Displacement and Iraq's Political Marketplace: Addressing Political Barriers to IDP Return

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Displacement and Iraq's Political Marketplace: Addressing Political Barriers to IDP Return IRIS REPORT Displacement and Iraq's Political Marketplace: Addressing Political Barriers to IDP Return Mac Skelton February 2021 Zmkan Ali Saleem ABOUT IRIS The Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) is an Iraq-based research center committed to producing independent and empirically rigorous political analysis of Iraq and the broader Middle East region. Housed at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS), the Institute partners with academic institutions and funding agencies from across the world that share IRIS' mission of grounding the policy conversation on Iraq in rigorous research and local expertise. IRIS convenes events throughout the year, including the annual Sulaimani Forum, in order to disseminate research findings and to promote dialogue among a broad range of stakeholders on the most complex policy challenges facing Iraq and the region. Finally, IRIS builds the skills and capacity of young researchers, policymakers, and leaders towards the aim of leveraging policy research into political and social change. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dr. Mac Skelton is Executive Director of the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS), and a Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economics (LSE) Middle East Centre. He tweets @Mac_Skelton Dr. Zmkan Ali Saleem is Program Director for Research at the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS). He teaches in the College of Political Science at the University of Sulaimani. The views expressed in the article are those of the authors alone, and do not reflect the views of the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS). TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 6 METHODOLOGY 7 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 7 ANBAR PROVINCE 9 UNDERSTANDING ANBAR'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 10 DISPLACEMENT TRENDS SHAPED BY THE POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 14 POLITICAL MARKETPLACE APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING DISPLACEMENT IN ANBAR 18 DIYALA PROVINCE 19 UNDERSTANDING DIYALA'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 20 DISPLACEMENT TRENDS SHAPED BY THE POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 24 POLITICAL MARKETPLACE APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING DISPLACEMENT IN DIYALA 27 KIRKUK PROVINCE 28 UNDERSTANDING KIRKUK'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 29 DISPLACEMENT TRENDS SHAPED BY THE POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 32 POLITICAL MARKETPLACE APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING DISPLACEMENT IN KIRKUK 35 NINEVEH PROVINCE 37 UNDERSTANDING NINEVEH'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 38 DISPLACEMENT TRENDS SHAPED BY POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 40 POLITICAL MARKETPLACE APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING DISPLACEMENT IN NINEVEH 44 SALAH AL-DIN PROVINCE 45 UNDERSTANDING SALAH AL-DIN'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 46 DISPLACEMENT TRENDS SHAPED BY THE POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 49 POLITICAL MARKETPLACE APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING DISPLACEMENT IN SALAH AL-DIN 53 CONCLUSIONS 54 PROVINCE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 54 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 56 IDP camp in Khanaqin. IDP INTRODUCTION At the peak of the fighting between Iraqi forces and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2017, at least 5.8 million people were forced to flee their homes.1 As fighting subsided, some 4.78 million inter- nally displaced persons (IDPs) returned. However, the pace of return has now slowed, leaving an estimated 1.28 million IDPs at risk of protracted displacement: as of October 31, 2020, there are approxi- mately 253,000 IDPs located in camps and another 924,000 IDPs in private or informal housing arrangements.2 Iraq's IDP population is comprised of diverse groups with equally diverse intentions: the majority wish to return if the conditions are conducive; others prefer to integrate where they are; and still others prefer to resettle in a third location within Iraq.3 1 “Iraq Displacement Crisis: 2014-2017,” International Organization for Migration (IOM), October 2018. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/ reliefweb.int/files/resources/IOM-Iraq_Displacement_Crisis_2014-2017.pdf. 2 “Iraq Master List Report 118: September-October 2020,” IOM. Available at: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/images/MasterList/202011233237773_DTM_118_ Report_September_October_2020.pdf. 3 See IOM's “Integrated Location Assessment” tool, which shows that the short-term intention of 80% of IDPs is to stay in their current location, while the long-term intention of 60% of IDPs is to return to their place of origin. Available at: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/ILA5. 