)

Hukumats of towns, nohiyas, districts of Dushanbe Jamoats

Jamoats ...... TAJIKISTAN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: A POTENTIAL...... BRIDGE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY? 17

Tajikistan local self-governance: a potential bridge between government and civil society? ...... Sabine Freizer Centre for Civil Society at the School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), England

Introduction ployment, social disruption, loss of fields of infrastructure development, revenue and lack of energy sources housing, communal activities, service Five years after the signing of the and communication links. Localities provision and other areas of commu- Tajik Peace Agreement, Tajikistan is have been left mainly on their own, nity and economic life. Empirical evi- immersed in a process of political, to cope with the situation in a most dence reveals shortcomings in the social and economic reform which basic way, seeking piecemeal solu- leadership of existing institutions of goes to the heart of the country’s tions to structural problems. Howev- local self-governance in Tajikistan, their system of government. The State er as social, political, and economic degree of representativeness and ac- faces the challenge of establishing conditions have begun to gradually countability, competencies and abili- mechanisms to ensure good gover- improve, the question of how to for- ty to collect resources. Most signifi- nance, decentralization and increased malize the competencies of institutions cantly experience suggests that the accountability. of local self-government has come to de-jure institution of local self-govern- The Constitution of the Republic of the fore. The concept of local self- ment - the jamoat - is less a mecha- Tajikistan, passed in November 1994, governance is not new in former com- nism of self-government then a pure- and a series of subsequent laws lay munist regimes; and it was previous- ly governmental form. At the com- the foundations for the country’s cur- ly heralded during Khrushchev’s re- munity level a host of other tradi- rent governing institutions. However forms. Today local self-government tional and new institutions function this reform process dealt mainly with has become a popular notion in de- more effectively as local self-gov- higher echelons of government. Eight velopment fields, where it is being ernment entities. Since 1997 sever- years later one of the fundamental applied in a host of countries from al internationally funded projects, questions policy makers and legisla- to Costa Rica. In Tajikistan a de- adopting different approaches, have tors face, is how to further encour- facto tradition of local self-governance attempted to strengthen local self- age decentralization and regulate the exists, which was partly superseded government. The most substantial of lowest levels of governmental author- by socialist institutions, but regained these efforts was initiated by the Aga ity. Since 1991, an armed conflict, legitimacy during 1994 legislative re- Khan Foundation (AKF) village orga- loss of contacts and trade with the forms. For the purpose of this paper, nization program. The AKF’s short- , and the rapid plunge of local self-governance is defined as a comings and successes provide use- the country’s economic production mechanism enabling citizens to decide ful lessons to be integrated into Tajiki- and living standards, have left all Tajik about their common interests, and stan’s conceptualization of local self- localities suffering deeply from unem- satisfy their common needs, in the government. 18 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Theoretical and legal bases for Self-government in Towns and Vil- ry, as well as the most important Tajikistan local self-government lages passed in December 1994. In problems directly touching the inter- this law, local self-governance is de- ests of the population.» (Article 1) Local self-governance is historically scribed as «the system of organiz- The lists of tasks assigned to the ja- ingrained in Tajik society and gov- ing public activities to address issues moat are extensive and include many erning practice. Mahallas are a his- of local importance autonomously that may be considered as falling torical example of effective Tajik lo- and at their own discretion, directly within governmental competency. cal self-governance. Mahallas brought or indirectly, in accordance with the The jamoat should thus organize im- people living on the same territory legislation of Republic of Tajikistan. plementation of the Constitution, leg- together on a voluntary basis, along Local self-governments resolve is- islation, acts of the president, Parlia- interest lines based on profession or sues within their competence direct- ment or the government of Tajiki- good neighborliness. They created ly or through their representatives.» stan as well as local government a forum where local values, rules of (Preamble) Jamoats were set up on decisions. It also assists government behavior, and common interests a territorial basis, and generally took bodies in tax collection, and in the were defined, through which group over the jurisdiction of the former notification of reservists and recruits interests were protected and joint village councils. Local self-govern- about their call to military service. actions organized. Tea-houses ment was clearly set up as separate (Article 19) (Chaihana) served as the meeting and distinct from other forms of gov- point for mahalla members. Though ernment, whose competencies were mahallas had limited powers and au- 2. The absence of any legal defined under the Law on Local thority to oppose themselves to basis for the work of mahallas Governing Bodies. Significantly the state decisions, mahallas could lob- Though mahallas have existed for legal basis for local self-government by neighborhood interests. Mahallas centuries as a traditional form of lo- institutions in rural areas was provid- had some resources collected from cal self-governance, when the legis- ed for, while no such institutions were the voluntary contribution of people lation on local self-governance was envisioned for cities. In 2002 some belonging to them. drafted in 1994, mahallas were not 350 jamoats existed on the territory included. This is particularly surprising of Tajikistan. as during the Soviet era, though 1. The concept of Jamoats The legislation on Local Self-gover- mahallas as a representation of ur- According to 1994 Tajik nance in Towns and Villages provides ban self-organization weakened sig- legislation jamoats with a large range of com- nificantly, they gained new influence The concept of local self-government petencies and duties. Fundamental- in rural areas. In urban areas many as it is used today in Tajikistan was ly, as an institution of local self-gov- traditional forms of civic organization enshrined in the 1994 Constitution. ernance, jamoats assist «in the fulfill- - such as the mahallas - were usurped According to the Constitution, a ja- ment of the rights of citizens to par- by communist-style social organiza- moat is defined as an institution of ticipate in the management of the tions. But in rural communities, the self-government in towns and villag- activities of the state and society, communist system was much less es. The framework for their authori- and unites them to solve social and successful in replacing and eradicat- ty is set forth in the Law on Local economic problems on their territo- ing traditional structures. Therefore ...... TAJIKISTAN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: A POTENTIAL...... BRIDGE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY? 19

in the 1980s a wide range of village struction of the homes of widows clubs, with members of Tajik Gov- level institutions - mahallas, shura ak- and the elderly. Though this practice ernment, jamoats, political parties sakal - with their different forms of continues to exist in Tajikistan, accord- and NGOs, organized by the Unit- leadership - rais mahalla, rais chaiha- ing to a survey carried out in the NGO ed Nations Tajikistan Office of na, sardor, rohbar - continued to func- ASTI in Sughd Oblast, a large major- Peace-building (UNTOP) and the tion. In the Karetegin Valley during ity of mahallas did not organize a National Association of Tajik Political the 1980s the population of villages hashar between 2000-2002.2 In fact Scientists in 2001 and 2002. The gathered together to make decisions though mahallas continue to play a clubs were held throughout the concerning the construction of pub- significant role in the national psyche country, and provided an open form lic buildings - schools, mosques, of Tajikistan, since the end of the civil for discussions on jamoats’ shortcom- teahouses (chaihana), libraries. They war, they are increasingly passive and ings and advantages. Three main raised funds through benevolent con- risk withering away. areas of weakness were defined. tributions, carried out work through They concern leadership, represen- Tajikistan legislation defines local self- voluntary labor (hashar), secured the tation and participation in local self- governance as «a system of orga- provision of assistance from the col- government; undefined competen- nizing public activities to address is- lective farm and established their cies and tasks of jamoats; and re- sues of local importance autono- own supervising bodies to ensure source deficits. mously.» Though a strong tradition that the projects were carried out.1 of local self-governance exists in Although traditional rural institutions Tajikistan, as does a legal basis for 1. Local self-government are not defined by law, as local self- the functioning of local self-gover- leadership and representativeness government structures they carry nance entities, a large percentage out many self-governing tasks. Tra- of what in practice represents local Though jamoats are termed local self- ditionally, mahallas are governed by self-governance - the work of ma- government bodies, the executive a council of elders (shura aksakal), hallas - is not regulated or legally powers in the jamoat are controlled which helps resolve social problems recognized. from above. The chairperson of the and conflicts within the community. jamoat is selected by the govern- Mahalla committees facilitate the or- ment (hukumat) chairman of the city Local self-governance in practice: ganization of key events in the lives or region, and approved by the ja- problems and opportunities of local citizens: births, marriages and moat council for a five-year term. burials. Mahallas help solve conflicts The problems and challenges which The chairperson is responsible for within families and between neigh- institutions of local self-government nominating his/her own deputy, sec- bors, thus helping build social cohe- face in Tajikistan, were the topics retary, and committee - though in sion and maintaining peace and uni- of a series of political discussion practice the hukumat may also influ- ty. Mahalla committees can also ini- ence this selection. Local participa- tion in the selection of the chairper- tiate community work through hashar 1 Information collected in interviews in the Garm - for example, garbage collection, region in July, 2002 son and committee is nominally guar- anteed as all nominations must be ap- the cleaning of ditches, re- 2 Interview with Farrukh Tyuryaev, General Di- proved by the jamoat majilis. Jamo- habilitation of public buildings, recon- rector, Association of Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia, on 27 June, 2002 in Khojand. 20 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

at majlis representatives are ad-hoc moat majlis meetings not less than 2. Tasks and competencies appointees selected at the level of twice a year. These meetings are of the jamoat the mahalla, village, street... They attended by jamoat representatives The Law on Self-government in approve the jamoat chairman and who may be considered to be the Towns and Villages distinguishes be- staff nomination by a show of hands; lowest-level of citizen representa- tween the powers allocated to the rarely do jamoat representatives pro- tion. However as they are tempo- jamoat (powers of the bodies of self- pose alternative candidates (in this rary appointees, and meetings of management) and the to the jamoat case a closed vote may be orga- the jamoat representatives are rare, chairman. The jamoat majlis has eight nized). In practice the powers of their powers are limited. main responsibilities according to law majlis representatives are weak as Though jamoat committees and ja- (Article 14), while the chairman has the hukumat has the power to de- moat majlis by law unite citizens to twenty-seven (Article 19). The main cide when the elections will be held, solve economic and social problems role of the majlis is to pass the pro- and how many representatives are on their territory - in practice this is gram of activities and budget of the needed to hold a vote. The huku- rarely possible, due to the jamoats’ jamoat, hear the annual reports pre- mat’s influence over the selection of size. In 2002 356 jamoats functioned sented by the chairman, and moni- the jamoat chair may provide the with populations ranging from tor spending (Art. 14). In fact the jamoat with better access to higher 50,000 to 1,500. On average ja- jamoat is given few legal powers or levels of government, yet it clearly moats tended to represent some 6- means to fulfill its essential legal duty limits the jamoat’s accountability to 12,000 inhabitants, or since the of «organizing public activities to local citizens. country was made up of 3,200 vil- address issues of local importance.» Within the jamoat the majority of lages, cover about 10 villages. These responsibilities are under the powers are consolidated in the hands Many municipalities in Western Eu- competencies of the jamoat chair- of the chairman, and are only nom- rope are much smaller; in man who, «takes measures to im- inally delegated to members of the the average size of a municipality is prove the material and living condi- jamoat committee. The committees 5,430, in 7,120 and in Slove- tions of citizens, and can represent range in size, with an average of nia 10,360. The very size of most the interests of citizens in the bodies five to seven employees, depend- jamoats makes it difficult for com- of state authority» (Art. 19). Never- ing on the vastness and population mittee staff to have a firm under- theless according to the law, the of the territory. They receive a standing of local needs. As some chairman of the jamoat also repre- nominal salary from the government jamoat chairmen pointed out during sents the executive branch of local (approximately 25 somoni for the the political discussion clubs, they government and is thus engaged in chairman, and 10-18 somoni for the frequently have neither the funds a variety of tasks delegated to him others). The role of the committee to travel throughout the jamoat ter- by higher governmental authorities. members is to carry out the admin- ritory, nor the time. Consequently Though by law the jamoat chairman istrative tasks assigned to the jamo- the jamoat system therefore does and his staff have vast responsibili- at. Representation in the jamoat is not serve as an effective represen- ties and competencies, in practice guaranteed by the jamoat majilis. tative or participatory mechanism of they are unable to fulfill many of its The jamaot chairperson must call ja- government. tasks because of a lack of staff and ...... TAJIKISTAN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: A POTENTIAL...... BRIDGE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY? 21

resources. Instead jamoats appear or neighborly quarrels. Many citizens the budget lines that the higher lev- most frequently to divide their time approach the mahalla chair or his/ els of government have assigned. In between carrying out tasks of local her staff in the first instance, then many instances jamoat chairmen are government and addressing citizens’ the jamoat, and only afterwards turn unaware of how much money they complaints. In many instances, a large to the police or the courts. Mahallas have at their disposal and how much percentage of the jamoat’s efforts and jamoats therefore maintain a they have spent. Each district gov- are concentrated on revenue collec- higher degree of trust among the ernment determines how much fund- tion. According to the Nosiri Khisrav population then law enforcement ing it wishes to allocate to jamoats jamoat secretary, bodies. In many parts of Tajikistan and the sum may vary significantly there is a dearth of judges, and in- from region to region. «60-70% of the time of the adequate courts, thus jamoats help jamoat is used in the collec- Theoretically the strength of a jamo- fill an existing gap in judicial service tion of taxes on property, at lies in its ability to collect volun- provision. land, and transport and tary contributions from citizens, en- state duties/ fees. The jamo- terprises and other organizations at is responsible for insuring 3. Resources operating on its territory. Yet since that people pay on time, yet Like all other levels of government the end of the civil war few jamoats people have few monetary in Tajikistan since 1991, institutions have successfully collected revenues resources so it’s difficult for of local self-government suffer from from communities, or mobilized them them to pay. Because of this a lack of financial and material re- in hashar. Jamoats also benefit from we have little time to do sources. In addition, as they are not financial control over community anything else then go after legally part of the country’s govern- property, which may include means these people.» ing structure, jamoats do not have of transportation, equipment and oth- This particular jamoat estimated that official budgets or their own bank er facilities, public or social, which it collects approximately 3000 somo- accounts, but are dependent on lo- these institutions have built or pur- ni ($1000) a year. The degree to cal governmental financial depart- chased. They have broad rights to which institutions of local self-govern- ments. During the political discussion lease or use their property, as well ment are engaged in tax collection club meetings, jamoat chairmen not- as discretion over the use of the as- varies between localities, as legally ed that one of the main factors limit- sets. Nevertheless it is extremely Tax Authorities are responsible for ing their work is the lack of a clear difficult to determine to what extent tax collection, but may request as- mechanism regulating how they can jamoats take advantage of these sistance from jamoats. The second collect and employ funds. When resources. Two jamoats attending a main function of jamoats is to receive asked whether they regularly pre- political discussion club, in the Kara- citizens, examine complaints, regis- pared their own annual budgets, only tegin Valley, exemplified to what ter them and take appropriate mea- a small minority of the jamoat chair- extent revenue collection differs. In sures. Complaints may concern men responded affirmatively. Instead 2001 one jamoat located in the Jir- group problems - such as the use of they rely almost exclusively on city gital district collected 128,000 somo- water, land, and waste - or personal or district councils’ budget allocations, ni (approximately $40,000) while disputes - such as marriage, divorce and employ the funds according to another in the Darban district gath- 22 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

ered only 26,000 somoni. Both ja- Program (MSDSP) has been one of but rather based itself on existing in- moats have similar populations and the most successful externally fund- stitutions such as the mahallas and are in neighboring districts, but the ed community development shura aksakal. It also promoted tra- chairman in Jirgital collected some projects in Tajikistan. Since 1998 the ditional concepts of self-help, volun- $26,000 from producers on MSDSP has been supporting the teerism, and community mobilization his territory. He claims that he con- strengthening of local «village orga- (hashar, sadoka, maraka). Local citi- vinced the producers to offer these nizations» (VOs) with the goal of zens participating in VOs saw a di- funds as a voluntary contribution, and «mobilizing human, physical and fi- rect link between these entities and that he did not impose an indirect nancial resources to empower local traditional Tajik forms of village self- tax. However this example also re- villagers, give them greater owner- governance. During interviews car- veals how the lack of regulation con- ship of development activities and ried out with six VOs in the Karate- cerning jamoat revenue collection generate wealth.»3 From 1998- gin Valley during Summer 2002, com- and budgeting leaves room for a host 2002, the MSDSP became engaged munity members described how of distortions, inequalities and lost in 400 villages in Gorno-Badakshan «everything that we are doing now opportunities in resource manage- and 72 in the Karategin Valley. Dur- through the village organizations, we ment. 5 ing that time the MSDSP achieved used to do before.» As the VOs One of the greatest challenges for its immediate objective of ensuring are accepted as a continuation of institutions of local self-government the availability of enough food for more traditional forms of organizing, is the re-awakening amongst citizens the local population’s survival; and it they are clearly embedded in local of the former spirit of self-help, com- is now in the process of working with communities. munity participation and volunteer- communities to reach food self-suffi- As described above, though mahal- ism that used to exist, especially in ciency. It can be argued that the las and other traditional village enti- rural areas. Jamoat chairman are find- MSDSP’s VOs are a form of local ties play a significant role in the na- ing this to be an impressive obstacle self-governance because they are tional psyche of Tajikistan, since the to their work; local communities are representative bodies of households end of the civil war, they have be- passive and unwilling to organize or living in a given geographic locality, come passive and ineffectual. The participate in any form of communi- who voluntarily come together to goal of the VO program is thus to ty action. In this context local self- make decisions and undertake activ- reverse this trend. According to the government is top-driven, and be- ities to advance common interests MSDSP 2002-2007 Strategy: coming increasingly weak. What and improve community livelihoods.4 changes may be proposed to re- «During the Soviet period When the MSDSP initiated its VO verse this trend? village-level institutions program, it did not seek to create were sponsored by the entirely new community structures, government, but they had A future model of local neither the funding nor the self-government: MSDP village 3 MSDP Five Year Strategy 2002-2006, Khorog, skills and experience to organizations April 2002 (p.6) make long term plans and The Aga Khan Foundation, Mountain 4 A Charter for Village Organizations, MSDPS, generally had few respon- Societies Development and Support Khorog, February 2001 (p.4) sibilities. Lack of experience

5 Interviews carried out in 6 village organiza- tions in the Karategin Valley, July, 2002...... TAJIKISTAN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: A POTENTIAL...... BRIDGE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY? 23

in election procedures led mental structures often attend the to increase the livelihoods of all seg- to the selection of poorly elections, they do not play a role in ments of the village. The VO chair qualified people, and in the nomination of candidates. Unlike is responsible for articulating a de- practice, the institutions jamoat chairmen, village organization velopment vision for the village, only carried out instruc- heads are selected by direct suffrage, and communicating it with citizens, tions from above. Over the for a period of two years. While the donors, governmental officials, etc. last few years the MSDSP has VO leadership is responsible for the The primary role of VO meetings adopted the village institu- entity’s day-to-day activities and is to serve as a forum where mem- tions and has been working planning, it is not authorized to exe- bers can discuss needs, make pol- to transform them into cute decisions without consulting the icy decisions and agree on imple- structural and better led vil- community. Monthly the chair must mentation. Members also hear ac- lage organizations with the call for a general VO meeting where tivity reports, monitor spending, potential to play a dynam- projects are discussed and agreed and may hold leadership account- ic role in village level gov- upon. Within VO participatory deci- able. Members have the right to ernance and resources sion-making is employed; this direct initiate their own public activities and management.»6 form of democracy is possible be- to request support from the VO as cause VOs represent between 500 To improve the effectiveness of vil- a whole. When governmental offi- and 50 households, and cover a rel- lage structures, the MSDSP initiated cials wish to provide information, atively small territory. VO leadership efforts to support the development or to request something from the is more aware of local needs be- of democratic leadership, increased village community, jamoat authori- cause they are expressed directly participation and accountability, the ties participate in VO meetings - by citizens in the monthly meetings. acquisition of resources and their they do not directly delegate tasks The VO general gathering is consid- transparent management, and to the VO or its leadership. The VO ered to be the legitimate entity rep- project planning and development. chairmen are ultimately responsible resenting the community, through for insuring that members pay their which citizens carry out self-manage- dues. But since this is a voluntary 1. Village organization, leader ment. contribution that can be bestowed ship and citizens’ participation in cash or kind, and is usually col- Village Organizations are based on 2. Village organization tasks lected at the general monthly meet- the system of direct participatory ings - it does not require the same The main aim of Village Organiza- democracy. The leadership of MSD- kind of effort as jamoa’ tax collec- tions is to improve the management SP village organizations - including a tion. Examples in the Karategin of available resources - human, so- chair, deputy, bookkeeper and the Valley demonstrate that VO chair- cial, financial, natural and cultural - head of the women’s organization - men also facilitate social cohesion- is selected through open and fair elec- building, as citizens come to them 6 MSDP Five Year Strategy 2002-2006, Khorog, tions, with the participation of at least April 2002 (p.11) to advise and arbiter when there 80% of village households. While are problems within the family and representatives of official govern- between neighbors. 24 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

3. Village organization to earn money for the bread them- region have amassed a total of resources and funding selves. Now farmers start under- 72,316 somoni in membership dues standing that in order to have some- for the Village Development Funds. While Village Organizations carry out thing they have to work.»7 In July 2002, the total savings the many of the same tasks as jamoats, 72 village organizations had placed they may more readily access ex- One of the goals of the MSDSP pro- in their Village Development Funds ternal funding and local financial and gram is to help formalize VOs - es- 8 physical resources. According to the pecially in regards to the manage- equaled 174,874 somoni. MSDSP Regional Manager in the Ka- ment, spending and planning of the rategin Valley, 378 projects have use of resources. Since 2001, VOs Conclusions been completed since 1998. Twelve have been encouraged to apply a A fundamental questions which poli- main types of activities were imple- Village Development Planning Pro- cy makers and legislators engaged mented, including -plant- cess to regulate how they analyze in governance reform in Tajikistan ing, bird-farming, irrigating, infrastruc- existing assets, plan expenditures, face is: how can Tajik institutions of ture and micro-credit for women. collect resources, implement activi- local self government be supported VOs benefit from the MSDSP fund- ties, monitor and report. This pro- to lay the foundation for self-sustain- ing ranging from 30 to 70% of cess aims to assist all involved to in- ing social and political development? project costs. The financial injection crease their awareness about local In 2001 The Presidential Office of provided by the MSDSP to VOs in needs, resource allocation and bud- the Government of Tajikistan estab- 2001 in the Karategin Valley totaled geting - knowledge which jamoats, lished a committee to work on new 387,000 somoni. However, citizens who have no clear mechanism regu- also participate through voluntary lating how they can collect and em- draft legislation on institutions of lo- contributions - collected through ploy funds, sorely lack. VOs are also cal self-governance. According to monthly member fees or ad hoc provided with their own budget Rahmatillo Zoir, Legal Advisor to the donations - and through the provi- through the establishment of Village President of the RT, it will include sion of their labor. In 2001 in the Development Funds. These funds are several significant changes: for the Karategin Valley MSDSP estimated set up with a one-time contribution first time mahallas will be included as that VOs provided approximately by the MSDSP (generally between institutional form of local self-govern- 234,781 somoni towards the imple- 500-2000 somoni), and supplement- ment. While this will positively bring mentation of projects. Though the ed over time with VO member con- local self-governance closer to the infrastructure projects are generally tributions and other VO fund-raising people, it will also become impor- financed by the MSDSP as grants, in activities. Since the MSDSP program tant to delineate at this level the role the majority of the other projects started functioning in the Karategin of local self-government institutions were distributed as credits, which Valley in 1998, the 72 VOs in the and public associations - or NGOs. beneficiaries have to pay back in cash Several mahalla committees and

or kind. The aim of the credit sys- 7 Interview with MSDSP Regional Manager for MSDSP village organizations, with no tem is to ensure that «We do not the Karategin Valley, July, 2002 other regulating edict to refer to, have already registered as public give anything to anyone for free. We 8 Statistics from «Information about the savings want people to learn how to work, of VOs of ,» prepared by MSDSP, associations. dated 30.06.02 ...... TAJIKISTAN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: A POTENTIAL...... BRIDGE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY? 25

Lessons learned from past experi- malized as governmental institutions, zens in local decision-making may ence with jamoats and the MSDSP rather then self-government bodies, potentially increase popular partici- village organizations provides help- reforms in jamoats leadership, struc- pation. While deficits will continue as ful indications for Tajik policy makers ture, funding and working mecha- Tajikistan undergoes massive macro- and legislators. Jamoat representa- nisms are also needed. The jamoat economic reform, there is room for tives are themselves vocal about the chairman position should be directly more efficient and equitable utiliza- need to delineate their competen- elected, and there should be more tion of existing financial, human, and cies; regulate their collection and use opportunity for community consulta- natural assets. A system rewarding of funds; and allow them to have tion through the jamoat majlis. There voluntary contributions, and enabling access to their own budgets. A fun- is room for greater cooperation and a percentage of revenues collected damental lesson for local self-gover- division of competencies between in one territory to be directly utilized nance entities is the importance of jamoats, mahallas, higher governmen- in the same region, has the potential reaching deep into local communi- tal authorities, local NGOs and inter- of contributing to better resource ties - at the level of individual villag- national donor agencies. allocation. For international donor es, neighborhoods, or mahallas, rath- agencies and political organizations er then at the level of territories rep- After over fifty years of , interested in promoting good gov- resenting on average 6-12,000 in- Tajikistan rural communities do not ernance, decentralization and in- habitants. The VO experience indi- lack mobilizing capacities or a sense creased accountability, a clearer com- cates that when local self-gover- of volunteerism. They are, howev- mitment to supporting Tajik institu- nance is organized at the village lev- er, suffering from a loss of direction, tions of local self-governance also has el participation of local citizens is passivity, and the absence of eco- the potential of insuring more sus- more easily promoted. While jamo- nomic resources. Reforms that sup- tainable social and economic devel- ats may more appropriately be for- port more direct participation of citi- opment in Tajikistan. 26 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Regional government in Tajikistan (centre and regions) ...... Zarif Aliev, Chairman Constitutional Court Tajikistan

Tajikistan is a unitary (as an entity, long to oblasts (these cities and ray- resulted in a particular and complete non-federative) state. To govern the ons are located around the capital social economic system of the oblast, state the territory of the republic is mostly in the Hissor and Rasht val- as well as the language, household divided into separate units. The na- leys) but they are directly subordi- and other ethnic features of the lo- ture and structure of these units is nate to the central Government. cal population were taken into con- determined in the Constitution and Local State power is divided into two sideration to form Gorni Badakhshan the Constitutional Law «On Proce- levels: 1) Oblast level 2) City and as an autonomous entity. dure of Administrative-territorial Or- rayon level. The lowest level of Taking into account these GBAO ganization of the Republic of Tajiki- governance consists of local self-gov- peculiarities, there is a separate chap- stan» passed on November 4, 1995. ernance bodies: settlement and vil- ter (Chapter 8) in the Constitution of They are the Gorno-Badakhshan lage jamoats (communities). The the Republic enacting that the status Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), re- above-mentioned Jamoats are inde- of GBAO is to be determined by a gions or oblasts (Khatlonskaya, Sog- pendent and have equal status. constitutional law. The constitutional diiskaya), the city of Dushanbe, cit- There are so called rural jamoats in law «On Gorno-Badakhshan Auton- ies, districts or rayons, settlements rural areas and settlement jamoats in omous Oblast» passed on Novem- and villages. Within these adminis- settlements. The self-governance ber 4, 1995 determines a specific trative units the local State and self- bodies (jamoats) are not created in status of this oblast. governance representative and ex- urban industrial areas, cities and ray- ecutive bodies were created on the ons (Dushanbe rayon and some oth- Taking into consideration the auton- oblast, rayon and city levels. State ers) because there are no correspon- omous character of GBAO, the law bodies do not exist below the levels dent administrative units such as vil- enacts not to change the borders of of the city and rayon. As to self - lage and settlement. In urban areas the oblast without the GBAO Majlisi governance bodies called Jamoats a mahalla council (city block council) of People’s Deputies’ (representa- (sub-district) they were established does exist. The Mahalla Council is a tive body of the oblast) consent; that public association of citizens living on on the levels of village and settle- the government shall create condi- the same territory; it is created by ment. In the Republic of Tajikistan the tions for the languages (Kyrgyz, Rus- local residents on a voluntary base. existing rayons and cities are includ- han, Vakhan, and Yazgulyam) to be ed into different administrative units: GBAO as an autonomous formation, freely developed and used; one of GBAO, Khatlon and Sughd oblasts and the city of Dushanbe as the cap- the Majlisi Milli deputy chairmen (up- and Dushanbe city. Some rayons and ital of the republic, have some pe- per chamber of the Parliament) shall cities called «rayons and cities of re- culiarities. The following factors: a be a deputy from GBAO (as usual publican subordination» do not be- specific natural-climatic feature that he is one of the people’s deputies ...... REGIONAL...... GOVERNMENT IN TAJIKISTAN (CENTRE AND REGIONS) 27

elected to Majlisi Oli from GBAO); tures are specified in the Law of the vices to Dushanbe, the regions of one of the judges of the Constitu- Republic of Tajikistan, «On the Sta- republican subordination, and others. tional Court shall be a GBAO repre- tus of the Capital of the Republic of The administrative-territorial organi- sentative, (the appointment proce- Tajikistan» passed on December 13, zation of the Republic of Tajikistan dure is not defined by the Tajik Con- 1996. It should be noted that in com- has been historically formed. The pre- stitution and the Law on Constitutional parison with the other regions includ- revolutionary Russia and part of the Court. As usual his candidature is pro- ed in the structure of the oblast many present Tajikistan that used to be in posed by the Head of the Oblast. of the social and economic problems the structure of czarist Russia were After that the candidature is pro- of Dushanbe must be solved by the divided into the following local terri- posed by the Tajik President, along city itself rather than by the districts torial structures - provinces, volosts with the candidatures of other Con- included in the structure of the city. (small rural districts), and districts. stitutional Court judges, to the Up- Thus, the law (Article 5) stipulates After the 1917 revolution it was per Chamber of the Parliament for that the Dushanbe government shall decided to break this old local gov- further approval) to form the GBAO be responsible for the transfer of the ernment system. In the late twenti- permanent representation to keep land, buildings, structures, construc- eth and early thirtieth of the 20th the Government of the Republic of tions and premises, amount of hous- century a new system of local terri- Tajikistan in constant touch with the ing, utilities, transport and other ser- torial organization of the Soviet state GBAO executive bodies under the vices. Costs for services rendered was developed that consisted of Government of the Republic of Tajiki- by the local executive bodies locat- oblasts, areas, cities, regions, settle- stan. (This permanent representation ed in Dushanbe should be reimbursed ments and villages which are all in- is formed in accordance with the by donations and subventions from cluded in the governmental system. central Government). the republican budget. There is a This system existed before the USSR These rights enacted by the law are special line in the republican budget collapsed and it still exists in Tajiki- the guarantee for GBAO as an au- for this purpose, (and a separate line stan at present. Before 1994, when tonomous oblast in the structure of for all other regions). The law also the Republic of Tajikistan passed the the Republic of Tajikistan, and the specifies a definite character of mu- Constitution, there were self-govern- form to protect its interests (not as a tual relations that the city of Dushan- ment bodies in settlements and vil- State unit but as a social and cultural be has with the regions of republi- lages. entity). As in some other similar cas- can subordination, especially those In the territorial structure system of es around the world, during the cre- that border on Dushanbe (Hissor, Soviet and present Tajikistan, a ray- ation of GBAO its cultural, language Lenin, and Kafirnihon (Vah- on is the basic part of the rural area and some ethnic peculiarities as well dat) rayons). These regions should and a city is the basic part of the as its geographical isolation were tak- support the development of Dush- industrial centers. Since rayons and en into consideration. anbe, including working out and im- cities are situated closer to the agri- The city of Dushanbe has similar rights plementing development programs cultural and industrial enterprises they as the other oblasts. Since Dushanbe to be fulfilled in the regions of re- unite the agricultural objects and in- is the capital of the republic, it has publican subordination and develop- dustries in the territory they are situ- some peculiar features. These fea- ment of the utilities that render ser- ated, and they are also nearer to 28 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

the population than oblasts and ar- rights of the oblast with some differ- others. This Joint Meeting of peo- eas. All rayons are included into dif- ences peculiar to the capital of the ples’ deputies is created only for one ferent oblasts or Dushanbe city. (As republic) In Dushanbe city many eco- purpose, which is the election of the stated before, the rayons of repub- nomic, social and cultural questions Rayons of Republican Subordination lican subordination are not part of an are solved on the city level because representatives to the Upper Cham- oblast but they are directly subordi- there is a united administrative unit ber of the Parliament. After the dep- nated to the Central Government). consisting of different branches and uties are elected the Joint meeting is This peculiarity of the area was spec- bodies (such as the water supply unit over because it has no other tasks ified when Soviet power was being called Dushanbe Water Channel, the or capacity. established. For example, the reso- electricity provision unit called Thus, local governance is carried out lution of the XVI VKP(b) Conference Gorelectroset, Heating System Net- in the oblast, city, and district. There specified that «the central unit for work unit, Telephone Communication are local self-government bodies in the Party and Soviet power instruc- unit etc). Some regions and cities (so- the settlements and villages which tions to be implemented is a region» called cities and regions of republi- are not administrative management (CPSS in the resolutions and decisions, can subordination (RRS)) have no part bodies but are self-governance units. volume 4, page 234) in an oblast. They directly communi- The local State power is represent- A rayon is the basic unit in modern cate with the republican bodies. The ed by executive and representative Tajikistan, the district is the lowest situation of the RRS (lack of oblast bodies. They cooperate and inter- level of government. It is the rayon part) limits their opportunity to ex- act with each other and with other that solves the important problems press and implement their rights and levels (oblast level) representing the of local government, economic and interests, also to protect the rights State power on a local level. The social-cultural development. The of the population. For example, lack representative and executive bod- State power is limited at the rayon of the oblast court does not enable ies represent the local government. level beyond which the next level the people to appeal to the court of They cooperate with each other and of self-governance unit is called the second appearance in order to pro- carry out local governance together Jamoat. Jamoats are included into tect their rights. They must go di- with the other levels (region and self- the territory of the rayons. rectly to the Supreme Court of the governance level). The oblast is an intermediate part to republic. The upper chamber of par- govern the territory between the liament basically includes represen- The representative bodies include Central Government, rayons and cit- tatives from oblasts and the city of Madjlisi (councils) of the deputies of ies. In fact the oblast governs the Dushanbe, (five representatives from oblasts, cities and regions elected by territory, existing bodies, enterpris- each oblast, Dushanbe city and ray- the population of these territories for es, departments and organizations. ons of republican subordination). The five years. They regularly meet with As it has already been mentioned law developed a new structure for their constituency voters. The num- the Republic of Tajikistan consists of the RRS that do not have their own ber of deputies of the Madjlisis is dif- GBAO, the Sogdiiskaya oblast, the oblasts - a joint meeting of people’s ferent. The constitutional law «On Khatlonskaya oblast and the city of deputies for the regions of republi- Election of Deputies to the Local Dushanbe (Dushanbe actually has the can subordination, RRS cities, and Madjlisis of People’s Deputies» en- ...... REGIONAL...... GOVERNMENT IN TAJIKISTAN (CENTRE AND REGIONS) 29

acts the quota for the oblast madjli- oblast, city, rayon and Chairmen of There are three types of bodies, sis and the Dushanbe madjlisi to be peoples’ deputies meetings of the enterprises, and organization accord- not more than 70 deputies, and for territories. ing to the current legislation in place: the regional and city madjlisis not Mutual relations between different enterprises, establishments more than 40 deputies (Article 7). local madjlisis are as follows: local and organizations of the com- Local madjlisis should express and madjlisis implement their activity in- munal property; represent the interests of the city dependently within the limits of their structural divisions of local and oblast population. Local madjli- competence. Higher local madjlisis governments; sis, as the representatives of the can delegate part of their authority appropriate territory, approve local to the lower madjlisis, lower madjli- local agencies, establish- budgets and hear reports on the sis can also, on mutual consent, trans- ments, enterprises and orga- budget execution; approve perspec- fer part of their authority to the higher nizations of the republican tive, social and economic develop- madjlisi; higher madjlisis have the right property. ment programs; approve general to cancel the resolutions of the low- The local governments manage the plans and rules of redevelopment; er madjlisis if they contradict the law; enterprises, establishments and or- approve local taxes, charges and the lower madjlisis have the right to ganizations of the communal prop- tariffs; approve the chairman and his go to court and contest the deci- erty; the chairman directly appoints assistants, chiefs of the structural di- sions of the higher madjlisis; the mad- their chiefs; and they have contracts. visions in the executive bodies, hear jlisis also have the right to cancel the their reports; make decisions on is- Government Resolution No.216 as decisions of their chairmen, if the sue, conditions and placement of of March 17, 1995 determined the resolutions do not correspond to cur- local loans, lotteries and others. They structural divisions of the local gov- rent legislation. These rights are not make these decisions within the lim- ernments. The structural divisions in- widely used but are in theory avail- its of the competencies. clude oblast, regional, and urban able. The deputies of the local madjlisis do structures of education, public health not work on a constant basis. They The chairman of GBAO, the chair- services, culture, environmental pro- convoke sessions not less than twice man of the city of Dushanbe, as well tection, economics and foreign eco- a year. The chairman of the oblast, as the chairmen of oblasts, regions nomic relations, justice, finance, ag- region and city heads a local madjli- and cities, head the local govern- riculture and others which are in dou- si. The President of the republic ap- ments. The chairman has a first dep- ble subordination: first of all they are points chairmen of the local madjlisis uty and assistants and his own office subordinated to the Chairman and from among the deputies of these (administration) appointed by him. then to the heads of Ministries and madjlisis for five years. The chairmen The chairman has overall charge of correspondent Government bodies. are approved at the session. The the structural divisions of the local Heads of the structural divisions are Chairmen usually head the executive executive bodies, and other bodies, appointed by the corresponding and representative powers on the enterprises and departments under Chairmen in accordance with the correspondent territorial units, which the jurisdiction of the oblasts, cities Ministers and heads of governmen- means that there are Chairmen of and regions. tal bodies. Their chiefs are appoint- 30 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

ed by the appropriate chairmen with competence, makes resolutions for the rayon Chairman applying to the the consent of higher bodies (Minis- all the bodies, organizations, enter- Upper Economic Court of Leninski tries, departments, organizations, prises and departments to follow. rayon) The higher chairman and court agencies, etc.). The Chairmen of oblast, Central have the right to cancel the chair- Government and Court have the man’s decision if the decision con- The third group of organizations is right to cancel the decisions of heads tradicts the law. The Government or the one not included in the first and of rayons and cities. Central Gov- the President of Tajikistan can cancel second groups. They belong to the ernment and Court may cancel the the decision of the chairman of republican property. Their chiefs are decisions of oblast Chairmen. The GBAO and the chairmen of oblasts, appointed and relieved of their posts decisions of all Chairmen (of oblasts, the chairman of the city of Dushan- by ministers and chiefs of the de- Dushanbe city, rayons and cities) may be and the chairmen of the cities and partments as agreed with the appro- be canceled by the corresponding priate chairman. regions of republican subordination if Majlisi Oli on oblast, city and rayons they contradict existing laws or leg- These different groups should follow levels in the case of contradiction with islative norms. the resolutions of the local Madjlisis existing legislation. Mutual relations and chairmen passed by them within of the chairman, as the head of the The local representative and execu- the limits of their competence. local government, with local bodies tive bodies have the following rela- and organizations are as follows: the tions with the ministries, departments Organizational issues and issues of chairman directly supervises the en- and other central executive bodies: territory management are in the au- terprises, establishments and organi- in the case that local governments’ thority of the chairmen of oblasts, zations of the communal property, rights and interests are infringed, the cities and regions, and the chairman coordinates the activity of the re- local governments have the right to of the city of Dushanbe. Thus, the publican property organizations, su- address the Government or the chairman convokes sessions of the pervises the activity of all organiza- President of the republic, or the local madjlisis, presides at the ses- tions located in his territory when it court. So, the Constitutional Law of sions, supervises the structural divi- deals with land utilization and other the Republic of Tajikistan «On the sions of local governments, manag- natural resources, environmental pro- Constitutional Court of the Republic es the communal property, coordi- tection, construction of communica- of Tajikistan» prescribes that the state nates the activity of the enterprises, tions, trade welfare service, social bodies (including local governments) organizations and establishments of protection, administration of legality, have the right to address the Con- the republican property, regulates law and security, protection of the stitutional court when the problems land utilization and organizes the lo- citizens’ rights and freedom. deal with constitutional doubt of the cal budget execution, etc. normative acts approved by the min- The enterprises, establishments and So, the chairman has real actual pow- istries, state committees and other organizations can appeal against and er and bears responsibility for the departments (Article 37). challenge the chairman’s decisions to business situation in his territory the higher chairman or in court. (For Public utilities of the communal prop- (oblast, rayon, city). instance many farmers in Leninski ray- erty intended to satisfy the direct The chairman, within the limits of his on have objected to the decision of social and economic needs of popu- ...... REGIONAL...... GOVERNMENT IN TAJIKISTAN (CENTRE AND REGIONS) 31

lation form the economic and finan- village councils and their executive The Jamoat has limited powers. It is cial basis of the local governments. committees. There is no local self- basically engaged in landscaping and (Government Resolution No.383 as government in the cities. In the cit- improvement of a sanitary situation of August 6, 1993 determines the ies there are bodies of social activity of the communities, streets, and etc. difference between communal and in the form of Mahalla councils. The The Jamoat’s activity is basically fi- republican property). The basis also law of the Republic of Tajikistan «On nanced by the regional (urban) bud- includes local budget, non-budget- Bodies of Self-government in Settle- get. A Jamoat has practically no self- ary and target funds, credit resourc- ments and Villages» (December 1, financing sources and may be fi- es, as well as subventions and dona- 1994) regulates organization and nanced by voluntary funds trans- tions from the republican budget. functioning of the local self-govern- ferred by the enterprises, organiza- Thus, the 2002 republican budget ment. tions, establishments, and citizens. stipulates a 32,648 thousand-somo- Jamoats of shakhrak (settlement) and The basic weight of work is assigned ni donation for the local budgets (10 dekhot (village) are the bodies of the to the chairmen of Jamoats. The million US$), and a 2,500 thousand- local self-government. They are chairman practically implements all the somoni donation - for the city of formed in settlements and villages. work including organization of work, Dushanbe (7.9 million US$). Jamoats are formed to realize the representation and protection of the Local taxes and tariffs (retail sales citizens’ rights to govern the com- Jamoat’s interests; organization of taxes, immovable property taxes, munity and the state, to unite the public control for the sanitary situa- passenger taxes); state taxes, do- citizens in order to solve their social tion in the communities, water sup- nations and subventions from higher and economic problems, to decide ply system, dwellings, schools, and budgets; deductions from the state the most important questions direct- other establishments; registration of budget (85% of the land tax, 100% ly touching the interests of the pop- division of family property in the ulation, to facilitate the execution of of VAT- except for the Sogdiiskaya dekhkan households, registration of the Constitution and other normative the inhabitants living in their territo- oblast, the city of Dushanbe and the legal acts. ry; promotes due payment of tax- city of Tursunzade that contribute es, insurance and other payments by to the local budget 30%, 50% and Jamoat, a local self-government the population; organizes obligatory 20%, income tax is 100 % , and etc.) body, is formed from the represen- presence of registrants and recruits draw up the local budget. tatives (delegates) of streets, ma- in the commissariats, involves the khallyas, and villages. These elected population to participate in civil de- representatives have meetings at Local self-government fense arrangements. least twice a year. The chairman, his in the Republic of Tajikistan deputy (deputies) and the secretary It should be noted that the powers Local self-government in the Repub- of the Jamoat are elected for five of the former settlement and village lic of Tajikistan is determined at the years. The chairman has a small of- councils and their executive commit- level of settlements and villages. It fice. The Chairman of the oblast (city) tees were insignificant and this is also was established by the 1994 Con- or the Madjlisi of people’s deputies the peculiarity of current jamoats. The stitution of the Republic of Tajikistan. of rayon (city) level determines the jamoat’s powers are not very signif- Prior to 1994 there were settlement number of the staff. icant either, and are insufficient for 32 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

the complete functioning of the local The powers of the local Mad- The legal structure of the lo- self-governments, jamoats. Besides jlisis of people’s deputies and cal governments and local local self-governance bodies there their chairmen should be de- self-government bodies are locally based public self-gover- termined more precisely. should be developed. The nance units (street councils, mahalla law should regulate more pre- The law should more clearly committees, neighborhood associa- cisely the competence of dif- stipulate mutual relations of tions etc) which are public (non-state) ferent local governments the local representative bod- citizen associations. Their activities (oblast, urban and regional), ies and the chairmen with oth- are regulated by the Law, «On Pub- and expand the competence er local governments, public lic Associations) of local self-government bod- associations and citizens. ies, fix the judicial protection The economic and financial of the rights and interests of Conclusions: basis of the local govern- the local governments and local self-government bodies, Local governments and local ments and local self-govern- and others. self-government bodies ment bodies should be were formed after the Con- strengthened. With this pur- It should be noted that in order to stitution of the Republic of pose it is necessary to ex- develop these laws, the President Tajikistan was passed in 1994; pand and precisely identify of Tajikistan approved the Decree they are practically new struc- the financing sources of the on July 11, 2002, and formed a tures. They have proved their local budgets and the bud- Working group to develop new laws viability but need to be de- gets of the local self-govern- on local governments and local self- veloped. ment bodies. government bodies...... ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION...... BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN 33

Economic aspects of the interrelation between centre and regions in Tajikistan ...... Azizullo Avezov

Doctor of Economic, professor, Khodjent State University

Introduction part of their rights or lose some of The reform of the Tajikistan legisla- them in contradiction to the Consti- tion system is still in process. As a Economical and financial relationships tution. Therefore regions often re- result, there are no rules and regula- between central government bod- sist the efforts of the center to med- tions regarding financial interrelation- ies and regions mainly predetermine dle with their mandates. A well-de- the development of democratic pro- ship between the Center and re- signed financial mechanism for inter- cesses in society. Either flawed leg- gions. However, financial mecha- relationship between the center and islation in this field or existing mecha- nisms regulating the interrelationship regions guarantees political stability nisms infringing upon legitimate inter- between the Center and regions in society, success in the country’s ests of parties can be sources for have been improved. The Constitu- economy development and nation political instability, social tension and tion of Tajikistan (1), Constitutional prosperity. The society develop- the development of separatism pro- Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on ment level, its industrial capacity, and cesses in the regions. On the con- State Governance in Regions (2), Tax its historical, cultural or religious men- trary, a coordinated mutual relation- Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, talities determine the features of the ship between center and regions is The Law on State Budget (3), as well interrelationship. a strong catalyst for social and eco- as a number of state rules and regu- nomical development in the regions After approving the strategy to lations are its legal foundation. as well as nationally. The Chinese move towards market economies, A brief essay on the history of in- experience is a good example: some the majority of former Soviet states terrelation between the Center experts believe that the Chinese faced the need to choose financial and regions in Tajikistan. The his- economic marvel is a consequence mechanisms for proper interrelations tory of interrelation between the of a successful financial relationship between center and regions. The Center and regions is very long. between central and local adminis- European Charter on Local Adminis- Before 1917, there existed the local trative bodies during last twenty tration is the legal foundation for fi- executive, legislative and judicial years. nancial interrelation between center bodies such as the mingbashi, aksakal, and local governance bodies in the History demonstrates that central and qazi in the Emirate. In majority of European nations [33]. governments often intend to violate 1917-1920 these bodies were re- Russia was among the first former the mandates of local bodies, restrict moved and the Councils of work- Soviet countries to sign the Europe- their independence and exceed their ers, peasants and army deputies (in an Charter on Local Administration constitutional powers. Sometimes northern Tajikistan) and Revolution- on December 27, 1996. local administrative bodies give up a ary committees (in Pamir) were es- 34 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

tablished instead. In 1936 these bod- nongovernmental enterprises that evolutions occurred in , Russia ies were replaced by the Councils substantially influenced the region’s and Germany in their budget devel- of workers deputies. In 1977 the further development. Since than, the opments [34, 35, 38]. councils were renamed Councils of interrelation between center and re- Before the Soviet era, people did People’s Deputies. People’s Depu- gions has been based on self-sup- not elect representatives of local ties to these Councils were elected port. However, the nature of the authorities and the level of popular by public, equal and direct ballot. interrelation between center and re- political activity and extent of local According to their mandates, Coun- gions was unchanged. Local author- administration independence were cils approved a local budget financial ities designed an initial plan of eco- very low. Such economic systems report, plans on social and economic nomic development, then they were defined as the «Asian mode development and supervised local sought income resources to imple- of production», since plots and pro- administrative bodies, enterprises, ment their plans and pleaded for both duction sites were the property of organizations and agencies. In ac- the plan and its income resources in local owners, while the irrigation sys- cordance with article 77 of the Sovi- the Government. In this situation the tem was state property. Due to this et Tajikistan Constitution, the local largest part of financial resources situation the state was able to im- representative authorities in provinc- flew up and the rest was spent re- pose high taxes. Point 1 on Figure 1 es, cities and districts were Majlis of strictedly. At the same time, com- corresponds with such a situation of People’s Deputies and in villages and mand-administrative governance was interrelation between the center and towns - jamoats. still in common use in the country. In regions. The state policy on local authorities the early 1990s the state started changed several times. In the early gradually to go over to market econ- During the Soviet era, Tajikistan was 1980s the center announced that omy and to establish economic and notable for its high level of political local administrations would be re- financial mechanisms for local admin- and economical centralization. All sponsible for integrated and balanced istration. means of production were state socio-economical development in the To analyze the ’s property. There was a vast indivisi- region. However, their real legal budget federalism we should use ble economic space in which the sources and economic capacities categories such as the level of local Soviet integral economic complex were not widened. At the same authority self-independence and the functioned. The State Planning Com- time, the most important source that extent of political centralization in the mittee of the USSR elaborated the determines successful economic ac- country. We will use the system of centralized frame of economical de- tivity is the economic entity power coordinates whose axes will be the velopment. The Ministry of Finance extent. Without such a legal source above-mentioned categories and and its branches designed local bud- - and recourse - it is impossible to then will have the general picture of gets. All appointments to positions implement economic activities. Tajikistan budget federalism devel- were under Communist Party con- In the late 1980s private businesses opment during the last century. On trol. Point 2 on Figure 1 corresponds and cooperatives started to expand figure 1 the analyses results have with such a budget federalism situa- and develop. They were the first been outlined. We can see the same tion...... ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION...... BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN 35

