História Contada (BCB): Gustavo Franco
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Persio Arida
XX Persio Arida Brasília 2019 História Contada do Banco Central do Brasil XX Persio Arida Ficha Catalográfica elaborada pela Biblioteca do Banco Central do Brasil – v. 20 Banco Central do Brasil Persio Arida / Banco Central do Brasil – Brasília : Banco Central do Brasil, 2019. 96 p. ; 23 cm – (Coleção História Contada do Banco Central do Brasil; v. 20) I. Banco Central do Brasil – História. II. Entrevista. III. Arida, Persio. IV. Título. V. Coleção. CDU 336.711(81)(091) Apresentação O Banco Central do Brasil tem mais de 50 anos. A realização de entrevistas orais com personalidades que contribuíram para a sua construção faz parte da memória dessa Instituição, que tão intimamente se vincula à trajetória econômica do país. Essas entrevistas são apresentadas nesta Coleção História Contada do Banco Central do Brasil, que complementa iniciativas anteriores. É um privilégio poder apresentar esta Coleção. As entrevistas realizadas permitem não apenas um passeio pela história, mas também vivenciar as crises, os conflitos, as escolhas realizadas e as opiniões daqueles que deram um período de suas vidas pela construção do Brasil. Ao mesmo tempo, constituem material complementar às fontes históricas tradicionais. O conjunto de depoimentos demonstra claramente o processo de construção do Banco Central como instituição de Estado, persistente no cumprimento de sua missão. A preocupação com a edificação de uma organização com perfil técnico perpassa a todos os entrevistados. Ao mesmo tempo em que erguiam a estrutura, buscavam adotar as medidas de política econômica necessárias ao atingimento de sua missão. É evidente, também, a continuidade de projetos entre as diversas gestões, viabilizando construções que transcendem os mandatos de seus dirigentes. -
Working Paper No. 222
Money and Taxes: The Chartalist L. Randall Wray” Working Paper No. 222 January 1998 *Senior Scholar, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute L. Rnndull Wray Introductory Quotes “A requirement that certain taxes should be paid in particular paper money might give that paper a certain value even if it was irredeemable.” (Edwin Cannan, Marginal Summary to page 3 12 of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, in Smith 1937: 3 12) “[T]he money of a State is not what is of compulsory general acceptance, but what is accepted at the public pay offices...” (Knapp 1924: vii) “Money is the creation of the state; it is not true to say that gold is international currency, for international contracts are never made in terms of gold, but always in terms of some national monetary unit; there is no important distinction between notes and metallic money.... ” Keynes (Keynes 1983: 402) “In an economy where government debt is a major asset on the books of the deposit- issuing banks, the fact that taxes need to be paid gives value to the money of the economy. The virtue of a balanced budget and a surplus insofar as the commodity value (purchasing power) of money is concerned is that the need to pay taxes means that people work and produce in order to get that in which taxes can be paid.” (Minsky 1986: 23 1) *****k*************X*********************~***********~****** Introduction In conventional analysis, money is used to facilitate exchange; its value was long determined by the value of the precious metal it represented, although under a fiat money system, its value is determined by the quantity of commodities it can purchase. -
A Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendment: Background and Congressional Options
A Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendment: Background and Congressional Options Updated August 22, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R41907 A Balanced Budget Constitutional Amendment: Background and Congressional Options Summary One of the most persistent political issues facing Congress in recent decades is whether to require that the budget of the United States be in balance. Although a balanced federal budget has long been held as a political ideal, the accumulation of large annual budget deficits and the associated growth of public debt in recent years has heightened concern that some action to require a balance between revenues and expenditures may be necessary. The debate over a balanced budget measure actually consists of several interrelated debates. Most prominently, the arguments of proponents have focused on the economy and the possible harm resulting from consistently large deficits and a growing federal debt. Another issue involves whether such a requirement should be statutory or made part of the Constitution. Some proponents of a balanced budget requirement oppose a constitutional amendment, fearing that it would prove to be too inflexible for dealing with future circumstances. Opponents of a constitutional amendment often focus on the difficulties of implementing or enforcing any amendment. Their concerns have been numerous and varied. How would such a requirement affect the balance of power between the President and Congress? Between the federal courts and Congress? Although most proponents would prefer to establish a balanced budget requirement as part of the Constitution, some advocates have suggested using the untried process provided under Article V of the Constitution for a constitutional convention as an alternative to a joint resolution passed by two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress. -
Sustainable Budgeting Brian K