4 IRIS: INSTITUTE OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES DISPLACEMENT AND IRAQ'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE: ADDRESSING POLITICAL BARRIERS TO IDP RETURN Currently available research on the return of IDPs to Missing from the existing body of research, however, is their areas of origin in Iraq typically identifies mate- the larger political context that creates or drives these rial and social factors as key barriers that prevent obstacles: namely, how specific political actors or polit- or hinder IDP return. For instance, in the annual ical strategies influence–or even determine–which “Integrated Location Assessment” by the International obstacles to IDP return exist, how often these barriers Organization for Migration (IOM) which surveys IDPs arise, and how difficult they are to overcome. This and returnees on their perceptions regarding return, study addresses this gap in knowledge by examining IDPs cited lack of job opportunities (73%), lack of access to how political dynamics in various provinces solidify or services (68%), and damage and destruction to housing mitigate obstacles to IDP return. (62%) as the main obstacles to return.4 Other obstacles to return include collective blame, tribal disputes, and concerns about safety and security.5 Map 1: Provinces included in the study: Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, Salah al-Din. Key areas of focus: Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh and Salah al-Din 4 “IOM Integrated Assessment Part 4,” IOM, March 2020. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iom-iraq-integrated-location-assessment-part-4-june-2019. 5 “The Long Road Home: Achieving Durable Solutions to Displacement in Iraq: Lessons from Returns in Anbar,” Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council, and International Rescue Committee. February, 2018. Available at: www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/the-long-road-home/the-long-road-home.pdf. 5 IRIS: INSTITUTE OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES DISPLACEMENT AND IRAQ'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE: ADDRESSING POLITICAL BARRIERS TO IDP RETURN In order to understand how political factors drive obsta- RESEARCH QUESTIONS cles to IDP return, this study contextualizes protracted This study pursues the following research questions: displacement within the provincial “political market- place,” a term referring to the arena of competition Analyze the over power among political and security actors, which Political Marketplace is mediated through violence, transactional exchanges, 1 6 Who are the key power-wielding actors and entities at and state capture. This study examines the political 7 the province level in the targeted areas? What are the marketplace in five Iraqi provinces –Anbar, Diyala, primary political and economic objectives of these actors? Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah al-Din–each of which was occupied by ISIS during the recent crisis. This research Analyze the Impact of the Political reveals how a variety of political actors leverage Marketplace on Displacement displacement and IDP return as a form of currency. 2 Ultimately, the study demonstrates how competition How does the political marketplace affect specific among political actors, and strategies that emerge groups of IDPs? What negative threat or positive within the political marketplace, interfere with the currency does the return, or continued displacement, options and autonomy that IDPs have to resolve their of certain groups of IDPs have for distinct political and own displacement. In sum, this method of analysis security actors? What interests and levers of power are reframes the issue of IDP return from merely a tech- shaping events on the ground? nical problem to one that is fundamentally political.8 Assess Political Marketplace At the outset, it is also worth distinguishing “political Solutions to Displacement marketplace analysis” (PMA) from “political economy 3 Through what policy interventions can the International analysis” (PEA). Although the differences are subtle and Organization for Migration (IOM), other international there is much overlap,9 PEA typically seeks to estab- organizations, and the Government of Iraq (GoI) incen- lish the “rules of the game” that drive the positions tivize political and security actors to support IDPs to of different political actors. In contrast, PMA applies resolve their displacement (whether through return, when the interests held by political actors are fluid, integration, or relocation), and to create the conditions and the rules of the game–indeed, the players and necessary for sustainable return? What are the condi- actors themselves–are in constant flux, such as in tions that incentivize distinct political and security post-war contexts. To account for this fluidity, PMA actors to facilitate the conditions necessary for sustain- always views the political field through a historical able return, or alternatively to obstruct, or undermine it? lens, in order to capture changes over time. This study focuses on 2003-2020, in order to track the shifts in alliances and interests since the start of the US-led military campaign, and to reflect on the ever-shifting set of power dynamics that humanitarian actors may face on the ground. 6 Alex
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