Level economic independence high low

Tadjikistan as a part of USSR (1917-1991)

Chinese budget system 2 high «Democratic Tadjikistan centralism» 1 4 before 1917 (1998-2003)

Budget systen of Russia (2003) 3 low Level of political centralization «Regional Feudalism» (1992-1997) Budget systen of Germany

Figure 1. Budget Feudalism Development in Tadjikistan

Chinese option: of economic decentralization and Political centralization

German option: high centralization of income, ensuring high living standards throughout the country

Russian option

The collapse of the Soviet Union and Experts call such an option «regional of such interrelation between the subsequent civil war in Tajikistan feudalism». Point 3 on Figure 1 cor- Center and local authorities that we caused a new situation in interrela- responds with such a situation. will deal with are the following: Lo- tion between the Center and local cal authorities have not enough pow- The Peace Accord signed by the authorities. Economical links be- er to regulate the economy in their Government and Opposition in 1997 tween different regions were cut, territory. The cause of such a situa- allowed for rehabilitating the coun- the territory of the country was di- tion is that the majority of enterpris- try’s economic unity. The interrela- vided by many « princes» es located in the territory of any dis- who were unwilling or unable to pay tion between the center and regions trict (rayon) or city, as a general rule taxes to the state budget due to the has got new features, characterized are either province or central gov- collapse of the economy. Weak by the very weak economic inde- ernment property. Therefore the state power was unable to protect pendence of local authorities and the total volume of output produced by the economic integrity of the coun- strong political centralization in the enterprises under local authority con- try or to efficiently collect taxes. country. The characteristic features trol is very low. As a result local TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION 36 ......

authorities are unable to amass ment. There are no criteria for the The method consists of three stages enough financial surplus to develop evaluation of local administration lead- - (1) approving development plan their own territory economy. Local ers’ activities. The local population after situation analyses, (2) design- share to consolidated budget does does not demonstrate political activ- ing the budget, and (3) monitoring not exceed 10-15% of overall bud- ity, because citizens are afraid to its financial results. It should be men- get. The low level of local authority criticize administrative bodies for their tioned that the distinguishing feature motivation to develop the local econ- inefficiency. There is no protection is that a large part of the process is omy occurs due to both the scanti- for local administrative bodies inde- pretentious, but its implementation ness of local administration expens- pendency in the frame of power focuses on maintaining the achieved es power and the existing system of outlined by legislation. The option level but not developing further lo- dividing income between local and of interrelation between the Center cal economy. Unfortunately, of late, center management bodies. More- and regions is defined as «democratic the abovementioned shortcomings over, local management bodies have centralism». The option is shown as have worsened. limited rights to impose tax types and point 4 on figure 1. The management system consisting rates. Thus, our conclusion is that The next subjects of our research are of four levels (country, province, there exists a weak economic inde- budget and fiscal mechanisms of in- city, jamaat) operates in Tajikistan pendence of local authorities in the terrelation between the Center and today. The three first levels elabo- country. regions. rate independent budgets. Econom- As for the second category used in ic Departments of districts, cities, and Budget Mechanism of Interrelation our study, namely political central- provinces deal with economic and between Center and Regions: Pre- ization in the country, our research financial planning. In accordance with view and Major Constraints. uncovers a high level of political cen- the regulations regarding depart- tralization in the country. In Tajiki- The budget mechanism determi- ments and other operation manuals, stan, there is no counterbalance and nates the process of economic and during the first stage of budget plan- deterrence mechanism due to the financial planning, budget design, fi- ning process the economic depart- conflict of interests among different nancial results and monitoring (12- ments are obliged to accomplish in- branches of power. We have such 27). The method of financial pro- depth analyses of economy and so- a situation since legislative power, the cess applied today in Tajikistan has cial infrastructure development in a justice system and the mass media been elaborated by the former USSR proper region for the past period. are under the control of executive Ministry of Finance. The method The analyses should substantiate so- power. The «party of power» has takes into account the best achieve- cio-economic development direc- been established and is in operation. ments of Soviet economic school and tions and clarify priorities by classifi- According to the Constitution Arti- has been elaborated and applied cation. The analyses also should de- cle 69, the center is authorized to throughout the Soviet Union regard- fine the region’s socio-economic appoint local administration leaders less of the different regions’ eco- development weak points and doc- and to dismiss them. The center of- nomical development features. The ument existent and potential sourc- ten issues such decisions on appoint- method, having been changed only es (material, financial, practical) that ment or dismissal without any com- a little, is in use in Tajikistan of today. could be used in forecasting periods...... ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION...... BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN 37

During the second stage regional of such minimum standards to be budget drafts of cities, districts, budgets are elaborated and ap- followed, like economic growth in- provinces, and countries should be proved. The main task of hukumat dex and expected rate, are submitted for consideration and economic departments is to identi- very small. The number of such in- approval to relevant representative fy, justify and adopt the most effi- dices has been increased after ap- bodies. cient budget for the region estab- proval of the poverty alleviation The analyses of existing budget lishing its sources of incomes, strategy. The concrete forecast in- mechanisms and the interrelation amounts and expenditures (12-27). dices set by region socio-economic between the center and local gov- The developed budget has to be development would be mapped ernance have uncovered a number approved by time. through this planning process. After of issues appearing in the process of adoption at the Parliament session Monitoring the budget process is local budget development and ap- (Majlisi Oli) the plan of socio-eco- the third and final stage of budget proval. All the issues have to be nomic development of region will implementation. The Ministry of Fi- taken into consideration by those become a background for prepara- nance and its regional branches are who are responsible for elaborating tion of the budget draft. responsible for monitoring financial a new version of the law on Local results. This monitoring is designed In accordance with the approved Administration. The problems out- to detect misplanning and misper- plan for economic development, the lined below are obstacles for the formance, elimination of such mis- regional budget draft is developed socio-economical development of takes, as well as for the establish- six months before the . regions. ment of a feedback system be- The Ministry of Finance submits con- 1. The cause of a main problem of tween center and regions. The trol indices of inflation and ratio of existing interrelation mechanism be- monitoring also provides an oppor- minimum growth. Until August 15 tween the center and regions is a tunity to audit the accuracy of im- of the current year, regional (oblast) feature of local governance, name- plemented management systems, administrations summarized the bud- ly, its two -faced nature. The prob- optimization of deadlines, expen- gets of cities and districts and sub- mitted them to the Ministry of Fi- lem calls forth contradiction between ditures and final outcomes. In or- nance. After taking into consider- the formally equal legal status of all der to evaluate the quality of fi- ation the budgets submitted to the local governance system elements nancial results a special system of Ministry of Finance, the estimate is and the different economical capac- indicators, which assess the form revised and clarified. (By the way, ities. This weakens local governance and effectiveness of management, clarifications are often restrictions. efficiency, and destabilizes gover- is applied. For example, the expenditure part nance vertical low levels. The prob- According to internal regulations the of the Soghd oblast final budget lem in essence consists of the fol- plan of economic development for draft submitted by local administra- lowing: on the one hand, the local next year shall be submitted by May tions was cut by the higher authori- governance body plays like an equal 15 of the current year. The gov- ties in 16 out of 17 cases. The in- economy partner at the market, ac- ernmental standard plan scale is used come part of the final budget draft cording to its by-law. It can inde- for planning. Usually, the number was increased in all 17 cases). The pendently dispose of property, fi- 38 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

nancial sources and land for execu- central government uses the old ning the activities of local governance tion of its public functions. On the method of command-administrative bodies. other hand, the local governance management. In some cases local 3. There is no evaluation table for bodies act as a subcontractor con- governance bodies incur additional controlling the budget efficiency. tracted by the government for exe- expenditures after higher-level gov- Almost impossible to asses and con- cuting state functions. The functions ernment decisions that do not en- trol investments made in regional the local governance bodies are sure increasing incomes (privileges for entities. The evaluation of results and obliged to accomplish are to take some categories of citizens, social the budget planning for next year care of accounting of migration of payment etc). There is fund reallo- based on yearly achievements com- population and property, social se- cation for financing the priorities cho- plete the budget process. Based curity, daily communication with lo- sen by the central government bod- on actual achievements rather than cal population and others. Such ac- ies. Moreover, local budget com- the plan of regional development, tivities demand substantial regulation pletely loses its independency and the planning process goes ahead. on behalf of the state and create a becomes an expenditure estimate. This kind of budget process is incon- base for effective performance of sistent and ruins any initiative by lo- state power at every level. There 2. The majority of enterprises that cal administrations towards self-de- is no official budget division: but in have an impact on regional econom- velopment and does not allow the reality two types of local budget are ic development are under state sub- formation of efficient and the region applied: a budget directed at imple- ordination. In practice, regional integral development. mentation of regional power by lo- governments are unable to run the cal administration; and a budget di- economic development of such en- 4. The financial resources of local rected at in accordance with the Law terprises or influence their policy. En- administrations are too poor and af- on entities of local governance bod- terprise interests quite often do not ter receiving money from the national ies. This creates a base for central concur with the regional interests. budget more than 80% of new local government intervention in the bud- The process of planning is narrowed budget must be spent on so-called get process, and, as result, not only to the interests of large enterprises earmarked articles of expenditure. expenditures linked with the execu- and sector agencies, but not to the This situation weakens capacities for tion of state power, but also local regional integrated development. efficient management of the socio- budget incomes and expenditures The interests of industrial sectors sub- economic environment of the region. should be submitted for approval. stitute real goals of regional devel- The economic incapacity of local ad- This phenomenon to a conflict opment. As rule, constant shortag- ministrations restricts their impact on of interests and the violation of local es of resources do not allow plan- economic and social sectors in their governance rules on management ning for middle term and long-term regions. division. As result, the regional bud- objectives and their implementation. 5. All abovementioned factors sig- get is approved by central govern- Local administration has to postpone nificantly reduce the capacity of lo- ment, whose objectives and tasks objective implementation in the long cal governance bodies to develop are rather different from regional term. This phenomenon aggravates regional economical strategies and to ones. So, we can conclude that the a very insufficient integration in plan- implement them...... ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION...... BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN 39

Fiscal Mechanism of Interrelation 5. To protect poorest local gover- deficit in the amount of 18”000”000 between Center and Regions: Pre- nance bodies in terms of finance it is somoni [3]. The republic budget for view and Major Constraints. Arti- necessary to implement the proce- 2003 has been approved for income cle 9 of the European Charter on dure of financial alignment or equal in the amount of 427”568”000 Local Administration defines general measures, intended for correcting the somoni (US$138”000”000; rate principles regarding central govern- results of uneven assessment of po- 1$=3.09 somoni) and for expendi- ment policy on taxes and budget in tential sources and expenditures. ture in the amount of 445”568”000 application to local governance bod- Such procedures or measures should somoni. The budget deficit is equal ies. The conclusion of the Article is not limit the freedom to choose lo- to the amount of 18”000”000 somo- as below: cal governance bodies in the frame- ni. A part of the deficit equal to the work of their competence. amount of 7”500”000 is foreseen 1. Local governance bodies have The tax system of Tajikistan is based to be covered by funds received rights in the framework of national on surcharges and deductions. It after privatizing state property. Tax- economical policy to possess their assumes to impose universal state es provide more than 90% of state own sufficient funds, which they can taxes and their apportionment among budget. Other sources of budget freely spend to implement their func- all administrative levels. The taxes income, such as non-tax proceed- tions. of Tajikistan consist of state and local ings, profits from state business and 2.Financial means of local gover- ones. State taxes are: 1) income tax, municipal credits are almost insignifi- nance bodies shall be in proportion 2) profit tax, 3) VAT, 4) excises, 5) cant. Table 1 demonstrates that only with powers granted by the Consti- social levies, 6) land tax, 7) tax on three kinds of taxes (VAT, sales tax tution or law. users of resources, 8) enter- (on and aluminum), and cus- prise property tax, 9) transport tax, toms duties and levies) provide more 3. At least a part of the financial 10) road tax, 11) entrepreneurship than 71% of budget income. The means of local governance bodies tax, 12) sales tax (on cotton and alu- phenomena show that the budget should be collected by gathering lo- minum), 13) customs duties and lev- income items are very few and un- cal taxes and duties whose rates lo- ies, and 14) state duties. The local stable. It should be noted that in cal governance bodies have the right taxes are: 1) retail sales tax, 2) in- 2003 the Soghd oblast allocates 50% to impose within limits defined by the tangible property tax and 3) public of VAT, 100% of cotton sales tax- law. transport tax es, and 100% of custom duties to the state budget for centralized re- 4. The financial systems on which the The state budget of the republic of allocation. funds of local governance bodies are Tajikistan for 2003 has been ap- based should be various and flexible proved for income in the amount of More than 41% of budget expendi- in order to follow as far as possible 637”018”000 somoni ture items are spent to finance gov- the change of expenses taking place (US$206”200”000; rate 1$=3.09 ernance bodies, defense, law-en- during the implementation of local somoni) and for expenditure in the forcement structures, prosecutor and administration competence. amount of 655”018”000 somoni with justice bodies (Table 1). 40 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Table 1. Incomes and expenditures of the State budget in 2003

Incomes amount %

Total 427568 100

Including:

1. VAT 166754 39

2. excises 35863 8.4

3. Sales taxes (aluminum, cotton) 66636 15.5

4. profit tax 8121 1.9

5. enterprise property tax 5202 1.2

6. income tax 4638 1.1

7. Custom duties and levies 72508 17.1

8. land 1888 0.4

9. road tax 11151 2.6

10. Other taxes and incomes 27807 6.5

11. International communities grants 27000 6.3 ...... ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION...... BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN 41

Expenditures amount %

Total 396575 100

Including:

1. Governance bodies, defense, law-enforcement structures, prosecutor and justice bodies 166115 41.9

2. Education 18281 4.6

3. Health services 8131 2.1

4. Social insurance and social protection 24179 6.1

5. Environment protection and infrastructure of cities 4569 1.2

6. Cultural, sport and social events 13746 3.5

7. Energy sector 6296 1.6

8. Agriculture, , fishery, and hunting 18407 4.6

9. Mineral mining and their processing, mining and construction sector 3724 0.9

10. Transport and communication 30246 7.6

11. Ministries and agencies conducting their business activities and offering their services 3434 0.9

12. Other activities 99447 25

There is a strong shortcoming in the from the central government. It is get income hoping to receive trans- existed tax mechanism: it supposes easy to transform profitable regions fers. Thus, in 2003, of 17 towns to regulate budgets at all levels. into unprofitable ones and visa ver- and districts of relatively successful With such a scheme the easiest way sa by changing deduction rates. A Soghd oblast, seven receive sub- to increase own incomes is the re- region, which would have collected vention (Table 2). Planned volume distribution of income sources be- more taxes and got its tax base wid- of subventions allocated from Soghd tween power levels. But such re- ened, would lose transfers from oblast budget form from 15.5% distribution, in its turn, leads to con- high-level budget in next year. In (Asht) up to 66.1% (Ayni) of all ex- flicts between local governance such case no one is interested in in- penditures of local budget (average bodies and the central government creasing the level of tax collection. app. 50%). Such a system kills any when they are in the process of Besides, it is usual to make up re- incentive to develop and improve forming and implementing the bud- tarded regions to the minimum lev- the base of taxation since budget get. Opportunity to manipulate el. Therefore those who are below adjustments level any initiation. It is deduction rates is a cause of local the minimum level do not have a impossible also to plan income sourc- governance body dependence strong motivation to increase bud- es for the long-term perspective. 42 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Table 2. Income, expenditures, and subventions of budget for Soghd oblast towns and districts in 2003

Towns and districts names Incomes Subventions Expenditures

1. Isfara 3827392 3827392

2. Kayrakumì 867400 867400

3. Kanibadam 3000000 3000000

4. Khojand 7079002 7079002

5. Penjikent 4803408 4803408

6. Istravshan 2476306 2476306

7. Chkalov 957864 957864

8. Taboshar 158612 163326 321938

9. Ayni 536770 1048969 1585739

10. Asht 1730677 318030 2048707

11. 804162 1257321 2061483

12. Zafarabad 1345755 1345755

13. Matcha 1843387 1843387

14. Spitamen 1891580 1891580

15. 1863583 1863583

16. Shahristan 238803 466744 705547

17. Mountain Matcha 270615 200109 470724

In general, the amount of 3”454”499 somoni is allocated to local budgets administrative bodies though differ- somoni (or US$1”118”000; rate: from the state budget as funds for ent models of taxation improves the $1=3.09 somoni) is allocated to towns special purposes (Table 4) first system slightly. In this case ei- and districts budgets as subventions Regional and local privileges do not ther the Government or local gov- (Table 3). The mentioned amount improve the system, as all the ernance bodies impose the same forms 37% of expenditure budget. abovementioned shortcomings still kind of taxes but the principles of In 2003 the amount of 39”993”000 exist. Income division between charge and collection might differ...... ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION...... BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN 43

Table 3. The Soghd oblast budget for 2003

Income and expenditures items Items

Total income 9293239

Including:

1. Income tax 4264125

2. Profit tax 2454894

3. VAT 2656250

4. Land tax Íàëîã íà çåìëþ 104484

5. Entrepreneurship tax 501070

6. Tax on users of mineral resources 1136862

7. Local non-tax incomes 274328

8. Road tax 1355724

9. Other revenues from the oblast budget -3454499

Total expenditures 9293239

Including:

1. Governance management sector 1199269

2. Reserve foundation of the head of oblast 495860

3. Oblast archive 5620

4. Defense and law-enforcement structuresà 1616850

5. Education 1448100

6. Health service 2626675

7. Social protection 291854

8. Other aid to population 286484

9. Cultural events 277602

10. Sport and physical trainingò 19000

11. Agriculture 165925

12. Centralized revenues 600000

13. Other expenditures 260000 44 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Table 4. State budget expenditures for 2003, according to Economical classification

À. Current expenditures 379266

1. Expenditures for goods and services 213499

nterest payment for internal and external debts 82821

3. Subsidies and transfers 82946

including

Subsidies to state enterprises and organization 12752

Funds allocating to local budget for special purposes 39993

Transfers to non commercial organization 450

Transfers to population 18136

B. Investments 65193

C. Crediting , migrants, and states employees according to Tajikistan 1109

There are some suggestions to im- a private right but as a public right. governance bodies are not interest- prove the system of taxation though Thus, taxes restricting rights to im- ed. Besides, it is well known that the division of incomes between plement any concrete activity should state power is very inert and unable power bodies. The suggestion en- also be attached to the competen- adequately to react to fast changing visages introducing the following prin- cy of local governance. Transport conditions. It is important for local ciples [28, 29, 30, 34, 35]: tax might be a good example. Mean- governance bodies to apply sanc- 1. There should be the correspon- while, taking the abovementioned tions using them not only as income dence of income sources with sub- principle into consideration it would sources, but also as a mechanism jects under local governance body be much better to use for regulation applying their power. Thus, severe control. The local administrations can the income taxes that the state rais- and wise decisions on implementing more efficiently implement taxation es from population. Thus, income different rules and regulations made in those spheres, wherein they build tax is a regulating one in the majority by local governance bodies will not up their policy. of countries. work if there is no constraint mecha- nism as a sanction for nonobser- 2. The taxes that are linked with 3. Opportunity to apply sanctions by vance. managing the social important activ- local governance bodies. State pow- ities in municipal entity should be as- er bodies impose types of penalties Difficulties in forming the Govern- signed to local government bodies. and define their rate. This approach ment Regional Strategy. Unequal Bound up with this is that the right leads to that situation that penalties socio-economic development of sep- for local governance appears not as and fines are not imposed, as local arate regions and hence, different ...... ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATION...... BETWEEN CENTRE AND REGIONS IN TAJIKISTAN 45

income levels are an objective fact. A main instrument used for the de- their major priority. Regional policy It is related to natural-climatic condi- velopment of individual entities by should be implemented by a special tions and industrial capacity of re- the Government is the design and agency, e.g. the Ministry of Region- gions. Therefore, a number of re- implementation of the State Invest- al Affairs. However, the Govern- gions are behind the average socio- ment Program. The Program has ment has not discussed such a sug- economic standards. The Govern- elaborated for five years and every gestion yet. In general, the concept ment is responsible for the socio-eco- year the Government revises it. The of budget relationship should provide nomic development of all regions. financial sources of the Program are a compromise between economic Unequal development of regions and means of the state budget, long-term and budget efficiency, social justice hence unequal incomes might cause loans and grants. Of late, the Gov- and political stability in society. high social tension and political insta- ernment has invested in the building bility. There is an obvious need to programs for the Kulyab internation- Bibliography support such regions and the Gov- al airport, the Kurgan-Tyube-Kulyab ernment does so. However, there railway, the highway approach to 1. The Constitution of the Republic are few options for assistance. There Karokarum highway, the improve- of Tajikistan. is a very good metaphor: you can ment and development of individual 2. The Constitutional Law of the Re- grant a fish daily, but also grant a towns on the occasion of their jubi- public of Tajikistan on State Gover- fishing rod and show how to catch lees (for example, the 2500th anni- nance at Places (as of May 22, 1998, fish. So far we still are on the first versary of the town of Istravshan or No. 616). way. But such a system is unable to the expected 2700th anniversary of find solution for problems our coun- the town of Kulyab). The confer- 3. The Law of the Republic of Tajiki- try has faced. Either wrong objec- ence of donor countries held in Dus- stan on State Budget, 2002. tives or structure, due to which the hanbe in May 2003 supported the 4. The program on socio-economic achievement of declared objectives State Investment Program. Accord- development of district, are unprofitable for all players, cause ing to the plans, in the next three 2001-2005, Khukumat of Zafarobod its shortcomings. The main mistake years 900”000”000 somoni will be district, Sughd province, 2001. of the existing system objectives is invested in the frame of the Program. that the system operates to equal- 5. The program on socio-economic ize all levels of population life stan- Regional policy is a kind of policy such development of Qairokkum city, dards instead of providing equal op- as foreign trade or economic: it has 2001-2005, Khukumat of Qairokkum portunities for all citizens from all the its goals and objectives [31, 32, 34]. city, Sughd province, 2001. , wherever they It is necessary to evaluate the re- 6. The program on socio-economic reside. Thus, the strategy of assis- gional policy not only in the terms of development of Chkalovsk city, tance should be not catching up back- economical aspects but also in the 2001-2005, Khukumat of Chkalovsk ward regions but providing equal terms of social and political efficien- city, Sughd province, 2001. opportunities for development in all cy. Regional policy should not be the regions of the country. The pol- under the control, say, of the Minis- 7. The program on socio-economic icy should be transparent and guid- try of Economy and Trade: they are development of Istravshan district, ed by the legislative base. oriented to efficiency and treat it as 2001-2005, Khukumat of Istravshan 46 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

district, Sughd province, 2001. 16. The Regulation on Economic Di- 24. Operational Manual of the Chief vision of Khukumat of , of Economic Division of the Khuku- 8. The program on socio-economic Khukumat of Isfara district, Isfara dis- mat of Isfara district, Khukumat of development of Isfara district, 2001- trict, 2002. Isfara district, Isfara district, 2002. 2005, Khukumat of Isfara district, Sughd province, 2001. 17. The Regulation on Economic Di- 25. Operational Manual of the Chief vision of Khukumat of Konibodom of Economic Division of the Khuku- 9. The program on socio-economic city, Khukumat of Konibodom city, mat of Konibadam city, Khukumat development of Bobojon Konibodom city, 2002. of Konibadam city, Konibadam city, district, 2001-2005, Khukumat of 2002. Bobojon , Sughd 18. The Regulation on Economic Di- province, 2001. vision of Khukumat of Istravshan dis- 26. Operational Manual of the Chief trict city, Khukumat of Istravshan dis- of Economic Division of the Khuku- 10. The program on socio-economic trict, Istravshan district, 2002. mat of Istravshan city, Khukumat of development of Khujand city, 2001- Istravshan city, Istravshan city, 2002. 2005, Khukumat of Khujand city, 19. The Regulation on Economic Di- Sughd province, 2001. vision of Khukumat of Zafarobod dis- 27. Operational Manual of the Chief of Economic Division of the Khuku- 11. The program on socio-econom- trict city, Khukumat of Zafarobod mat of Zafarobod district, Khukumat district, Zafarobod district, 2002. ic development of Konibodom dis- of Zafarobod district, Zafarobod dis- trict, 2001-2005, Khukumat of Koni- 20. Operational Manual of the Chief trict, 2002. bodom district, Sughd province, of Economic Division of the Khuku- 28. Local governance: techniques of 2001. mat of Khujand, Khukumat of Khu- socio-economic growth, Saint Peters- jand city, Khujand city, 2002. 12. The Regulation on Economic Di- burg, 1999. vision of Khukumat of Khujand city, 21. Operational Manual of the Chief 29. Municipal management, under the Khukumat of Khujand city, Khujand of Economic Division of the Khuku- editorship of T. MOROZOVA, M., city, 2002. mat of Qairokkum city, Khukumat of YSRTI, 1997. 13. The Regulation on Economic Di- Qairokkum city, Qairokkum city, 30. The bases of management of vision of Khukumat of Qairokkum 2002. municipal administrations, A. VORO- city, Khukumat of Qairokkum city, 22. Operational Manual of the Chief NIN, V. LANIN, A. SHIROKOV, M., Qairokkum city, 2002. of Economic Division of the Khuku- Delo, 1998. 14. The Regulation on Economic Di- mat of Chkalovsk city, Khukumat of 31. The concept of reforming of in- vision of Khukumat of Chkalovsk city, Chkalovsk city, Chkalovsk city, ter-budget relations, The Messenger Khukumat of Chkalovsk city, Ch- 2002. of RIEI, No. 6, M., 2000. kalovsk city, 2002. 23. Operational Manual of the Chief 32. Regional policy and socio-eco- 15. The Regulation on Economic Di- of Economic Division of the Khuku- nomic disproportions, The Messen- vision of Khukumat of Bobojon mat of Bobojon Ghafurov district, ger of RIEI, No. 6, M., 2000. Ghafurov district, Khukumat of Bob- Khukumat of Bobojon Ghafurov dis- ojon Ghafurov district, Bobojon trict, Bobojon Ghafurov district, 33. European Charter on Local ad- Ghafurov district, 2002. 2002. ministration...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 47

Economic Relations between Centre and Regions: the Case of Sughd Province ...... Alijon Boymatov, Doctor of Economics, Professor

Synopsis ternational trade turnover, import and the Jamoats, has been unjustifiably export; separately review Sogd’s reduced. This is the first ever comprehensive cross-border trade with Uzbekistan study devoted to the emergence and Kyrgyzstan; stratify the markets and development of a market econ- I. The Sogd Region, Republic for domestic and imported goods; omy in the Sogd Region, Republic of of Tajikistan: Introduction and assess the influx of foreign in- Tajikistan. vestment into the region. The report contains 6 sections, cov- 1.1 Geography 4. Plurality of Ownership Formats in ering the different aspects of the Sogd Regional Economy. We ana- The Sogd Region is located in north- regional economy. lyze privatization as the groundwork ern Tajikistan, in the heart of Central 1. The Sogd Region: Introduction. A of a market economy; the growth Asia, bordering on the Uzbek regions geographic profile of the Sogd Re- of the private sector in industry, ag- of Tashkent, Jizak, Syrdarya, Samar- gion is followed by a description of riculture, retail, catering, services, and kand, Fergana, and Namangan, and the Gross Regional Product and its other forms of enterprise. the Kyrgyz regions of and Bat- structural variation, and an assessment ken. One of the principal Central 5. Emergence of Market Institutions. of the impact of transitional process- Asian waterways, the Syrdarya, We analyze the reasons of the one- es on the regional economy. flows through the Sogd Region, and time growth and subsequent decline many important international roads 2. Interregional Economic Ties. We of cooperative businesses, the and railways cross it. The region is look at commodity exchange trends strengthening of private companies, close to several major cities: Tash- between the Sogd Region and oth- and the growth of sole entrepreneur- er regions of Tajikistan before and ship as a form of small business. kent and in Uzbekistan, after independence, determine the and Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan (see map 6. The Center and the Region. We respective roles of industry and ag- in Annex 1). identify the flaws of the existing sys- riculture in interregional relations, tem of economic administration and Originally established on October 27, identify the driving factors of nation- the imperative need for its decen- 1939, the Sogd Region was recon- al disintegration, and review the flaws tralization; look at the reasons why stituted as an administrative entity on in the transportation sector as a hold- regional needs are ignored and the December 23, 1970. Its territory is back for interregional relations. same decision-making powers are 26,100 sq. km; population: 3. International Economic Ties of the given to different governmental bod- 1,956,300, of which 513,300 Sogd Region. We analyze the ies, and why the economic role of (26.2%) live in cities and towns, and change patterns in the region’s in- bottom-level administrative bodies, 1,443,000 (73.8%), in rural commu- 48 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

nities. Administratively, the region is summary index of national industrial During the Soviet era, Sogd was the divided into 10 cities, 20 townships, output; the same index for a region leading industrialized region of Tajiki- 14 districts, and 93 Jamoats. is Gross Regional Product (GRP). stan. In 1991, when Tajikistan be- Viewed in comparable prices, the came independent, Sogd was home The capital of the Sogd Region, Hu- region’s GRP dynamics reflected the to more than 2/3 of Tajikistan’s in- jand, is 2500 years old, located on general economic decline in the dustrial enterprises, employing a pro- the route of the ancient Great Silk years 1992 to 1996. In 1996, Sogd’s portionate percentage of industrial Road. GRP amounted to only 14.1% of the personnel and accounting for about Climate and Terrain: 1991 level, versus 32.5% for Tajiki- the same share of the national indus- The climate of the Sogd Region is stan overall. The GRP as a physical trial output. The region produced continental with steep seasonal and volume of goods and services steadi- 37.5% of Tajikistan’s GDP in 1991. diurnal fluctuations. A relatively cold ly declined over that period. The percentage plummeted to 16.3% in 1996, then slowly rose to winter is abruptly followed by a rainy Notably, it took a long time for the 21.2% in 2000, and 36.3% in 2002. spring that, with equal promptness, general economic decline to be re- gives way to a dry summer with next versed and turned into a general Conclusions: Sogd’s contribution to to no rainfall for months. Unstable air economic growth. the GDP declined in consequence of temperatures are typical for the au- (1) faster development and commer- tumn. The local flora is exceptionally The year 1997, when Tajikistan ce- cial realization of natural and other diverse and rich. The terrain is incred- mented its peace and national accord, resources in the south of the coun- ibly uneven and varies, from a height is considered the year when the try; and (2) small business develop- of 2000 m above sea level in the economy leveled out, although pro- ment, growing small factory output, Turkestan Ridges, to terraced flood duction grew 1.7% nationwide, and and more goods produced by self- plains along the Syrdarya, surround- 5.8% in the region. Despite the dev- employed sole proprietors. ed by the Adyrs (hills): Digmai, Isp- astating damage inflicted on the re- isor, Aqbel, Aqchop, and Supetau. gion by the incursion of armed mili- The table below shows aggregate Ice Age mountain lakes, particularly tants in November 1998, Sogd post- and per capita GRP figures for the the Alpine Lake Iskander-Kul, are ideal ed a GRP growth of 5.1% that year, Sogd Region in 1991 through 2002 holiday destinations. close to the national GDP growth of versus the same figures for Tajikistan 5.3% in 1998. Sogd did even better overall. in subsequent years, posting a GRP 1.2 Economy: Gross growth of 17.6% vs. 8.5% nation- Regional Product and its wide in 2000; 86.5% vs. 10.8% na- Structural Changes tionwide in 2001; and 11.6% vs. (GDP) is the 10.6% nationwide in 2002...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 49

Table 1 Sogd GRP Dynamics Versus Tajikistan’s GDP

Tajikistan Sogd Region

Total, Per capita Total, Per capita % vs. Years million million % share national somoni Somoni US $ somoni Somoni US $ average

1991 5872 962 390 2202 1316 555 37.5 142

1996 1908 301 127 311 174 74 16.3 137

1999 2119 334 141 415 229 97 19.6 69

2000 2295 362 152 487 256 108 21.2 71

2001 2529 399 168 910 471 199 36.0 118

2002 2799 431 182 1016 513 216 36.3 119

2002, % 47.7 46.5 46.5 46.1 39.0 39.0 - - vs. 1991

Notes to the table: 42% above the national average. By the GRP of the Sogd Region also 1996, the figure dropped to a record changed, having climbed from 18% 1. The average annual exchange rate low of US $74; it improved to US in 1998 to 48.6% in 2000. used to convert per capita GDP and $108 in 2000, and $216 in 2002, GRP figures to US $ was 2,37 somoni which, however, is only 39% of the = US $1; 1.3 Market Reform: the Impact 1991 level. of Transitional Processes 2. The 1991 GRP of the Sogd Re- The GRP structure by industry on Sogd Regional Economy gion includes the output of industrial changed dramatically, both in indus- and agricultural goods and commer- The collapse of the Soviet Union, try and agriculture. Over the period cial services rendered by construc- which made Tajikistan independent, reviewed, industry’s share in GRP rearranged the geopolitical and eco- tion, transportation, telecommunica- dropped from 64.7% in 1987 and nomic map of Central Asia. New tions, and consumer services provid- 63.6% in 1990 to 14.8% in 1996, borders cut Tajikistan off from its ers. representing a drop of 4.5 times. main trade partners: Russia and Ka- Later on, as former state-owned fac- The table above shows that per cap- zakhstan, disrupting long-standing tories were privatized and retooled, ita GRP bottomed out in 1998, but economic ties and transportation and a number of joint ventures were has since substantially recovered. The routes between the regions of neigh- launched, industry’s portion of the aggregate annual per capita value of boring newly independent states, GRP improved to 40.9% in 2002 goods and services produced in the including Sogd, and erecting artificial (see Graph 1 attached). Sogd Region in 1991 was 1316 barriers for the flows of goods, cap- somoni (in 2001 prices), or US $555, The pro rata share of agriculture in ital and people. Ties were also sev- 50 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

ered at the grassroots level. In Sovi- the transition was complicated and ter its products proved unable to et Uzbekistan, for instance, goods prolonged by the civil war, slow compete in a free market. In 1990, flows from the three Uzbek regions post-war recovery, proximity to the the factory manufactured 62.6 mil- of the and the rest source of instability in , lion sq. m of silk fabrics for export to of the country went by road and and a mass exodus of qualified engi- 18 countries. Now the factory no railway via the Sogd Region, while neering and managerial human re- longer produces any silk at all. Sogd had access to the mountainous sources. The hardships of transition A number of local defense industries Pamir Region of Tajikistan via the Osh were further aggravated by interre- had to close down when govern- Highway, now in Kyrgyzstan. These gional economic disparities, differenc- ment contracts stopped. Torgmash, roads and railways were always of es in regional specialization, and un- for one, which used to manufacture tremendous importance to the resi- equal opportunity in adapting to new ovens and vats for the Army, is dents of the Fergana Valley, which market realities. Three groups of dis- mostly idle these days. encompasses 6 regions in three coun- tricts in the Sogd Region proved par- tries, but are even more vital now, ticularly vulnerable to the adversities Moreover, 1/3 of state-run mining being less readily accessible. New of transition. industries in the Sogd Region used transportation links between cross- to be unprofitable and government- The first group includes the District border regions have been forming subsidized during the Soviet era. of Hujand: the cities of Hujand, Ch- very slowly. The Sogd Region found The second group includes some kalovsk, Kairakkum, Gafurov, and itself in virtual isolation, blocked off peripheral districts where the eco- others, where industry used to be from international markets. Widely nomic situation worsened as trans- practiced by customs authorities, highly concentrated and dedicated portation prices grew faster than the corruption and utter disregard for the to specific products that either prices of local products, eventually law facilitate cross-border contraband ceased to make a profit when pric- destroying the commercial rationale traffic, but hobble the legitimate busi- es became deregulated, or lost their of economic exchange within the ness of companies and self-em- markets as a result of severance of Sogd Region and, especially, with ployed small-time import/export long-standing ties. One example is other Tajik regions. Due to high operators sometimes called “shuttle the Kairakkum Carpet Factory (cur- transportation costs, remote districts traders.” rently Kolinho AOOT) that once op- like Asht, Zafarabad, Penjikent, erated facilities producing 11.5 mil- Another major development affect- Aina, Isfara, and Gornaya Matcha, lion square meters of quality carpets ing the economy of the Sogd Re- do more import/export business for all the 15 republics of the Union gion was the abrupt transition from a with the neighboring regions of as well as 13 states. planned, government regulated Uzbekistan than the rest of Tajiki- After the loss of these markets, pro- economy to a free market with ten- stan. The , for instance, duction plummeted, falling to an all uous government regulation. All new- produces a huge surplus of table . time low of 0.4 million sq. m of car- ly independent states opting for a In 2002, some 25,000 tons were pets in 2002. free-market economy underwent produced here, 3.5 times more than similar socioeconomic turmoil for The Hujand Silk Factory (currently the district needs, and the surplus varying periods of time. In Tajikistan, Abreshim AO) halted production af- was exported to other regions of ...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 51

Tajikistan and across the border. majority of qualified labor to leave grade their economies. On the oth- While is readily accessi- for Russia in search of work. er hand, liberalization of internation- ble for domestic suppliers, Isfara is al business has affected the districts Construction projects were frozen too far away for them to make a differently. Districts exporting prod- as investment stopped. Cheaper profit. As a result, Isfara imports ucts that command steady interna- imports killed the domestic consum- from the Osh and Batken Regions tional demand, e.g. cotton fiber, er industry, which produced ready- of Kyrgyzstan. especially its fine-fiber varieties, silk- to-wear clothing, shoes, and ho- worm moth cocoons, tobacco, and The third group comprises districts siery. The once-thriving silk indus- some others, have reaped the most that once received large govern- try was eradicated. While preva- benefits. These include the districts ment subsidies to invest and subsi- lently agricultural districts were less of Matcha, Zafarabad, Jabbor-Ra- dize production, but lost those in- affected by crisis trends, they suf- soul, Hojent, Kanibadam, Asht, and come streams after the Union fell fered from the shortages of herbi- Spitamen, which grow regular cot- apart. Among these districts are the cides, mineral fertilizers, machinery, ton; Aina and Penjikent, which grow particularly remote and inaccessible technology, and other farming sup- tobacco; Isfara, Kanibadam, and Aina and Gornaya Matcha. Here, plies. This caused a slump in both Hojent, which grow ; the pota- stocks have to be brought in well land productivity and harvest to exporting districts: Gornaya ahead of time as the only road link- yields. Cotton yield dropped from Matcha, Gancha, Ura-Tiube, and ing these mountainous areas with the 30.2 centners per hectare in 1990 Shahristan; and silkworm growing rest of the country via the Shahr- to 18.1 centners in 2002, or 40%; districts: Hojent, Kanibadam, Spita- istan and Passes is impass- , from 34.5 c per hectare to men, and Jabbor-Rasoul. able from November until May, 27.4 c, or 21%; tobacco, from when goods can only be delivered 32.5 c/ha to 19.7 c/ha, or 41%; Districts filled with industries that have by air. potatoes, from 130 c/ha to 100 failed to compete with the imports, The beginning of market transition was c/ha, or 23%; corn, from 245 c/ or are strongly dependent on expen- marred by a profound economic cri- ha to 140 c/ha, or 44%; and so sive imported raw materials, supplies, sis that struck all Tajik regions with- on. or components, have found them- out exception in the early 90s, re- selves at a disadvantage. These in- Liberalization of international trade shaping Sogd’s economy out of rec- clude Kairakkum, Chkalovsk, and is a transitional process that has oc- ognition. smaller towns: Chorruh-Dairon, Adr- casioned the most dramatic eco- asman, Kansai, and Shurab. The crisis took different forms in ev- nomic changes in the Sogd Region, ery Tajik region. Home to about 2/ accelerating market transformation The districts attracting the highest 3 of Tajikistan’s industry, Sogd was and enabling the region to benefit percentage of trade/reselling, and hit the hardest. As markets were cut from the international division of la- financial business have derived max- off and government contracts bor. Sogd districts have acquired imum benefits from the opportuni- stopped, production came to a vir- direct, independent access to inter- ties of market transition. Hujand, Ist- tual standstill, resulting in sweeping national markets to trade and raise aravshan, and Gafurov are the most , and impelling the foreign investment in order to up- successful of those. 52 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

II. Interregional Economic Ties in excess of local needs, or the prod- in Tabashar; paints and varnishes, in of the Sogd Region: Before ucts of narrowly specialized local fac- Isfara; coal, in Shurab; fruit and veg- and After Independence tories, dedicated to the manufacture etable preserves, in Hujand, Gafu- of few product names or even one rov, Kanibadam, Penjikent, and Is- only. fara. 2.1 Regional Industry Within The manufacture of carpets is con- a System of Interregional Links The table below lists 8 consumer centrated in Kairakkum; silk fabrics product groups making up the bulk Goods exported from Sogd to oth- and leather shoes, in Hujand; outdoor of interregional trade flows. er Tajik regions are those produced wear, in Istaravshan; rubber boots,

Table 2 Industrial Output in Sogd, and Exports to Other Tajik Regions

1990 2002 Years Output Export Production Export

Description Total Â% Total Â%

Carpets and similar products, million sq. m 10.9 3.4 31.2 0.4 0.1

Silk fabrics, million sq. m 62.6 21.0 33.5 0.2 - -

Outdoor garments, million units 8.3 5.4 65.2 0.1 - -

Rubber boots, million pairs 6.3 4.2 66.8 0.1 - -

Leather shoes, million pairs 4.2 2.6 62.3 0.1 - -

Coal, thousand tons 475 252 53.2 24 - -

Paints and varnishes, thousand tons 13 6.0 45,5 0.1 - -

Fruit and vegetable preserves, million 215 41 19.3 126 19 15.3 conventional cans

Notes to the table: 2. Other industrial products manufac- ported much fewer industrial prod- tured in the Sogd Region were sup- ucts to other Tajik regions, includ- 1. During the Soviet era, Tajikistan plied to other regions as required by was mandated to export carpets and ing: fermented tobacco leaf for to- the state pro rata to regional popu- similar products, silk fabrics, and fruit bacco factories, pure alcohol for a lation figures. In addition, Sogd ex- & vegetable preserves to the rest distillery in Dushanbe, non-alcoholic ported lighting fixtures (Isfara Facto- of the Union and abroad. That’s why beverages and spring water, and ry), and gas appliances (Hujand Fac- their respective shares in interregional fruit and vegetable preserves, juic- tory). turnover were lower: 31.2%, es, and marinades for retail distribu- 33.5%, and 19.3% respectively. 3. In 2002, the Sogd Region ex- tion...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 53

2.2 Regional Agriculture Within a trade of the Sogd Region, which tion, and exports them to other re- System of Interregional Links both uses , melons, po- gions, primarily to the capital, Dush- tatoes, fruit, berries, and anbe. Agricultural produce has played an other produce for internal consump- increasing role in the interregional

Table 3 Agricultural Exports from Sogd to Other Tajik Regions (thousand tons)

Average price Total exports Internal Output Exports (2 - 3) per ton, (4x5), million consumption thousand somoni somoni

1 2 3 4 5 6

Potatoes 126.4 59.6 66.8 450 30.1

Vegetables 181.1 152.3 28.8 550 15.8

Fruit 67.2 47.0 20.2 960 19.4

Melons 15.5 10.5 5.0 350 1.8

Grapes 23.1 12.1 11.0 1100 12.1

Total: 413.3 281.5 131.8 - 79.2

Notes to the table: grapes worth 79 million somoni or time and transportation factors are US $25,500 million, in 2002. of the essence to the livelihood of 1. The agricultural output totals in the local population and the future column 2 include all farm formats: Conclusions: of local potato farming in Gornaya state-run, private farms, and private 1. One of the main potato growing vegetable patches. Matcha. districts is Gornaya Matcha, which 2. are the only vegetable 2. Internal consumption (col. 3) was turned out 34,000 tons, or 27% of that, along with such as apri- tallied based on the findings of a Sogd’s potato harvest in 2002, av- cots, peaches, pomegranates, and door-to-door poll, conducted by the eraging 1920 kg per capita. Pota- grapes, are exported to eastern and national statistics authority among toes provide the only income stream northern Russia, and are partially ex- 10% of the region’s population to for the locals, who are entirely de- empt from customs duty. These ex- determine per capita consumption of pendent on their potato sales. Being ports were included in our interre- agricultural produce, and Sogd’s per- aware of this, the government has gional commodity exchange figures. manent population figures for 2002. officially given local farmers full dis- 3. According to our calculations, the cretion to sell their potato harvest to Imports from other Tajik regions Sogd Region exported more than any buyers, domestic or internation- are a crucial supply source for the 130,000 tons of potatoes, other al, for cash or in exchange for any Sogd market. The following goods vegetables, fruits, melons, and goods or produce they need. The were shipped into the Sogd Region 54 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

from Dushanbe in 1990: household trade has equalized domestic and ing and a general commodity mar- refrigerators, cotton fabrics, non-wo- international prices, triggering a dra- ket slump, the accelerated decline ven fabrics, hosiery, leather shoes, matic slump in interregional trade. of interregional commodity exchange cigarettes, furniture, candy, pasta, This has resulted in a situation when, has been driven by very consider- fats, farm animals, and much more. over the past 5 years, international able changes in the value of prod- The region also imported cabling prod- trade has supplied an average of ucts exchanged. As many domestic ucts, pipe fittings, cement, slate roof- 64.2% of domestic consumer products lost their competitive edge ing, and other industrial supplies. needs in industrial/technical goods domestically, they have been super- (excluding electric power), leaving seded by imports in interregional From the Hatlon Region, Sogd im- only 3% to interregional suppliers; exchanges. Hujand and Istaravshan ported mineral fertilizers, caustic, the percentages for consumer are the main import destinations, from carbamide, ammonia (all produced goods are 32.3% and 12%, re- where goods are shipped on to oth- by the Vahsh Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant spectively, which signifies an ex- er Tajik regions. and Yava Chemicals), power trans- treme weakness of domestic trade formers (Kurgan-Tiube Factory), sub- links, and virtual disintegration of the tropical fruit and derivative products. 2.3Transportation Problems as an domestic economic environment in Obstacle to Interregional Trade Sogd imported porcelain tableware Tajikistan. from Tursun-Zade, sparkling wines The curtailment of interregional trade At the same time, the majority of from , wool from Kuliab, flows was mainly the fault of trans- enterprises in all industries have dras- and unprocessed gems from Horog. portation challenges. Shipping rates tically downsized production; do- grew faster than the prices of the These trade links have since been mestic products have been substi- goods shipped, significantly reduc- eradicated, and these goods flows tuted with imports; and able individ- ing demand for transportation ser- no longer exist. uals are finding it ever harder to find vices. Cargo carriage operations in employment domestically. Conclusions: the Sogd Region have dropped dra- 1. Full liberalization of external 2. Along with production downsiz- matically as a result:

