JULY-AUGUST 1972

AIR U N I VE R S I T Y

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNALreview OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

T he Obligation To Ser ve...... 2 Dr. Curtis W. Tarr Rapping with Ch a ppie...... 12 Brig. Gen. Daniel James, Jr., USAF T he Oppo sit e Number...... 22 Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret) Winners and Losers: A Conceptual Barrier in Our Strategic Thinking . . 33 Dr. Ralph E. Strauch Quo Vadis?—The Nixon Doctrine and Air Power...... 45 Col. Robert L. Gleason, USAF Military Affairs Abroad T he Latin American Mil it a r y : P ositive Roles...... 57 Maj. Michael A. Nelson, USAF Air Force Review USAF Area Specia l ist Program...... 65 Maj. James S. Austin, Jr., USAF Maj. Jimmy Mitchell, USAF In My Opinion W ho’s Listening? W ho’s Talking? ...... 72 Col. William R. Edgar, USAF M il it a r y Principles and Flexibilities: A R esponsive Policy for Change . 76 Lt. Col. Russell A. Turner II, USAF Books and Ideas T he Technological War...... 81 Col. Francis X. Kane, USAF (Ret) T he Contributors...... ' ...... 87

the cover Address manuscript* to Editor, Air University In recent years the world has seen much question* Review Division. Bldg 1211, Maxwell AFB, AL ing, challenging, and overthrowing of traditional 36112. Printed by Government Printing Office. authority. In this issue. Dr. Curtis W. Tarr Address subscription* to Superintendent of replies to five questions frequently asked him Documents, GPO, Washington DC 20402: yearly by young people; Brigadier General Daniel S4-50 domestic, 15.75 foreign; single copy 75<. ("Chappie") James, Jr., fielding questions at Air Command and Staff College, considers chal­ lenges from within and outside the military; and Major General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret), tell* of insurgents and how to counter them. Vol. XXIII No. 5 JULTAUCUST 1972 Our cover reflects one aspect of the challenge. k

THE OBLIGATION TO SERVE

Dr . C urtis W. T arr Ed

POPULAR ballad promises us that “the times they are a-changin’.” All of us who work with young people today realize that to a large extent this younger generation, to recall a phrase from Thoreau, oftenA hears and steps to the beat of a different drummer. Old reasons no longer justify traditional action. Young people want us to think anew before we act as of old. For that reason, their questions serve to provoke us to do the mental exercise we should have gone through long ago. Many officers and noncommissioned officers, forced to do this thinking, have found that they arrive at a new rationale to support what needs doing. At other times they have learned that tradition no longer can be justified. This experience suggests a change that benefits all of us, young and old alike. During my two years as Director of Selective Serv ice, I have met with young people all over the world, on campuses and in communities as well as on military posts, at sea, and in combat areas. I have been stimulated by their thoughtful questions. I have also learned that a careful answer may not satisfy their own mental reservations, but it will convince them that I am willing to reason with them, something they expect few of my age to do. Five questions have come up repeatedly in The other view about the prospect of peace our conversations. My experience is that young is more cynical. But we should disarm any­ Americans, whether they be in the service or way, some youth assert. If the world is moving in civilian life, all have some of the same toward nuclear suicide, then at least we should doubts; they puzzle over many of the same not contribute to it. issues. Sharing these questions and my replies To answer these pleas for disarmament, with men and women of the Air Force who let us first consider our relations with the work with youth may prompt other original Soviet Union, the world’s other superpower. thoughts that will be helpful in setting aside Our present difficulties with the Soviet Union the anxieties of rapidly changing times. are rooted in the last days of World War II, when Soviet satellite nations were established in Poland and Romania, contrary to the Why do we need armed forces? Yalta agreements, and a puppet state was How well I remember the bright young girl created in East Germany in violation of the who asked this question. She was one of three Potsdam declarations.1 We have been suspi­ hundred youth who came to our building in cious of the U.S.S.R. ever since. Winston Washington to protest a continuing war. Churchill spoke for many when, in 1949, I shall not forget the idealism she expressed he judged that only the possession of the fully in her face or the sincerity with which atomic bomb by the United States prevented she talked. a Red Army sweep to the English Channel. It is not sufficient for us to say that men It is evident to me that since 1945 the have always fought wars. The weapons of United States has impressed the Soviets best terror created in this century and the manner when we had ready a force to direct against in which rockets and jet planes have com­ them. For example, the Truman Doctrine in pressed distances make war all the less toler­ 1947 provided military and economic assist­ able. We must look more deeply for a reason ance to Greece and thereby thwarted a Soviet- to maintain armed might than merely to rely inspired coup. The Berlin Airlift in the follow­ on the traditions of the past. ing year brought relief to that beleaguered Young people offer two views on this sub­ city, persuading the Soviets to lift the blockade ject. First, they argue that the people of the many months later. Blunt force and the threat world are rapidly learning to live in peace. of nuclear war caused the Soviets to withdraw The only real necessity, they allege, is for the their nuclear missiles from Cuba in the fall United States forthrightly to disarm, since it of 1962. is our nation that has generated most of the Conversely, the absence of force has invited hostility anyway. They cite as evidences of Soviet domination. The U.S.S.R. moved progress the Berlin agreement of last year, the swiftly in Eastern Europe after World War continuing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, II, following the rapid demobilization of our the nuclear test-ban treaty of the Kennedy military forces. In 1948 the Soviets inspired years, or perhaps President Nixon’s recent a coup in Czechoslovakia that prevented fur­ trip to China. We have made encouraging ther expressions of freedom there. Even more strides, these young people claim. Have we militant was the suppression of Hungary in not practically reached the day when men can 1956, after that nation gave evidence of set war aside? seeking independence from the Soviet Union 3 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW and the Eastern European bloc of nations. the Chinese Communists seem willing to join In August of 1968, several hundred thousand the world community, but with the under­ Soviet troops, together with the armored standing that they help shape that community, columns of the Red Army, moved into create its rules, and establish its new relation­ Czechoslovakia, again to suppress the desire ships. Obviously the new world they are will­ for freedom from Soviet domination. ing to create would encourage their growing Apparently, the Soviet leaders fear the influence.3 Whether it will be shaped to our prospect of losing control over the people of advantage as well depends upon the degree the Soviet Union.2 This control rests upon to which we are strong enough to assert the proposition that Communism, led by the ourselves. Soviets, inevitably will control the future of The Chinese Communists in the past have men everywhere. If that proposition proves provoked conflict among their rivals, thus to be a myth in the months and years ahead, frustrating coalitions that might be formed then absolute control over the U.S.S.R. may against them. They haye played upon internal become impossible. Only expanding Soviet strife, upon the tensions that develop among domination will confirm the philosophy of the races, political groups, economic factions. To Kremlin’s leaders. do so, they have trained guerrilla cadres for Against this background, it appears to me use wherever opportunity presented the chance that progress toward stable relations with the to strike. These efforts seek out places of weak­ Soviet Union will come only when we and ness rather than strength. They have been our Western allies negotiate from a position antagonistic to our national aspirations in the of reasonable strength. We want very much past, and they may be so in the years ahead. to negotiate, to work toward political arrange­ That will depend upon our continuing nego­ ments that will encourage peace, but we must tiations that now, thankfully, have begun. be realistic enough to seek to do this in Have we not practically reached the day the climate that best will insure success. when men can set war aside? Hopefully, we Coexistence should not require a continuing are making progress toward peace, toward reduction of American opportunities and the compromises that all nations must make encourage a world environment in which our to insure it. But we have a long distance yet domestic idealism cannot survive. to travel. Furthermore, it seems evident that Let us consider China, also. The leaders our differences with the Soviet Union and the in the People’s Republic of China assume that People’s Republic of China are so funda­ the stronger nations are becoming weaker and mental that we cannot expect rapid recon­ the weaker ones are gaining strength. This ciliation. We must prepare for long years of process, of course, was somewhat inevitable the tension of coexistence, as time overcomes following World War II when our nation the sharp differences that separate the great emerged with such vast strength and resources nations. I see no evidence that a disarmed from victory and our allies, who shared in United States would encourage a just peace. the triumph, faced in common with our There is considerable reason to believe that enemies the massive job of rebuilding torn and force helps to preserve peace, even though it twisted nations. Relatively, our strength could comes as an uneasy blessing in today’s world. only decline. But the Mainland Chinese see themselves as one of the weaker countries beginning to gain strength to match their Does armed strength invite more mistakes population numbers. They seek to lead the like Vietnam? smaller nations of the third world. In so doing One morning a bright, restless fellow from THE OBLIGATION TO SERVE 5 an eastern state college came to my office is confirmed by those who carry it out. People with some friends to talk about the war. After consent to the commands of their leader for we had considered many topics, he bluntly numerous reasons. Doing what he orders may asked me this question: “Does armed strength make a person feel better, or more righteous, invite more mistakes like Vietnam?” or more law-abiding. Others may do so to As he did so, I remembered what a favorite follow tradition. Some fear the penalty of undergraduate professor of mine had told me disobedience that may involve loss of freedom and my fellow students in the last lecture of or even cause one’s death. Many persoas would the term: “Anger is obsolete.” What a percep­ not invite the enmity of those who disapprove tive insight that is! It was worth the entire of a refusal to follow orders. Most people term to have that benediction to our work. probably obey because they realize that the Anger has no place in the relationships among state cannot exist unless they accept reason­ civilized men, even though we often fall short able commands, or else they are indifferent of appropriate conduct. But if it is true among to them and obey out of habit. men, why is it not true that nations should Yet, whenever a person finds that the avoid anger as well, particularly a national reasons for consenting to an order are not anger expressed in war? We cannot dodge sufficient to compel him to do so, the refusal from such a question. of that person to comply undermines the We should turn to force only as a last authority of the leader. The more often that resort. But there are some evils that to me are authority suffers by disobedience, the less in­ worse than the evil of war itself. As a final fluential will be the traditions, the public pres­ measure, I would agree to the use of force sures, the power of fear, and all other factors in some circumstances to preserve life, to that augment the willingness to consent.4 insure the chance for freedom, to advance Let me offer an example. Suppose one the quest for equality, to guarantee the oppor­ morning I arrived at our building in down­ tunity to seek truth, and to establish and town Washington and asked one of the young maintain the right to believe. These are old fellows there to jog out to my home four ideas, I know, but they are still vital today. We miles distant to pick up a briefcase that I had cannot always avoid armed conflict. forgotten. If the man’s response to the order Vietnam presents a special case. A decade were repeatable, he probably would mutter or so ago, there were many discussions about something like, “You must be kidding!” the power of the President. Most of the books Rather quickly the story would circulate on the subject emphasized that the President throughout the building, making it somewhat had gained so much authority that the other less likely that the next person would agree two branches of government had become to a ridiculous order from the Director. inferior and effete. A similar renunciation has grown among Deriving from this attitude, a heavy reliance the American people regarding the war in on Presidential prerogative invited the tragedy Vietnam. By 1968, American citizens had of Vietnam. Too few leaders actually under­ begun to withdraw their consent to the mili­ stand what authority is. Does it come from tary campaign in Southeast Asia. The Presi­ God? Is it bestowed by elections? Can it be dent had committed us to a course of action granted by the Constitution, the Congress, that the people would not support without the courts, our laws? deep reservations and questions. Many Ameri­ Actually, authority comes to the leader cans simply refused to obey orders or laws that from those who consent to do what he asks. assisted the war effort. Ever)' time he gives an order, his authority An American President must maintain the 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW consent of the people for waging war by two entirely upon enlistees to support our armed means. First, he must be certain that there is forces until after World War II. Obviously, overwhelming support for entry into war and we cannot rely too heavily on this precedent, the continuation of it. The nation faced diffi­ since ocean barriers that isolated us until the culty both in 1812 and in the Mexican War twentieth century do little now to deter because of marginal public support. Second, missiles, planes, or ships. Furthermore, the the President must make certain that the role of our nation has changed remarkably people understand the war aims of the nation. since the nineteenth century. But most of us This was the problem of our Vietnam involve­ would agree that in a free society we should ment: a relatively minor commitment grew rely on voluntary service rather than conscrip­ into a major one without the American people tion whenever it is possible to do so. understanding clearly what the President in­ Political leaders in this country have talked tended to accomplish. Accordingly we have about the all-volunteer force for many years. faced serious difficulties as we attempt to with­ To study that possibility, President Nixon draw our forces and still carry out the obliga­ appointed a commission of distinguished tions we made with our military commitment. Americans in 1969, asking former Secretary One lesson from the Vietnam involvement of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., to be the seems quite clear to me. Presidential preroga­ chairman. After a year of intensive study, the tive is limited by the willingness of the people commission submitted its report, which recom­ to consent to the President’s actions and sup­ mended that a force of 2.5 million men could port them, and that essential support can be be maintained on a voluntary basis with a gained only by a clear enunciation of the goals yearly budget increase of $3.2 billion for the nation seeks in the use of force. salaries and benefits. Members of the com­ We will avoid a Vietnam situation in the mission declared that the reserve forces should future by skillful use of the machinery of be able to maintain desired strength through government as it should be used, not by uni­ voluntary arrangements, that civilian control lateral disarmament. The President must have of the military forces would not be reduced the opportunity for initiative, but it is quite by dependence upon volunteers, and that the clear that Congress and the courts must retain men entering the forces would not differ their independence of action. Together the racially or in personal qualifications simply branches of the government can gauge the because they were volunteers attracted by will of the people, help to direct it, and seek somewhat higher monetary rewards.5 to maintain support for national programs. In September 1971, the Congress passed legislation authorizing a yearly increase in pay Why can’t we have an all-volunteer force now? and benefits of $2.4 billion. When the Presi­ Shortly after I became Director of Selective dent signed this bill, he promised that he Service, I went to Indianapolis to talk with would work toward the establishment of an 700 high school youth. I met four groups, all-volunteer force by 1 July 1973. Since then, offering the students a chance to ask questions. the armed services have been working hard The first question in each assembly was, “Why to achieve that goal. don’t we rely on volunteers?” My response in But tough problems deter rapid progress. turn was to ask these young people how many For example, the reserve and National Guard would volunteer if we had no draft. Not one forces presently need 50,000 men to reach raised his hand. their authorized strengths. While some of the History seems to justify our use of volun­ states report gains, reserve leaders elsewhere teers. Except during time of war, we relied face rather discouraging prospects. Nor are THE OBLIGATION TO SERVE 7 the active forces immune from difficulty. In This is not an argument against the feasi­ January and February of this year, all of the bility of the all-volunteer force. It is merely forces together enlisted 6500 fewer men than an explanation of the difficulty we are en­ they did in those two months of 1971. The countering to establish that concept. Recruiters Navy missed its recruitment goal for six must be reoriented to look for young men months during late 1971 and early 1972. The with high mental qualifications. They must numbers of true volunteers, who enlist without not depend heavily on minority persons to concern for the draft, have not increased fill quotas. Society must encourage our youth greatly despite the considerable pay increases to serve in the armed forces. The military offered. services must be reorganized so that they Furthermore, it appears that blacks are utilize young men more effectively. All of entering the armed forces in greater numbers these difficult tasks must be accomplished to under voluntary arrangements. A year or so some degree at least before we will attain the ago, we relied no more heavily on blacks for President’s goal. our military forces than the black percentage If the all-volunteer force is to represent a of the youth population. Now the number of cross-section of American youth, then approxi­ true volunteers among blacks seems to be mately one out of three high school graduates about one-third higher than the population and college students who are qualified must share, an indication of the lack of oppor­ enlist. Young men can judge how quickly we tunities available to blacks in the job market. will attain the force we need by measuring Additionally, I believe we are relying more their own commitments to serve in the armed heavily on Spanish-speaking youth as well. forces. If a young man favors the adoption In other words, the all-volunteer force may of an all-volunteer force so that he may avoid be considerably more dependent on racial the burden of service, then he seeks an unfair minorities than was the drafted force unless advantage. we can take corrective action to prevent this. Most of us, I suspect, have more confidence that equity prevails in our society if our Why do / owe the government anything? armed forces represent a cross-section of the An Ivy League fellow at a fire base in Vietnam population. asked me this question. He was acute and Finally, the average mental capability of direct. He had that interesting quality of try­ enlistees has been lower than that of a force ing to shock listeners into a response that that includes inductees. Perhaps some of this otherwise they would not make. decline can be offset by improved training, He continued, “If this is a free country, better use of the men in higher mental cate­ why can’t I be free, do my thing, obey the gories, and a reorganization of jobs to make laws I want?” My guess is that he would have possible the accomplishment of technical work been happier if I had depended upon an with less able people. But ultimately we must emotional response rather than a reasoned one. rely on increasingly complex technology in However, his question helped me recall national defense, since it is only be doing so my reading about the social contract, which that we can utilize our national superiority I had first done as an undergraduate. I re­ in time of war. If we cannot recruit young membered the divine right of kings, a system men capable of using and maintaining highly under which the king spoke for God, and sophisticated weapon systems, then we will subjects thus were both morally and politically lose the option of using the most highly effi­ bound to obey. If the king ordered, subjects cient deterrent forces available to the nation. responded: the state had the power to insure 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW compliance. But eventually some bolder Although the idea of the social contract spokesmen for the people argued that the had considerable influence upon our found­ king sometimes spoke imperfectly for God. ing fathers, it is evident that the theory had Clearly there was a necessity for curbs on obvious limitations. Man was never free in an unjust king, particularly following oppres­ nature; societies, even in primitive surround­ sion such as that in the Massacre of Saint ings, have always existed. And, as David Bartholomew in 1572. Hume pointed out, examples when consent Accordingly, the concept evolved of re­ was given have been few and isolated.® straint imposed by natural and historic rights. Nevertheless, we can hardly discard the con­ During the English Civil War, rebels justified cept of service to the state that was part of their conduct because the king had broken the social contract simply because we reject his contract with the people that rested on as defective the mechanism by which Locke these rights. and Rousseau argued that man figuratively Philosophers had to grapple with both the associated himself to a political society. confusion and turmoil of a civil war, when The Utilitarians also agreed that man had people resisted the king’s prerogative, and the duties to society, even though they argued for necessity to contribute to the purposes of the strict curbs on the state. John Stuart Mill state so that it might survive. Thomas Hobbes proposed that the individual’s freedom of argued for the absolute state on the ground action should be nearly absolute, limited only that order was the highest good that man by the compulsion necessary to insure the could achieve. The way in which a man finds security of others. Yet he admitted specifically order is to give up his rights from the state that the state can require one to give evidence of nature in exchange for the security of a in a court of justice, bear a fair share of the government ruled absolutely by the king ex­ common defense, undertake a reasonable part pressing his will. This would eliminate civil of the work necessary to the interests of society, strife, insuring order through compliance of and perform individual acts such as saving a every man to the will of the state as set forth person’s life or protecting another from by the king.6 attack.10 Thus again we detect the underlying John Locke favored the rebels in the English theme that government may require each of Civil War, and consequently he sought to us to serve in some ways in order that society answer Hobbes with a justification for curbs will be preserved. on the power of the government. Locke argued I find similar logic in some contemporary that the state must be limited by the laws of thought. As an example, the theory of fairness nature, since the only necessity for the state argues that it is unfair for one to accept the was to interpret the law of nature that pro­ benefits of a society and not to assume its tected life, liberty, and property. If the agents burdens as well.11 of the state went beyond the law of nature, I recognize that many young people have they must be resisted.7 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, read a great deal about civil disobedience and in a similar justification for the social contract, are persuaded by the necessity for it. We recall saw that freedom could best be preserved if how Antigone defied Creon in order to bury men obeyed laws established by the general the body of her brother Polynices, protesting will.8 Yet, despite limitations that social con­ that Creon had defied the overriding laws of tract proponents placed upon the power of the gods.12 Thoreau spent a night in the the state, they admitted that men must agree Concord jail for refusing to pay taxes to a to serve the state or else law and justice are government that tolerated slavery and waged not attainable. a war with Mexico. Later, he stated defiantly THE OBLIGATION TO SERVE 9 that we should be men first and subjects after.13 a Swiss requirement. The concept never won Martin Luther King, Jr., in our time, acceptance in our Congress, partly because it insisted that we must refuse to obey unjust became apparent that more young men were laws. He said with poetic conviction that the available than we required for defense of “time always is ripe to do right . . . [to carve] the country. Furthermore, short terms of serv­ a tunnel of hope through the dark mountain ice that utilize more people vastly complicate of disappointment.”14 the training requirements of the armed forces Surely no just society can refuse to permit and correspondingly reduce readiness. dissent over apparent injustice. Thus we see More recently we have heard pleas for many forms of protest in modern America. universal sendee, the concept that every young Even more, we as a people sometimes are person would serve the nation in some capac­ swayed by that protest, when it strikes a chord ity, here or abroad. Each year, about 3.5 of conscience or conviction that is ripe among million young men and women become eigh­ us for expression. teen years of age. Perhaps three million of But despite that, if we are to retain the them would be qualified for some kind of goodness and justice underwritten by the state, service, and thus the total force would be then we must balance freedom and authority. this size if we asked them to serve a year, or I cannot see how anarchy will guarantee larger if the period of commitment were justice.15 Neither am I sanguine that we can longer. The logistics to induct, train, clothe, preserve a good state unless we are willing house, and care for a force of three million to serve it. youth would more than tax the capability of What reason is there to gamble upon the existing government departments and agen­ unknown and give up what we already have cies. Perhaps only the military services could secured in America through centuries of striv­ expand quickly enough to assume such a ing and courageous sacrifice? We must im­ burden. Even more demanding would be the prove our nation. But why should we consider requirement for imaginative leadership to in­ destroying it unless we have assurance that sure that these young people undertook worth­ what will take its place will improve the while responsibilities appropriate to their skills. quality of justice and understanding? We still Nothing would destroy the idealism of Ameri­ have reason to affirm that this nation is the can youth so completely as the requirement last and best hope on earth. that they do work that either does not need doing or that they cannot hope to accomplish. There are many activities in which young Why don’t we ask everyone to serve? people can make important contributions. Frequently young people tell me that they Before we ask them to undertake such activi­ would be willing to serve in some capacity ties, we must learn more about how success if everyone did so. Just a few days ago one may be achieved. In at least three important of our eastern newspapers reported a survey areas youth could contribute to the nation’s confirming public acceptance of universal critical problems: education, improving the service. environment, and providing medical care. But This idea has been expressed recently in it is worthwhile to consider the problems of two forms. After World War II, many public utilizing young people in each. leaders argued for universal military training, No social activity is more crucial to the a program in which every qualified American success of a democratic society than education. man would be required to spend some time Likewise no activity helps an individual better in the armed forces. This historically has been to achieve the possibility of accomplishment 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW that is his. Regardless how we settle the issue further pollution and encourage conservation. of where our children should attend school, But it is not likely that such programs will all of us probably can agree that we must prove sound until we undertake the experi­ improve the quality of the child’s experience mentation necessary to separate the feasible before he reaches the classroom. techniques from those doomed to failure. We will not improve this experience until I expect to see great changes soon in the we make certain that many of our children methods of providing medical service. It may receive better preparation for academic work. be possible for us to reorganize health care The public school concept assumes that all to place more reliance on the untrained, par­ children will acquire a certain level of skill ticularly on young people who are intelligent and accomplishment before they enroll. In but have not gone through the long academic many families, there is not sufficient resource programs to attain professional competence. of understanding or determination to justify Furthermore, we are aware that much which this assumption. Young people might be able is needed, under any organization for pro­ to give these children the preschool experience viding service, increasingly has become un­ they need and otherwise would not have, attractive to those who are available for work. such as building an adequate vocabulary while Caring for people who are ill and often help­ learning to converse, introducing them to less will always involve hard physical work; reading, providing a social experience in which sometimes it will be disagreeable. The quality the child begins to learn about discipline and of the service offered depends partly on the cooperation, and leading him through prob­ quality of concern on the part of those who lems where he starts to explore the funda­ offer it. Thus these are areas where idealistic mentals of logic and reason upon which young people could make an immense con­ academic work must build. tribution as soon as we understand better how Young people might very well make they might be utilized. splendid contributions as tutors in the ghettoes Because of these limitations, it seems to or isolated communities or on reservations me quite apparent that we should be working throughout the land; perhaps they could do now to expand and improve opportunities so both with preschool children and with for voluntary service rather than to seek those who are encountering difficulties in the universal conscription. The new action grades. But before we launch a vast experi­ agency in Washington is planning and orga­ ment, we must know a great deal more about nizing voluntary programs at the present time. how to undertake the work that needs to be But even if the American people demanded done. Experiments utilizing many approaches it now, which they certainly do not, universal should begin before we expect a massive sendee would not be a viable program for undertaking to produce the results we seek. many years. Similar problems exist with the improve­ ment of the environment. Although the major challenges may continue to be technological, T hus we find ourselves at a place in the financial, and organizational, there are areas nation’s history when we must have armed where young people can help. Youth can forces, when we cannot provide all of the clear streams, shores, roadways, and parks, men we need through voluntary methods, and create new recreational areas, check erosion, when we cannot utilize all of those who are restore forests, and plant grass and shrubs to available. Nevertheless, national security never provide food for wildlife. Furthermore, we has been more important than it is today. \\ e need programs of public education to prevent will provide that security, and hope for a THE OBLIGATION TO SERVE 11 peaceful future, if American youth will accept When too many fail to serve, then the nation the obligation to serve. cannot stand. No society can exist without requiring that Despite changing times, some requirements its members serve in some ways, either through remain. Society depends upon cooperation. their work, their sacrifice, their loyalty, their We cooperate as citizens partly by accepting tax payments, their hopes. We all owe some­ the obligation to serve when we are called. thing. Just as primitive tribes existed so that men collectively could hunt with crude weap­ Washington, D.C. ons, modern societies still depend upon each This article has been adapted from a presenta­ of us in some way to do his part. All of us tion by Dr. Tarr at Rockford College, Rockford, must be willing to serve as the nation needs Illinois, on 24 March 1972, while he was still the us, or we shirk our responsibilities as citizens. Director of Selective Service.

