DOCSLIB.ORG

Liberalization of the Capital Market in Russia

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Liberalization of the Capital Market in Russia University of Denver Digital Commons @ DU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 1-1-2008 Liberalization of the Capital Market in Russia Nejc Smole University of Denver Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd Part of the Economic History Commons Recommended Citation Smole, Nejc, "Liberalization of the Capital Market in Russia" (2008). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 613. https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/613 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. Liberalization of the Capital Market in Russia __________ A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of Social Sciences University of Denver __________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts __________ by Nejc Smole November 2008 Advisor: Dr. Tracy Mott Author: Nejc Smole Title: Liberalization of the Capital Market in Russia Advisor: Dr. Tracy Mott Degree Date: November 2008 Abstract This paper analyzes the empirical events of capital market liberalization in Russia and refers to the procedure of capital market liberalization described in theory as a benchmark to assess the magnitude of events shaping the capital market liberalization in Russia. The reformers of Russian regime change did not take a gradual approach of adjustments toward a successful socioeconomic transition. The state failed to create market-supporting institutions and instead rather proceeded with an ambitious program of synchronized application of policy changes and the economic liberalization. Lack of market-supporting institutions and an underdeveloped legal system in Russia have been the key tools through which politically well-connected managers and politicians themselves seized the opportunity and established ownership of former state-owned enterprises. Russian privatization did not provide efficiency incentives to produce new wealth, rather is has redistributed the already existing wealth through dubious methods. Clearly, the ultimate goal of capital liberalization in Russia was not to disperse ownership of former state-owned enterprises among the people of Russia, but to create a powerful support group that would ensure the second mandate of President Yeltsin’s administration. The class of newborn ‘oligarchs’ in Russia became the ruling minority that was not interested in creating value; rather, they were interested in stealing the value that has already existed. Weak and vaguely defined laws as opposed to explicit legal foundations and the ability to enforce contracts at proper institutions make an enormous difference in development of capital markets. ii Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 2. Liberalization of the Capital Market .......................................................................... 3 3. The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Years of High Inflation ................................ 6 3.1 THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION .................................................................................................. 6 3.2 THE YEARS OF HIGH INFLATION .......................................................................................................... 10 4. Privatization Years ..................................................................................................... 12 4.1 RESTRUCTURING AND EFFICIENCY ...................................................................................................... 12 4.2 PHASE ONE .......................................................................................................................................... 16 4.3 VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION ................................................................................................................... 18 4.4 PHASE TWO ......................................................................................................................................... 21 4.5 THE OUTCOME OF THE RUSSIAN PRIVATIZATION PROCESS ................................................................. 23 5. New Class of Owners in Russia – The Oligarchs ..................................................... 27 5.1 RE-NATIONALIZATION ........................................................................................................................ 27 5.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA ................................................................................................. 30 5.3 ENTRENCHMENT .................................................................................................................................. 36 5.4 AGENCY PROBLEM .............................................................................................................................. 37 5.5 THE ROOT OF PROBLEMS WITH THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA ........................................ 40 5.6 ECONOMIC CRIME ............................................................................................................................... 42 5.7 TRANSPARENCY ISSUES ....................................................................................................................... 44 6. Russian Financial Crisis of 1998 ................................................................................ 50 7. Financial Crisis Revelations ....................................................................................... 