1991 1995 2001 2001 vs. 1991

Goods shipped, million tons 22.8 3.2 1.4 16 times down

Cargo flow, million tons/km 405 5,8 19 21 times down

A part of the truck pool has been trucks are idle due to a lack of fuel not necessarily a bad thing. The mar- privatized. These vehicles and their or shipping engagements. ket transition put an end to many ir- owners are currently doing business rational and unsound economic prac- Conclusions: outside the region, mostly in Russia, tices imposed on enterprises report- , and Uzbekistan. Some 1. A drop in interregional trade was ing to the same ministries. For in- ...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 55

stance, silk fabrics made in Dushan- moting interregional commodity ex- is largely conditioned by domestic be were shipped to the Hujand Silk change. macroeconomic processes. As the Factory for processing and dyeing, GRP improved appreciably and ma- then finished fabrics were shipped jor industrial enterprises were priva- III. International Economic Ties back to Dushanbe for sale. tized and resumed operation, im- of the Sogd Region port/export activity picked up in 2. The most important improvement the Sogd Region. On the other was that new integration factors ap- 3.1 International Trade hand, the region is too dependent peared with transition. For example, and its Change Dynamics manufacturers now have a vested on more advanced CIS economies, In an independent Tajikistan, interna- interest in overcoming regional mar- especially Russia, and has to import tional trade is the key to socioeco- ket boundaries, and exploring new the bulk of its energy resources. nomic progress nationwide and in the markets. This interest is encouraged This dependency adversely affects regions. by the regional authorities, realizing import/export trade, causing seri- that expanding production and grow- The domestic market in small coun- ous disproportions and develop- ing sales boost government reve- tries like Tajikistan tends to depend mental difficulties. Looking at the nues, family incomes, and reduce heavily on international trade, which import/export dynamics, we can unemployment. largely shapes economic reproduc- see how the operation of these tion and makes sure the needs of factors conditioned fluctuations in 3. Regional disintegration processes both local manufacturers and individ- the import/export turnover, which have continued unabated in Tajikistan uals/homesteads are adequately reached US $309.6 million in 1997, since the Soviet Union collapsed. met by market supply. The Sogd then dropped to US $284.4 million Deterioration in interregional trade Region is located in such a way that in 1998. and economic ties is the mainspring its links to other Tajik regions remain of spatial economic disintegration in In 2002, the Sogd Region posted an severed for 6 to 8 months every Tajikistan. To halt this process, it is import/export turnover of 749.4 autumn and winter season (when necessary to step up domestic man- million somoni (US $281.7 million at mountain passes are inaccessible), ufacture of goods to supersede im- the official average exchange rate which makes its industries and popu- ports. The choice of an import-sub- of the National Bank of Tajikistan that lation so much more dependent on stitution strategy in economic devel- year), 6.5% up from 2000 and international trade. opment will lay down the ground- 26.7% higher than 1996, but 11% work for new economic ties, pro- The state of import/export trade below the 1997 level. 56 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Table 4 Import/Export Trade of the Sogd Region, 1996-2002

2002, % vs. Index Years 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 1996 2000

Total, US $ million, including: 222.2 284.7 264.9 272.6 281.7 127 106

Export: US $ million 52.4 63.1 64.1 62.5 65.2 124 102

% vs. total 23.6 22.2 24.2 23.0 23.2 - -

Import: US $ million 169.8 221.6 200.8 210.1 216.5 127 108

% vs. total 76.4 77.8 75.8 77.0 76.8 - -

During the entire period reviewed, 2. Import/export has a major role in colleges has paved the way for elec- the regional trade balance was shaping domestic supply. In the Sogd tronic commerce. In the Sogd Region, plagued by a deficit with imports far Region, upwards of 1/3 of foods people already search the Web for exceeding exports. and 3/4 consumer goods on the prospective partners to do business market come from extraneous sup- Conclusions: together, advertise, buy, sell, pro- ply sources. mote different products, and so on. 1. International trade is the main source of new technology and pro- 3. Import/export trade can also re- duction equipment for the Sogd Re- shape domestic consumer needs. In 3.2 Scope and Structure gion, enabling domestic manufactur- the Sogd Region, the growing inter- of Exports from the Sogd Region national orientation of production has ers to enlarge and diversify their prod- It is interesting to look at Sogd’s in- deepened the gap between de- uct portfolios, improve production ternational trade ties with other processes and make their products mand, which reflects the level and states in the former Soviet Union more competitive. Having launched structure of international commodity (FSU)/Commonwealth of Indepen- new, advanced production lines, supply, and the poor options of dent States (CIS), and the rest of Zarafshon JV (in 1993-1994), Kab- meeting that demand with domestic the world (ROW): Europe, Asia, the ul-Tajik Textiles JV (1994-1996), Jav- production. Whereas some markets Americas, the Middle East, etc. oni (1996-1997), Obi-Zulol JV, and have become competitive, the IT a few other companies boosted market is still in a fledgling state. The The table below shows Sogd’s ex- Sogd’s export potential very consid- rapid arrival of computers, the Inter- port figures for the FSU and the rest erably. net, and email facilities in schools and of the world: ...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 57

Table 5 Sogd Exports to FSU and ROW

1996 1998 2000 2001 2002

Export total, including: 52.4 63.5 64.1 62.5 65.2

FSU

US $ million 27.5 10.5 19.1 16.9 10.1

% vs. total 52.5 16.5 29.8 27.1 15.5

ROW

US $ million 24.9 53.0 45.0 45.6 55.1

% vs. total 47.5 83.5 70.2 72.9 84.5

The share of FSU destinations in Sogd Union. The Sogd Region supplied up of the regional export portfolio exports has been decreasing year 35% to 50% of Tajik exports. changed after Tajikistan gained inde- on year. pendence. During the Soviet era, Traditionally, the Sogd Region exports group 1 products (raw materials) In 2002, CIS destinations, including three types of commodities: the former Soviet Baltic republics made up 70% of regional exports; 1. Raw materials: cotton fiber, silk- , and , account- group 2, 12%; and group 3, 18%. worm cocoons, rare-earth metals, ed for 15.5% of Sogd exports ver- After Tajikistan became independent, concentrates, and other goods after sus 29.8% in 2000, and 52.5% in these percentages changed to 81%, primary processing; 1996. No trade as such existed be- 8%, and 11%, respectively. The shift in favor of a higher percentage of tween the former Soviet republics; 2. Halfway finished products that group one exports (products after all commodity exchanges went ac- have gone through several succes- primary processing) does not bode cording to a centrally designed in- sive processing cycles, but are not well for the economy, signifying high- ter-republic supply plan, which yet ready for use or consumption: er dependency on raw materials amounted to very substantial sums. undyed cotton and silk fabrics, fer- exports. This trend needs to be re- In the years from 1987 through mented tobacco, unrefined gerani- versed. 1991, commodity exchange be- um oil for perfumes, dried herbs, tween Tajikistan and other republics etc. While the regional authorities right- of the Union reached an average of fully view import-export trade as a 3. Fully processed products that 65% to 72% of the republic’s GDP way to generate foreign currency, are ready for use: between 50 and annually; 80% to 85% of Tajik im- relieve excessive dependency on a 60 product items. port/export transactions were con- few exportable product items, ex- ducted with other republics in the It is interesting to see how the make- pand export geography, and reori- 58 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

ent foreign trade towards countries export destinations outside the FSU million. Tajikistan mainly exports cot- outside the FSU, these favorable was 47.5% in 1996, 72.9% in 2000, ton fiber, cotton yarn, denim trou- changes have been progressing and 84.7% in 2002, currently total- sers, and a few other commodities very slowly. The share of Sogd’s ing 146.5 million somoni, or US $55.2 to Europe.

Table 6 Exports of Cotton Fiber, Cotton Yarn, and other Cotton Products from Sogd to Europe and the US, US $ thousand

Country Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total, 5 years

Switzerland 9400 26893 18146 16494 7246 70129

UK 194 2231 4087 4844 4501 15837

Germany 924 1456 205 692 317 3614

Austria 6485 7147 4927 4904 6607 30000

Slovakia 72 - 483 762 421 1838

Italy 2254 6236 7907 5032 5731 27210

Portugal - - - 565 693 1258

Belgium - 12206 12248 6365 5674 36503

Spain - 375 579 287 - 1241

US - 1905 2430 887 - 5222

Between 1996 and 2002, the Sogd Korean joint ventures using up-to- Germany, Slovakia, , , Region exported US $192.8 million date textile equipment based in the and the US. worth of cotton fiber, cotton yarn, Sogd Region, are Switzerland, which Sogd has recently launched cotton fabrics, and other cotton products absorbed US $70.1 million, or 36.4% exports to Israel, South Korea, Chi- to nine European countries and the of Sogd’s aggregate cotton exports na, Vietnam, UAE, , and some , which represents to Europe and the US, in 5 years; other countries. 92.2% of Sogd’s exports of these followed by Belgium with US $36.5 commodities, totaling US $209.1 million, or 18.9%; Austria with US $30 Sogd exports to the former Soviet million for the five years in question. million, or 15.6%; Italy with US $27.2 Union include fruit and juice million, or 14.1%; and the UK with worth between 7 and 10 million The top five importers of cotton fi- US $15.3 million, or 8.2%. somoni (US $2.6-3.8 million) annual- ber, yarn, and 100% cotton fabrics ly; quartz powder (US $500,000 to produced by Tajik-Italian and Tajik- Lesser volumes were imported by ...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 59

1 million); industrial explosives (US $8- wines, Shifo balsam, geranium oil, 3.3 Imports and Local 9 million); buses (US $1 million); car- karakul, fine-fiber cotton, natural silk Distribution Challenges pets (US $500,000), and much more. fabrics, healing herbs, and some oth- Sogd’s imports have been increas- In addition, Sogd exports a range of er products that require great num- ing constantly to keep up with the agricultural products to the CIS and bers of unqualified labor to produce. growing needs of homesteads and the Baltic states. Untraditional exports are expected industries in both consumer and in- Conclusions: to be profitable due to: dustrial goods of various descrip-

The Sogd Region will have to step 1. low production costs; tion. In 2002, the region imported up the output of these products to goods worth 576.5 million somoni, 2. sufficient local labor pool with ad- be able to boost exports, but in the or US $216.6 million, 8.3% or US equate skills and experience; meantime, there are opportunities for $16.5 million up from 2000, and Sogd to further diversify into less 3. the labor market is saturated, and 27.5% or US $46.7 million up from customary exports such as vintage part-time employment is widespread. 1996.

Table 7 Sogd’s Imports from FSU and ROW

Years 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002

Total imports, US $ million 169.8 221.6 200.8 210.1 216.5

FSU, US $ million) 161.6 214.6 183.6 193.4 202.2

% vs. total 95.1 96.8 91.4 92.1 93.5

ROW, US $ million 8.2 7.0 17.2 16.7 14.3

% vs. total 4.9 3.2 8.6 7.9 6.5

Unlike exports, Sogd mainly imports Uzbekistan, supplying US $169 mil- with the low purchasing power of goods from the FSU. In the past 5 lion annually, or 84.5% of total im- Sogd consumers, who typically earn years, FSU countries have supplied ports coming into Sogd; Italy with up to US $10 a month. an average of 90% to 95% of US $10.3 million, or 0.5%; Kazakh- 2. In large cities like Tashkent, Bish- Sogd’s imports, leaving only 5% to stan with US $8.2 million (0.4%); kek and Almaty, major wholesalers 10% to the rest of the world. Russia with US $7.3 million (0.4%); from China, North Korea, , and the UK with US $3.5 million The Sogd Region currently imports and Russia have set up joint ventures from 12 countries in the FSU, 14 (0.2%). with local companies, operating large countries in Europe, and 17 coun- Conclusions: distribution warehouses where goods tries in the ROW. 1. The mix and prices of goods im- are cheaper to purchase and import The top five exporters to Sogd are ported from the FSU are more in line into the Sogd Region. 60 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

3.4 Cross-Border Trade gana, Namangan, Tashkent, Jizak, The table below shows the volume with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and Samarkand, as well as the Osh and mix of Sogd’s import and ex- Of particular note are the trade links and Batken . port from the neighboring regions, the Sogd Region has with the cross- These neighboring regions are cru- excluding electricity and natural border : Fer- cial to Sogd’s economy. gas.

Table 8 Sogd’s Cross-Border Trade with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan

Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan

5 years, 5 years, 1996 2000 1996 2000 1996-2000 1996-2000)

Total trade turnover, US $ million 23.0 14.7 62.3 1.3 0.5 5.9

Export 14.2 6.3 17.1 1.2 0.2 3.1

Import 8.8 8.4 45.2 0.1 0.3 2.8

These figures indicate a negative from Kyrgyzstan remained more and 55% to 60% of the region’s trade balance for the Sogd Region in balanced during the same time peri- exports to Kyrgyzstan. its cross-border trade with Uzbeki- od. The Sogd Region has stable export stan. Sogd’s steady exports to the neigh- contracts in place for 20 commodity Over the five years reviewed, im- boring countries include industrial ex- items with Uzbekistan, and 12 items ports from these regions, worth a plosives and quartz powder, used in with Kyrgyzstan. total of US $45.2 million, exceeded glass manufacture, which together The table below shows a break- exports, worth US $17.1 million, by account for 90% to 93% on aver- down of exports from the Sogd more than 2.6 times. Import/export age of Sogd’s exports to Uzbekistan, Region...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 61

Table 9 Cross-Border Exports from Sogd to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan

(US $ thousand)

Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Commodity 5 years, 5 years, 1996 2000 1996 2000 1996-2000 1996-2000

Quartz powder 500 400 3047 250 126 397

Industrial explosives 8560 5693 38024 110 50 1213

Crude oil 1640 112 865 - - -

Gypsum powder 110 68 268 12 3 16

Lead - - - - - 49

Paints and varnishes 80 12 45 - 450 14

Drilling equipment - - 10 - - 30

Furniture - - - - - 40

Buses - - 29 - - -

Other 283 75 331 1540 167 990

Notes to the table: tons of crude oil annually during the 3. ZIL-Hujand JV manufactures me- Soviet era. dium-range buses for sale to Uzbeki- 1. The region extracts crude oil, which stan and Kazakhstan. is then refined at the Fergana Refin- 2. Tajikistan does not manufacture ery in Uzbekistan, but Sogd retains oil drilling equipment, yet has export- The Sogd Region imports 33 com- preferential quotas on purchases of ed a quantity of such equipment in modity items from the cross-bor- gasoline, diesel fuel, and other oil recent years, apparently taken from der regions of Uzbekistan, worth products from the refinery. Sogd Soviet equipment stocks still remain- US $8.4 million annually, and 8 produced up to 250,000-300,000 ing at the warehouses. items from Kyrgyzstan, worth US $300,000. 62 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Table 10 Cross-Border Imports into Sogd from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Excluding Electricity and Gas

(US $ thousand)

Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Commodity 5 years, 5 years, 1996 2000 1996 2000 1996-2000 1996-2000

Cement 203 377 1821 - - -

Gasoline 892 162 3774 54 124 237

Diesel fuel 6656 2416 21503 - - -

Lubricants 414 91 1538 - - -

Glassware 58 80 374 - - -

Nitrogenous fertilizers - 592 3678 - - -

Tractors - - 975 - - -

Chemical fiber - - 1320 - - -

Natural wool - - - 7 22 57

Yarn - 2430 4535 - - -

Flour 26 41 85 - 452 562

Cotton seed oil 39 - 185 - - -

Other 540 2212 7688 39 304 1814

Notes to the table: sel fuel (28.5%), yarn and chemical ports mainly flour (23%) and gaso- fiber (34.5%), nitrogenous fertilizers line (9.2%) from the Osh Region of 1. From cross-border regions in (7.2%), and other goods. Sogd im- Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan Sogd imports mainly die- ...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 63

2. Typically, trade deals between with customs, fiscal authorities, and rency, putting a heavy strain on Sogd and its cross-border partner banks. Sogd’s balance of payments. With regions in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan this in mind, the Sogd regional gov- Although Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are made on an ad hoc basis, and ernment has been taking steps to cap have officially agreed to offset a are prone to sizable variation in pric- energy imports and streamline con- portion of electricity supplied from es and supply mixes. sumption. Uzbekistan to the Sogd Region with Cross-border trade is strongly affect- power supply from Tajikistan’s Nurek The figures below show how elec- ed by market changes, including Hydroelectric Power Plant across the tricity and gas imports to Sogd from domestic output, transportation rates, border to the Surkhandarya and Kash- Uzbekistan have decreased in recent customs duties, and how easy it is kadarya Regions of Uzbekistan, ac- years: to clear imported/exported goods tual payments are made in hard cur-

1999 2000 2001 2002 2002, %

Electricity (million kW/hr) 3484 3145 343 2911 83,6

Natural gas (million m3) 169.5 167.2 158.2 123.6 72.9

This signifies two contrasting patterns natural gas. The situation was ex- 7 years to supply electricity to small in energy use: firstly, industries tend acerbated by the continued use of rural communities. to abandon the high-cost strategy, old, high energy-consuming equip- 3. Cost-conscious use of imported which was widespread in the Soviet ment by regional industries and oth- energy; minimizing network losses. Union, realizing that it impedes the er power consumers, which can- Network losses currently add up to chances of upgrading production and celled out the potential benefits of as much as 1/5 of imported energy improving resource management; low labor costs and cheap raw supply. secondly, market pricing practices materials. are gaining wider circulation in the 4. Accelerated construction of the Earning salaries around or below 32 relations between electric companies LEP-500 South-North power line; the somoni a month (US $10), locals are and consumers as both come to bet- feasibility study for this project, and unable to make timely payment for ter understand the equivalent value pre-construction groundwork, had the energy products they consume. exchange principles governing the util- been completed in Soviet time. Essentially, shortage of energy has ities market. emerged as the greatest single im- Conclusions: pediment to economic growth in the 3.5 Market Structure Sogd Region. for Domestic and Imported Goods 1. As the Soviet energy supply sys- in the Sogd Region tem fell apart, Sogd industries and 2. The choice has been made in fa- homesteads alike found themselves vor of smaller HEPP construction. It is important to identify the different desperately short of electricity and Three small HEPPs have been built in market segments for domestic and 64 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

imported goods, in order to find an The market for imported consumer to meet the demand of up- optimal import/export proportion, ra- goods other than food shows similar per class consumers for pre- tionalize imports and exports, and de- differences between segments. Many mium, organically grown termine the region’s potential to meet products are not manufactured in suf- foods. domestic market needs and earn hard ficient quantities domestically, or not currency to purchase the necessary at all, and have to be imported from 3.6 Foreign Investment goods abroad (see Graph 2). the FSU or farther afield. Sogd imports in the Sogd Region all its television and radio sets, sports Imports supply 32.3% of Sogd’s Another important aspect of inter- equipment, “cultural” utility products, consumer market, so one in every regional relations is extraneous, or timber, motorcycles, automobiles, three somoni paid by consumers is foreign, investment. While foreign computers, paper and stationery. paid for an imported product. For investment has been limited so far consumer goods other than food, Other goods are imported as nec- in the Sogd Region, it is on the imports make up 74.3% of the sup- essary to meet local demand, if lo- grow. As sociopolitical and econom- ply, leaving only 25.7% to domestic cal output is insufficient. ic climate improved in the region, products. Conclusions: a better environment was created for an influx of investment dollars. In the food segment, imports make Sogd imports from the FSU and Indeed, foreign investors are in- up 17% of the supply. Key imports ROW: creasingly sizing up investment op- include tea and sugar (100% import- to meet the demand for portunities in Tajikistan’s Sogd Re- ed), flour (72%), confectionery goods not available domesti- gion. (69%), vegetable oil (33%), seafood cally; preserves (100%), butter and The table below shows foreign in- spreads (27%), and pasta to meet local demand for vestment dynamics in Tajikistan and (18%), brandy and sparkling wine better quality foods, not avail- Sogd over the ten years since inde- (72%), beer (23%), and soft bever- able in sufficient quantities pendence. ages (13%). domestically;

Table 11 Foreign Investment in Tajikistan and Sogd, 1991-2001 (US $ million)

Direct investment Other investment Total

Amount % vs. total Amount % vs. total Amount %

Tajikistan 248.9 61.8 154.4 38.2 403.3 100

Sogd Region 202.1 94.8 11.3 5.2 213.4 100

Sogd vs. Tajikistan, % 81.2 - 7.3 - 52.9 - ...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 65

Notes to the table: 2. The highest percentage of foreign 3. Other investment, including health- capital has been invested directly: care, education, small and medium- 1. More than half (52.9%) of for- US $249 million nationwide and US sized enterprise development, aid to eign investment in Tajikistan goes to $202 million, or 81.2% of the total, farmers, etc. totals US $154 million the Sogd Region. Over the ten years, in Sogd. Direct investment is usually nationwide, and only US $11 million foreign investors have invested US made in joint ventures (JVs), the num- in Sogd, or 7.3% of total foreign in- $403 million in Tajikistan, US $213 ber of which has reached 105 na- vestment in the region. million of it in Sogd. tionwide, and 34 in Sogd.

Table 12 Foreign Investment in Tajikistan and Sogd by Provenance: FSU or ROW

Tajikistan Sogd Region Index Incl. Incl. Origin Total Total Direct Other Direct Other

FSU

- US $ million 1.8 1.7 0.1 1.6 1.6 -

- % vs. total 0.5 0.7 - 0.8 0.8 -

Äàëüíåå çàðóáåæüå

-- US $ million 401.5 247.2 154.3 211.8 200.5 11.3

- % vs. total 99.5 99.3 100 99.2 99.2 100

Èòîãî:

- US $ million 400.3 248.9 154.4 213.4 202.1 11.3

- % 100 100 100 100 100 100

Notes to the table: from the Soviet Union. million), South Korea (US $53.4 mil- lion), Italy (US $39.5 million), Luxem- 1. As the majority of newly inde- 2. The majority (99.2%) of direct bourg pendent states in the former Soviet investment and 100% of other in- Union share the same economic hard- vestment in the Sogd Region was (US $31.2 million), the ships, the entire US $1.8 million in made by investors from countries (US $ 3.6 million), Switzerland foreign investment originating in the outside the FSU. FSU was invested by Russia, which (US $2.4 million), Vietnam (US $2.5 is keen to maintain its interests in 3. Nations having invested in Sogd million), Austria (US $1.8 million), and certain defense industries remaining directly include the UK (US $93.6 the US (US $8 million). 66 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Notably the geography of incoming Conclusions: IV. Plurality of Enterprise Formats investment flows expanded from in Sogd Regional Economy 1. Foreign investment has enabled only 2 investor nations in 1991 to 27 the Sogd Region to draw more ex- in 2001. The leading direct investors tensively on its natural resources and 4.1Privatization, the Groundwork in Sogd are the 6 European nations labor pool, improve production man- of a Market Economy listed above, having committed US agement, build up export potential, The private sector was formed $176 million, or 87.2% of total ma- and successfully continue market re- through privatization in the Sogd Re- jor investment in Sogd, between forms. gion. them over the ten years. 2. Foreign investment is crucial for Privatization or other ways of con- 4. Other - indirect - investments those industries that urgently need a veying government property to pri- come to Tajikistan from: the UK (US shot in the arm to begin manufactur- vate owners, form the groundwork $64.6 million), the US (US $55.2 mil- ing up-to-date, competitive products, of any market economy. A growing lion), the (US $13.7 mil- especially groceries, consumer private sector, formed through trans- formation of government property lion), Germany (US $5.4 million), and goods, services, pharmaceuticals, into collective, joint, cooperative, the (UAE) (US and other essential commodities. $4.3 million), who have committed rented, or other property formats, 3. The priority targets for foreign in- relieves the government from financ- a total of US $143.2 million to the vestors in the Sogd Region are: ing economically unviable investment Tajik economy, or 92.8% of all sim- needs and losses, while participation ilar investments in the country over revitalization and retooling of of foreign capital in the privatization the decade. Major indirect investors facilities to process, store, process creates new investment ship, and trade in agricultural in the Sogd Region are the UK, Ger- opportunities. Privatization of gov- many, the US, and Japan. produce; ernment property is the best way At the city level, the cities attracting fuel and energy sectors as- to encourage citizens to engage in private enterprise. the highest percentage of foreign sociated with the construction investment in Sogd are Penjikent with of hydro and thermal electric In the Sogd Region, privatization US $101.3 million, including US $91.7 power plants, small HEPPs, policies have been aimed to achieve million in direct and US $9.6 million in development and extraction two goals: firstly, to form a class of other investment, adding up to more of oil, gas, and rare earth private owners, the core of private than 50% of total foreign investment metals; enterprise and, secondly, to de-mo- nopolize the economy, unbundle in Sogd to date. The next runners-up modern infrastructure devel- conglomerates and major enterpris- are Hujand with US $99.8 million, Ist- opment, including transporta- es, differentiate production and thus aravshan with US $8 million, Kairak- tion, telecommunications, create a favorable climate for com- kum with US $2.1 million, and Za- warehouses, business facili- petition. These goals have not yet farabad District with US $1.7 million. ties, and services. been achieved in full...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 67

Table 13 Privatization of Government Property in the Sogd Region

Index/year Ãîäû 1991 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total

No. of enterprises privatized

Tajikistan 39 434 696 1264 1538 648 417 542 6837

Sogd Region 3 147 238 477 395 114 75 111 2110

% vs. total 7.7 33.8 34.2 37.7 25.7 17.6 18.1 20.5 30.8

A total of 6837 enterprises have been The figures in the table above sug- um-sized enterprises were general- privatized in Tajikistan since the priva- gest that the bulk of enterprises were ly in local or municipal ownership, tization drive began in 1991, 2110 of privatized from 1997 to 2000, when while major ones were owned by them, or 30.8% of the lot, in the Sogd 4146 enterprises, or 60.7% were the central government. Their respec- Region. Another 18.1% were priva- privatized in 4 years nationwide, and tive percentages in the aggregate tized in Dushanbe; 39.7% in the Hat- 1224, or 58.2%, in the Sogd Re- number of enterprises privatized in lon Region, 2.2% in the Gorno-Bada- gion. khshan Autonomous Region, and 10 years, 1991 to 2001, was as fol- 16.2% elsewhere in Tajikistan. Before privatization, small and medi- lows:

Tajikistan Sogd Region

Central government property 1050 enterprises, or 19.4% 184, or 10.1%

Municipal property 5400, or 80.6% 1826, or 89.9%

Total: 6450, or 100% 2010, or 100%

The table below shows the structure zation portfolios by industry as they of central and local property privati- shaped up between 1991 and 2001. 68 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Table 14 Government Property Privatization by Industry, 1991-2001

Central government Local government

Industry/Ownership Incl. Sogd Region Incl. Sogd Region Tajikistan Tajikistan % vs. % vs. No. No. Tajikistan Tajikistan

Manufacturing 88 24 27.3 32 13 40.6

Construction 99 22 22.2 204 42 20.6

Transportation 46 1 2.5 36 8 22.2

Retail and catering 323 58 18.0 1810 648 35.8

Utilities and community 133 22 16.5 1858 792 42.6 services

Agriculture 61 8 13.1 516 27 5.2

Other 300 49 16.3 944 296 31.3

Total: 1050 184 17.5 5400 1826 33.8

Notes to the table: privatization of major properties is Kolkhoz farms, or “collective” farms, underway and gaining momentum; were not really collective, but state- 1. Similarly to the rest of the country, the process has been facilitated by owned. Citizens were only allowed the retail and catering sectors showed the recent opening of a stock ex- to own the limited amount of posses- the highest privatization rate among change and real estate exchange. sions they needed for their own use all industries in the Sogd Region: 31.5% and consumption. It became obvious for centrally owned establishments, and that the government’s property mo- 33.5% for local government proper- 4.2 Growing Private Sector nopoly stood in the way of market ties; the respective percentages for in Regional Industry transition. The Property Act adopted consumer services and utility provid- It is illuminating to analyze industrial in Tajikistan in 1991 opened the flood- ers were 12% and 34.3%. output by ownership format, espe- gate for all property formats on an 2. Few major central government- cially since the multiplicity of owner- equal footing, including private prop- owned enterprises have been priva- ship formats, as a crucible of com- erty on all production facilities exclud- tized in the Sogd Region because the petition, largely determines how ad- ing land. The way was now paved majority of these enterprises are in vanced a market economy is. for the advent of a private sector. mining or defense, the two industries In 1990, when the market transition The table below shows how the pub- forbidden by law to be privatized. began, the majority of enterprises in lic and private sectors have evolved 3. While the majority of small busi- the Sogd Region and the rest of Tajiki- over the years in Tajikistan and the nesses have passed into private hands, stan were owned by the state. Sogd Region...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 69

Table 15 Public and Private Sectors in Manufacturing Industries % vs. total

Index/Year 1987 1990 1995 1996 2000 2001 2002

Tajikistan 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Public sector 99.0 98.1 96.7 90.4 79.7 71.8 68.4

Private sector 1.0 1.9 3.3 9.6 20.3 28.2 31.6

Sogd Region 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Public sector 99.5 98.4 94.4 89.1 76.6 64.3 59.4

Private sector 0.5 1.6 5.6 11.9 23.4 35.7 40.6

Notes to the table: two years. Private shareholders now possesses unique natural resources own majority stakes in some of those that attract foreign investors, and is 1. In 1987-1990, private enterprise companies, which should, therefore, home to between 30% and 32% of was limited to private, home-based be considered private. With this up- tailors, shoemakers, custom manufac- all JVs operating in Tajikistan, produc- date in mind, the share of the pri- turers of windows and doors, artists, ing 87%-90% of the value of prod- vate sector is actually 67.1% nation- craftsmen, and manufacturers of a few ucts manufactured by all JVs nation- wide and 78.5% in the Sogd Region other products for personal use. wide. (see Graph 3). 2. The private sector, which began The respective percentages of the growing fast in 1995, reached 4.3 Agriculture: public and private sectors in regional 31.6% nationwide by 2002, and Slow Structural Change industrial output are different in Sogd 40.6% in the Sogd Region, having Growth in agriculture is conditional from the rest of the country. soared 9.6 times nationwide and 7.3 on its structural reengineering and a times in Sogd. Apparently, privati- 1. The high (40.2%) share of private more active policy in supporting the companies in the national industrial zation has progressed faster in Sogd more successful rural industries. than the rest of the country. output is mainly secured by two in- dustry giants: Tajik Aluminum in Tur- There is every reason to promote The current practice is to consider sun-Zade, and Barqi Tochiq energy growth in the agricultural sector as: joint stock companies and joint ven- holding in Dushanbe. tures derived from government- 73.8% of the population live owned industrial properties, to be 2. In the Sogd Region, it is joint ven- in rural communities, produc- government-owned. This is not quite tures that account for a substantial ing 44% of the gross region- correct, and certainly not since the share of regional industrial output: al agricultural output; living government has sold off more than 45.3%, but more than 50% in some standards in rural areas are di- 50% of the shares it once owned in years. A relatively advanced indus- rectly dependent on how well manufacturing companies, in the past trialized region of Tajikistan, Sogd agriculture is doing; 70 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Agriculture provides 2/3 of The country earns the bulk of to upgrade agricultural production, domestic food supply; the its hard currency by export- foster new business entities and man- scope of agricultural output is ing cotton fiber, silkworm agement practices in rural produc- vital to the success of such cocoons, leaf tobacco, veg- tion. The reform targets primarily industries as textiles, cotton etables, fruit, and derivative private farmers. The table below refining, tobacco, food, fruit products. & vegetable canning, and oth- shows how the number of private ers, including joint venture With all this in mind, the reform cur- farms, and their output, have in- businesses; rently underway in Sogd is designed creased between 1996 and 2002.

Table 16

2002, % Index/Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 vs. 1996

1. No. of private farms

Tajikistan 2386 8023 10223 9293 12344 11939 12105 507,2

Sogd Region 395 460 812 932 1266 1622 2211 560,0

% vs. total 16.6 5.7 8.0 10.0 10.3 13.6 12.3 -

2. Output, million somoni

Tajikistan 7.0 27.0 41.1 70.0 103.5 139.8 196.5 28 times

Sogd Region 4.6 7.8 10.8 19.1 20.6 67.1 106.2 23 times

% vs. total 65.7 28.9 26.2 27.3 19.8 48.0 54.0 -

Only 12.3% of private farms oper- Note: There are 187 kolkhoz rural families have vegetable ating in Tajikistan are based in the (collective) farms in the Sogd Re- patches. Sogd Region, but they produce up- gion, 37 of them, or 28.2%, re- The table below shows gross agri- wards of 54% of the total output of organized into joint stock com- cultural output by branch and own- private farms nationwide, which panies. There are 2211 private ership format in 2002 vs. 2000. means the farms are bigger in Sogd. farms, and more than 219,000 ...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 71

Table 17

% vs. total Value, million somoni Branch/Index Collective sector Private farms Private patches

2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002

Total, including: 226.6 493.9 38.1 34.7 9.1 21.5 52.8 43.8

Growing 154.7 383.8 52.6 42.4 13.1 27.2 34.3 30.4

Animal farming 71.9 110.1 7.0 7.8 0.5 1.9 92.5 90.3

If you look at the structural changes wool harvest, 19.7% of grain crops cases, 100% of agricultural produce. in regional agriculture, it is obvious (, corn, etc.), 25.1% of pota- For instance, collective farms sup- that private farms have increased toes, 8.2% of other vegetables, and plied 100% of cotton wool, tobac- their presence and output exponen- 38.1% of melons (, can- co, silkworm cocoons, geraniums, tially in recent years, from 9.1% of taloupes, pumpkins, etc.) and healing herbs. Individuals were gross regional agricultural output in allowed to own up to 0.5 hectares Note: Pursuant to a recent presi- 2000 to 21.5% in 2002. The most of land for their vegetable patches, dential degree, farmers in 4 Tajik private farms were established after orchards, and cattle, which supplied regions will be charged a flat, uni- the president of Tajikistan decreed 1/3 of homesteads’ own needs. form land tax in 2003 instead of to allot 7,500 hectares of land to Private patches and orchards were the 7 types of tax levied so far, which farmers. There are more private tilled mainly by women, children, and is a good incentive to start new farms that grow crops (27.2%) than seniors, who were not involved in farms and increase production. breed animals, because growing re- kolkhoz work. quires lower investment. The few A percentage of collective farm cat- private farms that exist in the animal tle has been privatized by home- 4.4 Trade: Changes in Retail breeding sector produce only 1.9% steads. Most animals are kept on Volume and Structure of total output. As a high percent- their owners’ estates. Consequent- Families acquire goods and services age of collective farm cattle has been ly, the bulk (90.3%) of animal farm for personal use through retail out- privatized by homesteads, the over- produce is supplied by homesteads. lets. The retail turnover, or sale of whelming 90.3% of farm produce is In the Soviet Union, agriculture was goods to end-consumers, has been supplied by homesteads. dominated by collective farms: growing in Sogd year on year as the In the Sogd Region, private farms kolkhoz and sovkhoz, which supplied table below convincingly demon- supply 37.7% of the gross cotton the highest percentage and, in some strates: 72 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Table 18 Retail Turnover in All Outlet Formats (million somoni)

Tajikistan Sogd Region

Year Incl. Incl. Total Total Private sector % Private sector %

1987 2861 1536 53.7 993 514 51.8

1990 3462 1887 54.5 1215 635 52.3

1992 18.8 9.3 49.5 7.9 4.1 51.8

1996 130.7 97.0 93.5 40.4 37.8 93.6

1997 194.7 187.4 96.3 88.6 86.2 97.3

1998 435.9 426.4 97.8 157.2 153.8 97.8

1999 567.8 557.0 98.1 186.9 182.9 97.8

2000 558.2 543.9 97.8 183.2 176.9 96.6

2001 777.7 759.9 97.6 283.7 273.6 96.4

2002 1054.6 1031.4 97.8 380.7 370.7 97.4

Notes to the table: cording to sample surveys conduct- 3. Unorganized food and non-food ed around that time, “unorganized” markets are the favorite place to 1. In the Soviet Union during the markets posted very substantial sales shop with local families, small firms, years immediately preceding its de- figures reaching 1/5 of the aggre- and public institutions in the Sogd mise (1987-1990), there were, es- gate retail turnover of non-food com- Region, accounting for 89.2% of the sentially, three retail formats in the modities in the region. aggregate retail turnover in the re- Sogd Region: state-run stores in cit- gion. ies and towns (47.7% in 1990); co- 2. In 1987 through 1990, the prev- operative outlets in rural areas alent non-governmental retail format 4. A percentage of goods is retailed (48.3%), and kolkhoz outlets (4%). were cooperative stores, but most through “commercial” stores (as op- The turnovers of consumer goods rural stores and warehouses were posed to state-run stores where pric- (other than food) at outdoor mar- destroyed and looted during the es were regulated by the govern- kets («Sunday bazaars») were not 1992-1996 civil war. The share of ment), a retail format that appeared monitored or accounted for since cooperative outlets in the total retail in the late 80s as a precursor of mar- vendors were officially allowed to turnover consequently plummeted to ket reform. In 1990, “commercial” sell used items only. Meanwhile, ac- only 2.3% in 2002. stores sold only 1.2% of the aggre- ...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 73

gate turnover; the figure was 2.7% goods, and various “elite” or premi- Structurally, the retail turnover of in 1996, and currently stands at um products for the affluent classes. goods has changed dramatically in around 5%. Tajikistan and the Sogd Region since Graph 4 in the Annex shows how, the country gained independence. “Commercial” stores mainly carry by retail format, turnover figures imported goods, quality domestic changed in the Sogd Region.

Table 19 Groceries vs. Other Goods as a Percentage of Turnover

TTnajikistan SSnogdRegion YYrear IIxndex OrOther OrOther TTlotal GGsroceries TTlotal GGsroceries goods goods

1990 100 44.3 55.7 100 39.1 60.9

1996 100 55.2 44.8 100 58.2 41.8

2000 100 59.5 40.5 100 64.8 35.2

2001 100 57.5 42.5 100 63.3 36.7

2002 100 56.1 43.9 100 62.6 37.4

Notes to the table: purchases; in 1996, non-food spend- Conclusions: ing was down 10.9% to 44.8%. It is 1. Market turnover structure is con- 1. In the past two years, grocery obvious that during the civil war and sidered progressive if the percent- spending has begun to decline in fa- post-war recovery, repatri- age share of non-food commodities vor of non-food spending both in is growing. As disposable incomes ation, etc. people spent most of their Sogd and nationwide, which appears increase, families begin spending available funds on groceries: flour, to be a logical trend indicating a siz- more on quality clothing and foot- sugar, tea, butter, and other indis- able improvement of living standards. wear, as well as various goods for pensable foods. On the other hand, Tajikistan and the region will need another few years comfort and leisure (the Engels 3. The trend was even more pro- to reach the level of 1990, the year Law). nounced in Sogd, where non-food when the market transition com- 2. The retail turnover structure in retail sales dropped from 60.9% in menced. Tajikistan shows a negative trend with 1990 to 41.8% in 1996, or 19.1 per- grocery spending increasing, and centage points. The share of non- 2. The surge in retail grocery sales in non-food spending dropping, which food sales as a percentage of retail Sogd until 1996 was probably caused is indicative of plummeting living stan- turnover continued to decline until by bulk purchasing to deliver food to families and friends in the war- dards after the collapse of the Sovi- 2002, when it bottomed out at stricken Dushanbe and further south. et Union. In 1990, consumers spent 40.5% nationwide and 35.2% in the 55.7% of their budgets on non-food Sogd Region. The structure of grocery sales in 2002 74 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

was very different from 1990 (see alterations associated with cultural ply of “other goods” was expanded Graph 5). and lifestyle changes (see Graph 6). from 13 to 37 product groups, the largest of them being “lifestyle” sup- 1. The aggregate percentage share 1. The percentage share of clothing plies, bicycles, motorbikes, electric of three product groups: flour, in- and footwear in the non-food retail supplies, arts/crafts, matches, spare cluding pasta, cereals, and bread; turnover dropped from 47.7% in parts for long-life products, and so vegetable oil; and potatoes increased 1990 to 39.7% in 2002; perfumes on. during the period reviewed, from and toiletries, from 6.9% to 2.4%; 26.4% to 41.2%. The share of fruits, and automobiles, from 6.1% to especially grapes, climbed slightly 2.6%. Sales of construction supplies V. Emergence from 2.5% to 3.7%. naturally declined from 4.1% to 3.7% of Market Institutions 2. The aggregate percentage share as urban and rural housing construc- 5.1 The Rise and Fall of meats, meat products, milk, eggs, tion stopped; sales of jewelry of Cooperatives cheese and fats dropped consider- dropped due to lack of consumer ably, from 28.7% to 22.5%; sugar confidence in the quality and work- Cooperatives were buds of private and sugar products (candy, jams, manship of gems and precious met- enterprise born in the depths of the etc.) dropped from 10.7% to 7.1%; als. Soviet system. Unlike state-run busi- alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverag- 2. The percentage shares of such nesses, they were allowed to set es, from 15.9% to 4.4%; and veg- non-food commodities as petrochem- their own prices and offer any goods etables, from 2.4% to 2.2%. icals (1.4% to 3.7%), medical sup- or services that happened to be in demand, but most importantly, they 3. The retail turnover structure in plies (0.5% to 2%), and tobacco had the discretion to use their profits Sogd, which had changed markedly products (1.5% to 2%) increased as as they saw fit. All these perquisites between 1990 and 2002, indicates the state lifted its monopoly and re- inspired a swift proliferation of co- a lack of consumption balance typi- strictions, and prices went up for operative businesses in all industries, cal for regions with low per capita these products. and increased the retail presence of monetary incomes. 3. The share of other goods went cooperative goods. The table below The turnover of non-food commod- up from 12.2% in 1990 to 24.7% in showcases the rise and fall of coop- ities also sustained major structural 2002, or nearly doubled as the sup- erative businesses...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 75

Table 20 Cooperative Businesses in the Sogd Region

NsNo.ofco-ops NN)o.ofemployees(thousand)SsSales

117987 110990 222002 171987 101990 202000 171987 101990 222002

Cooperatives: 85 563 34 1.3 10.8 0.3 15.8 94.8 137.0 total,including

Manufacturing 19 115 6 0.40 3.3 0.04 5.2 33.2 97.1

Reselling andfood 11 29 8 0.18 0.3 0.06 2.1 5.2 10.5 &beverage

Consumer 27 108 4 0.17 2.5 0.02 1.8 16.1 2.2 services

Construction 2 93 5 0.12 2.4 0.06 1.5 17.1 10.1

Agriculture 5 35 3 0.08 0.5 0.04 1.9 2.5 1.0

Otherco-ops 21 183 8 0.35 1.8 0.08 3.3 20.1 16.1

The year the government gave a go- times; consumer services co-ops, number was down to 34, or 16.5 ahead to cooperatives or, more pre- 4.2 times; and retail and food & bev- times, and cooperative employee cisely, between July and December erage co-ops, 2.6 times. Coopera- numbers had dropped 36 times. 1987, 85 cooperatives were estab- tives multiplied the fastest in construc- Conclusions: lished in the Sogd Region, 27 of them tion (45 times) and agriculture (7 doing business in consumer servic- times). 1. Some cooperatives in Dushanbe and farther south were destroyed es, 19 in consumer goods manufac- At that point, cooperatives em- during the civil war. As these sad turing, and 11 in retail and food & ployed some 11,000 in the region, tidings came from the south cooper- beverage services. Then coopera- or 8.3 times more than in 1987. atives began wrapping up business tives came to agriculture. Sales proceeds on cooperative-man- in Sogd. Unlike Soviet state-run organizations, ufactured goods and services had cooperatives did their marketing and climbed 6 times to Rbl 94.8 million. 2. Once the prices and international sought to meet real consumer needs. The largest percentage shares in co- trade were liberalized, most coop- No wonder they soon cornered the operative sales belonged to manu- eratives found themselves unable to marketplace and won consumer loy- facturing (35%), construction (19%), compete with imports from Uzbeki- and consumer services (17%) coop- alty. There were 563 cooperatives stan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Iran, and eratives in 1990. in the Sogd Region in 1990, repre- Turkey. senting an increase of 6.3 times in It is a mystery what happened to 3. Some cooperatives were reorga- three years. The number of manu- the cooperative movement in the nized into limited liability partnerships facturing cooperatives had soared 6 years that followed. By 2002, their or limited companies, the business 76 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

formats that have proved particular- 5.2 Small Enterprise: Private Firms entrepreneurs without incorporating ly successful in the majority of mar- and Sole Entrepreneurship a company are required to obtain ket economies. an appropriate patent from the gov- The laws of Tajikistan provide two ernment, and pay a non-recurring 4. As the government shifted its fi- options for small enterprise: tax. nancial focus to private farms, rural 1. Establishment of a corporate enti- cooperatives, numbering 103 in The choice is made in favor of incor- ty in any available legal and organi- 1998, dissolved. The 3 rural coop- porating a firm or doing business as zations format. eratives still in business in 2002 are a sole entrepreneur based on the used as a testing ground for differ- 2. Sole entrepreneurship: individu- nature of the desired business activ- ent agricultural improvements. als carrying on their business as sole ity.

Table 21 Small Enterprise in the Sogd Region

2.2001,%vs. FFrormat/Year 111991 161996 181998 212001 1996

Tajiki- SogdTSTSTSTS stan

1.No.ofcorporate 2.60.73.12.02.01.11.20.53825 entities(thousand)

I2.Individual entrepreneurs 854630116687052152173 (thousandpatents)

Small enterprise peaked in 1996, effectual legal and regulatory frame- 1996 to 1,200 in 2001, or 2.5 times. when the number of small business- work; lack of start-up capital and The trend was even stronger in Sogd, es exceeded 3,000 nationwide and unavailability of credit; limited choice where the number of small business- 2,000 in Sogd. Meanwhile, small of available technology; pressure es dropped from 2,000 to 500, or businesses were operating in an un- from local authorities (endless inspec- 4 times, during the same time peri- certain, unstable environment. On the tions, extortion, etc.) and criminal od. Small business employee head one hand, small business had built up groups. count dropped from 31,000 in 1996 to 11,700 in 2001 nationwide, and the potential for a major break- Taken together, all these factors ef- from 18,400 to 4,700 in Sogd. through that could enable it to satu- fectively arrested the development rate the domestic market and even of the small enterprise format involv- Notably, in 1996, the government go international; on the other hand, ing the incorporation of a firm. Start- offered a simplified patent applica- there were numerous obstacles and ing in 1996, the small business bank- tion procedure for individual entre- hurdles impeding this aspiration to ruptcy rate far exceeded new busi- preneurs, boosting the small enter- grow. Those impediments included ness starts, resulting in a general prise format involving no incorpora- political and economic instability; in- slump in their numbers from 3,100 in tion. In 1996, the government issued ...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 77

46,000 patents to sole entrepre- types of business, and 68,000 pat- 50,000 in the Sogd Region. neurs nationwide, and 30,000 in ents in Sogd. Small business has been increasingly Sogd, 2.4 and 2.3 times more, re- In subsequent years, as small enter- dominated by privately owned firms. spectively, than the year before. prise stabilized in general, the num- Sole entrepreneurship bloomed in ber of sole enterprise patents issued The table below shows basic oper- 1998, when 116,000 patents were also leveled out at around 50,000- ating statistics for privately owned issued nationwide to engage in 78 70,000 nationwide and 35,000 to small businesses in the Sogd Region.

