The Changing Faces of Virtue: Plutarch, Machiavelli and Shakespeare’s Coriolanus Patrick Ashby University of Bristol
[email protected] Introduction: The hinges of virtue ‘Let it be virtuous to be obstinate’, says Caius Martius Coriolanus, shortly before the catastrophe of Shakespeare’s tragedy (Coriolanus, 5.3.26).1 In uttering these words, he articulates a moral hypothesis which is of central importance to Coriolanus: the supposition that steadfastness of principle is a fundamental good. This is a theory which the play puts to the test. The idea of ‘virtue’ — in a variety of guises — is a key focus of this essay, which identifies as crucial those moments at which definitions of virtue are unsettled, transformed, or confronted with a range of alternatives. Several commentators have connected Shakespeare’s Coriolanus with the political ideas of Niccolò Machiavelli, the Florentine theorist whose notoriety rests upon his recommendation of moral flexibility for political leaders. For Anne Barton, who reads the play in the context of Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy’s history of early Rome, Coriolanus dramatises the futile persistence of obsolescent virtues (the valorisation of battlefield heroics) in an environment of subtler needs and growing political sophistication.2 In Shakespeare and the Popular Voice, Annabel Patterson hints at Shakespeare’s sympathy with the idea of popular political representation, proposing that ‘there is nothing in the play to challenge that famous interpretation of the tribunate which [. .] Machiavelli made a premise of Renaissance political theory’.3 John Plotz 1 William Shakespeare, Coriolanus, The Norton Shakespeare, ed. by Stephen Greenblatt, Katherine Eisaman Maus, Jean E.