Oxford Reports on International Law: CPCF V Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Australia, First Instance Decisio

CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Australia, First instance decision, (2015) 316 ALR 1, ILDC 2936 (AU 2015), 28th January 2015, Australia

Date: 28 January 2015 Citation(s): (2015) 316 ALR 1 (Other Reference) ILDC 2936 (AU 2015) (OUP reference) Content type: Domestic court decisions Product: Oxford Reports on International Law [ORIL] Module: International Law in Domestic Courts [ILDC] Jurisdiction: Australia [au]

Parties: CPCF Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Australia Additional parties: (Intervening Party) Australian Human Rights Commission; (Amicus Curiae) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Judges/Arbitrators: Robert French (Chief Justice); Virginia Bell; Kenneth Hayne; Susan Crennan; Susan Kiefel; Stephen Gageler; Patrick Keane Procedural Stage: First instance decision Related Development(s): Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act (Commonwealth), 2014 (Australia) (amendment removing inconsistency with international law as a ground for invalidating an exercise of power under the Maritime Powers Act)

Subject(s): Asylum — Expulsion — Migrants, rights — Non-refoulement — Comity — Sovereignty — UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea)

Core Issue(s): Whether Australia’s executive powers were constrained by international non-refoulement obligations, which had not been implemented in domestic legislation, under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘Convention against Torture’). Whether non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR, and the Convention against Torture applied to extra-territorial actions taken by states.

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: University of Melbourne; date: 25 October 2019 Whether rights and obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea allowed states to detain individuals, on board an incoming vessel and take them from that state’s contiguous zone to a foreign country.

Oxford Reports on International Law in Domestic Courts is edited by:

Professor André Nollkaemper, University of Amsterdam and August Reinisch, University of Vienna.

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: University of Melbourne; date: 25 October 2019 Facts F1 On 29 June 2014, an Indian-flagged vessel carrying 157 people who were attempting to sail to Australia was intercepted 16 nautical miles from the Australian territory of Christmas Island by an Australian border protection vessel. That was within Australia’s contiguous zone. The officer in charge of the Australian vessel authorized the interception on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that those on board the Indian-flagged vessel intended to breach Australian migration laws.

F2 There was a fire on board the Indian-flagged vessel and it became unseaworthy. The passengers were transferred to the Australian vessel.

F3 Following a decision by the National Security Committee of Cabinet on 1 July 2014, the Australian vessel was directed to sail toward India with an intention of disembarking the passengers in India, subject to India’s permission. The Australian vessel left the contiguous zone, reached the vicinity of India, and remained on the high seas. That voyage lasted from 1 to 22 July 2014.

F4 Negotiations between the Australian government and the Indian government in order to disembark the passengers were unsuccessful. On 23 July 2014, the Australian vessel was ordered to sail back to the Australian territory of the Cocos Islands, where the passengers were disembarked and taken into immigration detention.

F5 CPCF, a Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity who was one of the passengers, brought a claim of false imprisonment before the High Court of Australia for the period of the passengers’ voyage on board the Australian vessel and sought damages.

F6 A special case application was made to the High Court under its original jurisdiction. Pursuant to that type of application, the parties agreed on a list of questions of law to be answered by the High Court.

F7 The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (‘Minister’) and the Commonwealth of Australia (‘Australia’) argued that the detention of CPCF was lawful given the powers granted to maritime officers under Section 72(4) of the Maritime Powers Act (Commonwealth), 2013 (Australia). That provision allowed a maritime officer to detain a person and take them to a place outside Australia.

F8 CPCF argued that removal to India would place him in danger of deportation back to Sri Lanka. He claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution if he were returned to Sri Lanka. He argued that Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (28 July 1951) 189 UNTS 137, entered into force 22 April 1954 (‘Refugee Convention’) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (10 December 1984) 1465 UNTS 85, entered into force 26 June 1987 (‘Convention against Torture’) acted as a constraint on the exercise of power under the Maritime Powers Act. He submitted that Australia’s non-refoulement obligations operated in spite of the fact that actions had taken place outside of Australian territorial waters.

