Theft and Loss of Electricity in an Indian State1 Miriam Golden University of California, Los Angeles Princeton University
[email protected] Brian Min University of Michigan
[email protected] April 9, 2012 Version 3.0 Comments welcome. Graphics require printing in color. 1An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2011 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, September 2–5, Seattle and at the 2nd IGC-ISI India Development Pol- icy Conference, December 19–20, 2011, ISI Delhi Center. For research assistance, we thank Julia YuJung Lee. Funding was provided by the International Growth Centre and the Center for Inter- national Business Education and Research at the University of California at Los Angeles. Golden acknowledges the hospitality of the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton Univer- sity. The authors are solely responsible for the views presented here. Abstract Utilizing data from the power corporation of Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, we study the politics of electricity theft over a ten year period (2000–09). Our results show that electricity theft is substantial in magnitude. The extent of theft varies with the electoral cycle of the state. In years when elections to the State Assembly are held, electricity theft is significantly greater than in other years. Theft is increasing with the intensity of tubewells, suggesting that it is linked to unmetered electricity use by farmers. Incumbent legislative members of the state assembly are more likely to be reelected as power theft in their locality increases. Our interpretation of these various results is that power theft exhibits characteristics consistent with the political capture of public service delivery by local elites.