Table 22 Basic Small Business Statistics in the Sogd Region

116996 171997 181998 191999 202000 212001 222002

1.No.ofprivatefirms 266 165 170 161 151 494 449

Including:Manufacturing 59 25 26 24 22 107 104

Construction 40 23 13 13 11 36 26

Retail,food&beverageservices 100 70 72 77 77 220 190

2.No.ofemployees 1817 967 1021 1278 1004 4519 4565

Manufacturing 472 240 237 351 235 1221 1256

Construction 225 103 102 99 78 365 345

Retail,food&beverageservices 620 335 332 446 415 1611 1598

3.Sales,thousandsomoni 248.0 351.9 1784.3 2580.9 2991.0 15479.9 16548.8

Incl.:Manufacturing 130.8 198.4 72.8 379.8 165.0 3222.4 4984.7

Construction 4.5 5.7 57.1 138.0 167.1 552.3 654.7

Retail,food&beverageservices 93.4 128.9 1453.9 1917.9 1222.0 9664.8 9137.0

Notes to the table: businesses dropped in all major in- 3. The trend has been reversed in dustries: 63% from 59 to 22 in man- the past two years, 2001 and 2002 1. The number of private businesses ufacturing; 67.5% from 40 to 13 in after (1) the Tajik president met with dropped 44%, from 266 to 151, construction; 23% from 100 to 77 in entrepreneurs to resolve a number between 1996 and 2000, while their retail and food & beverage servic- of crucial issues that had hampered employee numbers dropped 45%, es. The head count of employees enterprise for years whereupon gov- from 1,800 to 1,000. and the output of products and ser- ernment support was made avail- 2. Over the period reviewed (1996- vices by small private businesses de- able, bureaucratic hurdles were re- 2000), the number of small private creased accordingly. moved for new business registration, 78 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

the taxation system was simplified, tential in the Sogd Region. Its fast- marginal changes. It is typical for this the patent issuance process was paced growth is the key to a sweep- administration system to consolidate streamlined, and so on; and (2) the ing social restructuring precedent to enormous economic powers and dis- president decreed the maintenance a full transition of the entire econo- cretions within central government of so-called “Audit Logs” for small my and population to market-based ministries, which manage the entire businesses, both corporate and indi- economics. Small business promises economy. The role of local adminis- vidual. According to the decree, reg- thousands of new jobs and rapid GRP trative bodies is very limited while ulators may only audit a small busi- growth in the region. the Jamoats are left entirely outside ness or a sole entrepreneur once a the economic system. 2. Small businesses have a tendency year, and the findings of every audit to grow and become major compa- are to be recorded in the Audit Log. Every enterprise, a key economic nies. A number of small businesses player, finds itself reporting to two These incentives immediately led to a established in Sogd in the 1990s, governmental bodies, the relevant dramatic rise in new small business have reinvented themselves as ma- ministry and the local Hukumat. starts, both corporate and individual. jor, widely specialized companies. This administration system has always In the past two years alone, the num- These include Bars, Nur, Amon, Lal, ber of small businesses soared 4 times, sacrificed regional interests in favor of Istaravshan Technocenter, Imcon, reaching 449 in 2002: 5 times to 104 the industry concerned, and continues and Hunar, to name a few. in manufacturing; 2.6 times to 26 in to do so while weak local authorities construction; 2.4 times to 190 in retail 3. Small, patent-based individual en- stand and watch. Conflicts of interests and food & beverage services. As the terprise propagates a large substra- could be reconciled, and ideal solu- number of small private businesses in- tum of small owners earning a de- tions for regional development could creased, their sales of goods and ser- cent living and ensuring high living only be found if locals authorities had vices also rocketed 5.5 times. Steady standards for their families. This helps more power. The standoff between operations were launched by 75 small ease social tensions and fill the mar- ministries and Hukumats in economic privately owned workshops, mini- ket with domestic goods and servic- matters has been reconciled to an plants and factories manufacturing var- es. extent by the Local Government Au- ious consumer goods, more than 20 thority Act of Tajikistan. However, the mobile and full-service construction VI. The Center and the Region: law is frequently ignored, entailing two companies, 150 major stores, super- Decentralization of Economic sets of consequences: markets, malls and restaurants, all of Administration is Imperative 1. When spending appropriations are which have obtained the necessary registration with fiscal authorities. Small made in the national budget, a re- 6.1 Administrative Practices: private businesses established in 2001 gion may receive a larger or smaller Bodies with Identical and 2002 are generally more fit to amount of funds irrespective of its Responsibilities and the operate in a market environment than contribution to government revenue. “Tug-of-War” Method their predecessors. Misinterpretation of this practice, The Soviet system whereby eco- perceived as unfair distribution of Conclusions: nomic administration was industry- government funds, may cause an 1. Small enterprise has a huge po- focused, has survived with only adverse social reaction...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 79

2. As the democratic process gains 1. The ministries used as an example ers, resulting in general administra- momentum, the remit of local self- represent major industries producing tive inefficiencies. government is broadened, and the around 90% of Sogd’s GRP. 5. There is a missing link in this eco- competence and responsibility of lo- 2. In the existing regional administra- nomic administration chain: local self- cal authorities rises as they increas- tion system, the vital role is reserved government authorities: Mahalla ingly perceive themselves as own- for regional agencies managing spe- Councils in cities and towns, and vil- ers of their land, and patriotic senti- cific branches of industry and agri- lage Jamoats. ment is fostered in local communi- culture, established as the local body ties. Government decisions sent to affili- of the relevant ministry through ated enterprises via the relevant min- Research results indicate an impera- which the ministry implements its istry or Hukumat committee never tive need for new, better laws on technological and investment policy, reach the Jamoat or Mahalla Council local state bodies and local self-gov- awards government contracts, co- on whose territory the enterprise ernment that would ensure decen- ordinates the international business of operates. tralized economic administration. affiliated enterprises, secures credit

Decentralization must secure the pro- facilities and issues guarantees, etc. 6.2 The Role of Jamoats tection of local interests, rising social 3. Regional, municipal, and district in the Regional Economy awareness in local communities, and Hukumats are vested with the pow- relocation of local area-focused de- er to implement central government Under the Constitution of indepen- dent Tajikistan, Jamoats are repre- cision-making centers to the bottom policies and edicts. Special units called sentative local authorities in small administrative level (village Jamoats “Industry Committees” (for industry) towns and villages. Jamoats were and Mahalla Councils). The bottom- or “Departments” (for agriculture), formed to replace village councils level governmental body is the city which are part of the Hukumats, pursuant to the Tajik law On Self- or district Hukumat, which manages make sure the Hukumats perform this Government Authorities in Rural the local budget, communal proper- duty, as well as carry out steps to Communities, passed on December ty, and utilities, and administers local improve and develop production, 1, 1994. logistical, social, cultural, environmen- protect the environment, and secure tal, and other matters according to regional interests. As of the beginning of 2003, there the powers vested in the Hukumats were 20 small-town Jamoats and 93 4. In this parallel administration sys- by law. rural Jamoats in the Sogd Region. The tem, many identical duties are per- town of Kairakkum has the largest The Graph in Figure 1 (see attached) formed by both regional agencies of number of small-town Jamoats: 6; shows how powers are divided be- the ministry, and local Hukumat agen- the Matcha and Zafarabad Districts tween the center and the regions in cies. Sometimes government deci- have 3 each; Isfara has 2; the town the existing scheme of economic sions are misinterpreted or distorted of Chkalovsk, as well as Aina, Asht, administration. as they travel from top to bottom, Gancha, Jabbor-Rasoul, and Spita- Notes to the Graph showing the and the decisions fail to work prop- men Districts have one Jamoat each. existing regional economic ad- erly. Both the ministries and the Hu- ministration system: kumats sometimes abuse their pow- The Penjikent District has 14 village 80 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Jamoats; Hojent has 11; Istaravshan, to debate and pass Jamoat cial infrastructure improve- 10; Isfara, 9; Asht, 8; Aina and Gan- activity plans and budgets to ments within the Jamoat ter- cha, 7 each; Kanibadam and Spita- fund the activities necessary ritory; men, 6 each; Jabbor-Rasoul, 5; to ensure the normal liveli- other duties typically per- Matcha, 4; and Shahristan, Zafara- hood of homesteads within formed by local self-govern- bad, and Gornaya Matcha have 2 the Jamoat jurisdiction; ment authorities. Jamoats each. to create favorable condi- Conclusions: To be able to perform The average population within a sin- tions for the start of new small all the duties in their charge, Jamoats gle Jamoat jurisdiction varies from businesses, cooperatives, need more funding than they cur- 5,300 in the Isfara District and 8,100 workshops, and other busi- rently have, divorced as they are in Gornaya Matcha to 20,500 in the ness entities needed to sup- from the regional economic system. Kanibadam District and 22,200 in the ply the local market with de- Consequently, further drive towards Hojent District. The seven districts sired goods and services; greater decentralization of econom- have an average population figure to raise funds from home- ic administration will be associated of between 11,000 and 15,000 per steads, local businesses and with the need to admit the Jamoats Jamoat. organizations irrespective of as an integral part of the system in The Jamoats as local self-government ownership (with their consent) the capacity of bottom-level gov- authorities, have the following duties: as contributions towards so- ernment authorities operating onsite.

References ......

1. Annual Report of the Republic of 5. Industrial Output of the Sogd Re- anbe, 2000 Tajikistan. Dushanbe, 1997, 2000, gion in Natural Volume by District. 9. Granberg, A.G. Fundamentals of 2001, 2002 Annual bulletin Regional Economics. Moscow, 2001 2. International Economic Ties of the 6. CIS Economy: 10 Years of Re- 10. The : Republic of Tajikistan in 2001. Dush- forms and Integration-Based Devel- Growth Strategies. Issue #2, 2000, anbe opment. Moscow, 2001 and #1, 2001 3. Regions of Tajikistan in 2001. Dus- 7. Socioeconomic Development Pro- 11. Findings of the research conduct- hanbe gram for the Sogd Region, 2001- ed by the author between 1996 and 2005. Hujand, 2001 4. Annual Statistical Bulletin of the 2003. Sogd Region. Hujand, 1990, 1996, 8. 1999 Report on Human Resourc- 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 es Development in Tajikistan. Dush- ...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 81 9 6 0 2 4 2 7 . . ) ) ) . . . . 0 0 8 % % % * * * 1 1 5 2 1 4 4 * * * * . . . . ã ã ã ã i 2 2 2 2 n 6 0 0 0 0 4 6 o 1 m m m 3 4 1 9 001, 0 0 0 0 9 1 1 1 5 2 0 m 2 2* 2 2* 2 4 4 Mm M M Mm M 1 o s 9 3 0 1 8 3 Annex 1 ) ) ) 6 ...... 0 * * * 8 2 % % % 1 3 1 2 1 * * * * * 4 4 . . . . . ã ã ã ã ã 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 o 5 0 6 i m m m 4 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 8 9 1 4 m n 1 3 2* 2 2 2 2 2* 3 9 4 Mm M M Mm M o s 7 6 0 2 9 3 3 ...... ) ) ) 0 2 6 % % % * 3 0 * * 4 2 1 4 4 * * * * * . . . . . ã ã ã ã ã i 0 0 0 0 0 n 0 0 0 0 0 8 7 7 o 1 1 m m m 0 0 6 0 0 0 8 2 4 0 1 2 2* 2 1 2 2 2* m 4 2 2 Mm M M Mm M o s 8 0 0 9 9 0 4 . . ) ) ) . . . . 0 7 6 % % % * * * 1 0 1 2 1 4 4 * * * * * . . . . . ã ã ã ã ã 9 9 9 9 9 - 9 9 9 9 9 o 2 8 5 i 9 9 9 9 9 m m m 0 9 9 4 7 4 1 m n 1* 1 1 1 1* 1 1 1 4 Mm M M Mm M o s 8 0 0 8 8 4 2 . . ) ) ) . . . . 0 4 5 % % % * * * 6 5 3 4 1 1 6 * * * * * . . . . . ã ã ã ã ã i 6 6 6 6 6 n 9 9 9 9 9 1 2 o m m m 8 2 3 9 9 0 9 9 9 6 1 0 1 1 1 1* 1 2 1 1 1* m 4 3 2 Mm M M Mm M o s 0 6 0 1 4 9 0 . . ) ) ) . . . . 0 8 3 % * % % * * 6 5 4 2 1 1 6 . . . ã ã ã 0 0 0 9 9 9 5 0 l l l 2 8 2 3 9 9 9 1 2 0 m b b b 4 4 6 8 1* 1 1 1* 1 0 9 6 Rl R R Rl R 1 1 5 1 m 1 3 VII. Attachments: tables, graphs, maps, and charts 7 7 0 7 4 8 ) 7 ) ) ...... 0 * * * 4 8 % % % Sogd’s Gross Regional Product and its Structure by Industry. 6 1 3 4 1 . . . . . 6 1 ã ã ã ã ã 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 5 l 0 l l 2 3 5 9 9 9 9 9 3 8 7 8 m b b b 0 7 2 1 1* 1* 1 1 7 9 4 6 Rl R R Rl R 1 1 5 m 1 2 s s e e c c i i v v : s r r d g e e e i g s n o s r i n n t l i o d e s f r o a e i i u u g u l r t c t d a c d u c r r c n t n n u l e i i a a e r u f l , r t v m i l c u s i e e a a n r m n t h t pages 6 & 7. b a t g o o e o T & R C O C A M x) 1987 and 1990 GRP is shown in Soviet rubles xx) Source: Annual Statistical Bulletin of the Republic Tajikistan. 2002, pages 11-16; Sogd Region. 2 82 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Graph 1: Sogd GRP by Industry (%)

69,6 40,9 48,6

18

6,1 2 5,4 4,9 2,7 1,4 5,2 1,2 Manufacturing Agriculture Construction Commercial services Retail and food & beverage services Other industries

Graph 2 Consumer Market Segments for Domestic and Imported Commodities in the Sogd Region

Consumer market Food market Non-food market

17% 32,3% 74,3%

83%

68,7%

25,7%

- Imports - Domestic goods ...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 83

Graph 3: Industrial Output by Ownership Format

4,9 13,2 0,8 10,6 4,8 2,8 0,4 9,5 7,9 45,3 5,6 Joint ventures 40,2 1,1 Collective 14,8

Joint stock compames 69,9 Private 17,3 81,6 15,9 Public 21,5

32.9

1996 2002(%) 1996 2002

Graph 4: Percentage Shares of Ownership Formats in Aggregate Turnover (%)

1990 1996 2002

82,7 89.2 47.7 48.3

2.8 1.2 2,7 8,2 6,4 3.6 4.9 2.3

State-run outlets Cooperative outlets ‘Commercial’ outlets ‘Unorganized’ markets 84 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Graph 5: Domestic Food Market Segments in the Sogd Region (%)

3.7 1.8 2.5 2.4 4.9 2.2 4.4 20.2 15.9 22.6 19.2

7.1 10.7 13.4 13.6 16.8 4.4 5.5 10.5 18.2

Meat and sausage products Potatoes Milk, eggs, cheese, fats, vegetable Vegetables oil, sugar, and sugar products Fruits, grapes and other Flour, cereals, baked products Alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages Other

Graph 6: Non-Food Market Segments in the Sogd Region (%)

47.7 39.7

2.4

6.9 12.2 24.7 17.3 16.5 0.5 1.5 3.1 4.1 1.4 6.1 2 1.9 3.7 2 3.7 2.6

1990 2002 Clothing and footwear Oil products Perfumes and toiletries Jewelry Furniture and household supplies Tobacco products Construction supplies Medical supplies Automobiles Other ...... ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN...... CENTRE AND REGIONS: THE CASE OF SUGHD PROVINCE 85

Fig. 1 Existing Administration System in Industry and Agriculture

Government of Tajikistan

Decision 1 Decision 2

Decision 2 Decision 1 Ministry of the Industry Sogd Regional Ministry of the Agricultural Concerned Hukumat Branch Concerned

Industrial Agricultural Committee Committee

Regional Agricultural Agency Regional Industrial Agency

Decision 2 Decision 1

City Hukumat District Hukumat

Industry Department Agriculture Department Decision 1 Decision 2

Enterprises Enterprises

State-run, private, Kolkhoz, sovkhoz, private collective, farms, etc. joint stock, etc. Councils Village Jamoats Municipal Mahalla Agricultural Section Small-Town Jamoats

86 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Regionalism and its perception by major political and social powers of Tajikistan...... Saodat Olimova, «Shark» center

Introduction 2002 was applied as well. In August Regionalism as an interrelation 2002, under the research framework of ethno-regional groups. This document is a final report aiming another two focus group discussions at studying the regionalism phenom- The dominant number of respondents were held in Dushanbe. Focus groups enon in the Republic of Tajikistan. The considers regionalism from the per- consisted of ten people, each of goal of the study was to shape re- spective of ethno-regional groups. which were represented by the fol- gionalism as a social factor, its mech- lowing categories: Quote. Region - it is principally anisms of replication, structure and an ethno-regional group that in- factors rationalizing its viability in Tajik Young men - students of the habits one region and its repre- society, as well as the vision of re- Tajik National University, 20- sentatives living in other regions gionalism by various social and polit- 24 years old. than the territory of their origin. ical groupings of the society. One of Young women - students of Unquote. (Political party leader). the main research objectives was to the Russian-Tajik Slavonic Uni- map all possible ways to mitigate this The ethno-regional groups may be versity, 18-22 years old. problem in the country. described as communities or group- ings originating from the same place The empirical base of the research is Shaping of the problem and united by a common dialect or based on the progress of work of of regionalism. How political and sometimes language (i.e. inhabitants two focus groups and focused inter- social powers define regionalism? of Shughnon, Rushan and etc.) and views (N = 20). The respondents of common identity. each group were preliminary select- Our research has confirmed that the ed from elite layers of Tajikistan, i.e. majority of interviewees believe that Answer of young men - Quote. Re- parliament members, political lead- regionalism is a significant problem in gionalism - is a compartition of ers, supreme government (ministers, political, social, economic and cultur- people of one nation by regions vice-ministers, heads of governmen- al life of Tajikistan. The research and separate groupings. For ex- tal agencies and President Office), shows that opinions on this issue are ample, we are Tajiks and live in one country, but are still divided as well as well-known journalists and rather dissimilar. However, general- into regions, like, Pomiri, Kulo- academicians (historians, ethnologists ly, regionalism can be divided into bi, etc. Unquote. and conflictologists). A number of two major factors: interviews were conducted in Qa- All respondents admitted that Tajiks a) Abrasive relationship between bodiyon, Khatlon, Shughnon, Isfara practice a sustainable self-identity by ethno-regional groups and Sughd regions. Some material regions of origin and geographic from previous public opinion inter- b) Abrasive interrelation between frames of regions and its people are views by «Shark» center in 1996- center and regions. different. Inside every large region, ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 87

like: northern Tajikistan, Kulob, Qur- origin. Herein, the ethnic identity of Uzbek ethnic groups populating gon-Teppa, Karategin valley, Hissor the older population is almost unrec- Tajikistan, including so called intelli- valley, the latter often called Dush- ognizable, therefore Uzbeks, Tajiks gentsia. anbe and suburbs, and finally Bada- and other nations living in Kulob call Answer of young men - Quote. Re- themselves Kulobi and correspond- khshon there are many small valleys, gionalism is a compartition by re- ingly Tajiks, Uzbeks, Arabs and Turk- oases and districts. Thereafter, in gions, districts and even villages. mens that live in Qabodiyon call accordance with their place of birth One would support his mother- and regional origin respondents dis- themselves Qabodiyoni. land and its people. Unquote. tinguish small communities in their own Answer of young men - Quote. Be- As per National Poll of Public Opin- region and much larger regions in the ing overseas we are proud of our ion IFES - 96, in Tajikistan 64% of areas far from their own territory. united nation. Upon return to respondents account themselves For instance, people from the north Tajikistan we immediately split into Tajik, 22% - Uzbek, 5% - Russian, of Tajikistan differentiate the regions regions, upon return to districts 2.5% - Khujandi and 2.5% Pomiri, of Tajikistan as follows: Khujand, Uro- we split into villages. Even in vil- 1% each - Kulobi and Qurghon-Tep- Teppa, Zarafshon, Isfara, Maschoh lages we try to split into streets. pagi and the rest 3% - others. (all of them are north Tajikistan), then Unquote. goes Kulob, Dushanbe and Badakhs- Obviously, despite the fact that all hon. Kulobi respondents listed sepa- Usually, the self-identification of orig- nations of Tajikistan have a good rately , , Dangha- inal people of Tajikistan has a com- sense of ethnic origin more then 6% plex nature. For example, in Porsh- ra, Kulob, but the northern part was of respondents, Tajiks or Uzbeks nyov village of Shughnon (GBAO) named as one, integrated region. The defined their nation by regional origin. people distinguish themselves by research has shown that people have In January 1999, the same question their mother village i.e., Tishori, Pa- no relevant perception of regions was asked during the Public opinion shori, Midenshori, etc. At Khorog that could be accepted by all ethno- review. 64% of Dushanbe dwellers level they call themselves Porshin- regional groups. Many adult respon- accounted themselves Tajik, 2.6% yovi, meantime, further out they were called Kulobi and Leninoboti dents were proposing to consider prefer to call themselves Shughnoni. (Sughdi), 1.3% - Karategini and 1.7% districts as regions. Finally in Dushanbe they are Pomiri. Pomiri. Thus, about 8% of adults (18 In principal, original Tajiks represent Out of Tajikistan they are comfort- and older) of Dushanbe are ignoring a conglomerate of large and small able to be Tajiks in accordance with their ethnic identity and determine ethno-regional groups of manifold passport. This is true for all Tajik and themselves by regional nationality. 88 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Table 1. National composition of Dushanbe population.

NNyationality PePercentage

1-Tajik 63.8%

2-Uzbek) 8.8%

3-Russian 13.1%

4-Kulobi 2.6%

5-Leninoboti 2.4%

6-Khujandi 0.2%

7-Karategini 1.3%

8-Pomiri 1.7%

9-Other 6.0%

9-Other 100%

Source: Report on Public Opinion Review of Dushanbe electorate, «Shark» center, Dushanbe, 1999.

Evaluation of the degree of impor- Quote. Adults do not understand Regionalism is more about interrela- tance of self-identification is a way the difference between regional- tion of ethnic groups, than its natural to complexity. Thus, in 1999 ethnic- ism and nationalism. The war was existence. ity (nationality) was important only inevitable since our people could Quote. Regionalism is a compe- for 34.3% of respondents, but not distinguish and differentiate tition and confrontation of local 12.6% of respondents considered regionalism from nationalism. Our country had to suffer social and societies. Unquote. (Parliament regional nationality as a most impor- economic losses. Unquote. member). tant factor. In this regard, one can (Young men). Quote. «The case when regional state that regional identity is a signif- interests are above national is icant element of identity for the Tajik Quote. For us, young women and called regionalism. No matter population. future mothers it is highly impor- tant to get married. Today it is a where one works he/she thinks A somewhat different self-identifica- hard job. If a girl will select a hus- not about public and state inter- tion style is accustomed by youth. band from another district, her ests or at least organization, but For them ethnicity is a key factor. parents will be against it. This about their ethno-regional Young people deny regional identi- problem is very frequent. Un- groups. Regionalism is a compe- ty, calling it an engine of civil war. quote. (Young women). tition and confrontation of re- ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 89

gions. Inside each region the sit- jand and Uro-Teppa experience resentatives in governmental uation is unchanged - districts, continuous opposition. Whereas, structures. villages, mahallas. We do not in Khatlon province the dominant - Clan usually means a successful have a formed sense of single power is held by Baljuvoni peo- take-over of power and influence nation and national consolidation. ple. Currently, Kulob is affront- by people of one territory. Un- We do not think on national, but ed; in the past was a quote. (One of PIRT leaders). on local level». Unquote. (Scien- sort of rimland under Kulob’s um- tist/Conflictologist). brella. Meantime, other small 2. Clans do base on territorial unity, «counties» like Muminobod, but do not form it. Clan’s nationality Unclear perception of regions goes does not dictate the dwelling-place. well with manifold senses and defini- , etc. are hurt as well. That is why very often, local com- tions of regionalism. Research shows Unquote. (Political party mem- munities are heterogeneous. It is also that perception of regionalism most- ber). normal to identify the regional na- ly depends on social status and posi- The features of traditional society are tionality of immigrants of third gen- tion of the respondent. very strong in the political life of Tajiki- eration (likewise, Buhori, Farghoni, stan. As an individual in Tajikistan one Governmental and managerial per- Samarqandi, Khujandi and other eth- can be independent in private or spir- sonnel and political leaders are posi- no-groups of Dushanbe). One clan itual life, but must be completely and tive that regionalism is a system for or coalition of relative clans under the always a part of his/her community, organization and realization of pow- umbrella of a hierarchal and well-or- which in turn is a part of some eth- er in Tajikistan. As per research, the ganized clan scheme leads the polit- no-regional group. Here, a person is major elements of this system are ical life of country, region, and dis- not just a citizen with his/her rights as follows: trict. This principle is practiced both and responsibilities; he/she is an in- 1. Socio-political structure of Tajiki- at central and local level, such as ja- tegral member of some community. stan’s society forms a conglomerate moats. Consequently, every political opin- of ethno-regional groups, structured ion belongs to one’s ethno-regional Quote. Governance of clan is in hierarchy, which elements repre- group. They become some social subject to promotion and place- sent dynamic equilibrium. It creates organisms of the political scene of ment of its representatives. Un- a constant competition and opposi- Tajikistan lead by regional elite rep- quote. (Leader of political par- tion between groups, resulting in sup- resentatives, sometimes named as ty). port of balance among regional forc- clans by our respondents. es. Misbalance of which induces large 3. Recruitment of elite (political, eco- shocks in the political life of Tajikistan Quote. nomic, military and intellectual) is done by regional indication at every level. sometimes wrapped up by military - Regionalism is a collective name This is true both for regional and cen- acts. for organization of local clans and tral governmental elite. Quote. Competition and opposi- its elite in charge of some territo- tion of regions is well spread in ry, its life and problems, protec- Quote. Every chief is trying to fill many aspects of our life. For in- tion of its interests through pro- in vacancies with the thankful and stance, in Sughd province Khu- motion and placement of its rep- trustful: a) relatives, and b) coun- 90 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

trymen, that will guarantee his/ and correspondingly the control of istrative units) is practiced to em- her future support. Unquote. (Se- the business sector. However, the power this system. nior Ministry staff). key instruments of governance are Quote. Regions do not influence the legal system and military forces. 4. Clans or elites, both central and the governance of the country. That is why the law enforcement regional, are defended by their own Today, the governing south is structures and its commanding elite ethno-regional groups through the pulling itself together to prevent are being fully recruited by the gov- elite and non-elite ethno-regional re- the north coming into power, erning ethno-regional group. Obvi- cruitment system, practiced in all or- constantly reshuffling the Heads ously, the commanders of military ganizations, institutions, enterprises, of Sughd province. It is obviously units are closely related to the cen- private companies, etc. unfair and creates natural oppo- tral government, moreover, they sition in the province. Taking into As a result we build a very common represent the same ethno-regional account that Sughd province is Eastern scenario, where every eth- group. the biggest one and contributes no-regional group or sub-ethnos oc- Quote. I do not know how to de- the biggest share of GDP and cupy their own niche in the coun- scribe upcoming presidential state income. Unquote. (Party try’s economy and policy. This sys- elections. Change of high gov- member). tem was gradually demolished dur- ernmental officials is not possible ing the Soviet era. But the Soviet Establishment of a «governmental unless the commanders cease to mechanism was collapsed as a result party» - The People’s Democratic serve the private interests of some of the break in of a new govern- Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) is lead by individuals. Unquote. (President mental elite, when due to civil war the ruling ethno-regional group. This office staff). the positions of all clans and ethno- party is uniting the chiefs of ministries regional groups were changed. Cur- The role of law enforcement bodies and governmental agencies all over becomes highly important because: rently, taking into account a new re- the country; meantime the lowest the central Government elite is try- cruitment scheme based on an eth- units of this party are established in ing to monopolize the power and the no-regional basis, this system is com- every governmental agency, regions are trying to promote and ing back, but often with new ethno- organization and even companies place more of their own representa- regional groups in power. For in- and their chiefs automatically lead this tives. Herein, as far as the region, it stance, before the fiscal system was lowest party unit. is harder to bring it under control. in the hands of Sughdi and Gharmi Quote. Why is the PDPT allowed Here are some tools to cope with people, today, it is in hands of Kulo- to create units in organizations this problem: a) location of militia in bi people. and enterprises automatically more or less independent regions, leading them, while we, the 5. The governing group of clans for example, in Sughd province ev- Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, holds the central power in its hands, ery district center has its own militia do not have this right? Unquote. meaning governmental ministries and unit; b) President is practicing an as- (Party member). agencies. An integral part of their signment and full control of his en- governance is the control and regu- voys in regions. Fast reshuffle of re- Use of ideology - promotion of lation of customs and tax systems gional chiefs (heads of local admin- «Vahdat» governmental ideology ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 91

based on ethno-nationalism. In accor- trol by “blood relatives”. Underde- reveal the acting mechanism of re- dance with the laws adopted after velopment of individual conscious is gionalism. They pay more attention independence one ideology cannot fueling nationalism, which becomes to cultural diversity of regions of dominate in Tajikistan and pluralism a collective-defensive tool against Tajikistan. This makes a big difference should be a core principle of politi- the realities of open market. This re- between humanitarian intelligentsia cal, cultural, and socio-economic life quires higher mobility and individual from politicians and administrators, of the country. Despite this, the freedom. which fully denies the existence of leader of the state in his speeches substantial difference in culture, tra- Use of supplementary control in- and books («Tajiks in the Mirror of ditions and customs and dialects struments. For example, cotton History», by E. Rahmonov), as well among all ethno-regional groups. mafia is headed by a coalition of as other governmental officials in their governing ethno-regional groups - Moreover, governors and politicians statements and mottos in press clear- Kulobi and Hissori control the pro- believe that different levels of de- ly say otherwise about the new ide- duction and processing of cotton, velopment of every region condi- ology called «Vahdat» (translated as owning most cotton refineries: ac- tion the existent dissimilarity. the Accord). The key rationale of this cording to regulatory and law papers ideology is the declaration of accord Quote. There are no big dissimi- agricultural producers are attached and solidarity of ethnic Tajiks despite larities in the types of cultures of to cotton refineries and have no right the differences in political views, so- Tajiks. There is a difference at the to independently sell cotton. cial and cultural statuses. The key idea cultural level. Consideration of of this accord is the ethnic commun- Quote. The Center’s logo is distinct regions of Khatlon will ion and the role of ethnic ancestor «Plant the cotton, die, but plant show that poor, undeveloped of all Tajiks is given to the ruling eth- it». Futures contracts are stran- Muminoboti people will look like nic group. The research works of gling us. For three years we have representatives of some other contemporary Tajik historians and not been paid for produced cot- culture in comparison with rich publicists form a new political my- ton. We cannot fight with them and modern Khujandi. In reality, thology where “genuine” Tajiks are taking into account that they are they are quite similar; it is more represented by the ruling Kulobi eth- relatives of high officials. We about low income and opportu- no-group, which find their roots back can’t sell our cotton due to pro- nities. That is it. Unquote. (Par- in ancient and became a lin- hibition. But, we need to survive. liament member). We can do nothing and live our eal descendant of Arians. People of culture, science and jour- days in slavery. Unquote. (Chief Nationalism in post-Soviet Tajikistan nalism decidedly deny this point of of farm of Khatlon province). enjoyed a fast development not only view. They think that ethno-regional in respect of the need to retrieve groups have their own culture and some new foundations for national Stage II psycho-type. statehood, but also as a new meth- Journalists and scientists have a con- Quote: Provincial people are dif- od of collective survival in the transi- trasting perception of regionalism. It ferent. Diverse culture, dialect, tion period. Nationalism is replicat- seems that they feel regionalism and music, customs and traditions and ing the principles of geographic con- realize its consequence, but cannot finally, mentality. Gharmi were 92 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

always diligent and initiative. Ku- were putting more emphasis on the closed ethno-regional communities lobi - open and simple, but quite importance of regional solidarity and with their housing blocks, mosques, lazy and inactive. Sughdi hate to the sense of regional patriotism in schools or school classes. host guests. Southern Tajiks are their life. Quote: Before placing their chil- very hospitable. North loves Quote. Regionalism is a protec- dren to school class many par- «shashmaqom» (classic Tajik mu- tion of place of birth and honor ents inquire about the teacher’s sic). Southern people have no of each human being. Unquote. «regionality». Mothers do not sense of it and sing their own (Young men). want to place their children at «falak» (type of traditional vocal classes where the teacher is from music). Kulobi women love red Both men and women consider re- some other region. Anyhow, if dresses and in the North wear gionalism a normal thing. Regional parents are from Sughd province green and purple colors. Still, we solidarity is a natural sense, to be they are trying to find their coun- are so different. Unquote. (Jour- owned by every person. trymen, parents from Kulob will nalist). Quote. I want to describe some try to select a teacher from Ku- human attitude. For example, the lob. Teachers show different atti- Perception of regionalism through chairman of some enterprise and tudes towards their people. the eyes of young generation. you are from same region. If you Thereby, adults initially oppose ask for help he must support you. The young generation also binds re- children. Before the war, parents This is an advantage. To my opin- gionalism with ethno-regional were looking for professional ion, regionalism is a natural feel- groups, which they think, occupy one teachers, but now for relatives or ing for every human being. Un- territory, have their own culture, tra- countrymen. Unquote. (Young quote. (Young men). ditions and customs and dialect. Girls women). The work of the focus-group discus- were more active in this issue: More often regionalism is seen when sions attests that for the young gen- Quote. looking for a job. In parallel, with eration regionalism is a norm of life massive unemployment, people - Regionalism is a presence of to be faced countrywide. have to face supplementary obsta- well-determined territories occu- Quote. At a University test a Pro- cles set by institutions based on their pied by people united by their fessor will inquire about your re- internal environment. As per our re- own customs and traditions. gional nationality before making spondents, one of the most impor- - Regionalism is distinguished by final mark, an overestimation will tant factors in getting a job is to have the dialect. be natural if you are both from relatives or good friends (from same one region. Unquote. (Young area). - Regionalism distinguishes peo- man). ple by their territory, customs and The traditional structure of Tajik soci- traditions. Our study testified that civil war ety has a distinctive style of employ- caused internal consolidation of eth- ment. Until today, Tajik employers Unquote. no-regional groups in areas inhabited preferred to base on old, but very Young men (more than women) by various regional nationalities; new, strong relative, matrilineal ties (here ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 93

called «avlod» - clan) when making lieve that regionalism means compe- fall into groups. Respondents say that decisions of employment. A nation- tition and rivalry. in the student environment there is al poll held by the International Foun- continuous opposition between men Quote. Tajiks are separated in dation for Election Systems in 1996 of different regions. Often this op- regions consisting of 100-200 reported that 68.3% of Tajiks con- position leads to physical fights be- areas. Every region is competing sider themselves a part of some clan tween youth groupings of different with other regions. Each region (avlod). A consolidated number of regional nationalities. is dissatisfied and annoyed with avlods had predecessors buried at another region. «What are they the home territory of the mother thinking of themselves? They The engine of regionalism. from one ethno-regional group. pretend that power is in their Almost all respondents expressed an Strong family and regional ties and hands?» they say. One region is opinion that regionalism is being sup- mutual support make it easier to find blaming and abusing another ported by the Government at ev- a job for low class members of local region, more and more ery level. After the collapse of the groups. detaching each other. Unquote. Soviet Union regionalism became an (Young men). Quote. Any governmental official instrument of governance. prefers to build a team of trust- The young generation points to the Quote: Regionalism is surging at worthy people from his own re- relation between regionalism and the governmental level. At low levels gion. For instance, if I was ap- political formation of Tajik society. It there is no acute sense of region- pointed as the Chairman of Khu- is obviously felt that there is a con- alism. The higher the level of kumat I would also build my team tinuous conflict of regional elites re- Government the stronger the re- on an ethno-regional basis. This sulting in the balance of elite groups. gional ties and regional solidari- helps at work. I can punish and Youngsters understand that each ty. Unquote. (Scientist/Conflic- encourage him/her and give any group is holding its own niche in a task and be sure that it will be tologist). clan pyramid and that there is a rul- executed anyway. Unquote. ing regional group, which regulates Talking about regionalism, one should (Young women). other regions and the country in gen- mention that regional ancestry is not Another traditional element of re- eral. the only way of getting into the rul- gionalism is patronage. This style of ing elite. There is a quota system of Quote. Regionalism - creation of relations in modern Tajik city substan- regional representation of every re- special conditions and environ- tially affects professional mobility and gion in the government. This system ment, so as to let people of one predetermines the future of the was partially used in the Soviet era. region take advantage of other young generation of Tajikistan. Name quoting was implemented regions. Unquote. (Young wom- through a system of personnel ap- Quote. I cannot explain to you en). pointments in state and party agen- or express myself, but everyone Regional solidarity moderates the cies by ethnic-regional representa- has a «ceiling». Unquote. (Young creation of closed juvenile regional tion. Therewith, from 1930 until men). groupings taking into account that 1992, the Government of Tajikistan Young men more than women be- young people are more inclined to was ruled by representatives of the 94 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

former Leninibod region (now The Komsomol Committee - first region of Sughd (Prime-ministers of Sughd), and . The second- people were always from Leninobod Tajikistan after independence: A. ary posts were occupied by Samar- and seldom from Kulob area. At the Abdullojonov, J. Karimov, A. Sa- qandi, Buhori and by the inhabitants city and district administrations there madov, Ya. Azimov, O. Oqilov), of other regions of Tajikistan. For was a rule: the chairman of a city or Speaker of the Lower chamber of instance, from 1930 until the collapse district must be from another district Majlisi Oli (Parliament) S. Hairulloev of the USSR the Heads of Commu- or region. For instance, for many is from (as it was in Soviet nist Parties were: B. Ghafurov, T. years the Chairman of Isfara city was times the Head of Parliament is a Uljaboev, J. Rasulov, R. Nabiev and from Konibodom, and vice versa, representative of Gharm or GBAO. K. Makhkamov. All of them are from however, there was an exception: However, these are all vestiges of the Leninibod region. At city and dis- the Head of Khujand was always from the old system of regional represen- trict levels the first secretaries of the Khujand city itself. In Qurghon-Tep- tation in modern Tajikistan. Communist Party’s Committees pa, the major posts were taken by However, as a rule the Prime Minis- were Leninobodi Tajiks, second sec- Gharmi and Leninobodi, in Kulob by ter should be the representative of retaries - Russians and third secretar- Russians and Leninobodi. ies again Leninobodi Tajiks and sel- the economic elite of the most de- However, J. Rasulov, former Chair- dom others. veloped region - Sughd province. man of Communist Party, changed After seeing the CVs of governmen- The Heads of Supreme Council (Par- this system. He abolished the mo- tal officials it is clear that still there liament) starting from 1920 were nopoly of Leninobodi’s rule in the are free places and promotions due usually the representatives of Gharm government and started to recruit to advantageous marriages and mer- region (Karategin valley) or GBAO people from all ethno-regional its earned by «outsiders» towards (for i.e. Nusratullo Mahsum from groups. More and more often first ruling ethno-regional elite. This fact is Gharm, Shirinsho Shotemur from secretaries of the Communist Party attested by the occasional promo- GBAO, Sh. Shogadoev from Garm, were represented by Gharmi, Hissori tion of officials from other ethno-re- N. Dodhudoev from GBAO, Rahma- and less often by Kulobi. In accor- gional groups. As said before, these tov from Gharm, M. Holov from dance with regulations, the first sec- people have family ties or some Gharm and G. Pallaev from GBAO. retary’s term of assignment was not merits with ruling region. The Heads of Government were al- more than two years, with some rare Many respondents stated that region- ways Leninobodi Tajiks, except for extensions. However, long-term pro- alism is almost unknown among farm- two cases: in 1950-60s N. Dodhu- longations were not possible. This ers and workers of Tajikistan. doev from GBAO was the Head of newly introduced system was hin- the Council of Ministers and at the dering the formation of regional clans Quote: Simple people do not end of the 1980s, Mirzoev from and groupings. need regionalism. It is for people Kulob became the Head of the Coun- that fight for high positions, in The traditions of regional represen- cil of Ministers. parallel using their regional or tation remain at present, for exam- family ties. Unquote. (President Ministry of Interior, KGB and Prose- ple the Prime Minister is usually a cutor Office senior people were al- representative of the economic elite office member). ways from Russia. of the most developed, industrial There was an opinion that the elite ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 95

often uses marginals and the under- bers have mentioned that regional- to use regionalism for their benefit. class through their mobilization under ism is an integral of traditional politi- Some officials also acknowledged regional solidarity logos. cal culture of the Tajik nation, inten- that Moslem clergy, particularly, Sufi sively used by local elites after inde- Ishans foster regionalism. Since Ishans Quote. The source of regional- pendence. are an integral part of the regional ism is the elite, supported and elite all over Tajikistan and keep high trusted by the social underclass Quote. Seems like regionalism is positions they orderly support re- of their region. In a positive out- fostered by all people, but effi- gional consciousness. Despite the come they will forget about re- ciently used by the Government declaration of Islamic integrity most gionalism. Unquote. (President for their own sake. The society political movements of the Islamic office member). itself created this system and the party of Tajikistan have apparent re- Regionalism was always an efficient Government is successfully using gional characters. instrument of political mobilization in it. The Government is regulating Tajikistan. Political leaders firstly rely and directing the river flow. Here, Quote: Regionalism is stimulating on their ethno-regional supporters. people obey and follow seniors. both the ideological and the Is- That is why any oppositional move- Obviously, to live in the society lamic factor. Do not forget, that ment widely uses regionalism in its and oppose the Government is there is a large number of regional political aspirations and struggle. hard, like swimming against the Islamic parties in Afghanistan. river flow. Unquote. (Young Unquote. (Scientist/Historian). Officials noted that in Tajikistan re- women). gionalism is often a key instrument in Scientists assume that people with cabinet and political games. Moreover, youngsters accept that average education and low-income there are also «third players» in in- level, mostly villagers and farmers, Quote. Regionalism is a comfort- terregional games. Some of them are supporting regionalism. These are able instrument of governance suspected that external players are people with acute regional conscious- and manipulation of people. Be- using regionalism to manage events ness. fore we also had limits of region- in Tajikistan. al representation, but today they State leaders, high governmental carry slightly different functions, Quote. We are not sure who is officials and a scientist/conflictologist, of which the biggest one is ma- supporting and using regionalism which participated in our poll, have nipulation of people and career in our country. Maybe it is some emphasized that militarization is an intrigues. It is always simple to external power. Unquote. (Young influential strengthener of regionalism. write off misperformance to the women). This factor was not conspicuous for account of regionalism. Failures the society though. The academic circles, particularly hu- can be always explained by re- manitarian intellectuals, stay some- The Tajik militia represented by two gional sabotage. Unquote. (Tax what detached. They suspect that opposing camps was formed on the committee member). the moving forces of regionalism are base of partisan brigades and recruit- Young people have also stated that some political movements that pro- ment of combatants was based on regionalism is fostered by elite. How- mote separatist logos, as well as Is- family and regional background. As ever, a number of focus group mem- lam propagandists, which are trying a result, right before the Peace 96 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Agreement of 1997, the Tajik army ly conspicuous in the political thing. Unquote. (Party member). (both national and oppositional) was process - in elections, personnel Increase of the number of govern- grounded on family and regional bri- policy making, as well as allot- mental officials of one ruling region is gades. Currently, its commanders ment of zones of influence. (Po- surging an opportunity to re-distrib- are trying their best to keep and fos- litical party leader). ute the state treasury during privati- ter regional brigades. They under- - Regionalism is an ancient stone. zation, in parallel strengthening the stand that regional support is the It is usually related to politics and capacity and power of their ethno- guarantee of their power. Financial politicians. Unquote. (Young regional group. disability of Tajikistan makes regional men). support an advantageous and an es- Quote. In our country being close sential factor to backup the combat- Economy. to government means being by resources. Our business society ivity of military brigades taking into In the transition period, new collisions is intermixed with politics; precise- account that regional elites and busi- started to occur between politics and ly it cannot survive without politi- nessmen render financial and in-kind economy. The ability to convert ad- cal «roofs». assistance to «their» brigades. ministrative potential into financial Quote. Militants are supporting capital in the period of state proper- That is why an increase in the num- regionalism, precisely, those ty re-allotment has created new ber of «their people» in the gov- combatants that came into pow- motivations for empowerment of ernmental structures means an in- er during the war among regions. regionalism in Tajik society. crease of access to the «privati- Its commanders are keeping the zation pie» by ruling ethno-re- Quote. Regionalism is more seen power only due to regional soli- gional group. Obviously, the elite in governance, as well as in pres- takes the best products and sim- darity and assistance. Unquote. tigious and rich organizations. In ple people are left with remain- (Scientist/Conflictologist). time of allotment of resources and ders. Unquote. (President Office control administrators are trying member). Regionalism incidence. to build a team of «brothers». This The governmental leaders well real- manner was also used in the Sovi- Politics and governance. ize all risks related to such regional et system, but that Government privatization of state property, par- All respondents named power and was trying to prevent regionalism ticularly the risk of occupation of large state governance as the most ac- and clanism. Today the situation industrial objects by ruling ethno-re- tive zone of regionalism. has changed. Sughd province is gional groups and the obvious surge Quote. Regionalism is all about out of power. Relatives and of contradiction between regional governance. Unquote. (President «brothers» of the President hold elites. office member). key positions - Kulobi. It is a root of regional nationality of our gov- Quote. What are the parallels of Many people think that regionalism ernment and state in general. privatization and is an integrated part of the political Regionalism is less observed in in our context? It is appropriation process in general. small, low-income enterprises, of former state property by pri- Quote. - Tajik regionalism is most- where one can hardly get any- vate persons with an obvious ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 97

despoliation. It is quite unfair and Quote. - Regionalism is strong in becomes a family business, which dangerous. We are not like Rus- Parties. The Socialist Party of starts to use its “long hands” with sia and we do not have their un- Tajikistan is supported by people family solidarity and loyalty. As an limited resources. We are con- of Aini, Penjikent, Uro-Teppa (the example, the clan of Cholov broth- strained in resources, economic «Adolathoh» party - recently pro- ers, who used to be both the com- potential and each industrial ob- hibited), Shahristan and Konibo- manders of the People’s Front bri- ject is highly important for its own dom. The Party of Islamic Revival gades and later commanders of region. Unquote. (President Of- of Tajikistan is supported by Rasht Governmental militaries (Qurbon fice member). valley, Kofarnihon and Qurghon- Cholov, former commander of Bor- Teppa. More then others the der Brigade of the Ministry of Secu- Concentration of power in the hands Communist Party of Tajikistan is rity of Tajikistan) and strong narco- of a small number of top elite, which supported by GBAO, by some barons of Kulob. Regionalism is also converts administrative resources into districts of Republican Subordi- well spread in the criminal economy. financial capital is provoking leaders nation and Sughd province. (Par- Since the major share of business is of both central and regional elites to in the shadow economy, the crimi- ty member). re-distribute power to their own nal circles are controlling business hands. Meantime, regional elites are - All people are trying to vote through the establishment of «roofs» in charge of military brigades that for the person from their own re- based on regional character. Illicit Tajik could be used as an influential politi- gion. Of course, after selection, business is also active out of Tajiki- cal instrument. So if, some regional the People’s Deputy will help and stan. elites, in control of substantial finan- support those people that gave Quote. We have visited Moscow. cial, political and military capital are their vote to him. Unquote. Tajiks live there as well. On not happy with the apportionment (Young men). Cherkizovskiy market Tajiks also of power they can gather a momen- Criminal sphere. practice regionalism. Vanji, Ko- tum and to try to turn the power to farnihoni and others - all of them their own respect. Our research attested that regional- work under their regional «roof». ism is widely used in the criminal Elections. Political parties. «Roof» here means protection of world, including drug trafficking. The client. For example, if I am from Some regional elites are using political criminal groupings are formed on an «X» region, my countrymen will parties as an instrument of struggle. ethno-regional basis. The solidarity of help me. I will have to pay money All political parties of Tajikistan have criminal groups is interrelated with or to somehow reimburse it. Un- regional background, sometimes regional loyalty; together they lay quote. (Young men). open, like NDPT or a hiden one, like foundations for the establishment of «Ittihod» and «Adolathoh». Others criminal mafia clans. This is especially Regionalism grows roots for illicit fi- prefer to use ordinary nomenclature true in the drug business. There were nancial organizations, which make methods for getting the balance of a lot of cases when a drug dealer from and to Tajikistan. political powers, such as political bar- would involve his family, relatives and Usually, these organizations are work- gain and back-door negotiations, and countrymen into drug trafficking. ing without any guarantees and the of course powerful pressure. Thereby, such a drug trafficking group main factor of credibility is clanship. 98 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Youth and regionalism. they will assess your origin, but riage contract). In the Soviet period, not your knowledge. Unquote. these marriage traditions were grad- The survey confirmed that adults (Young women). ually disappearing. At present, tradi- experience regionalism in politics and tional types of arranged marriages economy, namely, in power and dis- Employment. tribution of capital. Apparently, re- are being revived. Quote. - If you are from Kulob, gionalism touches less in ordinary life, doors are open everywhere. With Quote. - Nowadays parents look communication and culture. Howev- wrong geography it is easy to find for regional marriages. For ex- er, regionalism is penetrating into the a hundred reasons not to employ ample, I want to take girl from lives of all young people. In ten years you (Young women). another region. When I send my of reforms the power of regionalism matchmaker to her house, her - I was an accountant in one or- substantially increased. Young peo- parents will refuse me taking into ganization for a year and there ple grow into adults, they socialize the account my originality. Bada- were no problems at all. In a year and observe regionalism every- khshoni man will not marry Sugh- we got our new director from where. They go to school and make Kulob and after about a month di woman, meantime Sughdi man friends by ethno-regional factors. The he started personnel clearance. I cannot marry Khatloni woman. biggest affect of regionalism for was called to his office. «Where (Young men). youngsters is concentrated during are you from?», he asked. «From education, employment and mar- - For instance, one guy fell in love Hissor», I replied. «Why couldn’t riage. with a girl, though he knew that you find a job in Hissor? Go and she was from another region. He Education. work there», he finished. I was went to ask for her hand in mar- forced to resign. (Young wom- Professional niches occupied by one riage, but never got it. Her fa- en). or another regional groups, dictating ther never gave permission. This them to select their occupation and - That is a reality of Tajikistan. For story happened in our region. form their life plans. instance, I have got an education (Young men) and I want to work. «What is your Quote. Before entering the Uni- - We have a neighbor from ?» the first question of em- versity, we inquire about the province. She fell in love with a ployer. He will not evaluate your Chancellor’s regional nationality Kulobi guy. There were strong skills first. Unquote. (Young or during semester exams we in- feelings on his side as well, but men). quire about Professor’s «region- the girl’s parents do not want this ality». We are happy if the Pro- Entering marriage. wedding, because he is from fessor is from our region. It means Many ethno-regional groups of Tajiki- Khatlon. They think that he will I can easily enter the University stan preserve ethnic monogamy. leave her anyway and marry a and pass all the exams. It is all in Besides, the status of ethno-regional woman from his region. They my pocket from now on. groups in regional hierarchy depends have different traditions and that Always there is the chance to pass on well-arranged marriages (the po- she will never be happy with him. an exam for nothing. Because, sition of marriage partner and mar- Unquote. (Young men)...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 99