F9 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) appeared as amicus curiae. The UNHCR submitted that Australia owed non-refoulement obligations under the

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: University of Melbourne; date: 25 October 2019 Convention against Torture and the Refugee Convention to people outside Australian territory where it exercised effective control over such people.

F10 A further question arose regarding whether Australia’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 3, entered into force 16 November 1994 (‘UNCLOS’) was a constraint on the exercise of powers in the contiguous zone under the Maritime Powers Act. Article 33 of the UNCLOS allowed coastal states, in their contiguous zone, to exercise ‘control necessary’ in order to prevent an infringement of that state’s immigration laws in its territory or territorial sea. The particular question was whether Article 33 allowed a coastal state to detain individuals on inward bound vessels and remove them from the contiguous zone (CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another, Hearing, [2014] HCATrans 227, 14 October 2014).

F11 The Minister and Australia argued that international non-refoulement obligations did not act as a limit to the powers that the state was entitled to exercise under the Maritime Powers Act. Even if they were, there was no suggestion that India would not have afforded CPCF adequate protection against refoulement. Furthermore, non-refoulement obligations were only owed by Australia in respect of refugees within its territory, and therefore would not include those intercepted in the contiguous zone.

Held H1 French CJ in a separate opinion: There was some support for the view that the non- refoulement obligation under the Refugee Convention only applied to receiving states in respect of refugees within their territories. (paragraph 10) There was no textual basis in Section 72(4) of the Maritime Powers Act to support a construction limiting the power which it conferred by reference to Australia’s non-refoulement obligations, assuming they subsisted extra-territorially. Section 74 of the Maritime Powers Act required that a person could only be taken to a place that was ‘safe’ for that person to be in. The risk of refoulement was relevant to evaluating whether a place was ‘safe’. (paragraphs 11–12)

H2 Australia was a party to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (27 April 1979) 1405 UNTS 97, entered into force 22 June 1985 (‘Search and Rescue Convention’). Extraterritorial non-refoulement obligations had been acknowledged by the International Maritime Organization in their guidelines relating to that Convention. The Indian-flagged vessel, after interception by the Australian vessel, became unseaworthy, thus engaging Australia’s rescue obligations at international law in respect of its passengers and crew. (paragraphs 16–7)

H3 ‘[S]hips of all states enjoy a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of a coastal state’ under Article 17 of the UNCLOS. However there was no suggestion that the Indian-flagged vessel was engaging in innocent passage. (paragraph 20)

H4 All Australian statutes were to be interpreted, as far as their language permitted, in accordance with international law. (paragraph 8) However ‘international law and convention or treaty obligations [did] not have a direct operation under Australian domestic law’. (paragraph 21)

H5 Crennan J, in a separate opinion: The exercise of maritime powers in the contiguous zone was subject to a number of limits, reflecting Australia’s obligations under the UNCLOS. (paragraphs 181–2)

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: University of Melbourne; date: 25 October 2019 H6 Under the Refugee Convention, refugees were not invariably able to claim protection from the country of preferred choice. (paragraph 195) There was also an ‘inherent’ tension between Australia’s obligations under the Search and Rescue Convention, CPCF’s interest in accessing Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, and the interests, enshrined in domestic legislation, in preventing contravention of Australian migration law. That tension was similar to the ‘inherent’ tension in the Refugee Convention between humanitarian concerns and preserving state sovereignty. (paragraph 213)

H7 No conclusion should be reached regarding the application of non-refoulement obligations to the present case. (paragraph 220) If Section 72(4) of the Maritime Powers Act had been used to return CPCF to Sri Lanka, or to a place that was not safe, it might have been necessary to consider consistent interpretation of the section in light of the Refugee Convention. (paragraph 219)