Western Kentucky University TopSCHOLAR® Economics Faculty Publications Economics 7-2010 Sustainable Budgeting Brian K. Strow Western Kentucky University, [email protected] Claudia W. Strow Western Kentucky University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/econ_fac_pub Part of the Finance Commons, and the Public Economics Commons Recommended Repository Citation Strow, Brian K. and Strow, Claudia W., "Sustainable Budgeting" (2010). Economics Faculty Publications. Paper 7. http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/econ_fac_pub/7 This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by TopSCHOLAR®. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of TopSCHOLAR®. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Sustainable Budgeting by Brian K. Strow & Claudia W. Strow Associate Professors of Economics, Department of Economics, Western Kentucky University, 1906 College Heights Blvd., Bowling Green, KY 42101 USA E-mail address: [email protected] Phone: (270) 745-3627 Fax: (270) 745-3190 Abstract At the forefront of current discussion and social conscience is the importance of ecological sustainability. An also important but often overlooked issue is the importance of sustainable budgeting practices for our various levels of government. Governments often provide social services such as food, clothing, shelter, education, public safety, or health care. If the money to pay for the social services comes from additional government debt, social services to future citizens become imperiled. In this paper, the authors set forth a theoretical framework for sustainable government decision making with special emphasis on sustainable governmental budgeting. The authors outline the intricacies of sustainable budgeting, describe why sustainable budgeting is important, and illustrate which countries and states are doing the best and worst jobs of sustainable budgeting. -
The Balanced Budget Amendment and Economic Thought
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy THE BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT Edward Foster* The last decade has seen a continuing effort to amend the Con stitution to limit spending by the federal government, require an annually balanced federal budget, or both. The proposed amend ment would have a big impact on the economy, and many econo mists have spoken out on the subject, mostly in opposition, but some in support. Two related concerns lie behind the movement. First, many people believe that federal spending is excessive. It grew from 3% of total output in 1929 to 13% in 1947 (its low point between the high defense spending of the war years and the domestic spending of the post-war years). The post-war peak was 24.9% in 1982. In 1984, it stood at 24% of output. Opposition to large government stems from (nineteenth century) liberal political philosophy. The economists who support the amendment generally share that phi losophy. But part of their justification is more narrowly economic, based on concerns about economic efficiency. High taxes sap incen tives, distort economic choices, and waste resources on tax reduc tion schemes. On the spending side of the budget, the size of the income flows controlled by government encourages us all to com pete for our share, wasting resources in the process. The second concern underlying the amendment is deficit spending. The federal government ran surpluses in seven of the fourteen years after World War II, from 1947 to 1960, but it has done so only once since then, in 1969. -
On Constitutionalizing a Balanced Budget
On Constitutionalizing a Balanced Budget Joe Amick Terrence Chapman Zachary Elkins [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] May 21, 2019 Abstract Do constitutional rules that mandate a balanced budget promote fiscal discipline? Although such rules are at the heart of austerity debates across the world, we know surprisingly little about their consequences. We leverage original data on constitutional budget provisions and analyze their effect on governments' primary budget balances. We find that constitutional rules that require balanced budgets are robustly associated with fiscal discipline. The constitutional effect remains even after controlling for statutory balanced-budget rules. Furthermore, the effect strengthens as constitutions become more difficult to amend, and under conditions of borderline solvency { two implications consistent with a constitutional impact. The results will be surprising to those who appreciate both the strong pressures against fiscal discipline and the creativity of governments in devising strategies to evade spending limits. These findings are among the first cross-national, over-time study of the impact of constitutional budget commitments and, therefore, provide a reference point for policy debates surrounding financial crises in many national contexts. Keywords - public finances; constitutional amendments; balanced budget rules, primary balance Supplementary materials will be available in an online appendix. Replication files are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse (http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jop) 2 1 Introduction The struggle to control public spending is pervasive, and the essential problem is easy to grasp. One useful characterization sees the problem as a common pool resource challenge (Weingast et al. -
A Balanced Budget for a Stronger America House Budget Committee | March 2015
Table of Contents Introduction 3 The Challenges We Face 7 Securing Economic Opportunity 11 Strengthening Health and Retirement Security 16 Protecting the Nation 23 Building Stronger Communities 26 Holding Washington Accountable 30 Appendix I: Long-Term Budget Outlook 33 Appendix II: CBO’s Estimate of the Macroeconomic Effects of Deficit Reduction 34 Appendix III: Summary Tables 36 2 | Page A Balanced Budget for a Stronger America House Budget Committee | March 2015 Introduction At the core of America’s character lies a founding belief that we as a people ought to always strive to build a better, more innovative, open and free society. It’s an understanding and obligation passed down from generation to generation. When we look at America today, we see a nation that is not living up to its economic or leadership potential, and the reason why has nothing to do with the quality and character of the American people. Rather, Washington has been unable or unwilling to tackle big challenges with positive solutions. That has to change. The new normal of slow economic growth and low expectations is unacceptable. We know we can do better. This begins by putting forth a set of solutions that will restore accountability to government so that it serves the needs of its people in the most efficient and effective way possible. In so doing, we will help build an economy that works for all Americans. How do we achieve this? With fiscal and economic policies that shift the focus away from Washington and toward American families, businesses, innovators and local leaders who know the best way forward for their communities. -
Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Outcomes: Evidence from Historical Constitutions Zareh Asatryan, Cesar Castellón, and Thomas Stratmann Discus Si On Paper No