Welfare and Social Services. counties were concurred by Afghan were dissatisfied. This situation was - Abdurakhmon Khan and were decelerating national consolida- The collapse of systems of social passed to Russia as a result of the tion. Unquote. (Scientist/ Con- service, education, healthcare and big Russian-British game in the Mid- flictologist). social protection has made people dle East. Despite all concurs and con- reliant mainly on family, relatives and This group also believes that region- stant feudal wars which were chang- their ethno-regional groups. alism is about unequal development ing the political map, during the cen- of regions, especially in the econo- Quote. - Let’s say there is a fu- turies the administrative map stayed my. neral or a wedding, only coun- unchanged up to the invasion by tryman will come to support it. . It testifies that re- All respondents accept that region- Social backing from your own gions remained pretty much the alism has grown during the post-So- region is already a good thing. same for centuries, from time to time viet period. (Young men). rejoining newly established countries Quote. Because of Civil war, - When I fall sick, the doctor will as administrative-territorial units or which was a conflict of regions be from my region. He will charge independent countries. This fact is a for power. Unquote. (Parliament less and treat better. Unquote. big concern for a government that is member). (Young men). trying to form one united state. Apparently during inter-Tajik conflict Quote. The reason there is re- shaded by ethno-regional measure- Reasons of Regionalism gionalism is due to the nonexist- ments, we could observe a forma- ence of a unified state in the past. tion of the most acute aggravation All respondents thought that geo- There is no one sense of common of conflict and post conflict period. graphical obstacles were the reasons territory, no universal center. We The internal consolidation of ethno- for the formation of separate origi- do not have a base for consoli- regional groups has taken place. In nal regions in RT, (mountains, rivers, dation and no national conscious- 1997 one could see the obvious for- prairies, etc.). These marked off val- ness. Unquote. (President office mation of sub-ethnic territories with leys and oases from each other and member). their own system of governance, facilitated the establishment of rela- culture and economy. These territo- tively isolated regions. A number of scientists and officials ries were inclined to self-isolation and from the South of Tajikistan believe Historic rationale: in the past many inter-conflict. Disintegration was a that regionalism is a part of Soviet regions of Tajikistan were part of dif- real risk. This tendency was broken power, which was governing the ferent states. For example, Sughd down by the Peace Agreement of country through representatives of province was a part of Bukhoro Emir- June 27, 1997. Along with building the North of Tajikistan. The elite from ate and Kukond Khanate. Small in- peace, empowerment of nationhood the North was used to control the dependent counties inhabited south and law and order the relations be- whole country. and central parts of Tajikistan, as well tween territories and regions be- as GBAO. Only in the second half of Quote. During Soviet rule gover- came better. However, there were the XVIII century did some of them nance was done by one region - new factors that facilitated regional- join Bukhoro Emirate. Badakhshon Sughd province. Other regions ism in the political, economic, social 100 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

and cultural lives of Tajikistan. These social protection is almost nonexist- thoritarian regime, which is based on are the major ones: ent. Social incapacity of the govern- appointments rather than on free ment has weakened its performance. elections. This notion confirms that State incapacity. Clan interests are at the cutting edge. regional elite, which hold political All administrators agree that Tajik Ethno regional groups that support power in central government, has the governance is very weak, quite un- and protect their own members, benefit of an absolute dominance in regulated and uncontrolled; the state making them more and more influ- all spheres of life of the country, in- machine is ineffective and regional- ential, hold the social services. cluding the economy, defense and ism has replaced it. security. The ruling elite is not de- Quote. The reason for regional- pendent on people due to their sys- Quote. There is no school of state ism is an unavailability of state tem of appointments to all official service, no professional official- thinking and security in future, posts. As for elective posts, like the dom, no traditions of bureaucra- people are not sure about their president, members of the lower cy that are guarding state inter- destiny. Unquote. (Member of the chamber of the parliament and heads ests, regardless of place of birth Ministry of Finance). of local governments, the ruling elite or family ties. Most Government Almost all respondents believe that has all the administrative tools for officials do not know their terms the reason for regionalism are low “arrangement” of elections, falsifica- of references, which is why they culture and education of people and tion, manipulations and pressure dur- are often busy with private things. governmental officials. ing the election period. That is why Unquote. (Member of President the ruling elite is making every ef- office). Quote: The reasons for regional- fort to hold the power in hand and ism are: Some officials believe that state not to let other ethno-regional groups weaknesses are due to poor strate- Low culture of administra- have their share. The ruling regional gic planning, lack of common goals, tion and culture in gener- elite gets the super price and tries unclear future and plans. The gover- al, as well as poor educa- its best to keep it. Personal loyalty nance is done inefficiently. Private tion of new administrators. to one ethno-regional group and eth- needs and interests are put above (Party member) no-regional solidarity are the main public and in the context of Tajikistan instruments of management. Poor education and un- these are also the interests of eth- awareness, especially po- no-regional groups. litical and legal. Low ac- Assessment of Regionalism Quote. There is no common goal cess to information and in- by various social and age groups.

and strategic planning. Unquote. capacity of intelligence. The survey showed that evaluation (Member of President’s office). Unquote. (Member of of regionalism depends on a person’s President office). In transition period the state started ethno-origin and age. The represen- to forget about social services. To- A number of interviews carried out tatives of the ruling ethno-regional day it renders only a small number in Isfara district among young entre- group believe that regionalism is of social services. Healthcare and preneurs confirmed that the reason sometimes useful. They say that re- education are not free anymore and for regionalism is a current strict au- gionalism is facilitating formation of ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 101

political clans that can guarantee ef- Quote. At present regionalism is changes are prevailing among the fective governance. a protection of interests of taken young generation, where one could territory, in the context of Tajiki- observe a big conflict between the Quote. Regionalism is empower- stan. Unquote. (Member of Khu- traditional-collective and individualis- ing the social political system and kumat of Qabodiyon district). tic systems. The collision and deteri- development. Formation of new oration of the system of social val- political clans is good and facili- Regionalism is very much condemned ues is the major source of intergen- tates sustainability of the society. by career officials and representa- erational conflicts. A number of Actually, regionalism is not an tives of old bureaucracy. They be- young pro-European people are important political factor in Tajiki- lieve that regionalism is collapsing against group solidarity and loyalty, stan. Unquote. (Member of Pres- state structures and governance. In- but they all use the benefits of the ident office). tellectual elite - scientists, journalists, regional support. Therewith, the also condemn regionalism. Many respondents noted the posi- majority of focus groups concluded tive influence of local patriotism as a Apparently, dual perception of re- that regionalism is helping them in part of regionalism. gionalism, by politicians and adminis- some way, but more endamages; trators from a ruling ethno-regional moreover it has damage on the so- Quote. The positive side of re- group is closely related to their prac- ciety in general. gionalism - people are conscious tice. They see and realize the nega- of their region, support it at their tive influence of regionalism on the official positions. It is their small Stage II. Regionalism life of state and society, so they im- motherland. Unquote. (Member as an interrelation between plement it at work. Our young gen- of President office). center and regions. eration has got a dual position; from Almost all young people that partic- one side - regionalism for them is an In ten years of independence it be- ipated in our research emphasized inevitable factor, from other side - came obvious that political powers that regional solidarity gives them they more than others feel the neg- of the country are built on regional support and provides opportunities ative consequence of regionalism. basis, rather than political preferenc- and resources in every life situation. Regionalism, community organiza- es. In absentia of civil society, re- They say that young people without tions and traditional social institutions gional political elites become the in- their ethno-regional ties or people helped people to survive during and dependent political powers that thirst from weak and indistinct regions are after the civil war, but on the other for full control of power. Regional almost deprived from their social re- hand they conduced people to stay elites could be the strong foothold sources. If they are intelligent and within their regional and community structures of an authoritarian regime, talented they are employed by an groups. Factional conscious and soli- if this elite that controls the central NGO that is less affected by region- darity are opposing individualism, governmental units could gain a na- alism than state organizations or busi- which is the effect of market re- tionwide status. It never happened ness. Representatives of regional forms. The development of market until now and the current dominative elites see regionalism as an opportu- economy and democratization are elite is of a regional character. Mean- nity to protect the interest of their fueling the change of paradigm and time, all other regional groups are regions. development of individualism. These trying to implement their own policy 102 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

to secure their interests and forming in Tajikistan is executed at the cross- Quote. Regions do not have spe- nain political position, opinion and tac- way of relations among regional cial regional interests. There are tics. In reply, the central government elites, sector administration and re- common national interests of is depressing regions, trying to keep gional response. Tajikistan: unemployment, im- away from decision-making. provement of economic and so- Quote. Differences and contra- cial sectors. This could be solved Quote. Having many regions is not dictions among regions are ex- through effective sector manage- a problem. The problem is their plained by regional diversity, ment. However, our Ministries and alienation and competition. Cen- contrast in their capacity and in- agencies prefer to do more pa- ter-oriented and centrifugal state terests and of course competition per and administrative work, trends depend on development between regional elites. Unquote. though there are many important speed of regions, as well as the (Party member). technical tasks to be solved. Un- economic and cultural policy of Complexity and contradiction in such quote. (Tax committee member). the country. Unquote. (Scientist/ type of governance is well observed Historian). The state decision-making process is in opinions of elites and bureaucracy done by a small number of people, Thereby, regionalism should not be on place and role of regions in the not regulated by anyone. There were considered detachedly from territo- life of the country. samples of such decision-making, for ries. The governors draw a clear Are there any interests of GBAO, instance: resolution on partial delimi- parallel between regionalism and ter- Sughd and Khatlon provinces and tation of Tajik-Chinese state border ritories and administrative-territorial Districts of Republican Subordination? that have affected the interests of apportionment of the country: If yes, what are they about? GBAO. Quote. Regionalism is a group of The answer on this question was al- Quote. Regions have no influence persons in control of certain ad- most equal. Representatives of re- over internal and foreign policies ministrative-territorial area of their gions, particularly members of Qa- of the country. Decisions are origin. Meantime, appointment bodiyon Khukumat, businessmen of made by a small number of indi- of administrative staff at any level Isfara and members of Porshnyov viduals. A couple of people, is executed on a regional basis. jamoat, as well as, representatives which will never account for re- Regionalism is integrating inter- of ruling region have replied «yes». gional opinions. Unquote. (Pres- ests of both ethno-regional ident office member). group and territory. Unquote. Quote: Regions/territories that (Tax committee member). have administrative-territorial sta- A number of officials are concerned tus (province) have their common that ignorance of regional interests Miscommunication between center interests, especially economic and corresponding contradictions and and regions is an attribute of differ- and social. Unquote. (President conflicts are dangerous for the coun- ent understanding and establishment office member). try. of power in center and regions. The situation grows more complicated Representatives of ruling elite and top Quote. Interests of regions and with sector administration (ministries governors completely deny the ex- country in general are sometimes and agencies). In reality, governance istence of special regional interests. different. But, it is not a dreadful ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 103

thing. It is worse when there is a counted for in the center. Relation- Does the government control the conflict of interests between re- ships with the regions are built on an economic life of regions or they gions and top governors and informal basis, i.e. through direct or are free to act independently? Is some governors lobby the inter- indirect pressure, political intrigues, economic life centralized? ests of their regions, meantime inter-elite negotiations, bargains and mediation. Actions for demonstra- harming other regions or the Stage III. tions of power by regions or intimi- whole country. Unquote. (Presi- Do regions have any degree dation by government, particularly dent office member). of independence? by ruling ethno-regional group are This kind of conflict must be con- widely used. The problem of partic- All respondents acknowledged that trolled by the government, particu- ipatory approach of territories and administrative regions, namely prov- larly by governmental officials in governments and provision of bal- inces are not independent. The cen- charge of regional politics and inter- ance of group interests is one of the tral government is treating them like relation with regions. most complex one for Tajikistan. It is ordinary administrative subdivisions Quote. At the level of President important both at the level of center with a very limited delegation of all interests of regions shall be rep- vis-a-vis region and at low-level units power. However, almost all inter- resented at Registry office, Of- of territorial management. For ex- viewees realize the necessity and fice of the State adviser on per- ample, in GBAO like in other regions importance of the development of sonnel policy and Committee on of Tajikistan there is a clan, family regions and accounting of their local State affairs of Majlisi Namoyan- and ethnic fight for power. At interests. dagon. At present, Zokir Vazirov, present, the key administrative posts Quote. Regions are extremely de- Vice-Prime Minister, regulates the are in the hands of Shugnan people. pendent. Ideally, we should take issues on regional policies. Un- They dominate in most regional or- into account the interests of re- quote. (Parliament member). ganizations and agencies, located in gions and keep a medium degree Khorog city. Meantime these clans However, all respondents agreed of self-sufficiency. It is better to are distinguished by Dormurukhti, that existent bodies are not perform- sustain a middle line between cen- Shokhdari, Suchani, Khorugi, Porsh- ing accordingly. tralization and decentralization. niyovi, etc. Quote. Special envoy and repre- Unquote. (President office mem- We were informed that present lo- sentative of GBAO, as well as Peo- ber). cal administration facilitates no bal- ple’s deputies of GBAO districts Almost all respondents pointed to an ance of interests of ethnic groups. It are based in Dushanbe. There are incapacity of regions in terms of im- was obviously seen during elections Advisers on regional policy in plied powers and decision-making. to Majlisi Oli, when regional adminis- President office. So what? They do tration was openly supporting their Quote. The regions are quite de- not protect anyone. Unquote. placemen from Khorog clan. This fact pendent. It is implied that they (Scientist/Conflictologist). accumulates dissatisfaction of re- have to make decisions them- All elite representatives accepted gions, which are not represented in selves. For that, they need to be that regional interests are hardly ac- management. more independent and not to be 104 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

too much afraid of the conse- es are sort of liaison offices for rec- existence of common values and quence of such decisions. Un- onciliation of interests of the center, goals, as well as a unique coordina- quote. (Tax committee member). regions and ethno-regional groups. tive state economic policy, the in- terests of regional elites are at the In line with low application of implied It is quite hard to evaluate the eco- cutting edge and regionalism is used powers our regions do not have nomic self-sufficiency of regions. for re-allotment of state resources enough responsibility. The major After massive privatization the cen- to the benefit of the ruling ethno- power and responsibility is focused ter was supposed to lose its industri- regional group. in districts. al leverage. As of January 1, 2002 some 24.4% of enterprises were in Quote. I cannot say that center is Quote. The regions are depen- state property (Source: Socio-eco- controlling regions; there is no dent. Though, they should have nomic development report of the decent control. Center has no independence. At present, it is all Republic of Tajikistan, Statistical mag- development strategy and con- dictated by the Center. Unquote. azine, 2003, page 103). However, trol scheme. All investments are (Senior staff of the Ministry of Fi- this has never happened and the made into sectors that were im- nance). state is still the main investor of the portant in Soviet times. Invest- This situation is suggesting abolishing country. It signifies that our economic ments are done inertly, so as just regions and delegating all powers to sector is still substantially centralized to continue support and to pre- districts more centralizing the gov- and does not depend on regional vent final collapse. There is no ernance. Curiously, these suggestions administrations (meaning Khukumats preventive strategy, but there is were made only by respondents of of provinces). an inert input of money into old the ruling ethno-regional group. The priority sectors. This government Quote. In principal, the center reason: the ruling ethno-regional should prepare a development shall be in charge of strategic is- group is trying to eliminate every strategy paper. Until it is pre- sues and regions should have more possible chance for consolidation of pared money and resources will opportunities to develop their other ethno-regional groups in re- continue to flow into pockets. economies. However, we should gions/provinces, as these groups are (Ministry of Finance member). be realistic in the sense that Gov- potential candidates for governance. ernment must control regions. It is a time of pocket interests, not These concerns reasoning a very low Unquote. (President office mem- to the benefit of state though. Un- degree of delegation of powers to ber). quote. (Senior staff of the Minis- regional administrations, though our try of Finance). experience attests that regional ad- In accepting that regions do not have ministration is a good instrument for an opportunity to form their econo- Administrators do recognize that the management of different, unequally my our officials realized that mean- prevailing tendency of centralization developed and separated districts of time the state cannot control the is facing a number of obstacles, of Tajikistan. At present, the real pow- economy of regions as well. The rea- which absence of a reliable system er is implemented by the Central son for this is incapacity of the gov- for collection and processing of in- Government, district administrations, ernment to prepare one real eco- formation. Neither the ruling elite nor whereas, the Khukumats of provinc- nomic development strategy. Non- Central Government has a clear pic- ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 105

ture on development of regions. get and election period. (Politi- traditions of centralized governance Deterioration of statistical service, cal party leader). and to a strong habit to rely on cen- collapse of science and incapacity of tral government as the only protec- - In practice, regional budget is mass media create a vacuum of in- tor and counter-pressure, even in in competence of the Ministry of formation, both for elite and ordinary cases of abuse of power by gov- Finance. During the development people. ernmental officials. of regional budgets the Ministry Quote. Dushanbe is not fully reg- of Finance is taking into consid- Young people are often insufficient and ulating economic life of regions. eration the opinion of regional lack initiative, which often creates nos- In order to control them fully we financial departments and the talgia for «iron hand and order». should have maximally evident in- opinion of Deputy chairmen of Quote. No, I think regions should formation on regions, which we Khukumats on economic matters. not be independent and center are not possessing at the moment. In process of budget formation must govern them. Of course, they Unquote. (Staff of the Tax Com- they participate in discussion ses- will be against it. At present, the mittee). sions in the Ministry of Finance chairmen of Khukumats are boss- and protect the position of their The most evident part of the rela- es and they apply their own con- region. But, the final word is for tion between center and regions is stitution. Unquote. (Young men). the Government of Tajikistan. In budget policy. Regional administra- case regions are interested in For the past years regions and dis- tions have limited budgets and lack- budget improvements, they are tricts have formed social communi- ing opportunities to manage the re- trying to lobby it through the Min- ties of a mobilized, authoritarian type, sources of their region. istry of Economy that is in charge which fully replicate the political man- Quote. Regional independence of budget resolutions. They are agement of the central government. doesn’t go out of budget allo- using corruption. However, The young generation is observing cated by the center. They don’t sometimes these resolutions are this local baronage and assumes that and will never have political in- never implemented, for example, such feudality and anarchy can be dependence. Unquote. (Presi- the Ministry of Finance does not curbed only by a strong, centralized dent office member). have enough funds. Very seldom power. This opinion is a result of an involution of the society after the in- Budget formation - the main battle is the center making some excep- dependence of Tajikistan. The wrong place of ethno-regional groups. This tions. Unquote. (Member of the consequences of the war are: col- battle is concentrating all interests and Ministry of Finance). lapse of the legal system and legal ambitions of ethno-regional groups, Youth opinion. rights of citizens, poor respect of the as well as contradictions between Curiously, young people both wom- law, devaluation of human life; in regions from one side and regions en and especially men acknowledge addition, people become accus- and center from another side. that regions should not be indepen- tomed to atrocity and consider it Quote.- The major contradictions dent and it is necessary to even natural. Our young generation has between regional groups are more centralize governance. We grown up and was socializing in the seen during distribution of bud- imagine that it is related to Soviet period of war and instability and that 106 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

is why they consider the power A lot of administrators realize that all Authoritative assignment of represen- games as a normal social behavior. failures of the Government, of which tatives of ruling ethno-regional group The market reforms are bringing in a inefficient political and economic re- to various posts in regions and dis- spirit of competition, individual activ- forms, detrimental social policy and tricts generates complex problems. ism and freedoms, which go in line regional discrimination are invoking a Quote. - There were cases of mas- with post-conflict deterioration of the deep dissatisfaction of people. This sive civil conflicts in those regions legal system and order stimulating state of affairs may tend them not where assignments of outsiders the escalation of power games to vote for present government in took place. New conflicts and among young people. Therefore, the future. The most dangerous com- contradictions occur between lo- young generation considers it natu- petitors are other ethno-regional cal regional-clan elites and out- ral when clans and their leaders fight, groups, since they are the major side liegemen. It is necessary to win and oppress each other with the players in the political process of the develop a decent program. We help of their ethno-regional groups. country. That is a reason, why this do not have a State adviser on Government is against free elections The majorities of youngsters do not internal policies. There is no of local governments. believe in elections and call them longer an adequate analytical “bluff and falsification”. They think Quote. In reality, our Govern- service. We need a system for that people make a herd, which re- ment has left society adrift. The collection of information and as- quires a good herdsman, and that is interrelation of the Government signment of proper liegemen in why they do not really see the re- and society can be simply called regions. We should also have an gionalism as a tool of regional ex- - anarchy. This is the result of the efficient, concrete process of pansion and territorial dominance. civil war and collapse of power adaptation. system. For 10 years of indepen- - Besides, our Government should Shaping of preferable dence our Government got used pay attention to local elections. organization of political life to not to pay for work. The state They are not considered serious- and power model for RT. land is distributed in an unfair ly at the moment. What is Majlisi manner. bThis attitude is deep- Oli? Its operations bring no ben- The research has attested that polit- ening people’s distrust and re- efit to regions. It is a simple bu- ical views and preferences primarily gionalism. How to act in such cir- depend on ethno-regional origin and cumstances? It is better to rather reaucratic body. Unquote. (Pres- less on the official position of respon- appoint than vote, because elec- ident office member). dents. Officials and politicians of rul- tions will not be faithful. In such An authoritative assignment of liege- ing ethno-regional group are more elections the regional elites will men by the ruling ethno-regional interested in centralization and its take all power. So, how should group is fostering regionalism and empowerment. the central government commu- corruption in provinces deteriorating Quote. Centralization is vital to- nicate with them? Power and as- its economic and social situation due day. After some ten years we can signment are natural partners. to poor management. It also esca- shift to decentralization. Unquote. Unquote. (President office mem- lates unexpected oppositional (Party member). ber). moods. Young men pointed out that ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 107

such authoritative assignment of re- dance with the Constitution he Tajikistan sustains a multiparty, par- gional representatives on behalf of cannot become a Chairman of liamentary democracy separated in ruling ethno-regional group is stimu- the district, unless he is a Peo- legislative, executive and judicial sys- lating corruption as this representa- ple’s Deputy of local Majlis. tem of power. The President is both tive conceive it his duty to despoil Now, there is a new term - Act- the Chief of State and the Chief Ex- this region and pass a share to the ing Chairman of District. After ecutive. However, instead of objec- central government. his appointment they wait until one tively operational democratic institu- of People’s Deputies of Majlis dies tions we have off-institutional politi- Quote. The center is assigning its or leaves the region and official- cal mechanisms. loyal people. Regions deliver ly appoint the Acting Chairman portions to Center and ask for to the post of Chairman. You may The state is based on three systems support and promotions. Un- imagine that there is a constant of dependency: quote. (Young men). reshuffle of Chairmen. Unquote. Administrative-territorial sub- In this regard, sometimes among rul- (Parliament member). ordination: provinces, cities ing elite, here and there occur sug- Our poll of public opinion and inter- and districts, jamoats, mahal- gestions on introduction of free elec- views in regions confirmed that peo- las and villages. tions at district and city level. How- ple vote for free elections in every Ethno-regional groups head- ever, the top governors never ac- governmental level in regions. ed by clans. cept these suggestions. Quote. Princelings rule every- Sector management: minis- Quote. If regions will have free where, but it is better that Heads tries and agencies. elections we will never be able to of regional administrations are control them. Unquote. (Party elected rather than appointed. Two of which are formal and one, member). They have to be responsible for ethno-regional - informal. First two their acts to their electorate and systems are closely interrelated, but At present, such an authoritative as- the law. Unquote. (Scientist/His- not concurrent. They are based on signment system is contradicting with torian). territory and land. From one side, the Constitution and invokes its colli- ethno-regional groups are close to sions that are not solved yet. their land, home of clan leaders (of- Conclusions on Stage II. Quote. Something has to be ten seniors of leading «avlods» of done about these assignments. The facts of the research have gen- the region) and graveyard of their Today, it is all about violations eralized two major conclusions: Tajiki- predecessors. The legacy and conti- of the Constitution. The Chair- stan is on the way to form a state nuity of a family are ruling these re- that will represent an amalgam of man of the district must be the lations, however the clans do not elements of Soviet planning-distribu- member of District Majlis of Peo- form administrative-territorial unities. tive system, revived elements of ple’s Deputies. For instance, the Clans do form territorial unities that traditional-archaistic state and new Center wants to appoint a new act and manage the behavior of peo- democratic institutions and relations. Chairman that has nothing to do ple of this unity, no matter of loca- with District Majlis. But, in accor- In accordance with the Constitution, tion. 108 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

From other side, the political hierar- Stage III. The effects is discontented with senior man- chy of the President/Sovereign rep- of regionalism on social, agement. This is true all over the resents different levels of adminis- political and economic life. country. Unquote. (Parliament trative-territorial divisions of compe- member). The consequences of regionalism: tence: province, city, district, jamo- Poor management in gov- at, etc. Thus, the territorial structure Distrust, rivalry and animosity ernmental layers, in econo- among ethno-regional groups. is a foothold of the political-adminis- my, in social sphere and cul- Dominance of one clan and trative cabinet of the state. This struc- ture. ture is centralized, hierarchal and is ethno-regional group is invok- ing the discontent of others based on of Quote. Low professionalism and and provoking a struggle for incompetence of managers at all territory and personal relationship. At the «super prize». levels and governmental bodies. the same time, the regional-clan struc- Unquote. (President office mem- ture carries on. This structure is part- Quote. Danghara is in power now ber). ly based on the fact that regional and other clans are dissatisfied elites are often landlords. with it. The dominance of one Repression of economic clan over others and ambitions of growth, stagnation in devel- The political will of the President and clan leaders create hate and com- opment of regions and low personal relationships (patron-client) petition between regional groups. efficiency of investments guarantee the territorial state orga- The sense of hate is penetrating nization, which may be described, Quote. Imprudent preparation of the country. Unquote. (Political as a net consisting of: a) horizontal strategies for development of re- party leader). clan structure - regional leaders, not gions. Every clan is dreaming of necessarily administrative officials; b) There is no unity among re- how to get more and more for hierarchic vertical structure - officials, gional elites. This fact is dra- their regions, though there is no reported directly to the President matically balking the progress appropriate environment or con- (Chairmen and management of prov- of national ideology. There is ditions for feasibility of invest- inces and districts). no feeling of integrity and in- ments. Everyone is pulling the tegration aiming at determi- blanket to his back. Unquote. In Tajikistan, the real governance is nation of national goals and (President office member). executed at the crossroad of these priorities and realization of systems. Sometimes, the clan and Stagnation of development national interests. state systems are interrelated, but due to brain escape of pro- sometimes they compete with each Incertitude, distrust and neg- fessionals. Intensification of other. That is why central govern- ative attitude of Tajik citizens brain escapes due to lack of ment is blocking the independence towards the Government. jobs for «irrelevant» special- izations. of regions. This sector system was Quote. The personnel policy is a very important at the time of the combination of dissatisfaction and Quote. - Experienced doctors, Soviet Union, but now it is gradually suspicions. People are suspect- economists and lawyers are in losing its influence. ing each other and secondary staff search of jobs, meantime their ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 109

potential jobs are occupied by dent and ending with the head of develop self-administration and unqualified workers, and young the smallest village. Authoritative give more powers to mahallas. doctors that do not have any ex- assignments must be minimized. Finally, we were reduced to the perience. They are employed Regionalism will pass away auto- situation when mahallas are not because they are from Kulob. matically. People will select man- governmental, but their heads are (Young men). agers by their qualifications. Un- appointed by the center. We quote. (Tax committee member). need to adopt a new law on local - The competition among regional administration. The local govern- elites is surging social tensions and As per some governmental officials, ments, including the Chairmen of may finally cause social outbursts elections are necessary in order to provinces should be elected. In taking into account present pov- banish the feeling of inconstancy, at general, the election process erty state. (Party member). present prevailing in the society. should be re-structured. It is also - Government is not responsible Quote. At present, everyone necessary to organize some le- for its decisions and it is all around wants to get as much as possible. gal training for governmental of- us. (President office member). That is why our society must cre- ficials, especially for high-rank- ate some control mechanisms, Unquote. ing managers. Unquote. (Presi- which will limit the power. Now, dent office member). every chairman is a king of his A number of central government Stage IV. Mapping of potential district. There is no mechanism of officials, particularly the representa- solutions to overcome influence on power by public, tives of the old bureaucratic school regionalism. If regionalism and no public control of power. suggest the strengthening of: state- is a named problem, how (Senior Ministry member). hood and centralization, regulatory it can be solved? In spite of regional origin, many ad- bodies, struggle against regionalism Political actors are separated by eth- ministrators and politicians empha- and training of governors and man- no-regional origin and official posts. sized the necessity to implement a agers, especially of a high rank. The representatives of regions are real self-administration. Quote. - Effective reform of gov- suggesting introducing free elections Quote. Now, it is a right time to ernment is required. It should cov- for regional governments. As per introduce adjustments to the Con- er both state governance and lo- them, it will motivate more respon- stitution. It is necessary to expand cal administration. Some work is sibility in regions. From the other the responsibilities and compe- done under the framework of state side, citizens will select professional tence of self-administration, es- reforms of administration, started and capable people, efficient man- pecially at the level of jamoats, back in October 2001. Some du- agers, and not just the representa- districts and even provinces. Be- plicate state bodies were already tives of their ethno-regional groups. fore jamoats were keeping bank abolished and a number of high Free elections will break the clan accounts and budget. Today dis- professionals were invited from system of management in Tajikistan. trict Khukumats are ruling the ja- regional governments to center. Quote. Every governor must be moats. It is time to solve the prob- All this shows that there are chang- elected, starting from the Presi- lem. We need to improve and es, but quite minor ones. 110 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

- For example a new Department mocratization and development of Meantime, schoolteachers must give for State Service under the Presi- mass media as important instruments quality education. Unquote. (Young dent and Academy for State Ser- to cope with regionalism. men). vice were organized, but all of it Quote. - Our Government de- One of the ways to solve the prob- is on paper only. However, it clares that Tajikistan is an inde- lem of regionalism suggested by would be more efficient to orga- pendent and democratic coun- young people is to eliminate tradi- nize some short-term courses for try. But, in reality it is not. There tional, arranged, ethnic-regional mar- officials, both in center and re- is no democracy here. Laws are riages, which escalate endogamy gions, including Ministries and inactive. We should replicate and hierarchy of groups. They have agencies. Since we are left with- Russian experience of free elec- suggested forming a Commission or out professional bureaucrats we tions of President and . If Committee, to which young people need to bring up new profession- we would act as in other civilized can complain in the case of parents als. It seems to me that regional- countries and apply free elec- of marriage partners refusing due to ism is immortal in this part of the tions, even for election of City ethno-regional origin. world, but it is possible to miti- Mayor, regionalism will fade gate it applying fine personnel Quote. Another instrument to away. policy. Unquote. (President of- cope with regionalism is to foster fice member). - It is required to develop mass and encourage family relations media. People should have Representatives of political parties between different regions. Un- chances to speak out. This is a think that it is necessary to develop quote. (Young men). way out. Unquote. (Young men). a multiparty approach. Firstly, they Young respondents expressed an say that integration of people by Young people see a way out of re- opinion that in order to cope with political preferences will release them gionalism in development of national regionalism it is necessary to refer consciousness, formation of ethnic from the influence of ethno-regional to Islamic leaders to make propagan- identity that will dominate over oth- elites and will decrease the affect of da of Islamic integrity. regionalism. Secondly, development er elements of identity. Curiously, Quote. Every group has its lead- of parties and a multiparty approach young people think that ethnicity er, Mullah and Ishan. They can will gradually create a political sys- should dominate over citizenship. help to solve this problem in the tem, where legal institutions will fade Quote. The resolution of this form of discussions with local out the influence of informal off-insti- problem is as follows, regardless communities and describe its neg- tutional structures. of location and country the an- ative impact. If they would more swer to the question «Where are Quote. Empowerment of multipar- often exhort people to integrate you from and what is your nation- ty approach will reduce regional- and say «Let’s solve this problem ality?» should be, «We are Tajiks ism. However, parties should rep- together!» it would be solved fast- from Tajikistan». resent some regional interests as er. Islam is forbidding regional- well. Unquote. (Party member). Regionalism is taking its beginning ism. The para «Lo ilo illa-l-loh» Young generation and representa- from families. Parents must give means, «We are all one nation». tives of political parties consider de- good education to their children. Unquote. (Young men)...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 111

Young people are certain that im- occasionally to satisfy needs of tion, including municipal admin- plementation of agitation and cultur- some officials. (Tax Committee istration based on free elections. al events, like discussion clubs, sem- member). When the system of such region- inars, festivals and other actions can Regions should independently deter- al administration will be intro- serve an instrument for mitigation of mine and set their economic policy. duced and well-managed there regionalism. Meantime, the Center shall direct and won’t be any need for authorita- tive assignments. Unquote. (Par- Quote. We need to create some coordinate their activities. Regions ty member). working groups, which will visit must independently form this policy, local communities, schools and as proposals should come from the Parliament members, officials and universities and hold workshops lowest level. Unquote. (GBAO rep- regional representatives are con- and round tables among youth on resentative). cerned that Tajikistan has no sufficient aspects of regionalism. Unquote. Young people, more than their el- legislature that would regulate rela- (Young men). ders, prefer larger centralization. tions between Center and regions. Tajik Constitution and laws are full of Young women think that it is good Quote. All regions prefer to be contradictions. to create agitation brigades, hold more or less independent, but the contests and competitions of come- Center should manage them. Quote. A great work should be dians for young people from differ- (Young men). done for the formation of a legis- ent regions of Tajikistan in order to lative base for interrelation of And yet, the most loyal devotees acquaint each other with the customs center and regions. Unquote. of centralization are politicians and and traditions of our regions. (Parliament member). governors from the ruling ethno-re- gional groups. They are sure that Senior governors from the Center The interrelation between Tajikistan is not ready for free elec- and regional representatives accept- the center and regions: tions, decentralization and self-admin- ed the importance of legislative seg- suggested model. istration. regation of powers at all governmen-

In accordance with the research the Quote. - The unitary state is an tal levels. most preferred model of this inter- efficient and comfortable form of Quote. Very precise systems of relation is self-sufficiency under the management. The local govern- segregation of powers should be direction, coordination and control of ments at provinces should be abol- set at all administrative levels. At the Central Government. ished. We do not need them. present, politics is extremely lack- (Party member). Quote. Regions should basically ing in this. Unquote. (GBAO rep- develop themselves. Center must - In prospect, decentralization is resentative). determine common goals and required. But, at present central- Nearly all respondents noted that objectives and coordinate the ization is more appropriate. there is no legal mechanism of rec- activities of regions. This kind of (President office member). onciliation of interests between Cen- approach is sometimes used for - In ten years time we will need to ter and regions. This process is go- sector management and orders, introduce a real self-administra- ing in informal spheres through the 112 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

traditional technique of peace build- tary party factions would be a good just on paper. (Parliament mem- ing, (negotiations, bargains, intrigues instrument for optimization of rela- ber). and mediation). tions between Center and regions. - Parliament members should rec- Quote. We need a mechanism for oncile and protect regional inter- reconciliation of interests of re- Who are the major actors ests. This is not true any more in gions and Center. Unquote. at the scene of regionalism Tajikistan. Unquote. (Scientist/ (Member of Qabodiyon Khuku- that can find or force a decision Historian). mat). on this problem? Parties Only representatives of humanitari- A collective opinion of respondents Quote. Parties can positively in- an intelligentsia and GBAO represen- was as follows: the key actors that fluence the easing of the prob- tatives pointed to the necessity of can solve the problem of regional- lem, especially during pre-elec- restoring the system of regional rep- ism are President, Parliament and tion campaign. Parties’ represen- resentation in Central government. other senior governors (supreme tatives could contribute a lot management of the country). Quote. It is necessary to rebuild through the Governmental bod- the regional balance of represen- President and Parliament. ies in which they are being elect- tation of regions in Central Gov- ed. (President office member). Quote. - The Governmental bod- ernment. Unquote. (Scientist/ ies in leadership of the President For political parties and movements Conflictologist). should combat regionalism. A it is necessary to acquire national The majority of respondents agreed President cannot be a leader of meaning. Nowadays, there are three that Parliament is the best place for any party. He cannot express the such parties - NDPT, KPT, PIRT. They reconciliation of interests and posi- interests of one ethno-regional should reverse the situation and tions of the Center and regions. group. As per Tajik Constitution switch from regional-clan to political- Quote. The interests of regions he is a guarantor of rights and regional entities. Unquote. (President could be reconciled at the level freedoms. It is quite the contrary office member). of Parliament. If elections would here. (Party member). Society in general be carried out in an honest and - Who can fight regionalism? Pres- Young people think that the prob- fair manner the People’s Depu- ident, Majlisi Oli and local Gov- lem of regionalism can be solved only ties will guarantee protection and ernments. The President must reg- by the society, if it can recognize reconciliation of interests of re- ulate personnel policy. Majlisi Oli the influence of regionalism in future. gions (between each other) and is a legislative body that can ini- the Center. Unquote. (Tax Com- Quote. - In my opinion all our tiate and adopt the laws aiming mittee member). problems that appear today we at restriction of regionalism. Lo- should solve by ourselves, inde- Members of Political parties stated cal Governments are executors. pendently and without outside that the establishment of a real mul- The mediation between them is intervention. (Young women). tiparty political system in Tajikistan, inactive, that is why most laws are including active work of parliamen- - We should form a party to op- ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 113

pose regionalism and to agitate Quote. In reality, intelligentsia, such as , cotton, precious people in the regions in order to People’s Deputies and powerful stones etc., they are making mon- join together and to handle a regional military commanders, ey and money opens doors. problem inside the region or re- managers of big industrial enter- (Young women). public. Unquote. (Young wom- prises and businessmen protect - Businessmen are against region- en). the interests of regions. Unquote. alism, because they are working (Member of party). The major part in the process of solv- for themselves and consequently ing the problem of regionalism can High level administrators consider that trying to hire valuable experts, be played by the following groups the resolve of regionalism is impossi- regardless of place of birth. Un- of people: ble without the formation of a na- quote. (Young men) tional elite, which will be the only Chairmen of districts. Art intelligentsia. party that could provide the solution Quote. - It is possible that an ed- Regional representatives emphasized to the problem. that among the main actors who rep- ucated part of the population resent interests of the regions are Quote. Nowadays, there are few could mitigate this problem. Po- chairmen of districts. However, they people who care about national litical parties exist only on paper. are in an ambiguous position now, interests. National elite should be Laws passed by the Parliament are from one side they are placemen of formed and represent the power not functioning. (Scientist/Histo- the President and report directly to which will assure the solution of rian). regionalism problem. Unquote. him, from the other side they are - It would be good if writers and (Sukhrob). governing bodies of the districts, that poets would organize some mo- consist of influential autonomous pow- From the point of view of young bile groups that could travel in ers that cannot be controlled by state people, combatants can play the regions or theatres and conduct administration. main role as well. topic meetings and discussions. For instance, visit of Sughd the- Quote. Chairmen of Khukumats Quote. - Combatants, power and atre to Gharm, and from Gharm have a two-edged policy; they weapons protect the regional in- to Kulob. It would be beneficial are scared of constant reshuffle terests. (Young women). of personnel. Moreover, the to have cultural gatherings more Businessmen. Chairman must gather back all frequently. Unquote. (Young bribes, which he spent buying his - Entrepreneurs also put forward men). position. Unquote. (Member of the interests of their regions. One Mass Media. district Khukumat). of their objectives is to develop Quote. Mass Media is also play- the economy of their region. Many people expressed the opinion ing one of the major roles in solv- (Member of Ministry) that handling the problem of region- ing the issue of regionalism. For alism is impossible without regional - Businessmen can also express the instance, the popular «TV- Sub- integrative elites, which include eco- interests of their regions. They ex- kh» program, which is broadcast nomic, military and intellectual elites. port treasures of their regions, to the whole republic. So, this 114 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

program can help to suspend employment and poverty detach Strengthening of the Government. people from regionalism. Un- people from each other, facilitates Restoring the control system and quote. (Young men). ethno-regional solidarity and pre- governance. serves clan power. That is why it is Education System. Quote. - We need a strong Gov- vital to improve socio-economic sit- Quote. It is necessary to make a ernment that will erect above the uation in country and reduce pover- negative propaganda of region- regions and will subordinate them ty. alism to children and young peo- under the national interests. (Pres- ple in schools and universities. On Quote. - If I had been the chair- ident office member). the given problem some discus- man, I would give jobs to peo- - We should not forget about sions, seminars and conferences ple. (Young women). Governmental officials. We should be conducted. Unquote. - No money, no job, the conse- should feed wolfs to save sheep. (Young men). quence is that person will search If the salary of Governmental of- for the guiltiest and will accuse ficials equals to USD 7-10, there What and how to change other regions. Unquote. (Young is no use in battling corruption to make the solution possible? women). and regionalism. With this salary It is necessary to: an official is dependent not on build a market economy. government, but on his head or Formation of state ideology The majority of respondents consid- protector, who will find him of ethno-nationalism. er that implementation of economic the»gravy train» or at least will reforms, establishment of market Youth, especially young men and close eyes on illegal acts. Un- economy and in prospective - for- representatives of high-rank govern- quote. (Member of Tax Commit- mation of internal common market in mental officials deem that the solu- tee of RT). RT will lighten the problem of region- tion of the problem of regionalism is Restoring of law and order alism. in formation of ethno-national con- in the country. sciousness. Quote. It is necessary to form one Incapacity of law and order is the common market. (Scientist/Con- Quote. - The only way out of major reason for surging clans and flictologist). regionalism is national accord regionalism. There is a necessity to Improvement of the life standard and nationalism. If Tajik people restore legality in society and the will destroy regionalism. Econom- will unite and recognize them- legal conscience of citizens, empha- ic reforms conduce to decrease selves as one community, the sized all respondents. regionalism. Market makes peo- problem will be resolved. Quote. - We have some decent ple come closer. Unquote. (Par- (Young men). laws, but they have to start to ty Member). - We need nationalism that will work. For example, the law on Combating poverty and developing unite all citizens of the Republic governmental services envisages socio-economic situation. of Tajikistan. Unquote. (Member conducting competitive examina- Young people think that massive un- of Presidential Office). tions, to evaluate the profession- ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 115