H8 Gageler J, in a separate opinion: All Australian statutes were to be interpreted, as far as their language permitted, in accordance with international law. In the instant scenario, that principle empowered officers to act in accordance with rules of international law where statutory language permitted. However, it could not be presumed to constrain an officer to ‘act in conformity with international law norms as those norms might be ascertained, interpreted and then enforced by a domestic court’. (paragraph 385)

H9 The exercise of maritime powers could not be limited by international law norms. The Australian government had ultimate discretion regarding implementation of Australia’s international law obligations. (paragraph 387)

H10 Keane J, in a separate opinion: Australian courts were bound to apply Australian statute law ‘even if that law should violate a rule of international law’. International law did not form part of Australian law until it had been enacted into domestic legislation. As such, the exercise of power conferred by Section 72(4) of the Maritime Powers Act was not constrained by international non-refoulement obligations. The ‘general words’ in a statute should be read as subject to the established rules of international law unless a contrary intention appeared in the statute. That did not assist CPCF, given the absence of such ‘general’ wording in the Maritime Powers Act. (paragraphs 462–3)

H11 That India was not a party to the Refugee Convention did not mean that CPCF was at risk of refoulement to Sri Lanka. Whether non-refoulement obligations were met would depend on the level of effective protection that India afforded, rather than whether it had ratified the Convention. (paragraph 469)

H12 Bell and Hayne JJ, in a joint dissenting opinion: The Minister and Australia’s suggestion that Australian officials had exclusive power over the Australian vessel and those on board it, under the Maritime Powers Act, in order to detain and take passengers abroad, ran contrary to the principle of comity among nations. (paragraph 82) That suggested that powers under the Act should be read restrictively. (paragraph 83)

H13 The question asked under Section 74 of the Maritime Powers Act—whether it was safe for a person to be in a place—was ‘a different question from that inferentially posed’ by the Refugee Convention. Nonetheless, there was considerable overlap between the two enquiries, since ‘many who fear persecution for a convention reason fear for their personal safety in their country of nationality’. (paragraph 109) Assessing refoulement risk in a particular state required assessment of its domestic law and state practice. No facts suggested that CPCF faced such a risk in India, (paragraphs 124–5) so there was no need to

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: University of Melbourne; date: 25 October 2019 rule on whether non-refoulement obligations were a constraint on the exercise of power under the Maritime Powers Act. (paragraph 126)

H14 Kiefel J, in a dissenting opinion: Under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, an individual could only be removed to a safe third country. That would not be a country where there was a danger that they would be sent from there to a country where they were at risk of harm. (paragraph 297)

H15 The facts regarding the risk of refoulement from India were insufficient to reach an answer on whether Section 72(4) of the Maritime Powers Act should be construed in accordance with non-refoulement obligations. (paragraphs 298–300)

H16 Although India was not a signatory to the Refugee Convention and had not ratified the Convention against Torture, it was a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976 (‘ICCPR’). Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR contained an implied non-refoulement obligation. (paragraph 303) More assessment was required of India’s domestic law to ascertain the risk of refoulement. (paragraph 302)

Date of Report: 15 May 2019

Reporter(s): William Thomas Field-Papuga

Analysis A1 Three High Court judges (French CJ, Gageler, and Keane JJ) held that Australia’s non- refoulement obligations did not constrain powers exercised under the Maritime Powers Act. (paragraphs 10–11, 391, 462–3) The remaining judges (Bell,Hayne, Crennan, and Kiefel JJ) did not make a decision on that point. (paragraphs 112, 220, 296–304) Several judges (French CJ, Crennan, Gageler, and Keane JJ) recognized Australia’s international obligations as critical to interpreting domestic statutes where statutory language permitted. (paragraphs 8, 220, 385, 462)

A2 The issue of whether non-refoulement obligations operated extraterritorially was left unresolved, as was the question of whether Article 33 of the UNCLOS allowed a coastal state to detain individuals on inward bound vessels and remove them from the contiguous zone.