Notes 1. The best general introduction 1 have found to United States 6. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. foreign policy is Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the 7. John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government. American People, Eighth Edition (New York, 1969). 8. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I. 2. Robert F. Byrnes, “ Russia in Eastern Europe: Hegemony with* 9. David Hume, Of the Original Contract. out Security." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 4, July 1971, 682—97. 10. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Chapter I. 3. For an interesting opinion on Chinese policy, see Michel Oksen- 11. John Rawls, "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play," berg, "The Strategies of Peking," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1, Sidney Hook. ed.. Law and Philosophy (New York. 1964), 3-18. October 1971, 15-29. 12. Sophocles, Antigone. 4. See particularly Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Exec• 13. Henry David Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience." utice (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1938) , 161—84. 14. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from Birmingham City Jail." 5. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 15. An interesting but unconvincing argument may be found in Report (Washington, 1970). Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York, 1970). Moderator: Ladies and gentlemen, General RAPPING James indicated that he would field your questions on the full range of subject mate­ WITH rial, including race relations, public informa­ tion, budgeting—the whole nine yards. CHAPPIE General James: We in Public Affairs—that is part of my business, as you know—face a Brigadier General Daniel James, J r . “firing squad” every day, made up of repre­ sentatives of all the major news media in the country, in our pressure chamber up there in our press briefing room in the Pentagon. As­ sistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Daniel Z. Henkin is our boss. Every day at eleven o’clock Jerry Friedheim, the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, is the primary briefer of the press, with me as backup. Since at least one of the three of us usually accompanies the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense anytime he hits the road, I find myself facing the press many, many times. We are supposed to be able to address almost any question that Brigadier General Daniel (“Chappie”) comes up about the Department of Defense, James, Jr., usaf, Deputy Assistant Secretary so I want to give you the same freedom the of Defense for Public Affairs, recently addressed the class of the Air Command and Staff press has. I might not have all the answers, College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. or my answer or solution might not be the Following his presentation, he invited same as yours, but that is what it is all about, questions from the audience, and we are happy too. to give our readers the benefit of excerpts Incidentally, I do not make a profession of from that question-and-answer period. being black. I do not have time for that, but T he Editor since I have been black for some 51 years now, I do have a good deal of experience. So, any­ thing you want to talk about, fire away. Q: Sir, could you talk a little bit about some of the race problems that you saw while you were over in Vietnam and what is being done about them? A: Yes. This is a point on which I have re­ ceived a lot of criticism from the black side of the house—the Black Caucus, to be specific. But I believe it is really unfortunate that, in the last three years when the services have made more progress than in the whole history of the armed forces, we are getting so much flak on racism in the services. To the wild RAPPING WITH CHAPPIE 13 charges of institutionalized racism in the serv­ That is what I talk about to young lads all ices, I say, definitely, “Not so!” There are over the country: that there is not all that still individual practicing bigots in the services, much mutual hate over there between our and, to be sure, the services reflect the same personnel. It is true, however, that any hate is problems that we have on Main Street, too much. But we get them right from the U.S.A.; but we have attacked them, and we ghetto and from Main Street, U.S.A. Johnny have a systematic attack. White Man comes in with his prejudices, his The Secretary of Defense has a real moral fears, and his private hates. He is confronted commitment to solving the problem, but we are never going to get it solved until all of you commanders have the same kind of moral commitment. By that I mean not just solving it because the regulations say there will be none of that but because in your hearts you know it is wrong. Now, we did not have enough of that moral attitude in Vietnam, or any of the other places. As a result, we have suffered accusations, the fraggings, and the hate spreaders. On the other hand, we have also been hurt by the guy who has been rais­ ing hell about everything from haircuts to the soul handshake—things one should not even bother about. Personally, I do not care how the troops shake hands, as long as they can fight, because that is what we were over General James conducts a news there for. conference in the Pentagon. Too often, however, when one of these in­ cidents arises, the press is right there with every’ camera zeroed in and every mike on. with the young black kid from the ghetto, and It makes every newspaper in the world. they go to Vietnam together still nursing a This kind of thing bothers the young black heartful of hurt and a fistful of hate. Too GI who is proudly out there leading his pla­ often they turn it on each other before they toon through the jungle, destroying the en­ have a chance to find out that they do not emy, and doing what he is supposed to do hate each other after all, that it is not really when it is necessary. So many of them come necessary, and that we cannot afford it— home with a stack of ribbons and their per­ which is more important. We have not solved sonal pride intact, but you seldom hear about it fully yet, but we are getting there. them. Also, you do not hear about their white As I said, we have a Secretary of Defense brothers who come along with them and re­ who is devoted to solving these problems. If spect them a lot more than they did any we catch any practicing bigot, he is dead, pro­ blacks before they went over and saw them fessionally, in this service. We do not have perform. And maybe they saved each other’s any place for a commander who cannot be life along the way. It Ls happening every day concerned about racism and have a commit­ just as it happened when we were in Korea ment against it. Mr. Laird has stated there together and as it happened when we were will be no more of that. And if we find them over Hanoi together. out, they will not command a latrine detail 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW in this service anymore, anywhere, I can around and speaking at many schools, both promise you. That is going to help solve it. black and white—the predominantly black Q: Sir, the percentage of black officers in the and the predominantly mixed—because it is Air Force today is still very low. What pro­ a fact that the percentage of second lieutenant grams are in progress to increase the number and first lieutenant blacks and other minorities of black officers in the Air Force? And, more is going down. The reason it is going down particularly, what programs are in progress is that the opportunities for them outside to increase the number of black pilots who the service—opportunities for them to get into will eventually move on to command positions? medical school, law school, and other high- paying and respected career areas—have A: I just finished talking to one of the young opened up recently. We in the Air Force are lads who is part of one of the programs being competing with those occupations now, and carried out. Captain Griffin is a member of we must not give up. We have to go out there the staff of the Air University here, and he and point out our scholarship opportunities. has been delegated to lead the planning and We have some hard work to do. the effort that his command is making to en­ Last week, we had some people from the hance minority recruiting. Minority recruit­ Air Force Academy in Washington, and they ing is a big thing in all of the services now, were concerned about this problem. You see, and we have made a lot of progress in this the Air Force has said for so long, “Man, we area. didn’t throw the brick—we’re all right. See, There are several developments, however, we have Chappie James, a general/” But he that make it a little more difficult for us. is the only one. You know, my mother used You see, despite what the militants are say­ to say there were two Negroes we could do ing, there has been a lot of progress made without: the first one, and the only one. And quietly on the “outside” because the incum­ I agree with her on her ideas of the first one bent President, too, is concerned about racial to do this and the only one to do that. She and minority affairs. The Equal Opportunity said, “I’m looking forward to the day when so and Equal Employer programs have taken many of us will be doing so many noteworthy hold in a lot of places. As you may know, a things that they will no longer be news­ large manufacturer almost lost a fighter con­ worthy.” That is what we are approaching tract recently because he had not complied today. with some of the rules. He has jolly well com­ But we are not going that way fast enough. plied now. But, you see, this company and The Navy has made much significant prog­ others are hiring a lot of brilliant young blacks, ress along this line in the past year, and the who are the same kind we want. .Army is moving ahead, too. The number of In the Air Force and the flying arms of blacks in the doolie class at the Air Force the Navy and Marines, we must have the Academy is about 25 this year, and the Acad­ good guy. We cannot take just anybody, and emy has made a commitment to improve. we are not going to lower our standards to The Navy’s number in first-year class went the street level. We have got to keep our up to 45, which was almost as many as they standards high, but also we must make sure had in the whole Naval Academy last year. there is a vehicle for the young black and Admiral Zumwalt explained on national other minority members to be able to com­ tv that they got them because they went out pete for these positions. And that is what we and found them, recruited them. The Navy are doing. told them it needed them, and it offered them Captain Griffin, for example, is going a $50,000-plus education in return for five no matter what color they are. who are going to turn that down. In fact, if someone is dumb enough to reject that offer, we probably could not use him anyway. So we must go out and talk to them—we do not recruit just in the lily-white areas any­ more. We go down to George Washington Carver High School, and we try to get that young black who has the ability but perhaps not the means. And we say, “We have an education here for you in the rotc, or at the Air Force Academy, or at one of the other academies, if you want to go and can qualify. In return, here is what vou have to do for ?A us, w hich is really a pan of vour responsibility, anyway. And you can do it all at the same time, at substantial expense to the govern­ ment. That is how we try to get them in. We are also trying to do away with the problems within service units. One of our methods is to utilize or recognize councils. Some might say we have councils coming out we are going to get them in because we find the ears. The commander has more help now these people all have the same kind of heart than he has ever had in his life. He has the and the same kind of concern for this country. Human Relations Council, the Equal Oppor­ And we want them all. tunity Council, and representatives of the General, would you discuss the effective­ other side. He has them all, and they are all ness of the Don Domestic Action Council and advising him. It can be quite a job to screen it< effect on race problems in the local areas. through this flood of advice, but when the A: Domestic Action is one of the best things final purified wrord comes out and is sent to we have going for us these days. We have a hn people, the commander had better make big program in Memphis, some programs in sure it has red-white-and-blue stamped all Mississippi, in Alabama, and in Massachu­ over it and that it amounts to rqual oppor­ setts. My old base, Otis Air Force Base, takes tunity for all. If not, he gets fired, and we put a whole hunth of kills from the ghetto and in vjmeone else who will make sure all his brings them in during the summer. They not people get an equal break. The more we do only let them swim and have campfires but this and the more wr show this kind of prom­ the\ also teach them a little something about ise to that lad from George Washington Car­ getting along with each other. ver High School, the more he wants to come We also have the Racr Relations Institute, in and join us. That is our goal. just opened at Patric k, which is going to work We have not reached that goal vet, but it very closely with these people. They are plan­ will hr your job to join hands and help push ning to have some seminars and course’s dur­ toward the goal. We are going to reach a lot ing the ‘ummer which they intend to offer to of black folks, Puerto Ricans, and poor white nonmilitary people in order to help attack folks who have not had a chance before, and tbr*r problems I have talked about the 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW heartful of hurt and the fistful of hate that there who are doing fine things. I do not know come to us from Ghetto, U.S.A. We are trying all the minute details about each of the pro­ to reach these young people early, before their grams, but I invite you when you come to the minds have been closed—both the black ones Pentagon to go up on the fourth floor and and the white ones—and I assure you the talk to them. They will be out here in the problem is on both sides. You cannot be fair field to talk to you, too. or candid without recognizing that fact, so You know, I was just talking about Do­ we are putting a lot of emphasis on our Do­ mestic Action with your Commandant, Gen­ mestic Action programs. eral Loving. I understand you had a Race Our image, as you know, has been distorted Seminar here and did not have Jesse Jackson by the Rubins and the Dellingers and all these and did not have Roy Wilkins. You had better other people who for the sake of “peace” have listen to those people, too. You see, if you fail stepped on the pride and dignity of the armed to listen to them, someday you may have to services. They have thrown a little mud on listen to others like Stokely and Eldridge— your uniform and mine. Our reaction cannot and I do not believe you would like what they be anger and name-calling; it must be through would say. Furthermore, they would not take programs like Domestic Action. the time to journey here and talk to you, but We must go out and talk to “Reverend Roy Wilkins will, and so would Jesse Jackson. Jones” and “Sister Smith,” and we have to get It is possible you might not like all they say, them to talk about it from the pulpits, where either, but they would tell it like it is. they have the ear of the people. We must let That is what we are doing in Domestic them know that we are not a bunch of killers. Action: we are telling it like it is and attack­ When we find someone within our numbers ing it where it is. who has gone astray and tarnished the uni­ form a bit, we must show we are big enough Q: Sir, you mentioned the Domestic Action to take action against him. Program, but what else is the Department of We must try to make them understand that Defense doing—or what do you think should nobody hates war worse than warriors, be­ be done—to improve the declining military cause, hell, we are the ones who get shot at. image in the United States today? Nothing is better for the warrior than peace­ A: O.K. I did touch on that in the middle of time on the post and beer call on Friday my more formal talk, and I did it somewhat night. But, when necessary, we have to fight jokingly. But it is not a joke. It is a very the enemy out there, else, while we shout serious proposition. It is a question of how freedom, we might not have the place to be much is enough and how far we should swing free in. And this is my place, my country, the pendulum before we start the other way. right here; this is what I fight for. This is Basically, we are trying to strike a balance what we have to tell them in the ghetto, in between discipline and listening to our young, the streets. dissatisfied people. I hear so much about lis­ That is what Domestic Action does. It is tening to the young, and for this purpose the a big program and has a lot of money in it. commander has more help now than he has The man at the Defense Department level is ever had. Unfortunately, a lot of it he does Earl Brown. He, too, has a bit of experience not need. But we must make sure we are at being black, although a little less than I listening to all sides in order to be able to have. Incidentally, he is a hell of a fighter come up with the right answers. pilot. Earl is really in there doing some great Now, I do think—and we all think—that things. We also have some white people in we may have gone a little bit too far in our search for answers by acceding to demands of people in the service who seem to want this to be like a country club. This is not a country club. We had a sign at our wing in Thailand which read, “The Mission of the Air Force is to Fly and Fight—And Don’t You Forget It!” The Chief of Staff keeps that motto hanging on his door. Boiled down, that is the mission of all the armed services of the United States of Amer­ ica. Of course, we would like to see the day when we could beat those swords into plow­ shares, but I have yet to see many shiny new plowshares. So we must maintain a viable fighting force. To do that, we have to have discipline. I think in the regrouping that is going to take place after this war—and we are winding it down—we are going to take all these people who have not conformed to the discipline and does not go to the nco Club or Service that is a must in the services and show them Club very much. When he finishes work in the gate. To some degree, we are doing that the afternoon, he goes home. He might stop right now. They fail to do us any good in a few minutes at beer call on his way home here, and they corrupt the minds of the young on Friday, but most of the time he is home. people who come in to us wanting to accom­ So he is not at hand when angry words are plish the mission. flung back and forth. With these remarks behind me, I will get Well, we are getting some of these people back to part of the answer to your question, sir. back in the barracks, getting them to make What is wrong, in my mind, is that we have sure they go over to the barracks and Service lacked the facing up to responsibility and Club and establish some kind of rapport with accepting the challenge of the young, mad these young people. We are beginning to rely minorities. I would include in this group the on our intermediate-level leaders with guts very antieverything elements, some of whom enough to stand and say, “Look, man, assess came into the service mad about the draft progress. Then you will find you don’t have and hating us deeply. For the most part, these as much to be bitter about as you think you are young, articulate people who are going out do.” and gaining converts from among the others The minorities have made a lot of progress who came in to do their duty, serve their in many areas. We must point that out to time well, and get out. our young people because most of the angry This challenge has not been picked up by young blacks have little or no idea how bad the young—or not so young—articulate blacks the black situation used to be or how much at our staff level, higher nco level, or young it has improved. I am not saying they do not officer level who possess the kind of credibility have the right to raise hell about the things that the young people would accept. This is that are still wrong, but I am saying that they part of what I am talking about. still have the responsibility to contribute to The staff sergeant probably has a family the solution and try to solve the problems. 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW The same can be said about the antiwar told me, and said, “We don’t want to wear guy who wants to come in here and in my our uniform to this thing. We want to come uniform stand up and hold a meeting in my in civilian clothes.” theater to tell these guys why they should hate Sandy asked me what I would say, and I my Air Force. I say “Hell, no!” He can go told him I would say, “Hell, no! They should down to the coffeehouse off base, or he can wear the uniform. After all, the problem hap­ address his grievances to me, or I can sit and pens in the uniform.” talk with him about it and we can get into a dialogue. But for him to have a one-way We never started out to be what Main pep rally for the disruption of the normal Street, U.S.A. or Ghetto, U.S.A. is. We are processes of the military, for him to want to the military. Without the discipline that goes rewrite our procedures, NO! I have a thing with it, we become a mob. Now, hear me right here in my briefcase in which one of right: There are things that are wrong. There these guys testified before the Black Caucus has been some neglect—more in the past, less last week. One of the things he wanted was in the present, and there should be none in liberalization of the Manual for Courts-Mar­ the future. There are still racial problems and tial and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, drug problems. There are still some things on with special emphasis on—get this—on drugs which we can listen to the young people. For and homosexuality. example, we can let them grow their hair a No, we are not going that route, and they little longer and get some bigger hats. have got to know it. But I think there are There are other simple things we can do, still, as the Marines say, enough good men. like keeping cool when a man shakes another Well, I think the policy of the Air Force is man’s thumb and they beat each other’s el­ right down that same line. We still think there bows, arms, and thighs, doing the “soul are enough young stalwarts out there so that, shake.” I do not care, as long as that man is if we show them what the Air Force really standing straight and tall when I call my for­ is, if we show them what kind of leadership mation. I do not care, as long as when I walk ours really is, and if we make ourselves exam­ by he throws me a “Good morning, sir” and ples of that leadership, we can get the nucleus salutes, and I return the courtesy. We are not to stamp out the weed. Unfortunately, we do going to back away from that. I do not care, have some bad guys, but we also have the as long as he takes direction when I give it, required leadership, some of it right here at without my having to explain to him why. Air Command and Staff College and over I do not have time for that over Hanoi at at the Air War College, where I spoke a few 30,000 feet. He had better learn that when weeks ago. he is back at the post. We have to be understanding but firm. For In short, I believe we can accomplish both example, Sandy Vandenberg met me the other tasks: maintain discipline and get good men. day at atc at Randolph when I flew in there. I say we still have enough good men in this He has a Human Relatioas Council, and country who will be receptive to leadership they get together and talk, or rap, about what and will respect us more for drawing a firm is wrong: equal opportunities, the blacks and line and hewing to it. We must correct the whites, the militants, and the antiwar guys. things that are wrong, but we cannot allow These groups have been asking for more and ourselves to fall on our tails while we do it. more. First, they wanted to hold the meetings That is my answer. during duty hours. O.K., he went along with Q: General, I have heard the concept of the that. Then, they came in the other day, he volunteer army criticized because people say it will consist of white officers leading predom- inandv black troops. Would you comment on that, please? A: O.K. They do not have to worry about that in Hometown, U.S.A. You are right, there are a lot of people who say that if we go to an all-volunteer force we will have an all-black army, an all-Mexican army, an all- Puerto Rican army, or an all-poor-wrhite-folks army. They should not worry about that for the reason I gave you a little while ago. There are so many opportunities for all these people now that we are having just as much—if not more—trouble in recruiting the black who has the talent we need as w'e do in recruiting the white. So we are just not getting them that fast. We have not lowered our standards to recruit in any of these categories, and we are not going to. But w'hat are we going to do to attract and hold good men, and what are we can develop the kind of responsibility in w’e doing right now' in the services? enough of our youth, backed up by some For one thing, we are working to better at­ fringe benefits, like better housing, educational tune career progression in the service between opportunities, and a good start when they re­ the whites and the minorities. It is not easy. turn to civilian life, that both blacks and Picture two young lads, a black from a disad­ whites are going to be interested. And I be­ vantaged neighborhood and a white fellow lieve we can do this while keeping our stand­ from a high-rent district who possesses a lot of ards on the same high plateau. Then we will skills the black guy does not have. Start them be able to maintain the same mix that we out at the same time, and what do you say have now. to the black lad at promotion time? “Sorry, This idea of a mixture is one reason we do son, you failed to make your stripe because not want to rely solely on the military acade­ you do not have the education that the white mies for officers. We must maintain the rotc guy has”? program so that we can keep the kind of Well, we are trying to do something about integrated mix of races, religions, social strata, it. We have all sorts of Headstart programs. and everything else that makes it a truly dem­ The Navy has made a lot of progress here, ocratic American military force—democratic and the other services are progressing also. to the point that we set. Realistically, that can­ They are holding conferences right now to not be too permissive or it would not be worth devise additional ways to bring that disad­ anything as a fighting force. vantaged lad up to the level of his contempo­ In short, we must show our attractiveness rary. He might progress at a slower rate, but to the young men that we want. Then we will he is going to be constantly gaining as he goes. get the mixture we want. We do not worry Now, financially speaking, you cannot ever about what percent of us is going to be black pay a man what it is worth to fight for his or white; it will seek its own level. However, country, especially somebody who has done the resultant force will not be all black or all it and knows what it’s all about. But we feel white or all Mexican or all Puerto Rican. 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Even if it were, I will tell you frankly—and one particular segment, they were taking the I do not care what the papers say about dis­ Army to task about racism in Germany. Curt sension and all that—if they were the kind of was the very articulate black lad who pointed people that the majority of blacks, Mexicans, out the things that were wrong and where and Puerto Ricans whom I know in this serv­ Army justice had fallen short of the mark. ice are, we would not have a bad army any­ He was quite critical of some of these things, way. They love their country just like you but he was very factual in what he said. and I do. Mike Wallace, who was conducting the interview, said, “Captain, you are being very Q: Sir, in grappling with the personal prob­ candid here and very open with your answers. lems of management, we have looked at a Aren’t you afraid the Army will take some model of General Maloy’s efforts over in Ko­ action against you?” Curt’s reply went like rea. Without asking you to evaluate that this: “Well, I’m sure the Army can if it wants personally, I would like to ask you for an to. But I would be very surprised if they did— Air Staff position on that example and if any­ and very disappointed if they did—because, thing is being done to follow it up? first of all, I am a legal officer and I’m con­ A: Yes, there is, at the Defense Department cerned about military justice. And I wouldn’t level. You know, one of the first things Mr. be here talking to you about these things if Laird told me when I came on board was to I had gotten the proper ear back there in the remember that my suit was purple—that I caserne. I think I’m doing the proper thing. had to be concerned with all the services, Now, I might be stepping on some policies, across the board. Of course, when you wear and, if in fact I am, then maybe I should be this blue suit as long as I have and love it called down. I think the Army is bigger than as I do, it is not easy to forget the color all that, but if not, so be it.” of the time. He was right. The Secretary of Defense Nevertheless, we assimilate all the informa­ was bigger than that. They brought him up tion from the Maloy effort, from General and made him an Assistant to the General Simler’s interracial fact-finding group in Air Counsel in the Pentagon. Since that time, a Training Command, and similar investiga­ year ago, he has been up there helping Mr. tions, like those directed by General Catton in Buzhardt deal with some of these things. Now Military Airlift Command. Incidentally, back he is going off active duty status and is going to Public Affairs, some writers who published to be a civilian—27 years old and a GS-15— stories on these reports evidently found what that is quite a jump! Curt is going to be up was wrong more newsworthy than the action there trying to solve those things, you see. taken to set it right. And, indeed, action is That is what is happening in this so-called being taken, based on these and other reports “racist” Defense Department. and recommendations. Now, I know General Maloy very well. For example, just taking their seats is a One of the things that hurts Maloy and others new team under a Deputy Assistant Secretary like him is to have an incident occur in his of Defense for Equal Opportunity. The num­ command while he is making headway in his ber one man is Don Miller, who comes to us programs. One of those happened. Some black from the Vice Presidency at Seatrain Corpo­ guys who still figured they could not wait for ration. The number two man is Curt Smoth­ his program to work went out and took over ers. Curt is the young black captain, Army some joint downtown in which they had been type, whom many of you may have seen on treated unfairly and tore it apart. Sure one of the cbs “Sixty Minutes” programs. In enough, that story was all over the front page, while not enough people heard about Gen­ eral Maloy’s positive program. Once more, too many people did not get the whole story, but we have to win in spite of these breaks. Those are some of the problems we face. Look at the efforts of Army General Mike Davison, the new commander of all Army forces in Europe. He has made tremendous progress. Now, a few weeks ago, the media gave quite a bit of coverage to his conference on race problems, which was held at Berchtes- gaden. At one point in the conference, while they were discussing how many whites had been assaulted by blacks in those roving bands that we are having trouble with—over there and over here, too—General Davison said, ‘'But you’ve only given me part of it. We’ve sat here and talked about it for fifteen minutes, yet no one has said how many blacks have been assaulted by whites. That’s the kind of imbalance we’ve got to get away from before we can begin to address the problem.” And they got along with that topic, too. What we in dod are doing is the result of what Davison discovers over there, what Ma- loy finds in Korea, what the commander of this is called listening to all sides. Maybe the Fort Benning finds over here, and the com­ onlv way we can be sure we get all views is mander at Pendleton, along with what the to have all these councils and be responsive Black Caucus alleges, and others. to the things within reason that they are talk­ ing about. We arc getting it all up there and putting We have to have commanders who are the answers to it. And I think we are going influenced by the Race Relations Institute, to find them; I know we are! by the councils, by all of this information— Q: General, you have commented on the num­ and by our response to it. This way a com­ ber of councils available today to the com­ mander learns a lot about the races, the prob­ manders, but I would like to address this lems. their feelings, and, probably, quite a specifically to unit or squadron commanders. bit about himself. And he starts to change, Do we need all these bureaucracies, or do we \ou see. Then we have a commander who perhaps, in your own view, need dedicated olieys the regulation and makes sure it works, and motivated squadron commanders who because he has the only thing that is going have been educated specifically in race rela­ to solve it all: a moral commitment to do it tions and human behavior? because it is right. When that is done, we As We need both. But the way we get to the can dissolve all the councils and go back from latter is by having the former. I have poked, “command by committee” to the single com­ with some fun and extraneous comment, at mander system. the number of societies that we have; but Thank you very much. OS*-'

THE OPPOSITE NUMBER

Major General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret)