57 7.1 LEGISLATIVE ISSUES ............................................................................................................................ 57 7.2 FINANCIAL MARKET ............................................................................................................................ 59 7.3 POLITICIZATION ................................................................................................................................... 60 7.4 INSTITUTIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 61 7.5 PROPERTY RIGHTS ............................................................................................................................... 65 7.5 THINK OUTSIDE THE BOX ..................................................................................................................... 67 8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 69 Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 70 iii Liberalization of the Capital Market in Russia 1. Introduction After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the breeze of fresh start, independence, expansion, creativity, and most importantly - freedom from the state-controlled market operations blew from Western Europe to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Soviet Union. The drive towards economic development and further economic integration has fostered liberalization of the financial markets and market-based reforms in many Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union. Liberalization and market - based reforms in the beginning of the 1990’s created new market opportunities. These reforms permitted fewer controls on credit, interest rates and gave birth to international transactions. The reforms themselves were fostered by the general climate favoring privatization, deregulation and reliance on market mechanisms, the gradual erosion of the effectiveness of and policy support for capital account regulation, and the influence of international financial institutions in promoting greater integration into the global economy and more robust domestic financial systems (BIS, 2004). Liberalization of economic activity in the words of Edgar L. Feige is: “an activity that permits market determined prices to provide the information and incentive signals required to allocate factors, products, and assets to their highest valued uses, including price linkages that permit integration with the world economy”. (Feidge, 3) Liberalization is a precondition for the provision of a smooth transition from state-controlled market operations to market economy. 1 Russia has not achieved macroeconomic stabilization during the process of transition, which is a consequence of inter-connected causes. Most importantly, Russia failed to create a macroeconomic environment with explicit market information signals as well as an environment where contracts concerning private property rights are honored. This paper will analyze the impacts affecting liberalization of capital market in Russia and discuss its discontents. In the example of capital liberalization in Russia, I wish to understand to what extent Russian authorities have carried out the reforms concerning liberalization of the capital market and to find out which factors have been the most influential in the process of determining policies being carried out. 2 2. Liberalization of the Capital Market The Soviet Union through its centrally planned economy prevented financial intermediaries in the country from operating at a level in accordance with their technological potential. The capital and banking system in Russia had to evolve from ‘scratch’, or in other words from what is considered
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Expiry Notice
    Expiry Notice 19 January 2018 London Stock Exchange Derivatives Expiration prices for IOB Derivatives Please find below expiration prices for IOB products expiring in January 2018: Underlying Code Underlying Name Expiration Price AFID AFI DEVELOPMENT PLC 0.1800 ATAD PJSC TATNEFT 58.2800 FIVE X5 RETAIL GROUP NV 39.2400 GAZ GAZPROM NEFT 23.4000 GLTR GLOBALTRANS INVESTMENT PLC 9.9500 HSBK JSC HALYK SAVINGS BANK OF KAZAKHSTAN 12.4000 HYDR PJSC RUSHYDRO 1.3440 KMG JSC KAZMUNAIGAS EXPLORATION PROD 12.9000 LKOD PJSC LUKOIL 67.2000 LSRG LSR GROUP 2.9000 MAIL MAIL.RU GROUP LIMITED 32.0000 MFON MEGAFON 9.2000 MGNT PJSC MAGNIT 26.4000 MHPC MHP SA 12.8000 MDMG MD MEDICAL GROUP INVESTMENTS PLC 10.5000 MMK OJSC MAGNITOGORSK IRON AND STEEL WORKS 10.3000 MNOD MMC NORILSK NICKEL 20.2300 NCSP PJSC NOVOROSSIYSK COMM. SEA PORT 12.9000 NLMK NOVOLIPETSK STEEL 27.4000 NVTK OAO NOVATEK 128.1000 OGZD GAZPROM 5.2300 PLZL POLYUS PJSC 38.7000 RIGD RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 28.7000 RKMD ROSTELEKOM 6.9800 ROSN ROSNEFT OJSC 5.7920 SBER SBERBANK 18.6900 SGGD SURGUTNEFTEGAZ 5.2450 SMSN SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO 1148.0000 SSA SISTEMA JSFC 4.4200 SVST PAO SEVERSTAL 16.8200 TCS TCS GROUP HOLDING 19.3000 TMKS OAO TMK 5.4400 TRCN PJSC TRANSCONTAINER 8.0100 VTBR JSC VTB BANK 1.9370 Underlying code Underlying Name Expiration Price D7LKOD YEAR 17 DIVIDEND LUKOIL FUTURE 3.2643 YEAR 17 DIVIDEND MMC NORILSK NICKEL D7MNOD 1.8622 FUTURE D7OGZD YEAR 17 DIVIDEND GAZPROM FUTURE 0.2679 D7ROSN YEAR 17 DIVIDEND ROSNEFT FUTURE 0.1672 D7SBER YEAR 17 DIVIDEND SBERBANK FUTURE 0.3980 D7SGGD YEAR 17 DIVIDEND SURGUTNEFTEGAZ FUTURE 0.1000 D7VTBR YEAR 17 DIVIDEND VTB BANK FUTURE 0.0414 Members are asked to note that reports showing exercise/assignments should be available by approx.