A3 Regarding extraterritorial application of non-refoulement obligations, French CJ and Keane J mentioned the persuasive effect of rulings in other common law jurisdictions. (paragraphs 10, 461) Those included the United States Supreme Court decision of Sale, Acting Commissioner (Immigration & Naturalisation Service) v Haitian Centers Council Inc, Appeal decision, 509 US 155, 21 June 1993 (‘Sale’) and the United Kingdom House of Lords decision in R (on the application of European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, Appeal decision, [2005] 2 AC 1; ILDC 110 (UK 2004), 9 December 2004. In Sale, 163–66, a majority of the US Supreme Court ruled that Article 33 of the Refugee Convention could not be construed as imposing non-refoulement obligations on actions taken on the high seas.

A4 The UNHCR, as amicus curiae in the current proceedings, submitted that the obligations under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention applied wherever a state exercised

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: University of Melbourne; date: 25 October 2019 its jurisdiction, whether de jure or de facto. The UNHCR had submitted that Sale was the only superior court decision against that principle.

A5 The European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) decision Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, Appeal decision of the Grand Chamber, App No 27765/09, 23 February 2012 (‘Hirsi’) was not referenced by the High Court, but it might be considered as persuasive authority in favour of the UNHCR’s assertion that non-refoulement obligations operated extraterritorially. In Hirsi, the ECtHR ruled that Italy had contravened Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 221, entered into force 3 September 1953 (‘ECHR’). Similarly to the instant case, Hirsi involved the interception of migrants, from Somalia and Eritrea, on the high seas by Italian authorities. Those individuals were returned to Libya by Italian authorities, and subsequently complained of a violation of their rights under Article 3 of the ECHR, given the risk of exposure to torture and inhuman or degrading treatment in Libya as well in their respective countries of origin.

A6 In Hirsi the ECtHR unanimously ruled that, in spite of actions that took place on the high seas, Italian jurisdiction was present for the purposes of engaging Italy’s obligations under the ECHR (Hirsi at 26–7). Judge Pinto de Albuquerque also stated that Italy had violated its obligations under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention (Hirsi at 78–9). Judge Pinto de Albuquerque disagreed with the rule in Sale regarding extraterritorial application and stated that the ‘United States Supreme Court’s interpretation contradicts the literal and ordinary meaning of the language of Article 33 of the [Refugee Convention] and departs from the common rules of treaty interpretation’ (Hirsi at 67).

A7 Hirsi gave an interpretation of the Refugee Convention consistent with that accepted by UNHCR and also presented a more compelling argument under international law. By contrast, Sale presented an unduly narrow interpretation of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. Allowing states to deny individuals under their exclusive control the right to non-refoulement on the high seas, whilst granting the same right to those in their territory, allowed a double standard. That double standard was in breach of states’ obligations to implement their treaty obligations in good faith. It was also contrary to the object and purpose expressed in the Preamble to the Refugee Convention which declared the intention to give refugees the ‘widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms’.

A8 It is unlikely that applying the rule from Hirsi in the instant case would have changed the outcome, given the limited role that non-refoulement obligations played in the ruling. However, it could have been cited by the High Court to unambiguously state that non- refoulement obligations continued to operate in the high seas and contiguous zone.

A9 The High Court also did not resolve whether the powers outlined in Article 33 of the UNCLOS permitted coastal states to arrest those on inward-bound vessels within the contiguous zone and take them outside of the contiguous zone. French CJ suggested that Section 41 of the Maritime Powers Act, which was reflective of the rule under Article 33 of the UNCLOS, did not preclude such exercise. (paragraphs 29, 352) Bell and Hayne JJ went so far as saying that such practice was ‘controversial’, with reference to IA Shearer, ‘Problems of Jurisdiction and Enforcement against Delinquent Vessels’ (1986) 25(2) ICLQ 320, 330. (paragraph 79) However, Shearer suggested that that practice was more than merely controversial. Rather, under Article 33, which stated that ‘control’ could only be exercised to prevent infringement of specified laws, neither jurisdiction nor sovereignty

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: University of Melbourne; date: 25 October 2019 could be exercised. He suggested that ‘control’ had to ‘be limited to such measures as inspections and warnings, and cannot include arrest or forcible taking into port’).