HERE are Americans who study the history of warfare in order to prepare themselves for leadership roles in future armed conflict. It is not that they have an unhealthy love of war. Rather it is their awareness of the world weT live in and of man’s proclivity for war that makes them study; if the United States gets into shooting trouble in the future, they want to be ready to serve our country expertly and professionally. I believe that these Americans, with their foresightedness, are admirable. In the event of war, I want them to succeed. Because I do, I offer them the following thoughts about the nature of a war which I feel may well be the next one in which Americans are involved. In a war, of course, there are two sides, ours and theirs. Among those on the THE OPPOSITE NUMBER 23 other side against us there will be at least one rillas intend to win themselves a country with person who is the real opposite number of the methods of the Tupamaros next door. each American military leader, whatever his Our place in history is one of great social rank—an opposite number who will try to out- ferment, a breeding time for advocates of think the .American—an opposite number who making politics out of a gun barrel. As the will try’ to outdo the American. defenders of what now exists, we are in the I believe that this opposite number will be way of such advocates. So they are learning a revolutionary. I don’t want him to surprise how to defeat us. Their education in how to us. do this, through revolutionary struggle, is Concluding from the course of studies pur­ vastly different from ours. Perhaps some of sued in our advanced service schools, I am it, superficially, might look familiar, such as aware that an American military leader is students attending lectures in a classroom of expected to have quite a different sort of op­ the associate course at Moscow’s Lenin Polit­ ponent. I gather that he is supposed to come ical Academy. The subject matter Is not fa­ up against a fairly grown-up whiz kid—a miliar, however. Further, the graduates of bright military type who has learned to man­ such formal schools are adept at getting others age masses of men, money, and materiel for to carry out the actual struggle. They step in nuclear wipe-outs or for the “instrument of afterwards, as organization men, to actually policy” gambits of power politics. That sort run things. One need look no further than of thing. Cuba for a classic example of how the fighters I suspect that this opponent now emerges lost their revolution to the organization men in the imagination as not too bad a guy. A afterwards. professional like our Air Force professionals— Our future opponent, the hard-core revo­ only he is taking a course at his war college. lutionary, right now is probably getting his Perhaps it is a national war college such as higher schooling in his style of warfare by the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in carrying out illegal actions on the very battle­ Moscow or the Soviet air and naval war col­ ground where we will come up against him leges at Monino and Leningrad. Or perhaps later. Or maybe he is in jail, going through it is a war college such as the ones at Peking, some further hardening that will set him apart Tirana, Brno, Dresden, Budapest, Bucharest, from other men. Most likely he is an idealist or Belgrade. whose experiences have forced him to grow Well, maybe the course planners of our a tough hide, to cling even closer to a political schools are right. But, again, maybe they are ideology and a belief in its eventual success— not. We live in a revolutionary era. My hunch and its eventual humanity—to answer his own is that history is waiting to play a deadly joke doubts about the ugly things he has had to do on us. It did so on recent graduates of the in the name of his cause. For he probably has Imperial Defence College in London, who killed at least one person, face to face, has now find themselves facing the savagery of blown up others with plastic or dynamite, revolutionary warfare in Northern Ireland. It and perhaps has done his share of kidnapping, did so on the Pakistani officers under General arson, torture, and bank robbery. Niazi, who undoubtedly wish now that they He might even be from an affluent family, had learned better ways of coping with the a college graduate, a seeming member of the Mukti Bahini guerrillas. It is starting to do so part of society he is seeking to destroy—as on Argentine graduates of the Escuela Na­ have been so many of the revolutionaries of tional de Guerra in Buenos Aires, who are our time. Thus, his formal education might waking up to the fact that Marxist erp guer­ have been much the same as ours, except that 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW somewhere along the line he started picking Various names are given to this total polit­ up other ideas and using them, committing ical warfare that he wages. Among these himself. Perhaps these were the teachings of names are “war of national liberation,” “peo­ Mao Tse-tung, or of “Che” Guevara, or of ple’s war,” “revolutionary war,” “guerrilla Vo Nguyen Giap. Or perhaps they were the war,” and even “insurgency.” I feel that it teachings that have supplanted Che’s with so is useful for us to think of these conflicts as many younger revolutionaries, those in “The “people’s wars,” because this helps us to focus Minimanual for Urban Guerrillas” by Carlos on the most important feature of the battle­ Marighella. (His book tells how to make and ground: the people who live on it. Whoever steal weapons, describes the most valuable wins their support, and keeps it, wins the places to bomb, whom to attack or kidnap, struggle. and how to survive in the concrete jungles of We military men are great ones for study­ the cities.) Or perhaps our future opponent ing the wars and the battles of the past. Yet, only learned the teachings in the new training in the face of today’s people’s wars, it strikes films for revolutionaries now being shown me that too little time has been spent in study­ throughout this hemisphere as well as in Af­ ing the great “people’s wars” of the past— rica and elsewhere. the ones that are so filled with precepts of use The point is that he is getting ready in a today. Three of the people’s wars of the past hard, realistic school, learning rules of combat come to mind in particular: the American vastly different from those that are being Revolution, the French Revolution, and the taught in our war colleges. He has many re­ so-called Wuchang Uprising of 1911, when cent examples to assure him that the rules he Sun Yat-sen’s ideas turned China upside is learning will succeed over the rules that our down. professionals are learning. I admit that study of these people’s wars is About all that I can do in this article is not very rewarding in terms of conventional to give a glimpse of what this prospective military operations. Somehow the critical ac­ opponent knows and does—and a further tions in these wars seem to have been invaria­ glimpse of the only way I know of defeating bly offstage, out beyond the battalions some­ him. I hope readers of the article will start where. True enough, they were. Each of these studying him and his ways on their own. wars was fought by revolutionaries as a total Certainly we are going to need every bit of political war. Each saw masterful use of psy­ knowledge and alertness and wisdom possible chological warfare as the prime weapon in when we come up against him. the struggle. Each resulted in the overthrow of centralized, dictatorial governmental rule by finding the weaknesses in it and then pry­ T his possible future adversary of ing away at those flaws until they cracked ours is a believer in waging total political war­ open and the structure fell in on itself. It is fare to gain his ends. His task is to destroy the significant that the French Revolution and existing social order. Its destruction accom­ the Wuchang Uprising overthrew centralized, plished, he intends to replace it with another dictatorial governments only to have them re­ social order, one that he believes to be ideal, placed by new centralized, dictatorial govern­ beautiful, and as perfect as humans can make ments. It was only the American Revolution it. He says that this end justifies the means he that wound up with a way in which the people uses, not daring to understand that ugly means could govern themselves. only result in an equally ugly end, not the Consider how Americans fought and won utopia he envisions. our Revolution. First they built a careful polit­ THE OPPOSITE NUMBER 25 ical foundation for their cause, a legal brief Revolution: see it for what it really was, a almost, one that pled their case eloquently in people’s war. They will have to do some dig­ the court of world opinion. Then they engaged ging, because many historians did not under­ in dynamic psychological actions, backed by stand the nature of that war and thus inter­ armed resistance where possible. Think of preted it shallowly. Here are some tips for what would have happened in Vietnam if the the digging: practical ideas from our own Revolution had • Learn how Sam Adams built up the been applied there—by our side, not the en­ Boston Massacre as a propaganda showpiece, emy’s. If we had used the psychological ac­ a forceful psychological weapon. (Think what tions of our own Revolution, Ho Chi Minh’s he would have done about the Viet Cong gang would have been scaled down to their massacre of 1968 in Hue!) frailties and split away from popular support —just as were George Ill’s forces. Ho’s claim • Learn how Tom Paine rallied the to be the people’s leader was as phony as the people to the cause, as well as how he bol­ claim of the divine right of kings—and every stered troop morale when it hit bottom. bit as vulnerable to devastating attack. * Learn about the splendid agent Lenin apparently heeded the lessons from work of Ben Franklin and others in London, the French Revolution when the Germans Paris, and Madrid, including the arranging returned him to Russia in 1917. As is well of clandestine support, which sounds today as known, the French revolutionaries were sloppy though it were right out of a cia casebook. on discipline and organization, were violently * Above all, gain a deep understand­ moved by emotions while proclaiming them­ ing of the spiritual values that Thomas Jeffer­ selves as men of reason, and killed their lead­ son and George Mason ascribed to the way a ers at a great rate—until Napoleon appeared man must look upon his fellowman. on the scene and took over with discipline and These lessons are our true heritage for applica­ organization and secret police. Thus, it was tion in any people’s war. Let us learn them not too surprising that when Lenin updated and be ready to use them. the French Revolution in his work in Russia, he essentially modernized the management techniques used by Napoleon—but did so Lenin and Mao, although to­ from the start. gether in their view of revolutionary goals, Similarly, while the strategy espoused by were widely divergent in their ideas on how Mao Tse-tung owes much to the thinking of to reach those goals. Basically, the difference Sun Tzu and that of Clausewitz, his homely between them was that Lenin was a city boy rules and principles for the behavior of 8th and Mao a country boy. Thus, when Lenin Route Army troops—at the crucial interface thought of revolutionary action, he thought in of his people’s war in China—came right out terms of using the proletariat in the van of of the experiences and lessons of Sun Yat-sen’s his class struggle. To him, the proletariat was revolution. Oddly enough, Chiang Kai-shek the urban working man, the manual laborer and the Kuomintang leadership had as much whose only property was himself and his skills. right and chance to learn and use these rules He was the one to be organized and used in and principles, but they did not. guided actions. Once outside the cities, revo­ So I suggest that our military leaders study lutionary actions would have to be carried out history some more before they meet our revo­ by disciplined and politically indoctrinated lutionary' opponent. In particular, they should military forces. It was thus that he won Russia. take another reflective look at the American On the other hand, Mao had a farmer’s 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW opinion of the cities. Cities and the people in a regular army, before it could go to work. them were rather poor things, existing only It is small wonder that Mao’s ideas brought on the backs of the people on the agrarian a gleam to the eyes of have-nots in country land. He once summed up his revolutionary after country around the world. With Mao’s strategy in the slogan, “First the mountains, methods, a revolutionary did not need to then the countryside, and finally the cities.” be a multibillionaire to start a guerrilla war He organized and trained his forces at remote to win himself a country. All he needed was bases—in “the mountains” of his slogan. He ambition, lots of ability, energy, and iron then moved his forces into the countryside, discipline—along with a cause to be sold to indoctrinating, organizing, and governing the the people. Thus, most of the guerrilla wars farmers. By the time he was ready to subdue of the past two decades have been instigated the cities, his guerrilla forces had grown into and led by revolutionaries who tried hard to regular armies. It was thus that he won China. stick by Mao’s guerrilla principles. Partici­ By the time of World War II, these two pants who wrote down rules of this warfare, operational philosophies had shaped markedly such as Che Guevara or Giap, actually merely different usages of guerrilla forces. When the noted their versions of what Mao had meant. Germans invaded the Soviet Union, the So­ This is worth remembering when one searches viets formed groups of partisans to operate in out readings on guerrilla warfare for study. German-occupied territory. These partisan Giap and other Vietnamese Communist groups were considered to be mere adjuncts leaders were students of Mao in Yenan, where to the Red Army, subject to its needs and they first learned their guerrilla trade. Thus, operating primarily to ensure the success of it is understandable that they have taken great the regular main forces. As an illustrative pride in having added a new wrinkle to their parallel, the doctrine of Soviet chiefs towards old master’s strategy. In fighting the French their partisans was almost identical with the in Indochina, the Vietnamese Communists doctrine of U.S. military commanders towards actually entertained the thought that they guerrilla forces, such as those in the Japanese- could carry their political war to metropolitan occupied Philippines. They were auxiliaries France. They not only would apply Mao’s to main forces, not the core upon which main strategy in Vietnam but also would sap the forces were to be built. will of the mother nation thousands of miles In contrast, Mao’s guerrillas in China were away, around the world from Vietnam. There far from being auxiliaries of any regular army. were revolutionaries in France. The Vietnam­ For one thing, the only regular Chinese armies ese got to them. By the time the battle of fighting the Japanese invaders were those of Dien Bien Phu took place in Indochina, the the Kuomintang leaders, Mao’s deadly rivals, Vietnamese political warfare in France was for whose eventual defeat he was planning succeeding. There were mass demonstrations already. Thus, all he had to start with were in France against the war. Large numbers of rural guerrillas. Necessity mothered his inven­ draft-age youngsters were hiding out from tion of them as the nucleus for regular armies, military service. Troop transports were which he built up once he controlled enough blocked from sailing. There were serious mo­ territory and manpower to make positional rale problems and drug usage among the warfare feasible. troops. There was a terrific din from pulpit, Or, put another way, Mao evolved a way press, and political circles against the immor­ in which a poor man could conquer a country ality of the French war in Indochina. with guerrilla forces. The Soviet partisan doc­ Nobody should have been surprised a dec­ trine required that horribly expensive thing, ade later when, with U.S. troops fighting a THE OPPOSITE NUMBER 27 war in Vietnam, across the world from home, ela before the visit, I included a talk with similar political warfare broke out here in the Joe Kornfeder. I had met him through my United States. Nor should it be labeled “para­ Chinese guerrilla friend, Bernie Yoh. Korn­ noia” to say so. Skilled political warfare feder was a graduate of the Lenin Political should be respected, not just dismissed with a Academy in Moscow, having attended its flip and fashionable put-down. second class, just after the one that had Ho Soviet and Chinese strategies and tactics, of Chi Minh as a student. Kornfeder was one course, were seen by their manufacturers as of the founding members of the U.S. Commu­ export products, once the revolutions in Russia nist Party in 1919 and later was an executive and China had succeeded. As a result, mar­ in the Comintern, but he had sickened of what kets for these ideas have been lively for some he was mixed up in, had quit, and was de­ decades now in many countries of the world. voting the rest of his life to fighting Commu­ As they are tried, there are combinations and nists. When I asked him about Venezuela, variations that grow out of local conditions. he gave me a sort of rueful smile and told One current model has some of the old parts me about how the Venezuelan Communist in it but really does not look like the old fa­ Party and its revolution got started. He had miliar types. It is the making of a revolution had a hand in it. through urban guerrillas, a style that Is under­ One of Kornfeder’s earliest assignments as going constant innovation and refinement to­ a professional revolutionary was to organize day. In several countries it is growing beyond Communist movements in the northern tier the capabilities of urban police forces to cope of South America, including Venezuela. He with it and is becoming a problem for mili­ was to do this among the proletariat, as he tary forces. had been taught at the Lenin Academy. He went to Venezuela, in the guise of a U.S. trade unionist, and started to organize the workers Now, I am not claiming that there for a book-style class struggle. To his revolutionaries are ten feet tall and can whip dismay, he discovered that most of his con­ their weight in wildcats. All I am saying is tacts in labor circles were actually members that they look at armed struggle differently of the secret police or their informants. Vene­ than we do and that they are dangerous. They zuela was a dictatorship under Gomez at the have some human failings, too. The story of time, and undesirables such as Kornfeder modem revolution in Venezuela is a case in went to prison and disappeared. Kornfeder point. realized that he would have to act fast if he About ten years ago a team of revolution­ was to save his hide. The only possibility for aries in Venezuela blew up some oil pumping help he could think of was a professor at the rigs on Lake Maracaibo. The rigs belonged Central University in Caracas. A social friend to Venezuelan subsidiaries of U.S. oil com­ in the U.S. had given him a letter of introduc­ panies. The sapper team had been trained in tion to the professor, suggesting that the two Cuba and did the sabotage raid in the name of them might have a drink or dinner to­ of the National Liberation Front (fln) of gether. So Kornfeder visited the professor, Venezuela. Their action got a lot of attention gave him the letter, told him of the spot he in the world press and thus fulfilled much of was in, and asked for advice. Impulsively, the its purpose. It also gave me a good excuse professor promised to hide him from the se­ to get out of my Pentagon office for a look cret police. at the situation in Venezuela. And so I did. Kornfeder hid with the professor for days In finding out what I could about Venezu­ until he could get out of the country safely.

Continued on page 30 PACIFICATION FROM THE INSIDE

In the Republic of Vietnam in August 1965, Nguyen Tat Ung became Minister for Rural Reconstruction, charged with pacification of the countryside. On the eve of his first field trip, an informal meeting brought together Ung (below left, with glasses) and knowledgeable Vietnamese leaders and workers to discuss practical courses of action, at the home of U.S. adviser Major General Edward G. Lansdale (gesturing). The next day Ung was killed in a plane crash. . . . Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky (below right, with Lansdale), thoroughly committed to the pacification program with its stress on protecting and helping farmers and villagers, sought another dedicated person to head it. . . . He picked General Nguyen Due Thang (opposite top). The dynamic general not only quickly got a government program going nationwide but also became personally involved with the problems of the people in the rice paddies. . . . Thang (center), having inaugurated an adult education program, watches as a farmer's wife shows him that she has learned to write. . . . Thang became distressed at some of the Americanized practices of farm and village children, particularly their yelling "Okay" at U.S. troops and begging cigarettes and gum, instead of extending traditional Vietnamese greetings. He frequently stopped to give paternal instruction on politeness (bottom) until one day when he returned home to be greeted by his own children with "Hey, poppa, you okay. Gimmee cigarette." Bemused, he concluded that he'd better begin his crusading at home!

General Lansdale entertains Nguyen Tat Ung, first After Ung’s untimely death, Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Vietnamese Minister for Rural Reconstruction. Ky selected General Nguyen Due Thang for the post. General Thang, conferring with Lansdale, was eager to take his program to the people.

In adult education classes many rural people, like the woman here, first learned to read and write. 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW He found the professor to be not only sympa­ they again had picked the wrong place. This thetic to his ideas but eager to organize a time they found not only that there were no Communist Party in Venezuela. Soon the people in the hills but that there was no professor was bringing friends to the house water either. Canteens empty, they had to for secret meetings with Kornfeder. They come down out of the hills. (Intellectuals are organized the Party. It was a far cry from the not always bright when it comes to practical, proletarian movement that Kornfeder had everyday matters.) been charged with creating, and he was not With their attempts at following Mao’s too proud of the substitute. Its members were doctrine a failure and as aliens to the urban intellectuals from the upper and middle classes proletariat, the Communist intellectuals had of the country. to make their revolution another way. They They had a significant advantage, though, chose urban terror, waged by youth recruited in the tradition of academic freedom accorded from affluent families, in an attempt to destroy universities in Latin America. There the the established order at its center. The univer­ campus is a hallowed place, sacrosanct from sity was their safe-haven base. Students formed police or governmental interference. Thus they an fln brigade on campus, with head­ discovered that the university made an ideal quarters in a dormitory that they renamed safe haven for revolutionary organization. In “Stalingrad.” Each morning the student bri­ effect, the campus became the “remote base” gade, mostly armed with submachine guns, envisioned in Mao’s doctrine—onlv, instead would march out to the flagpole in the center of being in the mountains, it was located right of the campus and raise the fln flag. It was in the heart of the nation’s capital city. What a rather public affair, since main city streets started as an accidental makeshift in Vene­ skirted the campus and were filled with people zuela soon became the fashion in South going to work during these ceremonies. America, with universities becoming the birth­ Between classes and at night the students places and freeholds of various national Com­ indulged in such off-campus thrills as com­ munist parties. mitting murder, kidnapping, bombing, armed By the time of my visit, years later, Vene­ robbery, and intimidation. The police, the zuela had thrown out her dictators. A demo­ government officials, and the foreign com­ cratic regime was in power, one supported munity were the main targets. Policemen by both the workers in the cities and the stopped wearing uniforms while off duty, in­ ranchers in the countryside. The Communist stead changing into them on arrival at the Party had attempted one Maoist-style guer­ station house and then making patrols only rilla action, starting with a base camp in the in pairs or squads. When alone and identifi­ western mountains, only to discover that the able, they were subject to quick death. people living there were not about to join any One night I stayed at the Officers Club in nutty cause to overthrow the government. Caracas. In the early morning hours four The people felt that the government now students drove up to the entrance in a Chrysler belonged to them. They helped the police Imperial, two boys and two girls. One of the chase the Communists out of the mountains. girls stayed at the wheel. The other girl While I was in Venezuela, university stu­ swayed drunkenly up to the sentry at the door, dents took advantage of their mid-year vaca­ put a cigarette to her lips and asked for a tion and made another try at starting a Maoist light. While the sentry was looking at her, guerrilla force. This time they raised the flag one of the boys stepped up behind him and of the National Liberation Front in the Falcon shot him in the back, killing him. The other Hills. The students quickly discovered that boy raced inside the building and tossed a THE OPPOSITE NUMBER 31 grenade into the empty corridor. Then the representatives easily identified by the people students went roaring away in the car. It was —a district chief, a policeman, a military man. a typical action, lasting only brief moments. Any misbehavior by such a government man Despite such urban terrorism over the years was blamed not only on the individual but since then, the revolution has not succeeded also on his boss in Saigon. Diem, Thieu, Ky— in Venezuela. It remains too close to being all the leaders in Saigon—have been subjected simplistic anarchy in a place and time unripe to this type of attack, some quite effectively. for anarchy. In other countries, though, Americans in Vietnam, and through them revolutionaries have done their political home­ the U.S. President, have similarly been targets. work. They are making more sparing and One of the earliest contradictions in Ameri­ more skillfully telling use of urban terror— cans exploited by the Communists was our as an identifiable instrument of their political stated purpose for being in Vietnam. The program, which they have attempted to tie political cadre would tell villagers: “The into popular needs. I expect that we shall Americans claim to be here to protect your get some firsthand experience with urban freedom. But they are liars, as you shall see.” terror in the future, as targets often do. The cadre would then fire on our troops or aircraft. Noting hostile fire, our folks would blast back at the village. There would be N ow we come to the crunch. village casualties. The Communist cadre It is this: How does a country defend itself would then say to the villagers: “See, the against modem guerrilla attack? Americans are not your friends but are your Preliminary to any answers, it is worth enemies. Join us and help drive them out taking a look at the way an enemy defines his of Vietnam.” This happened over and over method of attack. The enemy in Vietnam told again. Some Americans never did learn that, us his, plainly, in just seven words. Le Duan, by this psychological judo, the enemy used one of the leaders in Hanoi, described the our strength to have us hurt ourselves. Communist actions in Vietnam as "exploiting Of course, the perfect defense against a internal contradictions in the enemy camp.” strategy that exploits contradictions is not to We should all think about those seven words. have any contradictions that can be exploited. They give the essence of the strategy that the Since perfection is not a human trait, the United States will encounter in people’s wars. defender should do the next best thing: strive In Vietnam, the Communists clandestinely honestly and vigorously to remedy any weak­ organized a political structure in villages and nesses that make a country’s leadership alien towns. The political cadre in this structure to the people instead of being one that serves spotted contradictions in the political and the people and reflects their will. Graft, economic systems, called them to the atten­ brutality, self-serving and bullying mis­ tion of the people, and exacerbated popular behavior, even overweening autocracy—all feelings about them, getting the people first are weak spots in the defense. If they are not angry about these wrongs and then to hating corrected, the defense remains vulnerable. them. At this point the enemy would get the With clean hands, officials, troops, and police people to join their ranks, to right the wrongs. can join hands with the people, and together These contradictions were acts by political they can rid the body politic of a common and economic leaders that could be portrayed enemy. This is a sound defense. It works. as acts dishonoring the people’s respect for I saw it done in the Philippines. It happened and trust in such leadership. The political in the western mountains of Venezuela, when leadership was especially vulnerable. It had the people refused to help the Communists 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW overthrow the government because they looked for what it actually was, then we in return upon that government as their own. must damage the leaders’ ability to make war. With such a sound defense, the defenders It would put the burden of “to bomb or not can then go into a counterattack, adopt the to bomb” squarely on their shoulders, for all enemy’s strategy and exploit his contradic­ to see. tions. In Vietnam, for instance, the leaders Much the same could be done about in Hanoi keep speaking in the name of the prisoners of war. We can go directly to the people. Yet the people of North Vietnam people of North Vietnam by leaflet. We have had no true choice in selecting anyone could give them the names and status of to speak for them. The only two elections in their thousands of homesick men now pris­ the last 25 years in North Vietnam were con­ oners in the South. We could bluntly tell them trolled ones, in true police-state style. So the that the only thing preventing their seeing position of the leadership in Hanoi is a con­ these men again is the selfishness of their tradiction, vulnerable to attack. The people leaders in Hanoi. We are willing to exchange of North Vietnam and the people of the prisoners; all the North Vietnamese people world could be made to see this—if our side have to do is demand this of their leaders. made the effort. It would be worth it. Hanoi’s Such actions—pitting the people against the leaders planned, prepared, and carried out leaders—are part of the real arsenal of people’s the aggressions in South Vietnam. If they were wars. made to stop doing this, the war would end. Above all, as Americans, let us be true to There are hundreds of ways to carry out our own heritage. We have an ideology that psychological and political attacks against is a rousing battle cry of freedom to people Hanoi’s leadership. Think of what would all around the world—if we serve it faith­ happen if each of our bombing raids against fully. It is stated plainly in our Declaration North Vietnam were undertaken only after of Independence and in the Bill of Rights. publicly announcing a new, specific act of It is our strongest rallying point in a people’s aggression in South Vietnam—an act of war. Free people—and those yearning to be aggression which we honestly identify as hav­ free—are still expecting Americans to uphold ing been ordered by Hanoi: the Communist our finest ideals wherever we serve. Let’s show leaders made a new act of war, we label it them that we can do so! Alexandria, Virginia WINNERS AND LOSERS A Conceptual Barrier in Our Strategic Thinking Dr . Ralph E. Strauch

