March - May 2017

Return Trends Overview

Sindana (sindanik) Nargazlia village Nargizilia camp Qawsiyat Derek Baybokht Baweza Dahuk Nasir complex Qahira quarter Wana Qaymawa camp Zahra qarter Tel Kaif city Hassan Sham Abu Jabora'a Ninewa Northern Mosul East Hadher Khazer Sulay aniyah West Shirqat Al Zawiya Kirkuk Dream city camp Shirqat district Al-Riyadh neighborhood Al-Dour Al Qayyara Mazar'a Tuz Khormato Abbassiyah Telol Al Baj Al-Alam Camp Silo Al-Hajjaj Al-Hwesh Salah al-Din Jalawla Jilam Saadiya M a nsouri Diy aMl uqta adiya Yathrib a

Al-Saqlawiya Falluja Al-Habbania Anbar Amriyat Falluja Baghdad

Wassit Kerbala Babylon

Qadissiya Missan

Thi-Qar Returnees (Individuals)

None Basrah < 200,000 Muthanna 200,000 - 400,000 400,000 - 600,000 600,000 - 800,000

Situational analysis is provided by RWG members responding to returns in . This map highlights the areas covered during the reporting period.

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Situational Analysis: Focus on Mosul and Baiji Overall, spontaneous returns and/or returns arranged by the authorities, are taking place across the country. The main trend evidenced is that of premature returns (complete and accurate of information not made available to IDPs prior to making the decision to return). Anbar still has the highest numbers of returnees with 85% of total population having returned. The displacement from Mosul is continuing. Trends record an average of 25% IDPs having returned to Mosul since the beginning of the offensive. According to the Assessment Working Group (AWG) Multi-Custer Rapid Needs Assessment (RNA)– Mosul April 2017, the three main reasons for returning in the 36 assessed neighborhoods were reported to be the expensive cost of living in the area of displacement, an improved sense of security in the area of origin and the improved physical access to land and property in the area of origin. The main reintegration challenges reportedly faced by families returning to Mosul are loss of livelihoods, destruction of property and having no access to restitution and compensation mechanisms. Evidence suggests IDPs intend to return as soon as areas are accessible, to check on property / leave camps at the earliest opportunity. Secondary displacement patterns need to be better monitored. IDPs who originate from the right part of Baiji (areas which are geographically connect to the Al-Malha village) have been encouraged by authorities to return back to their homes. Families from the left part of the city are reportedly not allowed to return back. Services appear to be scarcely available (no water, electricity, fuel, markets). Partners nonetheless indicate availability of water, and electricity (poles, transformers and wires are being rehabilitated) but lack of PHCs call for an urgent need for mobile health clinics until permanent health facilities are rehabilitated. Tensions between various security forces are still running high, especially given recent ISIS attacks (end of April) with BBIEDs, which increased tensions and led to the arrest of local tribal fighters. To access areas of return opposite the Baiji refinery, NGOs need an official communication with the PMF management. Partners indicate trends in secondary displacement, with an approximate 200 families cleared for return, reportedly returning to check on their property, rehabilitate it if possible and then leave again, displacing elsewhere. Partners continue to report a need for stronger coordination processes to ensure all IDPs are allowed to return, given some areas of origin remain access restricted. The security condition in Shirqat is still volatile, as the east side remains under ISIS. Yet partners regularly report returns to West Shirqat. Efforts are made at the ICCG South Central level to assess the conduciveness of return and respond to these areas. In August 2016, the Salah Al Din (SAD) governorate had passed a decree staying that anyone proving complicit or affiliated to ISIS had no right to return to the governorate. As a result, potential discriminatory practices have been evidenced in subsequent vetting processes. There remains an issue of potential forcible returns of individuals to Al Shahama camp in SAD. The camp has been divided into two sections, one allegedly hosting “innocent” families and the other hosting “ISIS affiliated” individuals, raising significant protection concerns over camps being used as internment centers. A security committee was established in Shahama to re-vet these families with the aim to allow individual Freedom of Movement. Efforts continue at all levels, to move the situation in the right direction. Monitoring of vetting mechanisms and regular engagement with SAD authorities is recommended.