    [Show full text]
  • The Killing of William Browder
    THE KILLING OF WILLIAM BROWDER THE KILLING OF WILLIAM BROWDER Bill Browder, the fa lse crusader for justice and human rights and the self - styled No. 1 enemy of Vladimir Putin has perpetrated a brazen and dangerous deception upon the Weste rn world. This book traces the anatomy of this deception, unmasking the powerful forces that are pushing the West ern world toward yet another great war with Russia. ALEX KRAINER EQUILIBRIUM MONACO First published in Monaco in 20 17 Copyright © 201 7 by Alex Krainer ISBN 978 - 2 - 9556923 - 2 - 5 Material contained in this book may be reproduced with permission from its author and/or publisher, except for attributed brief quotations Cover page design, content editing a nd copy editing by Alex Krainer. Set in Times New Roman, book title in Imprint MT shadow To the people of Russia and the United States wh o together, hold the keys to the future of humanity. Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppressions of body and mind will vanish like the evil spirits at the dawn of day. Thomas Jefferson Table of Contents 1. Bill Browder and I ................................ ................................ ............... 1 Browder’s 2005 presentation in Monaco ................................ .............. 2 Harvard club presentation in 2010 ................................ ........................ 3 Ru ssophobia and Putin - bashing in the West ................................ ......... 4 Red notice ................................ ................................ ............................ 6 Reading
    [Show full text]
  • Privatization in Russia: Catalyst for the Elite
    PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: CATALYST FOR THE ELITE VIRGINIE COULLOUDON During the fall of 1997, the Russian press exposed a corruption scandal in- volving First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoli Chubais, and several other high- ranking officials of the Russian government.' In a familiar scenario, news organizations run by several bankers involved in the privatization process published compromising material that prompted the dismissal of the politi- 2 cians on bribery charges. The main significance of the so-called "Chubais affair" is not that it pro- vides further evidence of corruption in Russia. Rather, it underscores the im- portance of the scandal's timing in light of the prevailing economic environment and privatization policy. It shows how deliberate this political campaign was in removing a rival on the eve of the privatization of Rosneft, Russia's only remaining state-owned oil and gas company. The history of privatization in Russia is riddled with scandals, revealing the critical nature of the struggle for state funding in Russia today. At stake is influence over defining the rules of the political game. The aim of this article is to demonstrate how privatization in Russia gave birth to an oligarchic re- gime and how, paradoxically, it would eventually destroy that very oligar- chy. This article intends to study how privatization influenced the creation of the present elite structure and how it may further transform Russian decision making in the foreseeable future. Privatization is generally seen as a prerequisite to a market economy, which in turn is considered a sine qua non to establishing a democratic regime. But some Russian analysts and political leaders disagree with this approach.
    [Show full text]
  • Information on IRC – R.O.S.T., the Registrar of the Company and the Acting Ballot Committee of MMC Norilsk Nickel
    Information on IRC – R.O.S.T., the registrar of the Company and the acting Ballot Committee of MMC Norilsk Nickel IRC – R.O.S.T. (former R.O.S.T. Registrar merged with Independent Registrar Company in February 2019) was established in 1996. In 2003–2015, Independent Registrar Company was a member of Computershare Group, a global leader in registrar and transfer agency services. In July 2015, IRC changed its ownership to pass into the control of a group of independent Russian investors. In December 2016, R.O.S.T. Registrar and Independent Registrar Company, both owned by the same group of independent investors, formed IRC – R.O.S.T. Group of Companies. In 2018, Saint Petersburg Central Registrar joined the Group. In February 2019, Independent Registrar Company merged with IRC – R.O.S.T. Ultimate beneficiaries of IRC – R.O.S.T. Group are individuals with a strong background in business management and stock markets. No beneficiary holds a blocking stake in the Group. In accordance with indefinite License No. 045-13976-000001, IRC – R.O.S.T. keeps records of holders of registered securities. Services offered by IRC – R.O.S.T. to its clients include: › Records of shareholders, interestholders, bondholders, holders of mortgage participation certificates, lenders, and joint property owners › Meetings of shareholders, joint owners, lenders, company members, etc. › Electronic voting › Postal and electronic mailing › Corporate consulting › Buyback of securities, including payments for securities repurchased › Proxy solicitation › Call centre services › Depositary and brokerage, including escrow agent services IRC – R.O.S.T. Group invests a lot in development of proprietary high-tech solutions, e.g.