ONCEPTS of limited strategic conflict for coercion or bargaining purposes have been discussed by strategic theo­ rists for over a decade. Until recently, how­ Cever, these concepts have had little impact on the institutional concepts and images of conflict that provide the foundation for strategic planning within the U.S. defense community. Those concepts and images of conflict have, for the most part, remained centered around general nuclear war (the rapid and massive exchange of most of the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals) and as­ sured destruction (the ability to inflict un­ acceptable damage on the Soviet Union in such an exchange) as a deterrent to general nuclear war. A number of factors, including the recent buildup of Soviet strategic forces, have resulted in increasing concern within the U.S. defense community about the adequacy of these con­ cepts and the ability of our strategic forces to deal with potential future conflict situations. This concern is reflected in President Nixon’s much-quoted questions in his 1970 foreign policy statement: 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Should a President, in the event of a nuclear around a small number of unifying concepts attack, be left with the single option of order­ ing the mass destruction of enemy civilians, and ideas. This is due in part to the need for in the face of the certainty that it would be a simple conceptual framework to serve as followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? an institutional “language” for internal com­ Should the concept of assured destruction be munication. Once adopted, however, the lan­ narrowly defined and should it be the only guage imposes limitations on the issues with measure of our ability to deter the variety of which the institution can deal readily and on threats we may face?1 the way it perceives those issues. Even granting this, however, these institu­ and in 197 l’s answer to that question: tional concepts and images are difficult to I must not be—and my successors must not identify and explicate, and, when identified, be—limited to the indiscriminate mass de­ they appear as grossly oversimplified carica­ struction of enemy civilians as the sole possible tures that almost no one would accept as valid. response to challenges. This is especially so This is because most experienced individuals when that response involves the likelihood of within the defense community possess a richer triggering nuclear attacks on our own popula­ and deeper understanding of the problems tion. It would be inconsistent with the political with which they deal than is reflected in the meaning of sufficiency to base our force plan­ institutional concepts of the community as a ning solely on some finite—and theoretical— whole. In their day-to-day activity, however, capacity to inflict casualties presumed to be this deeper understanding is often set aside, unacceptable to the other side.2 with phrases such as “These considerations I want to explore the thesis that a major are important, but we’ll ignore them for the part of the inflexibility in our current strategic time being” or “This formulation leaves a capabilities stems from the institutional images lot out, but it’s the one everybody uses, so it of strategic conflict which form the founda­ will have to do for now.” As a result, the tion for our defense planning. These images, caricatures become accepted by the institution even of limited strategic conflict, are based on as adequate representations of reality. It is an underlying idea of conflict as a process these caricatures, then, which few individuals that separates the protagonists into a winner in the defense community would accept with­ and a loser according to criteria which both out reservation but which are accepted and accept. This “winner-loser” image is, I believe, used by the community as the “operating inadequate to deal with problems of limited principles” underlying our defense planning, conflict between nations that possess the ability with which this article deals. to destroy each other’s societies. The premise underlying this thesis—that the winner-loser image of conflict there are identifiable institutional concepts and Though the realities are far more complex, images of conflict on which our defense plan­ warfare is commonly thought of as resulting ning rests and that these concepts and images in a clear and unambiguous division of the impose significant constraints on the capabili­ protagonists into a winner and a loser—the ties we realize from our strategic forces—is victor and the vanquished—according to itself subject to question. The validity of the terms of reference that both accept. The con­ premise must be judged on subjective grounds, flict is thought of as terminating when one since there are no objective standards by which protagonist “agrees to lose and to accept to prove or disprove it. I believe it to be valid. the terms imposed upon him by the winner. Organizations and institutions—far more than The winner, in turn, acknowledges this agree­ individuals—tend to adopt and fit themselves ment and imposes the terms he desires. This WINNERS AND LOSERS 35 may occur when the loser has no other option, underlying winner-loser image of warfare. when his military’ forces are effectively de­ Our deterrent is based on ensuring that the stroyed and the winner is in de facto or near Soviet Union would “lose” in a general nuclear de facto control of his territory, or it may war. We translate this into an operationally occur considerably earlier if the loser decides relevant military objective—the “assured de­ that there is no point in continuing. The struction” of the Soviet Union as a function­ defeat of France by Germany in 1940 is an ing society following a Soviet attack—and we example of the latter type, while the later maintain strategic forces sufficient to achieve defeat of Germany in 1945 comes closer to that objective. The fact that our underlying the former. objective is deterrence notwithstanding, then, These perceptions lead easily to a highly we view general nuclear war, for planning simplified “winner-loser” image of conflict, purposes at least, as a winner-loser conflict in which all political considerations are ab­ in which “assured destruction” of the Soviet stracted out, and a “win” is defined by the Union, in spite of Soviet destruction of the achievement of what appear to be the opera­ United States, constitutes a “win.” tionally relevant military goals—destruction Their mutual ability to destroy each other of the opponent’s military forces, occupation induces considerable stability in U.S.-Soviet of his territory, etc. The purpose of the con­ relationships. In spite of that stability, how­ flict, then, and of the military forces employed ever, significant differences and sources of in it can be seen as determining the “winner,” disagreement between the two nations will according to that definition. This image pro­ continue to exist. We cannot ignore the possi­ vides the foundation for most peacetime de­ bility that those differences will lead to con­ fense planning. Winning is defined in terms flicts that must be resolved by military force, of the operational objectives for which it is possibly at the strategic level. Our ability to anticipated that military’ forces would be deal successfully with future strategic conflict applied in conflict, and peacetime defense will depend in part on the adequacy of our planning is directed at attaining the capa­ concepts of conflict when the conflict occurs. bilities needed to achieve those objectives. If we are prepared for only general war, we The objectives, in turn, provide analytical ensure ourselves the position of loser by pro­ yardsticks against which to measure the ade­ viding ourselves with only the alternatives of quacy of the preparation. capitulation or holocaust. The possibility of The label of “winner,” however, seems strategic conflict at less than the general-war unlikely to apply in any reasonable way to level is one we must be prepared to deal with either protagonist in a future U.S.-Soviet if it arises. general nuclear war in which most of the Our current institutional concepts of strate­ arsenals of both sides are used. Each now has, gic conflict at a less-than-total level, whether and seems likely to retain, enough destructive at high levels of counterforce exchange or at power to ensure that, if it is used without low levels of limited strategic conflict, are restraint, the term “loser” would be far more also based heavily on a winner-loser image. appropriate for both sides. This has been an The winner and the loser, perhaps, are defined accepted fact of life since the early 1960s, in less total terms and with significant con­ and for this reason the deterrence of nuclear straints, but nonetheless the image of a well- war, rather than the ability to fight one suc­ defined winner and loser is clear. This image cessfully, has been the primary objective of is conveyed in phrases such as “termination U.S. strategic policy. Even our basic concepts at a relative military advantage” or “he will of deterrence, however, are derived from an quit when his potential losses outweigh his 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW potential gains.” The image carries with it if those objectives can be determined in the implication of the mutually acceptable advance, then the capabilities required to definition of “victory,” or at least of “being achieve them can be identified and procured, ahead,” and the assumption that one side and the war plans to utilize those capabilities would be willing to quit at a time when he can be developed in an orderly and systematic is a “loser” by that definition, but still retains manner. Defense planning, therefore, can be the capability to inflict enormous damage on made into a systematic quantitative process the other. The implicit assumption is often and carried on in a manner which provides made, in effect, that political leaders directing “high confidence” that the objectives of con­ the course of a strategic conflict would do so flict can be adequately met if the conflict according to objectives and criteria which occurs. The “high confidence” apparently pro­ analysts find convenient for evaluating mili­ vided, however, is based on the assumption tary forces. If conflict between nations were of the validity of the winner-loser image. a board game, like Monopoly, with clearly It does not reflect the basic inadequacies of defined rules and mutually accepted methods that image or the degree of confidence which of keeping score, this view would be reason­ one might reasonably place in the likelihood able. Reality, however, is far more complex. that the “objectives” being met would be The same problem and the same situation may reasonable national objectives at a time of look coasiderably different to different people, conflict. or nations. It is sometimes argued that such assump­ strategic conflict as a process of bargaining tions are made for “analytical convenience,” Should a future strategic conflict occur be­ and the results must, of course, be interpreted tween the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it seems in a larger context. This argument would be likely that it would come about as something valid if, in fact, the problems of interpretation neither side really wants but that at least one in a larger context were regularly considered side feels itself forced into, possibly as a result and addressed; but they seldom are. It is of bad judgment or miscalculation by one standard practice in the analysis of strategic or both sides. The minimization of the amount forces and capabilities to perform “sensitivity of force used and the avoidance of escalation analysis” to determine the sensitivity of the to high levels of violence are likely to be major conclusions to variation in the values of the objectives of both sides. The ability of each numerical parameters describing weapon sys­ to assure, at the price of being a loser itself, tems performance. “Sensitivity analysis” of the that the other is also a loser will create sensitivity of the conclusions to the assump­ intense pressure for resolution in a manner tions made about the objectives, motivations, which allows each to claim at least a partial and behavior of the protagonists, however, is win and forces neither to accept a clear-cut performed only infrequently and is rarely loss. done systematically. The conflict is likely to be resolved, then, The winner-loser image is a convenient one not on a “winner-loser” basis but through a on which to base the defense planning process process of bargaining to achieve a mutually in peacetime, and perhaps that fact is a major acceptable outcome, where acceptability is reason for its predominant role in that process. defined in terms of the preservation of broad It assumes that when strategic forces are national interests and objectives. What looks employed in combat they will be employed acceptable at the termination of the conflict, for well-defined, operationally relevant, “mili­ moreover, may be considerably different from tary” objectives. This implies, in turn, that what looked acceptable at the beginning, for WINNERS AND LOSERS 37 both sides. A “final solution” to the under­ Who won, the U.S. or the Soviet Union? lying dispute, in the sense that the victory in In the U.S., a nearly unanimous view seems World War II was a “final solution” to the to be that we did. Soviet offensive missiles German problem, is unlikely. Solutions, in­ were removed from Cuba, and we obtained stead, will be temporary expedients, resolving a clear pledge that they would not be re­ the immediately crucial issues and passing the introduced. Relative to the situation which underlying differences on to the future. would have resulted had the U.S. been unwill­ Whatever settlement is finally reached, each ing or unable to act, therefore, the U.S. was side will accentuate those aspects of the settle­ clearly a winner. Relative to the situation ment which it finds favorable and downplay which would have resulted had no Soviet those wrhich it finds unfavorable. A “winner- attempt to introduce the missiles been made, loser” image seems particularly ill-suited to however, a strong argument can be made for describe (and to prepare for) this form of Soviet victory. In Soviet eyes, the U.S. prob­ conflict. Rather, it should be viewed as a ably represented a real threat to the Castro bargaining process, engaged in reluctantly, regime prior to the crisis. In the spring of at best, by one and perhaps both parties. 1961, the U.S.-supported invasion at the Bay The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 perhaps of Pigs had failed. Following this, sentiment was a prototype of this form of conflict resolu­ ran high in the U.S. in favor of decisive mili­ tion. The Soviet Union attempted the clandes­ tary action against the Castro government. The tine deployment of intermediate-range and objective evidence, coupled with traditional medium-range ballistic missiles to Cuba. The Russian distrust of the West, would have United States discovered this shortly before provided ample grounds for a Soviet assess­ the missiles became operational and placed ment that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was a real a naval quarantine around Cuba to prevent threat. This threat would almost certainly further introduction of strategic offensive have been one of the justifications used when weapons. A settlement was reached in which the decision to introduce the missiles was being the Soviet Union removed its missiles and debated and made. (It is, by the way, the agreed not to reintroduce them, and the justification advanced by Khrushchev in his United States pledged not to invade Cuba. memoirs.)3 The crisis ended with a U.S. The crisis involved a minimal level of pledge not to invade Cuba and with de facto violence. The only combat casualty was an U.S. recognition of Cuba as a Communist Air Force U-2 pilot. The confrontation, none­ stronghold in the western hemisphere, with theless, contained many of the elements that continuing significant Soviet presence there. might be present in a future limited strategic Khrushchev described the settlement in a conflict. U.S. military forces were used—the speech to the Supreme Soviet in December naval forces involved in the blockade. The 1962 as follows: use of other forces—U.S. air power against We declared that if the U.S.A. pledged not Cuba and Soviet submarines against the naval to invade Cuba and also restrained other ally- blockade forces—was threatened, at least in­ states from aggression against Cuba, the So­ directly. The threat of nuclear war hung in viet Union would be prepared to remove from Cuba the weapons the U.S.A. calls “ofjen- the background and significantly affected the sive.” decision processes, and the behavior, of both In reply, the President of the United States, sides. The actions taken by both sides show a for his part, declared that if the Soviet gov­ strong interest in restraining the escalatory ernment agreed to remove these weapons from process and resolving the dispute with a mini­ Cuba, the U.S. government would lift the mum of violence. quarantine, that is to say the blockade, and 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW give assurance of the rejection both by the the military capability to apply a blend of United States and by other countries of the military and political pressures and concessions Western hemisphere of an invasion of Cuba. The President declared in all definiteness, and sufficient to arrive at an acceptable resolution the whole world knows this, that the United with minimal use of force. All three elements States would not attack Cuba and would also —will, skill, and military capability—were restrain its allies from such actions. required, and no two, without the third, would But after all, this was why we had sent our have been sufficient. weapons to Cuba, to prevent an attack on her! It is important to note that neither side Therefore, the Soviet government confirmed attempted to force a resolution in a manner its agreement to withdraw ballistic missiles which would force the other to admit, or from Cuba. accept, a clear loss. The actions of each side Thus, in short, a mutually acceptable settle­ were strongly influenced by the desire to reach ment was reached that signified a victory for a settlement that was acceptable to the other reason and success for the cause of peace. The and to avoid escalation to higher levels of Cuban question moved into the phase of violence. Such a settlement was possible be­ peaceful negotiations and, as concerns the cause each side could and did look at it United States of America, was transferred differently, accentuating the aspects of the there, so to say, from the hands of generals settlement which were to its advantage. It into the hands of diplomats.4 (Emphasis seems likely that these same influences would added.) have continued to work, perhaps even more It has been argued that the outcome of strongly, had higher levels of violence the missile crisis was a significant factor in occurred. It also seems likely that these influ­ Khrushchev’s fall from power. Even if true, ences will be strongly felt in any future strate­ this in no way detracts from the central point gic confrontation or conflict between the U.S. of this argument: that the way out chosen and the Soviet Union. at the time could be interpreted at the time, This mutuality of interest in avoiding gen­ if not as a clear victory, as far less than a eral war and finding a mutually acceptable clear defeat. The interpretation of the out­ resolution of conflict is frequently expressed come as a clear U.S. victory was not, after by describing limited strategic conflict as a all, universal even in this country. There was “non-zero sum game.” That description, how­ significant criticism at the time, and subse­ ever, may obscure the nature of the bargain­ quently, of the President’s noninvasion pledge ing process as much as it illuminates it. The and of his failure to secure the complete re­ idea of a “non-zero sum game” carries with moval of the Soviet presence from Cuba. In it the image of a well-structured problem, spite of this criticism, securing the removal of with the objectives of each side well-defined the missiles was a major U.S. achievement. and unchanging—as well as the relationship The explanation put forth by the strategic between the actions available to each and the folklore, that the U.S. “won” because of our achievement of those objectives. It allows the “strategic superiority,” hardly seems borne out possibility that each side is using a different by the facts. It is far too simplistic. U.S. method of keeping score, but it still assumes actions were too cautious, and too tempered that both are playing the same game. One of by the desire to avoid nuclear war, to support the central features of future conflict may well that explanation. The U.S. was, in fact, be the fact that both sides are playing quite deterred from direct military action against different games for quite different reasons, Cuba, at least until the blockade was tried. and that the perceptions of each side about its What we did have was the will, the skill, and own, as well as its opponent s game, are con- WINNERS AND LOSERS 39 tinuaUy changing. This implies that precon­ dominant. However, the emergence of a ceived images of the nature of the conflict, mutual capability for societal destruction and and of what constitutes acceptable outcomes, the need for restraint which that capability are likely to be inappropriate and possibly imposes require that the bargaining process dangerous, as are military plans derived from aspects of conflict receive greater attention such images. The nature of the dispute, and in peacetime defense planning. Nonetheless, the objectives of both sides, are likely to differ the iastitutional concepts and images of con­ considerably at the start of a conflict from flict on which our defense planning is based the stereotypes held prior to the crisis. Our are still predominantly of the winner-loser ability to resolve future conflicts satisfactorily type. These concepts and images appear to may depend on our ability to modify those provide clear and internally consistent solu­ stereotypes. tions to our strategic problems and yardsticks In the Cuban crisis, the U.S. was able to with which to measure the adequacy of our adapt to the requirements of the situation on strategic capabilities. At the same time, they an ad hoc basis—to overcome the institutional neglect or assume away many uncertainties “winner-loser” bias in our defense planning and ambiguities in the real strategic environ­ and use the inherent capabilities in our mili­ ment and possible deficiencies in our capa­ tary forces to fashion effective tools to resolve bilities to deal with that environment. the crisis acceptably. Our ability to adapt with In the absence of severe strategic crisis, equal success in the future, however, seems these concepts, and the capabilities developed problematic, and to rely on ad hoc adaptation while using them, are subject to no empirical seems dangerous. test. Whether or not they would survive such This suggests the need to develop an alter­ a test, therefore, remains in doubt and is a native “bargaining process” image of conflict matter that must be judged on purely intellec­ that more adequately (and explicitly) reflects tual grounds. (This is, of course, equally true the probable importance of political context in of any alternative, including that proposed future strategic conflict, and to bring this here.) We ask of our strategic forces that they image to bear more explicitly in the peacetime be able to accept the full brunt of a Soviet defense planning process. Such an image attack and respond with the destruction of would put less emphasis on well-defined the Soviet society. We label that test the threats and responses and more emphasis on “worst case.” That test, however, does not providing a range of responses to an ill-defined address, except perhaps indirectly, the under­ spectrum of threats, without attempting to lying goal of defending and preserving our identify a priori the “best” response to any national values and interests. A better “worst particular threat. It would bring into sharper case” test of that might be the ability of our focus the values of diversified, flexible, and strategic forces and institutions to bring us adaptable strategic forces, capable of provid­ through severe (and perhaps prolonged) ing such a range of options and of holding strategic confrontation, possibly involving the options open in the transconflict and post­ use of strategic nuclear weapons, without conflict period as well. leading to either extreme of capitulation or The bargaining-process aspects of conflict the holocaust of general war. Their ability to have always played an important role in the pass that test is less obvious. conduct of conflict, particularly in the last two decades. From the point of view of the military' planner, however, the winner-loser need for institutional and conceptual change characteristics have usually appeared pre­ We tend to think of our military capabilities 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW as determined by our weapon systems and a possibly different response. The set of reason­ our command, control, and communications able formulations and explanations, moreover, (C3) systems. These factors do, indeed, define will change as the conflict progresses, as will the inherent capabilities available to us. The the objectives and criteria for settlement on actual capabilities we can derive from these both sides. The institutional ability to recog­ forces, however, are also affected by our insti­ nize, articulate, and resolve these differences tutions and concepts for using them. The role during a conflict is needed. This ability to of institutional and conceptual factors in deter­ recognize different ways of looking at the mining the limits of our strategic capabilities problem is important to the bargaining receives little attention in our analyses of those process. Final resolution is likely to be brought capabilities, although it is no less important about by achieving a position that is accept­ than the weapon systems or the C3 systems. able to both sides, but possibly for quite If our military institutions believe that limited different reasons. The ability to evaluate the strategic conflict as a method of bargaining is situation from the point of view of the Soviets impossible or unthinkable, they may be unable and to identify ways of bending that point of to deal with such a conflict, regardless of the view to one which is acceptable to us (and adequacy for the task of the weapon systems possibly bending ours to one which is accept­ and the C3 available. able to them) is of major importance. This The major conceptual change required is is not the same as, and in fact may be con­ a broadening of our concepts of strategic siderably different from, bending the Soviet conflict and the uses of strategic forces—a point of view to one which agrees with ours. broadening which, while it need not totally We will want to induce them to accept a reject the winner-loser image of strategic con­ settlement that we find acceptable, not for flict, will also allow for recognition of a bar­ our reasons but for whatever reasons best gaining tool image, as well as the implications induce them to do so. of that image. Chief among these is the explicit The Cuban crisis of 1962 provides not only recognition of the high degree of a priori an example of a compromise settlement ambiguity and uncertainty about strategic reached through a political bargaining process conflict and appropriate forms of strategic but also an illustration of the fact that the force use in conflict. The major institutional important aspects of a strategic confrontation change required is a greater institutional toler­ —and the imperatives requiring (and deter­ ance for ambiguity, the ability to accept and mining) the U.S. response—may be far dif­ live with fundamental ambiguities and uncer­ ferent from those usually addressed in a priori tainties inherent in future strategic conflict. analysis of future strategic contingencies. The institutional propensity to identify those One result of the Soviet deployment of problems for which apparently satisfactory missiles in Cuba, had it been successful, would solutions can be found, and to deal only with have been a change in the balance of strategic those problems and solutions, should be re­ forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. placed with the explicit institutional recogni­ The usual formulations of problems involving tion of the fact that few, if any, strategic changes in the strategic balance, and the need problems have clear and unambiguous formu­ to react to such changes, are in terms of that lations or solutions, at least until they actually balance alone, i.e., in terms of the weapons occur. available to each side and the utility of those Even once a conflict occurs, the nature of weapons in a general nuclear exchange. It has the conflict and the strategic problem it entails been reported that during the Cuban crisis may be seen in various ways, each calling for Secretary of Defense McNamara analyzed WINNERS AND LOSERS 41 the problem in those terms and concluded the actions to be taken, a variety of explana­ that the change in the balance resulting from tions regarding the Soviet reasons for intro­ the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba ducing the missiles into Cuba were considered. would be marginal and would only speed up Only one of these (and one considered among the process of change that would probably the less probable) explained the Soviet be­ take place in a few years in any event. On the havior in terms of strategic balance. basis of this view of the problem, he argued The actions taken by the U.S. during the that no corrective action was necessary and Cuban crisis did not involve the use of that any attempt at corrective action entailing strategic forces in combat. Nonetheless, they significant risks of escalation was undesirable. illustrate many of the characteristics and com­ Regardless of the validity of these argu­ plexities that might be present in a conflict ments in the context of a “strategic balance'’ involving those forces. The military action formulation of the problem, they were some­ finally selected, imposition of the “quaran­ what peripheral to the problem facing the tine,” was chosen more for political than for President. In the weeks preceding discovery military reasons. It was taken not in isolation of the missiles in Cuba, he had drawn a but in combination with a number of diplo­ clear and unmistakable line between offensive matic and political actions, including a tv and defensive weapons and had stated cate­ speech, diplomatic notes, U.N. activity, and gorically that he was unwilling to tolerate the the implicit “threat” of further military action, Soviet deployment of offensive weapons in if required. As the crisis progressed, a number Cuba. He had done this largely to counter of actions were taken to downplay the Soviet domestic criticism from Republican senators, “loss” associated with removal of the missiles. in the belief that the Soviets had no intention Among these were the noninvasion pledge of introducing offensive weapons. Nonetheless, and the dropping of the initial demand for it was done. Because of that position, the on-site inspection of the removal. The objective objective change in the strategic balance was to obtain removal of the missiles, not to caused by the deployment was a secondary force the Russians to concede defeat in remov­ consideration. The credibility of the United ing them. States, and indeed President Kennedy’s per­ The quarantine itself was a course of action sonal credibility as its leader, required the re­ dictated by (and probably successful because moval of the missiles. He was thus under of) the total context of the situation, political pressure from what William Jones has called as well as military. It was chosen after con­ the “Imperial Imperative,” which he describes sideration of a diverse set of operationally dif­ as follows: “Kings do not voluntarily abdi­ ferent alternatives, including diplomatic action cate! When applied to the leader of a nation only, air strike, and invasion as well as other . . . it means that a decision that would variants of naval blockade. It was a course obviously result in a general loss of his control, of action that we possessed the capabilities tantamount to abdication, is a decision that to perform, but it was not an action chosen he will not make no matter how much it to achieve a clearly defined military objective would seem to an outside observer to be in directly relevant to the removal of missiles his nation’s interest.”* At the same time, already in Cuba. It was an option that prob­ Kennedy’s choice of actions during the crisis ably would not have been given much weight was significantly influenced by his desire to in any precrisis contingency planning process. allow Khrushchev a “way out” within the This suggests a need for considerable flexi­ terms of Khrushchev’s “Imperial Imperative.” bility to react to the requirements of the During the course of the debate concerning situation in contingencies requiring strategic 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW force use. That this need can be adequately of which are unacceptable for reasons he met by detailed preplanning of strategic opera­ ignored. tions, no matter how extensive, seems doubtful. The change in our strategic capabilities that What seems required instead is the develop­ this conceptual shift might bring about can ment of a variety of “building blocks” for be summarized by contrasting a caricature of strategic force use, capable of being put to­ our current position with one that might gether in a manner appropriate to the overall result from a shift to a bargaining process context of the problem and the national objec­ image. With some, but perhaps not excessive, tives at the time the need occurs. An institu­ distortion of reality, the position of the mili­ tional capability for evaluating all aspects of tary establishment with respect to the strategic the situation and developing appropriate capabilities it provides the President may be strategic options in light of the total situation summarized as follows: as it occurs is also needed. This requires a Mr. President: We have identified a set of high institutional tolerance for ambiguity, a possible objectives for which you might desire tolerance which must be carefully nurtured to employ strategic forces. We are prepared, and developed, since the normal tendency for at your direction, to accomplish those objec­ any organization is to attempt to structure tives within the capabilities of the forces we and perform its function in a way that mini­ possess. If the need arises, you need only select mizes uncertainty and ambiguity. the objective which meets your needs and give The objection can be raised, of course, that, us the word. We will take care of the rest. in developing the ability to look beyond the “military” aspects of force application and In peacetime, when the possibility of conflict consider the political implications as well, the seems remote and the President’s primary con­ military planner is overstepping the bounds cern about the strategic forces is that they of his responsibility and moving into areas provide an adequate deterrent, this position which rightfully belong to the politicians. At is satisfactory. It may not remain so, however, one time this might have been a valid objec­ in a crisis when he must seriously consider the tion, but this is no longer true. The nature use of strategic force. At that time he is of future strategic conflict will demand, con­ likely to find that neither the objectives pro­ sideration of all aspects of strategic force use, vided for nor the means proposed to accom­ including those usually considered “nonmili­ plish them are very well matched to his tary.” The resolution of political questions needs. This deficiency is reflected in Robert and the final selection of the option to be Kennedy’s description of President Kennedy’s implemented will remain the prerogative of impressions of the military following the Cuban the political leadership, specifically the Presi­ crisis: dent. In order to provide adequate options But he was distressed that the representa­ to the political leadership, however, the mili­ tives with whom he met, with the notable tary planner must take into account the politi­ exception of General Taylor, seemed to give so little consideration to the implications of cal context in which that decision must be the steps they suggested. They seemed always made. If he fails to do so, the military planner to assume that the Russians and Cubans is making the implicit, but nonetheless real, would not respond or, if they did, that a war judgment that that context is unimportant was in our national interest.B (Emphasis and can be neglected. That judgment is un- added.) supportable. In so doing, moreover, he runs the risk of providing the political leadership Similar mistrust marks the description of the with an insufficient range of alternatives, all meeting of the National Security Council at WINNERS AND LOSERS 43 which final arguments for a blockade and conflict, and the uncertainties inherent in it, we cannot make any a priori guarantees of military attack were discussed: success. At the same time, we believe we can The discussion, for the most part, was able provide strategic capabilities which may prove and organized, although like all meetings of to be politically relevant bargaining tools in this kind, certain statements were made as extremis and which will enhance your capa­ accepted truisms, which I, at least, thought bilities to achieve an acceptable settlement were of questionable validity. One member of and avoid escalation to general war. the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, argued that we could use nuclear weapons, on the I am not proposing this conceptual shift basis that our adversaries would use theirs as a way of making nuclear war more accept­ against us in an attack. I thought, as I listened, able or of justifying the use of nuclear weapons of the many times that I had heard the mili- to settle disputes that could otherwise be tary take positions, which, if wrong, had the resolved without resort to war. Rather, I am advantage that no one would be around at the suggesting it as a way of looking at conflict end to know.7 (Emphasis added.) which might provide greater opportunity for The objective validity of such views may containment and avoidance of escalation, be subject to dispute. Nevertheless, they may should war come about as a result of circum­ be held by a future President or some of his stances beyond our control. This requires, I closest advisers at a time of serious strategic believe, that we view the use of military forces confrontation. If the President finds the mili­ as an inherently undesirable, but occasionally tary options presented to him inadequate, he necessary, tool of policy, which should be used has three choices: First, he can forego the as carefully and sparingly as possible. This use of military force altogether and accept attitude toward the use of military force was whatever losses that entails. Second, he can eloquently expressed by the Chinese philoso­ accept one of the proffered options in spite pher Lao-tse over two thousand years ago: of the risks. Third, he can attempt to put Where armies are, thorns and brambles grow. together an appropriate response on an ad hoc The raising of a great host basis at the time, if necessary against the Is followed by a year of dearth. advice of his military advisers. This was the Therefore a good general effects his purpose course chosen in the Cuban missile crisis. and then stops; he does not take further These alternatives seem inadequate in view advantage of his victory. of the wide range of capabilities inherent in Fulfills his purpose and does not glory in what our forces. The inadequacy is traceable to the he has done; Fulfills his purpose and does not boast of what basic military position I have summarized. An he has done; alternative military position might be reached Fulfills his purpose, but takes no pride in what through changes in our strategic concepts and he has done; institutions along the following lines: Fulfills his purpose, but only as a step that Mr. President: We know that you would could not be avoided.8 prefer not to have to employ strategic forces, but we recognize that contingencies making The course I am suggesting involves a such employment necessary may arise. Our significant shift of emphasis in our strategic forces have a wide range of inherent capabili­ concepts that requires a rejection of the neat, ties, and should such a contingency arise, we clear-cut, high-confidence answers to our stand ready to assist you in identifying and strategic problems which our current concepts selecting appropriate strategic force options. appear to provide. At the same time it entails Because of the political nature of this type of an acceptance of the fact that no clear-cut, 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW high-confidence answers really exist. It requires prove inadequate, should the empirical test the acknowledgment of higher levels of risk arise. By acknowledging the difficulty of the in strategic conflict than do our current con­ questions, it would decrease our confidence cepts. It might produce, however, a lowering in our answers but would provide us with of the actual levels of risk we face—by lessen­ a better chance of having asked the right ing the chances that our capabilities would questions. Washington, D.C.