Recommended operational steps to ensure voluntary and sustainable return

Camps / Out of Camp Area of Return

 Ensure camp security forces and camp management respect  Protection monitoring/Rapid Protection Assessment. humanitarian standards.  Market assessments.  Through CwC activities and IDP call center (Iraq IIC): gauge  Social tension assessments / mapping. perception of affected populations on returns, safety  Pre-return contamination assessments of village. conditions, potential social tension and effectiveness of  Pre-return infrastructure and shelter assessments. humanitarian response. Measuring the impact of  Education access assessment. humanitarian response at an “affected population” level  Pre-positioning of assistance: shelter, food, WASH, NFI, promotes a more targeted and effective response. education, etc.  Roll out Intention surveys to determine voluntariness of  Cash for work assessments / livelihood opportunity return. assessments.  Pre-departure Mine Risk Education.  In areas where returns have already unfolded or about to  Community skills mapping. witness returnee influx, mixed population overviews should be systematically rolled out.

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Advocacy: focus on restitution and compensation As more areas of Iraq are accessible, the challenges related to safe, voluntary and dignified returns are becoming more prominent. Addressing these challenges is likely to be critical not only CURRENT LEGISLATION ON RESTITUTION AND for achieving durable solutions but also sustainable peace, COMPENSATION national reconciliation, justice, security, rule of law and ultimately development in conflict-affected areas of Iraq.

Land and Property restitution/compensation are crucial After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the transitional government aspects of these processes. Land and property violations issued compensation schemes for victims of terrorist attacks arising from the current crisis are significant, and very and individual grievances pre-2003. The parliament then varied. passed law #20 in 2009 categorizing who could benefit from The current legal framework and mechanisms at the this law but it did not include the properties, lands, and savings. disposal of the Iraqi state are not adequate and sufficient to This law was activated in late 2010 and allowed for significant address the volume and complexity of the arising land and number of Iraqi to be compensated by the government. property challenges. For instance in early 2017, Salah Al Thereafter, the government included buildings, houses, and Din, authorities notified families whose properties had been other forms of properties in the compensation process (Recent damaged due to the 2014 conflict, to submit requests for amendment, Law #57 clearly includes properties as a legitimate compensation to a specialized committee, currently sitting category of the compensation system. The amendment is called with the governor office. It is currently in registration “For better action to our martyrs”.) process, while the actual compensation will depend on Prior to ISIS’s offensive in 2014, the compensation committee availability of funds and feedback from the central used to consist of eight members. It now consists of only five authorities in Baghdad. members: (1) Judge (Class #1) / chair; (2) Representative from Thousands of compensation claims were rapidly lodged, MoD; (3) Representative from MoI; (4) Representative from the overwhelming local authorities’ capacities to absorb the Directorate of Property Registration; (5) Representative from sheer number of claims. The whole submission process can Directorate of Health. take up to three months, and can cost an average of 100,000 The committee normally reports to the national committee, IQD. which sits under Minister’s Council’s secretariat the secretariat of the ministers’ council.

Recommendations At the National level  Provide expert advice, technical support and capacity building to the Iraq Property Claims Commission, responsible for restitution/compensation of pre-2003 claims. Several options can be envisaged: o Revise and unify the current legislation since at the moment, two separate laws governing restitution and compensation exist, both of these with temporal, geographical and topical limitations; o Alternatively, support the government in designing a new legislation governing the issues of compensation/restitution; o Capacitate the existing or new national, regional and governorate level institutions which will be responsible for administering the claims and enforcing the decisions.

At the localized level:  Follow up with authorities in charge of compensating families whose properties have been damaged or destroyed.  Provide Legal Assistance and Information Counseling to IDPs/Returnees who need to submit compensation requests. o Support Returnees in lodging hand written claims at the nearest police station; o Map current functioning police stations in targeted Areas of Returns; o Provide technical support to police officers in charge of lodging the request, approve it, and refer it to the court(s); o Protection officer and legal clinics to support returnees in providing all the relevant documentation needed (ID, nationality certificate, PDS, residency card, property certification,etc) and pictures of the damaged property to be compensated in court;

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o Provide information to returnee as to the state of judicial system (are courts active? are judicial experts present in the area?) in area of return; o Provide legal assistance to the returnee when filling the relevant forms at the mayor’s office; o Advocate for a transparent communication between the mayor’s office and the various national security and intelligence offices who are responsible for checking the plaintiff’s claim against the database containing the names of ISIL affiliates; o Provide information counseling on how to collect the serial number, which is communicated to the Mayor after a successful vetting phase; o Provide technical support to the mayor’s office who is responsible for circulating every serial number and requester’s supporting document to the compensation committee.

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