Dis cus si on Paper No. 16-034 Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Outcomes: Evidence from Historical Constitutions Zareh Asatryan, Cesar Castellón, and Thomas Stratmann Dis cus si on Paper No. 16-034 Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Outcomes: Evidence from Historical Constitutions Zareh Asatryan, Cesar Castellón, and Thomas Stratmann First Version: April 8, 2016 This Version: October 4, 2017 Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server: http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp16034.pdf Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar. Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Outcomes: Evidence from Historical Constitutions Zareh Asatryan∗y Cesar´ Castellon´ z Thomas Stratmannx ∗ZEW yUniversity of Mannheim zClemson University xGeorge Mason University First Version: April 8, 2016 This Version: October 4, 2017 Abstract This paper studies the reduced-form effects of constitutional-level balanced budget rules (BBRs) on fiscal outcomes. -
The Brazilian Economy from Cardoso to Lula: an Interim View
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics de Paiva Abreu, Marcelo; Werneck, Rogério L. F. Working Paper The Brazilian economy from Cardoso to Lula: An interim view Texto para discussão, No. 504 Provided in Cooperation with: Departamento de Economia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro Suggested Citation: de Paiva Abreu, Marcelo; Werneck, Rogério L. F. (2005) : The Brazilian economy from Cardoso to Lula: An interim view, Texto para discussão, No. 504, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia, Rio de Janeiro This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175989 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO No. -
Growth, Poverty Reduction, and Inequality
32691 At the Frontlines of Public Disclosure Authorized Development Reflections from the World Bank Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized EDITED BY INDERMIT S. GILL & TODD PUGATCH Public Disclosure Authorized THE WORLD BANK At the Frontlines of Development Reflections from the World Bank At the Frontlines of Development Reflections from the World Bank Edited by Indermit S. Gill and Todd Pugatch Washington, D.C. © 2005 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington,DC 20433 Telephone 202-473-1000 Internet www.worldbank.org E-mail [email protected] All rights reserved. 123408070605 The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Exec- utive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work.The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other informa- tion shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions: The material in this work is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be a violation of applicable law.The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission promptly. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, telephone 978-750-8400, fax 978-750-4470, www.copyright.com. -
Nominality of Money: Theory of Credit Money and Chartalism Atsushi Naito
Review of Keynesian Studies Vol.2 Atsushi Naito Nominality of Money: Theory of Credit Money and Chartalism Atsushi Naito Abstract This paper focuses on the unit of account function of money that is emphasized by Keynes in his book A Treatise on Money (1930) and recently in post-Keynesian endogenous money theory and modern Chartalism, or in other words Modern Monetary Theory. These theories consider the nominality of money as an important characteristic because the unit of account and the corresponding money as a substance could be anything, and this aspect highlights the nominal nature of money; however, although these theories are closely associated, they are different. The three objectives of this paper are to investigate the nominality of money common to both the theories, examine the relationship and differences between the two theories with a focus on Chartalism, and elucidate the significance and policy implications of Chartalism. Keywords: Chartalism; Credit Money; Nominality of Money; Keynes JEL Classification Number: B22; B52; E42; E52; E62 122 Review of Keynesian Studies Vol.2 Atsushi Naito I. Introduction Recent years have seen the development of Modern Monetary Theory or Chartalism and it now holds a certain prestige in the field. This theory primarily deals with state money or fiat money; however, in Post Keynesian economics, the endogenous money theory and theory of monetary circuit place the stress on bank money or credit money. Although Chartalism and the theory of credit money are clearly opposed to each other, there exists another axis of conflict in the field of monetary theory. According to the textbooks, this axis concerns the functions of money, such as means of exchange, means of account, and store of value. -
O Saldo Do Economista
01/10/2018 O saldo do economista Imprimir () 16/06/2017 - 05:00 O saldo do economista Por Daniel Salles Persio Arida entra na Taberna 474 sem o peso de um banco nas costas. Três dias antes daquela segunda-feira ensolarada de 29 de maio, o economista anunciara sua renúncia ao cargo de conselheiro do BTG Pactual e a venda, ao longo dos próximos meses, de todas as suas ações. Descontraído e sorridente, veste paletó preto com camisa lilás, calça jeans escura e sapato marrom. Nada no aspecto dele lembra o compenetrado executivo que assumiu o comando do banco em novembro de 2015, um dia após a prisão do fundador e maior acionista, o carioca André Esteves, acusado de planejar obstruir as investigações da Operação Lava-Jato. A detenção do ex-controlador, solto no mês seguinte, foi catastrófica para o BTG. As atividades ligadas ao mercado de capitais não foram tão afetadas, mas as operações de crédito, nas quais o banco apostava, foram drasticamente reduzidas. Sem uma equipe altamente qualificada, poucos bancos não quebrariam num cenário parecido - por lei, o governo não pode socorrê-los com o chamado "bail-out". "Minha vontade de sair vem de 2014", diz Arida logo no início deste "À Mesa com o Valor". "Você trabalha em banco para ganhar dinheiro, mas chega um momento na vida que diz: 'Prefiro me dedicar a outros projetos a ter mais dinheiro'". Arida ficou no que ele define como "vai, não vai" até 2015. "Com o que aconteceu, fui obrigado a dar meia-volta, volver, a assumir a posição de chairman e focar totalmente." Estancada a sangria, cedeu a presidência do conselho do BTG para Marcelo Kalim, em novembro de 2016.