Notes 1. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for Peace, A 5. William M. Jones, Predicting Insurgent and Governmental Deci­ Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, February 18, 1970, p. 122. sions: The Power Bloc Model, The RAND Corporation, RM-6358-PR, 2. United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's, Building for Peace, December 1970, p. 12. a second annual review by Richard Nixon of U.S. foreign policy in 6. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban a message to the Congress, February 25, 1971. Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton & Co.. Inc., 1969). p. 119. 3. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, 7. Ibid., p. 48. Brown and Co., 1970) , pp. 492—95. 8. Lao-tse. Tao Te Ching, Chapter XXX, translated by Arthur 4. Speech to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in December 1962, Waley in The Way and Its Power (New York: Grove Press, Inc., reported in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XIV, No. 49 1958). (January 2, 1963) . r, K i m l: X

QUO VADIS?— THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND AIR POWER

Colonel Robert L. Gleason N 25 August 1970 Brigadier General that “in cases involving other types of aggres­ Robert N. Ginsburgh, in an address sion we shall furnish military and economic to the Air War College, squarely assistance when requested in accordance with posed one of the more salient issuesour that treaty commitments. But we shall look O military planners must face in the topost- the nation directly threatened to assume Vietnam war period when he said of the Nixon the primary responsibility of providing the Doctrine: manpower for its defense.”2 It is in this area The doctrine, of course, is still open to that the usaf may find its greatest challenge interpretation. If we will no longer undertake and its greatest opportunity to contribute to all the defense of the free world, how much the fulfillment of the Nixon Doctrine in the will we undertake? How will it actually be years ahead. Therefore, this article addresses implemented? How do our allies suddenly the “other types of aggression” and, more gain the strength to carry their share of the specifically, the problem of subversive insur­ defense burden and what is their share? Be­ gency—whether primarily internal in nature cause these questions have yet to be answered or externally stimulated and supported. and the Nixon Doctrine actually put to the One of the most popular theses adopted test, there is also a question of whether or not by today’s writers and political philosophers it will really work.1 is the “No more Vietnams.” Briefly stated, This statement should create an emotion run­ this thesis holds that the United States has ning from anxiety to near panic. For, if the found the Vietnam war so painful in terms Nixon Doctrine will not “really work,” then of casualties, cost, and internal political turbu­ what are the alternatives? The purpose of this lence that in the foreseeable future no Ameri­ article is not to examine possible alternatives can political leader will dare hazard another but to concentrate on the military equations involvement of this kind. of the Nixon Doctrine and suggest ways in Candidly recognizing the widespread un­ which the Air Force can assist in assuring that popularity in which the present conflict is no alternative is necessary. held by the American public, one is prompted The Nixon Doctrine lays down in some to muse over the question of just what con­ detail the basic pattern of U.S. foreign policy ditions must be satisfied before an armed and the tenor of relationships with foreign conflict involving U.S. forces will be at least governments in the years ahead. These rela­ accepted by the American people. tionships as articulated by the President on From our experiences in the four major Guam in November 1969 have three basic wars of this century (World War I, World elements. War II, Korea, and Indochina) and our The first of these, that “the United States exposure to several near-war involvements will keep all treaty commitments,” represents (Lebanon, Cuba, Dominican Republic), it an end or goal. appears that at least one (and preferably The second element states that “we shall more) of three general conditions must be provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens fairly obvious to the American public before the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a it indorses or even tacitly accepts its govern­ nation whose survival we considered vital to ment’s military involvement in a foreign our security and the security of the region conflict: as a whole.” (1) The vital interest of the United States The third element presents a formula for must be at stake. intergovernmental relations—and also con­ (2) The conflict permits a clear-cut mili­ tains a strong military obligation: it states tary victory; or QUO VADIS?—NIXON DOCTRINE AND AIR POWER 47 (3) If the conflict does not involve a vitaldeterrence. The former alternative is highly U.S. interest and its nature indicates that it impracticable, for World War II and events will be protracted and its outcome uncertain thereafter have thrust the U.S., willing or or nebulous, it must be conducted as a counter­ unwilling, into the position of singular leader­ insurgency operation with the U.S. participa­ ship of the Free World. The latter alternative tion confined to truly low-profile activities. has been erased by the entry of the U.S.S.R. World War II is an example of a conflict and Communist China into the nuclear club. satisfying the first condition. Our actions in regard to the Berlin and Cuban crises meet both the first and second conditions. U.S. implementation problems of the Nixon Doctrine action regarding Lebanon in 1958 and Presi­ To develop and explain a concept is one thing; dent Kennedy’s deployment of the U.S. to implement it is something else. The basic Marines into Thailand in response to a threat logic of the Nixon Doctrine cannot be to Laos in 1962 also loosely fit the second attacked. Its conceptual tenet has been voiced criterion. Vietnam circa 1961-63 and our by other Presidents in earlier times. President extensive assistance to numerous Latin Ameri­ Kennedy also was obviously well aware of this can nations are plausible examples where the concept and the frustrations associated with third condition prevailed. Unfortunately, Viet­ attempts to implement it. In a 1963 comment nam—like the man who came to dinner— on the Vietnam situation he said: did not remain transient in nature, nor did They want a force of American troops. U.S. involvement remain low-profile. Neither They say it’s necessary in order to restore con­ did the general U.S. population sustain a fidence and maintain morale. But it will be conviction that our vital interests were at just like Berlin. The troops will march in; stake or that victory, in the accepted sense, the band will play; the crowds will cheer; and in four days everyone will have forgotten. was attainable. Then we will be told that we will have to Rather, as the conflict continued, Defense send in more troops. It’s like taking a drink. costs rose, and the opportunity for a clear The effect wears off and you have to take military victory in the generally accepted sense another. continued to fade. Also, national frustration increased, and our initial disillusionment He also emphasized that the war in Vietnam gradually changed to dissatisfaction. Finally, can be won only as long as it is a South dissatisfaction gave way to outright dissent. Vietnam war: “If it is converted to a white This, then, is the background against which man’s war, the United States will lose as the the Nixon Doctrine was promulgated. The French have lost.”3 Doctrine represents a reinstilled hope that the President Nixon was obviously aware of U.S. will eventually find the key to a method the problems of implementation when he com­ of fulfilling its responsibilities as leader of the mented that “certainly the objective of any Free World—especially regarding the insur­ American administration would be to avoid gency-vulnerable emerging nations—but will another war like Vietnam any place in the do so in a manner that will not strain the world. . . . ” Mr. Nixon said it was very easy fabric of our own society. Failing this, we to say that but to develop the policies to avoid must accept the equally undesirable alterna­ it was taking an enormous amount of his tives of reverting either to a pre-World War own time and that of his associates/ II policy of military isolationism or to the Implementation of the military assistance post-World War II policy of international aspects of the Nixon Doctrine will require at brinkmanship through reliance on nuclear least three basic executive judgments. First, 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW a judgment must be made as to which of the nation cannot always be expected to be in­ many insurgency-vulnerable nations are suffi­ fallible. Further, the conditions existing at the ciently vital to U.S. interests to warrant initial moment of decision will oftentimes undergo or increased U.S. military assistance. change. Therefore, in the event that increased After determination is made as to which U.S. aid does not subdue or at least arrest the insurgency-vulnerable countries, individually insurgency condition, another clear ‘“go-no- or collectively, hold a high U.S. interest index, go” judgment must be made somewhere down a second judgment is called for. If the degree the line. This decision point should allow the of military support rendered by the U.S. is U.S. to withdraw from its involvement with­ contingent on the effort of the subject country out loss of prestige or, alternatively, provide (and the President has stated that “America a base for significantly increasing our commit­ cannot and will not conceive all the plans, ment, depending on the vitalness of the issue design all the programs, execute all the deci­ to U.S. security. In the event of such an sions and undertake all the defense of the free escalation on our part, it should be a con­ nations”),5 then how do we make an accurate scious, readily recognized step. The total risk judgment regarding the true extent of a given should be examined in detail, restrictions on country’s ability and potential to conduct the military operations that may stem from politi­ military aspects of counterinsurgency? cal realities should be identified, and profes­ Later another decision must be made: sional military opinions on their effects should whether to continue, increase, or phase out be sought. If after such a political/military our military assistance. Of course, this will examination we decide to deepen our commit­ depend on whether the insurgency is arrested ment, this step will not have been the result or escalated; and, if escalated, what will be of an obscured process in which the full extent the cost and impact of our continued involve­ of our involvement was not immediately ob­ ment, chance for success, etc. One can expect vious. President Nixon recognized the impor­ that the accuracy of these decisions will be tance of this planning when he stated that no better than the information upon which we must “avoid that creeping involvement they are based. that eventually simply submerges you.”6 In the past, information on a friendly The ultimate success of the Nixon Doctrine foreign nation’s military potential has been depends not only on its conceptual ingredients compiled from reports submitted through the but also on the adequacy and accuracy of the attache and Military Assistance Advisory military information available to high-level Group ( maag) systems. However, these decision-makers. sources may not be adequate to support the The answer to these problems can be par­ fine-focus decisions required by the Nixon tially provided through a revitalization and Doctrine in the future. In many cases, attache expansion of the Mobile Training Team and maag data also reflect the prevailing (mtt) concept employed by the usaf Special viewpoint of the host country’s military and Operations Forces (sof). However, before governmental leaders. Occasionally these directly applying the sof potential to the assessments tend to be influenced by the fact above, let us pause and examine the recent that the maag is also charged with the respon­ history of usaf efforts in counterinsurgency sibility of developing adequate host country ( COIN ) . military capabilities. Even with the best of precommitment in­ formation available to a President, the decision recent USAF special warfare history to actually assist an insurgency-beleaguered The movement by the usaf into the insur­ QUO VADIS ?—NIX ON DOCTRINE AND AIR POWER 49 gency spectrum of warfare was not a random sive command and control and management whim to preserve for itself a novel scarf-and- systems. To achieve its present pinnacle of goggles role of the World War II type of professionalism, sac was blessed with more flying. The action was a result of National than just the genius of General Kenney, Security Council policy, which in 1961 was General LeMay, and their staffs. It also promulgated to all agencies of the federal enjoyed the indispensable element of time. government as U.S. national policy vis-a-vis On the other hand, the saw forces were the counterinsurgency threat existing in the barely formed and equipped with “first guess” vast underdeveloped countries of the world. aircraft when they were thrust into an environ­ This policy was, of course, our counterthrust ment that became the dominant influence in to the U.S.S.R. foreign policy challenge em­ their further development. Unfortunately, the bodied in the now famous “wars of liberation” major characteristic of this influence has been dictum proclaimed by Khrushchev. The a sharp tendency towards orthodoxy: the con­ specific missions of the original usaf coin stant attempt to fight wars in a manner in unit, the 4400th Combat Crew Training which we feel comfortable and which has Squadron (later enlarged and designated the proven successful in the past. This tendency Special Air Warfare Center, eventually be­ has continued until, in the later years in coming the Special Operations Forces), were Southeast Asia, about the only difference be­ not immediately obvious even to the original tween saw and conventional forces was the cadre. Unfortunately, shortly after its forma­ age of the aircraft assigned to each. Although tion and long before it had an opportunity to some consider Vietnam as a limited war and fully develop and test sound doctrine and others as a counterinsurgency war, our tactics concepts, this original coin unit was immersed and strategy have been by and large conven­ in the Vietnam war. From that point on, its tional, utilizing both general purpose and saw entire modus operandi within Southeast Asia forces. Therefore, when we speak of the role ( sea) was tailored to general purpose force and contribution of Special Air Warfare vis-a- use. vis the Nixon Doctrine, we refer not to the Perhaps a valid contrast can be drawn contemporary role of saw in South Vietnam between the evolution of Strategic Air Com­ but rather to what it has done in Latin mand (sac) and the Special Air Warfare America, Thailand, Ethiopia, and other places. (saw) Center. One may ponder what would Examples of sof accomplishments are be the nature of sac today if, say, six months manifold. Early in the troubles in Southeast after its initial formation it had been totally Asia, sof forces (then called air commandos) committed to either a strategic or protracted established an intense and austere training limited war. Would it ever have developed program in Thailand to train the pilots of the concepts and doctrine, procedures and the almost defunct Royal Lao Air Force. As tactics that characterize sac as being one of an immediate result of this training, the rlaf the finest, most efficient military organizations fully supported the Royal Lao Army in blunt­ in existence? Those who were part of sac ing a major Pathet Lao offensive and allowed in its youth remember the trials and the errors the government forces to successfully launch and the retrials that led to its present status. a counterattack, now known as Operation It took years to develop and refine such sub­ Triangle. This was a classic example of trans­ elements as crew selection, training and quality ferring the knowledge and expertise of usaf control procedures, its flight formation and tactical air operations to a friendly air force penetration tactics, customized supply and without exposing a single American to com­ maintenance procedures, and highly respon­ bat, thereby minimizing the chances of U.S. Civic action by U.S. Air Force and Army Special Forces helps the people of developing countries to help themselves: Natives of Los Uveros, Panama, clear an airstrip that opens up their village to the outside world. . . . A tractor, paradropped, facilitates small construction jobs in village after village. . . . A medical team (opposite) introduces the people to health care.

involvement. This sof accomplishment was Panama. In one week the Special Forces nco singled out by high U.S. and Lao govern­ had three men checked out on operating the mental dignitaries as being a significant major tractor, though the indigenous people had step in preserving Laotian independence at never operated any mechanical engine. On a most critical time. this occasion a strip suitable for the C-123 In Latin America, accomplishments of the was molded out of the jungle. The plan was Special Operations Forces in civic action then to fly the tractor out, but so many other are notable. One instance, Operation Pista, small construction jobs were proposed by the occurred in 1963. In this demonstration the villagers that the tractor was passed from natives of a jungle village that was isolated village to village over the next several from land lines of communication were en­ years and maintained by airdropped logistical listed through the medium of airborne loud­ support. speakers to construct a lightplane strip, thereby On many occasions these Special Opera­ opening their village to commercial air travel. tions programs were applauded and personally An extension of this technique was carried observed by the presidents of Panama, the out under the guidance of Brigadier General Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Gilbert L. Pritchard, first commander of the Ecuador, although the programs were given usaf Special Air Warfare Center. In this little local area publicity. In fact the sine qua project the usaf Special Forces paradropped non of combined U.S./host country civic a small tractor, together with a U.S. Army action programs is to subdue the U.S. profile Special Forces civic action expert, into a large and magnify the participation of the host but completely isolated village in central country military personnel. On the other hand, discreet, properly oriented local publicity pro­ examined in depth. Based on this survey and operation of the indigenous population. In in conjunction with host country military grams are most effective in gaining the co- personnel, a customized training program is manv respects, these episodes are concrete structured. Normally this will consist of a examples of the Nixon Doctrine in action six- to nine-week program involving both before the Nixon Doctrine era. uniservice and—most important—joint train­ ing. A host country civic action program will normally be part of each exercise. It is from the anatomy of an SOF COIN M TT this pretraining survey that the first in-depth The concept followed by the sof in these and accurate appraisal of a specific country’s examples, and one that can provide the great­ actual coin capability begins to emerge. est complement to the Nixon Doctrine, is Concurrent with and following the survey, that of the Mobile Training Team. the local military conducts a well-planned, The first step in fielding an mtt is to low-toned public relations program to con­ conduct a joint survey, usually accomplished vince the people that the project will benefit by a usafsof officer and a U.S. Army them and improve their standard of living. Special Forces officer. The survey is con­ The people become more receptive to the ducted in-country and examines all aspects idea, and the program becomes more success­ of the host country military’s ability to conduct ful and better remembered by the recipients. joint counteriasurgency operations. Operation, Then an mtt team is formed and deployed maintenance, supply, communications, and to an operational site within the host country. command and control procedures are all Unlike the maag’s, which must of necessity 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW operate close to the indigenous air force head­ the mtt closes with graduation exercises in­ quarters (and the large cities), the mtt site cluding a 3- to 5-day joint field exercise is usually located in a more isolated portion (ftx). This is the phase that usually attracts of a country. The usaf element of the mtt the attention and often the attendance of the is tailored to meet the specific requirements highest governmental officials within the host of the host country as identified by the survey. government. It may (or may not) contain a strike element, While many virtues of the mtt type of an airlift element, and several support instruc­ training are fairly obvious, some of the most tors, e.g., forward air control (fac), combat important are not. Besides the intrinsic value control, communications, maintenance. Even of almost any training, there are four unique with this support package, the team is rather aspects of mtt’s that are more important austere, seldom exceeding 10 to 15 people. than others: The training is normally conducted in three • First is the fact that this training is phases. First, both the usa and usaf elements conducted in the same environment in which of the team provide uniservice training to the host country may at some future time be raise the proficiency of the students. This is called upon to conduct actual counterinsur­ followed by a joint training phase. Finally, gency operations. Further, the training for the

The 605th Air Commando Squadron (Composite) displays equipment and armament to a group of Latin American officers as part of its mission of training aircrews in COIN air operations. QUO VADIS?—NIXON DOCTRINE AND AIR POWER 53 most part is conducted in host country air­ Army Special Forces joint mtt first arrived in craft, maintained by their own mechanics and the Dominican Republic in 1963, Dominican supplied with ordnance and fuel processed Republic army officers were not allowed un­ through a locally established logistical system. escorted on San Isidro air force base while In many cases austere bombing and gunnery at the same time foreign air forces (usaf) ranges must be constructed before training were openly accepted and given free run of even commences, but then these facilities can the base. Similar deep-seated interservice hos­ sustain follow-on training programs after the tilities were evident in other Latin American mtt departs. countries. In one memorable example the This approach contrasts with a stateside- commanders of the national air force and based tactical training program for foreign army were cajoled by the usaf/ usa mtt officers, in which foreign nationals would fly commander into playing golf together for the U.S. aircraft, maintained by the world’s best first time in their lives. The event went off mechanics and supported by a very affluent amiably, though it was later discovered that and efficient logistical base, and train on the air force chief, still not sure of the atmos­ highly sophisticated and instrumented train­ phere, was carrying a loaded Sten gun in his ing ranges. Furthermore, when training is golf bag! Obviously this kind of traditional conducted in the U.S., normally only the pi­ prejudice cannot be reversed in a six-week lots benefit, and in most cases they are already period; however, mtt’s do provide an oppor­ the strongest element of the foreign air force. tunity for a form of communication between By contrast, when the training is conducted the dignitaries of different services, and this in the host country all members of the local may plant the first kernel of understanding. air force benefit. Stated another way, a cardi­ • A coin mtt can be conducted either nal aspect of coin training is the need to pro­ before or during actual counterinsurgency ac­ vide a realistic environment. It follows that, tivity; in the latter event, the team provides inasmuch as foreign military personnel will a ready vehicle for expanding U.S. materiel never conduct actual counterinsurgency in the assistance without raising the U.S. profile. U.S., stateside training holds less practical There are many examples in which this has value. been done with results quite different from • A second aspect of coin operation those we witnessed in Vietnam. The Thailand is its jointness, which dictates that training experience mentioned previously is a case in not only involve the host country but also point. Similarly, Special Operations expertise emphasize the support these forces can render and some equipment (mostly airborne loud­ to their various paramilitary and civilian in­ speaker sets) were used to good advantage stitutions. An unexpected by-product of past in defeating the Communist attempts to dis­ joint usaf/ usa mtt’s has been their impact rupt the Venezuelan national election of 1964. in instilling in the host country’s institutions As in Thailand, no U.S. military personnel an awareness of the need for and value of were directly involved; but through the use joint operations, especially in instances where of airborne loudspeaker equipment, the Vene­ long-standing culturally and politically based zuelan Air Force assured the villagers that animosities exist between different services or they could vote for the candidate of their between the military and nonmilitary police choice without fear of Communist terrorist elements. Some of the brightest moments in reprisals. As a result of this visible manifesta­ past Special Forces mtt experience came as tion of their government’s presence and confi­ the result of breaking through these service dence, a record voter turnout occurred, and animosities. For example, when the usafsof/ democratic aims were well served. 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

• Finally, one must recognize the psy­ sof/ sf mtt, provides a most useful tool for chological value of the U.S. maintaining a maag’s to gauge the effectiveness of their professional rapport with these “frontier” mili­ overall training and equipage programs. tary establishments and the necessity to do so in a manner that will not encourage emerging characteristics of the Special Operations Force nations to concentrate on sophisticated high- If the usafsof has the potential to assist ma­ performance prestige aircraft, sof mtt’s can terially in the implementation phase of the accomplish this both by example and through Nixon Doctrine, what then are some of the their face-to-face instruction. most important characteristics that it should One may logically ask, Are not these the possess in order to maximize its contribution? normal functions and duties of the Air Force First, it must not be considered as part of our Section of the maag or Military Mission? The general purpose combat forces, and this dif­ answer is yes, but only to a degree. First, the ferentiation should be clearly recognized. This in-country duties of U.S. Military Mission and is important for two reasons: Military Group personnel are of such a na­ (1) The involvement of sof units should ture that only a minor portion of their time not carry with it the implication of commit­ can be allocated to the direct training func­ ment of U.S. combat units. tion. Unfortunately, a considerable amount of (2) This cleavage between Special Opera­ their effort is spent administering a rather tions Forces and conventional forces should complicated Military Assistance Program be great enough to preclude the tendency to (map), conducting visitors around the coun­ augment the sof effort by adding small ele­ try, and responding to the legitimate but nu­ ments of general purpose forces, which in our merous requests from other elements of the eyes may be doing no more than helping the country team. Additionally, maag advisers are counterinsurgency effort. Unless we do pre­ normally on a two- or three-year tour (for clude this creeping involvement, we may sud­ good and meritorious reasons), which obvi­ denly find that, as President Nixon said, it is ously involves continuous association with the “submerging” us. host country air force personnel. As a result The second characteristic of the sof, opti­ they sometimes become conditioned to accept mized to support the Nixon Doctrine, is that attitudes and standards that have long pre­ its primary mission should be to develop coin’s vailed in that country, thus dulling their ob­ tactics and doctrine and to train others in this jectivity and ability to examine situations skill. In effect, we should pick up and con­ critically. This is not unique to the military— tinue where we left off before the distorting the same situation is a problem in U.S. em­ effects of Vietnam set in. When sof elements bassies.7 Further, the Air Missions and maag’s arrive in a country, they should not operate normally contain only a few operational types, as a tactical unit intended to augment the host and their backgrounds may include very little air force. Rather, their modus operandi should experience in countering low-order insur­ de-emphasize their operational combat role. gency. Finally, as a result of the professional President Nixon addressed this problem head isolation inherent in their assignment, they on when he stated: cannot be expected to keep abreast of the We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency We are an impatient people. Instead of teach­ techniques employed in other parts of the ing someone else to do a job, we like to do it world. From past experience there is little ourselves and this trait has been carried over doubt that a well-conducted six- to eight-week into our foreign policy. . . . When you are coin training program, administered by a joint trying to assist another nation defend its free­ QUO VADIS?—NIXON DOCTRINE AND AIR POWER 55 dom, US policy should be to help them fight assignments to maag’s, milgroups, missions, as the war, but not to fight the war for them. . .. air attaches, etc. This arrangement would We shall look to the nation directly threatened have the bonus effect of providing the usaf to assume the primary responsibility of provid­ with an in-depth pool of special area-oriented ing the manpower for its defense. . . .8 and cross-culturally trained individuals who To do this, of course, requires high selectivity would be retained in the field and thus reduce in the assignment of personnel—people who the cost of preparing new people for these can subdue their natural “do-it-yourself” in­ special assignments. stincts and still retain their dedication and Under such an arrangement, one could vis­ enthusiasm. ualize the following sequence of assignments The programmed aircraft equipment (both in the career of a young sof officer: He would fixed and rotary wing) for the future Special first be assigned to a conus sof unit, for ex­ Operations Forces should certainly be compat­ ample, the Latin American sof squadron. ible with the environment in which they will After his language and area training, he would operate and should be readily available via probably serve on several mtt’s in Central or map allocation. In this regard, a kind of “in­ South America. Later he would be selected stant map” concept could be employed. Rec­ for a pcs assignment to a Latin American ognizing that the cost of fully equipped indige­ Military Group or maag. Upon completion of nous coin units is not within the realm of a two- or three-year tour (under this arrange­ feasibility for many of these countries, sof ment, shorter pcs tours could be accommo­ could retain an equipment pool within its own dated), he would be replaced by another sof resources. Then when it was decided to assist officer, return to the conus sof squadron, a key country and to require equipment be­ and perhaps serve as an mtt commander or yond the capabilities of the recipient nation, sof staff officer. Later, as he reached a higher a special aid grant could transfer some of the grade, he might be selected for an assistant air sof equipment to the affected country, to­ attache assignment. This pattern could con­ gether with a training package. Again, rigid tinue throughout an officer’s career, with him controls would be required to assure that moving alternately up in rank and back and countries would not create emergencies in or­ forth between sof and in-country pcs der to obtain a dose of “instant coin map.” assignments. However, with a viable and hard-nosed mtt The key to such a future sof program is program, we would have the means to vali­ to keep it small and selective. It should never date aid requests. be placed in a position of competing with the There are many possible postures for the conventional forces for large dollar allocation. post-Vietnam Special Operations Forces. We It would have to be given at least parity could create and maintain several sof groups consideration for the quality of assigned peo­ or squadrons stationed in the continental ple. Most important, those selected for an sof United States, each trained and oriented to­ career must be recognized and enjoy advance­ wards a particular geographic area of the ment commensurate with non-soF specialties. world. Their training should include studies Perhaps the most important characteristic in the language and in the cultural, religious, of a postwar usafsof would be a dispensation economic, and political history of their re­ from orthodoxy and a granting, in its stead, spective areas of responsibilities. These squad­ of freedom to develop both tactics and hard­ rons would man the mtt units sent tdy to the ware in an atmosphere of no sacred cows and various areas, and they could also provide a no compulsion to adhere to parochial patterns. pool of individuals that could be tasked for In this regard, candid introspection concern­ 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ing our overall experience in South Vietnam act as a focal point and clearinghouse for all (as separate from the bombing campaign in Free World ideas and concepts on the appli­ the North) tells us that we still have a lot cation of air power to insurgency situations. to learn about the use of air power in counter­ These concepts can be transplanted to any insurgency and counterguerrilla warfare. Nor area of the world, when they are needed and are we the first to come to this realization. when our vital interest dictates some U.S. French General G. J. M. Chassin, Air Officer response. Commanding, Far East, reflecting on his early Indochina experiences (1951-54), listed as the first “eternal law” of counterinsurgency T he record of the Western World in arrest­ warfare the belief that “when offensive weap­ ing insurgencies without becoming deeply in­ ons make a sudden advance in efficiency, the volved has been spotty. Our very first expo­ reaction of the side which has none is to sure to the Indochina affair in 1954, following disperse, to thin out, to fall back on medieval the disastrous French experience, was a very guerrilla tactics which would appear childish cautious announcement by President Eisen­ if they did not rapidly prove to have excellent hower that “some airplane mechanics . . . results.” 9 who would not be touched by combat” had Developments typified by the AC-47 gun- been sent to Vietnam.10 But as President ship, low-cost mobile sensor systems, and Nixon said, somewhere along the line we be­ unique applications of helicopters should be came impatient. The patience, the controls, the sof stock-in-trade. Contrary to some be­ and a finer sense of appreciation of guerrilla liefs, this last item, if applied to sof, is not in and counterguerrilla warfare are the stock-in- conflict with any roles and missions agree­ trade of special air warfare. The preservation ments we have with other services. Further, as and contribution of our usaf Special Opera­ most of the helicopters in less-developed na­ tions Forces in the postwar era can be a key tions are in their air forces (not in their element in answering the question: Quo vadis, armies), this aspect of future sof operations Nixon Doctrine? is most important. In short, the usafsof can Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Notes 1. Robert N. Ginsburgh, “U.S. Goals, Priorities, and Means,'* in 5. US Foreign Policy of the Future, Department of State Bulletin Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, SAFOII, No. 1656. March 22. 1971. March 1971. p. 19. 6. Hearings, p. 247. 2. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations United 7. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little. Brown and States Senate, Ninety-first Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern­ Company, 1967) , p. 225. ment Printing Office. 1970). p. 243. Hereafter referred to as 8. Hearings, p. 259. Hearings, 9. C. J. M. Chassin, “Lessons of the War in Indochina." Interavia. 3. Robert F. Futrell, United States Policy Towards Southeast Asia VII, 12 (1952), 670. (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Aerospace Studies Institute, 1968), p. 159. 10. Futrell, p. 27. 4. Hearings, p. 249. Military Affairs Abroad