    [Show full text]
  • 2008-062 Russia's Emerging Multinationals
    Working Paper Series #2008-062 RUSSIA’S EMERGING MULTINATIONALS: TRENDS AND ISSUES Sergey Filippov United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands 1 Tel: (31) (43) 388 4400, Fax: (31) (43) 388 4499, e-mail: [email protected], URL: http://www.merit.unu.edu 2 RUSSIA’S EMERGING MULTINATIONALS: TRENDS AND ISSUES Sergey Filippov UNU-MERIT (United Nations University and Maastricht University) Keizer Karelplein 19, Maastricht, 6211TC, The Netherlands Tel: +31 43 3884400, e-mail: [email protected] Abstract: The paper focuses on the emergence of Russia’s multinational companies. It aims to analyse their motives to internationalise as well as the approaches to internationalisation. While relevance of the theoretical perspectives is highlighted, the intention of the paper is to contribute to the understanding of the present-day phenomenon of emerging Russian multinationals; a phenomenon that has been largely overshadowed by the remarkable rise of Chinese and Indian companies. A special attention is devoted to the R&D activities of Russian multinational companies, and access to foreign technology as a driver of corporate restructuring. A discussion of the challenges and opportunities for host countries and policy implications is provided. Keywords: Russia, multinational companies, emerging economies, foreign investment JEL codes: F21, F23, L21, O32 UNU-MERIT Working Papers ISSN 1871-9872 Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology, UNU-MERIT UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research carried out at the Centre to stimulate discussion on the issues raised.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Expansion of Russian Multinationals After the Crisis: Results of 2011
    Global Expansion of Russian Multinationals after the Crisis: Results of 2011 Report dated April 16, 2013 Moscow and New York, April 16, 2013 The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, and the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC), a joint center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University in New York, are releasing the results of their third survey of Russian multinationals today.1 The survey, conducted from November 2012 to February 2013, is part of a long-term study of the global expansion of emerging market non-financial multinational enterprises (MNEs).2 The present report covers the period 2009-2011. Highlights Russia is one of the leading emerging markets in terms of outward foreign direct investments (FDI). Such a position is supported not by several multinational giants but by dozens of Russian MNEs in various industries. Foreign assets of the top 20 Russian non-financial MNEs grew every year covered by this report and reached US$ 111 billion at the end of 2011 (Table 1). Large Russian exporters usually use FDI in support of their foreign activities. As a result, oil and gas and steel companies with considerable exports are among the leading Russian MNEs. However, representatives of other industries also have significant foreign assets. Many companies remained “regional” MNEs. As a result, more than 66% of the ranked companies’ foreign assets were in Europe and Central Asia, with 28% in former republics of the Soviet Union (Annex table 2). Due to the popularity of off-shore jurisdictions to Russian MNEs, some Caribbean islands and Cyprus attracted many Russian subsidiaries with low levels of foreign assets.
    [Show full text]
  • Press Release (PDF)
    MECHEL REPORTS THE FY2020 FINANCIAL RESULTS Consolidated revenue – 265.5 bln rubles (-8% compared to FY 2019) EBITDA* – 41.1 bln rubles (-23% compared to FY 2019) Profit attributable to equity shareholders of Mechel PAO – 808 mln rubles Moscow, Russia – March 11, 2021 – Mechel PAO (MOEX: MTLR, NYSE: MTL), a leading Russian mining and steel group, announces financial results for the FY 2020. Mechel PAO’s Chief Executive Officer Oleg Korzhov commented: “The Group’s consolidated revenue in 2020 totaled 265.5 billion rubles, which is 8% less compared to 2019. EBITDA amounted to 41.1 billion rubles, which is 23% less year-on-year. “The mining division accounted for about 60% of the decrease in revenue. This was due to a significant decrease in coal prices year-on-year. In conditions of coronavirus limitations, many steelmakers around the world cut down on production, which could not fail to affect the demand for metallurgical coals and their price accordingly. By the year’s end the market demonstrated signs of a recovery, but due to China’s restrictions on Australian coal imports, coal prices outside on China remained low under this pressure. High prices in China have supported our mining division’s revenue to a certain extent. In 4Q2020 we increased shipments to China as best we could considering our long-term contractual obligations to partners from other countries. These circumstances became in many ways the reason for a decrease in our consolidated EBITDA. In Mechel’s other divisions EBITDA dynamics were positive year-on-year. “The decrease in the steel division’s revenue was also due to the coronavirus pandemic.