al level before recruitment. (Par- ber of NGOs and capacity building strengthening regionalism. They are ty Leader). will also improve the situation. They focusing their attention on regional- say that young, talented and active ism factor. - The legislative power is not only young people can realize their po- about passing the laws and reso- Quote. - If international organi- tential through NGOs, which are not lutions. The legislation should be zations are intending to help, it touched by the regionalism yet. applied in practice. Unquote. would be better if they helped (Parliament member). Existence of external threats. to solve economic problems. But in principle, they are all corrupt. Conduction of honest Quote. A foreign enemy can in- They are squeezing theirs projects and fair elections. tegrate Tajiks. Alliance against through our government officials. external enemy will help to com- Quote. It is necessary to make the (President office member). bat contradictions of regionalism. election process absolutely real, Unquote. (President office mem- - International organizations but not fictional. People will elect those candidates that will repre- ber). should not aggravate regionalism sent their interests. It will guaran- as it is done now. For this it is necessary to eliminate corrup- tee that People’s Deputies will What is the role of external tion. Control, targeting and trans- really represent their regions. actors? Who are external actors? Only than, there will be sense in parency in extension of grants are International organizations are exter- development of new law on self- essential. The number of projects nal actors, respondents say. They can administration. Unquote. (Par- that are directed at development introduce international experience in liament member). of civil society should be in- solution of reciprocal problems, give creased. Unquote. (Member of It is time to build a civil society. The recommendations and force the NGO). young generation believes that more Government to take into consider- Many respondents deem that assis- open mass media will help to apply ation the opinions of international or- tance of international organizations in public control over the government. ganizations and institutions. This will allow young people outside the handling of the problem of re- And yet, there was an opinion that the ruling ethno-regional elite to have gionalism can be focused on support international organization can do noth- access to good career opportunities. of civil society. ing, because it is also corrupt and Free mass media will foster informa- Quote. Conducting various fo- infected by regionalism through its tion openness in the society, coun- rums with NGOs, support of re- local staff. teract the isolation and closed status gional NGOs, promotion of the of ethno-regional groups, encourage Quote. - Every international or- projects focused on interaction of dialogue between different ethnic ganization is surrounded by its NGOs from several regions, and groups and the formation of the uni- own mafia, which in turn has eth- support of mass media - all these versal national conscious. no-regional character. (Head of will help to find the solution for NGO). Another part of young people be- regionalism. Unquote. (Political lieves that the increase in the num- International organizations are just party leader). 116 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Young people assume that in princi- joined by local political traditions, 3. Sector management: ministries ple we should reject external assis- which is the reason why regionalism and agencies. tance. is perceived negatively. The region- At present, the most efficient ones alism acquires a negative color, signi- Quote. - It would be better if we are the first two. The core base of fies separatism and a threat of disso- could do without external forc- both systems is land. lution of the state. The Soviet author- es. (Young men). itarian regime was repressing region- The foundation of the socio-political - I think that foreigners cannot al identity and political independence chart of Tajikistan is a conglomerate help us. (Young men). of regions. After the collapse of the of ethno-regional groups, which form a hierarchic system of a dynamic International organizations should Soviet Union the newly established balance. The ethno-regional groups not interfere in the life of regions. state named the Republic of Tajiki- are represented by a complex of (Young women). stan had no experience in democrat- ic federalism, but in parallel had a state communities inhabiting same geo- with a clan-regional system of man- graphic location (region), often these Conclusion agement. Regional contradictions, inhabitants have a special dialect or The interaction between the center poor ties between the regions and even language and subculture. These and regions is determining the struc- the government in political, econom- so-called social organisms are head- ture of the government, plays the ic, social and cultural spheres are the ed by regional elites or better called clans. The members of these ethno- major role in the achievement of major bottlenecks on the way of de- regional groups can live outside their domestic political stability, resolves velopment of Tajikistan. region, but still feel its subordination. the task of reduction of tension in the society that is going through the So, what is regionalism? An individual has a right to his pri- difficulties of the transitional period. vate and spiritual life, but in political It should be acknowledged that for The problem of regionalism and co- life he/she is always part of a com- the past decade of independence operation between centrifugal and munity, which in turn is a part of some Tajikistan was able to form a state, center-oriented powers in the gov- ethno-regional group. He/she is not which bases on authentically local tra- ernment is of a paramount impor- just a citizen with rights and respon- ditions. The role of the Soviet state- tance for Tajikistan. This problem has sibilities, but a representative of hood and new democratic institutions got an affinity between each other some community. One clan or coali- is significant, but not crucial for the and is divided into: a) interrelation of tions of relative clans, which form a development of the society and the ethno-regional groups and b) inter- hierarchic system of clans, direct the state. The state is founded on a relation among the regions and be- political life of a country, province, threefold system of supervision: tween the Center and the regions. region and district. This principle is 1. Administrative-territorial supervi- being implemented at all levels, like The regionalism processes in various sion: regions, cities, districts, jamo- central government, administrative- political and social circles and differ- ats, mahallas and rural settlements. territorial organizations, including the ent regions of Tajikistan have a di- local communities (jamoats). verse nature. The Soviet style of a 2. Ethno-regional groups and their strongly centralized management is leading clans. The ethno-regional elite, which takes ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 117

over the power, enjoys the bene- of administrative-territorial divisions in order to indemnify itself from neg- fits in all spheres of life, including state present the political hierarchy start- ative developments. It is worth ac- administration, politics, economy, ed from a sovereign-president, such knowledging that there is a close defense and security. Since Tajikistan as: province, city, district, jamoat relation between regionalism and is practicing the system of nomina- and others. Hence, the territorial militarization of the country. tion to almost all posts the ruling elite structure is a ground for political-ad- has little dependence on people. The ministrative machine. This structure What causes regionalism? only elective posts are president, is highly centralized and hierarchical. members of Majlisi Namoyandagon It is based on administrative-territo- Geographic isolation of re- (Lower Chamber of Parliament) and rial divisions and personal ties and gions due to diverse natural heads of jamoats. The ruling elite has relations. The real governance of obstacles, like mountains and got all the administrative tools for Tajikistan is done through adminis- rivers. organization of elections (including trative-territorial and clan spectrum. Historic facts: annexation of falsifications, manipulations and sup- The central government is carefully regions into different states; pression). That is why the ruling elite balancing the relations with clans from due to that the regions had is making every effort in order to other ethno-regional groups in or- different histories, they keep the central power closed for der to reach a certain degree of formed contrasting political the representatives of other ethno- stability. The government, howev- and cultural traditions and regional groups. The recruitment of er, tries to reduce the independence were attracted to manifold officials (in politics, economy, military of administrative-territorial units to external political, economic and even intellectual) is done on re- avoid the strengthening of clan and cultural centers. gional basis. This is true both at cen- groups. USSR control instruments tral and regional levels, including even Thus, regionalism in Tajikistan is a sys- were authoritarian and were organization, enterprises, private tem of power, which is based on not giving any chances for companies, etc. The foundation of collectivism and community solidari- self-management; on the oth- state management is the personal ty of traditional pre-industrial society. er hand during the Soviet era loyalty to some ethno-regional This system is quite unstable. The the governance was imple- group, ethno-regional solidarity, ac- centralization of power in hands of mented through northern cord and unity of clans. some small elite oligarchs is provok- Tajiks that were more ad- The president is not only the leader ing the leaders of the ruling and oth- vanced and owned an ancient of the country, but also a leader of er ethno-regional groups to re-dis- and cultural ethnicity. some ethno-regional group, which tribute the power to their on advan- Unequal development of re- won in the inter-clan battle and won tage. This process keeps the major- gions (especially economic). the main prize, really. From this point ity of people away from the pro- of view, he is a head of the system cess of decision-making and fuels the Civil war caused disintegra- of clans and ethno-regional groups. instability of state power and social tion, strengthening of ethno- The people of Tajikistan accept this control correspondingly. The ruling regional solidarity, increase of state of affairs. The various levels elite is strengthening its military units the role of traditional social 118 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

institutions, which became a elites consider the regionalism as a state. The issue of centralization is way of survival (namely: av- tool for protection of their regional quite controversial to this fact. Tajiki- lod, mahalla, etc.). interests. stan is a small country with more or less homogenous population. Nev- Governmental incapacity - The regionalism is negatively per- ertheless, existence of various re- the Soviet command-admin- ceived by: gions always reminds us about de- istrative control was substitut- a) Career officials - they believe that centralization, regardless of the opin- ed by the state with no polit- regionalism is deteriorating state ion of the center. On the other side, ical will, but with a strong clan structures and jeopardizes the gov- strongly bureaucratic cabinet, urgen- system. There is no strategic ernance in general. cy of shocking economic reforms planning or universal goals. b) Representatives of intellectual elite (that could be implemented only by Personal interests are over - scientists, journalists, etc. the strong central government) and public and ethno-regional in- terests are of a crucial value. c) One part of young people be- finally importance of peace process lieves that regionalism is closing op- are partly justifying strong central- Political traditions of Tajiks also portunities in many fields, for i.e. self- ization of Tajikistan. This is relevant foster regionalism. actualization, career development not only between the center and the Post-Soviet involution of po- and individual achievements. regions, but also at the lowest terri- litical, economic and social torial management level. In addition, spheres of Tajik society en- the territory interests of the regions Regionalism - interrelation courages revival of ancient are not considered, the right for re- between the center forms of political and social gional identity is not being watched, and administrative-territorial units. life. and there is only bargain and fragile The territory control is a very com- balance of ethno-regional groups. plex problem for Tajikistan. Con- Taking into account that the regions Perception of regionalism by straints in interrelation of regions of were always participating in the po- various social and age groups. Tajikistan: Dushanbe has never been litical process of Tajikistan the attempt The regionalism is positively per- a real center for all regions of Tajiki- of the government to leave regions ceived by: stan. Regions were always a part of with no chance of independence is political process of Tajikistan. The a) Politicians and officials from the provoking a confrontation of region- economic relations between regions ruling ethno-regional group, saying al elites. This situation is getting worth had a complex nature. There is no that regionalism is helping to keep taking into account that Dushanbe common market. Tajikistan had nev- the power. never had the status of a real center er formed a single economic body. for all regions of Tajikistan. For in- b) One part of young people be- Sughd province was ruled by Mos- stance, for Sughd region Moscow lieves that regional solidarity is a good cow directly, both during Soviet times was the center during the Soviet support, which opens wide oppor- and first years of independence. times. This was related to the fact tunities and resources. The constitution of the country en- that Sughd region used to be one of c) The representatives of regional visages that Tajikistan is a unitary the areas of industrial importance to ...... REGIONALISM AND ITS PERCEPTION BY ...... MAJOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWERS OF TAJIKISTAN. 119

the Soviet Union. The economic ties Nonexistence of a coordinative state ers at all levels of the government, with the regions of Tajikistan were economic policy and common val- formation of legislation that will reg- also uneven. In soviet era Tajikistan ues are fuelling the increase of the ulate the relations between the cen- was not considered as one econom- role of interests of regional elites, ter and the regions, fair elections, ic entity. Regional economic dispro- which are using regionalism as a tool decentralization, promotion of self- portions were always used by Sovi- for re-distribution of state resourc- management (Parliament members et power. After the independence es. and representatives of regions). and the civil war the road and trans- E) Restart of the system of regional port sector lost a lot, which in turn How to overcome representation in highest levels of the increased the isolation of regions. the regionalism? The opinion government (Humanitarian intelligen- There is no market system in the of respondents (main points). tsia, representatives of GBAO). Republic. The representatives of re- A) Through strengthening of the gov- gional elites acknowledged that the The project respondents acknowl- ernment, further centralization, sup- regional interests are not considered edged that the strife against region- pression of regional elites, formation by the center. alism must be started from the sov- of one universal elite, formation of a ereign powers; only the President The interrelation between the cen- strong bureaucratic school, intensifi- can initiate this movement. The issue ter and regions is built on informal cation of the state control, develop- of centralization is controversial. In basis, through direct or indirect pres- ment of market institutions, devel- accordance with its constitution, Tajiki- sure, political intrigues, inter-elite ne- opment of market economy with a stan is a unitary state. Tajikistan is a gotiations, bargains and mediation. strong regulatory hand of the gov- small country with a quite homoge- The worst situation is observed in ernment (Officials). neous population (80% of its popu- provinces (oblasts). The range of their B) Development of market econo- lation are Tajiks). However, the pres- powers, rights and responsibilities is my, liberalization of entrepreneurship, ence of a number of different re- limited and implemented mostly on democratization (to be started with gions is making the issue of decen- district level. Reason: the ruling elite fair elections at all governmental lev- tralization topical. In reality, the re- is trying to reduce to nothing any els), support of parties and devel- gions are trying to run decentralizing chance for regional consolidation, opment of civil society, support of policies and not to depend on the because this could be growing pow- independent mass media as a tool center’s preferences. On the other er for future take over of the power for civil control. (Party functionaries hand, application of market reforms in the country. However, since the and intellectuals). will cause short-tern dislocations, regions have no capacity to build which can be overcome only by a C) Further centralization. Develop- their own economy, the central gov- strong and centralized government. ment of national consciousness. The ernment also lost its potential to con- More important is to sustain the nationalism will repress the regional- trol the economy of regions. This is peace process, which partially acquits ism. The Islamic integrity can help to because this government failed to the aspirations to centralization prac- fight the regionalism (Young people). build the universal economic objec- ticed by almost all officials and politi- tives and development strategy. D) Legislative segregation of pow- cians interviewed under the project. 120 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

From Ambivalence to Ambiguity? Some Paradigms of Policy Making in Tajikistan ...... Stephane A. DUDOIGNON CNRS/Marc Bloch University, Strasbourg

.. «Ensemble nous oeuvrons pour la posterite de nos deux magnifiques nations. . Vive la probablement future Republique d’Iran !» SAN-ANTONIO, Ma langue au chah (Paris: Fleuve Noir, 1970), 60.

The announcement, ten years in ad- take the risk of beginning the present lamic Revolution?» Such was one vance, of the proclamation of a re- study with an idle quotation, and a of the most recurrent questions the public in Iran, by Frederic Dard (1921- pointless parallel between the unex- author was asked by colleagues and 2000), alias Commissaire San Anto- pected Tajik independence and the various observers between April and nio - a French, Swiss-based (from unpredicted proclamation, twelve August, 2003. Such a popularity of 1966 onwards), «He used to say af- years before, of the «Republic of comparison with Iran among interna- ter this date: «I committed swisside» Iran»? The author did so with the in- tional researchers working on Tajiki- . (je me suis suisside)», liberal best-seller tention of suggesting some answers stan, and the strength of the para- thriller writer who never hesitated to to one of the questions which were digm of an Islamic revolution, and of mock «serious» human sciences1 - is the most oftenly asked to him during «Islam» in general as a common de- a thing not easy to find in the polito- his long stay in Tajikistan, during the nominator of everything potentially logical literature of the time. A San spring and summer 2003, partly for hostile to the West,2 have provided Antonio may have been lacking to CIMERA: «Doesn’t the overall sit- us a sort of common theme for our Tajikistan, if we refer to the much pre- uation in Tajikistan today - i.e., in study. This theme should at least al- dicted dislocation of the Soviet Union, the first years of the 21st century low us to underline, beside the un- but much unexpected proclamation C.E. - remind you that of Iran in predictability of political evolutions in of Tajik independence in 1991. San the decade which preceded the Is- Dushanbe, fundamental differences of Antonio’s absence, the lack of his joy- all kinds between the Iranian and the 1 On French Iranologists and one of their odd- ful derision may feel even more acute- Tajik cases. est habits, viz their taste for complicated tran- ly - relatively speaking, indeed - scription systems, that we have tried to avoid The most striking of these numerous whence the future of Tajikistan seems in the present study: Ma langue au chah, 99. discrepancies between these two to many more unpredictable than 2 Cf. Edward W. SAID, Covering Islam. How different - if not antinomic as we shall ever in almost two decades. the Media and the Experts Determine How We see - cases concerns the respective Why, will object our reader, did we See the Rst of the World (London: Routledge size and populations of both coun- & Kegan Paul, 1981 [2nd ed. New York: Vin- tage, 1997]), in particular the chapter about Iran, 81-133...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 121

tries, and the ability of each to re- playing the card of Uzbek minor- fierce pressure of the Taliban threat. sist, or to oppose pressures from ities outside Uzbekistan, etc.) The situation, although pacified abroad. If most observers of Tajiki- since the late 1990s, remains shaky In terms of we are stan do stress indeed the unpredict- in spite of collusions of interests probably still in Dushanbe in a phase ability of the evolution of the politi- between the former foes. This which has been opened in 1994 with cal situation there, they explain it for overall frailty has been recently illus- the launching of negociations be- a significant part by the decisive role trated by general nervousness dur- tween the Rahmonov government of a multiplicity of external factors, ing the weeks preceding the Refer- and the armed opposition, then po- each of which could suffice to de- endum of June 23, 2003 and by sitioned mainly in Afghanistan, both cide the overall future of the coun- mutual threats that we have been parties being then put under the try (e.g., DJALILI & KELLNER 2003, listening before and since that date 275 ff.). (Among them, those most in the mouth of leaders of the two oftenly mentionned are: the evo- 3 «Nahzat» is the Tajik common denomination main opposite camps - the presiden- lution of the political situation in (Hizb-i Nahzat-i Islami: Party of the Islamic Re- tial faction and the Nahzat.3 (See in- newal) of the Islamic Party of Renewal (IPR) of Afghanistan; the unpredictable fra our comments on the arresta- Tajikistan; it will be currently used for more destiny of the anti-terrosist coali- tion of one of the Nahzat’s lead- commodity in the present paper. The term tion set up in the aftermath of Sep- nahzat (not to be mistaken for nazhat: «volup- ers in the Soghd region, Sham- tember 11, 2001; the unstable tuous pleasure») makes reference to the intel- siddin Shamsiddinov [alias Ishan attitude of Russia and the Russians lectual renewal of the early 20th century in the Shams al-Din Khan], in early June toward 450,000 to 1,5 million - Arabic and Islamic world (see N. TOMICHE, 2003).4 It is reinforced by the ex- «Nah1/2a,» The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. according to official or unofficial clusion from the peace process of [Leiden - New York: E. J. Brill, t. 7, 1993]: 900- quite many protagonists of the polit- statistics - Tajik economic immi- 903); such a global reference should suffice to grants in the Russian Federation; differentiate the Nahzat from more radical orga- ical arena, like the representatives the possibility, sometimes ex- nizations which claim to be followers of the of the formerly powerful «Leninaba- posed in the Russian medias and Muslim Brothers or Islamist political movements di» (i.e., northern) faction of the Tajik echoed in the American ones, of posterior to WWII: the former shows guided Communist Party and state, whose by an overall project of modernising Islam, a rapprochement between the dissatisfaction had caused the failed whence the latter’s project remains limited to coup by Colonel Khudoyberdiev in armed Islamic Movement of an Islamization of modernity. Uzbekistan and some of the Khujand in November 1998 - the 4 At the congress of the Nahzat devoted to former Tajik warlords of the civil main political crisis in Tajikistan since the Reconciliation Day (Dushanbe, 25 June 2003), the very signature of the peace war period; the continuous ex- the party’s historical leader Abdulloh 5 pansion of drugs traffics; the po- Nuri (b. 1947) devoted the second half of his agreement. litical dissatisfaction of the impor- discourse to a violent accusation of President Despite the difficulty, and the risky Rahmonov’s police, and to a severe warning to tant Uzbek minority of Tajikistan, character of pronostics, provisional the government. (Full text: Sayyid Abdulloh and the popularity among its ranks NURI, «Vahdati milli az e’timodi hamdigari sar- perspectives for the decade to of the an Islamist party of Near- chashma megirad [National Unity Takes Its Source come will be sketched in the present Eartern origin, the Hizb at-Tahr- in Mutual Respect],» Najot [the party’s weekly pages. They are based mostly on ir, which in Central Asia has been newspaper] 27 (2003/7/4): 1-3). an analysis of the logics of the Tajik

5 On the situation of this groups of interest in Tajikistan at this moment, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, «Tajikistan: Leninabad, Crackdown in the North,» HRW 10/2 (April 1998): 20 p. 122 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

political system as it has been cal motos, and to play simulta- may be considered a key aspect of working, in the framework of a neously in different, sometimes any cooperation programme, al- specific and provisional balance of openly contradictory registers of though this dimension is generally forces, since the signature of the discourse, if not of thought.7 very much underestimated by the General Peace Agreement between protagonists of humanitary activity Such dispositions can be easily the Rahmonov government and the and technical assistance (e.g., RYF- traced, to a lesser extent, in other then United Tajik Opposition on June MAN 2002). As to recent political Central Asian countries; they may 27, 1997, up till the very recent events in Tajikistan, like the tensions be partly explained by a long ex- developments of the Tajik political after the arrestations of members of perience and a rich imaginary of scenery. It does not take into ac- the Nahzat during the weeks pre- foreign domination (in which cur- count the possible impact of most ceding the Referendum of June rent Western donors have re- of the above-mentionned external 2003, one should never forget that cently taken a place occupied factors, but focuses on the inner pa- the OSCE as well as other interna- beforehand by the Soviet pow- rameters of political culture, and the tional organizations established in er), partly by a dependence on balance of forces inside the hetero- Dushanbe, and implicated then in the foreign assistance which, among geneous leading class of Tajikistan. resolution of the conflict between the Central Asian countries, remains Islamist party and the Tajik presiden- *** more specific to Tajikistan. Bringing cy, are now considered locally a full- Before proceeding to the main body this country’s political leaders from right protagonist of the political are- of our study, it is perhaps worth current ambivalence to future am- na. All discourses and actions by Tajik mentionning that there is a second biguity may perhaps be considered political actors, at least since since reason at least to open it through a goal to attain for people involved 1997 should be replaced in the con- the Iranian tropism, for practical pur- in technical assistance in fields such text of communication strategies pose concerning the work of donor as that of political and economic re- aimed at the strongest possible in- states and their organizations in Tajiki- forms. volvement. stan. If Iran has been showing for In the shorter term, the ambivalence more than two centuries a general of the recipients, coupled with a par- attitude of ambiguity towards ev- 1. The Political Substratum ticular ability at instrumentalizing erything coming from the West,6 in assistance from abroad for goals Few attention has been paid, in these Tajikistan’s official circles the domi- which may have nothing in com- pages, to official political practice and nant and characteristic posture to- mon with durable development, discourse, especially those relative wards Western innovations, espe- to diplomacy and cooperation with cially those brought about by those 6 For a synthetic overview, see for instance donor countries. What we have programmes of technical assistance DIGARD, HOURCADE, RICHARD, 353-355. been trying to do during four months

which have been flowing to this coun- 7 For a very recent illustration about the divi- and a half in Tajikistan has been to try during the last six years, seems sion of collective memory, see Sabine TREBIN- cast light on some of the societal to be that of ambivalence - an atti- JAC, «Le savoir musical des Ouighours: s’il and mental structures which un- s’agissait d’ambivalence de la memoire?», in tude characterized by a special derline these practices and dis- Stephane A. Dudoignon, ed., Devout Societies ability to integrate alien ideologi- courses: the balance of antagonistic vs. Impious States? Transmitting Islamic Learn- ing in Russia, Central Asia, and China through the Twentieth Century (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2004), in print...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 123

forces, the active cultural models (or words, nor the mere messenger of at analysing some key paradigms of lack of cultural models ...), the such or such Tajik institution to such policy making in Tajikistan today: [A] strategies (or lack of strategy ...) or such donor institution, nor the pro- the constant reelaboration, since of political leaders and thinkers, ponent of a necessarily gentle and the last decades of the soviet pe- whom we have tried to identify, and creative «society» against a neces- riod, of what we have been call- finally an overall set of unformal prac- sarily evil and immobile «state». ing the «quota system,» for the tices and negociations common to integration of various, sometimes This has allowed us to cast light on the political class of Tajikistan, but antagonistic figures and forces political demands, thoughts, and prac- usually hidden to outside observers into the state apparatus and gov- tices which remain dominated, since and, it goes without saying, poorly ernment organs; [B] some para- the end of the Soviet period - even documented in official literature. doxical effects of foreign techni- among members of the Nahzat - by cal assistance; [C] the adoption For this, we have notably tried to economic preoccupations of an un- of -style legislations study some of the main political ques- questionable technicity (DUDOI- deprived of measures of applica- tions of the time - in particular that of GNON 1994; 1998). (We will no- tion, or including mutually con- relations between the central state tably evoke the manner in which tradictory articles). Last we will and the regions - in the terms in which the question of decentralization try to sketch some tracks for fur- they were dealt with during this year is closely associated, in the mind ther country studies ([A] the non- by various local protagonists, with of our various interlocutors, with reform of regional power and lo- sensitive variations depending on the those, no less actual, of privati- cal communities; [B] a growing identity of their own respective in- zation, and with the reform of the Islamo-Christian animosity - to be terlocutors. These questions have tax system with a redistribution of replaced in the context of a local been studied according to a great the tax resources at the local lev- instrumentation of international variety of protagonists, from the el). The present report begins with organizations of all kinds estab- grassroots level8 to that of political considerations on the political substra- lished in Tajikistan; [C] and a case strategists, with a special attention tum of Tajikistan at the turn of the of multiple: regional, national, to the particular manner in which 21st century ([A] the overall bal- economic and political cleavage, these two levels are mutually articu- ance of forces; [B] the contem- that of the Uzbeks of Tajikistan). lated - or not - in Tajikistan. So do- porary logics of localized politi- ing, we have always tried to mea- cal clientelisms, through that of sure the relativity of what was said the Nahzat; [C] the political per- 1.1 The balance of forces to us as to one of the possible inter- sonnel. It continues with an attempt The logics of the protagonists in locutors. For that, we have given the political arena of Tajikistan can- ourselves the time necessary to 8 This approach has necessitated very numer- not be understood without tak- ous informal meetings, sometimes in difficult check and compare all the assertions ing into account the clear con- conditions (I went as far as interrupting a med- which were being made to us, or ical congress in Khujand for questioning the science that each of them has of publicly expressed in different medi- director of the town hospital), which added to its respective weigh, possibilities as, in order not to appear as the mere long periods of illness in May and June, explain and limitations at present. The bal- bearer of any of the protagonists’ the long delay with which the present report ance of forces, marked by an over- has finally been submitted to CIMERA’s direc- tion. 124 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

whelming domination of President parties remain devoided of the es- stratum from the «Tajik highlands Rahmonov’s Popular-Democratic Par- sential tool of a political organization (Kuhistoni tojik)10» and the Tajik ty (PDP) and network, is a heritage in Tajikistan: the disposition of armed highlanders’ migrant communities of the civil war and the peace agree- forces or the possibility to mobilize of the Wakhsh cotton valley - a ment of June, 1997. The hegemo- them in a quick time - such a resource significant part of which compos- ny of the PDP has been largely rein- remains specific to the PDP and, to es now the Tajik migrant manpow- forced during the last years, due to a much lesser extent, to the Nahzat.9 er in Russia.)11 massive assistance to the Tajik gov- A common denomination of all the The present political power still comes ernment from the international com- political organizations of Tajikistan is out largely from the «Kulabi» faction munity after the lauching of the anti- a total lack of stable and identifiable which has long been considered the terrorist coalition in the aftermath of electoral basis, as well as a lack of main victor of the civil war in De- 11 September, 2001 and Tajikistan’s strategy for enlarging it. (The en- cember 1992.12 During this period, demonstrations of loyalty to the co- larged benevolent activity which however, President Rahmonov has alition at least until the beginning of has shown so decisive in the po- managed to partly restore some au- the US-British intervention in Iraq in litical fortune of the now govern- thority of the state, and to get rid of Spring, 2003. ing reformist Islamist party AKP the main warlords who had permit- in Turkey seems to be totally ab- Since 1997, multipartism has been ted the victory of the «Red» south- sent from the activity of the gradually introduced again in the po- ern milicias in the civil war. (See the Nahzat, which shows mainly pre- litical life of Tajikistan, although one very recent arrestation in Mos- occupated in the maintenance of can hardly speak of the existence of cow, on the request of the Tajik existing ties with its traditional sub- a real political opposition or alterna- authorities, of the former warlord

tive in the country. During the past 9 Conversations with Muhiddin Kabiri and Parviz Yoqub Salimov, the first Minister six years, the higher personnel of Mullojonov, Dushanbe, June-July 2003. of the Interior of the Rahmonov

former oppositional forces of the 10 In the Nahzat this denomination designates presidency, then ambassador of Perestroika and civil war periods the higher part of Gharm (now Darband) Valley, the Tajik Republic in Ankara, and - the Nahzat and the Democratic the Higher Zerafshan Valley and Higher Mast- finally the chief of the much lu- Choh area, migrants of Lower Mast-Choh in the Party of Tajikistan - has been partly crative Direction of Customs of Soghd region, and for some part the Khowaling integrated into the state structures, hilly area in Khatlon. Tajikistan, before his fatal partic- whether political or economic. As ipation in the failed coup by 11 See a short biography of Shamsiddin Sham- to newly founded parties (the So- siddinov, in SATTORI 2003, 87. Colonel Mahmud Khudoyberdiev cialist Party and the Social-Dem- in Khujand, in November 1998, 12 The term «Kulabization» has been widely in ocratic Party), they used to ap- use among the political elite of Tajikistan during which had forced Salimov and his pear until these very last months the last ten years; e.g., conversation with Dr. family into exile.)13 President Rah- as mere think-tanks. Beside their Iskandar Asadulloev, a former director of the monov has also managed to put an Institute of Strategic Studies for the Presidency purely elitist character, their absense of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, early end to the rivality of great families of mass support, and their amor- May 2003. and their factions of the late Soviet

phous infrastructure (well seen by 13 Comments in Asia Plus (2003/7/3): 1; Nerui period (the Khudonazarov’s, Osimi’s, ABDULLAEV 2003, 5), these new sukhan 22 (2003/7/3): 1; 26 (2003/7/31): 2; for Karimov’s, etc.) for the control of further comments: Marat MAMADSHOEV (in- terviewer), «Gaffor Mirzoev: Prezident ne kho- tel teryat’ Yakuba ... [Ghaffor Mirzoev: The President Did Not Want to Lose Yaqub],» Asia Plus (2003/7/10): 1 & 5...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 125

the Central Committee, then of the School. (See the biography of the ity has caused an over-indebt- Presidency of the Republic.14 In the Qurghon-Teppa-born agronomist ment of cultivators, which should same time however, inescapable Abdulmajid Dostiev, vice-presi- hamper for years any kind of re- reversals of alliances have also oc- dent to Rahmonov in 1992-4, now form in this sector [see ICG curred, sometimes spectacular, a vice-president of the Lower 2003a]); the extraction of precious which on the long term could under- Chamber of the Parliament, and and semi-precious stones (a confi- mine the power of the President: one of the main strategists of the dential sector, on which it re- some of Emomali Rahmonov’s regime since its very foundation: mains difficult to obtain any valu- former allies have turned against him, BASHIRI 2002, 79-80; OLIMOV able statistical or cartographic as can be seen for instance through 2002, 144-5). information); and newly discov- the present opposition of leading ered oilfields (the symbol of a re- The enlarged «Kulabi» faction con- imams of the , his distribution of playing cards af- centrates in its hands the control former supporters from the very ter a privatization confiscated by over the main resources of the coun- beginning, whence some of his ma- the Communist , the try: the factory (more jor political partners in the former state-owned firm Tajik-Gaz has than 250,000 tons a year,16 «Red» coalition, such as the ambi- been ruled during last years by which consumes half the electric- tious Mayor of Dushanbe Mamad- the president of the opposition- ity produced by the country and said Ubaydullaev (b. 1952), already al Democratic Party of Tajiki- has caused so many dramatic appear as potential rivals inside the stan). The biography of Saydullo electricity cuts shortages last win- state and party apparatus.15 Khayrullaev (born in 1945 in Gharm), ters); the cotton production an ingeneer in hydrology who has The Kulabi faction, however, has (ceded for years, by those who also passed through the Tashkent been opened in the meantime to control it in the state apparatus, Party School, and who is since 2000 most deserving officers from vari- to Swiss companies whose activ- the President of the Lower Cham- ous geographical backgrounds, most ber of the Parliament, and since this 14 Conversation with Iskandar Asadullaev with a Soviet-style professional and year the number two of the regime (former Director, the Institute of Strategic Stud- political pedigree: as well as the ies), Dushanbe, late April 2003. (he was ubiquitous on the Tajik former Prime-Secretary Qahhor Mah- TV during the weeks preceding 15 Interview with Amb. Marc Gilbert, then kamov (in charge from 1985 to the June 2003 referendum), is char- chief of the OSCE mission in Tajikistan, Dushan- 1991) and most of the local leaders be, mid-May 2003. On Friday August 8, the day acteristic of those technicians who, of the last decades of the Soviet before our departure from Dushanbe, the ap- although not coming from Kulab, but period, the main pillars of the re- pearance of a new private, nation-wide news- like in his case from «loyal» families gime are still ingeneers specialists paper, Ruzi nav [The New Day], was interpret- of the Gharm valley (a highland of metallurgy and electricity, cot- ed among leading members of the Nahzat as sanctuary of the Nahzat’s), have the launching of a «machine of war» by Ubaydul- ton production or mine industry, managed, in spite of «privatization,» loev for future electoral struggles - the inter- added with a transition through to keep in their hands the main as- esting testimony of a state of mind, in a period the Komsomol and, for some priv- characterized, as we shall see, by intense po- sets of the republic. (See his pres- ileged ones, a stronger political litical manoeuvres. idency of the strategic State Com- education in the Tashkent Party mittee for Precious Metals in 16 These are official figures, the real produc- tion probably exceeds 300,000 tons a year: conversation with Amb. Marc Gilbert, mid-May 2003; ICG 2003a. 126 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

1995-8,17 then his presidency of force worth of this denomination.) The temptation of violence may be- the no less strategic State Com- come stronger in the next future, A «Tajik» political party which has, mittee of Agricultural Resources since the Nahzat has felt the limits of since its clandestine creation in 1973 and Agricultural Development in the PDP’s disposition for openness, (SATTORI 2003, 6) and its official 1998-2000: BASHIRI 2002, 157- whence the Tajik Islamist party itself recognition in 1991 limited its action 8; OLIMOV 2002: 214-5.) has simultaneously lost a part of its to Tajikistan (ROY 1999) and, inside Tajikistan, to the Highland Tajik com- initial legitimity by its participation in 1.2 Localised political munities of Gharm in the East, Mast- a regime where its position remains clientelisms: Choh in the north and Khowaling in largely symbolic. (The Nahzat has the example of the Nahzat the south, the Nahzat appears more recently lost key positions in the executive power, such as the im- On the side of the opposition, the and more as the specific political portant Ministry of Economy oc- Nahzat does not seem to have a clear instrument of «Tajik Highlanders» cupied in 1998-2000 by the influ- representation of its present electoral and of migrant communities from ent Davlat Usmon - opponent to weigh, which has never been prop- these Highlands in the Wakhsh Rahmonov in the November 1999 erly measured and is probably very basin, south and south-west of the presidential election, in which D. much overestimated by most ob- country, largely devoted to cotton Usmon was forced to participate servers - who usually do not take monoculture since the early 1950s. at the last moment, receiving an into account the massive migration Highlanders still make off a yet un- official and symbolic amount of to Russia of many active young men measured, but probably considerable 2,1% of expressed votes -; be- from the large Highlands (Kuhisto- portion of Tajik economic migrants sides, the party counts only for ni) community. (The lack of regu- to the Russian Federation. The main two deputies in the Parliament, lar opinion polls does not seem preoccupation of the Nahzat including one who is not a mem- to bother the Nahzat’s leaders, seems to be maintaining its present neither the officers of the inter- position as the sole real interlocu- ber of the Islamist party, but a national organizations established tor of the power, which may drive renegate from ... the PDP.) Dur- in Dushanbe. Such polls, indeed, him to permanent one-upmanship ing the last three years, the Nahzat could appear instrumental in the and research of violent confron- has been more and more challenged expansion of a culture of multi- tation with systematic appeal to by the development of the Hizb partism in Tajikistan, and contrib- the intervention of the OSCE, in at-Tahrir, a non-violent but radical ute to reduce the present exclu- order to avoid any further open- organization of Near-Eastern origin sive showdown of the Presidency ing of the political system which (e.g., ROY 2002: 200-201), espe- and the Islamists - although, as we would allow a reenforcement of cially active in the Uzbek-peopled dis- will still repeat in the current newly created and potentially al- tricts of northern and western Tajiki- study, the disposal of armed forc- ternative political parties. stan, as well as by ... the agressive es, or the ability to mobilize them missionary activity throughout in a short time still continue to Tajikistan of Evangelist and Bap- 17 On the developments of foreign investment appear today in Tajikistan a mat- in mine industry, interviews with Tim Dixon, a tist Churches, which have commonly ter of survival for any political British businessman active in Tajikistan, Dushan- contributed to undermine the be, May and June 2003...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 127

Nahzat’s prestige and legitimity in- mine industries),19 and the Nahzat, ratus. (In the past, they had been side the country (see infra 3/B). at this date the only credible opposi- inspired by Safarali Kenjaev (1943- Despite its recent loss of influence, tional party in Tajikistan. Then come 1999); a potential rival to Rah- the Nahzat has curiously continued mini-parties more or less closely as- monov among the victors of the to benefit by the sollicitude of for- sociated with the PDP and the state civil war, and notoriously hostile eign and international organizations, apparatus: the Socialist Party (SP) and to the President’s policy of high- as the only credible counter-weigh the Social-Democratic Party (SDP), er state executives’ appointments, to the over-domination of the PDP - the personnel of which comes out Kenjaev was mysteriously assassi- a foreign assistance which seems to from the Communist party and the nated in Dushanbe in the year of be aimed at maintaining the political state apparatus, and the Democratic the second presidential election statu quo in the country, although it Party of Tajikistan (DPT), a former in the history of the country). is more and more badly perceived oppositional force of the Perestroika Both aging Communists and young- in the presidency,18 and among new- and civil war periods which shows er Socialists remain deprived of a ly created political parties, as well as from time to time impulses of oppo- charismatic figure, and of an armed in the popular base of the Nahzat sition (it has officially boycotted force which would help them to rep- itself. the June, 23 Referendum). resent an alternative to President Rahmonov’s PDP. The leader of the One of the numerous specificities of It is stating the obvious to write that still non-registered Agrarian Party, the Tajikistan in recent years, if compared most of these organizations share a 55 year-old Hikmatullo Nasriddinov, with neighbouring Central Asian common political culture: that of the from Kulab, is himself a former lead- states, has been the very phenom- Soviet-time Communist party and er of the Communist party in the enon of multiplication of political Komsomol. An extreme ideological Khatlan region - not the best guaran- parties and organizations. Six offi- and sociological closeness can be tee of future diversification of the cially registered parties exist today observed, in particular, between the Tajik political arena. in the country, plus several others presidential party and the Commu- (an Agrarian party, the «Wahdat» nists, whence the Socialists also come Moreover, leaders and representa- [Union] Party, etc.) waiting for their out of the Soviet Communist appa- tives of political parties which claim official recognition. Beside President to be oppositional use to occupy,

Rahmonov’s hegemonic PDP, we find 18 Interview with Sayfullo Safarov, vice-director sometimes until now, higher positions two parties with a potentially signifi- of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Dushanbe, in various organs of the executive cant - although poorly quantified - mid-May 2003. power.20 Scandals have recently electoral basis: the Communist Par- 19 On the evolution of the sociological basis of aroused around some of these fig- ty (CP) directed by the Pamir-born the Communist Party of Tajikistan in the first ures, such as the president of the electricity ingeneer Shodi Shabdolov years after the independence, see the pio- Democratic Party Mahmad-Ruz Is- neering and unfortunately still unique study by (b. 1943; BASHIRI 2002: 317), a his- kandarov, the director of the state- Saodat K. OLIMOVA, «Kommunisticheskaia torical figure of this organization owned strategic company Tajik- partiia Tadzhikistana v 1992-1994 gg. [The Com- 21 (during Perestroika he was heir munist Party of Tajikistan in 1992-1994],» Vostok Gaz, and Rahmatullo Zoyirov, the apparent to Qahhor Mahkamov, 1996/2: 52-62. founder of the Social-Democratic another ingeneer, specialist of Party and a close adviser to Presi- 20 See the analysis by Suhrob (a politologist generally favourable to President Rahmonov), «Politicheskie partii RT: na pervyi- vtoroi rasschitaetes’!», Asia Plus (2003/2/6): 4. 128 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

dent Rahmonov, until his recent res- perts, may allow in the short term a bies closely linked with leading eco- ignation from this position.22 In May (slightly) stronger representation of nomic sectors, and remains mostly 2003, another scandal had occurred: existing registered parties in the Par- characterized by its non-profitability that of those officials of the Com- liament. At the same time, the ap- - a common feature of many peri- munist party who, in order to pre- pearance of new leaders, and the odicals of the post-Soviet era, includ- serve their personal carreer in the eventual transformation of political ing leading Russia journals, which in state apparatus, had also taken the parties into mobilisation tools at the the Tajik case can explain occasional card of President Rahmonov’s PDP.23 service of these figures may on the demonstrations of «venality.24» longer term bring some change to However, one may not totally ex- the overall rules of the game. Of clude the possibility of a quick trans- 1.3 The political personnel course the scanty Tajik press is still in formation of several of some recently This phenomenon of double political the hands of a little amount of lob- appeared Tajik newspapers into affiliation characterises the idea that «machines of war» for alternative most Tajik officials have of political 21 Khurshid ATOVULLO, «GKChP dar hizbi candidates - as suggest the recent «engagement.» The erratic attitude demokrat «Tojikgaz»-ro besarvar naguzosht [The rumors on the creation of Ruzi naw Coup in the Democratic Party Did Not Deprive of most non-governmental parties by a lobby favourable to Mamad- Tajikgaz of Its Leader],» Tojikiston 30 [291] (2003/ before the referendum suggests, at 6/24): 5.22 Rajab MIRZO [interviewer], «Cha- said Ubaydullaev’s alledged presiden- the same time, the existence of fierce ro Zoyirov az mushovirii prezident dast kashid? tial designs. pressures from the PDP and from the [Why Did Zoyirov Give Up His Position as an A prominent political figure like the state apparatus for the conformation Adviser to the President?],» Nerui sukhan 22 Kazakhstan-born, Ukraine-educated of other political forces to the official (2003/7/3): 4-5. young lawyer Rahmatullo Zoyirov (b. lines. (See, in particular, the re- 23 See for instance the anonymous paper and 1958) - a man of higher Sufi ances- peated threats of re-opening the interview: «Kommunisty: na dvukh stul’yakh ne try, still another strong and significant hostilities formulated by higher sidet’ [Communists: One Armchair per Per- difference with most of his potential Tajik officials against the Nahzat, son!],» Asia Plus (2003/4/3): 2; «Karim Abdu- lov: Fraktsiiai HKT az tanqid megurezad [Karim rivals in Tajikistan -, may appear in in May and early June 2003.) Abdulov: The Fraction of the TCP Flees from the perspective of the 2013 presi- These pressures have made difficult, Critics],» Tojikiston 24 [285] (2003/6/12): 5. dential election25 a credible alterna- if not impossible, the reinforcement 24 On the overall practice of subsidized adver- tive to the 50/60 year-old ingeneers of the block or front of «opposition- tisement papers, including papers paid by in- with a Communist background and a al» parties which had been sketched ternational organizations established in Dush- Tashkent Party School education in the months preceding the June ref- anbe: conversations with Andre Loersch, me- (Ubaydullaev, Khayrullaev, Dostiev, erendum - although the obvious lack dia expert of CIMERA, Dushanbe, early August etc.) who are still over-dominating of interest among voters may also 2003. the PDP, the state apparatus, and explain the weak commitment of po- 25 Nobody in Tajikistan accepts the idea that a the integrated economic system of litical parties in this affair. The cur- real challenge may be opposed to Rahmonov in Tajikistan. However, this is not the rent reform of the electoral law and the presidential election planned for 2006: see scenario according to which the sys- code for the 2005 parliamentary, among others (although this author is not al- ways among the most non-conformists in the tem is supposed to change in a pre- and 2006 presidential elections, un- Tajik press, which allows us some doubt on the dictable future. Since the signature der the aegidus of the OSCE’s ex- present serenity of the power, less than three years before the election) Suhrob SHARIPOV, «Tadzhikskii referendum: izvlechem uroki [The Tajik Referendum: Let’s Take Its Lessons],» Asia Plus (2003/6/25): 4...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 129

of the General Peace Agreement wards the Ministries during short-lived kind of real counter-power, despite of 1997, we are situated in an coalitions (with non-Communist par- sensitive openings since early 2003. overall institutional logics where ties in 1992, with the Khujandi lead- These recent changes have been representative organs of power, er Abdumalik Abdullojonov in 1993) symbolised by the appearance, in and the government itself, led by appears in retrospect as mere perip- February of this year, of the radical the pale Prime-Minister Oqil eties, before a kind of return to the independent newspaper Nerui Oqilov, have been deprived of norm with a more usual concentra- sukhan [«The Strength of Word»], any political significance for the tion of decision power in the hands an organ with a rich history in clan- exclusive benefit of the presiden- of what is called today the Presiden- destinity, now edited at 500 copies cy. Although the United Tajik Op- cy. by Mukhtar Boqizoda, the president position has been given since 1997 Moreover the country, for the of the Association for the Defense an apparently significant 30% quota moment, knows no division be- of Journalists, and distributed on Dus- in the governmental positions, most tween the executive, the regional hanbe’s main avenues. Published by of political power has been concen- executive, the legislative, and the a staff of 5 persons in all, Nerui trated in the presidential office, de- judicial powers, which allows a lim- sukhan has immediately become the priving oppositional leaders of their ited amount of people to hold all main canal of written protestation initial share (ABDULLAEV 2003, 4). the political and economic might throughout Tajikistan.27 As we have This process of shift of the execu- in their hands. Even the universi- already suggested, the appearance tive power from the cabinet of min- ties are totally submitted to the on August 8, 2003 of the new pri- isters to the presidential office, which authority of the Presidency, which vate-owned, nation-wide newspaper is out of any kind of control from the makes still more difficult than in Ruzi Naw [The New Day] was in- parliament, has been characteristic of the past the appearance of an au- terpreted in Tajik oppositional circles the extreme flexibility of the Tajik tonomous academic intelligenstia. as the first step of the mayor of the political system, a worth heir to the Tajikistan remains deprived of a real- capital, Mamadsaid Ubaydullaev, to- Soviet institutions where one and the ly independent Constitutional Court, wards a candidacy to the next pres- same constitution used to allow spec- although the separation of powers idential election in 2006 - an inter- tacular movings of the centre of was one of the formal goals of the pretation characteristic of the climate power from one place to another confuse referendum of June 2003.26 which prevails now in Tajikistan, (e.g. LEWIN 2003: 429-439). One The relative weakness of the Tajik where a relatively great variety of may add that, on a slightly lonfer press deprives the country of any poorly diffused, but abundantly com- duration, in Soviet time the Central mented newspapers has been en- Committee of the CP, whose build- 26 R. ZOYIROV, «Izmeniat’ konstitutsiiu hancing the role of rumors in the neobkhodimo v interesakh naroda [Changing ing is now occupied by the Presi- making of an embryonic public opin- the Constitution Is A Necessity for the Sake of dency of the Republic, has always ion. The impact of recent innova- the People],» Asia Plus (2003/3/13): 2. been exerting a tutelage over the tions remain, in fact, limited by the 27 The pessimistic Report on the Media situa- Cabinet of Ministers. In this matter weak circulation of the press. (The tion in Tajikistan by Andre LOERSCH and Mark the shift of a part of central execu- GRIGORIAN (Geneva: Cimera, October 2000, amount of printed copies of the tive power from the Presidency to- 27 p.), although of an extreme acuteness on the most important non-commercial dark period 1993-2000, should be offered, by the same authors, a second volume on more recent developments. 130 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Russian-language newspaper of lent to the Tashkent Party School? ers of the current reforms, and op- Tajikistan, Asia Plus, has fallen - during his exile in Pakistan from position to these reforms? In the from 10,000 to 5,000 during the 1993 to 1997). So we cannot ex- government and its various organs? last five years.)28 clude that the Nahzat deprived itself In the political parties? In the interna- of a precious help during the ses- tional organizations present in Tajiki- Despite such slight changes, the lead- sions of the commission for the re- stan? Or in the local NGOs which ing impression remains that of a low form of the election system. During have been mushrooming in Dushan- level of political education, and gen- the meetings of the commission at be, with international support, dur- eral lack of technicians of public life the OSCE, the lawyer Rahmatullo ing the last six years, with a special among the officials of political par- Zoyirov, the President of the newly vigour since 2001? Inside the state ties, government, and public institu- recognized Social-Democratic party, apparatus, a first echelon can be dif- tions. An overall brain drain of who is graduated from the Kiev ferentiated: that of the president specialists from these institutions Academy of Law, has had no diffi- Rahmonov himself who, although towards international organiza- culty to appear as a judicial expert sometimes considered a mere tions recently established in Tajiki- of international standard, although «wedding’s general,»31 has proved stan has been generally observed, showing few interest, if at all, for able to change pragmatically the alli- and often deplored by our inter- existing rules in European, North ance systems on which his power locutors, local and foreign; this American, and other democratic used to lie down, every time it was phenomenon can be considered countries. (The only model pro- felt necessary. one of the significant deregulat- vided up by him till now has been ing side effects, among the politi- Such an unexpected political instinct that of the Federation of Russia, cal and intellectual elites of the has probably been fueled by the pil- and the election of a State Duma country, of the massive influx of lars of the regime and a handful of still dominated by a hegemonic international technical assistance to advisers (some officials like Dostiev, party submitted to the authority Dushanbe during the last two and specialists like Suhrob Sharipov of President Putin.)30 years. The demand for more «spe- or the mysterious, anti-conformist cialists» of law and government, in One question remains: who, and high-ranking economist who signs the parliament and the political par- where are the strategists, the think- papers in the Tajik press under the ties, has been a moto of the meet- pen-name «Anvar Kamolov» [infra ings of party leaders and advisers at note 47]). The president benefits 28 Conversation with Andre Loersch, Dushan- the OSCE during the spring and sum- be, early August 2003. from the fact that most officials come mer 2003.29 out of the Komsomol system: the 29 The author’s participation in the meeting of ideological differentiation remains The Nahzat has delegated to the the Commission for the reform of the electoral too weak, and the taste for con- Parliament its only lawyer and former system, Dushanbe, OSCE, 5 June 2003. sensus too high inside the ruling president, Muhammad-Sharif Him- 30 Meeting of the same commission, 26 June class for bringing any risk of open matzoda (b. 1951, also an engi- 2003; on the referendum, see the detailed pa- schism inside its ranks (Zoyirov, neer, with a later education in law per by Rahmatullo ZOYIROV, «Vozrazheniia i predlozheniia [Objections and Proposals],» when referring, in a purely rhe- and government at the University Vechernii Dushanbe 16 [280] (2003/4/18): 8-9. of Peshawar - an Islamic equiva- 31 In Russian: general svad’by, a grotesque figure of Anton Chekhov and other late 19th- century Russian playwriters: interview with a local officer of the OSCE, Dushanbe, May 2003...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 131