THE LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY Positive Roles Major Micha el A. Nelson

TEREOTYPES in international affairs are persistent and pervasive, in spite S of their frequent inaccuracies. In no instance is this truer than among per- ' out the armed forces of Latin America. Some people outside Latin .pecially in the United States, conjure up visions of a comic opera in which the cast parades1 ostentatiously,*iii* delivers endless11 andi meaningless*1 1 harangues, gages •in capricious•- games of rcc “musical *i governments.” For others, .i *iincluding i * scholars, the Latin American military is the demonic political force incar- W greedily and selfishly allying itself with other oligarchic elements to feather n nest at the expense of the masses. Neither of these stereotypes is correct. They are incorrect because, on the one hand, the sheer diversity of Latin America dooms most stereotypes about it from the start; and, on the other hand, because they gre\ out of conditions which have changed so much that the perception is now ar These stereotypes probably reveal more about the people who preserve them than about the Latin Americans. They indicate a common bias in which Latin American political systems are regarded as inferior because they are not demo­ cratic copies of our own. Growth and development have been assumed to be coincidental with the example of civil-military relationships practiced in the 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW United States. From this viewpoint any other or eases popular pressures. Finally, the chal­ condition becomes an aberration or a retro­ lenge of distribution refers to the demands of gression that has no value in the develop­ the citizenry for a redistribution of national mental process. This tendency to judge and assets; in familiar terms, it is the challenge of prescribe for Latin Americans forms a long rising expectations. Generally these challenges and persistent theme in our perceptions of and or crises occur simultaneously in varying de­ relationships with Latin American nations. grees, and none of them is ever completely Governor Nelson Rockefeller, during his overcome; but by and large they must be 1969 fact-finding mission to Latin America tackled in the order described, since the ability for President Nixon, discovered a deep and to cope with each crisis depends on the success bitter reaction to U.S. paternalism. As a re­ of efforts to resolve previous crises. For exam­ sult, he recommended in his report to the ple, it is impossible to build a viable national President that our approach to Latin Ameri­ loyalty if the central government is not visible can affairs become more pragmatic and less and recognized in most parts of the country. dogmatic, that we understand that the Latin If a military activity meets one or more of American context is not the U.S. context, and these challenges, that role will be considered a that we recognize there may be functionally positive one. Of course, some activities may positive aspects of political processes we do detract from one challenge while assisting in not like.1 another, so it will be necessary to note occa­ In keeping with this spirit of new perspec­ sional caveats. tives, this article re-examines the Latin Ameri­ There are three major areas in which the can military to suggest positive roles it has Latin American military meets the criteria played and is playing in the developmental outlined above. The first is when the military process. Hopefully such an analysis will help participates as a political promoter of reform. dispel some of the old worn images still held This is an active role that must be consciously about the armed forces in Latin America. sought by the organization. The second area Before proceeding to the analysis, let us is less a conscious choice and more a result clarify what qualifies as positive. Professors of the inherent functions of the military in Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., developing societies. It concerns the military provide the criteria used in this investigation as a source of modernizing attitudes, especially when they contend that all developing nations for conscripts from backward environments. face four major challenges or crises: state­ Finally, the military contributes to develop­ building, nation-building, participation, and ment as a unique repository of skills and distribution.2 State-building is the extension services that can be exploited in essentially of central control and authority throughout nonmilitary tasks for the good of the nation. the geographic territory, while nation-building consists of developing a national consciousness in which the people believe that their welfare military as a political promoter of reform is inextricably linked with that of the nation. The Latin American armed forces, like the The participation crisis arises from pressures societies they represent, are changing. It is no by new and wider segments of society to influ­ longer accurate to think of all the Latin Amer­ ence national decision-making. It does not ican military as a partner of the church and necessarily mean that a democratic solution wealthy landowners in favor of the status quo. must follow—a sensitive single-party system There are several good explanations for the might serve the function well—but that a suc­ change, which of course has not been of uni­ cessful solution can only be one which satisfies form importance throughout the continent. In MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 59 the first place, recruiting for the officer corps when stability was restored. In Latin America, has shifted from the upper to the middle and where instability is frequently endemic, this lower classes. These officers, mostly younger role is particularly important. and of lower rank, reflect their background The danger here, of course, is that military in their increased concern for the condition intervention may, in fact, promote the very of the wider segments of their society.3 In instability it seeks to control. The disruptive addition, the armed forces of many nations effects of political interference, some of which have recognized a potential powder keg in may affect the political system long after the social conditions that lend themselves to vio­ event, are of such dimensions that the alterna­ lent revolution. Revolutions of the explosive tive must be dire indeed. Obviously there are type experienced in Mexico in 1910—17 and no standards that determine the relative pay­ Bolivia in 1952 destroy the established armed offs of passivity and action in conditioas of forces, so the military has a vested interest in internal conflict, but it is important to note satisfying pressures that threaten their exis­ that in some circumstances the alternative to tence. Also, and a related point, the armed military pressure might be monumental chaos.4 forces recognize that national military power Extension of the national political power depends on the health of the national party base. The challenge of participation is a cru­ as a whole; a strong economic system and a cial one. If segments of the national entity strong sense of national unity are prerequisites seek influence in decision-making but are frus­ to a viable national defense. For several rea­ trated, the conditions for an upheaval exist. sons, then, the military may take a political The military has, on various occasions, had a position in favor of meeting the challenges of hand in expanding the political power base development. and easing such pressures. In Argentina, for Achieving the conditions for change. The example, the military, when led by Juan Do­ state cannot take measures against any of the mingo Peron, allied itself with labor, previ­ pressures that beset it unless it operates in a ously a sizable force without significant influ­ reasonably stable situation. The military in ence. Whatever else Peron may have done in Latin America is an important factor in Argentina, he and his uniformed colleagues achieving the required stability. While its par­ brought the working classes into the political ticipation may involve purely military tasks, system, and no political equation since has such as counterinsurgency, it may also involve been complete without them.5 political action. There are also examples of the military’s Venezuela provides an example of the mili­ cooperating to remove roadblocks standing in tary in this role. In 1958 the government of the way of increased participation. These road­ Perez Jimenez was being rocked by extensive blocks have included fellow officers as well civil disorder. The reaction of the government as civilians. Professor Edwin Lieuwen has con­ was to increase its repressive measures, and ceded that “. . . they often played an anti- this, in turn, resulted in greater reaction and despotic political role, intervening to terminate violence. In two days of fighting in January, the impossible tyranny of one of their own over 300 people were killed and 1000 errant colleagues or to supply a corrective to wounded. The military, fearing chaos, de­ the excesses of civilian politicians.” 8 manded and received the president’s resigna­ A potential problem in this role is that, tion. That same year Romulo Betancourt was once having associated itself with one aspiring elected president in the first free election in group, the military might stick with it to the ten years. The military had acted as a care­ frustration of yet other groups. Some observ­ taker of the national interest and withdrew ers contend that this has already happened 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW generally throughout Latin America, where pendent fashion. This has created friction be­ the middle class is allied with the military tween Peru and the U.S. over expropriation against the lower classes.7 However, even if and the limits of territorial water, but on the true, it is only fair to point out that this situa­ other hand some powerful changes have been tion is vulnerable to change just as was the made for the Peruvian people. One careful earlier alliance with the oligarchy. Some evi­ observer recently listed these accomplish­ dence, in fact, suggests that it is changing, and ments: “. . . the breaking of the oligarchy’s doing so rapidly, as military men become in­ stranglehold on the economy; the distribution creasingly sensitive to pressures from the long- of hacienda lands to those who work them; denied lower sectors. the discrediting of the traditional, self-serving The modernizing military. Of tremendous political system/the reform of the educational, importance to Latin America has been the judicial, and university systems; and the in­ relatively recent emergence of socially con­ culcation in the public of at least a degree of scious, politically aggressive armed forces re­ social consciousness. . . .” 8 The military in ferred to as the “modernizing military.” The this role is attempting to meet the challenges modernizing military typically rides to power of nation-building, participation, and distribu­ on a theme of virulent nationalism, believing tion simultaneously. itself to be the only force capable of imple­ A most important reservation about this menting and directing a program of vast re­ role concerns the ability of the military to see form. Agrarian reform, more equitable tax the job to completion. Historically, when re­ structures, nationalization of basic industries, form-minded military men have assumed economic assistance to the underprivileged, power, their worst enemies have been their and national job-training programs are some colleagues in uniform. Different perceptions of the ideas espoused by the modernizing of military responsibilities and roles within the military. armed forces have led to reversals, iniquitous The importance of nationalism to this kind compromises, and countervailing pressures of military regime cannot be overestimated. that dilute the value of the original program. Nationalism provides basic motivation for the Before passing to the second general area military and the whole population; it is the of positive roles, we should note that the mod­ glue that holds together the previously sepa­ ernizing military, while it favors change, will rate sectors of the system. It is the rationale not condone free-wheeling, cataclysmic change for almost everything the modernizing military of a violently revolutionary nature. It believes does. The rising sense of national pride firmly in controlled change at a pace the mili­ throughout Latin America may indicate that tary can manipulate. Its faith in the necessity conditions conducive to the modernizing mili­ for stability shapes this requirement. Any at­ tary are becoming widespread. tempt to bring on a violent revolution, even Although most Latin American armed if the military shared some of its ultimate forces, whether they are in political power or goals, would be met with force. not, have modernizing elements, the most ob­ vious recent example of this phenomenon is military as a source of modernizing attitudes found in Peru. The revolution in 1968 brought to power what now appears to be a Some positive roles of the Latin American textbook case of the modernizing military. For military are inherent in the business of run­ whatever motives, the regime appears sin­ ning a defense establishment. They are spin-off cerely dedicated to meeting the crises of de­ benefits of the training that naturally comes velopment in a forceful and, above all, inde­ with armed forces in a developing nation. For MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 61 the most part these roles develop attitudes zation of today is by its very nature, then, a concerning the individual's political compe­ source of socialization that inculcates the kinds tence and his obligation to the nation, atti­ of beliefs that a developing nation must have tudes which are essential to the processes of in abundance. A broader and common cul­ development. tural experience of this type sets conditions National unity. The military by its very that are necessary for nation-building and for nature and mission is a strong national sym­ effective participation in the political process.9 bol. It possesses an effective set of emblems Social mobility. The military in Latin (uniforms, weapons, flags, etc.), which repre­ America has for some years been an accepta­ sents national authority. It frequently is the ble avenue of advancement for men of the most nationally dedicated element in the so­ middle and lower classes. In some societies, ciety, claiming no parochial view within its the armed forces constitute one of only a few ranks. It instills in its recruits an awareness such opportunities. An officer’s commission of the nation which in many cases was not puts him in the middle or upper middle class present before recruitment, and it exposes its economically regardless of his background and members to other segments of society—men also introduces him to high social and political from other areas with different views and circles perhaps not previously open to him. backgrounds—and contributes in this way to Social mobility in the military encourages national integration. the aggressive, problem-solving attitudes that The military in some cases is the only ob­ are necessary in meeting the challenges of servable national symbol. In the jungles of development. It promotes participation and Brazil, for instance, the Brazilian Air Force acts as a safety valve for individuals who seek frequently provides the only contact the peo­ a part in the national commitment. Access to ple there ever have with the national govern­ the respect, authority, and responsibility at­ ment. Both as a symbol and extension of state tendant to the profession induces otherwise authority and as a unifying force with its con­ lethargic members of society to become an scripts, the military performs an important active part of it. Further, status fluidity helps service. to get the best available talent with the best Teaching pragmatism. For recruits who en­ attitudes where they can be most effective. ter military service from traditional segments The Mexican armed forces provide a good of society, their tour of duty provides exposure example of the military opportunity for mo­ to attitudes that are prerequisites to the bility. The tradition of an open officer corps, problem-solving involved in development. A which had its roots in the revolution of recruit from a rural background brings with 1910-17, continues today; many Mexican of­ him a narrow view of human capability. He ficers are the products of families in the lower is impressed by the power of the supernatural income levels. A more specific example is the and consequently accepts his lot with little recent president of Peru, General Juan Ve­ question. The military exposes him, under lasco Alvarado, who began his career as an controlled conditions and with more security enlisted man and advanced to the officer corps than is normally available in this process, to by appointment to the Peruvian military secular, pragmatic thought and to man’s po­ academy. tential as a result of it. The requirement for The biggest drawback to all three of these training in twentieth century military skills modernizing attitude roles is that they apply promotes an objective and empirical ap­ to so small a part of the population. The proach, subordinating the mysticism and fa­ largest military establishments in Latin Amer­ talism of his upbringing. The military organi­ ica hold no more than one percent of the 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW total population. Consequently, although the Skills and services. There is another dimen­ military may perform a positive role for those sion to this set of roles which is potentially who become a part of it, relatively few people much more significant than the first. It results are affected. In addition, as Latin American when the military devotes its manpower and societies progress, other agencies assume a resources to solving the problems of develop­ much greater share of the responsibility for ment. This role is more commonly known as modernizing attitudes; schools and communi­ civic action.10 cations media are prime examples. Many other There are two compelling motivations for avenues for mobility also open up as the civic action. In the first, unfortunate social nation becomes more diverse and fluid. On the and economic conditions in parts of Latin whole, the more advanced economically and America persuade civilian and military au­ socially a nation is, the less significant is this thorities that the military must join the devel­ set of roles. opmental struggle, since all elements of the national life must be productive. Most armed forces in Latin America have no apparent military as a provider of skills and services serious international threat to prepare for. At The first set of roles centered around activities the same time they do have equipment and of the military that are largely political. The manpower that can usefully be turned to pro­ second set dealt primarily with positive social grams that either cannot or will not be ac­ or cultural roles. The third set will involve complished by the civilian sectors. functions that are preponderantly economic. The second and more immediate motivation This category includes (1) skills that the mili­ is the result of the existence or imminent tary provides to its members by virtue of its threat of insurgency. In addition to their mili­ inherent technological requirements, and (2) tary activities, the armed forces engage in both skills and services furnished bvJ the mili- civic action in order to gain the allegiance tarv to society beyond its military tasks. and cooperation of the population in the area Inherent skills. The modern military orga­ of dispute. Without the support of the local nization requires a vast number of specialties people an insurgent group is in serious danger. that have wide applicability in civilian life. The military, as representatives of the national This requires extensive training, and much government, simply undertake tasks, usually of it is founded in educational fields of broad short-range, that are designed to win loyalty utility, e.g., reading, writing, mathematics, in the area away from the insurgents and and basic physics. Because a recruit must be toward the government. able to read before he can be expected to learn Whatever the motivation, the range of proj­ how to maintain an aircraft engine, most ects is impressive. Virtually all Latin American Latin American armed forces conduct literacy armed forces now participate in some form training for those recruits who need it. Next of civic action, and several had long and ad­ comes skill training for tasks vital to the mili­ mirable histories of such activity well before tary mission, such as accounting, administra­ civic action came to be emphasized in the tion, carpentry, metal work, food preparation, 1960s. law enforcement, procurement, and sanita­ A complete list of civic action projects in tion. The training for all these jobs can be Latin America would be an enormous under­ productive in meeting the requirements of taking. However, several examples will serve an expanding economy. It also equips the to illustrate the kinds of things being done. member to achieve his goal of a better income • In Peru, the last three months of many con­ after leaving the service. scripts’ two-year service are spent in voca­ MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 63 tional training. Five schools were built by the development, but it contributes the most to army for this purpose, and 25 civilian trades meeting the crises of nation-building and are taught. In 1968, 4500 military men went distribution.11 through this program, and it has been ex­ panding since. * In Brazil the Air Force logs about 1000 hours a month on civic action missions and additionally maintains service for passengers, mail, food, and supplies on N ot even members of the armed forces of routes that are unprofitable for civilian avia­ Latin America would contend that all the tion. The Brazilian army is engaged in an efforts of their predecessors or contemporaries ambitious program of road and railway con­ can be judged as positive. Nor is it the inten­ struction, primarily in the less accessible parts tion of this brief survey to contend that the of the nation. * In Guatemala the army oper­ military stands entirely pure and untarnished. ates a press for making adobe and cement What it does contend is that old notions about blocks, then transports them to building sites, the negative nature of the armed forces in where servicemen help in the construction of Latin America are inaccurate. Iastead, the schools, dispensaries, housing, etc. The Guate­ military, which after all is an integral factor malan army built the first road from the in most Latin American countries, responds jungle city of El Peten to Guatemala City, positively to the imperatives of national devel­ thus opening up valuable hardwood and chicle opment. It can, in fact, be seen to perform a resources in the north. * In the Andean coun­ variety of roles which are beneficial in that tries the armed forces have been engaged in process. overcoming the mountain barrier by building Sufficient objections to these roles have been roads through it and flying over it. • In Bo­ raised so that it should be apparent that a livia and Peru the armed forces have been very careful analysis must be made to deter­ enlisted in an effort to colonize the rich east­ mine the potential value of specific cases. ern slopes of the mountains. The Bolivian Each situation must be weighed in terms of army is building roads in the area and supply­ payoffs versus sacrifices, possible damage to ing cadres of specialists to assist the early other facets of the developmental effort, ex­ settlers. The army is even prospecting for tent of national stability, availability and com­ mineral deposits in the hope that colonization petence of civilian alternatives, the question will be more attractive and profitable. of which challenges are most pressing, and There are many examples, some spectacu­ the existence of international threats. What is lar, some not so spectacular, but these few more, these considerations must be weighed indicate the scope of the role. The economic individually within each country on the basis fruits are important, for they raise the general of its specific context, independent of outside distributive capability of the nation. At the interference. Given these conditions, there is same time the military demonstrates its interest much for the military to do that can help to in uniting the nation and in supporting na­ overcome the monumental difficulties most tional goals. Civic action in one form or an­ Latin American nations face. other addresses all four of the challenges of Air Command and Staff College

Note* 1. Nelson A. Rockefeller, The Rockefeller Report on the Americas Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969). 1966), pp. 35-37, 314-32. 2. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative 3. John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

(Stanford. California: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 106-13. same work, pp. 1—14. 4. See, for instance, the assessment of Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance 8. Richard Lee Clinton, "The Modernizing Military: The Case of of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, Peru," Inter American Economic Affairs, XXIV (Spring 1971), 1930-1956 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1957), pp. pp. 43—66. 316-17. 9. See Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Moderni­ 5. Frederick B. Pike, ed.. Freedom and Reform in Latin America zation," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, (Notre Dame. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 57. op. cit. 10. Two excellent and thorough works on civic action are Edward 6. Edwin Lieuwen, "Militarism and Politics in Latin America," in Bernard Click. Peaceful Conflict: The Nonmilitary Use of the Military The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed., John J. (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpolc Books, 1967); and Hugh Johnson (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), Hanning, The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces (New York: Frederick p. 149. A. Praeger, 1967). 7. See Jose Nun, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," in The 11. Another appraisal of civic action can be found in Willard F. Politics of Conformity jn Latin America, ed., Claudio Veliz (New Barber and Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 66-118. Also Veliz in the (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966).

AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AWARDS PROGRAM

Lieutenant Colonel Earl W. Renfroe, Jr., USAF, has been selected by the Air University Review Awards Committee to receive the annual award for writing the outstanding article to appear in the Review during fiscal year 1972. His article, “The Commander and the Minority Mental Process,” was previously designated the outstanding article in the November- December 1971 issue. The awards program provides payment to eligible authors, a $50 award for the outstand­ ing article in each issue, and a $200 savings bond for the annual outstanding article. The award winners also receive a plaque. The bimonthly winners for the past year were Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish, USAF (Ret), “The Civilian Analysts, in Their Pride and Their Fall,” July-August 1971; Colonel Arthur R. Moore, Jr., USAF, “Squadron Officer School, Junior Officers, and You, September-October 1971; Lieutenant Colonel Earl W. Renfroe, Jr., USAF, “The Com­ mander and the Minority Mental Process,” November-December 1971; Colonel Albert P. Sights, Jr., USAF (Ret), “Strategic Bombing and Changing Times,’ January-February 1972; Major General Robert N. Ginsburgh, USAF, and Major Edd D. Wheeler, USAF, “The Evolution of Air Warfare,” March-April 1972; Herman S. Wolk, “Antimilitarism in America,” May-June 1972. Major James S. Austin, J r . M ajor Jimmy Mit c h el l N the years following its establishment as a be senior officers who knew the language and I separate service, the Air Force was pre­ the customs of the country: a Marine colonel occupied with the development of an ad­ in Morocco who spoke fluent Arabic, an vanced technology and the hardware to Army attache in the Far East who spoke counter a very real and capable enemy. Chinese, a Navy captain who could deal Through the late 1940s and the 1950s, the with his NATO counterpart in his own lan­ drive for military technological superiority guage during joint Mediterranean maneuvers. eclipsed any need the Air Force might have All too frequently these exceptional officers had for sophistication or advanced training in were from the other services. military sociopolitical affairs. This trend was Awareness of these human understanding given further impetus by the 1957 launching problems overseas has come at the same time of Sputnik I and the subsequent development the Air Force has been developing its internal of intercontinental ballistic missile systems by “people” programs. While the internal pro­ the United States. grams have been subject to considerable pub­ By the mid-1960s, there had developed an licity, a program to cope with some of our increasing awareness of the importance of the international understanding problems has “human” element, both within the Air Force been quietly evolving. The usaf Area Spe­ and in its external relations. Internally, mem­ cialist Program ( asp) develops area specialists bers of the Air Force were requesting a bit who can combine an understanding of a more understanding, the elimination of irri­ foreign language with a comprehensive knowl­ tants, and a “humanizing” of policies and edge of the culture, government, economics, procedures. The late 1960s saw the generation and geography of an overseas area. The pro­ and development of Air Force “people” gram is maturing into an integrated procure­ awareness in our official personnel policies and ment, training, and utilization system for in our Special Operations, Intelligence, and highly selected area specialists. Only by un­ Military Assistance programs. The Officer Ca­ derstanding people on their own terms can reer Development Program, Airman Career we become really effective in dealing with Advisory programs, Human Relations pro­ them and in communicating our beliefs and grams, topline, etc., are all indicative of this ideals to them. growing awareness that the individual human being is a key to success of the Air Force history of the program mission. The Air Force need for officers trained in In overseas areas, a number of incidents the language and culture of other areas of the and misunderstandings led to recognition of world has been talked about for a number the need to understand the attitudes and be­ of years. It was formally recognized as early liefs of the people of other countries. The Air as 1965 in the reports and recommendations Force was sometimes caught in the situation of the Air Force Educational Requirements where years of carefully cultivated relations Board.1 In 1967 the need for such a training were suddenly lost because of the behavior or program was stressed in correspondence from attitudes of one or two Air Force members. a number of af commands and agencies to Officials of other nations did not always un­ the Air Staff. As a result of the interest ex­ derstand or deal with us by our standards or pressed, an Air Force-wide meeting was con­ on our terms. vened by the Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel Conversely, those military officers who were at the Pentagon in May 1968.2 At this meet­ effective and respected overseas were highly ing, interested Air Force agencies reviewed visible. The most effective usually proved to the Army Foreign Area Specialist Training AIR FORCE REVIEW 67