    [Show full text]
  • Cold-Rolled Steel, Russia, Preliminary Decision Memo
    UNITI!C STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE International Trade Administration Washingt:on . D .C . 20230 C-821-823 Investigation POl: 0 1/0 1/2014 - 12/31/2014 Public Document Office Jll, Operations: KJ, SM, EBG December 15, 2015 MEMORANDUM TO: Paul Piquado Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Compliance FROM: Christian Marsh a1v1 Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Operations SUBJECT: Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Affirmative Determination, Preliminary Negative Critical Circumstances Determination, and Alignment of Final Detennination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination: Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Flat Products from the Russian Federation I. SUMMARY The Department of Commerce (the Department) preliminarily determines that countervailable subsidies are being provided to producers and exporters of certain cold-rolled steel flat products (cold-rolled steel) from the Russjan Federation (Russia), as provided in section 703 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act). Additionally, the Department determines that critical circumstances do not exist with regard to cold-rolled steel from Russia, as provided under section 703(e)(l )(A) of the Act. ll. BACKGROUND A. Case History On July, 28, 2015. the Department received countervailing duty (CVD) and antidumping duty (AD) Petitions concerning imports of cold-rolled steel from Russia, fil ed on behalf of the AK Steel Corporation, ArcelorMinal USA EEC, Nucor Corporation, Steel Dynamics, Inc., and United States Steel Corporation (co11ectively, Petitioners).1 On August 17, 201 5, the Department 1 See " Petitions for the Imposition of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties: Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Flat Products from Brazil, the People's Republic of China, India, Japan.
    [Show full text]
  • Contents Efficiency Leadership Understanding Nlmk
    ABOUT US NLMK CONTENTS EFFICIENCY LEADERSHIP UNDERSTANDING NLMK . 2 Report 2014 KEY PERFORMANCE TRENDS . 10 OUR MILESTONES . 16 STRATEGY . 20 STRATEGY IN ACTION . 24 OUR BUSINESS MODEL . 30 INTEGRATED PRODUCTION SYSTEM . 38 WHERE WE OPERATE. 42 PRODUCTS AND USES . 46 RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION . 52 FIVE-YEAR HIGHLIGHTS .. 59 CONTACTS . 60 1 ABOUT US / REPORT 2014 1. UNDERSTANDING NLMK NLMK Group is a leading international manufacturer of high- quality steel products with a vertically integrated business model. Mining and steelmaking are concentrated in cost-efficient regions; finished products are manufactured close to our main consumers in Russia, North America, and the EU. 2 3 UNDERSTANDING NLMK ABOUT US / REPORT 2014 Thanks to our self-sufficiency in key raw materials Having completed the investment phase of its Significant operational gains and conservative and energy, coupled with the technological development, NLMK Group turned its focus to investments have enabled a substantial superiority of our production capacity, NLMK is one increasing the efficiency of its business processes, strengthening of the Company’s financial standing, of the most efficient and profitable steelmakers developing its resource base, strengthening its as well as supporting deleveraging and providing in the world . NLMK has a diversified product mix, positions in strategic markets and enhancing for increased flexibility on dividends . ensuring our leading position in local markets production safety . Structural savings of more and our sales effectiveness . By leveraging our than $500 million in 2013–2014, generated by advantages – our flexible production chain, operational efficiency programmes have increased balanced product mix, efficient sales system, and business profitability . bn widespread customer base – we are able to react $1 .7 quickly to changing market conditions .