torical way, to the German or ernism: as we have tempted to sug- made of mid-aged Tajik political and Swedish Social-Democracy, re- gest in the above-quoted study on social scientists who have cut off their mains an exception). Moreover, the Bukharan Emirate, the very log- former ties with a rotten Academy all these peoples are united by a ics of political clientelisms - a com- of Sciences in the mid-1990s, and strong «counter-revolutionary» mon feature of modern societies, have been working since then in a solidarity,32 reinforced by clien- although they are usually underesti- limited number of private centres and telistic relationship: in spite of the mated in political studies on «devel- NGOs financed directly (i.e., not increasing roles of political agencies oped» societies33 - was then deep- through the Tajik Presidency, nor with a NGO status, many of these ly affected by that of the Russian its agencies) through grants from new structures remain dependent on domination on Central Asia; in this abroad (mainly from the USA), or the Presidency and its numerous ad- framework of a functionalist, not cul- in international organizations based in visers for the allowance of interna- turalistic, analysis, it is sometimes in- Dushanbe. These scholars have ex- tional grants. Besides, the venality teresting to put in perspective the erted an undirect, although not ne- of most public offices, beginning with clientelistic systems of one and the glectable influence on the course of ministerial positions, reinforces the same region of the world over dif- events, partly through their publica- inter-personal relationship between ferent, although close periods of his- tions (although the latter remain the members of the executive power tory. for the most part ignored by Tajik authorities),34 mainly through their and their common benefactor: Pres- A second echelon of expertise is ident Rahmonov himself - as in the participation in the multifold working 32 Conversation with Sa’dullo Safarov, Dushan- groups and seminars on topics as dif- early 20th-century Emirate of Bukha- be, May 2003. ra, if such an anachronical compari- ferent as the relations between the 33 For new, iconoclastic approaches, see Pierre son can be allowed: then the same TAFANI, Les clienteles politiques en central state and the region, or the venality of charges, or the payment (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 2003). current reform of the election sys- of huge fines by the detainers of the 34 See for instance a bright comparative socio- tem of Tajikistan, which were being main civil, religious and military offic- logical study on youth in Tajikistan and in Uzbeki- multiplied throughout Tajikistan since stan, ordered by the UNESCO to the Sharq es, used to draw the same links of the 1997 General Peace Agreement. Research Center of Dushanbe, and promptly inter-dependence between the sov- forgotten by the UNESCO itself soon after its We may deplore the lack of audi- ereign and the first circles of political publication in the summer 2002: conversation ence of these activists of their own with Muzaffar Olimov, Director of the Sharq power [DUDOIGNON 2003].) A among the greater public inside Tajiki- Research Center, Dushanbe, October 2002. methodological parenthesis, if al- stan; the responsability of such a lack 35 The Moscow-educated, well-known to CI- lowed: through such a comparison of echoe must be attributed in most MERA politologist Parviz MULLOJONOV in the cases to the Western organizations with a past and alledgedly tradition- Public Committee, and the politilogist Dr. Ab- alist society - a common feature of duali TOIROV in the OSCE are both considered which finance them, and rarely take close to the former opposition parties of the area studies, especially when Islami- into account this specific aspect of Perestroika and early independence periods; public activity in Central Asian cate societies are concerned - should the historian Muzaffar OLIMOV and the sociol- 35 not serve as an ideological tool for ogist Saodat OLIMOVA in the Sharq Research states. Center are sometimes considered more con- underlying the archaism of Central As to the Institute of Strategic Stud- servative, although all of these scholars active Asian societies, vs. imported mod- in the political field remain remarkable by their ies, it could be recalled «Potemkin courageous independence of thought, and their often iconoclastic inquiries. Significantly enough, none of them has for the moment managed to acquire a real audience among the ruling cir- cles, nor among the greater public in Tajikistan. 132 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Villages, Inc.» Most literature which intelligenstia dispute each other the ic life seems to be the growing limi- comes out of this institution do not favor of the Prince, ands that of rare tation of these circles’ own audience show outstandingly original, a major- foreign organizations (among which throughout the country, thanks to the ity of its experts having abandoned the Embassy of the Islamic Republic quick escheat of the school system, dialectocal materialism for various of Iran) through generally abstruse and the striking lack of social pres- categories of Western political cor- quibbles on the origins of the Tajik tige of everything linked with sci- rectness, in the intention of bringing people, which carry on early 20th- ence. more attention from donor institu- century Soviet teachings on the In the religious field, one can only tions. Most of the researchers of «ethnogeneses» of the peoples of observe in Tajikistan the absence the ISS seem lacking real convictions, the USSR. (See for instance the of a properly educated clergy and capable of defending any kind harsh polemics of the last years which would be able to give re- of position, or its exact contrary in between the Darwaz-born histo- sponses to challenges such as that the following quarter of an hour. It rian Rahim Masov [b. 1939], a of the Hizb at-Tahrir of that of re- goes without saying that most de- proponent of the restrictive south- formed Christian missionary activ- clare themselves ready to write any ern «Bactrian» identity of the ity. (The most active, listened, study on any subject, including even Tajiks, and the Bukhara-born, and promissing ideologists and decentralization, in a very short time pan-Iranist literary critic Muham- strategists of the Nahzat are non- (elementary politeness and our madjan Shakuri [b. 1926] [MAS- religious peoples: Ibrohim Rah- projects of future stays in Tajiki- OV 2001, TABAROV 2003, IBN namo, an adviser to the former stan forbide us to give concrete QURBON 2003].) These academ- mufti and Islamist moderator Hojji illustrations of these tendencies). ic intellectuals are the heirs of those Akbar Turajonzoda, and Muhid- If the Institute of Strategic Studies abundant literati who, in the last de- din Kabiri, Sayyid Abdulloh Nuri’s must be the main source of informa- cades of the Soviet period, were in adviser - although Kabiri seems tion on the country for the presiden- charge of shaping, and propagating now tempted to use the NGO that cy, many attitudes and decision of the collective proletarian identity of he presides, and his personal ties the power become then understand- each national republic. It is remark- in Europe for taking some dis- able. able that nor the overall sociology tance with the Islamic party, and A third echelon is made of overnu- of academic circles, neither the ideo- for playing a more personal card: merous ideologists educated in the logical framework of their disputes a strategy perfectly conform to humanities, who are in charge of have been substantially affected that of Tajikistan’s political insti- purveying the overall philosophical since the last decades of the Soviet tutions, but the contrary of what legitimation of the regime. Deprived period - today’s leading seventy- was probably waited from him by of any control on the economic ap- year-old scholars are those fifty-year- his European partners, probably paratus and of a real influence on the old ones who had taken power dur- not very well informed of the spe- course of political affairs, they fully ing Perestroika. In spite of official cific functionning of these institu- rely on the meagre subsidies given support, and the reinforcement of tions since the mid-1990s). An- to them by the presidential appara- the Soviet theory of nationality, the other peculiarity of present Tajiki- tus. The members of this plethorical main upheaval in matter of academ- stan is the very weak theological ...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 133

differentiation between the revo- OLIMOVA & OLIMOV, 2003, political alternance of any kind at the lutionary proponents of the passim; the latters have noticed summit of the state for the decade Nahzat and more quietist religious current problems for authority to come.38 This apparent immobility leaders (e.g., in Khujand the still building among the religious peo- of the political scenery has been un- active lineage of Abdulloh Ka- ple - a characteristic which would expectedly reinforced by the ges- lonzoda, the Mufti of Tajikistan suffice, if needed, to differentiate ture of the international community, during the Brejnev era): both have early 21st-century Tajikistan from first after the peace agreement of read the same books, and advocate pre-revolutionary Iran . . .).37 1997 (with the mainly symbolic for instance the orthodox thought of opening of the state structures to the founder of the Naqshbandi-Mu- a limited number of representa- 2. Some Paradigms jaddidi mystical order, the 17th-cen- tives of what was then the armed of Policy Making tury northern Indian religious thinker opposition), second after the Ahmad Sirhindi, alias Imam Rabbani.36 launching of the current «crusade» 2.1 A «quota system?» against terrorism (with pressures on There is, moreover, a deep genera- It is universally admitted in Tajikistan the government for further open- tional and qualitative gap between that the current political schemes are ing of the political system, and the generation of the locally famous contrary to any kind of change, and on opposition forces for more neo-traditionalist Hanafi theologian nobody seriously - or publicly, which moderation). Domullo Hindustoni (d. 1989), who is not exactly the same thing - ad- was active during the second half of The present governmental «coalition» mits the idea of the possibility of a the Soviet period, and his much repeats, more or less, the schemes younger, mostly undirect disciples of a first coalition set up in the spring 36 Conversations with Hojji Domullo “Ibodullo and followers of the Nahzat, whose 1992: the opposition parties had then Kalonzoda, vice-khatib of the Soghd region, ethical and intellectual education Khujand, mid-April 2003, Muhammad-Sharif Him- got a share in the Communist gov- seems very weakly different from matzoda, vice-president of the Nahzat, Dushan- ernment, for the most part in the that of a handful of «official» mullahs be, early June 2003. shape of the «ministries of talk» educated in the same years. In this 37 See also the author’s conversations with (THOM 1989), whence privatisation matter the gap between an old, now Sayyid Ahmad Qalandar, director of the «Sipe- of the assets of the Tajik CP and state vanishing generation of whether «of- hr» research centre and journal, Dushanbe, June was already going on for several ficial» or «parallel» ulama, on the first and early August 2003. years in secrecy, with no control on hand, and on the second hand a 38 In the weeks preceding the referendum, at it by representatives of oppositional largely secularized generation of a time when the Nahzat publicly advocated the forces. Even during those fatal «baby-boom» mullahs educated dur- «No», the present author jokingly asked Muhid- months of 1992, at the eve of the din Kabiri, political adviser to Sayyid Abdulloh ing the last years of the Soviet sys- civil war, a regime dominated by in- Nuri, founding father and president of the Islam- tem seems culturally more significant geneers of cotton culture, metallur- ist party, what would happen if the result of the than that between the young pro- referendum would be favorable to the Nahzat, gy and mine industries, educated in ponents of such or such tendency of and President Rahmonov would decide to re- the main party schools of the CPUS re-Islamization. (See BABADJAN- tire. The answer was simple: M. Kabiri an- had managed to maintain its control OV & KAMILOV 2001, passim; swered that in such a most unpredictable case, over the key resources and political Sayyid Abdulloh Nuri would refuse the respon- sability of government, and appeal to Rahmonov to come back to power. Interview with M. Kabiri, Dushanbe, early May 2003. 134 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

positions of the country in spite of since its recognition in 1991, for ganizations of the nationalist in- endless, hostile street demonstra- cooperation with the state appa- telligentsia.41 The current policy tions. This may explain why today ratus. The now well-known to us in- of the party for appearing as the the leaders of the former opposition, geneer and lawyer Muhammad- only alternative force to the Rah- in the Nahzat and the Democratic Sharif Himmatzoda, the president of monov regime can be considered Party in particular, are still much more the party from 1991 to 1999, has a continuation of this revolution- preoccupated in the reform, or re- long advocated cooperation with the ary strategy.) making of privatization, which was Communist regime and then with the As to the government, it has long crucial to them fifteen years ago, than Kulabi faction,40 against the financist inaugurated a tradition of selective in problems such as the administra- Davlat Usmon, an ephemerous min- engagement of alternative and tive relations between the central ister of the Economy in 1997-1999 non-conformist political figures state and the regions. and the candidate of the Nahzat to into the executive apparatus. Some The composition of the parliament the presidential election that year, people see here a mere attempt at since the 2000 general elections pro- beforehand a proponent of confron- «harmonisation and stabilisation of the vides a clear illustration of the bal- tation with Communist authorities. political sphere,» and attribute this ance of forces - in fact an unbalanced (The temptation has long existed attempt to the «pragmatism» of the hegemony of the PDP, to which can in the Nahzat, since Perestroika, head of the state?42 Such an expla- be added the 6 sieges of the Com- for an alliance with the Commu- nation, however flattering for Presi- munist party, against only 2 for the nists against the other political dent Rahmonov, does not take into Nahzat. The itinerary of Atobek forces of Tajikistan. It must be account the capacity of the regime Amirbekov (b. 1950), a founder of noticed that in the late 1980s, the born from the Soviet period and the «La’l-i Badakhshan» Pamiri auton- KGB itself was favorable to such the civil war to integrate those omous movement, in the opposition a line of rapprochement with the alien elements which are estimat- to the Communist power in the years Islamists, in order to marginalize ed too dynamic to be let out of 1991-1993, now a deputy to the the then aggressive political or- state structures. (Muhiddin Kabiri Parliament (OLIMOV 2002: 126-7), himself, today the main political 39 M. ISKANDAROV [president of the DPT], provides us an illustration of the des- «Nasha tsel’ - sozidatel’noe sotrudnichestvo adviser to Sayyid “Abdullah Nuri, tiny the Rahmonov presidency pro- [Our Goal Is a Constructive Cooperation],» founder and President of the poses to salient figures of opposi- Asia Plus (2003/3/5): 5. Nahzat, was invited by the gov-

tional parties. 40 Interview with Muhammad-Sharif HIMMAT- ernment to integrate the state ZODA, Dushanbe, mid-June 2003. apparatus after his return from In fact, several opposition parties Moscow in 1997.) have been advocating for long a 41 Conversation with Sulton HAMAD, a Gharm- line of «cooperation» with the born former collaborator of the KGB, the former This system, enlarged to represen- chief of the intelligence service of the Islamic Rahmonov government. Such is tatives of political parties, could be Movement of Tajikistan during its exile in Af- the case of the Democratic Party, called the «quota system.»43 Its his- ghanistan, now an independent journalist and 39 after first years in the opposition. memorialist, Dushanbe, late June 2003. See tory is longer than that of indepen- As to the Nahzat, a tendency has also DUDOIGNON 1994. dant Tajikistan, since its roots can be always existed inside this party, found in the politics of the CPUS in 42 SHARIPOV, «Politicheskie partii RT», 4.

43 A denomination borrowed from a Tajik offic- er of the OSCE, our regular interlocutor in Dus- hanbe, Summer 2003...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 135

the last decades of the Soviet peri- OSCE, in particular) at opening the ty with a rather erratic ideology. od. It consists in the selective ag- Tajik political society, only three par- (Advocating the suspension of gregation to the hegemonic par- ties seem in situation of playing taxes in order to favour the ap- ty and to the state structure of a some role in the next future: Rah- pearance of SME, as Zoyirov did limited amount of prominent fig- monov’s PDP, the Communist par- in a recent past, can hardly ap- ures from various political move- ty, and the Islamist party (the pear specific to Social-Democ- ments and forces. This is proba- Nahzat). The Communists and Is- racy.) A future adviser to Presi- bly the way the system will (try lamists, two organizations with a dent Rahmonov, R. Zoyirov creat- to) perpetuate itself, without big limited but stable clientele, will ed his party in 1999, which imme- changes, during the next decade, probably satisfy themselves with tiadely brought attention to him. at least until the 2013 presidential the unequal sharing of state pow- What his case suggested then is that election, if this process is not in- er and, to a lesser extent, eco- the creation of a political party, terrupted in the meantime by a nomic assets. As to «little» parties or the threat to create one, far major landslide linked, for instance, (the Perestroika-born Democrats, from bringing obstacles to a suc- to some external factor. In spite of and the Socialists and Social-Dem- cessful political carreer, may on tensions, sometimes inside the Kula- ocrats still deprived of an elec- the contrary become a key instru- bi faction itself (see the overall fear toral past), their personnel and most ment for personal promotion of of Mamadsaid Ubaydullaev’s per- of their programmes come out from a leader, or of a limited group of sonal ambitions among both «oppo- the CP and PDP’s ranks and political people inside the state appara- sition» and official circles), a fragile culture. In the next political cam- tus. (From this point of view, consensus exists today, among po- paigns, these parties will probably Tajikistan, and former Soviet Re- litical leaders of Tajikistan, including appear as mere prolongations of the publics, do not constitute excep- former oppositional leaders, on this hegemonic presidential camp. All tions: see the successful threat global evolution, or lack of evolution; the strategy of these parties seems formulated by the French Social- discontent is mainly expressed, for to be oriented towards the cre- ist leader Jack Lang in 2001 of the moment, on precise points such ation of a niche inside the state participating in the Paris munici- as the remaking of privatisation and apparatus and state owned eco- pal election where the Socialists the redistribution of political authori- nomic system, rather than the en- already had a candidate, for ty at the local jamoat and mahalla largement of their still inexistent, guetting a ministerial post that level - two postulates essential, how- or poorly quantified electoral ba- Lang effectively received very ever, for any structural change in the sis. soon; or more recently, the longer term, although they deserve, An illustration of this phenomenon threat by Valery Giscard curiously enough, little attention from can be given by the case of Rah- d’Estaing to participate in the donor states and other foreign part- matullo Zoyirov, a bright lawyer (ac- French 2002 presidential elec- ners of the Tajikistani authorities. cording to Tajikistan’s criteria), an un- tion, and to hamper President Despite guarantees given by the disputable virtuoso of manoeuvres Jacques Chirac’s chances of re- 1997 peace agreement and efforts inside the apparatus, and the presi- election, if he did not receive the by international organizations (the dent of a little Social-Democratic par- presidence of the European Con- 136 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

vention, that Giscard finally got through the parliamentary elections some of its figures - like that of Mu- thanks to President Chirac’s ef- in 2005. hiddin Kabiri, another «political ad- forts.) viser» who, as we suggested earli- Nobody should nevertheless forget er, seems currently tempted to use «Little» parties in Tajikistan express that, behind the overall curtain of a his European connections for taking no pretention to win elections: they consensual culture inherited from a some distance with the direction of should merely serve in the future recent past, all the political forces in the Islamist party, and for playing his as a reservoirs of young political presence characterize themselves, own card inside the overall system leaders, as the Komsomol used to like the CPUS at the time of its glo- (a system which now includes the do during the Soviet period.44 ry, by a high «fissionability» and international organizations of all These parties, as well as the Com- permanent research of alliances kinds present in Tajikistan, or munists and the Islamists in most cas- between antagonistic coteries linked through regular partner- es, satisfy themselves with the spo- (LEWIN 2003: 309) - which makes ship with Tajikistani institutions). radic denunciation of alleged «de- its obervation and prediction by out- These tactics of autonomization of fects» (Rus. nedostatki) in the ad- siders a particularly thankless exer- individual leaders, a specificity of ministration of the hegemonic party.45 cise. Whilst the Tajik Communist the period immediately posterior The content of their press remem- Party has given way, after indepen- to the referendum of June 2003 bers more and more that of the Ko- dence, to the creation of the late may bring significant changes in msomol’s during Perestroika. Possi- Safarali Kenjaev’s Socialist Party (the the alliance systems which have ble federation of insatisfactions can Mensheviks?) and Emomali Rah- been prevailing grosso modo in- occur on questions such as the failure monov’s hegemonic Popular-Demo- side Tajikistan’s political apparatus of privatization, which has been cov- cratic Party (the ?), the since 1997. However, in spite of ered by confiscated in Tajikistan by latter is for the time to come under upheavals such as the relative free- corrupted figures of the state appa- constant threat of scission/coalition dom of speech enjoyed by Tajik ratus and several mafia groups, and under the efforts of faction or party mass-medias since the beginning resulted in the ruin of many of those leaders such as Ubaydullaev and the of this year, this tactical changes enterprises concerned.46 «political adviser» Zoyirov - for will not necessarily affect the over- whom the conquest of an electoral Too much attention has been giv- all logic of these systems. en in the past to the Islamist basis is probably, for the moment, a movements in Tajikistan, not least preoccupation. The Nahzat it- 2.2 The erratic, limited, enough to the global function- self, according to the same political but salutary foreign intervention ning, since the last decades of the culture and logic, is very much ex- soviet period, of the Tajik state, posed to permanent inner scission of Such evolutions, it may be remem- inside which the Tajik Islamists of the its leadership, and autonomization of bered, could not be observed Nahzat have found a kind of niche without the strong presence in 44 Marat MAMADSHOEV [interviewer], «R. of their own, which should be pro- Tajikistan of the international com- Zoyirov: demokratiya yavlyaetsya usloviem a ne gressively, and reasonably enlarged sledstviem razvitiia [Democracy Is a Condition, munity, and its strong pressures in the next future in the framework Not a Result of Development],» Asia Plus (2003/ on the central power in Dushan- of the quota system, notably 1/9): 4. be. Until now, the Tajik authori-

45 ISKANDAROV, «Nasha tsel’ - sozidatel’noe sotrudnichestvo,» 5.

46 Ibid...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 137

ties have perfectly negociated the fragility of the overall peace process, acquired a foothold in Tajikistan have unpredictable, sudden and prob- and of the inter-Tajik dialogue. The lost, during the last years, a consid- ably short-term sollicitude shown threats formulated by members of erable part of the moral credit that by foreign powers for their coun- the presidential apparatus against the they initially enjoyed in the country. try after the rise of the Talibans in Nahzat, and conversely by Sayyid The non-coordinated and often a first step, then in the aftermath Abdulloh Nuri against the regime at redundant offer of technical assis- of September 11, 2001 - at a time the tribune of the party congress on tance has accentuated the attitude when, it should be remembered, the Reconciliation Day, remember a of ambivalence of the Tajik au- most Western compagnies and recent past of confrontation. As the thorities, which had a long habit of banks were preparing their withdraw- same time, the highly declarative dealing with contradictory and un- al from Central Asia . . . . Such a character of these confrontations consequent demands from Moscow strategic reversal must remember us between the Nahzat and the Presi- during the late Soviet period. If the the superficiality and versatility of dency may remember to us that they multiplication of donor organiza- Western commitment in the region. are intended towards observers of tions has had some mechanically This specific commitment has exert- international organizations, which have positive impacts, especially on the ed locally deep deregulating effects. become a full protagonist of Tajiki- pacification and on the relative Among the latter, we may not for- stan’s political arena. Nevertheless, opening of the political game, get some favourable influences on these organizations, although inti- however the redundant character the relative and still very limited mately implicated in the political pro- of that offer, the dispersion of re- opening of the political game. An cesses, have rarely proved capable sources, the lack of coordination, example of these influences can be of exerting a real influence on the the lack of knowledge of the in- given by the role played in Tajiki- very logics of the state apparatus in stitutional framework in Tajikistan, stan, during the last six years, by the Tajikistan, especially on the imple- the weakness of these foreign or- OSCE Mission, which appears to mentation of the quota system as it ganizations’ local partners, wheth- many as the sole real guarantee of has been developing during more er governmental or non-govern- the new political order. (After the than a decade of independence, mental, have complicated local arrestation, in early June 2003, according to schemes experiment- perceptions of foreign assistance, of Shamsiddin Shamsiddinov, a ed under the guidance of security whence they were permitting the vice-president of the Nahzat from organs during the last decades of the most conservative segments of the highland Mast-Choh and a Soviet period. state apparatus and economic sys- founder of the Islamist party’s It is true that international organiza- tem to elaborate means of resis- branch in the Soghd region, the tions and foreign NGOs which have tance to change, allowing numer- direction of the party appealed ous members of this new nomen- not to the Tajik state, but to the 47 Anvar KAMOLOV [pseud.], «Inostrannaia klatura to use these new incom- OSCE representation in Dushan- pomoshch’: pliusy i minusy [The Foreign Assis- ing resources for building fortunes be.) tance: Pluses and Minuses],» Asia Plus (2003/ sometimes considerable.47 (In the 2/6): 5; the author, an economist, is a high course of the past fifteen years, However the role played by inter- ranking official who regularly writes, under pseud- national organizations illustrates the onyms, on the economic situation of Tajikistan in one could observe an interesting the local press; we unfortunately did not man- age to identify this interesting figure during our stay in Tajikistan. 138 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

reversal of stereotypes about local civil society - which may be, programmes, the creation of an at- Tajikistan’s nouveaux riches - the indeed, the last preoccupation of tractive image of the country for «New Tajiks,» Tojikhoi naw -: fo- most European or Northern Ameri- investors, the actual stimulation and cused during a long time by the can Foreign Ministries. (When asked technical armament of the small and vox populi on petty merchants ac- why, although his party is preoc- medium production potential, etc. all cused of illicit commercial activi- cupied more in privatization than appeared out of the priorities of the ty, these stereotypes now con- in decentralization, it has regu- government as well as of the do- cern mainly those members of the larly participated in CIMERA’s nors themselves.»51 nomenklatura who notoriously programmes on the relations be- If we add to these considerations misuse their position in the appa- tween the centre and the regions, the lack of any real follow-up of ratus for diverting international of which he and his party do not most assistance files, money be- care very much at present, Mu- assistance towards non-govern- ing distributed with no great care hammad-Sharif Himmatzoda, the mental structures created for this for its real attribution and, in an- goal.) vice-president of the Nahzat, an- other register, the contradictory swers: «Because, guys, that was Moreover, most foreign NGOs ac- action of Western companies (see a condition for obtaining your tive in Tajikistan are, in fact, inti- for instance the impact of Swiss grants!»)48 mately linked, for their survival, to companies on the ever-growing Western governmental agencies Further losses of credit have been endebtment of Tajikistan’s cotton and fundings, a general trend in the endured locally by international or- cultivators and on the subsequent humanitary business since a decade ganizations after promisses of mas- non-reformability of this econom- (RYFMAN 1999: 114-129) - which sive funding were not fulfilled in real- ic sector;52 the more recent im- make most western NGOs present ity, which has contributed to fuel dis- pact of the activity of French com- in Tajikistan appear and act, in fact, trust and discontent among the Tajik panies on the ever-growing de- like what should be called «MGOs»: authorities as well as population.49 It pendence of Tajikistan on its no- Mainly Governmental Organizations is true that a real will for a radical toriously non-rentable giant alu- (in French «OMG»: organisations change in Tajikistan can hardly be minium factory), we get an idea moult gouvernementales). This discerned among donor coun- the paradoxical way Western influ- characteristic is significant for our pur- tries.50 «On the contrary, the idea ence can be perceived locally. All pose, since these links often oblige of an evolutional development of re- these realities have deeply influenced these NGOs to act exclusively at forms, the supposed support and the paradigms of political thought and the most official, governmental confidence of the population, the im- activity in Tajikistan during the last five level, whence they have to deal plementation of post-privatization years of further desovietization and with the ambivalent attitude and rapprochement with the West. A 48 Interview of M.-Sh. Himmatzoda, Dushanbe, duplicity of most local partners special field of activity has appeared: mid-June 2003. from the government, the state that of the permanent reformulation 49 ICG 2003a; the author’s informal interview apparatus and the presidential and conformation of these paradigms with Jacob von WEIZSACKER, del- for Western donor states and their party, with very few real possibil- egate in charge of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, early agencies in Tajikistan. ities of action and effect on the May 2003.

50 ICG 2003b.

51 KAMOLOV, 5.

52 ICG 2003a...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 139

It remains that international orga- of the Tajik state (through its spe- mented, gives us an example of the nizations and NGOs present in cific quota system, inherited from way Tajik law-makers deal with cos- Tajikistan have played a key role both the soviet era and the civil metic innovations imposed by donor in the shaping of a dynamics of war, for instance): this only can al- states.54 The structure of the newly inter-Tajik dialogue. Whatever low foreign protagonists to obtain adopted legislation remains very sim- may be the concrete result of such from their Tajik partners something ilar to the preceding one. The Tajik or such specific programme, mani- else than the ambivalent attitude they parliament has used a well-known festations like the multiparty meet- have shown until now, and to exert Perestroika technique, of a pure- ings organised under the aegidus of an impact on the durable opening of ly rhetorical character, consisting the OSCE about the current reform this specific system to new protago- of the vote of a lot of complicat- of the electoral system, or by CI- nists. ed texts devoided of the begin- MERA on decentralization have ning of an application measure, or played a crucial role in the last years containing articles mutually con- 2.3 The adoption in the shaping of a constructive dia- tradictory. The best example of of Perestroika-style legislations logue between various protagonists such legislations doubtlessly remains of Tajikistan’s political arena. The Tajik officials have up till now that of the Law on the National Lan- main result of such meetings has up shown up a cosmetic commitment guage voted on 22 June 1989, un- till now lied less in their concrete re- to norms ennunciated by interna- der pressure of street demonstra- sults - however crucial may show the tional agencies, coupled with a tions - a founding event for the Tajik future electoral reglamentation elab- total lack of political will for intelligentsia and for the first alterna- orated under the auspices of the change. Strong resistances to tive political organizations, and at the OSCE -, than in the dynamics and change inside the state apparatus, same time an excellent example of sense of common, if not public inter- added to an obvious lack of will for the faculty shown then by the party est that they have contributed to modifications among donor states and state structures for resisting to create inside a nascent Tajik «politi- (for which present stability is pref- change beside giving the impression cal class.» erable to any kind of political ad- of joining, if not guiding the flow of venture under pressure of an «Is- overall agitatsiia (see for instance In the next future, societal aspects lamic threat»), make more compli- AYUBZOD 2002: 235). of change should be less under- cate the work of organizations in- estimated by the main purveyors At the same time many reforms - volved in a partial reform of Tajiki- of technical assistance. More co- such as that, crucial, of the jamoats stan’s closed political and economic ordination, at all levels,53 will also and other local communities - re- systems. The newly adopted legis- prove decisive in the ability of the main impossible without deeply lation on trade, which has great international community to obtain amending the constitution,55 which chances never to be really imple- structural changes from the Tajik after the June 2003 referendum authorities. Less formal approach 53 See the current, meritorious attempts of the will hardly be imaginable for the may also be favoured, and a better ICG to obtain more coordination between two time being. Instead of the separa- international European organizations very ac- account of the specific recent histo- tion of powers demanded by some tive in Tajikistan, the EBRD and the OSCE: ICG ry and functionning of the institutions 2003b. political actors, the referendum has

54 Interview with Amb. Marc Gilbert, Dushan- be, mid-May 2003.

55 DE MARTINO 2003a, 3. 140 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

considerably added to those of the offers us a perfect example of those The structural changes demanded at president, and postponed the real working groups which have been the grassroot level in the provinces, perspective for change at the head organised in Dushanbe under pres- as well as in several political parties of the state until 2013, if not until sure of the donor states (in order to in Dushanbe concern primarily the 2020. Most dignitaries will keep please the latters and receive the redistribution of both economic/fis- unchanged cumulative responsabili- funds linked with the adoption of new cal and political powers between the ties, such as the ubiquitous and enig- legislations); those groups are usual- centre and regions. In the provinc- matic Mamadsaid Ubaydullaev, a ly dispersed at the moment when es of Tajikistan, it is generally admit- political leader of the Kulabi faction they give their first concrete results.56 ted that 80 to 85% of the income of during the civil war, now the Mayor Our interrogation of many protano- taxes goes to the state, whence 15 of Dushanbe, as such a member of gists concerned with change have to 20% remain at the level of the the government, and the President convinced us of the necessity to as- districts.57 In an overall context of of the National Assembly of Tajiki- sociate legal change in administrative extreme rarefaction of resources stan, which used to make him, until matters with transformation in the (present «decentralization» is the past summer, the de facto and economic system - transformations seen locally, since independence, de jure N°3 of the regime. In the already demanded by the Nahzat as a total suppression of public cat and mouse game played by the and the Democratic Party on the eve dotations)58, this can be only insat- international community and the Tajik of the independence of Tajikistan isfactory for the local tax payers. In government, a fatal occasion may (DUDOIGNON 1994), but still unsat- the comparatively rich region of Khu- have been lost by the formers to isfied for the most part after almost jand (Khujandi people use to speak obtain minimal legal conditions for twelve years of a much agitated his- of the «parasytism» of other re- change. On the contrary, the worst tory. gions),59 strong demands are be- habits of the former Soviet regime ing formulated for a liberalization may have been perpetuated for of the legislation which would au- 3. Some Tracks for Future Studies some time, which arises fears as to thorize local tax payers, especial- the organization of Tajikistan’s next ly big companies or production 3.1 Regional power parliamentary and presidential elec- units, to pay a significant part of and local communities tions in 2005 and 2006. their taxes directly to the local public institution of their choice.60 As to the decentralization advo- 56 Interview of M.-S. Himmatzoda, Dushanbe, cated for Tajikistan by various for- June 2003. Another key aspect of demanded

eign organizations, it may remain 57 Conversations with Iskandar Asadullaev, reforms concern sub-district local devoided of signification unless former director of the Institute of Strategic Stud- communities, jamoats and mahal- the privatization process under- ies, Dushanbe, late April 2003; with Jakov von las, both institutions with a strong taken since the mid-1980s, and the Weiszacker, World Bank representation in past, an a decisive economic and Dushanbe, late June 2003. current reform of the tax system social role, but no political status have come to an end that would 58 Interview with the director of Khujand Town of their own - they remain under be satisfactory for the main par- Hospital, April 2003. control of nominated administrators

ties. The decentralization process 59 Iskandar Asadullaev in our interview with who also preside local assemblies, him.

60 Conversation with the director of the Town Hospital of Khujand, late April 2003; confirmed by further interviews of local enterpreneurs...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 141

according to the same logic of non- cluding the creation or reinforcement in this field of relations between separation of powers which prevades of strong local clientelistic relations the centre and the regions. Our at the centre of the state as well as on the local and regional level, which interlocutors in the Soghd region have in its most remote peripheries.61 could escape the control of political generally underlined the under-rep- Generally speaking, in Tajikistan as power. Furthermore, a change of resentation of the 98 jamoats (98) well as in neighbouring former SSRs, this kind would run counter to the and 405 mahallas of this area in the the state has been for some time official opposition of numerous offi- process of decision making (see the tempted to play these local entities cials to the idea of decentralization, report by Prof. Alijon Boymatov as a mere intermediaries of the cen- especially in the framework of co- on the economic aspects of the tral power, and as a self-financed in- operation with NGOs.63 Decentrali- integration of the Soghd region strument for keeping local popula- zation in fiscal matter would oppose in Tajikistan). The region (in Rus- tions under control. Whence numer- the nationality theory elaborated, sian oblast’) remains in many fields ous «anti-jamoats» and «anti-ma- under the influence of the Uzbeki- the unique intermediary level be- hallas» have made their appearance stani model, by another leading po- tween the state and local communi- for resisting this tendency (in Uzbeki- litical adviser to President Rahmonov, ties, whence the effects of newly stan, notably, where the state’s the philologist Ibrohim Usmon (b. legislations laws generally stops at effort at controlling these local in- 1947) - a theory based on the prin- the city or district (raion) level. Ja- stitutions have been particularly ciple of a unitary state, open to affir- moats and mahallas still remain de- strong since half a decade [MAS- mative action but with one language, prived of a proper budget, and re- SICARD 2004]), powerful grassroot and where nobody wants to hear main outside the economic and so- demand are being formulated for a about autonomous entities or nation- cial life of the country life: taxes are depersonalisation of the local execu- al minorities.64 gathered, and remain at the level of tive power, now concentrated, in the town and raion. Then the potential economic aspects Tajikistan, in the hands of nominat- of any change in the centre/regions Up till now, administration executives ed, non-elected presidents of local relation retain most of the attention come from the centre, and the ne- assemblies (the reincarnations of among simple citizens as well as cessity of a radical change of para- the former local secretaries of the among the main protagonists of the digm, and to «go to the mahalla» Communist party). Most alterna- political game. Whilst the fiscal leg- (an adaptation of a late 19th-cen- tive political leaders in Dushanbe islations has been submitted to four tury moto «go to the villages» of point out the importance of the changes in ten years, no satisfac- the Russian Populist movement) is jamoat level as the only space for tory impact has been observed yet largely felt even outside the precints introducing elections for the local of the Nahzat, although judging by officials, and bringing some real 61 DE MARTINO 2003a, 3. legislation now in preparation, resis- political pluralism to the country tances to any kind of change remain in a predictable future.62 62 DE MARTINO 2003a, 4; interview with Mu- hiddin Kabiri, Dushanbe, «Dialog» Centre, May, very strong in the Tajik state as well A reform such as that of the fiscal 2003. as among foreign donor states, and system would of course bring con- any further modifications of the ex- 63 Interview of Sayfullo Safarov, vice-director sequences of various character, in- of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Dushanbe, isting texts will probably have a main- early May 2003.

64 Interview with Sayfullo Safarov, Dushanbe, early May 2003. 142 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

ly cosmetical character. It is true that them: if the «young mullahs»67 of the late Soviet period, although in Tajikistan people remain generally the early Nahzat used to differenti- they reluctantly accept to admit unaware of these plethoric new leg- ate themselves from «official Islam» it).68 islations, and continue to ignore the by references to the «pure Islam» This relative conservatism of the rights which have been conceded to of the Prophet and his Caliphs, they Nahzat, an organization inspired, al- them during the last half-decade. nevertheless always remained very though undirectly, by the neo-tradi- Only petty entrepreneurs have man- far from those called nowadays tionalist teachings delivered by Da- aged in the recent past to develop «Wahhabis» by their refusal to cut mulla Hindustani (1892-1989) in Dus- a juridical culture, in the main goal of off with the rituals of the traditional hanbe from the 1950s to the 1970s, protecting themselves against imped- Hanafi school, and by the importance makes it relatively fragile against iments brought on their path by re- they use to give up till now to re- the assault of newly born and more gional and local authorities ....65 formed Sufi learning (a tendency radical Islamist organizations such Tajik Islamists share with their as the Hizb al-Tahrir. The Nahzat’s more quietist religious leaders of 3.2 A Religious threat: Islam... current flimsiness can also, if not or its present weakness? mainly be explained by the lack of 65 Interview with Domlo “Ibodullo Kalonzoda, educated mullahs and ulamas who The «Islamic factor» arbitrarily isolat- Shaykh-Muslihiddin Great , Khujand, would be able to oppose the mes- ed by security agencies and outside April 2003. sages of the Tahrir as well as that observers makes the bulk of current 66 Foundation by Sayyid “Abdullah Nuri of the of Christian missionary activists literature on Central Asia - even more «Nahzat-i Javanan-i Islami-yi Tajikistan» [Renewal (e.g., KABIRI 2002, OLIMOVA & than on the worlds of Islam as a of the Youth of Islam of Tajikistan], the basis of OLIMOV, 2003). This social and in- whole since September 11, 2001. the future IRP of Tajikistan: see for instance SATTORI 2003, 6. This periodisation is exclu- tellectual lacuna seems to be specif- Most of these publications and ex- sively based, for the moment, on testimonies ic to Tajikistan, a country which, dur- pertise usually do not take into ac- by leading members of the Nahzat (see also my ing the Soviet period, did not enjoy count the specificity of the current interview of M.-Sh. Himmatzoda), and should an important access to Islamic higher politization of , if be taken with precaution, since it remains oth- educational institutions, then located compared only with other regions of erwise poorly documented (see for instance in Uzbekistan (the Imam-Bukhari In- the former USSR. An essentially cul- RO’I 2000: 357-8). stitute in Tashkent and the Mir-i tural movement at its very origin in 67 Javan mullayan, by analogy with the Young- “Arab Madrasa in Bukhara). the 1950-60s, in the years following Bukharans of the early 20th century. Tajikistan is now a country where Stalin’s death, re-Islamization in Tajiki- 68 See in particular the role of the locally the unfathomable institutional stan took a political dimension as soon famous Naqshbandi murshid “Abdurahman-Jan in weakness of Islam, and the temp- as 1973,66 through opposition of a the religious education of Muhammad-Sharif Him- tation of reaction against de-cul- young generation of Muslim «Baby matzoda - an education based on the practice turation through violence, makes boomers» to the Mufti “Abdullah of traditional ceremonies of dhikr, as well as the reading and comment of the early 18th- a problem more important than Kalonzoda”s quietism and «lack of century Northern-Indian Muslim mystical poet Islam itself ever was. devotion» to the cause of Faith - al- Bidel”s verses, of the arch-classical Mathnawi though, it should be noticed, there of the 12th-century C.E. Persian poet Mawlana Moreover, the Nahzat must face a was no theological schism among Jalal al-Din Rumi, and of the Maktubat of the current political weakening and del- 17th-century Indian reformer of the Naqsh- bandiyya Imam Rabbani Ahmad Sirhindi (inter- view of M.-Sh. Himmatzoda, Dushanbe, June 2003)...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 143

egitimisation, that we can explain in tional background, among whom represented (beside the Coreans, part by its cooperation with the Tajik many Tajiks, young and old, who who show particularly receptive, state institutions - a long-term ten- have embraced such or such re- we have met Russian, German, dency in the Nahzat, as was suggest- formed Christian faith.69 The already Tatar, and Qazaq converts). ed earlier, but a policy also dictated rich, although very recent, histo- Convertions still rarely concern full by general circumstances since ry of Christian missionary activity families or communities - except nu- 1997: the elaboration of the anti- in Tajikistan has been marked by clear families in the relatively rare Taliban coalition with support of Rus- violence which, for example, was case of aged converts. The propa- sia, the USA and Iran; the peace not observed in Qyrghyzstan: on ganda for the new faith is oftenly agreement and the disarmament of October 1st, 2000 ten persons are coupled with moral (teaching of the Islamist milicias; then the launch- said to have been killed, eighty in- children and adults on Sundays) ing of the current «crusade» against jured in the bombing of the «Core- and material assistance (distribution terrorism with massive support of the an Church» of Dushanbe (a Califor- of parcels, disposition of collec- international community to Tajikistan’s nian-based Evangelical congre- tive meals at the church on Sun- political authorities; and on the other gation, led by a Corean pasteur days), or medicine. (See the trav- hand the massive emigration to Rus- with strong personal ties in South el to Dushanbe of a Corean team sia of Tajik Highland young manpow- Corea). Narratives of miraculous of specialists of acupuncture led er - the main electoral support of the healing of a dozen of badly burnt by a famous pracitian from Seoul party -: all these phenomena have victims have greatly contributed to in July, 2003, a moment when the considerably reduced the Nahzat’s unite the young community, and rebuilt «Corean church» was at- room for manoeuvre. permitted its resurrection after the tended every day by more than eventual reconstruction of the church, One of the consequences of this 2,000 persons exposed to inten- which has been considerably en- conjunction of factors is the present sive propaganda as well as med- larged and is today coupled with an embarassment of the party lead- ical care - which created condi- academy of taekwondo.70 ers in front of the expansion of tions of various receptivity to acu- US-based Christian (mainly re- According to our data and per- puncture among the patients.)71 formed) missionary activity in sonal observations, most conver- Although this phenomenon has not Tajikistan - a phenomenon with no sions to Christianity remain indi- yet taken the social dimension it has equivalent in the region, except vidual, and they affect mainly the found in Qyrghyzstan, it has aroused Qyrghyzstan, although in the Tajik outcast youth of the main cities of a great alarm among opinion and case, the wave of conversions has the country, among whom Tajiki- political leaders. Those of the Nahzat been more recent and spectacular, stan’s residual minorities are over- could be tempted to use it in the which contributes to reinforce the next future, in different manners, for political speciticity of Tajikistan among 69 Interview of Abduali Toirov, local officer of recovering a part of their lost legiti- the Central Asian states. Some sev- the OBSE, Dushanbe, mid-July 2003. mity. Anyway, the Islamo-Christian enty churches are now active 70 Personal inquiries among the faithful, Dush- cleavage, which have proved so sig- throughout the country, with more anbe, spring and summer 2003. nificant in other regions of the former than 20,000 faithful of various na- 71 Parviz Mullojonov’s courageous testimony USSR during the past decade (in have reinforced our previous consideration on the decisive placebo effect of confidence in medical care, whatever may it be. 144 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Chechnia, in particular), has al- ethnic, economic and political cleav- valley) has paved the way for a rap- ready taken a special symbolic and age. The social and intellectual weak- id expansion of the Hizb al-Tahrir political weigh in Tajikistan - a weigh ness of traditional Hanafi Islam (even as an organization promoting ri- probably increased by the perma- in its politicized way as it is sym- gourous ethical and cultural norms nent presence of many organizations bolised by the Nahzat, a party of acceptable to the people of the of the international community in Dus- Tajik Highlanders poorly estab- bazaar and other city-dwellers, hanbe, which can be invoked by lished in big cities and lowlands, and as a party which defends the both parties in the regulation of ever except the migrant-peopled sub- interests of lowland and urban growing conflicts.72 urbs in Dushanbe and numerous Uzbek-speaking populations kolkhozes in the Wakhsh cotton throughout former .74 3.3 Uzbek minorities: 72 For instance: Shodi MUHIDDIN, «Isoi Maseh To such an extent that, during the a multiple cleavage? dar kuchahoi Dushanbe chi mejuyad? [What Does Jesus the Messiah Try to Find in the Steets of last years, the Tahrir has been gain- In this case of Christian missionary Dushanbe?],» Tojikiston 32 [293] (2003/8/7): 6. ing popularity among the Urghuti activity, a religious cleavage re- «progressive class»75 of the val- covers regional, social, ethnic, eco- 73 For general considerations on the way con- fessional cleaveges mask in Tajikistan national leys and cities of northern and nomic and political ones. (New and ethnic fractures, see DZHALILOV 2002. western Tajikistan, including the cap- converts, as already suggested, 74 On recent arrestations of Uzbek members ital Dushanbe. These Uzbek-speak- come mainly from the big cities’ of the Hizb al-Tahrir in Tajikistan, and the instal- ing petty traders, shopkeepers, outcast youth from residual na- lation of this party in Uzbek-peopled areas of changers, and shop-tour organisers tional minorities, with poor per- Central Asia, see notably Aleksei MATVEEV, originating from the Uzbekistani city «Tsentral’naia Aziia: bor’be za demokratiiu spectives of economic integration and district of Urghut make off, in in the future Tajikistani society.) meshaet ekstremizm [Extremism, an Obstacle to the Struggle for Democracy],» Asia Plus (2003/ Tajikistan, an overall population of Curiously enough, such is also, at 6/12): 9. On the party’s establishment in Uzbek- some 35,000 persons, which has least in part, the case of alterna- peopled regions of Northern Tajikistan and South- managed to take control of signifi- tive Islamic missionary activity as it Western Qyrghyzstan, see two papers, very cant segments of trade activity - for different in their spirit, by Kurbonali MUHAB- has been developing in Tajik land instance, no less than one third of BATOV [the Procuror of the Soghd Region], since the turn of the 21st centu- the «luggage-holder» (in Turkish ba- «Religiozno-oppozitsionnye gruppy v Tadzhiki- ry.73 stane: Hizb-ut-Tahrir) [Religious Oppositional vulcu) international trade mainly with Inside the Muslim community of Groups in Tajikistan: The Hizb al-Tahrir], in Lena Turkey or China. The direction of Jonson, Saodat Olimova & Muzaffar Olimov, Tajikistan itself, in spite of this new the Nahzat now admits, although not eds., Religioznyi ekstremizm v Tsentral’noi Azii. always willingly, that it has lost con- Christian pressure and under an ap- Problemy i perspektivy. Materialy konferentsii tact with this dynamic «Urghuti» cli- pearance of stabilization and normal- Dushanbe, 25 aprelia 2002 g. [Religious Extrem- ization of relations between the reli- ism in Central Asia. Problems and Perspec- entele with solid roots and connec- gious and the civil political organiza- tives. Proceedings of the Dushanbe Confer- tions in Uzbekistan. ence, 25 April 2002] (Dushanbe: Devashtich [for tions, we also face the same quintu- The problem here is not the Hizb the OSCE]): 73-87; and by Saniia SAGNAEVA, ple problem of a religious, regional, «Religiozno-oppozitsionnye gruppy v Kyrgyzs- al-Tahrir itself, but rather that par- tane: Hizb-ut-Tahrir) [Religious Oppositional ty’s growing popularity among Groups in Qyrghyzstan: The Hizb al-Tahrir],» ibid.: 64-72.

75 «Sinf-i pesh-qadam»: interview with M.-Sh. Himmatzoda, Dushanbe, early June 2003...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 145

various Uzbek-speaking commu- outside of Uzbekistan, the interests stan such as the little city of Chorkuh, nities of Tajikistan, on the basis of of compact Uzbek minorities. In Tajiki- in the Soghd region. In this case, economic and national discontent, stan, where the Uzbek president Is- such links can be explained by the whence the Nahzat, a purely lam Karimov, in spite of the failure of presence of an emigre community «Tajik» party from the beginning various military adventures (the last from Chorkuh in the Hejaz since the with few interest for political and one in Khujand under Colonel Khu- 1920s (SABBAGH 1999), and by the religious affairs outside Tajikistan doyberdiev in Fall 1998),76 has nev- cultural and economic influence of this (weel seen by ROY 1999), has er completely given up his ambitions emigre community in northern Tajiki- been cultivating its specific and lim- of having installed in Dushanbe a po- stan since the very first years of in- ited geographical establishment litical regime more conform to his dependence. However, according among the Tajik-speaking High- wishes, the existence of structured to various testimonies received dur- land and Highlander migrant com- demands for representation among ing our stay in Tajikistan, several hun- munities of the central and south- Uzbek minorities may give Tashkent dreds of Tajik students are said to ern parts of the country. Nothing an interesting, although risky, playing be studying now in various edu- has still been said here of the Loqay card. A partial solution to this prob- cational institutions of the Hejaz. Uzbek communities of the South, one lem may be the current reform of If the shabby-looking Imam-Termezi of the poorest and most poorly inte- the electoral legislation, and redefini- Madrasa in Dushanbe remains con- grated in the limited labor market of tion of the electoral districts (okrugs) servative in its teaching (its poor li- Tajikistan: in short, the reverse of the in search of a better coincidence be- brary, although composed for more dynamic and fortunate Urghuti tween the electoral and administra- 70% of Saudi publications, re- community. In such conditions, it tive/national okrugs in regions with a mains dominated by classical Ha- remains of course difficult to speak compact Uzbek population,77 - al- nafi literature)78, however its cur- of a united Uzbek community or mi- though a possible side effect of such sus seems hardly capable of satisfy- nority in Tajikistan. a legislation could also be the enforce- ing the religious demands of the Tajik ment of a still volatile «Uzbek» politi- However, the common denominator society. The future return to Tajiki- cal identity in Tajikistan .... of Urghuti, Loqay and other Uzbek- stan of numerous young theolo- speaking populations of Tajikistan Beside the new interest of Uzbek- gians, after several years in Saudi (25% of the overall population speaking minorities of Tajikistan for madrasas, may not remain devoid- according to official statistics), in the Hizb al-Tahrir, direct Saudi in- ed of impact on the religious situ- spite of their heterogeneous economic fluence has proved powerful in ation in this country, still deprived status in this country, is their lack of some specific areas of northern Tajiki- of authoritative Hanafi ulama political representation (except two whose authority could offer a 76 Significantly enough, this event is seen, in Uzbek MPs: one for the giant alu- counterweigh to direct or undi- both Dushanbe and Khujand, among both pro- minium factory in Regar, and one Only the ponents and adversaries of the reunion of Tajiki- rect Wahhabi influence. for the city of Regar itself), cou- stan with Uzbekistan, as the most important high degree of secularization of Tajik pled with a common insatisfaction event since the independence in 1991. society, and a strong attachment to which drives them towards radical 77 Meeting of the multiparty commission for cultural traditions specific to medieval organizations which use to promote, the reform of the electoral legislation, OSCE, and modern Central Asia seem to- Dushanbe, 5 June 2003.

78 Personal visit to the Imam-Termezi Madrasa and its library, early July 2003. 146 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

day79 able to protect Tajikistan from process may indicate a choice of poverty: most of the predominantly such an «shock of [Islamic] civili- Dushanbe for internationalizing rural population of Tajikistan struggles zations» - if the growing pressure the regulation of this problem - in by on subsistence agriculture, remi- of Christian missions from abroad, order, perhaps, to exert a better tances from relatives working and the current de-legitimation of the pressure on Uzbekistan, which had abroad, and humanitarian aid. A Nahzat do not drive the Tajik Islamist backed Khudoyberdiev during his last growing number benefits from drug leaders, or their young concurrents unsuccessful coup in Khujand in 1998, money and other aspects of an ever of the Tahrir and Nahzat’s most rad- and is now suspected to favour the growing shadow economy. If Mos- ical wing, to the search for violent activities of Islamist organizations like cow used to fund some 80% of confrontation with everything West- the (armed) IMU and the (non-vio- the national budget before inde- ern. lent) Hizb al-Tahrir in defense of the pendence, the present relayance Uzbek populations outside of the on foreign assistance is generally country’s boundaries (in the perceived as the only chance for Conclusions Qyrghyz and Tajik territories of the Tajik state to maintain a ple- Beside external factors briefly the Ferghana Valley, in the West- thoric administration and redun- evoked at the beginning of this study, ern regions of Tajikistan, in the dant body of poorly paid civil five main elements of destabiliza- Charjuy region of , servants - the key of the overall tion of Tajikistan have been identi- and in the south of Qazaqstan). corruption of public bodies in the fied by security agencies for the country. However foreign recom- As to persistent poverty and its di- coming decade: (1) a possible come mandations of reducing the finan- rect impact on the political sphere, back of the past warlords; (2) pov- cial burden of civil service has to an aspect which remains out of the erty; (3) drugs; (4) Islam; (5) nation- this date met no real success. Be- 80 scope of the present study, Tajiki- alities. cause these purely accounting pre- stan remains a country which lives occupations of international orga- The danger of a possible rap- beyond its means. The question of nizations rarely take into account prochement between the Tajik drugs is intimately linked with that of warlords of the civil war period, the decisive societal functions of this abundant administrative body: especially the still active Mahmud 79 See Muhammad-Sharif Himmatzoda’s words, Khudoyberdiev, and the Islamic when speaking of the radicals and one of their it has permitted the Tajik state to Movement of Uzbekistan has been main ideologists, the Pakistani al-Maududi, about integrate, at relatively low cost, oftenly mentionned in a recent past the specific taste for mysticism in Persian and large segments of the society into Urdu culture - including al-Maududi’s writings: as an important threat to the overall the overall system of social net- interview with M.-Sh. Himmatzoda, Dushanbe, stability in the Central Asian region.81 working. June 2003. Yaqub Salimov’s arrest in Moscow As to «corruption» linked with the 80 Interview with Ambassador Marc Gilbert, in early July 2003 gives us an inter- Dushanbe, mid-May 2003. practice of low salaries for this nu- esting element on the Tajik author- merous body of civil servants, the 81 Sayyid Abdullo NURI, «Nasha partiya ope- ities’ will to cope with this poten- clash between the definitions of cor- spokoena [Our Party is Worrying],» Asia Plus tial danger, whilst the search for a (2003/4/24): 4; on the IMU as a threat to Tajiki- ruption held by international organi- direct implication of Russia in this stan, see for instance Ludwig GIBELHAUS [a zations and the practices of ritual journalist of Die Deutsche Welle], «Tsentral’noi Azii ugrozhaet eskaladiia napryazhennosti [Cen- tral Asia Is Threatened by a Growth of Ten- sion],» Asia Plus (2003/5/22): 8...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 147

exchanges which are characteristic *** ing the debates at local level of modern Central Asian societies What to do? If it seems difficult to (where the distance between the comes from the fact that most ap- pretend to exert an action on the government and those who are proaches by development agen- long term on external factors, governed is the shortest) consti- cies fail to take into account local whatever decisive these factors may tutes, in the present political frame- definitions of what kinds of be- prove in the next future for the sta- work of Tajikistan, an opportuni- havior are appropriate forms of bility of Tajikistan and the whole Cen- ty to stimulate much awaited social networking. Gift giving, even tral Asian region - it should, in fact, changes in the long term (see DE between citizens and government be the task of diplomats to exert MARTINO 2003b, 2). At the same officials, is part of the fabric of social pressures, for instance, on the Rus- time, it would be only to the ad- life in Central Asian countries (WERN- sian and Uzbek governments, in or- vantage of such activities if they ER 2000; ADAMS 2003). It should der to facilitate the establishment of are enlarged to a wider public, be seen in its cultural - and socio- Tajik immigrants, or to ease the fur- notably through media and pub- political - contexts before bringing ther opening up of Tajikistan’s bound- lic discussions (ABDULLAEV 2003, about new legislations with a mainly aries to free movement of persons FREIZER 2003, and the present au- cosmetical effect, and subsequent and goods. Something, however, thor’s oral recommendations to CI- aggravations of the ambivalent atti- may be undertaken on the inner MERA during the 2002-3 term). tude of local partners towards the level, for favouring evolutions of The permanent redefinition of pro- self-legitimating requirements of do- the current political situation. CI- grammes of humanirary and a fortio- nor states and organizations. MERA’s overall project on decen- ri those of technical assistance has tralization in Tajikistan had been Islam and the nationality question been a characteristic of any coordi- based upon one fundamental pos- have been given more attention in nated action in Tadjikistan. From this tulate: «Where reform is slow to the preceding pages, since they lie viewpoint, the challeges that CIME- come, is in the regions.»82 Not that at the foundament of political life and RA has been facing since the begin- any significant change may be ex- strategy in Tajikistan. The national- ning of this year is a matter of norm. pected in the short term at the cen- ity question, in particular, when Whence most chanceries active in tral government level (especially coupled with all the criteria men- Central Asia remain dependant on without a major and coordinated tionned above, as in the case of short-sighted, day-after-day policies, pressure from key international Uzbek minorities, remains a cru- a technical assistance worth of this operators such as the funding in- cial threat for the future of the denomination cannot choose to over- stitutions). According to our inquir- country. Another of the manyfold look the necessity of the mid-term ies, however, the local, self-gover- aspects of this question is the politi- investment of important resources. nance level is probably the one cal segregation of the Soghd region, Up to this date, most NGOs which where a much expected and fruitful which has been left out of the 1997 are dealing with political reform have work may be carried out. Support- General Peace Agreement, and thus acted exclusively inside a narrow cir- has little access to political power, cle of deciders with few interest for as well as the Badakhshan and the 82 SMEC Team Leader Ed Hankin, quoted by the intermediaries of political power Rasht [former Gharm] Valley. Luigi de MARTINO 2002a, 3. in the regions and sub-regions of the 148 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

country, and even less interest for A good many differences one can which should be less underestimat- different categories of opinion mak- observe between the Tajik and the ed by international donor organiza- ers, however specific may be the Iranian societies lies in the colonial, tions. Last, as to analogies between typology of opinion makers in post- then Soviet past of Tajikistan, and its the Tajik and the Iranian cases, if the Soviet Tajikistan. The concept of in- specific culture of both public debate scope of this paper did not allow us formal consultation with interlocutors and relation to donor countries of all to develop as we would have liked outside the Tajik administration kind. The ambivalent attitude of most to do the initial idea of a compara- seems indeed to be an unusual con- of our local interlocutors towards tive approach between the two, cept an a new instrument of techni- everything partaining to the hege- there is probably one key common cal assistance in the CIS. However, monic political systems and cultures, point between them - which is also in a UNTOP meeting on December, as well as the lasting lack of space one of the main taboos in both Tajik 2002 nineteen representatives of the for public debate constitutes perhaps and Iranian political cultures: a com- Nahzat had already voiced that they the main non-visible difference be- mon reluctance of the leaders of each country to recognize their re- were not aware of the Government tween the Tajik and the Iranian cas- spective ethnic diversity, and to pro- initiatives in the local governance es; it should probably constitute, in mote measures for a better identifi- field, and that no political discussion the near future, two of the main 83 cation of sometimes very dynamic was taking place in this matter. Up obstacles to reform in Tajikistan, es- minorities to the state in which they till a recent date, clearly formulated pecially in foreign intervention is to live. A potentially dangerous fact in political demands continued to face be developed in the years to come. a region, Central Asia, where, in a a total lack of a real public debate. Another key difference, underlined context of very quick differentiation, Instead of a formal and, as we have ad nauseam in the present study, is religious differences, including those tried to suggest earlier in this study, the surprising weakness of Tajikistan’s inside the Islamic community, tend fatal concentration on legislation writ- Islamic religious institutions - a factor to recover ethnic, social, and eco- ing, the founding role of initial public of social violence, as we have sug- nomic cleavages. meetings should have been enlarged gested in the body of this study, to a wider range of protagonists.

Dushanbe and Paris, Quoted references September 2003 ......

- ABDULLAEV, Kamoluddin, 2003, tral Eurasian Studies. A Selective - ASADULLAEV, I. K., 2002a, Ek- «Current Local Government Policy and Critical Bibliography of spansiia podobiia, demokratiia i Situation in Tajikistan,» manuscript, Works Published between 1985 Tadzhikistan [The Expansion of Con- Dushanbe, 7 pages. and 2000, Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, in summation, Democracy, and Tajiki- print. stan], Dushanbe: Sharqi ozod, 130 p. - ADAMS, Laura, 2003, «Research Trends in Sociology,» in Stephane A. - 2002b, Posle 11 sentjabria... Dudoignon & Hisao Komatsu, eds., (politika, terrorizm, ekspansiia Research Trends in Modern Cen- 83 DE MARTINO, 2002b, 4. podobiia i dopustimaia mera no- ...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 149

vatsii) [After September 11... (Pol- - DIGARD, Jean-Pierre, Hourcade, the End of the ,» commu- itics, Terrorism, the Expansion of Bernard, Richard Yann, 1996, L’Iran nication to the First World Con- Consumption, and the Acceptable au XXe siecle, Paris: Fayard. gress of Middle-Eastern Studies, Measure of Novelty)], Dushanbe: University of Mainz, September 8- - DJALILI, Mohammad-Reza, KELL- Glavnaia nauchnaia redaktsiia Tadzhik- 9, 2002. NER, Thierry, Geopolitique de skoi Natsional’noi Entsiklopedii. l’Asie Centrale, 2003, De la fin - DZAILOV, Komyob, 25 April 2002, - 2003, with Larisa DODKHUDO- de l’URSS a l’apres-11 septem- «Faktory rosta ekstremizma: EVA, Tadzhikistan i Soedinennye bre, 3rd ed., Paris: PUF (Publica- regional’nyi kontekst [The Factors for Shtaty Ameriki posle 11 sentiabria tions de l’Institut Universitaire des the Development of Extremism: The po itogam kruglogo stola [Tajiki- Hautes Etudes Internationales, Gen- Regional Context], in Lena Jonson, stan and the USA after September eve). Saodat Olimova, Muzaffar Olimov, 11, Results of the Round Table], Dus- - DUDOIGNON, Stephane A., 1994, eds., Religioznyi ekstremizm v hanbe: Informacionno-issledovatel’skii «Une segmentation peut en cacher Tsentral’noi Azii. Problemy i per- centr «Simurg», Posol’stvo Soedinen- une autre : regionalismes et clivages spektivy. Materialy konferentsii nykh Shtatov Ameriki v Respublike politiques au Tadjikistan,» in Stephane Dushanbe, 25 aprelia 2002 g. [Re- Tadzhikistan. A. Dudoignon & Guissou Jahangiri, ligious Extremism in Central Asia. - AYUBZOD, Salim, 2002, Sad ran- eds., Le Tadjikistan existe-t-il? Des- Problems and Perspectives. Pro- gi sad sol. Tojikon dar qarni bis- tins politiques d’une «nation im- ceedings of the Dushanbe Confer- tum [One Hundred Colours of One parfaite» (Paris : CEMOTI) : 73-120, ence, 25 April 2002] (Dushanbe: Hundred Years. The Tajiks in the ill. (Cahiers d’etudes sur la Medi- Devashtich [on behalf of the OSCE], Twentieth Century], Prague: Post- terranee orientale et le monde 2002): 151-162 Scriptum Imprimatur. turco-iranien 18). - FREIZER, Sabine, 2003, «Tajikistan - BABAJANOV, Bakhtiyar, KA- - 1998, «Political Parties and Forces Local Sefl-Governance: A Potential MILOV, Muzaffar, 2001, «Muham- of Tajikistan (1989-1993),» in Mo- Bridge between Government and civil madjan Hindustani (1892-1989) and hammad-Reza Djalili, Frederic Grare, Society?,» manuscript, Dushanbe. the Beginning of the “Great Schism” Shirin Akiner, Tajikistan: The Trials - IBN QURBON [pseud.], 2003, among the Muslims of Uzbekistan,» of Independence (Richmond: Cur- Favohish va rahoish, Dushanbe: Er- in Stephane A. Dudoignon & Hisao zon): 52-85 [translation from: «Forc- Graf. Komatsu, eds., Islam in Politics in es et partis politiques au Tadjikistan Russia and Central Asia, Early (1989-1993),» in Mohammad-Reza - ICG 2003a, Tajikistan: A Road- 18th-Late 20th Centuries, London Djalili & Frederic Grare, eds., Le Tad- map for Development, Osh/Brus- - New York - Bahrain: Kegan Paul jikistan a l’epreuve de sels: ICG, 21 April 2003 (ICG Asia International, 195-219. l’independance (Geneva: Institut Reports: 51). Universitaire des Hautes Etudes In- - BASHIRI, Iraj, 2002, Prominent - 2003b, Central Asia: A Last ternationales, 1995) : 63-94]. Tajik Figures of the Twentieth Cen- Chance for Change, Osh/Brussels: tury, Dushanbe: The International - 2002, «Globalised Pilgrimage? ICG, 29 April 2003 (ICG Asia Brief- Borbad Foundation. From Central Asia to the Hijaz, since ing Papers). 150 ...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

- KABIRI, Muhiddin, 2002, «Islamskii Nacional’nogo muzeia drevnostei - SABBAGH, 1999, Armaghan-i radikalizm: faktory vozniknoveniia Tadzhikistana. Sabbagh [A Present from Sab- [Islamic Radicalism: The Factors of bagh], Jeddah. - MASSICARD, Elise, 2004, «De Its Appearence], in Lena Jonson, l’usage national de traditions locales: - SATTORI, Qiyomiddin, ed., 2003, Saodat Olimova, Muzaffar Olimov, le cas du mahalla dans l’Ouzbekistan HNIT, zodai ormoni mardum (Ba eds., Religioznyi ekstremizm v independant,» Revue des mondes iftixori 30-solagii ta’sisi Hizbi Tsentral’noi Azii. Problemy i per- musulmans et de la Mediterranee, Nahzati Islomii Tojikiston) [The spektivy. Materialy konferentsii forthcoming. PIRT, Born of the People’s Ideal (In Dushanbe, 25 aprelia 2002 g. [Re- Honor of the 30th-Anniversary of the ligious Extremism in Central Asia. - MIRSAIDOV, S., dir., 2002, Prob- Foundation of the Party of the Is- Problems and Perspectives. Pro- lemy ustojchivogo razvitija lamic Renewal of Tajikistan)] Dush- ceedings of the Dushanbe Confer- gornykh territorij Respubliki anbe: Imperial-Grupp. ence, 25 April 2002] (Dushanbe: Tadzhikistan [Problems of Sustained Devashtich [on behalf of the OSCE], Development of the Highland Terri- - RO’I, Yaacov, 2000, Islam in the 2002): 122-129. tories of the Republic of Tajikistan], Soviet Union. From World War II Dushanbe: Sorushan. to Perestroika, London: Hurst. - LEWIN, Moshe, 2003, Russia’s Twentieth Century: The Collapse - OLIMOVA, Saodat K., 1996, «Ko- - ROY, Olivier, 1999, The Foreign of the Soviet Union, NY: Colum- mmunisticheskaia partiia Tadzhikistana Policy of the Central Asian Islam- bia University Press, 2003 (French v 1992-1994 gg. [The Communist ic Renaissance Party, New York: Council on Foreign Relations. translation by Denis Paillard & Flo- Party of Tajikistan in 1992-1994],» rence Prudhomme, Le siecle sovi- Vostok 1996/2: 52-62. - 2002, L’islam mondialise, Paris: Seuil. etique, Paris: Flammarion, 2003). - OLIMOVA, S. K., OLIMOV, M. - RYFMAN, Patrick, 2002, L’action - MARTINO, Luigi de, 2002a, «Mis- A., 2003, Musul’manskie lidery: humanitaire, Paris : Ellipses. sion to Central Asia, 10-17 August sotsial’naia rol’ i avtoritet. Mate- - SEIFERT, A. K., KRAIKEMAIER, A., 2002,» Geneva: Cimera. rialy kruglogo stola, Dushanbe, eds., 2003, O sovmestimosti 20 fevralia 2003 g. [Muslim Lead- - 2002b, «Mission to Central Asia, politiche-skogo islama i bezopas- ers: Their Social Role and Authority. 14-21 December 2002,» Geneva: nosti v prostranstve OBSE [About Proceedings of the Round Table, Dus- Cimera. the Compatibility of Political Islam and hanbe, 20 February 2003], Dushan- Security in the Space of the OSCE], - 2003a, «Mission to Tajikistan, 8-15 be: Nauchno-issledovatel’skii centr Dushanbe: Sharqi ozod. February 2003,» Geneva: Cimera. Shark, 123 p. - TABAROV, Sohib, 2003, Mubo- - 2003b, «Mission to Tajikistan, 7-12 - OLIMOV, Muzaffar, ed., 2002, hisai «Ziyoii dehoti» va «muzofo- July 2003,» Geneva: Cimera. Majlisi Oli - Parliament of the Re- tishuur» bo «ziyoii shahri» va public of Tajikistan (Directory), - MASOV, Rahim, 2002, «shahrishuur» [Debate of a «Rural» Dushanbe: Sharq Research Center. «Nasledie» Mangytskoj dinastii Intellectual with an «Urban» One], [The «Heritage» of the Manghit - ed., 2003, Musul’manskie lidery Dushanbe: Osorkhonai millii bostonii Dynasty], Dushanbe: Tipografiia [Islamic Leaders], Dushanbe: Shark. Tojikiston...... FROM AMBIVALENCE TO AMBIGUITY?...... SOME PARADIGMS OF POLICY MAKING IN TAJIKISTAN 151

- THOM, Francoise, 1989, Le mo- Bribes and Development in Post-So- Investigative Reporting in the Media ment Gorbatchev, Paris: Criteri- viet Kazakstan,» Human Organiza- of Tajikistan,» Media Insight Cen- on. tion 59: 11-22. tral Asia 30-31 (November-Decem- - WERNER, Cynthia, 2000, «Gifts, - ZAKIROVA, Nargis, 2002, «No ber 2002), 1-2. 152 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

Tajikistan at a Crossroad: Contradictory Forces at the Heart of the Tajik Political System...... By Luigi De Martino Project Director CIMERA, Geneva, Switzerland

Summary Inter-Tajik Regional Dialogue», an ini- with was that of identity and of the tiative supported by the Swiss Min- legitimacy of the political system in This paper1 analyses the political situ- istry of Foreign Affairs. place. The former socialist republics ation of post-conflict Tajikistan and of Central Asia had been created in identifies two sets of contradictory the 30s by integrating vast spaces forces as being at the centre of the A conflict for the control characterised by a strong geograph- Tajik political system: the centralisa- of the state and its resources ical and cultural diversity and, at the tion vs. decentralisation trend and the In 1991, the breakdown of the So- same time, by a strong social and inclusion into the government vs. viet Union suddenly projected onto economical coherence and comple- exclusion trend. The elite that came the international scene a group of mentarities into a vertically integrat- into power with the civil war has used new states, among them, the five ed system where the centre, Mos- a strategy of centralisation of power Central Asian republics, Kirghizstan, cow, was the ultimate source of and inclusion of the opposition and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and power. has thus so far been able to success- Turkmenistan. fully manage the political forces of The breakdown of the soviet sys- the country in order to establish po- Nothing had prepared the popula- tem has led to a crisis situation af- litical and economic domination. The tions and their authorities to this new fecting all social and political relations. author makes the hypothesis that this «independence» and to the sudden It has been a moment of political flu- mode of operation may reach its lim- disappearance of the socialist eco- idity, a «multi-sectorial crisis « reshap- its due to the emergence of opposi- nomic system into which the «new» ing the relations regulating the inter- tion forces that are not easy to inte- states were integrated. For these actions among social groups (Dobry, grate into the present political sys- states the world had changed, a 1996). Uncertainty becomes thus a tem. As perspectives for broader whole system of references, politi- central parameter of such moments political change and reform are grim cal, economical and social had disap- of «transition» (Banegas, 2001). peared. in Tajikistan, government-supported Confronted with a crisis that had no repression and violence may become One of the challenges that Newly precedents and with the necessity the only instrument to deal with such Independent States (NIS) had to deal to (re)-build the state, the political opposition. The paper is based on elites in power during the Gorbachev published materials and on research 1 A previous version of this paper was present- period played the card on national produced within the frame of the ed at the 4th Annual Conference of the Central construction in order to give legiti- CIMERA project «Strengthening the Eurasian Studies Society (CESS) held in Cam- macy to their power. bridge, Massachusset on October 2-5 2003...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: CONTRADICTORY ...... FORCES AT THE HEART OF THE TAJIK POLITICAL SYSTEM. 153

In 1992 in Tajikistan, a competition networks based on patronage and coalition by the Rahmonov govern- for power among local elites trig- to a certain extent on geography, ment, the Tajik authorities gained gered a conflict, the consequences has not only been the instrument for important goodwill at the international of which can still be felt today. The mobilizing support for fighting the level. All these factors contributed main aim of the conflict was the con- war, but continued to be the key to the stabilisation into power of the trol of the state, at the confluence instrument to assert the predomi- incumbent President and his team. of political and economical power. nance of certain groups and to ac- These processes can be considered In 1992 Tajikistan did not have an cess economic resources through as positive developments in a war- economic sector outside of the state control of the state. torn country like Tajikistan, on the itself. The economy was the polity; other hand no deep political reform in this situation winning political pow- Rebuilding the state or change of the functioning of the er simultaneously ensures a preserve using old recipes political system has taken place. Even on all or most economic opportunity though the 1994 Constitution de- (Haysom, 2002). Tajikistan is in many ways an amaz- clares that Tajikistan is a sovereign, ing country. Considering the magni- The Tajik civil war (approx. 1992-97) democratic, law governed, secular tude of the challenges of the post- was driven by overlapping antago- and unitary state with separated ex- conflict period and the double heri- nisms arising from generational, ideo- ecutive, legislative and judicial pow- tage of the civil war and break down logical, regional and inter-communal ers (Abdullaev, 2003), the current of the Soviet Union, it almost surpris- competition (Akiner, 2001: 40). Re- regime and its political personnel have ing to see that during the period from gional political entrepreneurs and operated according to established 1999 to 2003 the political situation warlords fought the Tajik conflict and political models and cultures which in Tajikistan has stabilised, the Gov- succeeded to various degrees in were in place in the Soviet Union. ernment has successfully integrated securing mass support in their respec- This is no major surprise since the the opposition, including the Islamic tive areas (Abdullaev and Freizer, political personnel in Tajikistan are a Revival Party (IRP), and has been able 2003: 24). The war however, in very homogenous group in terms of to marginalize those opposition forc- weakening the authority of the na- education (mostly engineers with es that refused integration. At the tional government, re-emphasized KOMSOMOL and Communist party same time it could also bargain agree- regional divisions (Akiner, 2001: 66, education) and in terms of political ments with those elements within the Seifert, 2002: 67). This led to a deep culture and references (URSS sys- «government camp» that posed se- fragmentation of the society and tem, Russia) (Dudoignon, 2004). rious military threats to the stability economy of Tajikistan and to an in- of the situation. After the Septem- It is important to recall that at the creased authority for sub-national ber 11 2001 events, the US-led mil- signature of the Peace Agreement elites. itary intervention in Afghanistan, and in 1997, the conflict parties were The war has furthermore allowed a the support given to the anti-terror confronted with the enormous task change of elites at the top of the of (re)-building the state, a task that state, the «Kulyabis» replacing the required the central government to 2 «Kulybis», «Leninabadis» or «Gharmis» are previously politically dominant «Len- rough, general terms that indicate patronage (re)-assert its control over the entire 2 inabadi» . «Regionalism», sub- social networks that are partly regionally based. These country (large parts of the country groups are not monolitical but their structures of alliance change constantly. 154 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

were under the military control of of the Council of Justice in 1999 the gional feudalism», a situation charac- the opposition) and to give new sub- President has the power to nominate terised by the disruption of the pre- stance and content to its institutions judges and control courts. Finally, as vious economic links between differ- (the war had not only destroyed a leader of the most powerful re- ent regions and markets, the emer- much of the social infrastructure in gional grouping of Kuliabis, the Pres- gence of several «appanage princ- certain regions but also severed the ident enjoys the might and support es» (Avezov, 2004:34), extending links between state institutions in the of its regional elite and armed forces their authority in specific territories capital and in the regions). (Abdullaev and Freizer, 2003: 22). and over resources of the country and being unwilling or unable to pay At the same time, the post-conflict This strategy corresponded to the taxes to the state budget. period has been characterised by the concept of state adopted by the necessity to implement the power- Kuliabi elite: a presidential regime, a While the groups controlling the cen- sharing agreement at the base of the highly centralized «strong state» and tral government have tried to mo- 1997 Peace Agreement, to integrate clearly steered by the top (Seifert, nopolize political and economic re- personnel from the United Tajik Op- 2002; Dudoignon, 2004). sources at central level, regional elites position (UTO) and to reward those and groups have fought bitter bat- If prior to the conflict the state was groups that supported the new gov- tles for the control over regional and the source of most economic oppor- ernment during the conflict. local economic resources and oppor- tunities, and for this reason the con- tunities (most notably the Aluminium trol of the state was one of the main smelter, cotton production, markets First Trend: Centralisation objectives of the conflict, the war and roads, hotels and restaurants vs. Decentralisation has disrupted the control of central etc.) (Seifert, 2002: 67)3. government over the economic re- As mentioned above, the groups sources of the country. This situation of loss of control over that came into power with the civil economic resources by the state has war and took over control of the The collapse of the Soviet Union and been further increased by the pro- central government have tried to subsequent civil war in Tajikistan pro- gramme of privatisation of state monopolize both political and eco- voked what certain experts call a «re- property pushed by the World Bank nomical power. The centralisation of 3 In many cases military commanders have trans- and the International Monetary Fund, state power in the hands of the Pres- formed their military power over a certain re- which has strengthened the econom- idency has been at the base of this gion in economic and political power by trans- ic basis of local and regional groups strategy. Currently, the President forming themselves into entrepreneurs, or by acquiring public office etc. (Seifert, 2002; 69) and elites (Seifert, 2002). appoints the heads of provincial and 4 In such a situation, where the central govern- district governments; in turn district ment has few available resources to be used authorities nominate local self-gov- for meeting the challenges of reconstructing Polity is (still) the economy: ernment level chairpersons. More- the country and the state, it is important to and vice versa note that the central authorities have usually a over, the Presidential Office controls privileged access to an important source of The weak central state power, heavi- all finance, state property and mon- funding: the external resources from interna- ly dependent on cotton and alumini- ey flows through the Office of State tional organisations such as the Bretton Woods Institutions, the European Bank for Reconstruc- um for hard currency and on interna- Finance Control. With the creation tion and Development or the Asian Bank for tional loans for funding4, was unable Development. In this sense (especially after the September 11, 2001 events), the Tajik Gov- ernment has been able in recent years to at- tract considerable, though often inconsistent, international financial support...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: CONTRADICTORY ...... FORCES AT THE HEART OF THE TAJIK POLITICAL SYSTEM. 155

to avoid the economic fragmenta- tem permits that the distribution of litical opposition. This elite has been tion of the country or to efficiently tax revenues, offset revenues, of able to establish its control over the collect taxes. central government grants and trans- state and is able to use its structures fers for budgetary support from the and institutions as a tool to manage The elites controlling the central gov- national budget to the oblast level alliances, access resources and main- ernment are confronted with a situa- and below, be the object of a be- tain power.6 tion where their model of highly cen- hind-the-scenes negotiation process tralised state has to deal with a de- This system is characterised by two where differential regional political centralised economical power5. In this forces, one striving for more cen- influence becomes a key significant situation, they have to negotiate with tralisation (allowing increased control), factor affecting the distribution of other local and regional elites (Seifert, but excluding the majority of politi- funds. This situation is reinforced by 2002). If political power gives access cal forces from power, and the oth- the fact that the laws and processes to economic resources (for example er tending to integrate opposition regulating the budget formulation al- the control of the privatisation process), forces in order to gain support and low for year-to-year and inter-juris- at the same time economic power is better control them. The potential for dictional variation within a given year easily transferable into political power. contradictions between these two (Davis, Dunn and Nazirova, 2003). forces is important, since the system The yearly preparation of national and can only integrate a fraction of those sub-national budgets is one major Second Trend: Inclusion excluded from power. occasion for observing the negotia- vs. Exclusion, Two forces tion process between centre and According to Dudoignon at the heart of the political system regional actors. The system of gov- (2004:123), «During the past six ernment financial management, inter- The war in Tajikistan has allowed a years, the higher personnel of governmental distribution of revenue change of elites at the top of the former oppositional forces of the and capital spending still follows a state. These groups making the best Perestroika and civil war periods - highly bureaucratic but often unclear use of networks of patronage have the Nahzat and the Democratic Par- Soviet-era model. Intergovernmen- tried to monopolize political and eco- ty of Tajikistan - have been partly tal transfers are organised according nomical power. Thanks to alliances in integrated into the state structures, to a combination of differential tax- constant movement, this ruling elite whether political or economic. As to sharing rates and general fiscal-gap has so far been able to marginalize the newly founded parties (the So- closing grants (Davis, Dunn and Na- the most dynamic and creative po- cialist Party and the Social-Democratic zirova, 2003). If on one hand the Party), they appeared until these system is undesirable from the per- 5 Even though the Kuliabi elite has made sure very last months as mere think-tanks spective of efficient and equitable that key enteprises in the South of the country or reservoirs of young politicians for would fall under their control (Seifert, 2002). public financial management (Davis, the PDP and the government, with Dunn and Nazirova, 2003), on the 6 Maintaining power and cumulating economic a status analogous to that of the resources seem still to be the main goals of the other hand the system allows for a Komsomol (Communist Youth) for elites in place. The groups controlling the state large space for political bargaining. the former Communist Party». institutions seem still to function without long- The lack of transparency of the sys- term perspectives, tactically reshaping allianc- The success of the «integration tac- es whenever needed, making best use of the vocabulary of democracy (and anti-terror war) to extract as many resources as possible from the international organisations. 156 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

tic» is dependant probably on two pression, though more should be done of the political system on the basis of main factors. Firstly, the existing po- in order to systematically map and the example of «decentralisation»8. litical forces have been a relay for assess them. Since mid- 2002 the Tajik Government specific group interests (the IRP for has been speaking openly about «de- In summary, Sughd, the Uzbek com- the Tajik «Highlanders») or an «instru- centralisation», a topic previously a munities and the entrepreneurs’ net- ment for personal promotion of a political taboo since it would put in works seem to be the most vocal leader or a limited group of people groups in terms of demanding eco- question the vision of a unitary state inside the state apparatus» (Dudoi- nomic and political reform of the re- with one language. Responding to pres- gnon, 2004). As a consequence, lations between the state and the sure from the international organisations none of the existing political forces regions (at least ). Accord- (in this case the World Bank, UNDP has been able to federate the de- ing to Dudoignon (2004:159) «an- and USAID), Tajik authorities even mands coming from the different other key aspect of demanded re- launched several initiatives related to groups and sectors of society. Sec- forms concerns sub-district local com- the relations between central govern- ondly, the traumatic experience of the munities, jamoats and mahallas, ment and regions. However these civil war combined with the exclusion both institutions with a strong past, a could be characterised as follows: from political life at the national level decisive economic and social role, There is no overall steering / has produced disenchantment and a 7 but no political status of their own». coordinating body of the ex- large disaffection from politics. After isting processes the civil war, the demands for access In any case the «fragmentation» and to economic resources, for increased «de-politization» of demands has The initiatives are centralized political participation and representa- contributed to the success of the in the Executive Office of the tion seem not to have been system- ruling elite’s tactics of exclusion and President though there is atically expressed in a political way. compensatory integration of specif- some openness to accept In the present situation, marked by ic opposition forces. external actors in the discus- an overwhelming domination of Pres- sion (international organisa- ident Rahmonov’s Popular-Democratic A practical example: tions and partly-political par- Party (PDP) and his clique, where the The Case of «Decentralisation» ties) executive controls the legislative and I would like now to illustrate some of There is no overall agreed the judiciary powers, the possibilities the traits characterizing the functioning vision of reform of the state for an open political discussion on the structure redistribution of power are clearly lim- ited. One hypothesis could be that in Communication and co-ordi- 7 At the same time, the government’s ideology such a situation political demands are nation among the govern- of Tajikistan as a unitary state with one language expressed through economic chan- and no role for autonomous entities or national ment initiatives and among nels. The research carried out by Du- minorities will not be a factor facilitating the international support is often doignon (2003) on political culture in expression of such demands. problematic. Tajikistan casts some light on these 8 These reflections are based on the author’s The processes within the demands and their channels of ex- observations carried out as project director for a project funded by the Swiss Ministry of For- eign Affairs aimed at proposing a platform at national level for informal political discussion on the topic of «regionalism» and «centre-regions relations»...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: CONTRADICTORY ...... FORCES AT THE HEART OF THE TAJIK POLITICAL SYSTEM. 157

groups mandated by the gov- wards the international community. a structural reform of the present ernment are of juridical / ad- According to Dudoignon (2003, 27): political system would currently be ministrative nature. This is not «The redundant character of that unacceptable to the ruling groups. a major surprise given the offer, the dispersion of resources, The present system, where the cen- nature of power and govern- the lack of coordination, the lack of tre controls inter alia the appointments ment in Tajikistan. The central knowledge of the institutional frame- of the heads of the executive (and power’s internal struggles for work in Tajikistan, the weakness of legislative) down to the district, al- the reinforcement of the these foreign organizations’ local lows the team around the President President’s position, com- partners, whether governmental or to use these appointments as a bined with the secondary role non-governmental, have complicat- means to reward its own supporters of the parliament and of the ed local perceptions of foreign assis- or as a channel to integrate opposi- political parties, a lack of con- tance, whence they were permit- tion forces into the system. In this sultation culture etc., all con- ting the most conservative segments context, the state structures are thus tributes to the predominance of the state apparatus and econom- an instrument in the hands of the rul- of the top-down, technical ic system to elaborate means of re- ing groups for consolidating their net- and juridical perspective. sistance to change, allowing numer- work of alliances and allegiances and ous members of this new nomencla- «regionalism» becomes a rational and Following the June 22 2003 consti- tura to use these new incoming re- appropriate mode of functioning that tutional referendum a new modifica- sources for building fortunes - some- allows groups and individuals to ac- tion of the constitution is unlikely to times considerable.9» cess resources (political and econom- happen in the coming years, so de- ical). In this sense, it is not surprising spite the openness of the govern- Also in the case of the recent «de- that the research conducted by the ment to initiate reform initiatives con- centralisation» initiatives, the Tajik project indicates important support cerning «decentralisation», these aim officials have until now shown a cos- for this social and political phenome- chiefly at increasing the efficiency of metic commitment to norms enunci- non (Olimova, 2004). the existing system without question- ated by international agencies, cou- ing the control of the centre on the pled with a total lack of political will different layers of government. for change (Dudoignon, 2004:138). Conclusion: The limits of the system The Tajik authorities have been very In a context where the process of proficient in negotiating the non-co- political consolidation is far from com- Following the signature of the peace ordinated and often redundant offer plete and a high level of uncertainty agreement and taking advantage of of technical assistance by the inter- permeates life in Tajikistan, allowing a period of «stabilisation», the groups national organisations (Dudoignon that came into power with the civil 2004:136). Having as a reference war are reinforcing their position and 9 Anvar KAMOLOV [pseud.], «Inostrannaia the experience of managing the de- pomoshch’: pliusy i minusy [Foreign Assistance: centralizing the real decision-making mands of Moscow during the Soviet Pluses and Minuses],» Asia Plus (2003/2/6): 5; power in the hands of the Presiden- era, the Tajik authorities have devel- the author, an economist, is a high ranking offi- tial administration. With the end of oped an attitude of ambivalence to- cial who regularly writes, under pseudonyms, the armed conflict and thanks to in- on the economic situation of Tajikistan in the local press. We unfortunately did not manage to identify this interesting figure during our stay in Tajikistan. 158 TAJIKISTAN...... AT A CROSSROAD: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION ......

creased international support, the tary or political base but that were es and re-distributing resources. In central government has put more useful as a pool for political person- this perspective and with the present and more effort into trying to be- nel for the state apparatus. political personnel, a strong and cen- come less «virtual», consolidating the tralised control at the level of the However, in cases where the inte- state at central level and striving for Presidency seems the (only) strate- gration tactic cannot be applied, it a better control over its structures gy adopted by the ruling groups to seems that the government (at least at all levels. ensure the reproduction of their pow- at central level) has no other alterna- er. In my view this situation is not If during this period the combined tive methods of dealing with the likely to change significantly in the effect of the above-mentioned eventual pressure put on it by a next five years. trends and forces (centralisation vs. structured opposition (or does not decentralisation and inclusion vs. ex- have enough incentives to use such All these factors seem to corrobo- clusion) has allowed the Popular Dem- alternative methods). This situation rate the hypothesis of a semi-institu- ocratic Party (PDP) to establish its would be likely to provoke a violent tionalisation of power struggles domination, it is unclear what capac- response from the regime. among different individuals and / or ity the current regime has to contin- interest groups (Akiner, 2001: 88). In any case, the control of the state ue with the tactic of integrating some This would produce constant trials of remains at the centre of the inter- opposition forces in compensation for strength among groups with integra- ests of the current ruling elites and the exclusion from power of the tion as the main tool to manage such their supporting (regional) networks. majority of the population. crisis and a violent response for those On the one hand the state is the key situations where demands cannot be The increasing distance between the to the exercise of legitimate author- integrated without a structural change government and the population10 ity, the centre of the legitimate po- of the system. seems to contribute to the develop- litical space and, as in other Central ment of opposition forces that can- Asian countries, is the motor of na- not be easily integrated into the cur- tional construction (Petric, 2002: References rent system (see for example the 235). On the other hand, controlled ABDULLAEV, Kamol (2003), Current Hiz-ut-Tahrir11). The development of by specific groups operating with a Local Government Policy Situation in such forces would push the regime’s network-based, patron-client rational- Tajikistan, unpublished document. tactic of integration to its limits. ity, the state and its institutions (at all levels) become tools for managing ABDULLAEV, Kamol and FREIZER The regime has no interest in reform- alliances, integrating opposition forc- Sabine (2002), What Peace Five ing the current system and balance Years After the Signing of the Tajik of power. In the past12, it has shown Peace Agreement? DFID, London. capacity to use dialogue as a politi- 10 Including the incapacity of the government to cal means to solve disputes, though respond to the demands of the population for a AKINER, Shirin (2001), Tajikistan more evenly distributed economic development it has bargained power-sharing Disintegration or Reconciliation? Roy- or for social justice. agreements with an opposition that al Institute of International Affairs, had access to military forces or has 11 Even though this party seems to have be- London. come the main relay for demands from the Uzbek integrated small parties with no mili- communities AVEZOV, Aziz (2004), Economic

12 Especially up to the 2000 parliamentary elec- tions, a moment that marked the formal conclu- sion of the peace process...... TAJIKISTAN AT A CROSSROAD: CONTRADICTORY ...... FORCES AT THE HEART OF THE TAJIK POLITICAL SYSTEM. 159

Aspects of the Interrelation be- Republic of Tajikistan, report prepared OLIMOVA, Saodat (2004), Per- tween Centre and Regions in Tajiki- by the Urban Institute for USAID, ceptions of Regionalism in Tajiki- stan, Geneva, CIMERA, Situation Dushanbe. stan, Geneva, CIMERA, Situation Report 4. Report 4. DOBRY, Michel (1986), Sociologie BANEGAS, Richard (2001), «Les des crises politiques. La dynamique PETRIC Boris - Mathieu (2002), transitions democratiques: mobilisa- des crises multisectorielles, Paris, Pouvoir, don et reseaux en tions collectives et fluidite politique», Presses de la FNSP. Ouzbekistan post-sovietique, Par- in Cultures et Conflits, 12, automne is, PUF. DUDOIGNON, Stephane (2004), An 2001. Iranian Syndrome? Some Paradigms SEIFERT Arne Clemens (2002), Risik- DAVIS Marilynne, DUNN Johnatan, of Political Thought and Practices in en der Transformation in Zentralasien, NAZIROVA Khursheda (2003), As- Tajikistan, Geneva, CIMERA, Situa- der Beispiel Tadschikistan, Hamburg, sessment of Intergovernmental Re- tion Report 4. Deutsches Orient-Institut, Mitteilun- lations and Local Governance in the gen, Band 64. 160 ...... 161

ABOUT CIMERA

CIMERA is a private, non-profit organisa- We promote participatory gover- tion that conducts research, provides ad- nance and political dialogue to pre- vice and implements projects in the fields vent conflict and heighten awareness of media, governance and education. CI- about the importance of active citi- MERA works in «regions in transition» such zenship; as the Caucasus, Central Asia and the We conduct collaborative research Balkans where civil wars and ethnic con- and in-depth analysis on the rapid flicts have aggravated the difficulties in- and complex socio-political changes herent in social and economic change. We that societies in transition face. categorise our work under the conceptu- al umbrella of governance, based on the CIMERA’s interdisciplinary team of pro- premise that the access to and the qual- fessionals includes journalists, political and ity of public information and debate is a social scientists, psychologists, linguists precondition for more effective public and experts on international relations. policies and for a peaceful society. They organise conferences and vocational We implement media programs and training, conduct research and evalua- offer vocational training to journal- tions, support the organisational devel- ists in order to support access to opment of associations and educational public information and debate institutions, lecture and advise others on through the media; our areas of expertise. Through our pub- We engage in policy research and lications series, we wish to contribute in conduct programs to strengthen ed- the East as well as in the West, to the on- ucations systems to deal with con- going reflection and debate about the flict and social change; future of countries of transition.

For more information: www.cimera.org 162 ......

...... cimera www.cimera.org

Rue de l’Athenee 28, P.O.Box 474 CH-1211 Geneva 12, Switzerland Tel. + 4122 347 52 06 Fax + 4122 830 18 41 [email protected]

Eidg. Departement fur auswartige Angelegenheiten - Politische Abteilung IV Departement federal des affaires etrangeres - Division Politique IV Dipartimento federale degli affari esteri - Divisione Politica IV Department of Foreign Affairs - Political Affairs Division IV

Luigi De Martino is a cultural anthropologist and is currently responsible for a CIMERA project supporting the dialogue in Tajikistan on the relation between the central government and regions. He has worked as a Programme Coordinator in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) and Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) for the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, a nd as a Programme Officer in the United Nations Development Programme in Tajikistan. As consultant, he has conducted evaluations and research mandates for CIMERA and other organizations such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva.

ISBN: 2-9700358-9-8