( fast) Program and discussed what kind of candidate area-oriented. We will have to be­ gin this process before we are sure about the program would best meet the unique needs potential candidate’s capability to fulfill the of the Air Force. In addition, Air Staff repre­ first two qualifications. I think this only serves sentatives briefed participants on current and to point up the need for a broad base of anticipated Air Force personnel plans and the potential area specialists and the need to be relationship of the committee’s work to such extremely discriminating in our final selection guidance.3 Research tasks were assigned to all process.4 conference participants to prepare for a follow-on conference. This concept of the Area Specialist Program When the ad hoc committee met again in was readily accepted by the conference, and May 1969, it was treated to an exceptional the three qualifications outlined by General keynote address by Brigadier General Robert Cardenas have become the key operational L. Cardenas, who was then Commander, concepts of the program. usaf Special Operations Force. General Car­ The May 1969 meeting concluded without denas challenged the conferees to think be­ resolving some of the problem areas, such as yond traditional area study and to have both personnel identification and coding, selection breadth and depth in the proposed af procedures, language training, etc. Tasks were program. He said, in part: again assigned, and a third meeting of the Since Korea, we have seen the pattern of committee was scheduled for the fall of 1969.5 warfare evolve which requires the military This conference was held at the usaf Acad­ officer to have a deeper and broader under­ emy in November 1969. The meeting place standing of the political aspects of conflict in was most appropriate, since the Academy had addition to being an expert in the employ­ recently developed area specialty majors in its ment of an increasingly complex array of curriculum and had a number of qualified fighting hardware. We have also seen the re­ quirement for this political-military under­ area specialists on its faculty. At this meeting, standing reach down from what was formerly participants agreed on several general operat­ a general officer’s exclusive province to be ing concepts for the program, including a essential in the effective performance of duty stress on technical skills, language training, by a junior officer and often an nco. The indi­ and career flexibility. The conference enter­ vidual, military or civilian, serving in areas tained a number of suggestions for a name for of conflict today who does not understand the the program; the one agreed upon was sim­ environment in which he is working can, many ple: the usaf Area Specialist Program. The times, cause infinitely more harm than he can conference concluded that there would be do good, however well intentioned are his several possible avenues into the program: by efforts. prior education, by in-country experience, or In speaking of what an area specialist through Air Force-sponsored graduate educa­ should be, General Cardenas stated: tional programs. The committee reviewed and modified a draft of an Air Force regulation Unequivocally, the usaf foreign area spe­ cialist must be first and foremost qualified in concerning the program. Language training his Air Force specialty. and its phasing with an educational program The second qualification I think our area were discussed but not completely resolved. specialist should have is the right attitude. The matter of AF-wide requirements for area We have to select people who have a genuine specialists was dealt with at length, and the interest, not only in the area, but the people committee concluded that work must go for­ in the area where he is going to serve. ward on identifying specific duty positions as . . . a third qualification is to have our requiring area specialist officers.6 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW The ad hoc committee adjourned without This coding system has as its prime objective the expectation of further meetings. The ball the proper identification for career assignment passed, so to speak, to responsible Hq usaf utilization of these uniquely qualified resources. agencies to work through the remaining prob­ lems and publish a comprehensive Air Force regulation to formally establish the program, AFIT programs which is being staffed now and tentatively Basically, the academic program for area spe­ identified as afr 36-16. cialists incorporates a master’s degree with Concurrent with the initial area specialist interdisciplinary course work and language conference, the Air Force educational process training. Depending on prior language profi­ began to include area specialist educational ciency and particular country or area for programs in the annual Air Force Institute of which instruction is desired, a selectee’s pro­ Technology programs.7 For the fiscal years gram will average fifteen to eighteen months. 70, 71, and 72, these programs have repre­ A person who has an adequate grasp of the sented the bulk of social science quotas in the area language can normally complete his aca­ afit program, with input into Intelligence, demic program in twelve months. One who osi, Special Operations, and Psychological has no prior language capability and will need Warfare career areas and a few quotas fore­ conversational proficiency in an Asian tongue casted in Education, Security Police, Military may need a longer program. Assistance, and Plans and Policy.8 The formal academic program for a selec­ As a result of a joint Hq usaf, au, afit, tee may be in the area (as an M.A. in Latin and afmpc meeting held in February 1971 at American Studies) or in a specific academic Wright-Patterson afb, Ohio, a new coding subject matter with an area emphasis. Aca­ system was implemented through appropriate demic subject areas include political science, changes to afm’s 36-1, 50-5, and 300-4. history, language, cultural geography, interna­ Now each area specialist officer will have an tional economics, and anthropology. “L” prefix to his authorized input Air Force Determination as to specific program em­ Specialty Code (afsc). He will also have a phasis is influenced by the major academic three-digit special experience identifier (sei) field ( maf ) code for which the officer is iden­ corresponding to his area of specialization. tified, his undergraduate background, his pres­ The geographic areas which can be identified ent language capability, and the specific re­ in this system are as follows: quirements of the assignment, if known. These factors interact in each case to determine an AREA SEI optimum program that will qualify the indi­ Western Europe 435 vidual in minimum time. Eastern Europe 436 The civilian school (as well as the depart­ Soviet Union 437 ment) to be attended is a crucial factor in North Africa 438 the Area Specialist Program. Once a country Sub-Sahara 439 or region is identified for a selectee and a Middle East 440 language specified, research must be initiated South Asia 441 to find an academic institution that (1) will Mediterranean 442 accept the officer, (2) has a meaningful pro­ Southeast Asia 443 gram to meet the specific usaf area specialist Caribbean 444 requirements, and (3) can schedule courses Latin America 445 to permit completion in a realistic but mean­ Far East 446 ingful time frame. AIR FORCE REVIEW 69 Many universities and colleges have estab­ Saint Mary’s University—Latin America lished programs in Latin American Studies, Stanford University—Asia Western European Studies, African Studies, University of Texas—Latin America East European/Soviet Studies, Mid-Eastern Washington State University—Europe Studies, Asian (South, East, Southeast) Stud­ University of Washington—Asia ies, but some may lack the specific foreign Obviously, some schools, either because of language, dialect, or conversational emphasis facilities available, number of faculty assigned, needed to prepare an area specialist officer. or program longevity, offer better developed In that event, attendance at the Defense Lan­ area specialist programs than others, afit’s guage Institute at the Presidio of Monterey, task is to match selected officers with inter­ California, or Washington, D.C., may be es­ ested, capable schools that will work with the sential after completion of formal course work student and with afit to prepare the man at the university. Meaningful programs can properly. Only by working together in this be developed in schools not hosting such area way can we develop qualified area specialists specialist programs, per se, through a liberal who will be truly effective representatives of interdepartmental policy allowing a selectee to the United States Air Force in overseas areas. major in one department for degree attain­ ment and enrich his area emphasis by taking interdisciplinary' courses and language expo­ assignments sure in associated departments. The Military Assistance Advisory Groups Both approaches are currently being em­ ( maag) , the air attache system, U.S. embassies ployed by afit, and an evaluation of the ef­ having usaf representation, the usaf Special fectiveness of a given institution’s preparation Air Warfare School, Special Operations Force, is periodically undertaken to provide afit with the intelligence community (af/ in , dia), and valid management data to plan for future the Office of Special Investigations (osi) are training. the prime users of officers receiving area Schools currently used by Air Force stu­ specialist training. Other assignments for area dents with particular area emphasis include specialists include duty with overseas com­ University of Alabama—Latin America mands ( pa ca f, usafe, etc.); academic pro­ University of Arizona—Asia, Latin grams, as at Air Force Academy, Inter- America American Academy; government agencies University of Denver—Middle East such as Department of State; Air Staff; and Florida State University—Asia, Latin other special positions. America, West/East Europe, Soviet Proper communication between afit, the Union usaf Military Personnel Center, and these Indiana University—Soviet Union, users can result in placing the right man with Europe the required training in the specific country Michigan State University—Europe, or area needing his particular background Africa, Latin America and experience. In this respect, perhaps the University of Michigan—Asia, Europe most effective coordination to date has been University of Notre Dame—Europe, that evidenced with the selectees for the Office Soviet Union, Latin America, Africa of Special Investigations. Oklahoma State University—Latin Fulfilling usaf area specialist requirements America and satisfying particular needs with regard San Diego State College—Asia, Latin to specific end assignments can be illustrated America by the following example. 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

An officer nominated by osi has been afit to evaluate an applicant academically.9 selected for the afit-sponsored Middle East The Civilian Institutions Program manager area specialist program by afmpc and has for asp then assists afit admissions in deter­ been tagged by osi for subsequent assignment mining if the applicant is eligible for a par­ to Turkey, osi makes this tentative end assign­ ticular area program and how long such an ment known to afit and the requirement that interdisciplinary/cross-cultural program should the officer possess R-3, S-3 proficiency in take. The sponsoring agency will then be the Turkish language. Civilian Institutions informed of this evaluation, and any sub­ (afit/ ci), after reviewing the officer’s records sequent adjustment in programming can be and the programs of a number of schools, made prior to the applicant’s military screen­ submits this officer’s academic credentials to ing by the af Military Personnel Center. Once the University of Utah. He is found to be selected, the officer can then be educated academically acceptable for admission by the against a specific country/area assignment university and is subsequently enrolled in the instead of merely against a generalized quota, Middle East Center under the direction of as had been the case prior to fy 1972. Dr. Khosrow Mostofi. The eighteen-month Officers educated through this system are program gives him thorough course work, already on assignments in a number of over­ directed reading, and research on the Turkish seas areas, and the number will grow with culture, and includes language exposure the fy 1972 graduates. It is too early now through the intermediate level. for the Air Force to measure the value of Since he was already fully qualified in his such training in terms of increased effective­ technical specialty, the officer will be assigned, ness or measurable improvements in our inter­ upon graduation, to an osi office in Turkey national relations. for direct and immediate utilization of his In this article we have stressed the academic training. phase of the program since it is presently the A specific need is being satisfied for a par­ most visible portion of the system. However, ticular user in support of an established Air the Air Force has many individuals who by Force requirement. That officer’s effectiveness prior education or experience are already well in-country will reflect how well the system has qualified to be designated as area specialists worked. —those who have gained their knowledge Hopefully, the end product will be a better and language firsthand. Formal identification informed and more receptive usaf officer in of some of these individuals was completed that area of concern: an Air Force officer in late 1971 under Change 5, afm 36-1, whose overall capability and area knowledge Officer Classification Manual. have been to a great degree enhanced by A key problem remains in identifying those education provided through the Area Special­ positions in the Air Force which need the ist Program. services of an area specialist and verifying As a result of the success of the model osi the language and other qualifications required. Area Specialist Program, afm 50-5, USAF This work is proceeding but requires very Formal Schools Catalog, now requires an careful review to insure that the area special­ individual desiring to enter the Area Specialist ists will be properly utilized. Program to obtain a sponsoring agency such as Intelligence, Special Operations, Military Assistance, Plans and Policy, or osi. The T he rate of progress in the overall develop­ sponsoring agency will try to assure utilization ment of this program can best be described as in a specific end assignment before asking “deliberate.” It has gone from a recommenda­ AIR FORCE REVIEW 71 tion in 1965 to a fully staffed proposal in the future. As General Cardenas said in clos­ 1970. Some of the most difficult problems, ing his address to the 1969 conference: those of coding and identification within the I think we have a great opportunity in the Air Force personnel system, were finally re­ development of our Area Specialist Program solved in 1971. Today, its academic phase is to take advantage of the lessons we and other services and agencies have learned worldwide. a reality, with students studying in a number If we use this opportunity wisely, I’m sure we of major universities and the first graduates can develop individuals who can make signifi­ already in the field. We expect that the care cant contributions to the usaf and the U.S. and deliberation with which the program has government capabilities to cope with interna­ been developed will pay large dividends in tional problems.10 Air Force Institute of Technology

Notea 1. Air Force Educational Requirements Board, Panel Report of Area Specialist Conference, May 1969, USAF Academy. Qualitative Educational Requirements for the Security Career Area, 5. Minutes—May 1969 Conference. April 1965. 6. Minutes—November 1969 Conference. 2. AFPDPRO letter, undated. Foreign Area Specialist Training 7. FY 1969 AF1T program, AFPDPRO. (FAST). 8. FY 1970—FY 1971 AF1T Programs. AFPDPRO. 3. Hq USAF. Directorate of Personnel Planning, DCS/Pcrsounel, 9. AF1T section of AFM 50—5, USAF Formal School Catalog, Foreign Area Specialist Training Program, undated. 1 July 1971 (para 5c (6) . page 3-AF1T-5) . 4. Brigadier General Robert L. Cardenas, Keynote Speech, Foreign 10. Brigadier General Robert L. Cardenas, op. cic. In My Opinion

WHO'S LISTENING? WHO'S TALKING?

Colonel William R. Edgar

F THERE is one thing that makes a Iprofessional Information Officer grit his teeth and cringe, it is to be called an “iso” or, even worse, “pr o” or “pio.” Those abbreviations stand for what used to be the Information Officer’s equiva­ lent a long time ago. (We have not been Public Information Officers for a full generation.) The old terminology is objectionable not because we are sensi­ tive or finicky but because the offender seems to be thinking we are still perform­ ing the same functions as the pr o of World War II. To say the least, the ball game has changed. The truth is, the Information Officer’s job goes far beyond getting the news media work done. It also encom­ passes community relations and internal information — indeed, relations with IN MY OPINION 73 people of all kinds, both inside and outside the why this kind of news gets exposure: quite organization. The io doesn’t do all this com­ simply, it’s exciting, and exciting news is municating himself, of course, for that would what sells newspapers and gets good audience be beyond human capacity; since we are all ratings. At least for the foreseeable future, we communicating all the time, every' one of us must live with the fact that the mass media in a blue uniform is a communicator. will tend to be more willing to use bad news Information is not only a tool of manage­ about the military than good news. ment, as we often hear; it is the very function Compare this communication situation with of management itself. It is implicit in every’ that of a well-informed public speaker before policy decision and every action. It is not a a group of concerned civilians. He has their function that can be contained within a undivided attention; he does not run the risk limited category as something that is the io’s that they will get up and go to the icebox job and no one else’s. for a beer. In short, public speaking provides Calling the Information Officer the “pio" eyeball contact between our spokesman and leads into a semantic trap. Public information large numbers of people, a kind of communi­ (only a fraction of the io’s job) consists of cation unattainable in any other way. efforts to communicate with the general public The responsibility does not belong to the via the mass media—press, radio, and tele­ Information Officer alone. Air Force Manual vision. Mass media are important, certainly, 190-4 pointedly states: but they cannot be relied upon to carry the Air Force story to the public all by themselves. It is incumbent upon general and senior Mass communications do have certain in­ officers to avail themselves of every practical herent advantages, chiefly in that large num­ opportunity to speak and otherwise officially bers of people can be reached economically. represent the Air Force before reputable But there are disadvantages as well. We in groups. (Italics added.) the Air Force do not run the mass media. This responsibility, sometimes ignored, is more We can submit a story or a story idea, but important today than ever before. What we the mass media control its acceptance and need to achieve is public understanding of how it is used. Furthermore, media use of a the Air Force mission and the tools we will story does not guarantee that every reader need to accomplish that job. It is in the public (or viewer) will see and digest the information. interest to do so. In addition, all the mass media constitute When a responsible spokesman stands up a “buyer’s market.” There are more stories to deliver the facts, he should underscore the competing for attention than can possibly be point that specialized Air Force interests and used. I had a talk not long ago with one of the public interest do coincide. One of the the news executives of one of the major tele­ central truths of the modern world is that vision networks. Fie said that most Air Force government is growing larger, more complex, stories are simply “too bland and unexciting and harder to understand. Certainly the mili­ to rate even a minute or two of precious net­ tary, despite recent large cutbacks, has under­ work time.” gone a general trend of increasing size and But there is one kind of Air Force news complexity. The inevitable result of this trend, that seems to make the grade these days— unless steps are taken to counteract it, is that bad news. We have all seen the many promi­ people will feel more and more remote from nent national news stories about scandals and the government. And, unless we do something mismanagement, corruption and atrocities in about it, we will become more and more the military services. There’s a good reason remote from the people. 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW The tendency toward remoteness can be establish credibility. The speaker must be will­ deadly at a time when public opinion is more ing and prepared to answer all questions powerful than at any other period in Ameri­ directly and forthrightly. President Nixon put can history. What people cannot understand, it this way in his address to the nation on they will mistrust. When the concerned citizen 3 November 1969: cannot find out to his satisfaction what the I believe that one of the reasons for the military is up to, he will tend to believe the deep division about Vietnam is that many worst. Much of the recent criticism of the Americans have lost confidence in what their military in the United States is a direct result Government has told them about our policy. of this tendency. The American people cannot and should not Too often, an officer who would seemingly be asked to support a policy which involves be a good spokesman gives the appearance of the overriding issues of war and peace unless giving a speech only after he’s finally been they know the truth about that policy. trapped and there is no escape. This may fill The American people welcome dialogue the proverbial square, but it doesn’t contribute and have traditionally listened to viewpoints. to communication. Especially in these days We must zealously guard against perpetrating when a civilian group is likely to adopt a pious platitudes; only facts must be used, and questioning attitude toward whatever we have they must be framed by a well-briefed aware­ to say, it is vital that each officer prepare well ness by the speaker of Air Force requirements. for every speech he makes, with the goal of The need for the public to know the facts making a real contribution to the audience’s has never been greater, and the obligation to understanding and appreciation of the Air tell it like it is has never been more pressing. Force role. We all lose when a spokesman fails We cannot, in good conscience, blame the to make this contribution, either by boring or public for their lack of understanding. alienating the group—or by missing the oppor­ And no matter how much we may seek tunity completely. scapegoats in the press or on tv, in the Con­ A constant problem is the speaker’s aptitude gress or on the university campuses, there is in the public arena. The need still exists not finally one inescapable explanation for this to neglect the art of speechmaking! The objec­ lack of understanding. We do not need to tive is to communicate our military capabili­ look far to find who is remiss. ties and requirements without the cynicism The time for self-delusion is past. Informa­ of damning those who oppose or the arrogance tion Officers all over the Air Force keep track of threatening national catastrophe if our of and file reports on the speeches and public needs are not met. Excellent speech material appearances made by generals and other senior is available in the Aerospace Speech Series, officers. A casual look at the reports would and every general officer should be required seem to show speech after speech lulling us to have a 15-minute speech written, approved into the comfortable notion that we are truly by Security Review, and ready for presenta­ communicating. But a second look shows that tion with minimum updating. “Have the word our spokesmen are speaking almost exclu­ —want to be heard” then becomes the by­ sively to audiences composed of Air Force word, and the local io arranges the appear­ officers, dependents, Air Force Association ance. A short, succinct, sincerely delivered members, military students, aerospace indus­ speech establishes the background for audience try officials, and others who already under­ questions, from which emerges public opinion. stand and accept our point of view. We are Direct responses to questions about the Air not talking to the public; we are talking only Force, consistent with security requirements, to ourselves. We are not confronting; we are IN MY OPINION 75 consoling! The question which arises is not good news will rarely be adequately reported only who is or is not talking but who is to the American public according to present listening? practice. Word-of-mouth communication is The audiences made up of friends and traditionally the most effective and valuable members of the Air Force are important; we of all communication techniques. It is time should not ignore them. But we should not to respond to the people’s preference to accept delude ourselves that speaking only to them information from a known and respected fulfills our responsibility to speak to the public authoritative source. It is also our best hope —no matter how many squares it may fill in that the good news will have equal oppor­ the official report of the Air Force Speakers’ tunity to be heard. Program. We are copping out on a responsi­ It has been said in many ways by the bility to communicate with people who have concerned leadership of the Air Force. General no Air Force connection, because those are William W. Momyer, Commander, Tactical precisely the ones we need most to reach. Air Command, put it this way in a letter to I do not think we are afraid of the truth, his subordinate commanders dealing with but I think we act as though we were. The public attitudes toward the military: time to hide is not when the going gets rough. A major cause of the problem seems to be a That is the time to be up front, to be seen combination of diminishing mutual under­ and be heard. If a visitor from another planet standing and blurred communications. . .. It should come to observe what we are doing, is a problem that we must recognize and do he could only conclude that we were cursed everything possible to solve. with an obsessive death wish—like the mythi­ cal lizard that ate its own tail until nothing Let me address you, a valued reader, as remained. an individual. There is one spokesman you To be practical, we all know that even should develop for the Air Force, and that when a senior officer is motivated to speak, is you, yourself. No one else in the world can he may have difficulty finding the right plat­ speak as authoritatively as you can about form. But help is available for each Air Force what you are doing for the United States now. speaker from his Information Officer. Getting The American people welcome the oppor­ the right speaker and the right audience to­ tunity to be told the facts about how the Air gether is one of the functions of the io. Force is conducting its role in national defense. Let’s face a fact of life: If Air Force spokes­ We must tell our story so as to be responsive men continue to ignore the audiences and to each audience’s interests, factual with re­ publics that lack the surety of acceptance, gard to the subject matter, and in timely then those segments of our society will form recognition of the opportunity. Achieving this their opinion about us based on what others will, in my opinion, get us back on the right say. The consequences are clear. Since bad track to have people start listening when an news tends to dominate news coverage, then Air Force representative starts talking. Langley Air Force Base, Virginia MILITARY PRINCIPLES AND FLEXIBILITIES A Responsive Policy for Change

Lieut ena nt Colonel Russell A. T urner II

E are on a collision course with change. ciples are essential to the military’s purpose, World cultures are restless, and the existence, and effectiveness. Although they hot breath of dissent is seering the moral fabric are influenced by change, they remain essen­ Wof nations. The time seems out of joint, and tial. The flexibilities support the principles the nihilism expounded by Nietzsche is echoed by allowing the military to adopt certain by today’s intellectual avant-garde. This con­ changes that are necessary to maintain or dition of change is producing confrontations increase its effectiveness as a fighting force. and conflict that threaten to destroy our eco­ By adopting these changes, the military be­ nomic structure and cultural value systems. comes a more realistic reflection of the society The imperative character of this world at large. change is permeating all levels of American It is important that the public understand society. As a subculture of that society, the these principles and flexibilities if America’s American military establishment has recently youth are going to support an all-volunteer been one of the targets of carping attacks force. This will not be easy, however, since challenging its traditions, customs, and opera­ some Americans have always suspected that tional needs. Even some military people have the professional soldier and a standing army joined the vociferous voices of those critics constitute a threat to political freedom. advocating immediate and sweeping changes According to Marcus Cunliffe, the American’s in our military system. concept of the ideal soldier is the civilian who That change is in process is self-evident. eagerly takes up arms when duty calls, defeats What is not so self-evident is where this change the professional enemy soldiers by his vigor is leading us and how we in the Air Force and ingenuity, and then resumes his peace­ should respond to it. More important, how time occupation when the danger is past.1 will a changing American society affect a This ambivalence is again manifesting itself future all-volunteer military force? today as the nation seeks to substitute a volun­ Numerous in-depth studies have already teer force for its conscript armies tainted by been made addressing the many cause-and- an unpopular war. Therefore, before discuss­ effect relationships of specific factors influenc­ ing the principle and flexibility factors, let ing our society and the Air Force. However, us clarify the need for a strong military estab­ while these studies are invaluable, they are lishment in the future. often recondite and microcosmic in their The necessity for the United States to analysis. What the military needs is a uniform, maintain a strong military force for defense responsive policy with which to meet the against internal and external dangers is an problem of change and guide it through the absolute. The present worldwide activism call­ transition to an all-volunteer force. This policy ing for love and human rights does not neces­ would recognize certain principles and flexi­ sarily signal a mellowing of man’s aggressive bilities in the military establishment. The prin­ nature—a fact seemingly not realized by the 76 IN MY OPINION 77 activists who believe in the efficacy of demon­ remains for the United States to maintain a strations to produce universal peace. It is no strong military defense establishment for the secret that there is a prominent animalistic foreseeable future. element in humanity which is prone to vio­ lence and conflict. Man is a recalcitrant, in­ secure organism competing for existence in a Now, what are the principles hostile world. Aggressive impulses are inevi­ and flexibilities that will aid the United States table in a competitive environment, and the in maintaining a strong military establishment emergence of different world cultures has and help the military respond to the problems expanded man’s aggressiveness into organized of change and transition to an all-volunteer wars. Immanuel Kant wrote: “Peace among force? men living side by side is not a natural state; Numerous principles and flexibilities might natural to them is rather a state of war, if be identified as inherent in a military estab­ not open hostilities at least the eternal threat lishment. Space, however, permits me to of them.”2 define only a few of the many overlapping The growing belief today that war is not sociological, psychological, political, and other inevitable belies the fact that war has sur­ factors influencing those principles and flexi­ vived throughout history regardless of changes bilities. Therefore, the purpose of this article in social and political systems, in religions, is merely to provide an impetus for thought ethics, in intellectual and technical standards. on a conceptual level and a working hypoth­ A recent seven-year study of 75 major nations esis for further consideration. of the world found that internal and external Inherent in an effective military establish­ aggression is more than a random occurrence ment is the principle of discipline. This princi­ and that the greatest period of frustration ple leans heavily upon the flexibilities for (and possible aggression) in a nation is the support and is much affected by cultural “mid-awakening,” or the period during the changes. A great many of the disciplinary and middle of the transitional phase between tradi­ morale problems in the military today can tional societies and modernity.3 The popula­ be attributed to the social ills inherited by tion explosion and the rising expectations of the military from a changing society, e.g., the have-not peoples of the world are now, drug abuse, racial strife, crime, revolution­ more than ever before, combining to make aries, militants, the Vietnam syndrome, and today and the immediate future a seething youthful officers and draftees who are the cauldron for potential aggression. products of an affluent and permissive environ­ Although the decision to switch to an all- ment. Compounding this problem has been volunteer force will be the result of changing the charge that some officers and nco’s do values and needs in American society, the not exercise their lawful responsibility to en­ need for a strong military establishment will force order and uphold the provisions of policy remain unchanged because of man’s aggres­ directives and regulations. In Vietnam, this siveness and the historical fact that all major combination of factors has, on occasion, cul­ societies have been strongly oriented to war. minated in physical threats to and the fragging Therefore, a lasting peace would require uni­ of officers and nco’s .4 No military organiza­ versal fundamental changes in society and tion can function effectively whose leaders man. For the United States unilaterally to have been intimidated or have abdicated their make military defense a minor national prior­ authority through fear or frustration. What ity, as some revolutionaries and intellectuals have we learned from these circumstances advocate, would be quixotic. Thus, the need that can be applied to an all-volunteer force? 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW First, we have learned that authoritarian tary did not waste its time with these types discipline usually produces only outward con­ but discharged them instead. An all-volunteer formity while raising inward resentments. force affords the military the luxury of being Graduating afrotc students at North Caro­ selective, something it could never completely lina State University were told last year by be under the compulsory draft law. the guest speaker, Major General Robert N. Differential psychology shows that individ­ Ginsburgh, that for “a deeper discipline” a ual differences tend to be quantitative rather man must know “the reason why.”5 We should than qualitative, a difference in degree rather adopt this democratic approach to discipline than in kind. In theory, this means that most because it provides us the flexibilities of guid­ men can become soldiers. In practice, how­ ance without domination and freedom without ever, it means that some people are better laxity. It recognizes that the infinite grada­ off in other professions than in the military. tions of human behavior are due mainly to Many of these types of individuals could be environmental rather than hereditary factors identified early through a testing and training and that this is a basic sociological phenome­ period designed for this purpose. If, at the non underlying group attitudes which produce end of this period, the enlistee decides he tension and conflict. Behavior and attitudes wants out, or if the military decides he is not are so interrelated that psychologists cannot the “soldier type,” he could be returned to agree which is the cause and which is the civilian life without stigma. It is wasteful in effect. (It is probably a mixture.) But be­ money and human resources, besides being havior in any situation is influenced by the unrealistic, to expect the military to take just individual’s anticipations concerning the any kind of individual and try to make a effects of his actions. Thus, when an individual soldier, sailor, marine, or airman out of him who violates a group norm does not receive and then return him to society a better man. the anticipated group sanctions, the norm The privilege of selectivity, therefore, would is likely to become ineffective. People do not free the military of this responsibility and feel right if their misbehavior is persistently allow it to incorporate only those individuals overlooked. The principle of discipline then it could employ effectively. In support of this does not tolerate disruptive behavior that selective approach, psychological studies show intimidates authority. It expects and demands that there are probably no inherently superior role performances to conform to role require­ or inferior races or ethnic groups as a whole, ments and expectations. This means that mili­ since man is largely a product of his environ­ tary group norms—the rules, regulations, poli­ ment. Thus, society at large must improve cies, and directives—be enforced, not through the environmental conditions of all its mem­ a martinet application of authority but bers so that their offspring can benefit during through a democratic approach to discipline the critical formative phase of their lives. designed to produce an enlightened body of The regulation of behavior in accordance military personnel. The new personnel pam­ with the will of the community is a principle phlet, “Air Force Standards” (afr 30-1), of law. This is secured through moral, social, is a special effort in this direction. and official sanctions and by law enforcement In practicing democratic discipline we must agencies. The crucial relation between law also recognize that there are certain types of and social mores has been expressed by Dr. individuals who will take advantage of the Robert M. Hutchins in the following passage: lenient flexibility and become egocentric and The law is a great teacher. It is . . . the way self-assertive. These are the proverbial trouble­ in which newly discovered moral truth is dis­ makers. Perhaps it would be better if the mili­ seminated among the population and incor­ IN MY OPINION 79 porated in the conscience and mores of the resist change by identifying with people and community. The popular notion that law re­ things that reinforce our preconceived con­ flects the mores is, as countless historical ex­ cepts. When we are confronted with the reality amples show, often the reverse of the truth. of change, we sometimes behave like the Law helps make the mores. Law-making is the emperor in his new clothes. process by which the members of the political But the world does change, and man must community learn what the mores should be.6 change with it. The military can ease the The significance of this concept to the mili­ transition of change within its ranks by utiliz­ tary, in the author’s opinion, is that since ing the flexibilities available to it. Flexibilities World War II the major egalitarian decisions are the military’s ways and means of narrow­ by the nation’s courts have helped to increase ing the gap between itself and its parent differences between the military and civilian society. We have already touched on a few segments of our society. These differences of these flexibilities, i.e., a democratic ap­ have been further compounded by a small proach to discipline, a testing and training portion of the communication media, by a period for enlistees, and the protection that determined onslaught upon our judicial sys­ law affords to the innovator. There are myriad tem by militants, and by a public opinion that other ways in which the flexibilities support on occasion appears to support the law vio­ the principles. For example, flexibility allows lators rather than the legal authorities. the length of hair to change with the prevail­ Future enlistees in an all-volunteer force ing social standard; enforcement of the re­ will come from this environment where almost quired length is a principle. Allowing an air­ everything is at issue in the war between the man to seek redress through approved channels young and their elders—from morality, to for what he feels are infringements of his politics, to love, to personal cleanliness. The rights is a flexibility; the prohibition against assimilation of these young men in the future demonstrations in the military is a principle. military could bring increasing confrontations The right of an airman to question the reasons and conflict unless the military acts to main­ for an order is a flexibility; the carrying out tain a certain minimal adjustment to chang­ of that order is a principle. Flexibilities thus ing conditioas that will insure its survivability help the individual adjust to the principles as an effective fighting force. If, as Hutchins of his military role by decreasing as many says, law helps make the mores, then military frustration-causing factors as possible. law can help bridge the civilian-military cul­ Defining flexibilities will require careful tural gap. The principle of law then should consideration. Commanders must refrain from protect the military against disintegration initiating innovations in a pell-mell fashion. from too many and too varied innovators, For example, what appears as fair and equal while at the same time avoiding the suppres­ treatment to a white airman might not be sion of innovators whose ideas represent interpreted as such by a black airman whose improvement and benefit. This is the optimum environmental background has deprived him balance between conformity and deviation. of the education needed to compete, or who Achieving this optimum balance is perhaps has a marked inferiority complex because of the most urgent psychological problem in the his socioeconomic status. Selected, highly military today. It means the changing of trained, and perceptive officers and airmen are attitudes. Since attitudes are the residuals of needed in every military unit, to serve as a our past experiences, they tend to constrict, direct link between the men and their com­ conserve, and stabilize our worlds. As such, mander. In this way the root causes of frus­ we find security in the status quo and tend to tration and tension can be identified, brought 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW to the attention of the commander, and cor­ If the military lacks the courage to stand rected before they develop into confronta­ against its critics when it believes itself right, tions and conflict. The morale improvement or if it fails to pronounce judgment upon program of the Air Training Command is itself when it believes itself wrong, it will be an outstanding example of this approach.7 guilty of moral agnosticism and deserving of In dealing with deviant behavior, however, the most acute public criticism and censure. the military must never bow to unjust de­ It seems inevitable, as Anthony Wermuth mands either through appeasement or com­ suggests, that “change will probably be en­ promise. De Tocqueville warned against demic in the armed forces for the next decade, tyranny of the majority in America. Tyranny at least, as social change in American society of the minority can be just as deadly. In gathers momentum.”8 The military can identifying and defining principles and flexi­ weather this change and successfully progress bilities, optimum balance must be maintained. to an all-volunteer force if it remains true to In explaining this course to the American its principles while bending with its flexibilities. people, the military should avoid apologia. Washington, D.C.