A10 The actions in the instant case contravened the ordinary meaning of ‘control’ under Article 33 of the UNCLOS, which should only extend to measures strictly necessary in order to prevent breach of certain Australian laws. That was consistent with the understanding that the contiguous zone was an area of limited sovereignty. Detaining and removing CPCF to India was an unnecessary measure in order to uphold those laws. Accepting that construction of the UNCLOS would have supported an overall conclusion from the High Court that the actions taken in the instant case were in excess of a legitimate exercise of maritime powers.

Date of Analysis: 15 May 2019 Analysis by: William Thomas Field-Papuga

Further analysis M Marmo and M Giannacopoulos, ‘Cycles of Judicial and Executive Power in Irregular Migration’ (2017) 5(16) Comparative Migration Studies 1 P Emerton and M O’Sullivan, ‘Rethinking Asylum Seeker Detention at Sea: The Power to Detain Asylum Seekers at Sea under the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth)’ (2015) 38(2) UNSWLJ 695 F Brennan, Maintaining a Convinced and Pondered Trust: The 2015 Gasson Lecturers (ATF Australia Ltd, Adelaide 2015)

Instruments cited in the full text of this decision:

International

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (28 July 1951) 189 UNTS 137, entered into force 22 April 1954, Article 33

Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (29 April 1958) 516 UNTS 205, entered into force 10 September 1964

Convention on the Continental Shelf (29 April 1958) 499 UNTS 311, entered into force 10 June 1964

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976, Articles 6, 7

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (31 January 1967) 606 UNTS 267, entered into force 4 October 1967

International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (27 April 1979) 1405 UNTS 97, entered into force 22 June 1985, Article 1

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 3, entered into force 16 November 1994, Articles 2, 3, 4, 17, 19, 33, 98

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (10 December 1984) 1465 UNTS 85, entered into force 26 June 1987, Article 3

Constitution, 1901 (Australia), Sections 51(xxix), 61, 64, 68, 75

Cases cited in the full text of this decision:

Australia domestics courts

Lo Pak, Ex parte, Appeal decision, (1888) 9 LR (NSWR) L 221, 17 May 1888

Robtelmes v Brenan, Appeal decision, (1906) 13 ALR 168, 2 October 1906

Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners Association, Appeal decision, (1908) 14 ALR 701, 6 October 1908

Zachariassen v Commonwealth, First instance decision, (1917) 24 ALR 81, 20 December 1917

Polites & Kandiliotes v Commonwealth, First instance decision, [1945] ALR 113; ILDC 2057 (AU 1945), 10 April 1945

Chow Hung Ching v R, Appeal decision, [1949] ALR 29, 6 December 1948

Bradley v Commonwealth, First instance decision, (1973) 1 ALR 241, 10 September 1973

New South Wales and ors v Commonwealth, First instance decision, (1975) 8 ALR 1; ILDC 2581 (AU 1975), 17 December 1975

Simsek v MacPhee (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs), First instance decision, (1982) 40 ALR 61, 10 March 1982

Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen, First instance decision, (1982) 39 ALR 417; ILDC 2552 (AU 1982), 11 May 1982

Kioa v West, Appeal decision, (1985) 62 ALR 321; ILDC 2086 (AU 1985), 18 December 1985

Queensland v Commonwealth (Daintree / Queensland / Tropical Rainforests case), First instance decision, (1989) 86 ALR 519, 30 June 1989

Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Appeal decision, (1989) 87 ALR 412; ILDC 2568 (AU 1989), 12 September 1989

Dietrich v R (1992), Appeal decision, 109 ALR 385, 13 November 1992

Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, First instance decision, (1992) 110 ALR 97, 8 December 1992

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh, Appeal decision, (1995) 128 ALR 353; ILDC 779 (AU 1995), 7 April 1995

Victoria v Australia (Industrial Relations Act Case), First instance decision, (1996) 138 ALR 129, 4 September 1996

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd, Appeal decision, (1997) 141 ALR 618, 4 February 1997

Kartinyeri v Commonwealth of Australia, First instance decision, (1998) 152 ALR 540, 1 April 1998

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Haji Ibrahim, Appeal decision, (2000) 175 ALR 585, 26 October 2000

Patto v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, First instance decision, (2000) 106 FCR 119, 2 November 2000

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar, Appeal decision, (2002) 187 ALR 574, 11 April 2002

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Australia, First instance decision, (2003) 195 ALR 24, 4 February 2003

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Lam, First instance decision, (2003) 195 ALR 502; ILDC 203 (AU 2003), 12 February 2003

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Respondents S152/2003, Appeal decision, (2004) 205 ALR 487, 21 April 2004

Al-Kateb v Godwin, Appeal decision, (2004) 208 ALR 124; ILDC 33 (AU 2004), 6 August 2004

Woolley, Re; Ex parte applicants M276/2003 by their next friend GS, First instance decision, (2004) 210 ALR 369; ILDC 516 (AU 2004), 7 October 2004

NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Appeal decision, (2005) 213 ALR 668, 2 March 2005

Plaintiff M61/2010E v Australia; Plaintiff M69/2010 v Australia, First instance decision, (2010) 272 ALR 14, 11 November 2010

Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; Plaintiff M106/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, First instance decision, (2011) 280 ALR 18; ILDC 1915 (AU 2011), 31 August 2011

Momcilovic v R, Appeal decision, (2011) 280 ALR 221, 8 September 2011

United Kingdom domestic courts

Huckle v Money, Appeal decision, (1763) 95 ER 768, 1 January 1763

Entick v Carrington, First instance decision, [1558–1774] All ER Rep 41, 2 November 1765

Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works, First instance decision, (1863) 143 ER 414, 21 April 1863

Folkard v Metropolitan Railway Co, (1973) LR8CP 470, 3 June 1873

Mediana, Owners of the Steamship v Owners, Master & Crew of the Lightship Comet, Appeal decision, [1900] AC 113, 13 February 1900

Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd, Appeal decision, [1920] AC 508, 10 May 1920

Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade, Appeal decision, [1977] 2 All ER 182, 15 December 1976

Siskina, Owners of the Cargo on board the v Distos Compania Naviera SA (The Siskina), Appeal decision, [1979] AC 210, 26 October 1977

Murray v Ministry of Defence, Appeal decision, [1988] 2 All ER 521, 25 May 1988

JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade & Industry, Appeal decision, [1990] 2 AC 418, 26 October 1989

R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2), Appeal decision, [2001] 2 AC 19, 27 July 2000

R (on the application of European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, Appeal decision, [2005] 2 AC 1; ILDC 110 (UK 2004), 9 December 2004

R (Hurst) v London Northern District Coroner, Appeal decision, [2007] 2 AC 189, 28 March 2007

R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2), Appeal decision, [2009] 1 AC 453; ILDC 1538 (UK 2008), 22 October 2008

Lumba (Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Mighty(Jamaica) v Same, Appeal decision, [2012] 1 AC 245, 23 March 2011

United States domestic courts

Nishimura Ekiu v United States, Appeal decision, 142 US 651 (1892), 18 January 1892

Sale, Acting Commissioner (Immigration & Naturalisation Service) v Haitian Centers Council Inc, Appeal decision, 509 US 155 (1993), 21 June 1993

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