    [Show full text]
  • Yakutia) “…The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Is the Largest Region in the Russian Federation and One of the Richest in Natural Resources
    Investor's Guide to the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) “…The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) is the largest region in the Russian Federation and one of the richest in natural resources. Needless to say, the stable and dynamic development of Yakutia is of key importance to both the Far Eastern Federal District and all of Russia…” President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin “One of the fundamental priorities of the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) is to develop comfortable conditions for business and investment activities to ensure dynamic economic growth” Head of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Egor Borisov 2 Contents Welcome from Egor Borisov, Head of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 5 Overview of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 6 Interesting facts about the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 7 Strategic priorities of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) investment policy 8 Seven reasons to start a business in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 10 1. Rich reserves of natural resources 10 2. Significant business development potential for the extraction and processing of mineral and fossil resources 12 3. Unique geographical location 15 4. Stable credit rating 16 5. Convenient conditions for investment activity 18 6. Developed infrastructure for the support of small and medium-sized enterprises 19 7. High level of social and economic development 20 Investment infrastructure 22 Interaction with large businesses 24 Interaction with small and medium-sized enterprises 25 Other organisations and institutions 26 Practical information on doing business in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 27 Public-Private Partnership 29 Information for small and medium-sized enterprises 31 Appendix 1.
    [Show full text]
  • RUSSIA WATCH No.2, August 2000 Graham T
    RUSSIA WATCH No.2, August 2000 Graham T. Allison, Director Editor: Ben Dunlap Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project Production Director: Melissa C..Carr John F. Kennedy School of Government Researcher: Emily Van Buskirk Harvard University Production Assistant: Emily Goodhue SPOTLIGHT ON RUSSIA’S OLIGARCHS On July 28 Russian President Vladimir Putin met with 21 of Russia’s most influ- ential businessmen to “redefine the relationship between the state and big busi- ness.” At that meeting, Putin assured the tycoons that privatization results would remained unchallenged, but stopped far short of offering a general amnesty for crimes committed in that process. He opened the meeting by saying: “I only want to draw your attention straightaway to the fact that you have yourselves formed this very state, to a large extent through political and quasi-political structures under your control.” Putin assured the oligarchs that recent investi- The Kremlin roundtable comes at a crucial time for the oligarchs. In the last gations were not part of a policy of attacking big business, but said he would not try to restrict two months, many of them have found themselves subjects of investigations prosecutors who launch such cases. by the General Prosecutor’s Office, Tax Police, and Federal Security Serv- ice. After years of cozying up to the government, buying up the state’s most valuable resources in noncompetitive bidding, receiving state-guaranteed loans with little accountability, and flouting the country’s tax laws with imp u- nity, the heads of some of Russia’s leading financial-industrial groups have been thrust under the spotlight.
    [Show full text]
  • Holborn Gate Master Fax Template
    **CONFERENCE CALL** MECHEL OAO (NYSE:MTL) Scheduled for: Thursday, December 18, 2008 10:00 AM New York Time 3:00 PM London Time 6:00 PM Moscow Time __________________________________________________________________ You are cordially invited to participate on a conference call with the management of Mechel OAO to discuss our 2008 first half and nine months results. Igor Zyuzin, Chief Executive Officer, will host the call. Please call the number below approximately 10 minutes prior to the scheduled time of the call, quoting Mechel, and the chairperson’s name, Alexander Tolkach. Conference Call Phone Numbers: US: +1 718 354 1158 International: +44 20 7138 0810 Confirmation Code: 8468348 The earnings release will be distributed prior to the conference call. In addition, the conference call will be available live via the Internet. To access the call and associated slides, please visit our website at: http://www.mechel.com/investors/fresults/index.wbp on the day of the call. A replay of the call will be available until 11:59PM New York time on December 24th. To access, please dial, US: +1 718 354 1112; UK: +44 20 7806 1970. From both areas, enter: 8468348# to access. MECHEL 2008 FIRST HALF AND NINE MONTHS RESULTS CONFERENCE CALL TO BE BROADCAST OVER THE INTERNET Moscow, Russia — December 15, 2008 — Mechel OAO (NYSE: MTL) announces that it intends to release its results for the first half ending June 30, 2008, and the nine months ending on September 30, 2008 on Thursday, December 18, 2008. In conjunction with this release, Mechel will host a conference call, which will be simultaneously broadcast live over the Internet.
    [Show full text]