Notes 1. Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: the Martial Spirit in an AFROTC commissioning address at North Carolina State University, America. 177S-I86S (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Com­ Raleigh, North Carolina, 15 May 1971. pany. 1968), pp. 101-19. 6. R. M. Hutchins, “The Nurture of Human Life," Bulletin, Center 2. Urpo Harva, “War and Human Nature" in The Critique oj for the Study of Democratic Institutions of the Fund for the Republic, War: Contemporary Philosophical Explorations, ed. Robert Ginsberg No. 10. March 1961. (Chicago: Henry Rcgnery Company, 1969), p. 45. 7. John G. Rogers, “Something New in the Air Force: Got a 3. Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend, “Conflict, Crisis and Collision: Gripe? Tell the General," The Washington Post Parade, August 29, A Study of International Stability," Psychology Today, May 1968, 1971, pp. 18. 20. pp. 26-70. 8. Anthony L. W'ermuth. The Impact of Changing Values on 4. Arthur Hadley. “The Soldiers: No One Cares Anymore," Military Organization & Personnel, ASG Monograph No. 6, December Washington Post, August 15, 1971, pp. B1-B3. 1971 (W'altham, Massachusetts: Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 5. Major General Robert N. Ginsburgh, “Discipline and Dissent," 1952), p. 29. Books and Ideas

THE TECHNOLOGICAL WAR

Colonel Francis X. Kane, USAF (Ret)

Technological leadership is essential for the U.S., given the nature of the Soviet society. D r . J ohn S. Foster, J r .

SMALL, important, but unwelcome book has appeared in the literature of A^ international affairs. The Strategy of Technology,f by Doctors Possony and Pournelle, is fittingly small because it deals with principles; it is important because it is destined to become one of the fundamental books for the future; it is unwelcome because it illuminates some of our most cherished self-delusions about war, strategy, and policy. The book is controversial in another sense in that the authors engage in polemics on past programs. Critics of the book have focused on the polemics rather than the fundamentals. Hopefully, however, this book will contribute to forging new options for the future of the United States. One conclusion is clear: we have been committing a major strategic blunder in our current dismantling of our technological base, a blunder that ranks with the demobilization of our armed forces at the end of World War II. That past blunder could be over­ come, though at the cost of much treasure, because we had time and a lead in technology. t Stefan T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War (New York: The Dunellen Company, Inc., 1970, $7.50), xxxii and 189 pages. 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Our current blunder could be a disaster mentum are essential to our national security. for us and the Free World if it permits the The second principle is that the elements Soviet Union to become technologically supe­ of technology are interdependent. Those ele­ rior. In testimony in 1971 before the Senate ments are not national; they are international, Armed Services Committee, Dr. John S. even global, in extent and complexity. U.S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and withdrawal from the supersonic transport ele­ Engineering, stated: ment of technology resulted from a failure to U.S. recovery from such a loss of techno­ understand this second principle. Development logical leadership would not be feasible with­ of the sst goes on in French/British and out enormous expenditures over many years— Russian programs. The qualitative changes and without grave risk meanwhile of losing that will result will not bear the imprint of our national margin of safety. the U.S. as they could and should. The third principle is that technology and its impact are ubiquitous. We assumed that Principles the space age ended when we put three astro­ The principles articulated by Possony and nauts on the moon. We had done what we set Pournelle are important because The Strategy out to do; the rest of the world was supposed of Technology asserts correctly that we are to follow our lead and thence ignore space. involved in a war—in fact, the decisive war: What happened is quite the opposite: our the technological war. Thus, the authors rea­ success has called attention of the rest of man­ son that success in the decisive war requires kind to the potential of space. Consequently, a deliberate strategy. Such a strategy must over half the countries of the world now use recognize that technology has a momentum satellites on a daily basis for communications all its own. In the sixties we saw an attempt and weather. Hundreds of ships use satellites in the U.S. to legislate technological change for navigation continuously. Soon satellites out of existence by postulating that we had will provide the means for direct broadcast reached a “technological plateau.” The con­ to the whole Indian subcontinent and to all clusion which was supposed to follow was of Brazil. The resulting changes in their that we did not need to invest time, talent, national education will be profound. and treasure into modernizing our technology. More important, the Soviets have continued Possony and Pournelle show that change in an aggressive space program and have applied technology follows a “life pattern,” deduced space technology to offense, defense, surveil­ from experience and demonstrated to apply lance, communications, weather, navigation, to the present. Their “S” curves of change and geodesy. illustrate that any “leveling off” is not only The final principle is that technology paces extremely short-lived but also the prelude to strategy; it leads strategy and determines its a new cycle of change. The “plateau” never content and effectiveness. This principle is was reached because of the continuing onrush the most controversial one because it expresses of technology. what is, not what ought to be. Strategy should Such an attempt to legislate the end of lead technology, but it has not and does not. change implied more than the denial of an Those who constrain our technology through impersonal momentum; it was based on the measures such as reducing the space budget false assumption that the course of technology do not give us a better strategy; they reduce can be controlled unilaterally by the U.S. our strategy potential and constrain our withdrawing from its mainstream. Understand­ strategy. ing and applying the basic principles of mo­ The whole point of Strategy of Technology BOOKS AND IDEAS 83 is to energize effort toward creating a national enhance our security. An after-the-fact strat­ strategy that can and does lead technology. egy is not adequate today and will not be The second main theme of the work is that tomorrow. such a reversal of relationships and establish­ The technological war is the decisive war. ment of the proper ones require leadership. It is also an alternative to destructive war, not Finding and exerting such leadership go a cause of “arms races.” Our goal must be counter to one of the schools of thought that to win that war, not play by play, or game make Possony and Pournelle’s work unwel­ by game, but season after season, for it is a come. As they correctly point out, the tech­ war that will not end unless we default or nological war is inseparably linked to the surrender. protracted conflict. Intuitive understanding of that interlinking runs counter to the self- delusion that protracted conflict does not exist. Russian Strategy of Technology All our past efforts, including General Bernard That we do not have a strategy of tech­ Schriever’s attempts to create a Technological nology is very clear. That the Russians do War Plan and Project Forecast, came to have a strategy of technology is equally clear. naught because they were unwelcome to In his testimony of March 1971, Dr. Foster those theorists who postulated that U.S. initia­ described the elements of that strategy and tives produced Soviet reactions. In effect, they its importance. assumed that the U.S. influenced Soviet be­ First, the Soviets have purpose and con­ havior. They refused to accept that the Soviets tinuity of purpose. Science and technology could be pursuing a strategy of technolog)'. have been vital in their thinking since Lenin. Rather than take the intelligent step of creat­ They have used research and development to ing strategy to guide our dynamic technology, better their position. Their planning and they constrained our technology. allocation of resources have reflected long­ Several important findings follow. We are term steadiness of purpose. still waiting for proof of the theorem of the Second, they have followed consistent poli­ sixties that the Soviets would slow down their cies on technology. In order to challenge the technology if we slowed down ours. Events U.S. technologically, the Soviets have imple­ have proven those theorists to be wrong. We mented three main lines of policy. They have might ask why. increased the number of technically qualified Furthermore, we have seen several Presi­ people available to them. The number of dents attempt to find ways out of the strategic graduates in engineering and natural sciences box in which they have been placed by those grew from 145,000 in 1960 to 247,000 in who constrained technology in the past. As 1970. Our estimate is that by 1976 the the authors point out, the decisions the Presi­ number will grow to 359,000 annually. (The dent makes on technology have impact two corresponding numbers of graduates in the terms later. It follows that in order to cope U.S. are 83,000; 142,000; and 181,000. The with current circumstances we must take a latter number for 1976 seems high considering view which is both broader and deeper. the extent of the depression in the U.S. aero­ Our strategy is confined to tactics—that is, space industry and the greatly reduced oppor­ the “realm of the possible.” The key to a tunities for employment in the coming years.) strategy adequate for security problems lies The Soviets have steadily improved the in a top-down approach to reversing the quality and quantity of laboratory and engi­ present situation. If we have a strategy, we neering facilities available. They have a can lead our technology in directions that planned growth in the floor space of their 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW design bureaus and laboratories to accommo­ They are creating a global navy and pro­ date the growing number of scientists and jecting their presence throughout the oceans engineers. of the world. They have steadily increased the amount They are demonstrating formidable new of money devoted to research and develop­ techniques for air defense. ment efforts. Beginning in the early 1950s, They are modernizing their aircraft. the Soviets started to increase steadily their They are equipping their land forces with investment in rdt&e . Through 1965 the aver­ advanced weapons. age annual growth exceeded 10 percent. Since Dr. Foster’s finding that they can increase 1965 it has averaged 8 percent. However, in their civilian rdt&e and still reach military military rdt&e their growth rate since 1968 technological supremacy by the mid-seventies has been 15 percent per year. U.S. funding will not be accepted by those who complain for military rdt& e in the same period has about the high cost of military and space been constant. As a result, this year the Soviets r &d . As Kosygin pointed out as long ago as will be devoting about 40 to 50 percent more 1965, expenditures for space are as helpful in equivalent effort to military r &d than to the Soviet economy as any other expendi­ the U.S. ture. (He doubted that space expenditures If the Soviets continue to implement their were an undue burden in the U.S. either.) strategy of technology and we continue to con­ In sum, the Soviet strategy of technology strain our efforts, the resulting trends will give has changed the entire global strategic situa­ us cause for concern. We could see several tion. One of the principal effects is, as Admiral technological surprises; we could expect the Zumwalt stated before the House Committee Soviets to become technologically superior in on Appropriations, to decrease our military military r &d in a few years. options in the event of a conflict of national In addition to purpose, continuity, and interests. resource1-, the Soviet strategy of technology includes secrecy. Secrecy coupled with parity or superiority can give the Soviets a real and Other Strategies of Technology substantive advantage over the United States. The Soviets have had spectacular success, Contrary to some U.S. theorists, the U.S. but General de Gaulle also made significant policy has been to wait for Soviet advances advances by implementing his own strategy and then react to them. The so-called “action/ of technology. His purpose (unwelcome as reaction cycle” applies to the U.S. nonstrategy it was within the nato alliance) was to of accommodating to Soviet initiative. But permit France to play an independent role. Soviet secrecy and superiority could make Independence applied to more than political timely, effective U.S. reaction impossible. decisions; for de Gaulle, it also meant that We need look only briefly at the list of he could circumvent U.S. laws prohibiting Soviet advances in recent years to understand collaboration in nuclear energy programs and the effectiveness of their strategy of technology: develop his own missile and computer tech­ They have passed us in numbers of ic bm’s. nology. By sustained effort he created an They are continuing the rate of slbm independent nuclear deterrent, the force de deployment. frappe (now called force de dissuasion). They are continuing to increase the number Presently, Mirage IV-A aircraft are being of satellites launched each year. augmented by medium-range ballistic missiles They have demonstrated the ability to “kill” ( mrbm ) in hardened silos and by sea-launched satellites with nonnuclear devices. ballistic missiles ( sl bm). BOOKS AND IDEAS 85 Emerging countries also are attempting to war in some detail. Coping with surprise and develop their own strategies of technology. capitalizing on our own technical advances The Jackson Report of 1969 pointed out the as surprises are vital to the purpose of the need for better management of the programs technological war. As already mentioned, of the Second Development Decade for the Possony and Poumelle consider technological industrial, educational, and economic ad­ war the alternative to active hostilities; its vances of these ninety nations. goal should be the negation of war. And We have little insight into the r &d of Red the key to surprise is initiative. China, but it seems clear that they appreciate several fundamentals: Possessing nuclear weapons, missiles, and satellites does not make Assured Survival a nation a great power, but having them In identifying U.S. options for the future, is essential to becoming a great power. the authors describe a strategy of “assured Consequendy, Red China is creating them. survival.” They propose a complex of offen­ Finally, we have yet to see what Japan sive and defensive forces. Their complex of will do in advanced r &d . Japan, however, weapon systems would give us many capa­ is a space power and is increasing its defense bilities to negate the Soviets’ potential tech­ budget significantly. nological advances in the systems they are developing. Such a range of U.S. capabilities

would continue to create uncertaintyi in the Options for the U.S. minds of the Soviets about the outcome of Possony and Poumelle have catalogued the any war they might initiate. Uncertainty is assumptions governing our strategy and chal­ the key to deterrence. War, including and lenged some of our most persistent fallacies. especially technological war, is an operation One of these fallacies regards science as a primarily against the will of the opponent. substitute for military judgment; another so Those operations aim at providing security, regards systems analysis. In the past we used but security cannot be guaranteed by passive management as a substitute for strategy and measures, nor by agreements that try to halt assumed that the more centralized the man­ the stream of technology. The way to guaran­ agement was the more responsive and effective tee security is to win in the technological the strategy would be. However, their dis­ war. Winning can come from a strategy of section of errors, delusions, and fallacies is a technology. prelude to their positive steps for improvement. Their emphasis is on creative leaders who capitalize on the technological process and Some Troublesome Issues make judgments in keeping with the reality Possony and Poumelle have articulated the of that process. To assist these leaders, we principles of the decisive war of technology need strategic analysis that integrates tech­ and have illuminated some of the funda­ nology, the military arts, and nonmilitary mentals we must address to insure our con­ conflict. This function of strategic analysis is tinuing security. They do not address some the final decision in the process of selecting issues that may make it impossible to effect the systems to be acquired. a viable solution for us. Those issues lie out­ In his testimony of March 1971 Dr. Foster side the realm of military and security policy; stated that we could expect some technological they lie in our national character as well as surprises from the Soviet Union. The Strategy in our philosophy. We can rid ourselves of of Technology deals with surprise in modern our self-delusions, but can we create a new 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW philosophy to guide our strategy and thus current demobilization of our technology is our security? French General Andre Beaufre, one of the dominant indicators. But if we in his works on deterrence, has stressed the are going to lay down our mantle of leader­ need for a unifying philosophy, but few have ship, let us do so as a rational, conscious recognized the wisdom of his finding and decision, not an emotional response to the nothing is being done to overcome this basic burdens of the protracted conflict in the deficiency. technological war. A great nation can cease to be great either In The Strategy of Technology, Possony through defeat by its enemies or because its and Pournelle have shown how we must act people decline the burdens of leadership that to win the decisive war, the technological are inherent in being great. In reality, defeat war. By implication, they have shown that results from attempting to withdraw from we are pursuing a course toward defeat— greatness. There are many indicators that the unknowingly. U.S. wants to stop being a superpower. The Los Angeles, California The Contributors

Harvest Project Office, Air University. A graduate and former faculty member of Air War College, he was part of the original Jungle Jim organization and remained in special warfare operations, including tours in Vietnam and Latin America. Colonel Gleason was assigned to the Air Staff 1965—68, when he be­ came Deputy Chief, MACSOG, Vietnam.

DR. Curtis W. Tarr (Ph.D., Stanford University) f until his recent appointment as Under Secretary of Stale for Coordi­ nating Security Assistant Programs, served Major General Edward G. Lansdale, as Director of the Selective Service Sys­ USAF (Ret), served in the Army of the tem. He was Assistant Secretary of the U.S., 1943—47, and then in the USAF Air Force (Manpower and Reserve until his retirement in 1963. He served Affairs) in 1969-70. After combat service as special assistant to Ambassador Lodge in the U.S. Army, European Theater, ho in South Vietnam and as U.S. represen­ earned degrees and filled teaching and tative on the Vietnamese government dean assignments at Stanford and Har­ commission to win support of the vard. Dr. Tarr was President of Lawrence countryside. He also served as assistant University, 1963-69, and served as Chair­ for special operations to the Secretary of man, Task Force on Local Government Defense. General Lansdale has published Finance and Organization, State of articles in magazines and a recent book, Wisconsin. In the Midst of Wars, his memoirs of the Philippine Huk campaign and Diem’s early leadership in Vietnam. Major Mich a el A. Nelson (M.A., Uni- versity of Arizona) is a student in the Air Command and Staff College. His pre­ vious experience has centered primarily in tactical fighters, including a combat tour in the F-105. On returning from SEA, Major Nelson attended graduate school under the AFIT program and specialized in Latin American politics. Subsequently he was assigned as an adviser to the Republic of Korea Air Force.

DR. Ralph E. STRAUCH (Ph.D., Univer­ sity of California, Berkeley) is a mathe­ matician with the Washington Research Department of The RAND Corporation. He served with the U.S. Navy as a com­ munications officer from 1959 to 1962 and has been a member of the RAND staff since 1965. His areas of research have included mathematics, operations re­ search, weapon systems analysis, and strategic forces and policy. His articles have appeared in technical journals and Bricadier General Daniel James, J r . as RAND Corporation publications. (B.S., Tuskegee Institute) is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) . Commissioned in 1943, he served with fighter units and in the Korean War flew 101 combat missions. Other assign­ ments include Commander, 60th Fighter Interceptor Squadron; Deputy Com- mander/Operations, 81st Fighter Wing, England; DC/O, 4453d Combat Training Wing; Vice Commander, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing. Thailand; and Commander, 7272d Flying Training Wing, Libya. He Major James S. Austin, J r . (M.A., is a graduate of Air Command and Staff Saint Mary’s University of San Antonio) College and has been nominated and is Manager, Special Programs Division, confirmed for promotion to major general. Civilian Institutions Directorate, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. From 1961 to 1969 he held assignments in OSI district offices in San Antonio and Republic of Vietnam and as instructor, USAF Special Investigations School, Washington, D.C. In 1966-67 he Colonel Robert L. Gleason (M.P.A., was Assistant Professor of Aerospace Stud­ Auburn University) is Chief, Corona ies, University of California, Berkeley. 87 4500th Air Base Wing, Langley AFB, Officer School, USAF Communication Virginia. During World War II he was a Course at Boston University, and Armed pilot and light bombardment instructor. Forces Staff College, was once a com­ He has served as NATO Operations Staff mercial and free-lance artiBt and has two Officer; in Personnel Retention Division paintings in the Air Force art collection. and Selection Board Secretariat, DCS/P, Hq USAF; in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force as Liaison Officer to the House of Representatives; and as Direc­ tor of Information, Tactical Air Com­ mand. He is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Major Jimmy L. Mit c h el l (M.A.. Ohio State University) is a test psychologist, Det 17, ATC, Lackland AFB, Texas, fol- lowing duty in Civilian Institutions Direc­ torate, AFIT, as Arts and Social Science Program Manager and Executive Officer, 1966-71. Commissioned from OTS in 1960 after two years as psychiatric clinic technician, USAF Hospital, Wright-Pat- terson AFB, he served as police or com­ bat defense officer state-side and in Morocco until selection for AFIT at Ohio State. Major Mitchell is a graduate of Squadron Officer School. Colonel Francis X. Kane, USAF (Ret), (USMA; Ph.D., Georgetown Uni­ versity) served 27 years in war planning, systems analysis, space and missile plan­ ning, and overseas as assistant air attache, Paris, and with the 508th Fighter Group. Lieu t en a n t Colonel Russell A. He is still actively engaged in strategy TURNER II (M.A., American University) analysis and long-range space and missile is Chief of the Air Force Art Progrum, planning. He has taught at Catholic Secretary of the Air Force Office of University, Pepperdine College, and the Information. A former B-29, C-121, and University of California at Los Angeles. C-130 pilot, he has been an information His writings have appeared in Fortune, officer with Air Force Systems Command Orbis, Air University Review, Missiles Colonel Wil l ia m R. Edcar (M.B.A., and with NATO forces in Iceland. and Rockets, Air Force and Space Digest, Harvard University) is Commander, Colonel Turner, a graduate of Squadron and Air Power Historian.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “Antimilitarism in America” by Herman S. Wolk as the out­ standing article in the May-June 1972 issue of the Review. C olonel Eldon W. D owns, USAF Editor Jack H. M ooney Managing Editor L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Laun C. S mith, J r ., USAF Associate Editor L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Philip M. F lammer, USAF Associate Editor M ajor Edward Vallentiny, USAF Associate Editor E dmund O. B arker Financial and Administrative Manager J ohn A. W estcott, J r . Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L ia Mid o s i May Patterson Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition W il l ia m J. D e P aola Art Editor and Illustrator

C olonel Sheldon I. Godkin Hq Aerospace Defense Command C olonel Arthur G. Lynn Hq Air Force Logistics Command D r . H arold Helfman Hq Air Force Systems Command C olonel John W. Keeler Hq Air Training Command C olonel Irving H. Breslauer Hq Military Airlift Command L ieu t en a n t Colonel John H. Scrivner, J r . Hq Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Francis W. Jennings SAF Office of Information C olonel John B. V oss Hq Strategic Air Command C olonel Boone Rose, J r . Hq Tactical Air Command Colonel Arthur S. R agen Hq United States Air Force Academy

ATTENTION Air University Review is published to stimulate pro­ fessional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents reflect the opinions of its authors or the investiga­ tions and conclusions of its editors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW